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
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
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SOVIET COMMUNISM:
A NEW CIVILISATION

POLITICAL DIVISIONS



of the U.S.S.R.



SOVIET COMMUNISM: A
NEW CIVILISATION. BY
SIDNEY AND BEATRICE
WEBB

THIRD EDITION,
IN ONE VOLUME

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. LTD.
61 PATERNOSTER ROW

17 CHITTARANJAN AVENUE, CALCUTTA
43 ALBERT DRIVE, LONDON, S.W.19
NICOL ROAD, BOMBAY
36A MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
55 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
215 VICTORIA STREET, TORONTO


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

First published, *November 1935*

Second Edition, *October 1937*

Reissue with New Introduction at
a Cheaper Price, *October 1941*

Third Edition in One Volume *1944*



CODE NUMBER : 97297-1

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, EDINBURGH

PREFACE

THIS book calls, perhaps, for some explanation of its scope and plan, if not also of its length. It is not easy to appreciate either the magnitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (nearly one-sixth of the entire land-surface of the globe, with a population rapidly approaching 200 millions); or the variety, ranging from barbarism to a high degree of culture, of its hundred or more different races and languages. Its organisational structure is surely the most complicated known to political science. We ask the reader to gaze at the map (frontispiece), and at the two diagrams (pp. 350 and 353 of the Appendices of Part I.) giving precisely the main administrative areas and the principal organs of government of the USSR, which Mr. J. F. Horrabin has specially drawn, upon Mr. S. P. Turin's information, and generously contributed to this work. These diagrams, notwithstanding their wealth of symbols, can do no more than start the requisite impression of complication of federation within federation, and of tier upon tier of local governing bodies and central administrative organs. But in addition to all that is indicated by the map and those diagrams of the organisation of the citizens, the reader has to visualise the wholly different and not less complicated organisation of these same men and women in wealth production, whether as independent producers, or as wage or salary earners in their trade unions, or as groups of co-partners in agriculture, in hunting and fishing, or in manufacture. There is yet a third universal organisation of these 40 million families in their capacity of consumers, in which they become members of a hierarchy of some 45,000 local societies for the distribution among themselves of the foodstuffs and other commodities of their domestic housekeeping. And we have still to name a fourth pyramidal and equally ubiquitous organisation, the most unique and original, and some would say the most significant of all, made up of the extensive membership of what we have termed the Vocation of Leadership.

Even this is not the whole story. The degree of complication of the administrative, industrial and political structure of the USSR does but correspond with the magnitude and variety of the functions for which the structure is elaborated: functions which transcend in scope and range those consciously and deliberately undertaken by any other community. And, in each department, structure and function are intertwined with each other and with a wealth of voluntary associations and spontaneous individual activities to constitute a highly integrated society which definitely forms a synthesis. In all social history—that "endless adventure of governing men"—there has been no such a colossal and so exciting an experiment. It takes us over 760 pages, constituting the six chapters and appendices of Part I. and the first four chapters of Part II., to set forth all the welter of structure and function making up

what is, merely in magnitude, the biggest integrated social organisation in the world.

This widely comprehensive and, as it seems to-day, solidly united mass organisation, is brand new, not yet twenty years old, and is still rapidly developing. We suggest that, if it endures, its eventual impact on the rest of the world must be considerable. Its aims are grandiose and far-reaching. With what purpose are its leaders and directors animated? What is the philosophy on which their lives are based? Upon what motives and instruments do they rely for the attainment of their ends? What original conceptions of economics and political science, and what new inventions in systems of wealth production and of social relations, are being worked out in the Soviet Union, where, by the way, they claim, by their novel adjustment of a planned supply to a universally effective demand, to have definitely got rid of involuntary unemployment? Can it be true that there is evolving, out of the incessant public discussions of the millions of adolescents between the Baltic and the Pacific, a new ethical system, with a code of conduct emerging from their actual experience of a transformed social life? These issues are discussed in Chapters XI. and XII. Finally, we add a short epilogue raising the question whether what the world is witnessing to-day in the USSR does not amount to a new civilisation, differing from any that has hitherto existed; and whether it is likely to spread beyond its present borders.

But why undertake so great a task as a comprehensive description of the entire social order of the USSR? The answer is that it has been borne in on us by experience that the first step to any competent understanding of what is happening in the USSR is that the picture should be viewed as a whole. At the outset it may seem easier for each student to confine his investigation into his own particular speciality, and to write a detailed monograph upon what the USSR has done in that limited field. But unless and until the organisation of the Soviet Union has been studied as a whole, and some intelligent comprehension has been gained of its complicated structure and manifold activities; of its aim and purpose; of the direction in which it is travelling; of its instruments and its methods; and of its philosophy—no satisfying judgment can be passed upon any part of its work. No survey either of its achievements or of its shortcomings in wealth production or in artistic development, in education or in medicine, in changing the standard of living or revising the bounds of freedom, can be competently made without a grasp of the principles of multiformity and universalism that run through the warp and weft of every part of its texture. It is not the failure or the fulfilment of any one function that is significant, but the life of the whole; and, be it added, not so much what the ever-moving mass is to-day, as whence it has come and whither it is tending. It is for this reason that we have, greatly daring, attempted to map the whole of what we may picture as the Eurasian Plain, in the belief that, however imperfect our survey, it will help other travellers to find their way in more detailed

studies of their own specialities, by which our necessarily superficial sketches may be corrected, supplemented or superseded.

Contrary to common expectation, we have found the material for our work abundant and accessible. Of the vast outpouring of books in many languages since 1917, giving tourists' impressions of the land of the soviets, together with the better authenticated narratives of the resident newspaper correspondents, we need not speak. Among the more scientific studies of which we have been able to make substantial use in enlargement and correction of our own researches, we have to acknowledge that by far the greatest proportion stand to the credit of the United States—an outcome, we think, not only of the wider interest taken by that country than by Great Britain in a new social order, which is now attracting thousands of immigrants from the United States, but also of the large number of scholarships and fellowships enabling scientific researchers to spend a year or more in the USSR for the production of valuable monographs. There are far too few such opportunities yet provided for the British student.

In addition to the stream of books affording descriptions by eye-witnesses of what they have seen in the USSR, there is available to the serious student an unusual output of printed documents by the Soviet Government through many of its departments; by the ancient Academy of Sciences, and the thousand and one scientific research institutes, and the exploring expeditions that they send out; by the trade unions; by the Industrial Cooperative Societies; by the Consumers' Cooperative Movement; and, last but not least, by the Communist Party. These masses of reports and statistics are not all in Russian, nor yet in the languages of the various national minorities. Probably no other government in the world issues so large a mass of documents in languages other than its own (largely in English, French or German), whether as the proceedings of conferences or congresses, or the decrees and codes, or the speeches of its leading statesmen, or the reports of the discoveries of the scientific exploring parties, or the instructions to subordinate departments. In addition to these documents there is the large and always increasing soviet press, from such leading journals as *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, and their scores of local imitators, down to the innumerable news-sheets and wall newspapers of the factories and mines, of the collective farms, and of the state, municipal and cooperative plants and offices; whilst, for those who are interested in the personal life of the soviet citizen there are novels and plays, comic periodicals and all varieties of exhibition of the self-criticism in which the Russians delight. Nor are foreigners neglected. The Moscow press turns out daily and weekly organs, widely distributed throughout the USSR, in English, German and French. These journals, like all newspapers in the USSR, are almost entirely filled with information about the doings of the Sovnarkom, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or with detailed descriptions of the workings of mines, oilfields, factories and state or collective farms, statistics of the extent of

fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, and other instructional material. Meanwhile, the powerful wireless stations in Moscow broadcast the same kind of thing nightly to the world in no fewer than fourteen European languages, together with Esperanto.

Although we have aimed at precision in our references, we do not indulge in a comprehensive bibliography. We have thought it more likely to be helpful to students wishing to explore further any of the topics with which we deal to give in each chapter a list of the principal sources of information accessible to British or American students (usually omitting therefore books existing only in Russian or Ukrainian, even where we have had relevant extracts from them translated for our own use).

Throughout our work we have had the valuable assistance of Mr. S. P. Turin, lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies and the London School of Economics and Political Science in the University of London, who has not only kept us continuously up to date about what is being published in the USSR, but has also freely placed at our disposal much additional information derived from his long study of his native land both prior and subsequent to the Revolution. His recent book *From Peter the Great to Lenin* supplies a valuable historical introduction to the present labour movement. Mr. Turin has enabled us to avoid many mistakes without necessarily sharing either our viewpoint or our opinions; and he is in no way responsible for our generalisations or our judgments.

We must mention also the assistance we have derived from Dr. Julius F. Hecker, alike through his books, *Religion and Communism*, *Moscow Dialogues*, *Russian Sociology* and others, and through our illuminating discussions with him in Moscow and London. Indeed, we must gratefully acknowledge the continuous help we have received during the past four years from friends too numerous to mention, scientific and literary, Russian and non-Russian, residents in the USSR and also exiles of more than one generation, and of all shades of opinion. At all times, and notably during our visits to the USSR, the soviet authorities have willingly answered our innumerable questions, and given us every facility for going anywhere that we wanted to go; for seeing works, factories and farms, schools and hospitals, and other institutions, as well as for admission to meetings that we wished to attend. We have gathered much, not only from officials but also from trade unionists, teachers, engineers, doctors, peasants and fishermen, not omitting to take due note of what we have been told by discontented intelligentsia and disgruntled revolutionaries both inside the USSR and elsewhere.

What we have sought to present is an objective view of the whole social order of the USSR as it exists to-day, with no more past history than is necessary for explanation, and with an intelligent impression of the direction in which it is travelling. We have not hesitated to criticise anything that seemed to us to call for criticism. We do not pretend to be

without bias (who is ?), but we have tried to be aware of our bias, and have striven for objectivity.

The question will arise in some quarters : Why did two aged mortals, both nearing their ninth decade, undertake a work of such magnitude ? We fear our presumption must be ascribed to the recklessness of old age. In our retirement, with daily bread secured, we had nothing to lose by the venture—not even our reputation, which will naturally stand or fall upon our entire output of the past half-century, to the load of which one more book makes no appreciable difference. On the other hand, we had a world to gain—a new subject to investigate ; a fresh circle of stimulating acquaintances with whom to discuss entirely new topics, and above all a daily joint occupation, in intimate companionship, to interest, amuse and even excite us in the last stage of life's journey. This world we have gained and enjoyed. To use a theological term, this book is therefore to be received as a work of supererogation, which, as we understand it, means something not required, but spontaneously offered, which may be ignored or criticised, but which does not warrant blame, even if it be deemed (to use the words of Steele) “ an act of so great supererogation as singing without a voice ” ! Or, to take a humbler analogy, it may be taken as the etcetera, often thrown in as a gift by the salesman with a package of goods already paid for. As such we may present it unabashed to our British and American readers.

The reader will find at the end of Part I. (pp. 410-431) an exceptionally accurate translation of the complete text of the New Constitution of 1936, by Mrs. Anna Louise Strong, to whom we are indebted for permission to reprint it. We give also a summary in the form of a new Declaration of the Rights of Man. At the end of Part II., after the Epilogue, we add a lengthy Postscript (pp. 918-973), dealing with the principal changes in the Soviet Union since 1934-1935.

SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB

October 1937.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	PAGE VII
INTRODUCTION	xix

PART I. THE CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER I

THE CONSTITUTION AS A WHOLE	1
---------------------------------------	---

Preliminary survey—Declaration of Rights of the Labouring and Exploited Peoples—Proclamation of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER II

MAN AS A CITIZEN	7
----------------------------	---

The Origin of the Soviet System—The Base of the Pyramid—The Village Meeting—The Village Executive—The City Soviet—The Method of Election—The Electors' Instructions—A Moscow Election—The Organisation of the City Soviet—The Rayons in the Cities—Indirect Election—The Rayon—The Oblast—The Seven Federated Republics—The RSFSR—The Ukraine—The White Russian and Transcaucasian Republics—The Formation of the Soviet Union—The All-Union Congress—The Central Executive Committee (TSIK)—The Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom)—The Council of Labour and Defence—The Commissariats—The Commissariats dealing with Production and Trade—The People's Commissar of Finance—Banking and Saving—Insurance—The Commissariat of Defence—The Army as a School—The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs—The Commissariat of Internal Affairs—The OGPU—The Supreme Court—The Procurator—The College of Advocates—The Problem of National Minorities—Cultural Autonomy—The Tartar Republic—The Jews in the USSR—A New Basis for Statehood.

CHAPTER III

MAN AS A PRODUCER	124
-----------------------------	-----

Section I. Soviet Trade Unionism—History—Trade Union Structure in the USSR—Trade Union Elections—The Trade Union Factory Committee—Collective Bargaining in the USSR—The All-Union Congress of each Trade Union—The All-Union Congress of Trade Unions—Labor Structure in USSR Trade Unionism—The Trade Union Officials—The Transference of the Commissariat of Labour to the Trade Unions—The Shock Brigades and Cost Accounting Committees—Professional Associations—The Profintern—How does Soviet Trade Unionism compare with British Trade Unionism?

Section II. The Associations of Owner-Producers.

(a) The Self-governing Workshop—The Members' Meeting—The Regional Council—The All-Union Council of Industrial Cooperatives.

(b) The Collective Farm—The Unproductive Peasant—The Crisis in Foodstuffs—The Prolonged Discussion as to Policy—The Policy of Universal Collectivisation—The Struggle for Efficiency in the kolkhosi—State Machinery for Control: (1) The New People's Commissar; (2) The New Agricultural Departments; (3) Supervision by the Village Soviets—The Machine and Tractor Stations—The Work of the Policy Sections—Was there a Famine in the USSR in 1931-1932?—Life on a Collective Farm—Management—Democracy in Agriculture—The Commune—The Results in 1933-1935.

(c) Miscellaneous Associations of Owner-Producers—The Fishermen's Kolkhosi—Integral Cooperatives—War Invalids, etc.

(d) Associations of Artistic and Intellectual Producers.
The World of Labour in the USSR.

CHAPTER IV

MAN AS A CONSUMER 235

The Hierarchy of Consumers' Cooperation—The Members' Meeting—The Committee of Management—The Rayon Union with the Rayon Council (Raisoyus)—The Oblast or Republic Union with its Council (Oblsoyus)—The All-Union Congress of Consumers' Cooperatives, with its Central Board for the USSR and the RSFSR (Centrosoyus)—The Mechanised Bakeries—Cooperative Education—The Rivals of the Consumers' Cooperative in Retail Distribution—Recent Encroachments on the Sphere of the Consumers' Cooperative Movement—Network of Contracts for Supplies.

CHAPTER V

THE VOCATION OF LEADERSHIP 262

How the Communist Party arose—The Party Membership—The Rules of the Order—The Meaning of Leadership—The Party Group (late fraction)—The Primary Party Organ (late cell or nucleus)—The District (Rayon) Conference—The Republic Congress—The USSR and RSFSR Party Congress—The Central Committee—The Motives for Party Membership—The Purging of the Party—The Internal Reorganisation of 1934—The Comsomols—The Pioneers and the Octobrists—The Comintern—The Nature of the Communist Party—Why, in Soviet Communism, National Leadership requires an Elaborate Organisation.

CHAPTER VI

DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY? 324

The Meaning of Dictatorship—Is the Party a Dictator?—Is Stalin a Dictator?—The Dictatorship of the Proletariat—Is the USSR an Autocracy?—In whose Interest does the Government act?—A New Social Form?

APPENDICES TO PART I

	PAGE
I. Diagram of the Political Structure of the USSR. Table I.—Political Structure	351
II. Diagram of the Administrative Structure of the USSR. Table II.—Administrative Structure	354
III. Appendix to Chapter I.—The Declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 13, 1923	355
IV. Appendix to Chapter II.—The Powers and Authorised Functions of the Village Soviet	358
V. Appendix to Chapter II.—The Sections and Commissions of the City Soviets	363
VI. Appendix to Chapter II.—Note relating to the Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin, or RKI).	365
VII. Appendix to Chapter II.—The Internal Organisation of the Narkomat of Sovkhosi	369
VIII. Appendix to Chapter II.—The Internal Organisation of the Narkomat of Agriculture	374
IX. Appendix to Chapter IV.—List of the 154 Trade Unions among which the Membership of the 47 Trade Unions of 1931 was distributed in 1934	380
X. The Duties and Functions of the Factory Committees	384
XI. Appendix to Chapter III.—The Collective Agreement (Kol-dogovor) of the Frising-Lathe Works at Gorki for the year 1933-1934	391
XII. Appendix to Chapters II. and VI.—The New Constitution and Summary of the Rights of Man	410

PART II. SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOVIET COMMUNISM

CHAPTER VII

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE LANDLORD AND THE CAPITALIST	438
--	-----

The Liquidation of the Agrarian Landlords by the Peasantry—The Expropriation of the Capitalist—The Civil War and Foreign Invasion—War Communism—The Famine of 1921—The New Economic Policy—The Persecution of the Intelligentsia—The Trial of the Industrial Party—The Trial of the Menshevik Professors—Trial of the Metro-Vickers Engineers—Murder of Kirov—The Liquidation of the Kulaks—The Activities of the Tcheka and the Ogpu—The Organisation of the Ogpu—The Constructive Work of the Ogpu—The Procurator of the USSR—Three Revolutions in One—Comparison with the English Revolution.

CHAPTER VIII

PLANNED PRODUCTION FOR COMMUNITY CONSUMPTION	495
--	-----

The Episode of Workers' Control—The Supreme Economic Council—The Emergence of the General Plan—Kraassin's Exposition of Planning in 1920—Gosplan as Planning Authority—How the Plan is Made—The Provisional Plan—The General Object of Soviet Planning—The Division of the Nation's Income between Current Consumption and Capital Invest-

ment—National Defence—The Development of Education—Public Health and Housing—The Final Plan—The Efficiency of a Planned Economy—The World's Argument about the Plan—The Plan obviates both Booms and Slumps—The Abolition of Involuntary Unemployment—The Abstract Economist's Criticism of a Planned Economy—A Communist Reply to the Economist's Criticism—How the General Plan might be Upset—"But Planning means Slavery"—Consumers' Control instead of Producers' Control—Citizens' Control where that of the Consumer Fails—The Supposed "Coercion of the Consumer"—Greater Freedom of Choice for the masses.

CHAPTER IX

IN PLACE OF PROFIT	569
------------------------------	-----

The Old Incentives Remodelled—Not Equality of Wages—How Piece-work Rates are Fixed—The Trading of Wages—Payment According to Social Value—The Machinery of Arbitration—Self-Employment as an Alternative to the Wage System—Individual Self-Employment—Self-Employment in Manufacturing Artels (Incops)—Self-Employment in Collective Farms (Kolkhosi)—The Complicated Network of Agreements for Supplies—The Bazaar—Socialist Emulation—Patronage—The Udarniki (Shock Brigaders)—Cost Accounting Brigades—Subbotniki, or Voluntary Labourers—Public Honour and Shame—The Soviet Orders of Merit—Public Dishonour—Encouragement of Inventions by the Workers—Multiformity in Employment—The Practice of Self-Criticism—Shortcomings and Achievements—The Wasteful Costs of Inexperience—The Inefficiency caused by Overlapping of Control—Where are the Captains of Industry?—The Substitute for Profit-making—An Analysis of the Producers.

CHAPTER X

THE REMAKING OF MAN	653
-------------------------------	-----

(a) Health—The Woman—Motherhood—Infancy—Birth Control—The Control of Abortion—Creating Health—How the Health Service is Administered—The Staffing of the Service—Hospitals—Health Centres in Factories—Rural Consultation Points—The Flying Squad—The Campaign against Tuberculosis—The Night Sanatorium—Provision for Street Casualties—Medical Research—A City of the Science and Art of Health.

(b) Economic Security—How the System of Economic Security Developed—Death Benefit—Sickness Benefit—Invalidity and Old-Age Benefit—Maternity Benefit—Unemployment Benefit—Other Benefits—Rest Houses and Sanatoria—Personal Credit—Imperfections of the System.

(c) Education—Universalism—Polytechnikisation—The Organisation of Leisure—Physical Culture—Political Culture—Artistic Culture—Museums and Picture Galleries—Theatre and Ballet—Music—Holidays and Amusements—The Meaning of Culture—The Civilisation of a Whole Nation—Educational Shortcomings.

(d) Changing the Environment—The Service of Housing—Systematic Town Planning—Municipal Services.

CHAPTER XI

SCIENCE THE SALVATION OF MANKIND	PAGE 761
--	-------------

The Struggle with Nature—What Marxism Means—The Organisation of Scientific Research—How Research is Planned and Executed—The Academy of Sciences—The Communist Academy—Popular Participation—The Work of the Several Research Institutes—Mathematics and Physics—The Materials and Processes of Wealth Production—Agriculture—Genetics—The Fight for Health—The Central Institute of Röntgenology—The Leningrad Institute of the Brain—The Leningrad Institute of Experimental Medicine—The Moscow Institute of Endocrinology—The Campaign against Rheumatism—The Central Aero Hydro Dynamic Institute—The Exploring Expeditions—The Unevenness in the Development of Science—The Need for Study of Social Institutions—The Science of Human Behaviour—The Disease of Orthodoxy—"Anti-Godism"—The Campaign against Religion.

CHAPTER XII

THE GOOD LIFE	818
-------------------------	-----

The Pursuit of Plenty—For the Whole Population—With Advanced Industrialism—In Social Equality—The "Classless Society"—A Compulsory Environment—Plan or No Plan—Where is Freedom?—Unity in Action with Adventure in Thought—The Solution of the Problem—The Evolution of Communist Ethics—No Sense of Original Sin—No Absolute Morals—Ethics emerging from Life—The Constant Service of the Community—The Payment of Debt—The Maximising of Health—Sexual Intercourse—Prostitution—What is "Not Done"—Personal Acquisitiveness—The Duty of the Party Member—To each according to his Needs—Ethical Progress in the USSR—The Withering of the State—Contradictory Trends in Foreign Affairs—The Policy and Activities of the Third International—Soviet China—The Comintern Congress of 1928—The Change of the Soviet Government from War to Peace—Joining in International Conferences and the League of Nations—Contrast between Comintern and Sovnarkom—The Comintern Congress of 1935—Prospects of greater Consistency—The Obstacle to Communist Propaganda of "Government from Moscow".

EPILOGUE

A NEW CIVILISATION?	898
-------------------------------	-----

What constitutes a Distinct Civilisation?—Other Civilisations—The Eight Principal Novelties in Soviet Civilisation—The Abolition of Profit-making—The Planning of Production for Community Consumption—Social Equality and Universalism—A Novel Representative System—The Vocation of Leadership—The Cult of Science—"Anti-Godism"—A New Conscience for the Good Life—These make a Synthetic Unity in contrast with Disintegrating Capitalism—Will it Endure?—Will it Spread?

	PAGE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE SECOND EDITION	918
<p>The New Constitution—Its Significance—The Moscow Trials—The Stakhanov Movement—The Success of Collective Agriculture—The Retailing of Commodities—Soviet Currency—The Control of Abortion— Some Criticisms—Inequality of Incomes—Bureaucracy—Repression of Independent Thinking—A New Civilisation.</p>	
INDEX OF PERSONS (with brief biographical details)	971
INDEX OF PLACES	989
INDEX OF SUBJECTS	992

INTRODUCTION

SINCE the signing of the German-Soviet Pact in 1939 I have been frequently asked by bewildered friends : Is there any distinction between the status and activities of Stalin on the one hand and Hitler and Mussolini on the other : are these three men all alike dictators ? And secondly, have these three sovereign states similar constitutions by law established : or is the Soviet Union, unlike Germany and Italy, a political democracy similar in essence, if not in detail, to the political democracies of the U.S.A. and Great Britain ? And assuming that the Soviet Union is a political democracy, has democratic control of the instruments of production, distribution and exchange been added so that the government should be, not merely a government of the people by the people, but also a government for the good of the people ? Finally, is it right to suggest that Soviet Communism is a new civilisation which will, in spite of the crudities and cruelties inherent in violent revolution and fear of foreign aggression, result in maximising the wealth of the nation and distributing it among all the inhabitants on the principle of from each man according to his faculty and to each man according to his need ?

Is Stalin a Dictator ?

To answer the first question—Is Stalin a dictator ?—we must agree on what meaning is to be attached to the term *dictator* : otherwise argument is waste of time. Assuming that we accept the primary meaning of the term *dictator*, as it is defined in the *New English Dictionary*—"a ruler or governor whose word is law ; an absolute ruler of the state—and who authoritatively prescribes a course of action or dictates what is to be done" (the example given being the Dictators of ancient Rome)—Stalin is not a dictator. So far as Stalin is related to the constitution of the USSR, as amended in 1936, he is the duly elected representative of one of the Moscow constituencies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. By this assembly he has been selected as one of the thirty members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, accountable to the representative assembly for all its activities. It is this Presidium which selects the Council of Commissars (Sovnarkom) and, during the intervals between the meetings of the Supreme Soviet, controls the policy of the Sovnarkom, of which Molotov has been for many years the Prime Minister, and, since 1939, also the Foreign Secretary. In May 1941, Stalin, hitherto content to be a member of the Presidium, alarmed at the menace of a victorious German army invading the Ukraine, took over, with the consent of the Presidium, the office of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, leaving Molotov as Foreign Secretary ; in exactly the same way, and for a similar reason—the world war—that Winston Churchill, with

the consent of the House of Commons, became Prime Minister and Minister of Defence with Chamberlain, the outgoing Prime Minister, as a prominent member of the British Cabinet. As Prime Minister I doubt whether Stalin would have offered, as Churchill did, to amalgamate the USSR on terms of equality with another Great Power without consulting the Presidium of which he was a member. Neither the Prime Minister of the British Cabinet nor the presiding member of the Sovnarkom has anything like the autocratic power of the President of the U.S.A., who not only selects the members of his Cabinet subject to the formal control of the Senate, but is also Commander-in-Chief of the American armed forces and, under the Lease-Lend Act, is empowered to safeguard, in one way or another, the arrival of munitions and food at the British ports. By declaring, in May this year, a state of unlimited national emergency, President Roosevelt legally assumes a virtual dictatorship of the United States. He has power to take over transport, to commandeer the radio for the purposes of propaganda, to control imports and all exchange transactions, to requisition ships and to suspend laws governing working hours, and, most important of all, to decide on industrial priorities and, if necessary, to take over industrial plants.

In what manner, then, does Stalin exceed in authority over his country's destiny the British Prime Minister or the American President? The office by which Stalin earns his livelihood and owes his predominant influence is that of general secretary of the Communist Party, a unique organisation the characteristics of which, whether good or evil, I shall describe later on in this volume. Here I will note that the Communist Party, unlike the Roman Catholic and Anglican Church, is not an oligarchy; it is democratic in its internal structure, having a representative congress electing a central committee which in its turn selects the Politbureau and other executive organs of the Communist Party. Nor has Stalin ever claimed the position of a dictator or fuhrer. Far otherwise; he has persistently asserted in his writings and speeches that as a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he is merely a colleague of thirty other members, and that so far as the Communist Party is concerned he acts as general secretary under the orders of the executive. He has, in fact, frequently pointed out that he does no more than carry out the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Thus, in describing his momentous article known as "Dizzy with Success", he expressly states that this was written on "the well-known decisions of the Central Committee regarding the fight 'against Distortions of the Party Line' in the collective farm movement. . . . In this connection", he continues, "I recently received a number of letters from comrades, collective farmers, calling upon me to reply to the questions contained in them. It was my duty to reply to the letters in private correspondence; but that proved to be impossible, since more than half the letters received did not have the addresses of the writers (they forgot to send their addresses). Nevertheless the questions raised in these letters

are of tremendous political interest to our comrades. . . . In view of this I found myself faced with the necessity of replying to the comrades in an open letter, *i.e.* in the press. . . . I did this all the more willingly since I had a direct decision of the Central Committee to this purpose."

Is the USSR a Political Democracy?

In answer to the second question—Is the USSR a political democracy?—it is clear that, tested by the Constitution of the Soviet Union as revised and enacted in 1936,¹ the USSR is the most inclusive and equalised democracy in the world. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR consists of two chambers—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union is directly elected by the citizens in electoral districts of one deputy for three hundred thousand inhabitants, the number of deputies to-day being over twelve hundred. The Soviet of Nationalities, with over six hundred deputies, also directly elected, aims at giving additional representation to ethnical groups whether manifested in colour or figure, language or literature, religion or manners, inhabiting large areas of the USSR. These separate Constituent Republics (now sixteen, formerly eleven) are supplemented by smaller local areas also distinguished by racial characteristics, termed Autonomous Republics or Autonomous Regions, to all of whom are allotted a small number of deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities. The two chambers which make up the Supreme Soviet of the USSR have equal rights, and their sessions begin and terminate simultaneously. Joint sessions of both chambers are needed to ratify legislation and meet twice a year, and are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet at its direction, or on demand of one of the constituent republics. All these assemblies, whether the Soviet of the Union or the Soviet of Nationalities, together with a network of subordinate provincial, municipal and village soviets, are directly elected by secret ballot, by all the inhabitants over eighteen years of age, without distinction of sex, race or religion, or political or social opinion. For instance, the "deprived class" of the earlier constitutions, former landlords and capitalist profit-makers, relations of the late Tsar, or members of a religious order, are now included on the register of voters. I may add that nearly fifty thousand practising priests of the Greek Orthodox Church, together with several hundreds of Roman Catholics, Evangelicals, Mohammedans and Buddhist officiants, were enfranchised by the constitution of 1936.

The Insistence on Racial Equality

How does this constitution of the Soviet Union compare with that of Great Britain which assumes to be a political democracy? Passing

¹ The first meeting of the freely elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place in January 1938 (see page 431).

over the doubtful characteristics in the constitution of Great Britain itself with its forty-seven million inhabitants—for instance, the hereditary House of Lords and the prerogative of the King to refuse sanction to statutes passed by the House of Commons and rejected by the House of Lords—let us admit that the Home Country (after the enfranchisement of women in 1919) is a political democracy. What about the constitution of the British Commonwealth of Nations with its five hundred million inhabitants? Within this vast area only seventy millions are governed by a political democracy. Even among the self-governing Dominions which are assumed to be political democracies, one—the South African Union—refuses any participation in its government by the coloured races who are the majority of the inhabitants; whilst Canada and Australia ignored the native tribes (when they did not exterminate them) as possible citizens of the newly formed state. New Zealand is the one honourable exception; the British emigrants, once they had conquered the island, accepted the Maoris as fully-fledged citizens, not only as electors, but as members of the legislature and in many cases members of the Cabinet. Leaving out of consideration the fifty or so small protectorates or mandated territories, we note that India with its four hundred million inhabitants is mainly governed by a British civil service, and though we may believe in the good intentions of our Government to make it into a self-governing Dominion, we imprisoned without trial some seven thousand natives who spend their lives in propaganda for Indian independence, and condemned their remarkable and highly gifted leader, Nehru, to five years' rigorous imprisonment.

The British Commonwealth of Nations is not alone among the capitalist democracies in the refusal to accept racial equality within its own territory, as a necessary characteristic of political democracy. In the U.S.A. the negroes, though assumed by the federal constitution to be entitled to vote and to represent voters, are by the electoral law and administrative practice of particular states excluded from being fully-fledged citizens with the right to vote and to become representatives. The Dutch and Belgian empires have a like discrimination against the native inhabitants. Hence, if equal rights to all races within a sovereign state is a necessary characteristic of political democracy, the USSR stands out as a champion of this form of liberty.

Thus, one of the outstanding features of Soviet political democracy is racial equality; the resolute refusal to regard racial characteristics as a disqualification for the right to vote, to be deputies to the legislative assembly, to serve on the executive or to be appointed salaried officials. One of the reasons for the Anti-Comintern Axis, uniting Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Shintoist Japan in hostility to the Soviet Union, was this insistence by the Bolshevik government on racial equality throughout the USSR. These three Great Powers were all alike intent on extending, by force of arms, the dominance of their own race over new territories inhabited by so-called inferior races, who have no right to self-determina-

tion and were to accept the social order imposed by the conqueror, or to risk extermination.

The One Party System

There is, however, one characteristic of the political democracy of the USSR as formulated in the Constitution of 1936 which needs explanation of how and why it exists, if only because it has led to a denial by some fervent political democrats that the Soviet Union is a political democracy. This seemingly objectionable feature is the One-Party System of government.

I admit that as an original member of the British Labour Party and the wife of a leading member of His Majesty's Opposition and, for two short intervals, of a minority labour government, I had a stop in the mind when I read the following article in the New Constitution of the USSR, 1936 :

"In accordance with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of developing the organised self-expression and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the USSR are ensured the right to unite in public organisations—trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organisations, sport and defence organisations, cultural, technical and scientific societies ; and the most active and politically-conscious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of the working people unite in the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and which represents the leading nucleus of all organisations of the working people, both social and state." This means, in fact, though it is not explicitly stated, that no other purely political organisation is permitted to function in the USSR.

A study of the facts suggests that when a revolutionray government is confronted with the task of educating a mass of illiterate and oppressed peoples, of diverse races and religions, among them primitive tribes, not only to higher levels of health and culture but also in the art of self-government, there is no alternative to the One-Party System with its refusal to permit organised political opposition to the new political and economic order. The recent history of the democratic Republic of Turkey established by that great statesman Kemal Pasha in 1920 is instructive. Faced with a far less difficult task, Kemal Ataturk copied the One-Party System of Turkey's friendly neighbour, the USSR. But after studying the democratic constitution of Great Britain he decided in 1930—to quote from a recent history of Modern Turkey—"that Turkey needed an opposition ; contrary to the advice of the Party, he authorised an experienced politician named Fethi Bey to form an opposition group in the Assembly, and had arrangements made to see that this group—the Independent Republican Party—secured some seats in the Assembly at the General Election." The experiment, we are told, "was not a success.

The various social and religious changes had aroused opposition among the reactionary elements in the country and the existence of Fethi Bey's party provided a justification and focus for the expression of this opposition. There were street fights between supporters of the Opposition and supporters of the Government; numbers of the Independent Republican Party drifted back to the People's Party and the leader himself finally resigned. The régime was not sufficiently consolidated for opposition to it to be encouraged in this way. What Ataturk had in view (apart from the conciliation of democratic opinion abroad) was the education of the people in political issues, for he believed that that education would come from the open clash of opinion in debate in the Assembly. Since the death of Ataturk the project has been revived—this time with the approval of the People's Party. Twelve of the Party deputies were, in the summer of 1939, instructed to form an opposition group of devil's advocates in the Assembly. They remain, however, members of the Parliamentary group of the People's Party, and even attend its meetings, although they may not vote or take part in the discussions there."¹

This solution of an artificially created opposition seems rather far-fetched. Perhaps the Soviet Union's invention of "non-Party" members, nominated by trade unions, cooperative societies, collective farms and all other conceivable associations for science, the arts and sport, is a franker and more feasible method. By the term *non-Party*, I may explain, it is not implied that the delegate is an unbeliever in the living philosophy of Soviet Communism, as would be the case in the use of the term *non-Christian* within a Christian community. All that is meant is that, in respect of the communist faith he is a *layman*: that is (to quote the second meaning in the *New Oxford Dictionary*), "A man who is an outsider, or a non-expert in relation to some particular profession, art or branch of knowledge, especially to law and medicine". These non-Party

¹ *Modern Turkey*, by John Parker and Charles Smith, 1940, Routledge. "Freedom for Colonial Peoples" in *Programme for Victory*, Routledge.

The insistence that an illiterate and uncivilised people requiring to be educated for the art of self-government before they can exercise the right freely and with good results has been brought out by the studies of Professor Macmillan of the natives of South Africa and the West Indies. An ardent supporter of democratic self-government for the natives of our colonies, he describes his conversion, brought to him after years of experience, of the need for a period of apprenticeship to overcome "natural obstacles to freedom". "It is unnecessary to remind you of the stultifying, soul-destroying effect of utter poverty and prolonged physical deficiency. Considerations of political freedom do not touch the oppression of poverty. That this always existed in Africa is clear. It was a revelation to me to find, in parts of Africa, quite untouched by white settlement, or any white influence at all, poverty every whit as abject as that induced by landlessness in South Africa" (*Freedom for Colonial Peoples by Victory*, p. 91, a collection of essays prepared by the Fabian Society, 1941). Hence Macmillan suggested that the superior races who have become the dominant power in a territory inhabited by a primitive race should, before they retire from an authoritative position, educate the native inhabitants not only in the art of self-government, but in the capacity to produce sufficient wealth for a healthy and a cultural life. For a more detailed study of the need for educating the natives in the art of self-government and the maximising of production, see also Macmillan's *Africa Emergent* (Faber, 1938) and *Democratization of the Empire* (Kegan Paul, 1s.).

delegates are said to form the majority in the hundreds of thousands of subordinate soviets, village, city and provincial. Even in the All-Union Congress of Soviets of 1936 which enacted the New Constitution, they constituted 28 per cent of the delegates. "Political democracy in a socialist state", so we are told by the most knowledgeable American student of Soviet Communism, who has lived and worked for many years in the Soviet Union, "demands clearly both the expression of special interests of a relatively permanent nature, and the continuous correlation of all those interests into a unified programme which shall not be the 'either or' of the two-Party system, but an honest attempt to satisfy as nearly as possible the sum-total of popular demand. Both these needs are met by the Soviet Constitution. The special interests of the Soviet citizen are continuously expressed in the public organisations to which he belongs, his trade union, cooperative association, cultural, technical or scientific society. All these organisations have the right to nominate candidates for office (Article 141) and will certainly avail themselves of the right. The Communist Party meantime exists as a central core of members in all of these organisations, drawing out their special demands, correlating them with the rest of the country, and leading them in a direction of a stronger and more prosperous socialist commonwealth. . . ." ¹ This unique characteristic of the Communist Party as created by Lenin and developed by Stalin and his associates, as an organisation for bringing civilisation, not merely to millions of poverty-stricken Slav workers and peasants, released from legal serfdom eighty years ago, but also to Mongolian races and primitive tribes inhabiting the southern and eastern territories of the USSR, will be described later on.

*The Alternative of the One-Party System: the Referendum,
the Initiative and the Recall* ²

Let us now consider the present-day alternatives to the One-Party System as it exists in the USSR. First we have the most theoretically democratic of all methods of the government of the people by the people, that is, an assembly of the whole body of adult citizens, or if that be impracticable owing to masses of electors scattered throughout an extended territory, the referendum, the initiative and the recall. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, this obvious type of political democracy was the fashion of the day; the exemplar of the long-established Republic of Switzerland ³ being cited,

¹ Preface to Anne Louise Strong's translation of the New Soviet Constitution, pp. 87-90.

² In the New Constitution of 1936 the recall is permitted:—Article 142. Every deputy shall be obliged to report to the electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of working people's deputies, and may at any time be recalled by decision of a majority of the electors in the manner prescribed by law.

³ There are many descriptions of the Swiss Constitution and the working of the referendum, the initiative and the recall. The most authoritative seems to be *The*

described and applauded, especially by Conservative politicians and journalists, but if free thought and free speech are the test of a political democracy it is one of the most backward of the western democracies, judged by its written constitution, and its present law, no citizen of the Swiss Republic may be a member of the Jesuit Order or of the Communist Party. If he belongs to either of these somewhat discordant partners in the sin of heterodoxy he may not reside in his native land. So far as Great Britain is concerned, we have already experienced this primitive democratic structure in the Open Vestry, an assembly of all the male parishioners for the relief of the poor, the maintenance of roads, the policing of the parish and the levying of the necessary rates to pay for these expensive services. The results were so calamitous that it was superseded by the Closed Vestry, that is, government by an oligarchy renewing itself by cooption; which, in the early decade of the nineteenth century, gave place, in thickly populated districts, to the Select Vestries under the Sturges Bourne Act of 1818, a representative committee elected by the rate-payers, thus excluding the very poor. The referendum of particular proposals to local electors was continued, however, for some time, with calamitous results for those who believe in the extension of social services. I recall that in my husband's L.C.C. constituency the proposal made by the local authority for the establishment of a public library was negatived by a large majority, the library being afterwards established under statutory authority and being much appreciated by the population. More recent and spectacular experiments in the referendum, the initiative and the recall have been tried in some of the States of the U.S.A. So far as I know, the results have not been encouraging.

Free Discussion prior to Legislative Enactment in the Union

And here, I think, the political scientist might consider quite another use of the referendum, introduced by Soviet statesmen, which seems to

Referendum in Switzerland, by Simon Deplaige, advocate, translated into English by C. P. Trevelyan, edited with notes, introduction and appendices by Liliun Tom, 1898:

"(5) The prohibition of the Jesuits, which was part of the programme of 1872, 'may be extended also by Federal ordinance to other religious orders whose action is considered dangerous to the state or disturbs the peace between sects' (Art. 51).

"(6) The foundation of new convents or religious orders and the re-establishment of those which have been suppressed are forbidden (Art. 52)" (p. 115).

See also *Government in Switzerland*, by J. M. Vincent: "The order of the Jesuits", it is stated, "and societies associated with it, are forbidden to locate anywhere in the country, and their activity in church or school is entirely prohibited. The establishment of new monasteries, or the reopening of suppressed cloisters, is also forbidden. The downfall of the Jesuits in Switzerland was caused by their incessant interference in affairs of state, and the intense ultra-montane character of their policy. It was chiefly their agitation that brought about the conflict of religions which resulted in the secession of the *Sonderbund*, and very nearly the downfall of the republic. It was determined that in future this particular activity should be excluded, since without the agitators the people would soon learn to accommodate themselves to each other's religious views. . . . The introduction of the Federal Constitution, the last edition being 1874, introduced proportional representation and destroyed the party system by the referendum, the initiative and the recall" (p. 275).

me to combine the political and economic education of the ordinary man with a unique opportunity for the government to ascertain what the people are thinking and feeling on certain issues, before they proceed to submit the proposed projects of social reconstruction to the supreme representative assembly for acceptance or rejection. This device is to urge all available organisations, whether governmental or voluntary, to hold a series of meetings to discuss freely and openly the particular policy proposed by the government. This was markedly the case with the all-important New Constitution of 1936, after it had been drafted by the Communist Party and the Presidium of the Soviet Union.

“There forthwith ensued the most spectacularly widespread discussion that has ever taken place in connection with any governmental action in history. Under pressure of public demand copies of the draft constitution were issued in editions of ten and fifteen millions, until the grand total of sixty million copies was reached, a greater number than has ever been published of any document in such a brief period. In addition to this publication in pamphlet form, the Constitution was printed in full in more than ten thousand newspapers, with a total circulation of thirty-seven millions. Discussions were held in every farm, factory, school, workers’ club. Classes met in repeated sessions to study it. In all there were held 527,000 meetings, with an attendance of thirty-six and a half million people, all of whom felt themselves entitled to send in comments and amendments. The number of suggested amendments which reached the Constitutional Commission, sometimes from individuals and sometimes from organised meetings, totalled 134,000. These were sifted and considered, and the more important suggestions discussed in full session. Some were adopted. Such a plebiscite is without precedent. A people that uses its opportunities of debate so thoroughly has the main requirement for working democracy.

This referendum prior to enactment of the New Constitution does not stand alone. In all the factories and plants and in every trade union, consumers’ cooperative movement, and the meetings of local soviets, there is an interminable discussion by the people concerned of what should or should not be done, whether in national legislation or local administration. It is by these spontaneous and intimate discussions of what actually happens or should happen in the workshop or mine, on the railways or in the collective farms, in the school or university, and even within the Communist Party, that the ordinary man and woman becomes an active citizen. This self-criticism—to use the Soviet term—is in fact part of the process of educating the people in the art of self-government. It also enables the national executive to ascertain what exactly are the reactions of all the people concerned to the proposed legislation. A notable instance was the reference, for public discussion throughout the country, of the proposed penalisation of the practice of abortion, unless it were needed for the survival of the mother; a discussion which revealed the opposition of many women, intent on living the life they liked, and

the support of men, anxious to secure the health of their womankind and the increase of the birth-rate deemed necessary for the Soviet Union. There are, of course, some objections to this freedom to criticise; it may result in hampering the initiative of the director of the plant or the commissar of a public authority. Moreover, when these criticisms are published in the press, they provide the hostile foreigner with evidence of the apparent failure of Soviet Communism. Indeed it is amusing to discover that nearly all the books that are now written proving that there is corruption, favouritism and gross inefficiency in the management of industry and agriculture, are taken from reports of these discussions in the Soviet press, in *Pravda*, the organ of the Communist Party; in *Izvestia*, the organ of the government; in *Trud*, the organ of the trade union movement, and in many other local and specialist newspapers. Imagine the thousands of bankruptcies, occurring every year in capitalist countries, being investigated not only by the workers concerned, but also by the inhabitants of the "distressed areas"; and their proceedings not only reported in the local press, but notified in the government department concerned in maximising production for community consumption. In Great Britain what material they would furnish to the critics of profit-making enterprise.¹ But to those who value free thought and free speech as the most important factor in a democratic world, these risks should seem worth running, as they do apparently in the Soviet Union.

The Two-Party and Many-Party Systems

And now for the past and present alternatives to the One-Party System: the assumed Two-Party System of Great Britain and the U.S.A. or the Many-Party System as displayed in the German Second Reich inaugurated at Weimar in 1919, or in that much-honoured Third Republic of France, established 1871. First, we note that in Great Britain since the Reform Act of 1832, right down to the present day, there has always existed a third party: during the nineteenth century the Irish Party, after 1906 the Labour Party, and since 1924 the Liberal Party. This has resulted in minority governments on more than one occasion, which are upheld or let down by a party representing a small minority—in the case of the Irish Party, a minority who were hostile to the Government of Great Britain whatever its policy might be. Even in the case of the Liberal Party and the Labour Party this support of an existing Government is given or refused according to whether or not the policy of the

¹ There is also what the American big business chiefs call "the English lovely law of libel", i.e. the use by big British capitalists of action for slander or libel to ensure the suppression of all criticism "of the malpractices of capitalist enterprise". This "accepted technique", to quote the Bishop of Birmingham's protest in the House of Lords, June 17, 1941, makes defence in the law courts so costly, sometimes running into "thousands or even tens of thousands of pounds, which are mere nothing to a multi-millionaire capitalist ring" but are so ruinous to private individuals that no one who is not himself a millionaire dares to risk it.

minority is implemented by the Front Bench, quite irrespective of whether this policy happened to be desired by the majority of the inhabitants. The Two-Party System of the U.S.A., represented in the federal Government by the Republican and Democratic parties, with their bosses and their "spoils system", and leading in the individual states or municipalities to perpetual changes in the constitution, sometimes concentrating dictatorial powers in a Governor or a Mayor, sometimes evolving one or two representative bodies checked by the referendum, the initiative and the recall, is not considered a satisfactory example of political democracy. One of the ablest and most recent students of the American political system states: "The present parties have had their life drained out of them and are now mere shells; collections of professional politicians trading the irrational loyalties of the mass of the voters. It is difficult to see any way of improving the existing parties. The Republicans have all the faults bred by long success and the illusion that all is for the best in the best of all possible parties. The fidelity and success with which the G.O.P. served the dominant interest of the American economic system in the past two generations makes the party, to-day, less able than ever before to meet the altered demands of the new society. The party of business, by its tariff policy, its farm policy, its lack of any rational foreign policy, is now an enemy of many forms of big business. The relationship between the party and business may have been symbiotic in the past, but it is now parasitic. The feeblest industries, the least hopeful activities of the American capitalist system, are those which the Republican party is determined to foster. Nor is the Democratic party any better. Much against its will, it has been unable to identify itself with the economically dominant forces of modern America and is therefore less committed to an obsolete politico-economic technique; it has given fewer hostages to old fortunes. But what it gains in this direction, it loses by its internal incoherence. The victory of 1932 is probably meaningless in relation to party fortunes. The nation has given the ship of state a new master and a new crew and given them sealed orders. If by a miracle of political boldness and sagacity, a new orientation could be given to national policy and that were accompanied by a revival of business, the Democrats might dig themselves in, but such a new course would require a degree of boldness and coherence which the Democrats no more than their rivals have had any chance of developing. If they remain content to be 'maintained by the business interests as a combined lightning rod and lifeboat' (Paul H. Douglas, *The Coming of a New Party*, p. 164) they will give way to the Republicans as soon as the major party has got its breath back. If they start on a really new tack, they will split or cease to be the old Democratic party." ¹

Finally, we have the suppression of the Two-Party System which has taken place to-day. His Majesty's Government is no longer checked by His Majesty's Opposition, which has ceased to exist. The Front

¹ *The American Political System*, by D. W. Brogan, 1933, pp. 383-384.

Opposition Bench is occupied by a few Tory and Liberal dissentients together with Labour men who support the Government. The official leader of the Front Opposition Bench is the Right Honourable Arthur Greenwood, a whole-hearted supporter of the National Government. Hence, to-day, we have in Great Britain a One-Party System which is (so the Prime Minister suggests) to continue for some years after the ending of the war. Meanwhile the three official parties, Conservative, Liberal and Labour, have agreed not to contest any bye-election, so as to leave the political Party represented by the retiring or dead M.P. in undisputed possession of the seat. I remember a British Prime Minister who was also a distinguished philosopher observing that the Two-Party System, within a political democracy, is all right "so long as there is no fundamental difference of opinion between the two Parties". Is the transformation of Great Britain from a capitalist democracy to a socialist democracy with its planned production for community consumption, and its elimination of the profit-making motive, the fundamental difference of opinion which will make the Two-Party System impracticable? ¹

Even more sensational has been the fate of the Many-Party System, based on proportional representation and a second ballot, characteristic of the political democracies of continental Europe, whether old-established or created by the Versailles Treaty. Why have the majority of these political democracies collapsed during the last twenty years, to be superseded by a constitutional dictatorship of one sort or another? First Italy, then in quick succession Portugal, Spain, Poland, Greece, Austria, some if not all of the Baltic and Balkan states, and finally the two great

¹ Further, who actually govern the Great Britain of to-day? Is it the rapid succession of Cabinet Ministers and their under-secretaries who come and go, or the permanent civil servants? The practice of changing the principal officers of a government department with a change of the Party in power, as is usual in the United States of America, is universally condemned by political scientists as leading to favouritism and even to financial corruption, in deciding who these civil servants should be. In Great Britain the salaried officials appointed by the national government or local government authorities are life appointments, in the higher positions recruited mainly by competitive examination. In the case of highly specialised occupations, such as medical men, lawyers and chartered accountants and sanitary inspectors, this examination is conducted by the professional organisation and therefore consists, like the Soviet Communist Party, of a self-elected *élite* who alone can practise the profession, whether they are appointed by the state or employed by private individuals. For these reasons the civil service as a whole may be considered as a self-determined *élite* with a specialised knowledge and an obligatory code of personal conduct, and to some extent a social outlook approved of by the existing government, largely influenced by that of the superior civil servants who belong, by origin, and always by social ties, to the landed and capitalist class. It is noteworthy that some of the ablest of the superior civil servants are attracted out of government service by the offer from great capitalist enterprises of salaries four or five times greater than those of the head departments. During the present war the reverse process has taken place, and some of the most important salaried posts have been transferred to profit-making capitalists, thus strengthening the capitalist system as against the socialist movement as represented by the Labour Party. To-day the leadership of most of the new functions of government, rendered necessary during the war, such as the rationing of food, the control of shipping, and other types of war production and distribution, have been taken over by business men who have been and are still connected with the particular type of capitalist enterprise concerned.

tragedies of the Weimar Republic of Germany established in 1919, and the honoured Third Republic of France ; whilst the democratic governments of Czechoslovakia, Norway,¹ Holland and Belgium are exiled from their own countries and have their headquarters in Great Britain. It is a strange fact that the only constitutional political democracies established in Europe after the Great War, to survive to the present day, are, in fact, the USSR and the Republic of Turkey, both of which have recognised in their constitution the One-Party System of government.²

I cite these failures of the traditional Two-Party System of the U.K. and the U.S.A. and of the Many-Party System of other European capitalist democracies, *not in order to pave the way for the adoption of the One-Party System of the USSR and the Republic of Turkey*, but to raise the question whether sociologists have yet solved the problem of how to organise the government of the people by the people, and be it added, for the good of the people ? Is the problem which we have to solve the ascertainment of the personal or public opinion of the inhabitants—if they have any—as to what should be the exact policy of the government in the complicated issues of home and foreign affairs ; or is it the understanding and consequent consent of the inhabitants to policies originating in the advice of specialists, with an agreed scale of values of what is right or what is wrong, and with sufficient scientific knowledge of what has happened and is happening, to be able to forecast what will happen if certain steps are taken to make it happen ?

¹ "Norway has no two-party system, but proportional representation. The whole country is not one constituency but is divided into eighteen provinces and eleven groups of towns with proportional representation within each separate constituency. Since the last Great War no party has commanded an absolute majority in the national parliament, called the Storting, and no government has been a majority government. This means that generally the administration has not been very strong. . . . There was a feeling that political institutions and procedures had not been readjusted to meet modern conditions ; in many quarters there was a craving for 'more business in politics and less politics in business'. Certain sections in the press were constantly trying to ridicule the Storting and the whole political system as not efficient enough. And the complex party situation called for a thorough discussion of the very principles of our parliamentary system. . . .

"But anybody taking this as an evidence of budding sympathy for a totalitarian system of government would have been entirely mistaken. It was rather evidence of a growing realisation of the waste of energy in Party strife, of a groping toward new means of minimising the costs of friction in public life, of a realisation of the fact that national politics does not mean merely fighting—fighting other Parties and platforms and their political ideas and conceptions, but that it means also (and in daily routine more than anything else) cooperation and coordination." See *I Saw it Happen in Norway*, by Carl J. Hambro, pp. 66, 70-71.

² One of the cardinal defects of the Two-Party or Many-Party System, as contrasted with government by a permanent civil service, or the equivalent, a One-Party *élite*, is that the immediate purpose of a general election, contested by rival Parties, is to bring into office a group of men many of whom have no technical qualification, whether as administrators, or for dealing with such specialised services as national finance, or the supervision of courts of law, foreign or military affairs, special services of education, health insurance and unemployment.

Will Political Parties survive?

It is obvious that when there is civil war within a country, or international war between sovereign states, the One-Party System with its suppression of incipient revolt or Fifth Column treachery, will and must prevail. Once class conflict between "a nation of the rich and a nation of the poor" within a community or war between sovereign states has ceased to trouble humanity, I see no reason for the survival of political Parties, One, Two or Many, seeking to dominate the whole life of the country on all issues, home and foreign. I foresee a rise of infinite varieties in the grouping of men and women for different but not inconsistent purposes. These associations will include as a matter of course the trade unions and consumers' cooperative movements, collective farms and industrial cooperatives, professional associations with definitely ascertained qualifications for the service of the community such as lawyers, medical men, architects and accountants, and civil servants. There may even be associations of individual producers, preferring a lonely but unregulated life, producing and selling stray articles sufficient for meeting their own personal needs. But besides all these organisations concerned with the production of commodities and services needed for the material progress of a community, there will be organisations for scientific research, for music and acting, for sports and games and heaven knows what else, even for participation in religious rites and ceremonies, in order to live a holy life with the hope of personal immortality or of absorption in the spirit of love at work in the universe. All these bodies will seek to be represented on local councils and the national representative assembly, elected by all the adult inhabitants within a particular area; not in order to fight each other for supremacy in all issues of the nation's home and foreign affairs, but so as to secure the opportunity of contributing their peculiar knowledge, skill, artistic gifts or ethical codes of conduct to the life of the nation. So-called "free thought and free expression by word and by writ" mocks human progress, unless the common people are taught to think and inspired to use this knowledge in the interests of their commonwealth. This will be done by lectures and discussions among their fellow citizens up and down the country; by seeking election to representative assemblies or serving on administrative executives. It is this widespread knowledge of and devotion to the public welfare that is the keynote of Soviet Democracy.

*The Democratic Control of the Instruments of Production,
Distribution and Exchange*

At this point I reach the most distinctive and unique characteristic of Soviet Communism: the democratic control of land and capital. This entails a brief summary of the Marx-Engels interpretation of the

structure and the working of capitalist profit-making—the dominating feature of what is termed “Western Civilisation”.

Karl Marx in his long study of the capitalist profit-making system in Great Britain—the land of its birth—admitted that in its earliest stages it had two outstanding achievements. Through the use of power, mechanisation and mass production carried out by multitudes of weekly wage-earners, the wealth of the nation had been enormously increased. But it had done more than this. By sweeping away the network of feudal obligations between king and barons, the lord and his tenant, and the craftsman and his guild, and by substituting for these outworn ties the individualist creed of free competition with the minimum of state interference, Western Civilisation had secured for the fortunate few who have inherited, or gained, a secure and sufficient livelihood, an absence of restraint in thought, word and act unknown to the mediaeval world. Unfortunately this same capitalist profit-making led to mass destitution, to low wages, long hours, bad housing and insufficient food. In the famous words of Disraeli, it divided Great Britain into “a nation of the rich and a nation of the poor”. The all-powerful governing class of landlords and capitalists had, in fact, refused to multitudes of men, women and children that other and all important ingredient of personal freedom — *the presence of opportunity to live a healthy, happy and cultured life*. Even more disastrous to the welfare of the community is the constantly recurring unemployment of millions of men, gradually producing a hard kernel of workless people, mostly young persons, who become, as years pass by, veritable parasites. One evil Marx did not foresee. There would be not only unemployment on a vast scale, but a sinister decline of the birth-rate threatening the survival of our race as a significant factor in human progress. What British socialists failed to realise was the truth of Karl Marx’s prophecy, that with the advent of monopoly capitalism, with its restricted production, and when profits failed, periods of bad trade would not diminish, but would increase in intensity and duration. Thus the landlords and capitalists in the European sovereign states would, in order to use profitably their surplus capital, seek new lands to conquer in Africa and Asia, inhabited by helpless natives, easy to cheat and enslave. This would lead to aggressive imperialism on the part of the Great European Powers. The climax would be world war, which, if not prevented by an international uprising of the proletariat, might destroy Western Civilisation by mutual mass murder and the wholesale destruction of property and lead to a return of brutal barbarism—a forecast which has been dramatically fulfilled. Hence the slogan: “Workers of the world, unite: you have nothing to lose but your chains, and a new world to win”.

But what should be the new world order when the workers were in the seat of power? Karl Marx had suggested a “dictatorship of the proletariat”, to be followed, in some undefined way, by a “classless society”. When fanatical followers argued among themselves what

exactly these phrases meant, and appealed to their leader, Karl Marx is reported to have observed, "I am not a Marxist"—which implied that the future socialist order would have to be determined by the scientific study of future events which could not be foreseen. Lenin discovered, when the Bolsheviks achieved power, that a classless society had to be slowly built up by the deliberate but gradual evolution of a multi-form democracy: the organisation of man as a citizen, man as a producer and man as a consumer. Thus the Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, proceeded to develop a powerful trade union movement, now numbering more than twenty million members, including all the workers, by hand and by brain, employed in state or municipal and consumers' cooperative enterprises; also of the consumers' cooperative movement, to-day numbering over thirty-seven million members, the largest and most active in the world. There remained over the agricultural population, the largest element in Tsarist Russia; consisting of a few great landlords and a minority of well-to-do Kulaks owning agricultural land and employing labour at miserably low wages, in order to make profit by the production and sale of agricultural products, whilst the vast majority were poor peasants, always on the point of famine whether as agricultural labourers or as the owners of tiny plots of land. Lenin did not undertake to solve this problem. He thought that it was impracticable at that stage of development to sweep away the profit-making motive in agriculture. After his death, Stalin and his associates persuaded the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party to adopt, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to apply, the principle of the collectivisation of agriculture embodied in associations of self-governing worker-producers. After 1929 thousands of collective farms opened up throughout the Soviet territory, to-day numbering well over two hundred thousand. These collective farms had what has been termed a mixed economy. Unlike the agricultural cooperative societies of Scandinavia and the U.S.A., the members of the collective farms are not profit-making employers of labour, whether in their own farms or in joint factories for the preparation of food products and the selling to the retailers. They are associations of agricultural workers engaged in a common task of cultivating the land for the supply of food, whether vegetable or animal. Nor is personal property excluded from this mixed economy: it is usual for each worker and his family to be allotted a piece of land which they can cultivate for the supply of their own food, the surplus being sold in the neighbouring free market, where they can buy commodities produced in the neighbourhood. These collective farms hold the land on a permanent lease from the government without payment of rent so long as they fulfil their collective obligation to the community. In return for the use of the land they are required to sell to the government a defined amount of the product, for which they are paid fixed prices, selling the surplus in the local market; they also depend on the government for the supply of tractors and often for the skilled mechanics provided by the government local tractor stations.

Any inequality in the fertility of the land held by a particular collective farm, or its access to nearby markets, is remedied by an income tax on the members as a whole, and on the individuals who are selling commodities in the free markets. Thus the government exercises a monetary control over the collective farms.¹

It must be added that for the cultivation of plants and the breeding of animals involving specialised knowledge and scientific research, there are state farms, either belonging to the national or local governments, and administered with the active cooperation of the trade union movement, as is the case in all completely socialised institutions.

Is the USSR a Multiform Democracy?

Now it is important to note that, throughout the development of this multiform democracy, Lenin and Stalin both realised that it was man as a citizen through the political state that had to be the predominant partner, if only because, unlike the organisation of the producers in trade unions or collective farms, or of the consumers in the consumers' cooperative movement, political democracy represents all the inhabitants of a given territory. It is necessary to emphasise this plain and indisputable fact, because the supremacy of the political democracy over industrial democracy not only angers the anarchists, who want to be free of all control, by whomsoever exercised, but upsets those who believe in "workers' control" or the "dictatorship of the proletariat". What is still more surprising is that some avowed believers in political democracy suspect the duly elected deputies of becoming, somehow or other, "dictators" of a peculiarly sinister type. But it is clear that it is only an assembly, representing *all the inhabitants* on its executive, that is entitled, according to democratic principles, to preserve public order by law courts and police, and to defend the country from the aggression of foreign powers, and therefore to maintain an army, navy and air force. Moreover, there is the supply of electricity and pure water, transport by land and water, reclamation of deserts and waterlogged low-lying land turned into mud by slow winding rivers, enterprises which, in sparsely inhabited territories, may not yield profits to the capitalist and will therefore not be undertaken. Even more outstanding are the social services designed to provide for the health and education of all the inhabitants, for scientific research, music, art, even games and sport; in a word, the

¹ This type of organisation—associations of self-governing owner-producers—is also that of specialised workers, such as fishermen and the hunters of fur-producing animals, as well as the handicrafts for the production of specialised articles, and in a few cases of factory and mine workers. These industrial cooperatives or self-governing workshops to-day include over two million workers and show every sign of increasing. Within the capitalist profit-making system they have been a failure in spite of the devoted propaganda of the Christian Socialists in 1840-1860, or the more revolutionary fervour of the Guild Socialists in 1910-1922. The few that have survived are closely connected with and dependent on the consumers' cooperative movement.

culture for a progressive people. All these activities require an income which can only be raised in one of three different ways: (1) taxation of individuals or groups; (2) the surplus value over cost of production yielded by state and municipal enterprises for home consumption; or (3) by foreign trade, exchanging goods which the nation does not require (*i.e.* gold in the USSR) or can make more cheaply for commodities which they do not possess but require for the consumption of their own citizens. Hence the need for the establishment of a planning department (Gosplan), perhaps the most important of all the ministries included in the Council of People's Commissars for the successive Five-Year Plans from 1928 to 1942.

The Constitution of 1936 based on the Rights and Obligations of Man

This elaborate structure, including a declaration of the rights and obligations of the individual citizen, is described and laid down as the law of the land in the Articles of the New Constitution of 1936. This remarkable document ought to be studied by all sociological students. Where it differs from the two historic Declarations of the Rights of Man—the American and the French—at the end of the eighteenth century, is that it insists on the fundamental fact, that without this obligation on the part of all the inhabitants, all the time, to provide security and produce plenty, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness will be an idle dream for the vast majority of the inhabitants of a given country.

Here are a few of its 134 Articles, in its 13 chapters, which I pick out as defining the structure and activities that I have attempted to summarise. *Article 4* lays down that "The economic foundation of the USSR consists of the socialist economic system and the socialist ownership of the tools and means of production, firmly established as a result of the liquidation of the capitalist economic system, the abolition of private ownership of the tools and means of production, and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man". This does not mean that the state should take over all the means of production, distribution and exchange. *Article 5* insists that "Socialist property in the USSR has either the form of state property (the wealth of the whole people) or the form of cooperative collective property (property of separate collective farms, property of cooperative associations)". *Article 6*, that "The land, its deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, railways, water and air transport, banks, means of communication, large state-organised enterprises (state farms, machine-tractor stations, etc.), and also the basic housing facilities in cities and industrial localities, are state property, that is the wealth of the whole people". It is interesting to note that this economic democracy does not interfere with private property for personal use, so long as this property is not made the opportunity for exploiting land or labour by profit-making landlords or capitalists. Thus *Article 9*

provides that " Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the dominant form of economy in the USSR, the law allows small-scale private enterprise of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labour, provided there is no exploitation of the labour of others ". Finally *Article 10*, " The right of personal property of citizens in their income from work and in their savings, in their dwelling-house and auxiliary husbandry, in household articles and utensils, and in articles for personal use and comfort, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law ".

There are other rights which are protected by the New Constitution. For it ensures to every citizen not only protection against aggression and arbitrary arrest, but also the right to have remunerative work ; for the women the right to a specially elaborate provision for motherhood ; for both sexes the right to specified hours of rest and paid weeks of holiday ; the right of education of every kind and grade and at any age ; and, most far-reaching of all, the right to full economic provision, according to need, in all the vicissitudes of life—this formal enactment of such enormously extended " rights of man " is but the explicit consecration in the Constitution of what was throughout the USSR already very largely in operation. Over and above all this elaborate organisation *Article 11* insists that " the economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by a state plan of national economy in the interests of increasing the public wealth, of steadily raising the material and cultural standard of the working people, and of strengthening the independence of the USSR and its capacity for defence ".

Finally, all these rights are complemented by obligations on the part of the individual citizen. *Article 12* enacts that " Work in the USSR is a duty and a ' matter of honour ' for every able-bodied citizen, on the principle ' He who does not work shall not eat ' ". Thus " in the USSR the principle of socialism is realised : ' From each according to his ability, to each according to his work ' ". Once this principle has been acted on the human race can progress to the higher level of communism : " From each according to his faculty and to each according to his need ".

This fundamental transformation of the social order—the substitution of planned production for community consumption, instead of the capitalist profit-making of so-called " Western Civilisation "—seems to me so vital a change for the better, so conducive to the progress of humanity to higher levels of health and happiness, virtue and wisdom, as to constitute a new civilisation. This is not to say that in twenty years the Soviet Union has achieved a condition of plenty as statistically opulent as the richest capitalist nations have reached in the course of several centuries. In spite of a material progress during these twenty years which has probably never been equalled in any other country at any period of its history, the one hundred and eighty million Soviet citizens (excluding the territory regained in 1939–1940) have still an insufficient supply of what seem necessities of civilisation—to name only two, of

bedrooms and baths ! What is really significant in this connection is the economic discovery that this substitution, for profit-making manufacturing, of planned production for community consumption, frees the nation not only from the alternation of booms and slumps, but also, by ensuring a ubiquitous effective demand in the growing population, from the hitherto incessant social malady of involuntary mass unemployment. As to increasing plenty, Soviet Communism has the guarantee not only of a continuous advance of technical science, but also of the psychological discovery by the workers that the planning system eliminates the enemy-party in the production, distribution and exchange of commodities and services. The entire net product of the community is, in fact, shared among those who cooperate in its production, in whatever way they themselves decide, without tribute to an hereditary parasitic class. This produces an emotional passion for production among the millions of workers by hand and by brain such as heretofore has only been manifested in other countries by the individual peasant proprietor or the profit-making entrepreneur. In the USSR it is the trade unions that most strongly insist on the utmost use of the labour-saving machinery, and who have developed the famous Stakhanov movement and socialist emulation between the workers of one factory and those of another factory, so as to produce more at a less cost and thus increase the wealth of the nation.

The Communist Party : its Origin

To what group of men can this remarkable transformation in so short a time be attributed ? For it must be recalled that a bare twenty years ago the vast territory of Soviet Russia was a scene of indescribable misery and confusion ; a defeated army with millions killed and wounded ; workers and peasants everywhere in revolt ; famine and epidemics raging through the land. Five Great Powers had invaded, or were invading the country ; first victorious Germany, to grasp more land ; then Great Britain, France and even the U.S.A. to help the White Army to restore the Emperor to his throne ; whilst Japan was in occupation of some of Siberia. No one outside Russia, except a few fanatical communists, believed in the early twenties that Bolsheviki Russia could or would survive. To-day, despite violent prejudices against the new social order on the part of capitalist governments and their supporters, all the governments of the world, whether dictatorships or political democracies, are compelled to recognise that the USSR is a Great Power, with a stabilised population of two hundred millions ; a decline of the death-rate and rise of the birth-rate ; no unemployment, and, so many competent investigators think, a steadily rising standard of health, comfort and culture, for the vast population of one-sixth of the earth's surface.

No one denies, whether he admires or abhors the daily life and destiny of the two hundred million inhabitants of the USSR, that it is to the

Communist Party, as created by Lenin and developed by Stalin and his associates, that the credit or discredit of the entire organisation of the Soviet Union belongs. What is the origin and constitution of the Bolshevik Party? What is its living philosophy and what are its activities? And finally, what are its defects, or "infantile diseases", to use Lenin's term, which may or may not be permanent?

The All-Union Party (of Bolsheviks), which to-day is its official title, first appeared in 1898 at Minsk, as the result of a cleavage in the Social Democratic Party of Russia, two separate parties emerging—the Bolshevik, the Majority Party, and the Menshevik, the Minority Party. I need not, in this summary, describe in detail the tangled history of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the USSR. The Bolshevik Party led by Plekhanov and afterwards dominated by Lenin, was inspired by the Marxian vision of a world revolution, whilst the Menshevik adhered to the liberal policy of the German Social Democratic Party and the British Labour Party during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Unlike his Russian predecessor, unlike any other party organiser, Lenin had no use, within the Bolshevik Party, for mere sympathisers, for partly converted disciples who were ready to vote for his Party. The Bolshevik Party was not a Party of electors prepared to give their vote for candidates selected by the Party; popular election did not exist in Tsarist Russia. The Party that Lenin forged for his revolutionary activities became, after the seizure of power, the organisation by which alone the revolution, so Lenin believed, would be maintained and directed. To-day it exists, as the student of political science will realise, chiefly as the means by which the people of the USSR, in all their multiform participation in public affairs that we have described, have been supplied with a political, intellectual and legislative *élite* enjoying the confidence of the people by its disinterestedness, its superior training and its practical insight into the needs of the immediate situation, able to guide the people's uncertain state during the first period of its new freedom. Otherwise there would have been no continuous guidance, no persuasion, ubiquitous and consistent, of the hundred and sixty million inhabitants belonging to different races, mostly illiterate, scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface.

Its Organisation

The elaborate constitution of the Communist Party described in the sixty-paged chapter of *Soviet Communism* is a complicated type of democratic self-government of which I can here give only a mere outline. From first to last there is no mention of an autocratic leader whose will is law. The Communist cell, the basic organisation to be found in every type of association, industrial and agricultural, scientific and cultural, even associations for games and sport, elects deputies to local conferences of the Party, and from these conferences deputies are appointed to the congress of the Party of each constituent republic or autonomous region,

and from thence to the supreme authority of the Party—the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party meeting at Moscow. So far as its internal constitution is concerned, it is a democratic organisation, similar to the recognised professions in Great Britain of medical men and surgeons, of barristers and solicitors, and it admits new members after examination to test their capacity to practise the vocation concerned. Where it differs from these professional organisations is in the rigour and all inclusiveness of the conditions imposed on the members, and in the variety and importance of its activities.

“ Puritan ” Ethics

What, for instance, is the code of conduct for the individual member? Here I may note that there is a stop in the mind of former Bohemian admirers of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917–1922 regarding what seems to them a terrifying resurrection of what they call “ puritan ethics ”. Within the Communist Party and among the five million Comsomols (the organisation of youth) sexual promiscuity, like all forms of self-indulgence, has come to be definitely thought contrary to communist ethics, on the grounds enumerated by Lenin: “ it is a frequent cause of disease; it impairs the productivity of labour; it is disturbing to accurate judgment and inimical to intellectual acquisition and scientific discovery, besides frequently involving cruelty to individual sufferers ”. This insistence on self-restraint, in all cases where the health and happiness not only of the individual person but also of the community are at risk, accounts for the penalisation of homosexuality and for the limitation of abortion to cases in which the life of the child-bearing mother is threatened—reforms which are violently denounced by some of the more anarchic of Soviet critics. Most reactionary of all, from the standpoint of the libertarian, is the outspoken approval of the lifelong attachment of husband and wife as the most appropriate setting under communism for family life.

Thus the test of membership of the Communist Party is fundamentally that of acceptance of an ideology relating to man in his relation to man, and man's relation to the universe, from which is evolved an exceptionally strict code of conduct, not imposed on the ordinary citizen, a code which all members must carry out, the sanction being reprimand, or, if obdurate, expulsion from membership. It has even added, in its new category of “ sympathisers ”, something analogous to the “ lay brothers ” of the religious orders. In fact, in the nature of its mentality, as in the code of personal conduct, the Communist Party resembles more a religious order than the organisation of the learned professions of Western Europe, such as those of lawyers and doctors, engineers and public accountants.

The Education of the People

Can I sum up the purpose—the vocation of the Communist Party of two million five hundred thousand members, reinforced by five million

Comsomols, who are at work in the USSR to-day? They constitute, it is said, the vanguard of the proletariat, or, varying the metaphor, the spearhead of its activity, in the maintenance of the Bolshevik revolution and the building-up of the state. But what does this mean in practice? At all times more than half the Party membership continues at its manual labour in the factory or the mine, in the oilfields or at the hydro-electric plants, on the farms or in the railway or postal services, they serve in the armed forces on land, sea and in the air, with the mercantile marine or the river-transport vessels. The specific Party duty is so to lead their working lives as to be perpetually influencing the conduct of all their fellow citizens among whom they work. They must set themselves to be the most zealous, the most assiduous, the most efficient workers of their several establishments. They must neglect no opportunity of raising their own qualifications and increasing their technical skill. They must make themselves the leaders among the wage-earners, employing every means of educating the non-Party mass in communist doctrines and soviet policy. In the meetings of the trade union and the consumers' cooperative society, as in the manufacturing artel and the collective farm, they must, in concert with their comrades in the concern, constantly take an active part, using their influence to guide the whole membership towards the most complete fulfilment of the function of the organisation in the socialist state, along the lines from time to time authoritatively prescribed by the All-Union Congress held at Moscow and addressed by the Party leaders, of whom, as I have before stated, Stalin exercises the greatest influence.

The Living Philosophy of Soviet Communism

But there is another factor in Soviet Communism, setting it in contrast with the civilisation of the western world. It is based on an intellectual unity throughout all its activities; it definitely rejects every remnant of the superstition and magic which the twentieth-century man in the capitalist democracies retains in his conception of the universe and of man's place in it. That is to say, Soviet Communism has a new ideology as well as a new economics. Soviet Communism puts no limit to the growth of man's knowledge. It counts, in fact, on a vast and unfathomable advance of science in every field, but it refuses to accept as knowledge, or as the basis of its code of conduct, any of the merely traditional beliefs and postulates about man and the universe for which no rational foundation can be found, or any of the purely subjective imaginings of the metaphysician or the theologian. It excludes, and dogmatically excludes, the supernatural, whether this takes the form of the primitive belief in good and evil spirits, or the more civilised reliance on a one omnipotent God (whether or not opposed by a Devil) involving the immortality of all human beings, each individual being destined for Heaven, Purgatory or Hell. This new living philosophy, termed scientific humanism, is working out the ethics of a new civilisation arising from its own experience of social

life. And in that pragmatic evolution of a code of conduct based essentially upon the hygiene of the individual and of the social organism of which he forms part, Soviet Communism is assisted by the essential unity in principle of its economics and its ethics. Under Soviet Communism, with its planned production for community consumption, the pecuniary gain to the profit-making entrepreneur, nicknamed the "Economic Calculus", the free working of which is the be-all and end-all of capitalist civilisation, is deemed an undesirable guide to action, whether public or private.

Scientific Humanism

To quote the last words of the last book of the Webb partnership, in the postscript to the second edition: "The dominant motive in everyone's life must be not pecuniary gain to anyone but the welfare of the human race, now and for all time. For it is clear that everyone starting adult life is in debt to the community in which he has been born and bred, cared for, fed and clothed, educated and entertained. Anyone who, to the extent of his ability, does less than his share of work, and takes a full share of the wealth produced in the community, is a thief, and should be dealt with as such. That is to say, he should be compulsorily reformed in body and mind so that he may become a useful and happy citizen. On the other hand, those who do more than their share of the work that is useful to the community, who invent or explore, who excel in the arts or crafts, who are able and devoted leaders in production or administration, are not only provided with every pecuniary or other facility for pursuing their chosen careers, but are also honoured as heroes and publicly proclaimed as patterns and benefactors. The ancient axiom of 'Love your neighbour as yourself' is embodied, not in the economic but in the utilitarian calculus, namely, the valuation of what conduces to the permanent well-being of the human race. Thus in the USSR there is no distinction between the code professed on Sundays and that practised on week-days. The citizen acts in his factory or farm according to the same scale of moral and ethical values as he does to his family, in his sports, or in his voting at elections. The secular and the religious are one. The only good life at which he aims is a life that is good for all his fellow men, irrespective of age or sex, religion or race."

The Infantile Diseases of Soviet Communism

At last I come to the question: What have been the disreputable features, the infantile diseases, to use the Leninist term, of the new social order during the twenty years of its existence? Or, to put the question more bluntly: What exactly is the indictment of Soviet Communism on the part of those who insist that it is a step backward in human progress and therefore should be opposed by the capitalist democracies?

There is, of course, the complete pacifist who objects to the use of

physical force, whether to upset a cruel tyrant at home or to repel a foreign power bent on new lands to conquer—a living philosophy and code of conduct which neither I nor the vast majority of the critics of Soviet Communism regard either as practicable or desirable as the way of promoting the welfare of mankind. I will therefore pass it by as irrelevant to the purpose of this introduction.¹

The Treason Trials

Let us take the first objection. During the three or four years from the autumn of 1917 to 1922, the Bolshevik Government had established itself in Moscow and had succeeded in repelling the German, British, French, American and Japanese invasion, of that part of the territory of Tsarist Russia which the Bolsheviks thought themselves capable of defending. For some time after they had made a formal peace with their recent enemies they were confronted not only by local rebellions but by continuous and extensive underground sabotage in the newly established plants and factories, mines and means of communication, workers' flats and hospitals, by the remnant of the upholders of the old tsarist régime, all of which had to be summarily suppressed. But this obviously necessary use of force was not the only task awaiting the revolutionary government. History proves that in all violent revolutions, those who combine to destroy an old social order seldom agree as to what exactly should be the political and economic pattern of the new social organisation to be built up to replace it. Even our own limited revolution of 1689 in Great Britain, whereby a Protestant king by Parliamentary statute was substituted for a Catholic king by Divine Right, was followed, for nearly a hundred years, by generation after generation of conspirators to whom treason and rebellion, spying and deceit, with or without the connivance of a foreign power, were only part of what they deemed to be a rightful effort to overturn an even worse state of home and foreign affairs than they had joined as rebels to destroy. Thus, when we published the second edition of *Soviet Communism* in 1937, the outstanding scandal, so hostile critics of the Soviet Union declared, were the Treason Trials² which took place in the thirties, not only of old Bolshevik comrades of Lenin and opponents of Stalin's subsequent policy, but also of the best known commanding officers of the Red Army, many of whom had been tsarist generals, transferring their allegiance to the Bolshevik Government

¹ Those readers who are complete pacifists may be interested in an article by me in *I Believe* (a volume of essays by twenty-three eminent men and women published by George Allen and Unwin, pp. 337-338), where I give my reasons for rejecting the assertion "that all wars are wrong".

² In the American Ambassador Davies' remarkable book *My Mission to Moscow* he declares that these Treason Trials were justified by the police in the USSR, and not only of Quisling's intriguing with the enemies of Moscow, like Yagoda or the GPU of the generals, but also in respect of honourable men who were bent on securing, by underhand means, the defeat of Stalin's policy of the collectivisation of agriculture and other social reforms started in 1923-1927. See pp. 129-138.

in order to defend their native land from invasion by German, British, American, French and Japanese armies ; but who, it was alleged and I think proved, had begun to intrigue with the German Army against the new social order of the Soviet Union. The most important of these conspiracies was the Trotsky movement against the policy of building up socialism in one country as impracticable and insisting that the Bolshevik Party should abide by what was held to be the Marx-Lenin policy of promoting proletarian revolutions throughout the world. The success of the Soviet Government in instituting not only a political but an industrial democracy, and thereby enormously increasing the health, wealth and culture of the inhabitants, and the consequent recognition of the USSR as a Great Power, discredited the Trotsky movement, which I think was finally liquidated by the murder of Trotsky in Mexico by one of his own followers. To-day, and for some time, there has been no sign of conspiracies or faked conspiracies within the Soviet Union. The fear of German invasion and the consequent dominance of the Nazi system of racial oppression has made clear to all the *bona fide* citizens of the USSR the overwhelming desirability of keeping out of world war as long as possible, meanwhile devoting their energies to increasing their means of livelihood and their defensive power ; whilst the capitalist democracies and Axis powers were engaged in mutual mass murder and the destruction of property. When the German attack plunged Russia into war it was immediately apparent that the inhabitants of the USSR, whether soldiers or civilians, men, women and young people, were so convinced of the benefits yielded to the Socialist Fatherland that they resisted not only with reckless courage, but with considerable skill and ingenuity, the powerful onslaught of the highly mechanised German army hitherto victorious conquerors of one country after another.

There are, however, features in Soviet Communism which are either wholly absent in Great Britain, the self-governing Dominions and the U.S.A., or are far less virulent and permanent than they seem to be in the Soviet Union of to-day.

The Idolisation of the Leader

The first of these is the idolisation of one individual as an infallible leader who must be revered and obeyed and not criticised. This idolisation was seen in the popular elevation of Lenin, notably after his death, to the status of saint or prophet, virtually canonised in the sleeping figure in the mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square, where he was, to all intents and purposes, worshipped by the adoring multitude of workers and peasants who daily pass before him. After Lenin's death it was agreed that his place could never be filled. Some new personality had to be produced for the hundred and sixty million inhabitants of the USSR, most of whom were illiterate, deplorably superstitious and incapable of grasping the new philosophy of the Communist Party. Among the leaders

of the Communist Party there ensued a tacit understanding that Stalin should be "boosted" as the supreme leader of the proletariat, the Party and the state. His portrait and his bust were accordingly distributed by tens of thousands. But this idolisation of Stalin has largely ceased to exist in the Soviet Union of to-day. In the village, municipal and union soviets, local heroes are held up for the admiration of and imitation by the people; heroes of the workshop and of the field, heroes of research and exploration, ordinary people whose heroism consists not in an isolated courageous act under the stress of emotion, but in outstanding continuous application of courage and intelligence, initiative and self-discipline. The portraits of these heroes and heroines are to be seen everywhere. Moreover, Stalin's recent step down from the pedestal of the Holy Father of the Communist Party to the prosaic position of Prime Minister, elected strictly according to the constitutional procedure of a political democracy, has, so to speak, secularised his status and made it that of any other Prime Minister ultimately dependent on the votes of the people. When Stalin disappears from the scene will he have a successor as an idolised figure? I doubt it. The very conception of an infallible or a mysteriously inspired leader is wholly inconsistent with the Marx-Lenin materialist interpretation of history. Lenin would have mocked at his idolised figure in the mausoleum in the Red Square of Moscow. Stalin has never claimed to be more than the duly appointed official of the Communist Party and the democratically elected member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Hence, I believe this infantile disease will die out with the spread of education among the multitude and the practice of the scientific method in all branches of human activities. With a more enlightened electorate and the emergence of men with specialised talents I foresee that the influence now exercised by Stalin will be inherited by a group of prominent members of the Communist Party, of its All-Union Congress, qualified to stand for the central committee and its subordinate councils. This group who happen to become the recognised leaders of the party will grow larger and more diversified with the development of new scientific technique in all departments of government, alike in Moscow and in its constituent republics.

The Disease of Orthodoxy

Far more repugnant to our western political habits is the absolute prohibition within the USSR of any propaganda advocating the return to capitalist profit-making or even to any independent thinking on the fundamental social issues about possible new ways of organising men in society, new forms of social activity, and new development of the socially established code of conduct. It is upon this power to think new thoughts, and to formulate even the most unexpected fresh ideas, that the future progress of mankind depends. This disease of orthodoxy in a milder form is not wholly absent in the capitalist political democracies. No one suggests that Switzerland is not a political democracy, and yet, as I have

already noted, members of the Society of Jesus are not only refused citizenship but are actually banished from their native land, a penalisation which has been extended of late years to the members of the Third International, assuredly a strangely discordant couple to be linked together in the dock of Swiss Courts of Justice accused of the propaganda of living philosophy incompatible with the public safety. Likewise the U.S.A., in some of the constituent States, through the device of Primaries, has excluded the Communist Party, and to-day even the Socialist Party, from selecting the candidates for election to the legislature of those states ; while in one or two states being a member of the Communist Party is punished by penal servitude. In Oklahoma City, we are told in the *New York Nation*, December 28, 1940, "mere membership in the Communist Party is regarded as a crime punishable by imprisonment for ten years and a fine of 5000 dollars. This vindictive sentence was passed on Robert Wood, state secretary of the Party, in October, and has now been repeated in the case of Alan Shaw, twenty-two-year-old secretary of the Oklahoma City Local. In neither case was any overt act charged. Both men were convicted of violating the state criminal syndicalism law on evidence consisting of selected passages from the works of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Since the ideas put forward in these books were those of Communist leaders, it was charged, they must also be subscribed to by the accused. . . ."

Whenever a country is threatened with foreign invasion or revolutionary upheaval, the suppression of sects advocating disobedience to the law, sabotage or giving information to the enemy is a necessary use of force on the part of a government, however democratically representative of the majority of the inhabitants it may be. Have we not imprisoned two M.P.s and a distinguished ex-Cabinet Minister, and some thousand other fellow citizens ? Have we not interned thousands of well-conducted and even distinguished foreigners because they were suspected of a like antagonism to our existing social order ? Have we not blamed the tolerance of Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium towards what is termed Fifth Column activities, i.e. propaganda by its own citizens of the Nazi system as an alternative to their own type of government ?

It is not surprising, therefore, that there should have been intolerance, on the part of the Soviet Government, towards free thought and expression, by word and by writ, of antagonism to its home and foreign policy. How does this intolerance differ in character from the intolerance manifested in Great Britain ? As we have already described (p. xxvii), free criticism, however hostile it may be, is permitted, even encouraged, in the USSR, of the directors of all forms of enterprise, by the workers employed, or by the consumers of the commodities or services concerned. In Great Britain no such detailed and personal criticism by the workers employed, or by the consumers of commodities and services concerned, is tolerated by capitalist profit-makers when they close down works or charge monopoly prices, or even if they go bankrupt through inefficiency or fraudulent practice. Moreover, when anxious to encourage historical research, the

Soviet Government is singularly open-minded and has just published a translation of the complete works of Ricardo into Russian, which is exactly as if the British Government were to issue from the Stationery Office a translation into English of the complete works of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

There is, however, a type of suppression of free thought by word and by writ that is absent from capitalist democracies but is indisputably present in the USSR. No criticism of the living philosophy of the Communist Party is permitted in the Soviet Union. It would, for instance, be impossible to issue a stream of pamphlets against Soviet Communism and in favour of the capitalist system, such as the Fabian Tracts for Socialists, or the works of G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski, criticising capitalism and suggesting various forms of socialist organisation; it would be still more impossible to publish a condemnation of Soviet Communism such as the Webbs' *The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation*. Nor would there be permitted in the USSR newspapers and periodicals as favourable to profit-making capitalism as the *Daily Herald*, the weekly *Tribune* or the monthly *Left Book News* (leave alone the *Labour Monthly*) are to the various types of socialism. I venture to prophesy that this form of intolerance—which we term the disease of orthodoxy—will prove to be merely the growing pains of a new social order which has struggled into existence in a hostile world. I may note, in passing, that owing to the increasing urgency of war, our Home Secretary has banned, for the last fourteen months, one daily paper—the *Daily Worker*—and has threatened another—the *Daily Mirror*—with a like fate. I see no reason to doubt that with the increased prosperity of the Soviet Union, at peace with the world, the Communist Party of the USSR, whose living philosophy depends for its realisation on the scientific method, will gradually lift the bar to free discussion in the press about rival conceptions of political and economic systems, if only to increase the prestige of the new civilisation among the intelligentsia of other countries, and, be it added, to gratify the passion for discussion, day in and day out, of every conceivable issue, practical and theoretical, which distinguishes the Russian Slav, the majority race of the USSR.

The Comintern or Third International

At first sight the least important, but in many ways the most injurious feature of the internal structure of the Soviet Union, exciting the enmity of the British and other Capitalist Democracies, are the highly organised Communist Parties whose policy is dominated by the Comintern in Moscow, presided over by Dimitrov, the Bulgarian socialist rendered famous by his courageous and successful defence during the celebrated Berlin trial springing out of the burning of the Reichstag in 1933. These Communist Parties within the territories of the Allied Governments, have pursued what has been termed a "contortionist"¹ policy, in order to

¹ See the angry pamphlet issued by the Labour Party Publication Department, Transport House, April 1940: *Stalin's Men—"About Turn"*. A more elaborate and

serve the national interests, not of their own country, but of the USSR. In the first stages of the Allies' war with Germany, during the period of the German Soviet Pact of 1939, they denounced the war as an "imperialist war, wholly in the interest of the ruling capitalist and landlord classes of Great Britain, intent on safeguarding and extending the British Empire with its dominion over the coloured races of Africa and Asia. But directly Hitler's German army marched, without warning, into the USSR, they suddenly turned round and started a campaign for an all-out war against Hitler's barbarous Nazi armed forces. How far Premier Stalin and his colleagues in the Sovnarkom and the Presidium approve of the continued existence of the Third International is unknown. In the two years after Lenin's death, Stalin successfully advocated the policy of building up a multiform democracy which would eliminate the capitalist and the landlord within the vast territory of the USSR; and he denounced Trotsky's alternative of organising, in other countries, violent revolutions against the capitalist system. Hence the foreign policy of the Soviet Government has been, throughout the leadership of Stalin, in favour of peace, if possible enforced by the League of Nations, and if that broke down, secured by treaties of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and all other sovereign states, without attempting to interfere with the internal organisation of each other's countries. Persistent rumour suggests that he would like to see the Comintern disappear, but, owing to its foundation by Lenin during the first glorious days of the revolution of 1917, he is not prepared to suppress it.¹

There is however another explanation for the continued existence of a British branch of the Comintern or Third International, and the con-

documented denunciation of this sudden twist-round of the Communist Party, June 22, 1941, is Victor Gollancz's able book, *Russia and Ourselves*. It is notable that neither one nor the other mentions the fact that the Communist Party is by its constitution dependent for its policy on the Comintern at Moscow; if that ceased to exist, the little group of able men presided over by the distinguished scientist Professor J. B. S. Haldane and the honest and able labour leader Harry Pollitt, as general secretary, could become members of the local Labour Parties or of the Fabian Society, and take an active part in the organisation of a united Labour and Socialist Party.

¹ We are told in the most authoritative history of the Communist Party—*Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 2 vols., by N. Popov—that (pp. 61-62) "The First, Constituent, Congress of the Communist International was held at the beginning of March 1919. It was attended by delegates from Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Germany, the United States, Norway, Hungary, Switzerland, Finland, Britain and other countries. The central question at the Congress was that of bourgeois democracy and proletarian dictatorship, the report on this question being made by Lenin. In his introductory speech at the opening of the Congress, Lenin said: 'It is only necessary to find that practical form which will enable the proletariat to realise its domination. Such a form is the Soviet system with the proletarian dictatorship. . . .' In Lenin's book *State and Revolution* we are told the purpose of the Comintern—"This victory of the world proletarian revolution calls for the greatest confidence, the closest fraternal union and the greatest possible unity of revolutionary action on the part of the working class in progressive countries. These conditions cannot be achieved unless a determined rupture is made on matters of principle, and a ruthless struggle is waged against the bourgeois distortion of socialism which has gained the upper hand among the leaders of the official Social Democratic and Socialist parties" (p. 63).

tinued clash of this organisation with the Labour and Socialist Parties within the capitalist democracies in which the blame is on the other side. From the very outset of the Bolshevik revolution in the autumn of 1917, the International Federation of Labour and Socialist Parties (known in former years as the Second International) has actually accepted, as representing the Russian people, three hardened counter-revolutionaries, who opposed Lenin and the revolution of 1917, and since then have continued to intrigue against the Soviet Government. It is also a regrettable fact that the International Federation of Trade Unions, representing the Trade Union movement of the capitalist democracies, has refused to accept, as members, representatives of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) with its twenty-three million members. It is an odd fact that it is only the International Cooperative Alliance which has from the first to last accepted representatives of the Central Board of the Centrosoyus with its thirty-seven million members.¹ Let us hope that Sir Walter Citrine by his wise recognition, on terms of equality and warm friendship, of the All-Union Central Committee of the Trade Unions of the USSR, will remedy this disastrous situation within the trade union world and that henceforth the Red trade unions will be represented by Russian trade unionists in the International Federation of Trade Unions. If so, we may hope that the International Federation of Labour and Socialist Parties will follow suit and that the Third International and Second International will be thus merged in one organisation aiming at a new social order within their own countries as well as permanent peace among all the nations of the world.

Britain and Russia : Social Reconstruction at Home

One more question. Why have I exhausted the dwindling strength of an Over-Eighty in arguing that Stalin is not a dictator, whose word is law, like Hitler is, and Mussolini tried to be ; that the USSR is not only a fully fledged political democracy, but also an industrial democracy, with a powerful trade union and consumers' cooperative movement, with a newly invented type of associations of owner-producers in the collective farms and industrial cooperatives, all alike under the control of the central and local government of a representative democracy, without distinction of sex, class or race ? And finally, that through planned production for community consumption, and the elimination of the profit-making motive, the Soviet Union has, in the short space of twenty years, increased the

¹ This " odd fact " is explained by the similarity in constitution and activities of the Consumers' Cooperative Movement in the Soviet Union and in capitalist countries ; whereas there is a striking difference (as will be understood by readers of the foregoing pages) between the constitution and activities of the Trade Union Movement within Capitalist Democracies, compared to the multiform democracy of the Soviet Union. This disparity of aim is even more true in the case of the Labour and Socialist Parties in capitalist countries, compared with the activities of the Communist Party in the USSR, with its planned production for community consumption as the accepted economic structure.

opportunity for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for the vast majority of its near two hundred million inhabitants, scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface ?

I started this task with the approval and help of my life partner (also an Over Eighty) because we thought it desirable that all those who are sincere in their avowed intention of creating a new social order within their own country, designed to eliminate the poverty in the midst of plenty, characteristic of the wealthiest and the most powerful of the capitalist democracies— the United Kingdom and the United States of America — should study the internal organisation of the USSR so as to avoid its mistakes and learn from its successful experiments. Owing to Great Britain's unified and stabilised population and unwritten constitution which permits every possible alteration, the establishment of this new social order need not involve a violent upheaval against a despotic and corrupt government, as it did in tsarist Russia. Thus the British people will be able to avoid the crudities and cruelties inherent in a sudden and violent revolution, rendered more ruthless by the intervention of foreign powers in favour of the old tsarist régime. On the other hand, in order to carry out this social reconstruction, without undue delay, it will be desirable to study the bolder experiments practicable in the USSR owing to the fact that the revolutionary government swept away the remnants of the old social order and therefore had a clear field for experiments, deliberately devised; to carry out their new living philosophy of scientific humanism. We may discover that many of the newly formed institutions are not contrary to the living philosophy of the Christian religion which the political leaders of the capitalist democracies assure us is the foundation-stone of our own civilisation, but are actually more in accordance with the precept of "love thy neighbour as thyself" than the root impulse of profit-making enterprise, "each man for himself and devil take the hindmost".

Cooperation for a New World Order

But this peaceful establishment of an equitable humane social order has ceased to be the main purpose of this essay. The vital issues confronting the British people are, first to win the war and then to win a permanent peace. It is obvious that the heroic resistance, over a battle-front of 1500 miles, put up not only by the Red Army and Air Force, followed by a successful offensive, but also by civilians, men, women and children, is helping us to win the war in a shorter time than was practicable before Great Britain's all-out alliance with the USSR. What seems crystal clear, even if we beat Germany to her knees and occupy her territory and emancipate the conquered peoples, we shall not secure a permanent peace without the whole-hearted consent of the USSR. In order to obtain this cooperation in setting up a new League of Nations for the prevention of aggression, we must treat the government and people of Soviet Russia as equals, without any reserve arising from the deep-seated antagonism

of our ruling class to the internal organisation of the socialist fatherland. For it is difficult to deny that during the period between the two world wars the ruling class of Great Britain was hostile to the continuance of Soviet Communism even within the land of its birth. In the remarkable book *Ambassador Dodds' Diary*—published after his death—there is documentary evidence that the governments of Great Britain and the U.S.A. were, through their diplomatic representatives, official and unofficial, trying to turn Hitler's aggressive "intuitions" away from their sea-bound frontiers towards the common enemy of Hitler's Germany and the capitalist democracies of the U.S.A. and the British Commonwealth of Nations—the Soviet Union. This would mean that Germany would have secured the enormous resources of oil, minerals and foodstuffs in the Ukraine and the Caucasus, and might have been able to defeat the superior man-power of the USSR with its one hundred and eighty million inhabitants.

To-day the scene has changed. Our great Prime Minister Churchill has secured national unity by the reorganisation of his Cabinet on the basis of close collaboration with the Soviet Union in decisively beating Hitler's army in the west, recapturing the Baltic Provinces, with a possible joint occupation of Berlin by the Allied armies. When this has been accomplished the four Great Powers—the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the heroic Chinese represented by Kai-shek—can render Japan powerless by bombing her cities and munition factories from the Siberian airfields and invading with armed forces Manchuria, and thus collaborating in throwing Japanese armies out of China.

This new outlook entails abandoning the hostile attitude of some sections of our ruling class towards the internal structure of the new social order established in the USSR. For if we fail to treat her on terms of equality as a democratic and freedom-loving people, how can we win the war against Hitler's barbaric hordes intent on world domination, and reconstruct on a democratic basis the devastated states of Denmark and Norway, of the Netherlands and Belgium, of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and above all, of the downcast and humiliated inhabitants of the great historic Republic of France. The recent treacherous assault of Japan on the U.S.A. and the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the preliminary victories of the Japanese air force in Malaya, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, is another instance of the urgent need of an all-out cooperation with the USSR, with our other ally China, against the barbarous Axis Powers. Whether we like it or not, it seems that, owing to the closeness of her lengthy frontiers, in the west and in the east, to Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union will become the paramount military Power in winning complete victory for the Allies. "The whole civilised world", said the late British Ambassador to Moscow—Sir Stafford Cripps—in his farewell message to the Soviet people, "proclaims your victories, and we, your allies, are proud to count ourselves as such. But

the end is not yet. The power of the Nazis is shaken but not broken. . . . When victory comes, of which we are so confident, our two nations will have the privilege of leading the peoples of Europe towards a civilisation of sanity and cooperation. Together we must march forward to that victory. Together we must work and plan to bring about the happier life which their sufferings and their patience have earned for the masses of humanity. . . ."

B. W.

Feb. 1942

PART I

THE CONSTITUTION

"By constitution we mean, whenever we speak with propriety and exactness, that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason . . . that compose the general system according to which the community has agreed to be governed."

HENRY ST. JOHN, first Viscount Bolingbroke,
Dissertation on Parties, 1733, p. 108

CHAPTER I

THE CONSTITUTION AS A WHOLE

THE constitution of the Soviet Union differs, we think, from any adopted elsewhere during the past couple of centuries, in not having been the outcome of deliberate and usually prolonged study by political philosophers and jurists. At no time was there anything in the nature of deliberation by a constituent assembly. There was no formulated outline or plan either of the constitution as a whole, or of the relation between its several parts. Even its most prominent feature—the broad base of innumerable local elected councils universally known as soviets—was adopted, as we shall describe in the following chapter, without this having been thought of as the permanent base of a stable government eighteen months before. It is, in fact, one of the difficulties of intelligibly describing this continuously evolving constitution that, whilst it is nowhere given as a whole, in any statute or official document, no part of it can be properly understood without having in mind all the rest. Thus, in the Soviet Union, what the western jurist is tempted to regard as the constitutional structure, namely, the pyramid of soviets, is plainly only a fragment of it, and, as some may say, not the most important fragment. Whether by statutory enactment or by accepted practice, the constitution of the USSR provides for the active participation of the people in the work of government in more than one way. It is therefore not only man as a citizen who is represented. He acts and votes separately in his capacity as a producer. Yet again, as a consumer, he also acts and votes separately. And, so far as concerns the millions who are members of the exclusive and highly disciplined Order of Companionship styled the Communist Party, which undertakes the vocation of public leadership, we find these citizens acting and voting also in a fourth capacity, which may be thought to be the most influential of all. Thus, in dealing with the structure of the USSR, we must cast off, wholly and permanently, the obsolete idea that the constitution of a nation is to be looked for exclusively in some legislative enactment, or other authoritative docu-

ment. We know now that in no nation, not even in the United States, is the whole constitution to be found in any document; just as in no nation, not even in the United Kingdom, is the constitution wholly unwritten. Whether or not we choose to say, with Ferdinand Lassalle, that "the real constitution" of any country is nothing more than "the actual relationships of power", we must, at any rate, always include, as part of the working constitution, everything that operates as such. Moreover, in the USSR, we must accept, once for all, the fact that no distinction is made between the exercise of power that elsewhere would be called legislation, and that which would be deemed executive action or administration. Every organ of administration in the USSR is capable of legislative and of executive action. Every one of them is free to act, within its own area and for all who find themselves within that area, very much as thinks fit, so long as it does not actually contravene any action or decision by a superior authority. But, equally, every one of them can be peremptorily restrained, and may have its action vetoed and cancelled, by any organ occupying a superior place in the hierarchy.

Can we venture on a brief summary of this elusive constitution before embarking on the description of its various parts? Such a sketch, whilst possibly suggesting more questions than it answers, may help the reader to understand the necessarily detailed pages that are to follow. As we see it, the government centred in the Moscow Kremlin is the apex of half a dozen pyramidal structures covering the whole of the USSR, each of them based, according to a common pattern, upon a vast number of relatively small meetings of associated citizens for almost continuous discussion, and for the periodical direct election of primary representative councils. Each of these structures rises tier after tier, through successive stages of councils, governing ever-widening areas and constituted by indirect election, up to a group which is supreme for each particular mass. These half a dozen culminating groups, in different combinations, and by more or less formal joint consultations, constitute the source of all governmental authority, whether legislative or executive.

What are these half a dozen pyramidal structures? There is first the hierarchy¹ of soviets, from those of the village and the city, through the district (rayon) and province (oblast) and constituent republic congresses or conferences, up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets of the USSR, with

¹ Our use of the term "hierarchy" must not be misunderstood. No doubt the earliest usage, many centuries ago, was to employ this word with a theological implication, relating to the "heavenly host"; or to this or that form of church establishment or priestly order. In English usage the term long ago came to be applied to non-theological organisations, but often with an implication of formation and control from the top. The use of the term in modern logic, or in contemporary science, now implies no necessary ascendancy or pre-eminence, any more than any theological reference, but merely "a body of persons or things ranked in grades, orders or classes, one above another"; or "a system or series of terms of successive rank (as classes, orders, genera, species, etc.) used in classification" (*New English Dictionary*). It is in this purely neutral sense of classification, implying neither dictatorship nor popular election, that we use the term in this book.

its Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and its Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom). In this hierarchy of soviets it is the citizen as such who is represented. But all citizens are assumed to be also producers by hand or by brain, or the non-able-bodied dependants thereof. A large and rapidly increasing proportion of them are actually wage or salary earners and members of their trade unions. All the producers thus paid are represented in the trade union hierarchy, equally based on innumerable small local workshop or office meetings of the members of each of the trade unions—now 154 in number—electing representative councils which rise, tier upon tier, up to separate central bodies for each of the several unions, and, yet further, to a supreme common assembly; the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, acting for the whole aggregate of wage or salary recipients engaged in production or distribution of goods or services, by hand or by brain.

There are, however, other producers who are not remunerated by wages or salaries but are themselves owners, wholly or in part, individually or jointly, of the instruments with which they work, and of the product of their labour. Of these owner-producers, as such excluded from the trade unions, there are now several classes, among which two stand out as the principal. These two classes, numbering together more than half the active producers in the USSR, may be thought to be developing constitutionally into massive pyramidal structures parallel with those of the trade unions and the soviets, and formed on a similar pattern. Thus, there are the millions of *kustar* workers, joined in *artels*, now constituted as industrial cooperative societies of owner-producers (*incops*) which elect their own tiers of councils for districts and provinces, culminating in a central delegate body at Moscow. There are equally the millions of members of collective farms (*kolkhosi*, as distinguished from state farms or *sovkhosi*), the federal constitution of which is still only in germ, although it is already more developed in other instances, notably in the corresponding organisation of professional fishermen.

All these producers, whether they work for wages or salary, or as partners sharing a joint product, have, however, in common, not only their citizenship, acting through the hierarchy of soviets, together with their function of production, organised partly in the hierarchy of trade unions, and partly in the several hierarchies of associations of owner-producers, but also a separate and quite distinct interest as consumers. Accordingly practically the whole of them—in 1935 fifty millions of adults—are united in the 45,000 country consumers' cooperative societies in each of which the membership elects its own board of management, whilst the societies are all united in district and provincial and republic associations, formed on substantially the common pattern of indirect election, and culminating in the Central Board of *Centrosoyus*, specifically representing the whole body of consumers throughout the USSR.

Finally, there is the remarkable Companionship or Order, termed the Communist Party, whose three million adult members and candidates,

supported by its still larger junior organisations of Little Octobrists, Pioneers and Comsomols, are not abstracted from the several masses of citizen producers and consumers, but, on the contrary, whilst remaining citizens, assume the function and the duty, not merely, in so far as they are elected or appointed to office, of serving the community as its principal administrators, but also, in working at the bench or in the mine, of continuously educating, inspiring, guiding and leading the whole people among whom they live and work. It is interesting to find the internal organisation of this Companionship or Order following the common pattern running through all the rest of the constitution, with its base in the members' meetings of the 130,000 primary organs, and its tier upon tier of district and provincial and republic councils formed by indirect election, up to the supreme All-Union Congress of the Party, electing its Central Committee, which acts through its Politbureau, and its Organ-bureau, and the extensive secretariat that it appoints.

What are not publicly formulated are the arrangements for the constantly shifting consultations and conferences which are perpetually taking place, not only, at each tier, between the intermediate councils and officials, but also between the several supreme bodies centred in Moscow and among their prominent leaders.¹ It is from these consultations and conferences that emanate the streams of orders and "directives" required for the government of so vast a country. The power needed for administration may be generated in the innumerable meetings of electors, producers, consumers and members of the Communist Party, which everywhere form the base of the constitutional structure. It is transmitted through the tiers of councils as by a mighty conducting cable, working, as it passes, the machinery of government in village and city, district (rayon) and province (oblast) and republic. It is this conception of an upward stream of continuously generated power, through multifarious mass organisation, to be transformed at the apex into a downward stream of authoritative laws and decrees and "directives", that is indicated by its inventors by the term "democratic centralism".

If we had to name the principal distinguishing feature in this complicated constitution, unlike any other known to political science, we should say its all-pervading multifariousness. This was more than once claimed by Lenin as one of the principal merits of Soviet Communism. The very multifariousness of the soviet administration, he said, "is a guarantee of vitality: it is a pledge that the common and single aim will be successfully fulfilled. The more varied, the better and the richer be the common

¹ Does not a similar "blind spot" exist in the visions of other constitutions given by the political scientists? It is never easy to evaluate, in one generation after another, the transient mouldings of the constitutional structure represented by the constantly shifting private consultations between different ministers, different departments and different administrative officials; not only with each other, but also with the Bank of England and the powerful associations of capitalist employers, representing, as they claim, all industry and commerce; and, even if only formally, with the leaders of the Trade Union and Cooperative Movements.

experience, the truer and swifter will be the achievements of socialism, the easier will be the practical work, and only practical work will be able to evolve the best methods and means of struggle.”¹

What is the cause or the explanation of this multiformity? The answer is that the working constitution of the USSR has necessarily to cover a much greater proportion of human life than that of any capitalist state, where so much is left to competitive profit-making. This all-inclusiveness was indicated in the “Declaration of the Rights of the Labouring and Exploited Peoples”, drafted by Lenin himself,² with which the Fundamental Law of July 10, 1918, opened. This declaration announced that—

“1. Russia is declared a republic of soviets of workers, soldiers and peasants’ deputies. All central and local authority is vested in these soviets.

“2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of national soviet republics.

“3. Within the fundamental aim of suppressing all exploitation of man by man, of abolishing for ever the division of society into classes, of ruthlessly suppressing all exploiters, of bringing about the socialist organisation of society and the triumph of socialism in all countries, the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of workers, soldiers and peasants’ deputies further decrees :

“(a) In order to establish the socialisation of land, private ownership of land is abolished ; all land is declared national property and is handed over to the labouring masses, without compensation, on the basis of an equitable division giving the right of use only.

“(b) All forests, underground mineral wealth, and waters of national importance, all live-stock and appurtenances, together with all model farms and agricultural enterprises, are proclaimed national property.

“(c) As the first step towards the complete transfer of factories, works, shops, mines, railways and other means of production and of transport to the ownership of the workers’ and peasants’ Soviet Republic, and in order to ensure the supremacy of the labouring masses over the exploiters, the Congress ratifies the soviet law on workers’ control of industry, and that on the Supreme Economic Council ”³

¹ Quoted in Shvernik’s speech in *The Ninth Trade Union Congress*, Moscow, 1933, p. 3.

² Lenin doubtless had in mind, in emphasising collectivism, the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” adopted by the French National Assembly in 1789, with its emphasis on individualism.

³ *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, New York,⁴ 1929, p. 81. It was given in Molotov’s speech to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) on January 23, 1933, as reported in *Moscow Daily News*, January 29, 1933. Molotov expressly said that this Declaration of 1918 was “written by the hand of Lenin”. A French translation of this “Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, ratified by the Third National Congress of Soviets”, will be found in *Une Législation communiste*, by Raoul Labry, Paris, 1920.

The second document of this kind, formally adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1923, is more lengthy and may be read in the Appendix at the end of Part I. It was addressed, doubtless in recollection of the American Declaration of Independence, "to all governments and all peoples of the earth". Its purpose was to announce to the world the formation of the new federal state. "From the first moment of their existence", runs this grandiloquent announcement, "the soviet republics were united by the bonds of close cooperation and mutual assistance, which subsequently assumed the form of treaties of alliance. The power of the workers and peasants united them into a single unit, with common needs, in their struggle against the attacks of foreign capitalist states, and against the internal counter-revolutionary attacks on the soviet form of society. The solidarity of the labouring masses united them in their common task of establishing fraternal cooperation between the liberated peoples. Together they emerged from the victorious proletarian revolution, having overthrown the power of their landowners and capitalists. Together they passed through the dire experiences of intervention and blockade, and emerged triumphant. Together they started the enormous task of restoring the national economy, on the basis of the new economic structure of society, after it had passed through unprecedented calamities.

"Whilst rendering to one another constant fraternal assistance with all their strength and resources, they nevertheless for a long time remained separate states only united by treaties of alliance.

"The further development of their mutual relations and the requirements of the international position have now led them to combine into one united state."

In the following chapters we seek to describe all the various parts of this constitution as they have grown, during the past eighteen years, into the organic structure of the hundred and seventy millions of people inhabiting the largest continuous geographical area in the world, comprising one-sixth of the entire land-surface of the globe.¹

¹ It is the invariable custom in the USSR to describe its area as one-sixth of the land-surface of the earth. In the League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook* the area of the USSR is given as 21,176,000 kilometres (of which 5,999,000 kilometres are in Europe). The earth's land-surface is there given as 132,520,000 kilometres, of which the USSR forms, accordingly, 15.981 per cent, or somewhat less than one-sixth (16.666 per cent), but much more than one-seventh (14.285 per cent). We do not know whether all the soviet islands in the Arctic Ocean are included in the League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook* estimate.

CHAPTER II

MAN AS A CITIZEN

IN this chapter we deal with the part of the constitution of the USSR, the pyramid of soviets, which was enacted as the "fundamental law" of the new state, and has therefore been accepted by many commentators as if it were the whole of the constitution. How mistaken is this view, and to what serious errors in interpretation it leads, will appear in the following chapters.

The Origin of the Soviet System

"The soviet system", it has been well said, "was one of those innumerable creations of the human mind which seem to owe their existence to a fortunate historical accident. It has survived because it proved to be peculiarly well adapted to become the organ of that dictatorship of the workers which lies at the foundation of communist theory and practice."¹

By the word soviet, which originally meant any kind of council, is now understood a council of delegates or deputies chosen by the workers employed in the several factories and other establishments in an industrial city or district; or by the soldiers in the various units of an army; or by the peasants of a village or agricultural district or community; or by any combination of these constituent groups. Its most obvious difference from other political entities is that it avowedly excludes the representation of the capitalist employers, landowners, shop-keepers, and persons of no occupation, even if these are of the same tribe, race or nationality, or are resident within the area concerned. Soviets of this nature were spontaneously created in May and June of 1905 at Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Kostroma to conduct strikes of textile workers.² They seem to have been invented on the spur of the moment, owing particularly to the absence of any independent and trusted trade union. These working-class organs did not confine themselves to the strikes, and assumed some of the functions of the decrepit local government. It was, however, the soviet formed in St. Petersburg in October 1905 that gave a lead to the rest of Russia. At its first meeting, on October 13, 1905, "it was only partly representa-

¹ *How the Soviets Work*, by H. N. Brailsford, New York, 1927, p. 57. This admirable, unpretentious little book, together with its predecessor *The Russian Workers' Republic*, New York, 1920, by the same author—though more complete and erudite volumes are now available—still afford, in brief, the best pictures known to us of the life of the USSR.

² "It was the greatest strike ever witnessed in Russia. . . . Thus it was that the first soviet of workers' delegates in Russia was formed between May 15 and 18, 1905. For the first time the workers came forward as a class for themselves, and no longer under the influence of the 'democrats' as they had been from the time of Gapon" (*Brief History of Russia*, by M. N. Pokrovsky, translated by D. S. Mirsky, London, 1934, vol. ii. pp. 153-154, 189-190).

tive, consisting as it did of the factories from only the Nevsky district. A proclamation was issued in its name which said: We propose that every factory and every trade should elect a delegate for every hundred workers. The delegates of each factory shall form the factory committee. The delegates of all the factories shall form the General Workers' Committee of St. Petersburg." ¹ In the course of the next two months similar soviets sprang into being in a score of other Russian cities, from Reval to Baku, but their prompt suppression allowed no opportunity for any national congress of soviets to be convened.

The summary suppression of the soviets of 1905 did not prevent their remaining in the minds of the Russian workers. When, in February 1917, the tsarist régime fell, almost of its own rottenness, the workers in the Petrograd factories at once spontaneously formed a soviet, which did not concern itself specially with any strike, but discussed and voted on all matters of public interest. This example was quickly followed by the workers of Moscow and those of many other industrial cities. Presently the Petrograd soviet invited all the other city soviets to send delegates to constitute a congress of soviets, which appointed a standing committee to sit and act between one congress meeting and another. Here, it would seem, might be the basis for a workers' government of the whole state. But it does not appear that this was immediately recognised as a possible development of what had been originally mere strike committees. The Bolshevik Party was nominally still working for the Party programme of 1903, which had never been revised, and which, whilst emphasising the full collectivism of its economic side, contemplated, on the political side, the substitution, for the tsarist autocracy, of nothing more novel than an extremely democratic parliamentary assembly.² Lenin, it is true, at once recognised the importance of the novel form of "soviets of workers' deputies" of 1905, in which he saw "new organs of people's power". At the Fourth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party, in April 1906, a resolution was adopted explaining that the soviets, in the process of struggle, became transformed from "pure strike organisations into organisations of *general revolutionary struggle*", and represented the "embryo of revolutionary power", dependent for "their strength and significance entirely upon the strength and success of *the uprising*"

¹ *Brief History of Russia*, vol. ii. p. 166. Details will be found in the Russian work *On the History of Soviets of Workers' Deputies in 1905*, by P. Gorin, second edn., Moscow, 1930. See also, for further details, *From Peter the Great to Lenin*, by S. P. Turin, 1935.

² This programme asserted that "the first and immediate task put before itself by the Russian Social Democratic Party is to overthrow the tsarist monarchy, and to create a democratic republic, whose constitution would guarantee the following:

"1. The sovereignty of the people, i.e. the concentration of all supreme state power in the hands of a legislative assembly, consisting of the people's representatives, and forming one chamber.

"2. Universal, equal and direct suffrage for all male and female citizens, twenty years old or over, at all elections to the legislative assembly and to the various local organs of self-government: the secret ballot at elections: the right of every voter to be elected to any representative institution: biennial parliaments: salaries to be paid to the people's representatives."

They were, in fact, at first regarded, as Lenin expressed it as late as November 20, 1915, merely as "*organs of rebellion*" (*Works*, vol. xviii. p. 312). There seems, accordingly, some warrant for the suggestion of an acute German historian, that, whilst Lenin had long foreseen the necessity of transforming the bourgeois liberal revolution into a socialist revolution, and had at once recognised the soviets as the weapon for effecting this transformation, it was only in March 1917, on receiving in Switzerland the first authentic news of the revolution in Russia, "that he (Lenin) made a fateful discovery. He became convinced that the system of Soldiers' and Workers' Councils—soviets—was the modern expression of the inevitable socialist-democratic revolution. . . . In the soviet Lenin recognised the existence, in a weak and elementary form, of an entirely new type of working-class government which could only be compared historically with the Paris Commune of 1871. His study of the soviet convinced Lenin that everything which Marx had said in his famous essay on the constitutional and political aspects of the Paris Commune applied with equal truth to the Russian soviet in 1917."¹

This is why, from the moment of his arrival in Petrograd, Lenin came more and more to speak of the soviets, as not only a means of checking and controlling the Provisional Government, and not merely as the instrument for the approaching overthrow of that Government, but even, occasionally, as the necessary basis of the new political constitution. It seems, however, that, right down to the actual seizure of power in October 1917, Lenin apparently thought it better that the Bolshevik Party should not commit itself definitely against a democratic parliamentary system as the political instrument for the administration of the socialist state that he intended.² This, however, did not prevent the launching of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets".

By October 1917 Lenin had become enthusiastic about the soviets not

¹ *Geschichte des Bolshevismus*, by Arthur Rosenberg, 1932, translated as *History of Bolshevism*, 1934, p. 87.

In the third of Lenin's "Letters from Afar", dated March 11/24, 1917, he discussed the rôle of soviets as organs, not merely of rebellion, but of proletarian democracy, as "the government of the soviets of workers' deputies" (*Works*, vol. ii. of English edition, p. 35). In the "Fifth Letter" he summed up that the next stage of the revolution must be the transfer of the state power to a new government which "must be organised on the model of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies" (*ibid.* p. 62, and see also pp. 99, 123, 128, dated April 1917).

² It is interesting to notice that, in May 1917, when Lenin was instructed to prepare for printing "all the material at the disposal of the Central Committee relating to a revision of the Party Programme"—this material consisting mainly of Lenin's own draft of the proposed new programme—he left unaltered the demand for a single supreme legislative assembly, elected by universal direct suffrage and secret ballot, merely adding proportional representation and recall by a majority of electors. His changing opinion is indicated only by the proposal to prefix a declaration asserting that "all representative parliamentary institutions would gradually give place to soviets of the people's representatives (from various classes and professions, or from various localities), functioning both as legislative and executive bodies".

(The old programme of 1903, and Lenin's proposed amendments, "written in May 1917", will be found in vol. xx. bk. i. of the English edition of Lenin's *Works*, p. 353. The revision was not proceeded with until 1919.)

merely as an "organ of rebellion" or an instrument of revolution but also as "a step forward in the development of democracy"; though the terms in which he describes them indicate that he had at that time a very inadequate vision of the gigantic edifice of government that was destined to be erected on this basis.¹ Finally, when the uprising had practically achieved success, and the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets was deliberating, actually within sound of the guns, it was decided, at his instance, by a large majority, that the supreme power should be vested, not in any parliamentary assembly, but in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets itself. In the course of its continuous session of twenty hours the same congress appointed a provisional "workers' and peasants' government", to be known as the Soviet of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), to act under the control of the congress and its central executive committee (TSIK); adopted Lenin's thundering declarations as to the immediate conclusion of peace; the transfer of the nationalised land to the peasantry in usufruct; and the election of workers' committees in all industrial establishments; and incidentally decided that the title of the new state should be the Russian Soviet Republic.²

During the next few months the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars, under the presidency of Lenin, governed the country with a high hand, struggling with a mass of executive business and issuing innumerable decrees on small matters and on great. Meanwhile some of the People's Commissars and various small committees were discussing the different items, and drafting the clauses, of a systematic constitution.³ All these

¹ Lenin's words are worth quoting. "The soviets", he wrote, "are the new state apparatus, which in the first place represents the armed force of the workers and peasants, a force which is not divorced from the people, as was the force of the old standing army. . . . Secondly, this apparatus represents a connection with the masses, with the majority of the people, that is so intimate, so indissoluble, so readily verifiable and renewable, that nothing like it was even approached in the former state. Thirdly, this apparatus, because it is elective, and its personnel is subject to recall in accordance with the will of the people without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than were the former ones. Fourthly, it represents a firm connection with the most diverse occupations, thus facilitating all sorts of radical reforms without any bureaucracy. Fifthly, it represents a form of organisation of the vanguard, i.e. of the most class-conscious, most energetic, more progressive section of the oppressed classes of the workers and peasants, whereby the vanguard can elevate, educate and lead in its train the whole gigantic mass of those classes which until now have stood absolutely outside all political life, outside history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of parliamentarism with the advantages of immediate and direct democracy, i.e. to unite, in persons of elected representatives of the people, both legislative and executive functions. Compared with bourgeois parliamentarism this is a step forward in the development of democracy which has an historical world significance" ("Will the Bolsheviks retain State Power?" written during October 1917 and published in the first and only number of the new issue of *Prosveshchenie*, a monthly journal. Included in Lenin's *Works*, vol. xvi. bk. ii. pp. 26-27, of the English edition).

² *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, pp. 52-53; *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, p. 18; *History of the Russian Revolution*, by L. Trotsky, vol. iii., 1933, pp. 297-337; *La Révolution russe*, par Fernand Grénard, Paris, 1933, chap. xii.; *History of the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935.

³ A summary of the proceedings of this period, taken mainly from *Istoria sovetskoi Konstitutsii*, and *Osnovy sovetskoi Konstitutsii*, both by G. C. Gurvich, is given in *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, pp. 67-68.

suggestions needed to be adjusted and combined, a task which the Central Executive Committee entrusted early in April 1918 to a drafting commission of fifteen, among whom were Sverdlov and Stalin, but not Lenin himself. When the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets assembled in July 1918, the draft so prepared was, without prolonged debate or serious challenge, immediately adopted as the "constitution or fundamental law" of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSSR). With many minor amendments this fundamental law has remained to this day (1935) substantially unchanged; and in 1923 its provisions were, in the main, adopted for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The Base of the Pyramid

The stability and permanence of a pyramid depend essentially upon the width and soundness of its base. In the USSR the electorate is at once more widely extended and more peculiarly restricted than in any other country; with the net result that it constitutes by far the largest voting body in the world, having at least as high a proportion of electors to the adult population as the United Kingdom or the United States of America, whilst in the USSR a much higher percentage of that electorate are actual voters at elections than in either of those countries. The right to vote, and with it the right of eligibility for office, is avowedly based on active participation in socially useful work of one or other kind, by hand or by brain; although not excluding those who, by age or infirmity, have ceased to be capable of such work. Every man or woman in the USSR who is not included in one or other of the legally disqualified categories finds himself or herself, at the early age of eighteen,¹ automatically entitled to vote, and to be elected to any position. The student of other electoral systems will be struck by the inclusiveness of this franchise. Apart from sheer incapacity to get to the meeting, there are practically none of the usual impediments to the actual exercise of the vote. Unlike every other political system, Soviet Communism does not exclude from its electorate residents living within its borders merely because they are of alien birth or nationality.² There is no disqualification by sex or marriage; by illiteracy or inability to speak or read any particular language; or by religious belief or lack of religious belief. Nor is there any requirement of independent occupancy or period of residence, which elsewhere so often excludes the mass of actually serving soldiers and sailors, domestic servants, lodgers in other people's houses and residents in hotels, boarding-

¹ The minimum age qualifying for the electoral franchise in different countries ranges from 18 to 25. The only countries, besides the USSR, allowing people of 18 to vote (and then men only) are Turkey, Argentina and (if married) Mexico. The minimum age for eligibility for elective office ranges from 18 (USSR only) to as much as 30. "No country in the world has yet thought of denying the franchise on the grounds of old age" (*Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, by Herman Finer, 1932, vol. i. p. 415).

² See p. 18 for an instance of an American citizen being allowed to vote. Among the members elected in January 1935 to the Moscow City Soviet is an American citizen (a negro).

houses and institutions ; together with the majority of the different kinds of " transients ". There is no disfranchisement of persons actually serving in any kind of public employment, such as sometimes disqualifies soldiers, revenue officers, policemen, postmen or other recipients of government pay or pension. Nor is there any disqualification for pauperism or the receipt of public assistance of any kind ; nor for bankruptcy ; nor (except where the deprivation of political rights for a stated term forms part of a judicial sentence) even for conviction of a criminal offence ; though persons in exile, or actually detained in penal institutions, are disqualified for the period of their exile or detention.¹

The Categories of the " Deprived "

On the other hand, there is compiled and publicly posted, in each electoral area, a list of local residents belonging to certain specified classes from whom both the right to vote and eligibility for elected office, and equally for trade union and consumers' cooperative society membership, are statutorily withheld. " The following persons ", enacts the " Fundamental Law " of the RSFSR,² which has formed the model for the laws of

¹ The " Instructions for the Election of Soviets and Delegates to the Congresses ", dated October 1, 1934 (printed in *Izvestia*, October 5, 1934), provide expressly, in the final paragraph of Article 14, that foreign " workers " have the right to vote ; and that foreign " specialists " may be granted the right to vote if they are loyal to the soviet power.

² Fundamental Law of the RSFSR, ratified by the Fifth Congress, July 10, 1918, fourth section, chap. lxiv. ; *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, pp. 31-34 ; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 92. This article was slightly modified in wording in 1925 and 1929 (becoming chap. lxix.), as given in French in *URSS : La Fédération soviétique et ses républiques*, by André Pierre, Paris, 1932, p. 26, and in the *Annuaire diplomatique* for 1933 (Moscow, 1933).

The decided cases show the following as held to be " deprived " : " Farmers, stock-raisers and mechanics who employ labour to an extent that enlarges their business beyond that of a toiler ; agriculturists and stock-raisers who also have trade and industrial establishments such as mills or shops with motor equipment, or those who manage them with permanent or seasonal outside help ; persons who rent out complicated farm machinery and motor equipment ; owners of large fishing-vessels who rent them out ; persons who loan money on security of stock, machinery, etc. ; persons who charge a land rent which is considered by rayon tax commissions as exorbitant ; persons who rent orchards or vineyards for purposes of exploitation (exceptions may be made when the tax commission does not consider the rents high enough to impose the unified individual and agricultural tax) ; owners and renters of undertakings who distribute work to individuals to be done at home, or lease or sub-lease these undertakings to a second party ; private traders, jobbers and middlemen, renters and owners of undertakings of factory-plant dimensions ; former officers and officials of the White Armies and leaders of counter-revolutionary bands ; all employees and agents of the tsarist police, especially of the corps of gendarmes, and all persons who were directly or indirectly connected with the former police ; ministers and officials of the old régime ; members of the imperial family ; former members of the prison staffs ; leaders of the nobility ; members of the prosecuting staffs and those who have held commanding positions in disciplinary battalions ; former and present employees of religious cults ; persons who have been exiled in an administrative manner for the duration of their exile and those who have been deprived of the franchise by judicial process, and persons in penal institutions " (*The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, pp. 32-33).

The latest statement of the categories of the " deprived " is that contained in the " Instructions for the Election of Soviets and Delegates to the Congresses ", dated October 1, 1934, and printed in *Izvestia*, October 5, 1934.

all the constituent republics as well as for that of the federation (USSR), "have neither the right to vote nor the right to be elected, even if they are included within one of the above-mentioned categories [of persons entitled to the franchise]:

- "(a) Persons employing hired labour for the sake of profit.
- "(b) Persons living on income not derived from their own labour, such as interest on capital, income from industrial enterprise, landed property, etc.
- "(c) Private business men and trade commercial agents.
- "(d) Monks and clergymen of all religious denominations.
- "(e) Employees and agents of the former police, or of the special gendarme corps and secret police, and members of the former ruling dynasty of Russia.
- "(f) Persons legally recognised as mentally deranged or imbecile, as well as those under guardianship.
- "(g) Persons convicted of 'infamous or mercenary crimes' for a period fixed by judicial sentence, according to law."

The percentage of members of these "deprived" categories has varied greatly from time to time and from locality to locality. In ten districts (uezds) of Pensensky gubernia in 1922, in which there were 892,244 electors, it was found by a statistical enquiry that the total number of the "deprived" was 9186, or just over 1 per cent of the electorate. Among them were 2070 traders and middlemen, 1187 rentiers and 581 employers, making a total of 3838 (two-fifths of the total exclusions) "deprived" on grounds of economic class. There were 1814 clergy and 1420 former members of the Tsar's police, making a total of 3234 (one-third of the exclusions), disqualified on account of professional occupation. Finally there were 1750 excluded by judicial sentence for crime, and 564 for unsoundness of mind.¹ On the other hand, it is alleged that in Leningrad, Kiev and Moscow there used to be, ten years ago, more than 10 per cent of the electorate in the "deprived" categories.

Of the numbers formerly excluded from the suffrage, many have died and others have been enfranchised by successive acts of leniency. At first the disqualification applied equally to persons who had at any time belonged to these categories but had ceased to do so, and also to the spouses and to the sons and daughters of such persons. But it has for some years been possible for the local electoral commissions to remove from the list of the disqualified the sons and daughters who could show that they are engaged in socially useful work, and have completed five years' service in it. Recent laws and election instructions have now admitted to the franchise all persons otherwise qualified who have reached the age of eighteen since 1925. A similar opportunity of escape may be given to older persons who have been for five years occupied in productive

¹ *Soviets, Congresses of Soviets and Ispolkoms, being Materials for the Study of the Soviet Administration* (Russian), Moscow, 1924, p. 7.

and socially necessary labour, and have proved their loyalty to the soviet power, at the discretion of the local commission responsible for the management of the elections, by whom the list of disqualified local residents is annually prepared.¹ This local discretion is said to be now exercised with reasonable leniency, each person being dealt with according to what are deemed his present merits in the way of socially useful occupation.

The result is that the numbers disqualified have been steadily declining, partly owing to statutory amendments, partly as a consequence of the trend of decisions on cases made the subject of appeal, and partly owing to the increasing leniency of the local electoral commissions.² The latest statistics as to the "deprived" that we have seen relate to the soviet elections of 1931 and were stated to cover between 80 and 90 per cent of the whole USSR. Of the total population over eighteen an average of 3.9 per cent were disqualified, as compared with 4.9 per cent at the elections of 1929. In the cities the fall had been from 8.5 to 4.9 per cent, whilst in the rural districts it was from 4.1 to 3.7 per cent.³ No fewer than 28.4 per cent of those "deprived" in the cities, and 43.4 per cent

¹ By the "Instructions for the Election of Soviets and Delegates to the Congresses", dated October 1, 1934 (printed in *Izvestia*, October 5, 1934) it is made clear that former kulaks working in the gold and platinum industry may be reinstated in their right to vote after three years of productive labour; and udmiki among them even earlier.

² A recent careful enquiry into decided cases "shows that . . . the following classes have the franchise: fishermen and peasants who sell the product of their toil in the open market: owners of all kinds of undertakings such as dairies, etc., who do not employ outside labour or distribute work to individual households: mechanics who do not employ outside labour, or who employ only two apprentices and one journeyman and sell the product of their own toil only on the open market: persons who live on the winnings of state lotteries or interest on state bonds or savings which are deposited in state savings banks: persons who receive aid from friends and relatives abroad, or insurance benefits from abroad: invalids of toil and war who are conducting small businesses: janitors, bellringers and similar employees of churches, and, strange as it may seem, members of [church] councils: members of the free professions who perform public useful labour, and children of those who have been disfranchised but who have come of age since 1925, who may have been as minors dependent on their parents but who are not performing useful work, although they still may be living with their parents" (*The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, p. 32).

³ The following table shows how each category contributes to the total:

Category	Percentage of Total Disqualifications	
	In Cities	In Rural Areas
Employers	5.3	22.2
Unearned incomes	8.3	5.9
Traders	39.9	10.1
Clergy	4.9	6.8
Former police	3.2	4.7
Unsound mind	1.2	1.5
Judicial sentence	8.8	5.4
Dependants of above over 18	28.4	43.4
	100	100

From Report of Presidium of Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of All-Union Congress of Soviets, 1931; see summary by Lazare Teper, in *American Political Science Review*, October 1932.

of those "deprived" in the rural areas, were dependants over eighteen of "deprived" husbands or parents: The decline is continuing. Counting by families, it is doubtful whether the exclusions, apart from unsound mind or judicial sentence, now average, in the rural areas, as many as 1 per cent of the families; or, in the cities, as many as 2 or 3 per cent of the families. "In 1934", declared Molotov to the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets, "there were 2.5 per cent disfranchised persons from among the entire adult population, which amounts to a little over two millions. Compare that with the total number of voters to the Soviets, which amounted last year to 91 million persons." Within another decade it is anticipated that practically all those "deprived" on grounds of present or former occupation, together with their sons and daughters, will, with one exception, have disappeared from the lists.¹ The net result of the enfranchisements and disqualifications is now a colossal and ever-rising electorate, which in 1935 reached 91 millions of men and women, being 55 per cent of the census population: an electorate of which some 85 per cent actually participates in the voting, and which increases at the rate of more than two millions per annum.²

The Village Meeting

Whilst the electoral franchise is the same in the village as in the city, the methods of election necessarily differ. We take the village meeting first, not only because it represents three-quarters of the whole population of the USSR, but also because it is typically Russian in its characteristics.

The village meeting represents probably the oldest constitutional form in Russia; and, as in various other countries, it antedates alike representative assemblies and statute law. Like the English parish vestry meeting of the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries,³ and its seventeenth-century offspring, the New England town meeting, the village meeting in Russia cannot be shown to have had any statutory origin. Whilst it has been legally regulated and restricted from time to time, and also has had additional functions assigned to it, there has never been any precise

¹ The exception is that of the priesthood. Whether or not the number of ministers of religion continues to shrink, we cannot anticipate that they will entirely disappear from the USSR, nor can we speculate as to the possibility of a change of soviet policy when all anxiety about the continuance of the soviet régime has passed away.

² After each general election, the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) publishes a report (*Osnovnye itogi raboty Pravitelstva*). The latest totals (in round numbers) are as under:

	Electorate	Voters	Percentage of Electorate
1927	77,800,000	39,000,000	50.2
1929	81,300,000	51,800,000	63.5
1931	85,900,000	60,000,000	70.9
1934	91,000,000	77,000,000	85.0

³ See *The Parish and the County*, by S. and B. Webb, 1907.

or complete delimitation of its powers. At the height of its authority, as the Mir, towards the close of the eighteenth century, it could apparently discuss any subject of local interest, apart from such as might be regarded as "political questions". It could declare the will of the village; direct any action to be taken within the village that the assembled villagers agreed upon; redistribute the holdings of land; alter the conditions of tenure; extract pecuniary contributions from any or all of the villagers; and even decide that recalcitrant members should be exiled to Siberia, a decision carried out by the tsarist police. On the other hand, the Mir was always subject to arbitrary control whenever the Tsar's Ministers chose to interfere. In particular, its members ran the risk of punishment by local official or judge for coming to "decisions not within the competency of the assembly". Moreover, by a ukase of December 24, 1905, any decision come to after the drinking of vodka might be declared to be invalid!¹

The village meeting in the USSR, now including all residents or occupiers, male or female, over eighteen, not being among the "deprived" categories, has lost some of the powers of the Mir, but is still unfettered by any precise limitation of what it may do. It may, however, now discuss any matters relating to the government, central or local. We are here concerned only with its position as the base of the pyramid of soviets. Whilst the meeting can still be held as often as is desired, and may, in practice, discuss anything in which its members are interested, a new and important function (if it has not less than 300 inhabitants) is the triennial election of the village soviet (selosoviet). This is conducted by an independent electoral commission, the president of which is appointed for each electoral area by the presidium of the rayon. This president is assisted by ten members nominated by the village soviet itself. The commission fixes the date at which the election is to take place; appoints a chairman for each meeting; revises the existing list of persons excluded from the franchise, and causes this to be publicly posted in the village; and sees to it that the electors are, five days in advance, personally notified to attend, as a quorum of 40 per cent of the electorate must be present to avoid an adjournment. The chairman of the meeting, who is supported by two assessors whom the meeting itself elects, announces the total number of electors in the electoral area and also the number present at the meeting, so as to demonstrate that there is the requisite quorum, and declares how many persons the meeting is called upon to elect. This is fixed by statute at one for each hundred of the population, with presumably one for the excess fraction over even hundreds—roughly equivalent to one for every fifty electors—but with a minimum of three members. The provision fixing a maximum of fifty members was omitted from the Election Instructions of 1931 and 1934. In addition, one-third of the

¹ The Mir was confined to heads of households belonging to the local community, and women were usually not permitted to participate. It could not appoint to public office any person neither owning property within its area nor permanently resident there.

number are to be elected as "candidates", meaning substitutes or alternates. The electoral meeting has also to elect a revision or auditing committee distinct from the soviet itself. Men and women are then nominated (either by themselves or by their friends), sometimes without recommendation, but often in speeches of fluent if rude eloquence. Wherever there is an active cell or nucleus of the Communist Party, this will usually prepare a "slate" of recommended candidates, seldom confined to Party members; usually putting these forward only for a certain proportion of the places to be filled, and often deliberately including ten or fifteen persons in excess of the places. At one stage it was officially ordered that, except in the districts practically covered by collective farms, there should be held, prior to the election meeting, a meeting of poor peasants (*bednyaki*) in order that they might prepare their own nominations. The vote is taken, as has been immemorially the custom, by show of hands, usually in a lengthy process of rejecting one by one those candidates whom the meeting does not support. Finally, the candidates who have received the votes of a majority of the meeting—the number having been thereby reduced down to the number of places to be filled—are put simultaneously to the vote, now usually unanimous, and declared by the chairman to be elected. Apparently the Russian peasant has never known such devices as "proportional representation", the "second ballot", or even any system of "exhaustive voting". On the other hand, it seems to have always been assumed, and is now invariably the rule, that the electoral meeting, and indeed any electing or appointing body, is empowered at all times to "recall", by its votes at a subsequent meeting at which 40 per cent of the electors form a quorum, any person whom it has elected, and to substitute for him, for the remainder of his term of office, as for anyone who dies or voluntarily resigns, any person from the list of those elected as "candidates" or substitutes.

A Discussion Forum

At this point it is well to remember that these meetings of the village electors are summoned, not merely triennially to elect the *selosoviets*,¹ but also frequently throughout the three years, often six or eight times within twelve months. These meetings are habitually, though not invariably, held in the evening, and are reported to be numerous attended, often by more than half the total electorate, and not infrequently by nearly as large a proportion of women as of men. The discussions range over the whole field of public interests, full expression being given to local desires. So many people wish to speak that the meeting is occasionally adjourned to a subsequent date. Resolutions may be passed for transmission to other authorities, but most of the speaking is directed

¹ The election of the soviets at first took place annually. A few years ago it was directed to be held every two years. Now it is, in village, rayon, oblast and republic alike, triennial. The recall can be exercised at any time by the electing body.

towards impressing the audience, and especially those members who have been or who are likely to be elected to the soviet; and who are expected to be present to supply information and to answer questions. The village meeting may pass resolutions in the nature of suggestions or instructions on any subject whatsoever, addressed either to the village soviet or to any higher authority. Thus the meeting may voice the popular desire for a public bath-house or a village hall, or for the establishment or closing of the government vodka shop.¹ All this helps to make the discussion interesting. Whether or not the resolutions are carried out, they have always to be forwarded to the rayon soviet, and they may be sent to any other authorities concerned; and their repetition in the same or in other localities becomes influential.

Thus, it seems that the working constitution of the USSR—taking, for the moment, only that part of it which lives in the villages and is represented in the pyramid of soviets—is rooted in an almost inconceivable amount of public discussion, in literally a million or two of small local meetings in the course of each year. Whether or not the vociferous debaters at these innumerable meetings get all the attention they desire, the political student will note, not only the amount of political education, but also the sense of continuous participation in public administration that such discussions create.

We have not ourselves had the opportunity of attending any village election meetings; and we have found hardly any detailed description by eye-witnesses. But the following, by a competent American observer, gives what we believe to be a characteristic sketch.

"I was present", writes Karl Borders, "at the election at Maslov Kut² in 1926, and even voted (for all resident workers of the country above the age of eighteen are eligible to vote whether actually Russian citizens or not). . . . As soon as the registration of those present was verified, the meeting opened with a speech by an organiser from the county centre. The visitor urged the selection of good, honest workers to the soviet, and particularly asked that some women be elected. . . . A caucus had previously prepared a complete list of candidates for the thirty-six places on the soviet, and this slate was first offered *in toto* to the assembly. With very slight parley this overture was almost unanimously rejected, and it was decided to make nominations from the floor. . . . One by one the names were shouted up to the secretary, who entered them as candidates. Sometimes a few identifying remarks were made,

¹ We have been told that, in one case in which a resolution to close the vodka shop was carried, the women electors rallied at the next meeting and got it reversed—not because they approved of the men's drinking habits, but because they thought the closing would only lead to the men journeying, or sending their wives, to the nearest vodka shop 16 versts away!

² *Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, New York, 1927, pp. 111-115. The author is an American graduate, who spent over a year in the USSR, after long experience of Russians in Chicago.

Maslov Kut is a village in the rayon of Archangolskoe in the North Caucasus, with a population of 3600 in 750 houses or courtyards.

but for the most part all of those suggested were well known and needed no such introduction. . . . The wish of the voter, as of old, is expressed by the raising of the hand. Nearly a hundred years ago the Tsar's government attempted to introduce the ballot-box in the village assemblies, but the peasants called it 'playing marbles', and would have nothing to do with it. Again the soviets have simply used an ancient custom, and have not invented one for the occasion. It is true that this open method of voting makes clear the political persuasion of the voters. But in this instance it seemed to deter freedom of expression very little. The little bloc of richer peasants voted together as a man. The few women stood manfully by the members of their sex who were nominated. The whole yard turned against the candidates offered from the workers of the sovkhos, reflecting clearly the effects of the land dispute between the village and the government farm which had been hanging in the courts for many months. Hour after hour the process moved on in the Russian way. As in the old village Mir, discussion ran free and high. . . . At times a candidate was asked to mount the verandah so that he might be seen by all. One was pronounced too young. Others were refused election on the basis of their indifferent records. The kulaks voted solidly against the women. My own political enthusiasm waned after two or three hours . . . but the villagers . . . used the rest of the mid-winter day to select the whole quota of candidates and the auditing commission, which by law must be chosen separately at the time of the general election. The final result showed that of the thirty-six members elected to the soviet three were women, five communists and remainder non-Party peasants of the village. . . . On the whole, one is impressed with the 'essential democracy' of these . . . meetings, and is certainly not aware of any intimidation on the part of the authorities. There is an intimacy about the smaller unit of the village, with its old-entrenched families, that makes little political hoodwinking possible. . . . Certainly the great emphasis on getting out the vote does not argue for the widely believed fiction that the communists are afraid of the will of the peasant. The daily conduct of public business is the only form of politics in which the peasant is interested."

The total number of rural electoral areas electing selosoviets was officially stated in 1931 as 71,780 when the number of villages and hamlets was given as 599,890, so that, on an average, eight or nine of these were united in each selosoviet. The village in some parts of the USSR has usually only a few hundred inhabitants, whilst in other parts it runs up to as many as 10,000.¹ But it may be doubted whether throughout this

¹ "The agricultural population of the USSR is settled mostly in villages. Isolated farms are found only in the northern and north-western regions of the Union; generally speaking, in the forest districts north and north-west of the blacksoil zone. Here the population is settled on isolated farms or in small villages. The average population of the rural villages in those regions is small, about 100 persons; in some regions a little below (70 to 90); and in some regions a little above (120 to 150). But in the blacksoil area there are very few isolated farms, and villages are larger. Here the average size of

huge territory there is any exact or complete enumeration of the separate settlements or hamlets. Wherever a new settlement arises in a previously unsettled part of the forest or the steppe, the inhabitants spontaneously begin meeting to discuss their local affairs, and they may presently obtain recognition as a separate voting-place for the selosoviet in the area of which they reside. Indeed, it is the practice, as outlying hamlets grow up apart from the main village, for the electoral commission itself spontaneously to arrange for them to have separate meetings at which to elect their own quota of the village soviet. For the RSFSR, which has 53,000 village soviets, or five-sevenths of the whole, we have been informed that the number of such separate "curia" or "election points" was, in 1929 275,000 as compared with 207,000 in 1927. The number increases annually with the constant growth of population. Thus, it may be assumed that, for the whole USSR, the total number of separate meetings simultaneously electing members of village soviets in 1935 must be something like 400,000, plainly the most extensive electoral machinery known to political science. The total number of members elected to village soviets was stated in 1932 to have increased from 1,112,000 in 1927 to 1,510,800 in 1932. In 1935 it will approach nearer to two millions: a colossal representation of rural opinion by direct popular election!

Administration by the Village Soviet

It is difficult to discover and to describe, in terms of British and American constitutional usage, either the exact degree of legal autonomy or the customary sphere of action of the 70,000 selosoviets of the USSR. We print as an appendix to this volume a recent formulation of their statutory duties.¹ The Soviet Government is not content that the village

a village is from 400 to 500 inhabitants. In Ukraine, however, the typical village has from 1000 to 2000, or from 2000 to 5000 and from 5000 to 10,000. Large villages are characteristic of all the blacksoil zone, particularly of the prairie regions. The villages in the regions of new colonisation, such as Western Siberia, often are large, with about 1000 to 2000 inhabitants. Of the new regions of colonisation, only in the dry steppes of central Asia are small villages typical, perhaps because here the native population is semi-nomadic, and crop raising is of secondary importance" (*Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem*, by Vladimir P. Timoshenko, Stanford University, California, 1932, pp. 33-41).

There is noticeable a tendency to take out of the areas of the village soviets (selosoviets) a considerable number of more or less urbanised or industrialised places, either as containing a large proportion of wage or salary earners, whether in isolated factories or workshops, motor-tractor stations, collective farms (kolkhozi) or state farms (sovkhozi), or as suburban districts destined to be more closely connected with the rapidly growing cities. These abstracted areas have their own elected soviets, and choose their own delegates either directly to the rayon soviet (ispolkom) or to the soviet of the neighbouring city, at the rate of one for every sixty electors (equal to about 115 population).

¹ Decree of February 7, 1930, of USSR TSJK: included in RSFSR decree of January 1, 1931, and in corresponding decrees of the other constituent republics. For an able summary see *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, pp. 83-99.

Note that a new election of the whole selosoviet is to be held (a) if more than half the elected members have resigned or left the district, and there is an insufficient number of "candidates" (substitutes); (b) if two-thirds of the members request a new election; (c) "if a selosoviet does not follow the proletarian class-policy, or if it includes in its

soviet should deal only with the questions of local or village importance; and the newest decree insists that every selosoviet should consider and discuss also affairs of rayon, oblast, republic and even USSR importance. It is laid down, in a general way, that, within its territorial limits, the village soviet has control of the execution by all citizens and officials of the laws and instructions of the government. The village soviet is to prevent all interference with the execution of the measures taken by the central government, or with the policy from time to time proscribed. The village soviet may, within its wide competence under the statute, issue obligatory ordinances and impose administrative penalties and fines. It may establish village courts, with jurisdiction over disputes as to property or conditions of employment and over petty offences. And the village soviet is expressly directed to support the great voluntary association, elsewhere described, having for its object the widest possible participation of the whole population in the measures taken for national defence. But perhaps the most interesting enlargement of the sphere of the village soviet is the range of duties assigned to it in connection with the newly developed kolkhosi or collective farms within its area. The village soviet is to instruct, to supervise, to inspect, to audit, to insist on the fulfilment of all obligations, and on obedience to all laws and regulations. Moreover, it is equally part of the duty of the village soviet to keep an eye on the operations of the state manufacturing and trading departments in its locality, and on those of the consumers' cooperative societies, in order that the village customers may not be balked in getting what they desire, and so failing to swell the receipts by their purchases.¹ Within the village itself, there is practically nothing that the soviet may not organise, regulate or provide at the public expense, from roads and water supplies, through clubhouses and dance floors, up to schools, theatres and hospitals.

To the British reader, accustomed to the narrow range of work allowed to the parish or rural district council, the lengthy and varied catalogue of duties prescribed for the local authority of the village in the Russian steppe or Siberian forest will seem absurdly pretentious, all the more so when he is told by the soviet jurists that within the village the selosoviet is "sovereign"; meaning that nothing which it does requires the sanction of any higher authority before it is put in operation.² This does not look

membership people who do not adhere to the above policy, or if it has manifested a general inactivity" (decree of January 1, 1931).

¹ The People's Commissar of Finance for the RSFSR—the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a republic of more than a hundred million inhabitants, who happens to be a woman (Varvara Nikolaeovna Yakovleva)—called attention, in her "Budget speech" to the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, to the financial deficit; and insisted on the need, not for reductions in public expenditure, but for greater attention by the Government trading departments and the consumers' cooperatives to the desires of their customers, so as to increase the receipts. "The local soviets", she declared, "will have to watch more carefully the work of the trade organisation" (*Moscow Daily News*, December 20, 1933).

² Or, as an American author puts it, "the village soviet is the highest governmental organ within a given territorial limit" (*The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, p. 89).

as if the Soviet Government was afraid of the peasant, or distrustful of popular democracy! Nor does the Government seem to grudge any amount of public expenditure on raising the standard of life of the mass of the people. Every public department at the republic capital, or at Moscow, is, in fact, genuinely eager to stir all the 70,000 village soviets into the utmost public activity. Far from wanting to concentrate everything in the ministerial commissariats of the USSR, or even in those of the several constituent republics, the widest scope is given to each of the directly elected councils of the 70,000 villages between the Baltic and the Pacific, to do all it can for its own people. The view taken by the central authorities is that it is only by the widely dispersed efforts of the local bodies—in fact, only by the active participation of the people themselves in their incessant meetings which the village soviet obeys—that the frightful social backwardness of the countryside can be, *within this generation*, overcome. The government of the USSR is perhaps unique among governments in this determined refusal to postpone rural social reform to a distant future.

It is, of course, not to be supposed that the immense catalogue of duties decreed in 1930, and recited summarily in Appendix IV of Part I, are actually being performed by the village soviets. Probably no selosoviet is dealing with all the matters prescribed, and the majority are doing but little. What is significant is that they are all empowered to take any action they choose in all these directions; and that they are being frequently exhorted to use this liberty to make their own decisions. Thus, what even the downtrodden Russian peasant is gradually acquiring is a sense of political freedom.

Administrative Safeguards

The student of administration will ask how the Soviet Government can afford to allow this unprecedented freedom to 70,000 village councils, without such safeguards as prior enquiry and sanction, a statutory maximum for local expenditure and a limit to local taxation; without even an official expert audit or the requirement of a report. And this in a country supposed to be enveloped in red tape! The answer is to be found in the characteristic soviet constitution about to be described. The principle may be summed up as freedom to err, subject always to veto and reversal by superior authority. Any decision or action by the village soviet will be, when it is heard of, summarily vetoed and reversed whenever it has contravened any specific prescription or action by any higher authority. Moreover, any decision or action by the village soviet may be vetoed and reversed by any higher authority, such as the ispolkom, or executive committee of the rayon, and will certainly be so treated by the highest constitutional authority of the constituent republic or of the Soviet Union, if it is thought to be seriously inconsistent with, or inconveniently obstructive of, the policy laid down by superior authority.

And there is a further safeguard. Although there may be, as yet, less than 100,000 cells of the Communist Party among the 400,000 village or hamlet separate meetings—there must, in fact, be a large number of “electoral points” at which there sits not even one member of the Party or a single Comsomol—yet the Party influence is widespread. Party guidance will not long be wanting if any village soviet shows signs of going astray; and the advice and instruction given by inspector or other official, or even by a visitor who is a Party member, will, if unheeded, in due course be supported and enforced by superior authority. And although a large proportion of the 400,000 electoral meetings must be uncontrolled by the presence of even one Party member or Comsomol, it is significant of the character and popularity of the Party that, out of 59,797 village soviets at the 1931 election, 35,151 chose a Party member as elected president, who is always a member of the local presidium, whilst 3242 others elected a Comsomol.¹

The Village Executive

Just as the Mir had its starosta, so the selosoviet has its president, with other executive officers, in addition to the secretary (who may or may not be a member of the soviet) whom it appoints. These executive officers, by a recent decree, are to number one for every seventy-five households in areas of complete collectivisation, and one for every fifty households in areas of incomplete collectivisation. They are appointed by the soviet for a term of two or three months, the persons qualified as electors and under fifty in the case of men, and under forty-five in the case of women, being taken by rotation. If they are members of a kolkhos, or collective farm, or employed in any public office at a wage or salary, they are entitled to take “time off” for their public service under the selosoviet without loss of income. Others may receive pay for their term of service at a rate fixed by the soviet; a tax to cover the expense being levied upon all persons in the village who are disqualified from holding the office, either as being for one or other reason disfranchised or disqualified by judicial sentence from holding positions in state institutions, or else as awaiting trial for some criminal offence. The duties of these village executives are to keep order; to protect public property; to keep open the highways and supervise sanitation; to report all violations of law, and to carry out the decisions of the village courts; as well as to perform any other functions that the soviet may put upon them.

The soviet is required by decree to appoint besides its ispolkom, or executive committee, also ² a number of sections or committees to deal with separate parts of the work, and it is strongly urged to associate with

¹ Report of Central Electoral Commission of the USSR on the elections to the soviets in 1931, and composition of the organs of power, p. 9 (in Russian).

² In large villages, where the soviet consists of more than fifteen members, it appoints a presidium instead of an ispolkom.

its own members on these sections a large proportion of the village residents. This is in accordance with the fundamental principle of Soviet Communism of ensuring the participation in government of as large a proportion of the people as possible. It is left to the legislatures of the several constituent republics to prescribe exactly which sections must be appointed. In the RSFSR it is ordered that every selosoviet shall appoint at least seven sections, for agriculture, women's work and interests, education, cultural developments, finances, trade and cooperatives, and finally, for the general communal life. In the numerous settlements or hamlets apart from the main village and entitled to elect their own quotas to the village soviets, settlement sections are to be appointed. In addition, selosoviets appoint special committees to deal with particular collective farms, or to collect taxes, and also such officers as statisticians, harvest controllers, etc. Over and over again the decrees insist on the duty of the soviets to incite, persuade and press the apathetic toiling masses, and particularly the women, to take interest in public affairs, to join the sections, to attend the meetings, and to vote. Village and settlement meetings are to be held every few months. Three times a year must the soviet render an account of its stewardship to specially convened meetings which every elector is urged to attend.

At first the village soviets had no separate budget, and their receipts and expenditure formed part of the budget of the volost (now rayon).¹ Now each selosoviet is ordered to make its own budget in the way prescribed by the constituent republic. In the RSFSR it is ordered that the village budget must include the expenditure of the soviet on all its functions or duties; and the mere recital of its liabilities for maintenance and repair of every conceivable public concern within the village territory is a reminder to the soviet itself of how diverse those functions and duties actually are. Its revenues include the income derived from local public property and enterprises, the local taxes and dues collected within the village territory, including the agricultural tax and contributions to local

¹ As recently as 1925, in six important districts, only about 13 per cent of the selosoviets had their own budgets.

District	Total Number of Selosoviets	Number of them having Budgets
North Caucasus	1911	252
Vladimirsk	1411	71
Stalingradsk	926	13
Briansk	598	66
German Volga	287	287
North Dvinsk	236	18
	5369	707

(*Local Soviet Apparatus* (in Russian), by A. Lazhin and M. Reznov, of the Institute of Socialist Construction and Soviet Law, Moscow Communist Academy).

revenues under various laws and agreements with the state, the constituent republic and the collective farms; and lastly, the "self-assessments" levied by the village soviet itself. These latter require the majority decision of a special meeting at which not fewer than 50 per cent of the entire electorate must be present. The assessments most frequently levied are, we are informed, those for the building and maintenance of educational, health and cultural institutions; the improvement of communications by roads; veterinary and other agricultural institutions; fire protection; public baths and water supply from wells and ponds; the provision of a new burial-ground; and the employment of a village watchman. The information is that the number of village soviets actively undertaking local work, and the aggregate revenue and expenditure of the village soviets in the USSR, are both increasing annually by leaps and bounds.¹

As is usual in the Soviet Union, it is the spirit in which the village is dealt with that is more important than the language of the laws. We cannot sum up our description of the organisation and activities of the village soviets better than by quoting at length from an address by M. I. Kalinin, the president of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR, to a conference of chairmen of village soviets of the western province of the RSFSR in 1933. "It is", he declared, "no easy task to lead a village soviet. You must always remember that, on the one hand, a village soviet is a government organ, an organ representing the government in the village; and that, on the other hand, the village soviet is an elective organ, which represents the workers of the village. Upon you, as the chairmen of village soviets, hard and very complicated tasks devolve.

"Our biggest trouble is that many of our village soviets are inclined to resort primarily to administrative measures. A weak chairman of a village soviet tries to do everything through administrative orders; and the weaker he is, the more frequently does he resort to this method. On the other hand, the more politically developed a chairman of a village soviet is, the more authoritative he is among the collective and individual farmers, the less frequently does he have to resort to administrative methods, to the employment of methods of coercion.

"Take the following example. A chairman of a village soviet issues an official order that on such and such a day all must appear to do some

¹ The activities of the village soviets were even stimulated in 1933 in a way which has not yet occurred to the British Minister responsible for village life. A contest for the best village soviet in the USSR was announced by the All-Union Central Executive Committee (TSIK), which set aside 50,000 roubles for premiums to be awarded to those adjudged the best. The winner of the first prize in this contest, which will last the whole of the year, will be that village soviet which gives the most active assistance to the state and collective farms; which best organises labour in their establishments; which works most energetically among individual peasants; and whose farms lead in fulfilment of the spring sowing campaign and the harvest season.

As a further measure, a series of educational classes for presidents of village soviets were instituted in 1935 at several urban centres.

social work. Such orders are given by strong as well as by weak chairmen of village soviets. In both cases they appear on paper in the same form, signed by the respective chairmen. But in the case of a good chairman the piece of paper would merely inform all citizens when and where to meet. The good chairman would organise his men, and make all preparations in advance; and his official order would merely announce a decision about which everybody already knows. The order merely gives the signal to start, to get into action. It is the same as a bugle call, or the commandant's order in the army. All units are given the signal to start, and the whole army moves as one man. That is how things work when the village soviet chairman knows his job. His order falls on the ears of a prepared audience. The people know in advance what has to be done, and they get together in order to do it.

"But how does it work out if the chairman is weak? With a weak village soviet chairman, the order is the first step he takes. A notice is put up announcing the order; and the citizens reading it begin to query what it is all about, and what good it will do.

"It is clear, therefore, that in the first case the order would be carried out promptly because the masses would be prepared for it by soviet methods, by Party methods. In the second instance nothing would have been done in advance, the announcement would be the first step taken, and naturally things would be done haphazardly; stern orders would be necessary, and resort to administrative measures would be called for.

"This is the difference. The first method is the soviet method, which is distinguished from methods used in any bourgeois capitalist state. Our orders, our decrees, if we regard them externally, may resemble the orders of any municipal government of a capitalist country; or the orders of some land administration in any part of the world. But preparatory work, the preparation of the people, that is the essence of soviet work. That work is performed at meetings of your communists, at Party meetings, at meetings of active citizens, and general meetings, and the like.

"I need not go into this at great length. You know about it very well. Herein lies the essence of our democracy. Our Soviet democracy is not expressed in our official edicts. Our Soviet democracy is expressed in broad activity, when every decision is worked out by the masses, criticised hundreds of times by the collective farmers, by the individual peasants, from every possible angle. Herein lies the difference and the intricacy of the work of leaders of village soviets."¹

*The City Soviet*²

The thousand or so urban communities naturally require governing authorities essentially different from those of the seventy-odd thousand

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, weekly edition for September 22, 1933.

² The constitution and organisation of city government, with the decrees under which it works, are given, to name only works in English, in *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell,

areas into which the half a million or more rural villages, hamlets and settlements are grouped. But city soviets and village soviets have this in common, that they are the only governing bodies in the USSR that are directly elected by the inhabitants at large. Together they constitute the broad base of the pyramid by means of which man as a citizen expresses his will and his desires.

The Method of Election

The city soviet is elected at relatively small open meetings of electors in much the same manner as the village soviet. But the electoral meetings in the thousand or so urban municipalities in the USSR differ essentially from the village meetings. When, in 1905, at whose suggestion we know not, the workmen employed in the principal industrial establishments in Leningrad almost simultaneously held meetings inside the several factories to choose their own delegates to form a workers' soviet for the conduct of the general strike, they invented a form of organisation—unprecedented in any country, and at that time extra-legal—which has become, by reason of the dominating influence of the city proletariat, the foundation stone of Soviet Communism. These electoral meetings at the factories (to which similar meetings have been added for all kinds of offices and institutions, cultural as well as industrial) have, it will be seen, not a territorial but an occupational basis. The electors are summoned to attend, not as residents within the city or within a ward, precinct or parish of the city, but, irrespective of their place of residence, as persons employed in a particular factory or other institution. If the establishment is large, there are separate meetings for the several departments, branches, brigades or shifts.¹ If it is very small, it is grouped for purposes

1934, pp. 48-82; and *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1920, pp. 663-687. Much additional information as to municipal administration will be found in *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich, 1931, 125 pp., and *The Construction of the Suburbs and the Plan of the City of Moscow*, by the same, 1934, 58 pp. Detailed description of the municipal organisation of Moscow and Leningrad will be found at pp. 39-42.

The decree of January 20, 1933, defining the constitution and powers of the city soviets, together with a verbatim report of the discussion in the third session of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), and a popular exposition of the terms of the decree, were published (in Russian) in a pamphlet entitled *The Tasks of the City Soviets in the Light of the New Decree*, by A. Kisselev, 64 pp., Moscow, 1933.

¹ The great tractor factory at Stalingrad in 1932 had about 130 such electoral group meetings, which, it was said, were attended by more than 95 per cent of the total number employed.

On the other hand, Narkomindel (the government department at Moscow corresponding to the British Foreign Office) is grouped together for election meetings, not only with Gosbank (analogous to the Bank of England) and several other offices, but also with a watch-repairing artel, or industrial cooperative society.

Nevertheless, though small factories or institutions may be joined together for election meetings, each establishment chooses its own member or members of the soviet, without interference by the electors from other establishments at the same meeting. Thus, in the example cited above, the staff of Narkomindel, though not numerous enough to have a meeting of their own, chose by their own votes one member and one candidate for the city soviet, with two members and one candidate for the rayon soviet.

of meeting with other small establishments of similar character. Those who work in the particular factory or institution, as soon as they become eighteen years of age, whatever their grade or salary or craft or sex—the manager, the technicians, the skilled artisans, the labourers, the factory doctors and nurses, the cleaners and the canteen cooks—all attend the same meeting. It should be noted that this is not trade union representation. All the employees are entitled to vote, and are eligible for election to the city soviet, irrespective of whether or not they are members of a trade union. Factories and other establishments or institutions, urban in character, which are situated outside the city boundaries, elect their members to soviets as if they were within a city.¹

Thus, in marked contrast with the constituencies of western Europe and America, the actual unit of the electorate in the urban communities of the USSR is everywhere a relatively small assembly of persons, usually a few hundreds and seldom exceeding one thousand, who, wherever they reside, or whatever their grade, or industrial status, or particular craft, or vocation, are, for the most part, *habitually meeting each other in daily work*. The employees of all establishments, whether manufacturing or mining, distributive or transporting, educational or medical—the theatre and the concert-hall, the hospital and the university, the bank or the government office—are for electoral purposes dealt with in the same way.

The number of members to be elected was fixed by a statute of

¹ In 1929 the number of cities was officially given as 704, whilst other industrial centres and workers' settlements treated as of urban type (such as isolated workshops and factories in rural areas and motor tractor stations) numbered 478; in 1931, 730 and 530 respectively.

It should be mentioned that there has been of recent years, especially in connection with the abolition of the former division called the Okrug, a marked tendency to include, as within the area of the city, a large number of surrounding villages, each with its own *sosloviets*, but sending delegates, not to the rayon council, but to the city soviet. For instance, the area already assigned to the rapidly growing city Dnepropetrovsk (which may possibly take the name of Electropolis) with 270,000 population, rapidly doubling its numbers, is at present governed by 62 village councils, which elect representatives to the city council to sit with directly elected representatives of the workers in the urbanised part. It is proposed eventually to have six city districts each with its own directly elected council, together with an indirectly elected council to control the whole area. We learn, incidentally, that in the Middle Volga Krai in 1930 five cities, between 50,000 and 200,000 population, had had added to them no fewer than 229 *sosloviets*, comprising 1185 villages and hamlets, raising the aggregate population under the five city soviets from 513,000 to 950,000.

Name of City	City Population (in thousands)	Village Population (in thousands)	Total	Number of <i>Sosloviets</i>	Number of Villages and Hamlets
Samara . .	176	68	244	37	193
Orenburg . .	123	102	225	65	364
Penza . .	92	100	198	52	278
Ulyanovsk . .	72	105	177	52	205
Syzran . .	50	55	105	27	145

Article, "The Liquidation of Okrugs in the Middle Volga Krai", in *Soviet Construction* (in Russian), Nos. 10, 11, 1930.)

October 24, 1925, on a complicated scale, varying with the city population, in proportion to the number of electors entitled to attend each electoral meeting. Thus -taking only a few examples of the scale- in cities not exceeding 1000 in population each meeting was to elect one delegate for each fifteen electors entitled to be present; in cities not exceeding 10,000 in population, one delegate for each fifty electors; in cities not exceeding 100,000 in population, one delegate for each one hundred and fifty electors; in Leningrad, one delegate for each 400 electors; and in Moscow, where there is so large a proportion of office workers, one delegate for each 400 factory workers and one for each 400 office workers.¹ These numbers are varied from election to election, as the population and the number of separate establishments increase, so as to keep down the number of elected persons to a reasonable figure.

It should be added that provision is made for taking separately the votes, and for hearing the views, of electors not attached to any factory, office or institution. These include the non-working invalids and the men and women superannuated or retired from age or infirmity; the home-keeping wives not working in factory, office or institution and others employed in domestic service; such independent workers, male or female, as "freelance" journalists or foreign newspaper correspondents;² authors, dramatists and musical composers not in salaried employment, independently working artists and scientific researchers of all kinds, together with such remnants of individual producers as the droshky drivers, shoeblocks and pedlars, casual washerwomen and dressmakers, etc. For all these, in each urban centre, many district meetings are held, often one in each street, having powers and functions identical with the meetings of citizens working in factories or institutions of any kind. In a great city these "non-organised" electors run into tens of thousands, and in Leningrad and Moscow even to hundreds of thousands, so that the electoral meetings summoned in order to hear their views and record their votes have to be held in all parts of the city, to the number of several hundreds.³

¹ Law of October 24, 1925; *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, pp. 53-63; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 672. By the RSFSR Election Instructions issued in October 1934 cities with between 400,000 and 450,000 inhabitants will to their city soviet elect one delegate to every 400 to 500 electors. In Moscow and Leningrad the city soviet will have one delegate for every 1500 electors.

² But of these only such whose attitude to the USSR "proves the fullest loyalty to the Soviet Government". In such cases the franchise is conferred by decision of the city soviet and the higher election committee, whilst no entry is made with regard to the others in the published list of the disqualified (Election Instructions for RSFSR, 1931, p. 13).

³ There is an interesting table overleaf, showing the statistics for the city of Leningrad of all these electors in their several categories, the number of members elected by them, and the proportions of Party and non-Party persons so elected (*Gorodskoy Soviet Na Novom Etape* (The New Stage of the City Soviet) (in Russian), Moscow, 1932; p. 126).

Lensoviet means the municipal authority for the whole city of Leningrad; raysoviet

The Election Procedure

There are, it must be remembered, in the USSR no political parties, using the term in the sense in which it is understood in all other countries, and consequently there is none of the usual party activity in the elections to the soviets. Nominations of individual candidates are made orally, either by themselves or by friends or admirers, there being always considerable competition and usually not a little personal rivalry. There is, of course, almost invariably a "slate" or list of candidates recommended

that for each of the eight ward- or boroughs into which the city is divided. Note the very large number of housewives not occupied as wage-earners.

MEMBERSHIP OF LENSOVIET AND RAYSOVIETS
(Deputies elected from non-organised population in 1930-1931)

Groups of Population	Number of Electors	ELECTION									
		To the Lensoviet					To the Raysoviets				
		Total	Men	Women	Party Candidates and Members	Non-Party	Total	Men	Women	Party Candidates and Members	Non-Party
Housewives .	222,396	251	56	195	120	131	510	122	394	230	286
Independent artisans .	801	3	3	...	3	...	5	4	1	2	3
Peasants .	720	1	1	...	1	...
Invalids .	21,049	30	26	4	23	7	46	35	11	21	22
Members of artels (industrial co-operative) .	55,183	89	81	8	84	5	205	142	63	141	64
Others .	2,020	9	4	5	8	7
TOTAL .	303,069	373	166	207	230	143	782	308	474	405	377
											1155

Another table supplied to the authors by the President of the Leningrad City Soviet gives particulars as to the voters in each of the rayon soviets at the 1931 election:

RAYONS	Number of Electors who have taken part in the Election	IN THEM					
		Men	Women	Workmen	Clerks	Housewives	Others
Vassileostrovsky	111,085	60,201	50,884	57,332	20,167	21,126	12,460
Volodarsky	108,419	64,448	43,971	64,231	22,097	16,006	5,185
Vyborgsky	130,012	80,793	49,219	87,560	12,029	11,321	18,193
Moskovsky	83,904	49,440	34,464	59,787	10,786	7,818	5,513
Nevsky	141,449	80,461	51,998	102,055	24,630	10,650	4,105
Oktyabr'sky	117,300	57,230	60,070	32,004	26,628	26,203	32,375
Petrogradsky	122,536	53,334	69,202	55,983	22,355	29,502	14,696
Smol'ninsky	258,445	130,974	127,471	82,829	98,755	53,092	23,169
	1,073,150	585,871	487,279	541,880	230,247	176,327	115,696

by the local members of the Companionship or Order styled the Communist Party, often including non-Party persons, and usually covering only a certain proportion of the vacancies; and there may be other lists.

What is not usually understood by foreign observers is that there is, at each election, not one election meeting, but (as often in the village elections) several successive election meetings for the same electoral unit, at which candidates are nominated, discussed and either successively eliminated or carried forward to the final meeting when the last vote is taken. This, the only decisive vote, is usually unanimous (or more strictly, what in England is called *nemine contradicente*), a fact which has often led to the inference that there has been no real exercise of choice by the electorate. On the contrary, the procedure is one of elaborate preliminary sifting of the nominations by various, often many, successive votes at the previous meetings, by which the less popular candidates have been eliminated.

The Electors' Instructions

There is, moreover, another function of the successive election meetings of the electors of each electoral unit, which is regarded, as we think, rightly, as of no less importance than the actual choice of members of the soviet. This is the passing of resolutions in the nature of instructions—perhaps we should say suggestions—to the deputies or delegates to be elected, or to the soviet as a whole, or even to higher authorities. These resolutions may be proposed by any elector, but they are usually put forward by groups of electors and often by those representing particular factories or institutions. In the large cities the aggregate number of such resolutions passed at one or other of the innumerable meetings of electors runs into thousands, the subjects being of extreme diversity. They vary in importance from the most trivial details of administration, and the smallest of improvements, up to issues of municipal policy of far-reaching character. Apparently nothing is formally excluded, but we imagine that anything “counter-revolutionary” or fundamentally in opposition to the communist régime would not be risked by any opponent, or if risked, would not be tolerated by the meeting. We are told that factories vie with each other as to which can bring forward the largest number of valuable suggestions, or of suggestions that will secure the support of a majority of the meeting. We are told also that the resolutions adopted, and even those largely supported though not adopted, are carefully noted by the authorities; and that those which are most frequently moved or adopted usually lead to appropriate action being taken, whether by the soviet or by some other authority, to remedy what is recognised as a widely felt grievance, or to meet what has been shown to be a popular desire.

It is hard for the foreigner to realise how extensive is the use made of this opportunity of the electorate to tell their delegates what they are

to do ! Fortunately the Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party gave a lengthy analysis of these instructions. "During the elections to the Moscow Soviet in 1931," declared L. M. Kaganovich, "no fewer than one hundred thousand additions to the instructions were put forward . . . [their subjects being] housing and city enterprises, 10 per cent ; city transport, 11 per cent ; education, 16 per cent ; food supply, 18 per cent. . . . The main demands were : (1) Break up the housing trusts into cooperatives (276 enterprises, 290,000 electors) ; (2) eradicate illiteracy (90 large enterprises) ; (3) introduce polytechnical methods in all the schools (3 large enterprises) ; (4) enlarge the number of closed retail stores (595 enterprises, 100,000 electors) ; (5) improve the quality of bread (313 enterprises) ; (6) increase the number of hospitals (210 enterprises) ; (7) goods transport to work at night (80 large enterprises) ; (8) the organisation of means of transport for workers and employees, for the delivery of fuel, and for the service of the population generally (80 enterprises) ; (9) facilitate exchanges between workers employed in similar enterprises with the purpose of bringing the places of living of the workers nearer to their places of work. *Most of these suggestions have already been carried out.*"¹

There is, however, throughout the whole proceedings, and, as it seems, in all the multitudinous speeches, no formulation of opposing or competing programmes, to which the candidates proclaim allegiance ; but only a common profession of desire for efficiency in the building up of the socialist state, possibly with emphasis on the achievements or shortcomings of particular departments, and sometimes on the candidate's own qualifications for office or personal predilections. In this respect, the soviet contests seem to resemble the British and American electioneering of primitive times, before the development of the party system ; a state of things still lingering in Great Britain in nearly all the country parishes, many of the urban or rural districts and some of the smaller municipalities, which the national party organisations have not yet

¹ *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and the other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich, Moscow, 1932, pp. 78-81. The same speech also specified a dozen of the concrete demands made at the same election. The first two of these were as follows : "(1) the public baths to work on the uninterrupted work system from 9 A.M. to 9 P.M. ; establish a children's day at the baths ; build special baths for children ; instal mechanical laundries at the baths, so that the bather's clothes may be washed while he is bathing. (2) The construction of new tramway routes ; at each tramway stop a strict schedule to be displayed of the movements on that route ; express tram routes from the outskirts to the centre without stop ; children under fifteen to be permitted to enter the cars from the front platform ; double deck buses to be introduced" (*ibid.* p. 79).

It is to be noted that the village meetings are equally prolific of instructions or suggestions. A report embracing a large number of village meetings throughout the RSFSR, excluding Moscow and Leningrad, during the election campaign of 1931, and those succeeding it during the ensuing two years, down to January 1, 1933, shows that these meetings sent up 26,000 concrete demands or proposals. Out of these, it is reported that more than 17,000, being about 60 per cent, were more or less carried into effect ("Mass Work of the Soviets in the Third and Fourth Years of the First Five-Year Plan" (in Russian), pp. 25-26, by the accounting information department under the presidium of the Central Executive Committee (VTSEIK) of the RSFSR).

reached or from which they have been deliberately excluded. What is remarkable in the soviet elections, in the absence of what Britain and America mean by party strife, is the width of public interest that they excite, the amount of discussion that takes place, and the very high percentage of the electorate that records its vote. We are told, for instance, that in the USSR there is never such a thing as an uncontested election, either for the village or the city soviets.¹

A Moscow Election

We may cite, as an outstanding example of these soviet elections doubtless an extreme instance, not necessarily typical of the smaller cities—that of the choice of the Moscow City Soviet and of its eight rayon soviets in 1931. There were 2542 members (or substitutes in case of absence)² to be elected to the governing bodies of this city of some three million inhabitants. The total number of men and women more or less formally nominated is not recorded, but they evidently numbered many thousands. The percentage of votes cast to the total electorate is given as 94.1, which we should take the liberty of calling an incredible figure, if it were calculated as it would be in Britain or America.³ What is

¹ British readers will be aware that in the United Kingdom a large majority of the elections for parish councils are uncontested; of the elections of rural district councils a considerable proportion are always uncontested; of those for urban district councils many are uncontested. The same is true of the elections for the town councils in a considerable number of wards in the municipal boroughs, and of those for the county councils in most of the rural county districts, as well as in many of the electoral areas in London for county and metropolitan borough councils. Even for the House of Commons there are always a number of constituencies in which the election is uncontested. Such an absence of the opportunity of "participation" would be considered in the USSR to be gravely "undemocratic", as well as socially injurious.

² It is customary for the electors to elect, especially to bodies of importance, not merely the proscribed number of members, but also a certain number of substitutes or alternates, usually termed "candidates" (not exceeding one-third of the number of members), who may automatically be appointed as members in place of members disabled or prevented from attendance. Such substitutes or alternates are entitled to attend the meetings of the elected body as guests, and even to obtain their expenses of travelling to the place of meeting, although they cannot vote. They may be consulted and give advice, and they may even be allowed to volunteer their opinions.

³ Explanations of such an apparently impossible percentage of voters to electorate may be found in the fact that there is, under Soviet Communism, as already explained, no such obstacle to universal voting as a register of electors always more or less "stale". In the United Kingdom no one can vote at an election, whose name is not included in a register now made up only once a year, on the basis of the completion of three months' residence at a specified address, and the arrival of the elector's twenty-first birthday, both prior to a fixed date, which may actually prove to be seventeen months previous to the election day! A large percentage of the registered electors are always found to have died or removed from the district, whilst newcomers and persons who have newly reached the qualifying age cannot vote. In the United States, although the method of compiling the register is different from that in the United Kingdom, the effect, in preventing a large proportion of those over twenty-one from voting, is substantially similar. In the USSR the man or woman reaching eighteen on the day of the election, and actually working on that day in the factory or institution, can at once vote; whilst those who have died or removed do not clog the electorate, or affect the percentage of actual voters to the electorate.

It is reported that the average percentage of voters to the electorate, in all the cities

more interesting is the detailed description of the efforts made both to educate the electors to and induce them to vote. The city evidently resembled, during several weeks, a British city in the last days of a hotly contested parliamentary election. There was the same elaborate display of printed and illustrated posters. There were flashing electric signs and illuminated statuary groups in plaster emphasising particular slogans. Besides the innumerable small meetings in the factories and institutions of all kinds, there were many large meetings in all parts of the city, open to all comers, at which speeches were made by candidates and other "spellbinders". The achievements and projects of the various departments of the municipal administration were described. The extensive shortcomings and patent errors were usually not explained away but frankly admitted and criticised. Questions were answered and complaints noted. There were processions through the streets, with banners and bands. In every factory or workshop, every school or college, every hospital or institution of any kind, repeated personal appeals were made to every elector to cast his vote. Foreign residents, we are told, asked with amazement why so much trouble was taken, and so much expense incurred, when no party issues were at stake, no party feeling was involved and no party gain could be made. The answer was that Soviet Communism was based on universal participation in public administration—participation by intelligent understanding of the whole function of the state, in which the casting of a vote for this candidate or that, according to personal preference, was but the final and conclusive act. "Such", it was declared, "was soviet democracy, then in its fourteenth year. How much more real", it was asserted, "than parliamentary democracy in other lands." In the end, out of the 2542 members or substitutes elected, either to the city soviet or to the rayon soviets, it was reported that 604 were women; 358 were doctors, engineers or clerical workers; and the rest, about 1400, were manual workers. Just about two-thirds of the total were members, or candidates for membership, of the Communist Party or of the League of Communist Youth (Comsomols); whilst about one-third were "non-Party", that is to say, unconnected with this dominant Order.¹

It is, of course, not denied that the members of the Communist Party, together with its probationary members (called candidates), and the League of Communist Youth (Comsomols), make up the bulk of the "activists", to whose zeal and exertions the "liveliness" of the elections is due. At Moscow in 1931 it was they who saw to it that two-thirds of all the candidates who survived to the final votes belonged to the all-powerful communist organisation, and it was doubtless to their special efforts that these nominees owed their success. But it was evidently by intention

of the USSR, was 84. In the several constituent republics the percentage varied between 70.9 in that of Uzbekistan and 90.6 in the Ukraine.

¹ Summarised from article on "The Soviet Elections" by D. Zaslavsky (of Moscow) in *International Press Correspondence*, 1931, pp. 90-91.

that room was left for a substantial minority of "non-Party" candidates to be elected.¹ The membership of the soviets is practically never wholly composed of docile adherents of the government. There are, indeed, constantly recurring complaints of the extent to which disaffected persons, or even "counter-revolutionaries", find their way into these councils, especially the rural soviets, to such an extent as even to impair their efficiency in "building up the socialist state". But though such persons may become candidates, may canvass quietly for votes among their friends, and may even secure election, they do not, in their candidatures, stand as opponents of the established order of things, or proclaim their preference for any contrary policy. When—as occasionally happens even in the cities, and more frequently than not in the rural soviets²—they even find themselves in a majority, they may hang back and cause trouble, leading often to their partial elimination at a subsequent election.

We add to the foregoing description an account of a previous Moscow election as seen from a textile factory, and of the procedure of electing its delegates to the Moscow City and rayon soviets, by an experienced British publicist who had more than once visited the USSR. This investigation took place in 1926, prior to the Five-Year Plan; at a time of the New Economic Policy, when many of the workers were being sweated by small profit-making employers and the Labour Exchanges were busy trying to place demobilised Red Army men and others who had failed, during this partial reversion to private enterprise, to get work. "On the walls of the factory when I visited it, some days before the actual election, two lists of candidates had been posted, who sought election to the Moscow City Soviet, and to the less important rayon [ward] soviet. There were also shorter lists of 'substitutes' who would take the places

¹ The statistical table in the footnote to p. 29 shows that, in the Leningrad election in 1930, slightly more than one-half of the members elected by the "non-organised" electors (namely, those not voting at the factories or other establishments) were Party members.

² The total number of members of the Communist Party in the village soviets was stated in a report to amount in 1932 to no more than 15 per cent (225,582 out of a total of 1,510,800), and this was an increase over the 9 per cent at which it stood in 1927 (116,774 out of 1,112,000). In 1935 they numbered 18.9 per cent (236,853 out of a total of 1,252,134).

In the city soviets, of which there now are over one thousand, there were reported to be 166,900 members in 1932 as compared with 122,572 in 1927. Among these the proportion of members of the Communist Party was just upon one-half; their number having risen in the five years from 54,927 to 82,952. Rather more than two-fifths of these various totals were reported to be manual working wage-earners, the remaining being mostly clerical employees of various grades, or engineers and other technicians, with a few doctors, journalists and lawyers. In 1935 the proportions of Party members and Comsomols in the city soviets were provisionally given as 43.1 per cent and 11.2 per cent respectively.

It should be added that women are now members of nearly every soviet, whether rural or urban, to the aggregate number, as it was officially reported in 1932, of 316,690 (as compared with 151,208 in 1927), being 21 per cent of the total membership (as compared with less than 14 per cent in 1927). In very many cases women are elected to the presidency of the soviet.

of the elected members in case of death or prolonged absence on other duties. The factory had the right to return one delegate for each 600 of its workers; its allowance was, in fact, fourteen members. The singularity of this list was that it contained fifteen names. At their head stood Lenin. He had been their member while he lived, and they still paid to his memory this touching homage. They would have laughed unpleasantly at the orthodox conception of immortality, but for them the dead hero still lived in his works, and in the hearts of his followers. I thought of the Greek fishermen of the Aegean isles, who will hail one another after a storm, with the traditional greeting 'Alexander lives and reigns'. After Lenin's name came that of Rykov, his successor as chairman of the Council of Commissars (the Russian cabinet). This factory had been the pioneer in the revolutionary struggle, and it claimed the honour of returning the active head of the Soviet administration as its senior member. The remaining names were all those of workers or former workers in the factory. Seven of the fourteen were, as the list showed, members of the Communist Party; one was a member of the Communist League of Youth, and the rest were 'non-Party'. Three of the fourteen were women.

"Here, then, was the official list, containing a bare majority of professed Communists presented to the electors for their ratification. There was no alternative list. By what method had it been compiled? The first step is that each member of last year's soviet (the elections are annual)¹ who desires to stand again, presents a report on his or her activity. A meeting then takes place between the Works Council [this is the factory committee] and the 300 delegates, who represent small groups of the various categories of workers. At this meeting names are put forward, and there often follows a thorough discussion of the record and reputation of each. There is usually a vote on each name. In this way the first draft of the official list is 'compiled' under the supervision of the Works Council [factory committee]. It then goes before separate meetings of the various crafts [query workshops] in the factory, and at these it may be modified. In its final form it is a selection presented by the Works Council to a general meeting of all the workers in the factory. At this general meeting it is still theoretically possible to oppose any name in the list and to put forward another name to replace it; but of this right the electors rarely avail themselves, for the good reason that the preliminary procedure by which the list is prepared does furnish some guarantee that it corresponds, on the whole, with the wishes of the electors. They are not consciously settling big issues of national policy, nor are they even directly choosing legislators. They are choosing average, trustworthy citizens, who will see that the administrative machine of the city runs efficiently for the common good of the working population. The atmosphere of the election and, indeed, of debates in the soviets themselves, is strangely remote from 'politics' as western democracies con-

¹ Now triennial (1935).

ceive them. A big family, animated by a single purpose, sits down on these occasions to administer its common property.

"The factory produces its own newspaper, *The Spin*, which appears fortnightly and is written entirely by workers under the direction of its branch of the Communist Party. Its contents during the election week are, perhaps, as good a sample as one could find of soviet politics, as the average town worker sees them.

"The number opens with a leading article in which every elector is summoned to take part in the elections. . . . 'Comrades, remember Il'ych's [Lenin's] watchword. The time is ripe for every servant-girl, while she is still in the kitchen, to learn how to govern Russia. The tasks before us are the practical work of building houses and increasing our output. We have many a hardship still to endure, and Russia needs you all. If you feel yourselves ill-off, then elect active members of the soviet to better your case. You are yourselves responsible for your own lot. Don't leave the work to others. Be bold, choose conscientious men who will carry out Lenin's ideas, and then be sure that your hardships will vanish and poverty disappear.'

"The heavy, business-like part of the election literature consisted in the official report of the Communist Party on the year's work of the Moscow Soviet. It claimed that the Party had fulfilled its promises. It had increased the output of industry, bettered the conditions of the workers, and kept alive the unity between workers and peasants. . . .

"The peroration of this very practical document boasted that these results were due to the participation of the 'broad masses' (a characteristic Russian phrase) in the work of government, 'a thing possible only under the soviet system'.

"The similar report on the work of the Ward Soviet was on much the same lines. It contained one reference, however, to the aesthetic side of life—trees had been planted to beautify the streets. It noted considerable activity in summoning small private employers (*kustari*) for breaches of the labour code. The rest of the election news consisted of the reports of some of the retiring members of the soviet. . . .

"'No. 1 [a woman] was responsible for inspecting the houses of the old-age pensioners. She got their daily ration of white bread increased by half a pound, and saw that better meals were provided for the consumptives. She was distressed by conditions at the Labour Exchange; many demobilised Red Army men had failed for two years to get work; some workers fainted while waiting at the Exchange; the present manager is not the right man for this post.

"'No. 2 [a man] occupied himself with education, and stressed his insistence that preference should always be given to the children of the workers.

"'No. 3 [a woman] claims that, as the result of her inspection of eighteen schools, the expenditure on food, per month, per child, was raised from fifteen to twenty-three roubles.

" 'No. 4 [a man] worked in the health section. He advocated a dispensary for venereal diseases and an increase in the number of beds both for adults and children. He was responsible for sending sick children to Yalta in the Crimea, and got an additional dispensary opened for the tuberculous, making the thirteenth in our district. He got a workshop for winter use built in the home for children addicted to drugs (these pitiable little wretches are mainly orphans of the civil war and the famine, who for a time ran wild in the towns). He also insisted that less monotonous work ("fancy" sewing instead of making sacks) should be provided for the women who are being reclaimed in the home for prostitutes.

" 'No. 5 [a woman] insisted that bed-linen should be changed fortnightly instead of monthly in the eye hospital.

" 'No. 6 [a man] found many cases in small private workshops in which lads under eighteen were working over eight hours; the employers were prosecuted.

" 'No. 7 [a woman] inspected five factories and found one in which there was no hospital. The workers had to walk seven versts to the nearest. This was remedied.' " ¹

The Organisation of the City Soviet

The method of election adopted from the start for the city soviet—the separate choice of one or more delegates by the staff of each enterprise—even the smallest—has given that body a membership and a character entirely different from those of the municipal councils of Great Britain or the United States. In any considerable city of the USSR the city soviet is composed of an unwieldy mass of men and women delegates without fixed total, the numbers increasing at each election with the perpetual multiplication of establishments of every kind. With the addition of 33 per cent of candidates or substitutes, who are entitled to attend, the plenum of the city soviet runs into hundreds, and in the cases of Moscow and Leningrad to more than two thousand. Such a body has necessarily to entrust its powers and functions to an executive committee, which, again, is too large for executive action, and therefore leaves the daily work to a presidium of something like a dozen members, in whom the day-by-day administration of the city resides, and who give their whole time and attention to their municipal duties.

On the other hand, again in contrast with the western municipalities, much less use is made in the cities of the USSR of that trained, permanent and salaried staff by whom in most other countries the actual work of municipal administration is conducted. In the absence of such a staff, which is only now beginning to appear in the USSR, the city soviets have made the most of that principle of the widest possible participation of the whole people in the work of government which is so characteristic of Soviet Communism. The city soviet appoints an ever-increasing number

¹ *How the Soviets Work*, by H. N. Brailsford, 1927, pp. 34-40.

of sections or committees, each consisting of a small proportion of the elected members or candidates, to whom are joined an indefinite number of volunteers drawn from outstanding and "activist" citizens of either sex and of the most varied positions and occupations. Each section consists of several scores of members; occasionally even of hundreds, and in Moscow and Leningrad sometimes running up to a thousand or so; all of whom undertake to spend hours every week in their own localities in gratuitously doing detailed administrative work, much of which would in England and America be carried out by a salaried staff of inspectors, relieving officers, investigators, school attendance officers, collectors and what not.

It must be said that the organisation of the city soviets is still inchoate, ranging from Moscow and Leningrad downwards to quite primitive conditions in some of the smaller cities. "The decree of 1925 and subsequent legislation provided for . . . six permanent committees (or sections), namely, communal economy, financial budgetary business, education, public health, cooperative trade and workman-peasant inspection. Other committees (or sections) may be appointed by local soviets in accordance with their needs. In most city soviets there are ten or more additional committees (or sections) and they are known as administrative, cultural, sanitary, judicial, trade, social security, etc. Deputies (or delegates) may select the committees (or sections) they prefer to join, but under some conditions they may be appointed to committees (or sections) not of their own choice." We must content ourselves with descriptions of Moscow and Leningrad.

Moscow

The plenum of the Moscow City Soviet consisted, in 1934, of 2206 triennially elected members, with half a dozen others added by the presidium, and with 450 elected candidates or substitutes. About 1750 were Party members, whilst about 900 were non-Party. This plenum meets ten or twelve times a year.¹ It elects an Executive Committee (Ispolkom) of 50 members, which is summoned to meet at irregular intervals about three or four times a year, when some special business requires its attention. But the effective municipal executive is the presidium of fifteen members, with six candidates or substitutes, elected by the Executive Committee (Ispolkom), subject to the approval of the plenum, and meeting

¹ "The difference between our soviets and bourgeois democratic municipalities consists not only in the fact that it is not the nobles, manufacturers, bankers and houseowners, and their lackeys, who sit on our soviets but working men and working women, but also in the very methods of working. The soviet is a permanently functioning legislative organisation, which controls and supervises not only the enterprises belonging to the city, but all other economic activities carried on within its territory. Much has been done in recent years to reconstruct the work of the soviets. The sections of the soviets are bodies that supervise and direct the various branches of city enterprise. . . . The work must be raised to higher levels. Ceremonial plenary sessions are still widely practised in our soviets: this practice must be discontinued" (*The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich, Moscow, 1931, pp. 78-79).

regularly nearly every week. Practically all important decisions are taken by the presidium. On a few issues of special importance or difficulty, the presidium consults the Executive Committee, which sometimes has matters under enquiry and consideration for several months.¹ Usually the decisions of the presidium are reported direct to the plenum, by which they are almost invariably ratified, although sometimes not without considerable discussion.

The majority of the members of the plenum man the sections, or, as we should say, the committees, which supervise the various branches of municipal administration. Every member is required to serve on at least one section, according to his choice, the numbers being unlimited, and varying with the popularity of the subject. In 1934 there were twenty-eight such sections, concerned respectively with finance, education, theatres and cinemas, health, housing, building projects, allocation of sites, supplies and trade, municipal shops, the municipal farms, city planning, construction, municipal heating, militia (police) and fire brigade, courts of justice, establishment, archives, statistics, the legal department, and sundry other matters; together with half a dozen charged with the supervision of the special trusts, or boards, to which is delegated the routine administration of such municipal enterprises as the tramways, the main drainage system, the underground railway works, the licensing of automobiles, and the management of dwelling-houses. Each section has a membership varying from about 40 to three or four times that number. All of them meet about once a month, but each elects a bureau of a few members who meet once every five days.

Leningrad

The Leningrad City Soviet, which is housed in the Smolny Institute, of revolutionary fame, has an even larger membership than that of Moscow. Its plenum consists of over 3000 triennially elected deputies, with about 1000 elected candidates or substitutes. It has a presidium of 17 deputies and 8 candidates, which meets nearly every week. Unlike Moscow, Leningrad has now no executive committee (Isполkom); and the presidium reports in all cases direct to the plenum. There are nearly 30 sections or committees, among which the members of the plenum distribute themselves according to choice. In the summer these sections meet once a month, but in the winter only three times every two months.²

It should be added that in Moscow and Leningrad, and often in other cities, the members and candidates elected to the municipal soviet by the several brigades, shifts or workshops of a large factory habitually combine into an extra-legal standing committee, which takes under its

¹ This was the case with the project for *metrostroi*, the extensive underground railway, which the city soviet is constructing by direct employment, and which was under examination for many months.

² See table on opposite page.

special care the municipal interests of all the workers employed in the factory as a whole, with those of their families. They see to the housing, the sanitation, the medical services, the arrangements for holidays and organised recreation, the provision of nurseries and kindergartens, schools and technicums. They deal with every sort of complaint or criticism. It is interesting to note that they do not confine their activities to what are essentially subjects of municipal government. They invade the sphere of action of the factory committee, with which they nevertheless cooperate without friction or jealousy. They investigate cases of waste or breakdown. They press for continuity and increase of output. They deal with absenteeism and complaints against foremen. In every respect they act in the factory as an additional influence for contentment and efficiency.

The Rayons in the Cities

But this is not all the complication of the municipal structure. In nearly all the cities having populations of 100,000, and in a few others by special authorisation of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the constituent or autonomous republic (or autonomous krai or oblast), subordinate rayon soviets may be elected by the several rayons (or, as we should say, wards or boroughs) into which the city can be divided for this purpose. Thus, Moscow has 10 rayon soviets, Leningrad 8, Baku 7, and Gorki (formerly Nizhni-Novgorod) 8. In some cases (as at Gorki) one or other of the rayons may include new industrial districts growing up outside the city boundary. In other cases, on the principle of cultural autonomy, the rayon may be formed out of an area within the city inhabited mainly by the racial "national minority". Elections to the rayon soviets are held quite independently of the election to the city soviet itself, but on the same franchise; and, for convenience, within the period of the same election campaign, and often on the same day. It is permissible but unusual for the same person to be elected to both city and rayon soviet. The rayon soviets are charged by the city soviet with much of the detailed municipal administration of their own areas, especially the supervision and management of the local institutions, and of the local sanitation. Each rayon soviet appoints its own presidium of a few members, and various sections of local inhabitants for specific functions, exactly like those of the city soviet.¹ Their finances form part of the budget of the city soviet; and this control over finance involves their general subordination to, and control by, the financial organisation of that body. The competition of the different rayons among themselves in order to obtain approval for their several projects of additional local amenities, leads to keen discussion in the plenum and Ispolkom.

It must be said that, although great improvements have been made, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the administration of the city rayon soviets and their sections. Kaganovich did not shrink, in 1934,

¹ See table on opposite page.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS OF THE Leningrad Rayon Soviets According to Their Social Standing
(Election of 1931)

RAYON SOVIETS	SOCIAL STANDING													
	Total	Total Number of Workmen	In Them			Clerks	Students	Housewives	Kustars	Peasants	Used Army Men	"Kompuls"	Unemployed	Invalids
			Industrial Workmen	Employed in Public Administration by Election and Economic Institution	Others									
Members of the Soviets:														
Vassileostrovsky	454	262	218	41	109	39	32	2	12
Volodarsky	478	370	287	53	51	8	34	13
Vyborgsky	598	373	315	58	158	44	23
Moskovsky	347	231	196	35	80	7	10	18
Nevsky	563	421	325	96	101	6	23	3	9
Oktyabr'sky	512	208	149	59	195	47	31	2	29
Petrogradsky	412	194	166	28	137	20	38	1	21
Smol'ninsky	1078	559	277	282	334	72	71	5	37
TOTAL	4442	2618	1933	682	1165	243	262	8	3	133	10
Candidates of the Soviets:														
Vassileostrovsky	164	87	87	...	33	13	22	9
Volodarsky	172	113	96	17	27	5	19	7	1
Vyborgsky	192	121	111	10	37	18	16
Moskovsky	129	82	81	1	31	1	8	1
Nevsky	214	149	126	23	38	4	16	7
Oktyabr'sky	164	58	48	10	59	13	24	10
Petrogradsky	152	90	81	9	30	...	24	...	2	6
Smol'ninsky	346	158	114	44	119	17	43	9
TOTAL	1533	858	744	114	374	71	172	...	2	47	9

from publicly declaring that "the district soviets are still working poorly on the improvement of their districts; they still do not show, and they do not feel themselves, that they are the masters of their districts in the full sense of the word. A most important task is to bring the district soviets closer to the masses of the population which they serve. In every corner of the district there must be a master, who would know all the needs of the district and make them his daily concern. There should be a master who pays attention to the good order of his street and house; there should be a master who, loving his section, his street, would make it his concern to fight against hooliganism, bad house management, untidiness and lack of culture. If the Moscow soviet and the district soviets are to begin this big undertaking, it is apparent that sub-district soviets must be created. The districts containing up to 400,000 population are too big—each district is a whole large city in itself. It is hard to cover and keep account of the needs of such a big district from one centre. If there are sub-district soviets covering several streets, if the soviet deputies and the soviet section leaders work actively in the sub-district soviets, becoming fighters for their street, their sidewalk, their court, the improvement of Moscow will go on apace."¹

The Subbotniki in the Cities

Both city soviets and, in the larger cities, rayon soviets, together with the numerous sections that they appoint, are constantly falling behind in the vast work involved in any municipal administration unprovided with an extensive and competent salaried staff. These shortcomings are, to some extent, made good by the spasmodic outbursts of energy by the subbotniki ("Saturday-ers"), who, as we shall describe in a subsequent chapter,² volunteer gratuitously to clear away accumulations of work which would otherwise not be done in time. It is estimated that in the aggregate, apart from such salaried staff as exists, as many as 50,000 citizens are, at any moment, participating in the municipal administration of Moscow, and nearly as many in that of Leningrad.³

Indirect Election

In describing the basic foundation of the soviet hierarchy we have had a lengthy but a relatively easy task. Much more difficult is it to describe,

¹ *The Construction of the Subway and the Plan for the City of Moscow*, by L. M. Kaganovich, 1934, pp. 56-57.

² "In Place of Profit", Chapter IX, in Part II.

³ It should be added that the members of the city and rayon soviets receive no payment for their services as members. The majority of them, being employed at wages or salaries, are entitled to take "time off" from the employment, without loss of pay, whenever they are engaged on their municipal duties. Those of them who have no wage or salary (such as the independent handicraftsmen) may receive from the soviet compensation for "lost time" at rates fixed by the soviet authorities. Housekeeping wives, supported by their husbands, continue to be supported by them, and are assumed (like the wage-earners) merely to take "time off" for their municipal duties, which they perform as part of the voluntary social work expected from every loyal citizen.

or even precisely to understand, the complicated political edifice that has been erected on that foundation. The first few congresses to which the People's Commissars reported their proceedings, and to which they addressed their orations, consisted only of delegates from an indefinite number of city and village soviets, being such as found themselves able to attend at the capital. They were drawn during the Civil War from a comparatively small and shifting area, which at one time sank to little more than a relatively narrow corridor of territory between Leningrad and Moscow. The available territory was, in fact, not only restricted by the political separation of the Ukraine and Transcaucasia, but also dependent month by month, during two whole years, on the fluctuating success of the Red Army in pushing back the various White Armies, subsidised and strengthened, as these were, by the munitions, officers and military contingents supplied by half a dozen foreign governments. But when, at the end of 1920, nearly the whole territory of what is now the USSR was cleared of hostile forces,¹ Lenin and his colleagues were confronted with the problem of constructing a firm and stable government from the whole continent extending from the Baltic to the Pacific, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, with more than a hundred millions of inhabitants, two-thirds of the whole unable even to read, belonging to many different races, languages and religions, including numerous nomadic and barbaric tribes without any written language, some of them still in the stage of animism and magic. Even if the Bolsheviki had been enthusiastic believers in western liberalism, with its faith in a parliament directly elected by universal suffrage and the ballot box, such a political constitution was plainly impracticable for the vast heterogeneous hordes with which they had to deal. But the Bolsheviks had become fervent believers in the plan of basing the whole constitution, not on the anonymous mass voting of huge electoral constituencies, but on a large number of relatively small meetings of neighbours and associates in work, at which there could be an intimate discussion of the issues in which the people were interested, and about which they had views of their own. At these meetings the people could choose, to represent their wishes, someone whom they actually knew. Only in this way, Lenin believed, could all these "dead villages" and primitive communities be taught the art of representative government, and at the same time be held together a unitary state. Many persons thought, at first, that it would suffice to constitute a federal republic of city and village soviets, to be governed by an All-Russian Congress of delegates or deputies from the innumerable little soviets throughout the whole area. This, in fact, was what was indicated in the resolutions "on the federal institutions of the Russian republic" adopted by the "Third All-Russian Congress of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Kazaks' Deputies", on January 18, 1918, as the plan on which the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) was to draft "these fundamental

¹ The Japanese did not evacuate Vladivostok until 1922, and the northern half of the island of Sakhalin not until 1925.

principles of the constitution" for submission to the next All-Russian Congress.¹ When, however, the drafting committees got to work, it became evident that such a conception was unduly simple. To represent directly in any central congress all the small meetings in so huge an area, with so colossal a population, was plainly impracticable. Moreover, the administration of provincial affairs affecting more than one local soviet had also to be provided for, and this mass of detail could not be brought to Moscow. Further, many of the districts, both small and large, clung desperately to their local autonomy, which had perforce to be conceded. Yet it was no less indispensable to establish a supreme government of strength and stability, if only to deal with such subjects as foreign relations, defence, transport and communications, and so on. Moreover, the Bolsheviks attached paramount importance to their peculiar conception—never before considered by framers of constitutions—of an economic community based upon the suppression of the landlord and the capitalist, and all forms of profit-making. This could be ensured only by a powerful and supreme central authority. To harmonise and achieve all these ends involved protracted consultations before even the first fundamental law was agreed to on July 10, 1918. It took four more years of congresses and discussions to get adopted the successive elaborations and amendments out of which emerged in 1922–1923, in relatively stable form, the constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The solution of the unprecedented constitutional problem with which the Bolsheviks were faced was found, as early as the spring of 1918, in the adoption, in the manner and on a scale never before attempted, of the principle of indirect election, which has continued unchanged down to the present day (1935); but of which a drastic alteration is now under consideration. As adopted in 1918, the directly elected primary soviets in addition to governing their own areas were to choose deputies or delegates to higher congresses of soviets governing larger areas. Each of these higher congresses of soviets, besides administering the affairs of its own district—whether we think of it as county, canton or province, *kreis* or *département*—was to choose deputies or delegates to yet higher assemblies, governing even larger areas; and these again ultimately sending their own representatives to constitute the All-Union Congress of Soviets, which was to be the supreme governing authority for the whole Soviet Union.

This sounds, to a Briton or an American, a complicated scheme for providing for the representation of "Man as a Citizen". But there are

¹ *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 789. We may perhaps regard this conception as an echo of the idea of Bakunin that, when the strong central governments of the European states had been overthrown, they would be succeeded only by congeries of free associations of the workers in each neighbourhood, which might be loosely federated in groups for common purposes. We are told that Prince Peter Kropotkin, who had re-entered Russia after the 1917 revolution, and who sympathised with Bakunin's ideas as to the necessary minimum of governmental organisation, had formed in Moscow a committee of his friends to discuss the proposed constitution, and their views were forcibly urged on others who were influentially concerned with the drafting.

many more complications yet to be unravelled. The soviet constitution, as will be seen, includes not only an assembly for the government of the whole undivided community inhabiting one-sixth of the entire land-surface of the globe, but also a graded hierarchy of local governing bodies, at once legislative and executive, for the administration of the affairs peculiar to areas of different magnitudes and diverse characteristics. And it does more than this. It provides also a series of independent assemblies for the separate governments of areas, large or small—whether we think of them as tribes or nations, states or republics—inhabited by peoples who feel themselves to constitute distinct nationalities. We have, in fact, in the USSR a unique constitutional form which combines, in one and the same hierarchy, the organs of both local and central government, of both legislature and executive, of both unitary state and federation.

How the Pyramid was Built

We need not trouble the reader with the successive changes since 1918 in the details of the indirectly elected hierarchy. The tsarist local governing authorities, whether gubernia, zemstvo, uezd or volost, quickly fell to pieces at the Revolution. For years chaos reigned in varying degree from place to place; and each soviet, in city or village, assumed whatever powers it wanted, and dealt with the affairs of its own areas as it chose. Gradually things were straightened out by the central government, and formulated by successive All-Union Congresses of Soviets. Municipal authorities were established for the cities. The village soviet (selosoviet) entirely replaced the Mir. The three old divisions of tsarist local government, whether gubernia (province), uezd (county) or volost (rural district), were eventually superseded by two new ones, formed, to some extent, along lines of economic characteristics, and termed *oblast* or *krai*,¹ and *rayon*.² No less important, as we shall presently describe, was the vital

¹ The terms *oblast* and *krai* are applied indiscriminately, according to local usage. But we are told that, strictly speaking, an *oblast* is a newly established district containing no autonomous area. Where an autonomous area peopled mainly by a national minority exists as an enclave within the district the proper term is *krai*. The North Caucasian *krai* contains as many as seven autonomous areas.

Among other works in Russian we may cite *The Soviet State: the Origins and the Development of the Constitution of the USSR*, by V. I. Ignatiev, 1928, 146 pp.; *The USSR, and the Union's Republics*, by S. A. Kotlyarevsky, 139 pp.; *The Soviet Autonomous Oblasts and Republics*, by K. Arkhipov, 123 pp.

² There was at first an additional tier of councils, termed the *okrug soviet*, for an area roughly corresponding to that of the old *volost*, in which both village soviets and city soviets were represented. This was found inconvenient, as leaving too little scope for the development of the *rayon soviet* in enlivening the village soviets; and as encouraging too much bureaucratic control, to which the city soviet especially objected. It was decided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party by a decree of July 6, 1930, to "liquidate" the *okrugs* and to wind them up by October 1, 1930. The decision was ratified by the Sixteenth Party Congress (*Political Report to the Sixteenth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party*, by Josef Stalin, 1930, pp. 125-129). But, in the vast area of the USSR, such changes take time to become universal. In 1934 there were still functioning 22 *okrugs*.

policy of cultural autonomy and, wherever practicable, native self-government for the scores of separate nationalities scattered over the Eurasian continent. What is of interest is that all these different kinds and grades of governing bodies find places in the main soviet hierarchy, and spring ultimately from the same base of primary soviets. The simple pyramid, springing by indirect election from the broad foundation of some 75,000 directly elected primary soviets of village or city, turns out to have, not merely one supreme apex in the All-Union Congress of Soviets, but also a number of separate minor apices, not only in the congresses of soviets of the autonomous republics or oblasts, but also in those of the seven (or rather nine) federated constituent republics,¹ of which we must give some description before tackling the supreme government of the Union.

The Rayon and the Oblast

There are, accordingly, two main strands in the closely knit constitutional fabric of Soviet Communism: the direct choice, by adult suffrage, at open meetings of fellow-workers or neighbours, of people's deputies or delegates; and the formation, by indirect election from below, of a pyramidal series of superior authorities. We may observe in passing that, as we shall presently describe, the same two strands run through all the four divisions of the representative system of Soviet Communism, whether it is dealing with "Man as a Citizen", or with "Man as a Producer", or with "Man as a Consumer", or with "Man as a Super-citizen engaged in the Vocation of Leadership".

We now resume our description of the government of Man as a Citizen in the successive tiers of councils above the village or small city soviet,²

¹ These are the RSFSR (Russia proper with Siberia); the Ukraine; White Russia; the Transcaucasian Federation (which is a union of three—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia); Turkestan; Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan.

The trouble about a metaphor is that it is never completely accurate as a description! One of the authors objects that it is a peculiarity of the soviet pyramid that its supreme apex is not flanked by parallel minor apices; these are all actually included inside the supreme apex, which they help to support, and moreover some of these minor apices have other still smaller pyramidal apices within themselves! A chart will enable the student to get a clearer vision of this amazingly complicated constitution than is practicable through the written word (see the diagram in the Appendix to Part I).

² It adds to the complication that the names and areas of the tiers of councils have been, during the past few years, in process of change. This economic "rayonising" of the USSR was contemplated immediately after the end of the Civil War, but was not seriously undertaken until 1928, when it was needed for the most effective formulation of the First Five-Year Plan. It was based on the conception of four different types. There were to be industrial rayons (as in the Leningrad oblast, or in the Donets Basin of the Ukraine). There were to be agricultural rayons (as in the Black Soil region, the Middle Volga, the south-west part of the Ukraine or in Kazakhstan). There had also to be mixed rayons, which were necessarily both industrial and agricultural (as in North Caucasus, the Lower Volga krai, the Crimea). There were also timber rayons (as in Northern Asia). (See an instructive section, in Russian, in *The Five-Year Plan of the National Economy Construction of the USSR*, vol. iii, "The Rayon Divisions of the Plan", 1929.) Under this "rayonising", what were, under the tsarist régime, 56 gubernia (provinces), 476 uезд (cantons or counties) and 10,606 volost (rural districts), have been reorganised into 190 oblasts (or krajs) and about 3000 rayons. An intermediate council for the okrug,

through those of the rayon and the oblast, and those of the autonomous and the constituent republic, up to the supreme authority of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, with its bicameral Central Executive Committee (TSIK), its Cabinet of Ministers (Sovnarkom) and its various other derivatives.

The Rayon

Among the innumerable and apparently unlimited powers of the selo-soviet and the small city soviets, there is one universal duty which stands out, that of electing people's deputies or delegates to the congress of soviets of the rayon. The rayon, now formed mainly on lines of economic production, is a new area comprising a number of adjacent villages and what in England would be called hamlets, together with such small cities or urban settlements as happen to be intermixed with them. The geographical extent and the population of the rayon differ from place to place according to local circumstances, and may be varied from time to time by decrees of any superior authority.¹ It may thus comprise any number of villages, from a few dozen to many score, with half a dozen times as many dependent hamlets, with or without one or more cities and urban settlements. The soviets of each of these annually elects one (or if large, several) people's deputies or delegates to constitute the rayon congress of soviets, which meets at the principal centre of the rayon.

In the RSFSR and the Ukraine the village soviets elect these delegates at the rate of one for every 300 inhabitants. The soviets of the small cities and urban settlements within the rayon elect delegates at the rate of one for each unit of 60 electors of these soviets (approximately equal

standing between the rayon and the oblast, was designed; but this was abandoned in 1930. This reorganisation is now nearly completed; and for the sake of clearness we shall limit our description to the new general system, although the old continues to exist temporarily in a few places.

With the abolition of the *okrug*, the cities having populations of more than 50,000, and some others of great industrial importance, have been, in the six smaller constituent republics, taken out of the rayon, and made directly subordinate to the Sovnarkom (Cabinet) and TSIK (central executive committee) of the constituent republic within which they are situated. In the RSFSR, however, these major cities are subordinated also to the executive committee (ispolkom) of the oblast or krai. The other cities, having populations below 50,000, remain within the rayons, but with an autonomy greatly exceeding that enjoyed by the villages. Such cities, for instance, fix their own local taxes and settle their own budgets, which are adopted by the city soviets, and only passed through the rayon ispolkom for general concurrence, and submission to the oblast ispolkom.

For exact information as to local government constitution in the USSR, the student must go to the decrees themselves, but these are summarised in *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, chap. vii., "Provincial Government", pp. 100-108; where the Russian sources are indicated (pp. 347-348). See also *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, chap. xi., "Local Administration" (pp. 663-687), which does not clearly give the more recent changes.

¹ Actually the 3000 rayons appear to include, on an average, about 23 selosoviets and perhaps one small city or urban settlement apiece, with an average population of about 45,000; which is analogous to that of an English rural district council in its much smaller area.

to 120 inhabitants). Thus, as is usual in the soviet bodies, the total number of members of the rayon congress of soviets is not fixed, and with the increase of population it is always growing. It elects a president, with some other members to form a presidium, and also a standing executive committee (ispolkom) not exceeding 45 members, together with one-third as many candidates or alternates.

When we enquire what are the powers and duties entrusted to the rayon congress of soviets, we are met with the same difficulty as that with which we were confronted in the case of the village soviet. The list of these powers and duties, as expressly laid down in the RSFSR decree of January 1, 1931, is indeed substantially similar to that relating to the village soviet, which we give as an appendix to this volume. These powers and duties range from the consideration and discussion of the loftiest matters of policy and administration of the USSR as a whole, in which the rayon congress of soviets, like the village soviet, is invited and desired to participate, and which it is expressly directed to put in operation within its own area, down to the minutest details of parochial administration. It is, indeed, not to be supposed that the entire conglomeration of these subjects are even discussed by any of the 3000 rayon congresses of soviets, any more than they are by the 70,000-odd village soviets. But in startling contrast with the narrowly limited and precisely defined functions of the British or American local governing body, there is practically nothing in the world that the rayon congress of soviets, equally with the village soviet, is not authorised and indeed invited to deal with, so far as its application to the denizens of its area is concerned. On the other hand, again in contrast with the British or American local authority, the rayon congress of soviets, like the village soviet, has no legal rights on which it can insist against the will of any superior administrative authority. It may at any moment find its decisions overruled, and its actions cancelled and reversed by the oblast congress of soviets which it joins with other rayons in creating; or by the oblast ispolkom (or executive committee); or by the republic congress of soviets or its Central Executive Committee; or by the sovnarkom, or the People's Commissar, of the constituent or autonomous republic within the area of which it is situated; or by the All-Union Congress of Soviets or its TSIK (or Central Executive Committee); or, indeed, by the presidium of any of these bodies; or by the USSR Sovnarkom of People's Commissars. Thus, the rayon congress of soviets has a practically unlimited sphere of action, so far as its own area is concerned, subject always to the liability to be sharply pulled up and overruled whenever it does anything contrary to the policy or the will of any authority higher than itself. It has absolute freedom to participate in government, and it is encouraged and strongly urged to participate in any way it chooses; but it is no less sternly warned that whenever it "goes off the rails", its action will be cancelled and reversed; and if the local body persists, it will be summarily disbanded, and a new election will be called for. In order to enable this superior authority to be exercised,

all obligatory decrees of a lower authority—indeed the minutes of proceedings themselves—have to be forwarded immediately to the next higher authority, as well as to the appropriate People's Commissariat of the USSR and that of an autonomous republic. We gather that, in practice, the rayon congress and its executive, like the village soviet, usually errs by default rather by excess of zeal; and that drastic interference from above, though unhesitatingly undertaken when required, is, to put it mildly, not of incessant occurrence.

The relation of the rayon congress of soviets to the various village and small urban soviets within its area is mainly one of supervision and control. Thus, the rayon congress appoints for each village the president of the electoral commission of ten local members to supervise the election of the village soviet; to compile and post up publicly the list of persons excluded from the electorate; and to provide an independent chairman for the various election meetings.

On the other hand, an essential function of the 3000 rayon soviets is that of concentrating in a single body the representation of the large number of village soviets within their several areas, occasionally amounting, as it seems, to more than one hundred, in such a way as to render practicable the election of delegates to the next higher council in the hierarchy.

The organs of local administration of the rayon congress of soviets, acting under the supervision and direction of the rayon ispolkom, or executive committee that the plenum elects, and of the presidium that the ispolkom appoints, consist of a number of sections (six of them being obligatory¹) on each of which there serve some members of the rayon congress and ispolkom, together with a varying number of inhabitants whom the ispolkom invites to act as a civic obligation. We are informed that the object of forming these sections is that of associating as large a proportion as possible of the "toiling masses" in the work of government. Meetings are held in the various factories and workshops, clubs and reading-rooms, throughout the rayon, where the members of the rayon congress of soviets, the "militia" (local constabulary) and the local courts of justice attend; where active workers are enlisted for the sections, and where the "concrete problems" of the work of the rayon congress are discussed. The obligatory sections are those dealing with "soviet construction and control of execution"; "industry, labour and supplies"; agriculture; health; education, the rayon's share in the General Plan, and the rayon's financial budget.

The rayon section dealing with the General Plan, so far as it relates to the rayon area stands in an interesting relation to Gosplan, to which it is

¹ Namely, those on (1) Soviet Construction and control of execution; (2) Industry, Labour and Supply; (3) Agriculture; (4) Finance and budget; (5) Popular Education; (6) Public Health (RSFSR decree of January 1, 1931, section 38). To these there has been added, for all but the smallest rayons, a section on the General Plan, in subordination to the Union State Planning Commission, which we describe in our chapter on "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

subordinate. National planning is now based largely upon constituent rayon planning. The rayon has to prepare each year its own preliminary plan for all the enterprises within its area in accordance with the general economic considerations of which it is advised. This has to be submitted to each local enterprise, productive or cultural. Each considers the quota assigned to it, and either approves or prepares a counter-plan. The whole are then submitted to the higher authorities to be further revised and finally enacted.¹

The only other part of the administration of the rayon calling for attention is that of finance. The rayon congress has annually to settle the budget of local receipts and expenditure for the ensuing year, which has to be submitted to the oblast ispolkomi for approval, and for inclusion in the oblast budget, with a view to its ultimate incorporation in the budget of the autonomous or constituent republic, and, indeed, finally in that of the USSR itself. Thus there is, in principle as well as in form, no effective local autonomy in finance in any grade of council from the smallest selsoviet up to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. In practice, however, there is a great deal of financial autonomy. To begin with, the amount of expenditure to be undertaken by the lower authorities, whilst it can be summarily restrained by any higher authority, cannot effectively be increased otherwise than by exhortation and persuasion. On the other hand, if the lower authorities choose to incur larger expenditure at their own cost, they are usually permitted to add a surtax to one or other of the taxes levied within their area by any of the higher authorities.

Elaborate provision is made by law as to the rayon being served by half a dozen organised departments of permanent officials, who are required to possess technical qualification and training. In fact there is as yet, in the vast majority of rayons, nothing more than a skeleton staff of officials of the very minimum of training. A marked feature is the extreme youthfulness of nearly all of them, few being over thirty, or having more than a few years' office experience. We understand that measures for the special training of administrative officials are under consideration.

The Oblast

Above both the rayon congresses of soviets of the rural districts and the soviets of the small cities, and superseding the ancient gubernia or province, stands, in the RSFSR and the Ukraine, the authority of the krai or oblast. The oblast congress of soviets is formed by delegates from the rayon congresses of soviets, representing the village soviets, at the rate (in the RSFSR) of one for every 12,500 inhabitants (equal to about one for every 7000 electors); and also by delegates elected directly by

¹ From paper by V. Kuibishev, head of Gosplan, in *Planned Economy*, April 1931. We deal with the whole subject in our subsequent chapter entitled "Planned Production for Community Consumption", Part II.

the soviets of the small cities (together with those of the urban settlements, factories and collective farms outside civic boundaries) at the rate of one delegate for each 2500 electors. Any autonomous republic or autonomous area within the territory is entitled to elect its own delegates at the rate of one for each 2000 electors from urban centres and one for each 10,000 inhabitants from rural settlements. It will be seen that the city soviets enjoy the usual disproportionate representation (more than twice as great as that of the rural villages). This disproportionate representation of the population of the cities, in comparison with that of the villages, does not prevent most, if not all, oblast congresses of soviets from containing far more representatives of villages than of city dwellers, because the proportion of the latter to the whole population of the area is still only as one to five or six.

The area over which the oblast congress of soviets presides, the number of its members, and the nature and extent of its functions, appear to differ in different parts and to be still in course of settlement. The population within the different oblasts varies enormously, even as much as from one to ten millions. In the RSFSR the approximate average appears to be nearly four millions. If we take the autonomous republics in the USSR, which are classed with the oblasts properly so-called, we see that their average population is only about a million and a half, whilst their average area is no less than 650,000 square kilometres. On the other hand, the average population of the fourteen oblasts properly so-called, exceeds five millions, although their average area is roughly the same as that of the autonomous republic.¹ In the Ukraine the average population and area are both smaller. The five lesser constituent republics have no oblasts, the rayon congresses of soviets, being directly under the republic congress of soviets, its central executive committee and its sovnarkom.

In the RSFSR there are, we gather, twenty-six territories ranking as oblasts, including the areas of the twelve autonomous republics within its boundaries which have the same constitutional form as other oblasts, except that they call their ministerial heads of departments People's Commissars and their council a sovnarkom. Thus there are the fourteen newly delimited oblasts of Moscow and Leningrad, the Ivanovo industrial area, the Northern territory, the Western territory, the Central Black Earth area, the Gorki (late Nizhni-Novgorod) territory, the Ural territory, that of the North Caucasus, the two territories of the Middle and Lower Volga, and the two of East and West Siberia, together with the Far Eastern territory. With them are ranked the twelve autonomous republics, namely, those of the Crimea, the Tatars, the Volga Germans, Kazak, Yakut, Kirghiz, Chuvash, Karelia, Buryat, Bashkir, Karakalpak and Daghestan. In each of these divisions there is a Congress of Soviets

¹ Thus the autonomous republic in the RSFSR, whilst having a large area, is comparable in population to the half-dozen most populous administrative counties of England. The oblasts of the RSFSR, on the other hand, usually surpass in population the most populous of the English administrative counties, and some even that of Ireland or the administrative county of London.

electing an executive (termed either ispolkom or sovnarkom) which directs a varied and extensive local administration.

In the Ukraine, some of the oblast areas are particularly large, there being only half a dozen so called for the whole republic.¹ But in the Donets industrial area the population is so dense, and the amount of work so great, that each rayon soviet is accepted as equivalent also to an oblast soviet. In the other parts of the Ukraine, the rayon congress of soviets, either each year or every two years, elects representatives to the oblast congress of soviets at the rate of one for each 15,000 of the population, amounting in each case to several hundred delegates.

Wherever it exists, the oblast congress of soviets is an important authority. It is, indeed, the supreme local organ of power within its own area, with a competence extending to all matters of government. It has, however, to coordinate its activity with the policy and administration of the central executive committee (VTSIK) and the Sovnarkom of the constituent republic, whilst the USSR sovnarkom and its presidium also have the right to suspend or reverse, in case of need, anything done by the oblast authorities. It has the right to control all public institutions within its area, not being those of the USSR; and even these it has a right to supervise and report upon. It can veto any regulation or decision of any of the city soviets or any of the rayon or selosoviets within its area. It controls all the elections within the oblast. Finally, it has the right to propose to the authorities of the constituent republic the enactment and promulgation of any laws and regulations relating to the oblast that are required.

But the oblast congress of soviets meets as a plenum, usually, only once a year, when it elects a president, and his assistant, who both give their whole time to the work, and also an ispolkom, or executive committee, of about one hundred members, who receive only their expenses and a free pass over all the railways within the oblast. In the case of the autonomous republics, the congress of soviets elects, in lieu of an ispolkom, a sovnarkom of People's Commissars who themselves control the various branches of administration. In both cases the USSR Government is directly represented in the oblast executive by officials of such USSR People's Commissariats as Railroads and Posts and Telegraphs. The ispolkom of an ordinary oblast is supposed to conduct its administration through its presidium and four organised departments of officials (a secretariat, an organisation department, a planning commission termed obplan, and a "commission of execution"). But the work which has to be performed falls under fifteen or more heads, of which we may mention a "regional council of people's economy"; agriculture; trade or distribution of commodities; finance; communal department; education; health; social welfare; military; political; and archives; together

¹ Namely, those of Chernigov, Kiev, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Vinitza, with which must be ranked the Moldavian Autonomous Republic, and, as explained in the text, all the separate rayons of the Donets Basin.

with the department of justice. In many oblasts the lack of an adequate official staff has led to the appointment of a number of sections each containing a selection from the members of the oblast congress of soviets and the ispolkom, together with other active or representative citizens appointed by the ispolkom. Each of these sections is charged with the supervision and actual administration of one department of the work of the oblast. It should be said that, in the matter of local taxation and the budget of the oblast the oblast ispolkom has the right to participate in the discussion both of the budget of the constituent republic and of that of the USSR itself, in so far as these relate to its own area.

The Seven Federated Republics

The next tier of councils, above that of the oblast or krai, where they exist, and of the autonomous republics, is that of the seven Union or constituent republics of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, White Russia, the Transcaucasian Federation (itself a federation of three distinct republics), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan, all of which are directly joined together in federation as the USSR.

The RSFSR

The first and by far the most important of these republics, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, although expressly termed a federation, is and has always been essentially a unitary state. Notwithstanding its title, and an express declaration in the first article of its Fundamental Law in 1918, what was established by that law, without subsequent revision, was a soviet hierarchy, or pyramid, of the pattern that we have so often described. The RSFSR was to have a supreme All-Russian Congress of Soviets, made up of deputies or delegates elected by provincial congresses of soviets under various designations; and these provincial congresses were made up of deputies or delegates from smaller district congresses of soviets, themselves consisting of deputies or delegates from village or urban soviets, who were directly elected at innumerable small gatherings of electors, associated either in work at particular establishments or as neighbours in rural villages. From top to bottom of this pyramid of councils, each tier has complete authority over all below it, and is itself completely subject to all above it. This system of "Democratic Centralism", as it is fondly called, which is universally characteristic of Soviet Communism, seems to us to have nothing in common with the curtailed but inviolable autonomy of the various units that is understood by federalism.¹

¹ In the discussion leading up to the formulation and adoption of the "Fundamental Law" during the first half of 1918, the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" was so strongly insisted on, that the very first article had to assert that "Russia is declared a republic of soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies. *All central and local*

It is, indeed, remarkable how small and relatively unimportant have been the changes since 1918 in the constitutional structure of the RSFSR, notwithstanding the development of autonomous republics and autonomous areas within it, and the formation of the USSR about and above it.¹ Its capital is still Moscow, where the RSFSR ministerial departments are cheek-by-jowl with those of the USSR. The "All-Russian Congress of Soviets" now meets only every few years, usually just prior to the All-Union Congress, to which the same delegates immediately proceed. It is composed of delegates elected by the congresses of soviets of the several oblasts or kraia, autonomous republics and autonomous areas, and the larger cities, in the proportion of one to every 125,000 population of rural areas, and one to every 25,000 city electors (equal to about 45,000 population). The Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the RSFSR, now increased in size from 200 to 400, meets only once a quarter. The Sovnarkom no longer includes as many as eighteen People's Commissars, seeing that all the "questions of national importance" specified in articles 49 and 50 of the Fundamental Law, with the departments of foreign affairs, armed forces, foreign trade, heavy industry, forestry, state farms, railways and waterways, posts and telegraphs, and food industry, have passed to the USSR; and these departments are now represented in the RSFSR Sovnarkom only by the delegates or agents of the USSR People's Commissars. There are, however, in the RSFSR Sovnarkom, still eight People's Commissars, under a president, with two vice-presidents, namely, those for Finance, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Social Welfare, Agriculture, and Light Industries, together with the president of the RSFSR Gosplan.²

When it is remembered that the population of the RSFSR exceeds one hundred millions, and that the territory stretches from the Gulf of Finland to the Pacific Ocean, it will be seen that even these nine government departments represent an immense task of administration. The *authority is vested in these soviets.*" The state that was established as the Russian Soviet Republic, and then styled the RSFSR, was conceived, by at least some of its most energetic advocates, as nothing more than a federation of all the urban and rural soviets throughout the country.

In article 10 it is again expressly declared that "all authority within the boundaries of the RSFSR is vested in the entire working population of the country, *organised in the urban and rural soviets*" (Fundamental Law of the RSFSR, ratified by the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918, First section, chap. i., article 10; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Baisell, 1929, p. 81). But the Fundamental Law, taken as a whole, established, as we now see, a state of the very opposite character.

¹ Incidentally we may note that the territory of White Russia, and thus of the USSR, was reduced, under the Treaty of Riga (1921) ending the war with Poland, by a strip along the western frontier, which was ceded to Poland. In 1929 the extensive but scantily peopled district of Tadzhikistan was taken out of the RSFSR, and promoted to the status of an independent constituent republic of the Soviet Union, entitled, like the RSFSR itself, to representation by five members in the Soviet of Nationalities, forming part of the bicameral Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

² Agriculture now has a USSR People's Commissar, who has, in the RSFSR, as in other federated republics, considerably reduced the autonomy of local People's Commissars. The departments of the Commissariat for Labour have been transferred to the AUCCTU, and there is accordingly now no People's Commissar of Labour.

civil service of the RSFSR may exceed in number the federal staff of the USSR itself, apart from the defence forces and the establishments in foreign countries. With the more significant features of this vast administration we shall deal in subsequent chapters. The RSFSR Sovnarkom is still busy in developing schools and medical services over the vast area that it controls. It has to carry on the great retailing business in Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov that we shall describe in a later chapter. Its responsibility - save for the occasional spasmodic intervention that we shall presently describe of the USSR Supreme Court—for the administration of justice, the prevention of crime and the maintenance of prisons within the whole area of the RSFSR may be circumscribed by the creation of the new USSR People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. The observer cannot resist the feeling that, whilst the local government of the cities, and that of the krais and oblasts, rayons and selosoviets, within the RSFSR, is growing in magnitude and activity, the various central organs of the RSFSR at Moscow have lost ground to the other central organs located in the same city, belonging to the federal government of the USSR that we have still to describe.

The Republic of the Ukraine

The second in importance among the seven constituent republics now forming the USSR and the only one of a magnitude and a population, a productivity and an aspiration at all comparable with the RSFSR, is that of the Ukraine. Here we have a population of thirty millions (nearly one-third of that of the RSFSR), concentrated, to the extent of 150 to the square kilometre, on an area comparable with that of Sweden, having its own language appreciably differing from Russian; its own ancient cultural centre at Kiev; and its own traditions of former national autonomy under an elected hetman. Although these traditions had been interrupted by centuries of tsarist tyranny, it needed little incitement from the German military authorities in 1916-1917 to induce a large proportion of the Ukrainians to struggle, not merely for the destruction of Russian dominion, but also, with some expectation of sympathy from Ukrainian (otherwise called Ruthenian) minorities in Austria, Poland and Roumania, for an independent Ukrainian Republic. This was proclaimed on December 27, 1917. There was, however, never any chance for a political union of the whole Ukrainian race, one-fifth of which, outside the USSR, remains to this day firmly held within the four neighbouring states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania. Accordingly, when between 1917 and 1922 the foreign armies and the widespread banditry were got rid of, there was established, within the Ukrainian part of Tsarist Russia, a reasonably well-organised government on the common pattern of the hierarchy of soviets, in a friendly "military and economic alliance" with the RSFSR, which was formally proclaimed in December 1920, and converted into a federal union in 1922-1923.¹

¹ See *National States and National Minorities*, by W. C. Macartney, 1934.

The supreme authority in the Ukraine is the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which now meets for about a week, usually once every few years, just before the All-Union Congress of Soviets at Moscow. It consists of about a thousand delegates and "candidates" (being substitutes or alternates) chosen by the plenums of the six oblast congresses of soviets, together with that of the Autonomous Republic of Moldavia and the congresses of soviets of each of the Donets rayons. This All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets hears speeches, approves drafts of decrees and administrative resolutions laid before it, and appoints a president of the Ukraine Congress, with an Assistant, together with a Central Executive Committee, and a sovnarkom of People's Commissars.

The Central Executive Committee of about 400 members, who all receive a free pass over the railways in the Ukraine, meets usually once a quarter for about ten days, and exercises supreme authority between the infrequent sessions of the All-Ukrainian Congress. A meeting is usually held immediately before each meeting of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR at Moscow, in order to consider the business coming before that meeting, and if necessary to concert a Ukrainian policy.

The Ukrainian Sovnarkom consists of a president, several vice-presidents and a secretary, with People's Commissars for Finance, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Justice, Light Industries, Education, Health and Social Welfare, and a local Planning Commission practically subordinate to Gosplan.

The Ukrainian People's Commissars dealing directly with industry have exceptionally heavy departments to administer. The industrial developments in the Ukraine during the past few years have been enormous in amount and range; and whilst most of the work has fallen first to the USSR Supreme Economic Council, and on its abolition to the People's Commissars for Heavy and Food Industries respectively, the Ukrainian Government has retained and developed some of its own undertakings. It has its own steelworks and machine-making factories, conducted in dutiful compliance with the General Plan, but as enterprises of the republic.¹ The Ukrainian Sovnarkom also conducts, in supplement of the efforts of *Centrosoyuz* and the increasing work of the Ukrainian Cooperative Societies, a very extensive business in retailing household commodities of all kinds, in the relatively well-appointed government shops at Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Dneprostroi and other cities.

Beneath the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, with its Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom of People's Commissars, there stands the usual hierarchy of soviets of the oblasts, rayons, cities and villages according to the common pattern which we have just described. Some peculiarities of the Ukraine may, however, be mentioned. Its

¹ When, in 1932, the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR was, as we shall presently describe, replaced by new People's Commissars for Heavy, Food and Timber Industries respectively, careful provision had to be made to preserve to the Ukrainian Sovnarkom its control over the enterprises that were Ukrainian.

villages are usually exceptionally large and populous, many having between five and ten thousand inhabitants, so that the electors have exceptionally often to be divided into settlements or wards, for each of which a separate meeting (election point or curia) has to be held to elect members to the village soviet (selosoviet). Similarly, as we have already mentioned, the rayons in the densely populated industrial area of the Donets Basin have so great a number of electors, and local government functions of such importance, that they rank and are treated also as oblasts, and directly elect their own delegates to the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.

The Ukraine retains among its intelligentsia a strong national feeling, and energetically develops its own Ukrainian culture, which is very nationalist in form, although communist in essence, in books and newspapers, theatres and universities. The USSR authorities wisely respect the racial susceptibilities of this important republic. It is as a concession to these susceptibilities that it was in 1934 decided to retransfer the capital which has for the past decade been at Kharkov, to the ancient metropolis of Kiev. But whatever may happen in learning and literature the industrial development is so predominantly "All-Union" in its influence, and the Communist Party in the Ukraine is so definitely directed from Moscow, that, in spite of repeated attempts of the *émigrés* centred in Paris and Prague to incite to rebellion, it is impossible to ignore a tendency to a more complete unification.¹

The White Russian and Transcaucasian Republics

We need not go into detail about the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (capital Minsk) on the western border of the USSR, adjoining Latvia, Lithuania and Poland;² or about the combined Union republic of the Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Federation, which has its capital at Tiflis, for its three constituent republics wedged between the Black and Caspian Seas, and adjoining Turkey on the southern border.³ Both have

¹ The Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, on the left bank of the Dniester river, which forms the frontier of Bessarabia, was made an autonomous republic under Ukraine on October 12, 1924. This exclusively agricultural community (capital Balta) with a population of 600,000 upon an area of only 8288 square kilometres—about as large as the North Riding of Yorkshire or the canton of Berne—may perhaps be regarded as a lasting embodiment of the protest of the USSR against the Roumanian seizure of Bessarabia, which it is hoped, may one day be enabled, as South Moldavia, to unite with the northern half of what is claimed to be a single community. With this view, the Moldavian Republic maintains a *sovnarkom* of People's Commissars, but is for many purposes dealt with as if it were merely an oblast of the Ukraine.

² The White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic has an area of 120,790 square kilometres—three times that of Switzerland—with a population slightly exceeding five millions, four-fifths of whom speak the White Russian dialect, whilst Jews attain the relatively high proportion of 10 per cent. The constitution is almost identical in form to that of the RSFSR, with which it finds its activities coordinated.

³ The three constituents of this federation are Azerbaijan (capital Baku), which established its soviet republic in April 1920; Armenia (capital Eriwan), which did so in December 1920; and Georgia (capital Tiflis), in which a soviet government was established by the Bolshevik army in February 1921. On March 18, 1922, these three governments,

governments organised upon the common pattern, with central executive committees several hundreds strong and sovnarkoms administering the local affairs. Both retain strong feelings in favour of local autonomy based on racial and linguistic, as well as (especially in the case of Georgia) historical associations, and are accordingly left in undisturbed enjoyment of the cultural autonomy that they value. Both find their industries developed, continuously and extensively, at the expense of the whole Soviet Union, and their agriculture directed according to the USSR General Plan; whilst in both the strictly unitary Communist Party everywhere exerts a potent influence in promoting a common economic policy and in gradually developing a new common sentiment as constituent parts of the larger whole.

The Formation of the Soviet Union

With the final defeat of the "White" armies, and the withdrawal of the last of the contingents of the foreign powers, the time came for the establishment of a common rule for the whole territory of what was left of Tsarist Russia.¹ The capitalist governments did not relinquish their hostility with the withdrawal of their forces, and the necessity for union for common defence had been made sufficiently obvious. Its importance for economic and social planning could not be missed. The influence of the widely dispersed membership of the essentially unitary Communist Party worked powerfully in the same direction. Already by December 28, 1920, Lenin and Chicherin, for the RSFSR, had agreed with Rakovski, president of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, and also its People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on a Treaty of Alliance which embodied the main outlines of the eventual Treaty of Union. The World International Conference, to which the Moscow Government had gladly accepted an invitation, was about to meet at Genoa, and agreements were hastily concluded by the RSFSR with White Russia and the Transcaucasian Federation, as well as with the Ukraine, providing that they should accept, as their representatives at the World Conference, the delegation of the RSFSR, and support the proposals in the common interest that would be

strongly influenced by the Communist Party, agreed to unite in a Transcaucasian Federation, with a common president, congress of soviets, a central executive committee of no fewer than 435 members and Sovnarkom of People's Commissars. Each of the constituent republics has also its own government for local affairs, and maintains its own cultural autonomy, especially the use of its own language in its own schools, law courts and public offices. The population of the federation now exceeds six millions in a largely mountainous area four times as great as Scotland. For the three other "Union Republics", namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan, see p. 63.

¹ The so-called Border States (whether Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; or Finland and Poland), by 1918 established as independent states, were never included in the RSFSR; whilst Bessarabia was seized by Roumania, and a further strip on the west was ceded to Poland on the conclusion of the war in 1921 (Treaty of Riga, 1921). The Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were, between 1918 and 1921, at various times enjoying a nominal independence under a shifting domination by foreign armies or local banditry.

put forward. The proceedings at Genoa proved to be of little interest or importance for the Soviet Government; but Chicherin was able to conclude with Germany, to the consternation of the other diplomats, the important separate Treaty of Rapallo, in which were included, for the first time, all four soviet states. This was followed, after months of negotiation, by the agreement of these four governments, in December 1922, to constitute the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Stalin was in a position to report to the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which opened at Moscow on December 23, 1922, that resolutions had been received from the supreme congresses of soviets of the Ukraine, of White Russia and of the Transcaucasian Federation, urging the necessity and advantage of creating a single federal union. A special delegation representing all four republics was appointed to draw up the necessary treaty, upon much the same basis as had been agreed with the Ukraine in 1920. The draft had already been prepared. Within three days the "Declaration of Union" was formulated; adopted by the "First Congress of Soviets of the USSR", and duly proclaimed by the Executive Committee which that Congress had appointed. All that was needed was a formal constitution. The new Central Executive Committee of the Union (TSIK), which was, in fact, dominated by the members who belonged to the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, prepared a draft which did little more than reproduce, for the Union, the scheme of government of the RSFSR itself. At this point the Communist Party publicly intervened with a more statesmanlike proposal. The Twelfth Congress of the Party was in session (April 1923); and its Central Committee formally recommended to the presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (TSIK) that the draft required amendment. The proposed constitution did not, the Communist Party protested, afford by its terms sufficient assurance to the three smaller republics that the autonomy to be allowed to them would be protected against the dominance of the RSFSR. Moreover, so Stalin urged, it did not provide for putting on a genuinely federal basis the autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts that he had been establishing, inside the RSFSR, for the principal nationalities. The "counter-plan" of the Communist Party embodied a new ideal, that of the "Unnational State", in sharp contrast with the consciously "National" states into which Europe had become divided in the course of the past four centuries, this stream of tendencies coming more recently to a climax in the Italy of Mussolini and the Germany of Hitler. The project of the Communist Party, which resulted in the present federal constitution of the USSR, seems to us so novel, and fraught with consequences so important, that we give in full its fundamental propositions. It was essential, the Party declared:

"(a) To secure, during the establishment of the central organs of the Union, the equality of rights and duties of the individual republics in their mutual relationship with each other, as well as in regard to the central authority of the Union.

"(b) To establish, in the system of supreme organs of the Union, a representation of all national republics and regions on principles of equality, with possible representation of all nationalities living in these republics.

"(c) To construct the executive organs of the Union on principles which would secure a real participation therein of the representatives of these republics, and a real satisfaction of all needs of the peoples in the Union.

"(d) To allow for the republics sufficiently liberal financial and, in particular, budgetary rights, which would enable them to show their own state-administrative, cultural, and economic initiative.

"(e) To man the organs of the national republics and regions chiefly from amongst the local population, who would know local customs, language, etc.

"(f) To issue special laws which would secure for them the right to use their native language in all state organs and institutions serving the local national minorities—the laws which would prosecute and punish with full revolutionary severity all violators of national rights, and in particular of rights of national minorities.

"(g) To promote educational work in the Red Army in the sense of cultivating therein the ideas of brotherhood and solidarity of the peoples composing the Union and to take practical measures concerning the organisation of national armies, at the same time taking care that the defensive structure of the republic shall always be kept adequate."¹

A special committee, in which the RSFSR had only 14 members out of 25, thereupon drew up a new constitution, in which Stalin's plan of a "Soviet of Nationalities", with no greater representation (5) of the RSFSR than of any other constituent or autonomous republic, but with the addition of single representatives also from all the other autonomous areas within the constituent republics, was adopted as part of a bicameral Central Executive Committee. At the same time the autonomy of each constituent republic was safeguarded by suitable phrases introduced at appropriate places. The new draft was approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and after formal agreement in the three other capitals, it was adopted at Moscow by the Central Executive Com-

¹ *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, pp. 281-282; *Fifteen Years of Soviet Construction, 1917-1932* (in Russian), 1932, p. 63. The novelty and the importance of the new conception, to which we recur at the end of this chapter, are handsomely recognised in the remarkable work, *National States and National Minorities*, by W. C. Macartney, 1934.

In the concluding section of this chapter we describe in some detail the steps taken in the USSR to establish, under the "Unnational State", complete political, economic and social equality among a population of 170 million persons, comprising nearly 200 different races at markedly different stages of development—Slavs and Teutons in sundry varieties of Christendom and paganism; Scandinavians of sorts, with Finns and Esquimaux; Mongols of every grade of civilisation; Jews and Syrians and gypsies; Turks and Armenians; with Siberian and central Asiatic tribes of the most varied character, from Buddhists and Bahaists and the "Shiahs" and "Sunnijs" of Islam to magic-mongers and animists.

mittee of the USSR (TSIK) on July 6, 1923, when it came immediately into force; to be finally ratified by the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets on January 31, 1924.

The Federal Union

We are thus brought, at long last, to the central federal organs of the gigantic Soviet State. But we cannot refrain from the observation that this seven-starred constellation, brilliant and powerful though it be—now filling, indeed, almost the whole soviet sky—is not and has never been a federation of participants of anything like equal status. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a leonine partnership. What happened in 1922 was that the RSFSR, with an elaborate parade of federal forms, and a genuine concession of cultural autonomy, virtually annexed to itself the three other fragments of Tsarist Russia which had been, by the Bolshevik forces with the active cooperation of a large proportion, if not a majority, of the inhabitants, cleared of hostile armies and insurgent banditry, and thus in effect conquered. To these have since been added three communities on the south-eastern Asiatic border, of vast area but small population, which have been set up as additional constituent or Union republics.¹ It must always be remembered that the prime mover in these transactions, the RSFSR itself, holds sway over a territory extending from the Baltic to the Pacific, in area twelve times as large as all the other six constituent or Union republics put together, and twenty-three times as large as the next biggest among them. It has a population twice as great as the aggregate of all the other six, and three times the total of the next greatest among them. It had at that date an army (and an armed police force) which had lately suppressed every attempt in any of the territories to set up or maintain any government hostile to that of Moscow. Above all, it possessed, in the Communist Party, a ruling order or companionship, at that time mainly concentrated in the RSFSR, which dominated the whole. When we consider how preponderant were those influences, the successive treaties of union themselves, and all the façade of federation that was set up, might easily be imagined to be unimportant, if not illusory. How far such a judgment would be accurate we shall now be able to examine.

¹ These are the Uzbek SSR (formerly Bokhara, capital Samarkand), the Turkoman SSR (capital Ashkhabad) and, promoted to independence from having been merely part of the RSFSR, the Tadzhik SSR (capital Stalinsk), all bordering on Persia and Afghanistan. The first two were formally admitted by the USSR Congress of Soviets in May 1925, and the third in October 1929. In area the three republics are nearly a million square kilometres, more than that of Germany, Austria, Holland, Belgium and Denmark combined. Their inhabitants, now numbering over seven millions, are almost all Moham-medans, but unlike the Persians, Sunnis, not Shiah. Notwithstanding this religious difference, it was apparently feared that they might be drawn into union with Persia or Afghanistan; and special efforts have been made to strengthen their loyalty to the USSR, with which they are now all connected by railway and river, air lines and telegraphs as well as by new motor roads, whilst agriculture, industry and commerce have been greatly developed. (See the able survey in *The National Policy of the Soviet Union* by A. Rysakoff.)

The All-Union Congress of the USSR

The supreme body in the soviet hierarchy is the All-Union Congress of Soviets, which is made up of delegates from every part of the USSR. These are specially elected just before each such congress, which is now convened only every three or four years. These delegates have hitherto been chosen, not merely by the highest congress of soviets of each of the seven constituent republics of the Union, but also, at the rate of one delegate for every 125,000 of population, by the congresses of soviets of the autonomous republics and autonomous areas within any of these seven constituent republics; and also by the soviets of the more populous cities and urban settlements at the rate of one delegate for each 25,000 electors, equivalent to about one for each 50,000 of population. The number of delegates varies, being roughly proportionate to the several census populations. At the congress in March 1931 the total (including 833 "candidates", being substitutes or alternates) was 2403, about three-fourths being members of the Communist Party, or candidates for membership. At the next congress, in 1935, there were 2200 delegates with deciding votes, the total including candidates or alternates reaching some 3000. Of the delegates 74 per cent were Party members or candidates, or Comsomols. About one-sixth were women. More than half of the whole were attending for the first time. This huge assembly, made up of delegates of scores of races speaking different tongues, who meet only for a week or so and then "surrender their mandates", and do not even know in advance each other's names, cannot, of course, develop the corporate life of a Parliament, or deal adequately with the details of legislation or administration. The Congress has been described, in fact, as little better than a picturesque "biennial picnic" in Moscow for locally elected visitors from all parts of the USSR, whose whole expenses are provided from USSR funds.¹ Even if this were true, it would not imply that the Congress is of no political importance. On the contrary, its periodical meeting is one of the most useful parts of the USSR constitution. Although so large and heterogeneous a gathering is of no effect as a legislature, and not even very well fitted to be a forum of debate, its very existence is a potent factor of unity. It would be difficult to overestimate the value in this respect of bringing together some three thousand local personalities from a thousand cities and villages all over the USSR, to be entertained for a week or so in Moscow, which many of them have never before visited, and to be made to feel that it is upon them that the whole government

¹ "During the congress of the soviets, which assembles from time to time in Moscow, I have watched the delegates from these far-flung territories assemble in the 'Big Theatre' which serves as meeting-place for the Congress until such time as the Palace of the Soviets is completed. Mongolians, Tadzhiks, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Yakuts and some scores of other nationalities, representing peoples of almost every creed, stand together in respectful silence as the 'International' is played. Later in the proceedings they pass a unanimous vote of confidence in their Central Executive Committee" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1934, p. 135).

depends. The delegates listen to the lengthy reports laid before them, and to the not less lengthy orations of the leading statesmen. In the end the delegates unanimously give a general sanction to the outlines of policy and legislation expounded to them. But they do much more than this. Probably no foreign observer sits through all the prolonged and sometimes heated discussions that, continued day after day, make the "picnic" a very strenuous exercise. Fortunately a shorthand report of the speeches is published. At the Fifth All-Union Congress in 1929, there spoke, on the general report presented by the Government, no fewer than 90 delegates; on the combined reports of the People's Commissar of Agriculture, the Grain Trust (Zemotrest) and the cattle-breeding state farms (sovkhosi), 40 delegates; and on the report upon the organisation of collective farms (kolkhosi), 41 delegates. At the Sixth All-Union Congress in 1931, there took part in the discussions on the Government's general report, 57 delegates; on the report dealing with the position and prospective development of industry, 31 delegates; and on that about the main tasks of agriculture in connection with the whole "people's economy", 40 delegates. The mere fact that no delegate is "denied the floor", even if there is no effective voting, makes so representative a gathering of real political importance.

The Soviet "Reform Bill"

The sensation of the Seventh All-Union Congress in 1935 was the proposal by V. M. Molotov, the president of the USSR Sovnarkom, speaking on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, for a complete change in the system of election. At a time, it was said, when in the capitalist countries parliamentary democracy was becoming more and more discredited, soviet democracy was evolving to the fullest electoral development. The Congress was invited to substitute "equal elections for not entirely equal, direct election for indirect, and secret for open elections". It was explained that, as the kulaks were now crushed and the kolkhosi had achieved victory, the basis of representation in village and city (hitherto differing as between one delegate per 125,000 *inhabitants* and one per 25,000 *electors*) might safely be equalised. "All soviet organs from city and village soviets to the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" are to be chosen by direct election. The right of the voters to recall their deputy from any organ is to be preserved. There is to be participation of non-Party organisations and groups of toilers in the nomination of candidates. All elections are to be by secret balloting. With these far-reaching reforms the evolution of soviet democracy would be completed. This important "Reform Bill" was enthusiastically adopted by the Congress, the whole of the delegates standing to give Molotov an ovation with no dissentient voice. Molotov's opening speech was broadcast from more than 60 radio stations to all parts of the USSR to be picked up by a couple of million wireless sets in

homes, and many thousands of loud-speakers in factories and offices, as well as on the streets and squares of every city. It must have been heard by literally millions of citizens.¹

By the Congress the proposal was immediately referred with unanimity to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) with instructions to have the scheme of reform worked out by a Constitutional Commission, for approval at a subsequent session of the Central Executive Committee, and for use at the next regular election of "the organs of soviet power". The very next day this Constitutional Commission was appointed, consisting of 31 members, under Stalin as chairman, and including all the seven presidents of the Union republics, Kaganovich, Molotov and Litvinov, Radek and Bukharin, and a number of other leading personalities of the Party, representing all shades of opinion. At its first meeting, on July 7, the Commission appointed eleven sub-committees to deal with as many separate departments of its work, together with a twelfth, the editorial sub-committee, consisting of the chairmen of all the others, under Stalin himself.

We understand that the new electoral system is now (1935) being actively worked out by the sub-committees of the Constitutional Commission: but nothing is yet known of the means by which the difficulties will be overcome. The methods of election of the village and city soviets, and of the rayon, oblast and republic congresses of soviets, have to be considered, equally with those of the All-Union Congress of Soviets; but there seems no actual need for complete identity of device in all these cases. Will the characteristic use of small meetings of the electors be given up? If anything like a couple of thousand delegates are to be directly elected to the All-Union Congress by single-member constituencies, approximately equal in populations, with electorates of between 40,000 and 50,000, the constituencies in the rural districts must be of great superficial area, entailing some difficulty in voting and in collecting the votes for counting. But in Queensland and Western Australia similar difficulties have been successfully overcome. In the USSR the date of the election might have to be changed from winter to summer. More difficult may be the adoption of secret voting. It is hard to imagine what system can be successfully adopted for an electorate soon to reach one hundred millions in number, dispersed over so huge an area. If individual ballot papers are used, the amount of paper required will be considerable; and if, as is the case at present, all the elections are contested, the task of counting the votes will tax the arithmetical powers of the local officials. The political world will watch with interest so colossal an experiment in taking the vote. We do not ourselves believe that the outcome of the election in the USSR under direct, equal and secret voting will be sub-

¹ Telegrams reported "good reception" and attentive listening crowds at all parts. Those "workers of Moscow factories and mills . . . of the morning shifts, who have no radio sets in their homes, remained at the plants till evening in order to hear the reports from the large Kremlin Palace" (*Moscow Daily News*, January 30, 1935).

stantially different from that under the present system of indirect election. The principal result may be a new demonstration of the very widespread acquiescence of the population in the existing régime, whose recent economic and political achievements have become highly appreciated. Equally striking will be the demonstration that the existing Soviet Government does not fear the peasants' votes, and has no need of the dictatorial powers conferred by law upon Mussolini and Hitler.

The Organs of the Congress

Of the routine decisions of the Congress, the principal is the election of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), to which is entrusted all legislative and executive power until the meeting of the next All-Union Congress. This executive is a curiously constructed bicameral body, which we shall presently describe in detail, consisting of the "Union of Soviets" of 607 members in 1935 (437 in 1931) elected by the Congress in proportion to the census population of the areas represented, at the rate of something like one to each 300,000 inhabitants; and of the "Soviet of Nationalities" of 150 members, being five representing the highest congress of soviets of each constituent republic or autonomous republic within a constituent republic, and one by the like body of each other autonomous area.¹

With regard to the distribution of powers between the federal government and the governments of the constituent parts, there may seem, at first sight, practically nothing that is unusual in federal states.² To the federal authority fall (1) all foreign relations (representation, treaties, declarations of war and peace, alteration of the external frontiers); (2) all the armed forces; (3) transport, posts and telegraphs and radio; (4) currency and credit systems, also weights and measures and statistics; (5) the issuing and management of all state loans, internal or external; (6) conditions of citizenship; (7) the right of general amnesty; and (8) more ambiguously, what is called the establishment of the bases and fundamental principles in respect of civil and criminal codes, courts of justice, education, public health and labour protection, and of the development and use of land, waters, mineral deposits and forests. What is unmistakably novel is (9) the concession to the federal government of everything relating to imports and exports to or from the Soviet Union,

¹ In practice, we are told, the actual choice of these representatives of the several autonomous parts of the federation—at any rate for the "Union of Soviets"—is sometimes made by the group of delegates from each part who find themselves together at Moscow attending the Congress. Each delegation nominates to the Congress the particular members of its delegation whom it wishes to see elected to the "Union of Soviets" (about a quarter or one-third of its own delegation to the Congress). The Congress elects without question the nominees put forward in the name of each republic.

² Batsell could even state that "The specific categories of power . . . declared to fall within the exclusive purview of the Union . . . conform very closely to section 8 of article 1 of the constitution of the United States" (*Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 284).

under which all foreign trade has become a centralised state monopoly ; and (10) " the establishment of the foundations and the general plan of the whole people's economy of the Union ", meaning the collective organisation of the whole production and distribution of commodities. These last two categories of federal government are, however, not gained at the expense of the constituent authorities, which never wielded these powers. They represent the deprivation of the individual landlord or capitalist of his private power over the means of production, distribution and exchange. Their assumption by the federal government, together with the enormous development of industrialisation during the past decade, have increased beyond all expectation the dominance of the USSR administration over that of even the largest of the associated republics.

The Central Executive Committee (TSIK)

The great powers of the federal government, whether legislative or executive, are shared between the bicameral Central Executive Committee (TSIK), with various commissions that it appoints, on the one hand, and on the other, the Sovnarkom, or Council of People's Commissars, which it also appoints, but which occupies a position of exceptional administrative authority requiring a separate description.

The Central Executive Committee, usually referred to as TSIK, and consisting of the Union of Soviets and the Soviet of Nationalities in two separate chambers, is a standing body, existing from congress to congress, and meeting three or four times annually,¹ principally to discuss and ratify the decrees and decisions formulated, either by its own presidium or arrived at by the USSR Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), which corresponds approximately to the Cabinet of Ministers of western democracies. Its agenda, which the committee itself can alter, is drawn up by its presidium.

One of the functions of the Central Executive Committee and the one to which it owes its bicameral form, seems to have lost some of its significance. The Soviet of Nationalities is unique among political bodies in its remarkable basis of numerically equal representation (5 each), not only of the 9 constituent republics (the Transcaucasian Federation counting as 3), which vary in population from one to one hundred millions, but also of the numerous " autonomous republics " which are actually

¹ It was stated that, of the TSIK members in 1933, 18.4 per cent were actually manual working wage-earners in industrial enterprises. It is habitually found that all but 1 or 2 per cent are members of the Communist Party. All members of the TSIK wear a silver badge, and enjoy the privilege of a free railway pass over the whole country. They receive, in addition, the whole of their expenses in attending the meetings at Moscow.

A member of TSIK cannot be arrested or prosecuted without the permission of the presidium of TSIK. They are empowered to attend any meetings of any public body in the USSR, and visit any institution. But they are forbidden to address any meeting on behalf of TSIK, or speak in its name, without its special permission.

situated within divers of these constituent republics; to these the other "autonomous areas" (oblasts or kraïs), also within the territories of the constituent republics, each add one representative. The two chambers of this bicameral body have equal rights as regards legislation. Each chamber must separately assent to every new law. In case of disagreement the issue is referred to a Conciliation Committee formed of an equal number of each chamber, with a president taken from among the members of TSIK, who may be in either chamber. The committee's decision is formally submitted to both chambers, and if either refuses to accept it, the measure is held to be rejected. However, either chamber may then appeal to the All-Union Congress, whose decision is final.

Thus, there is reason for the two chambers to meet separately and, when they have a joint session, even to vote separately. They must hold a joint meeting for the election of the presidium of TSIK, which is about the most influential organ of the constitution.

But we believe that the twofold nature of TSIK has, so far, never been called upon to resist either the increasing tendency to centralisation of authority, or the unmistakable predominance of the area (the RSFSR) within which both Moscow and Leningrad are situated. It was devised, it is said, by Stalin himself, as part of the inducement by which the Ukraine, Transcaucasia and White Russia were brought into federal union. With the liberal recognition of "cultural autonomy" and, very largely, of the principle of confiding the government of each locality to officials belonging to its own race, no serious cleavage along racial or geographical lines seems to have developed. Whilst differences of opinion naturally arise among members, and sectional grievances find spokesmen in both chambers of TSIK, it is understood that the Soviet of Nationalities, as such, has never voted differently from the Union of Soviets as such, so that the joint meetings of the two chambers, with which each session of TSIK terminates, and which are marked by unanimous votes in both parts of the joint body, have become purely ceremonial.

It would, however, be a mistake to regard the Central Executive Committee as merely a ratifying body. It evidently plays an important part in the discussion of general policy, alike by way of criticism of executive action and in the formulation and adoption of new measures to cope with changing circumstances. Its members from all over the USSR bring information, both of local needs and of local opinion, to bear upon the minds of potentates necessarily resident in Moscow itself. If current gossip is to be trusted, it is the discussions in TSIK that have more than once determined a change in policy. Moreover TSIK takes an important part in administration, by the various commissions which it appoints, and which report directly to itself. Thus it has a Budget Commission, which reports on the finances of the whole USSR, and a Central Election Commission, which sees to the regularity of all the multifarious elections throughout the Union. It has a standing commission on the care of the

central archives, and another on general questions of administrative organisation. There is a committee on scientific research and progress; a central technical education commission, and also a committee on the higher colleges, all of them dealing with the organisation and geographical distribution of university and other institutions necessarily transcending the purview of the several constituent republics and autonomous areas, to which all education had been allotted as one of the subjects of "cultural autonomy". Somewhat analogous functions are entrusted to commissions, entitled respectively the Supreme Council of Physical Culture and an All-Union Council of Communal Economy. Finally, there is the Supreme Court of the USSR, with the all-important Procurator's Department, and the newly appointed Procurator for the USSR, whose duties appear to include a new and increased supervision of the activities of the Ogpu itself, to which we shall recur. The aggregate of all these departments, directed by members of TSIK and immediately responsible to its plenum, make it one of the most important parts of the whole state organisation.

The Presidium of TSIK

The presidium of TSIK, consisting of 9 members from the presidium of the Union of Soviets, 9 from that of the Soviet of Nationalities, and 9 elected by a joint session of these two chambers, is a standing representative of TSIK itself. It chooses seven presidents, one from each constituent republic, to preside on successive days of the sessions alike of TSIK and of its presidium. All draft decrees of new taxes, or increases of old ones, have to be first submitted to this presidium. All decisions relating to the alteration or abolition of regulations as to any of the TSIK's, or their presidiums, in any of the constituent republics of the Union are invalid without the sanction of the presidium of the TSIK of the USSR.

Federal Machinery

The constitutional relations of the central federal organs of the USSR—such as the biennial All-Union Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars—with the several governments of the constituent parts of the federal state, are in many respects unique. By the "fundamental law" the "sovereignty" of the seven constituent or "Union" republics is not only to be recognised by the USSR but is also to be protected by the federal power. This state sovereignty is expressly declared (in the Fundamental Law of the USSR of July 6, 1923) to be "restricted only within the limits stated in the present constitution, and only in respect of matters referred to the competence of the Union. *Beyond these limits each Union republic exercises its sovereign authority independently.* . . . Each Union Republic retains the right of free withdrawal from the Union . . . and for modification [or]

limitation of [this provision] the agreement of all republics forming the USSR is required.”¹

Each of the seven constituent republics accordingly has its own congress of soviets of the republic, with its own Central Executive Committee and its own Council of People's Commissars, as “supreme organ of authority” within the limits of its own territory. But it can have no People's Commissars for foreign affairs, defence, trade beyond the USSR, mercantile marine, transport by rail or river, or posts and telegraphs, because these are subjects entirely reserved to the federal administration. What is unusual, if not unique, in federal constitutions, old or new, is the statutory provision that the responsible cabinet of ministers (sovnarkom) of each constituent republic, shall admit, as members, the official agents, delegates or “plenipotentiaries” of the People's Commissars of the USSR for each of these exclusively federal departments, “with either an advisory or decisive voice”, according as the Central Executive Committee of the constituent republic may determine. There is an exactly similar representation of these USSR commissariats in the sovnarkom of each of the 15 autonomous republics. In the majority of cases, we are informed, the “voice” is advisory or consultative only.

Accordingly, in the great Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), which has over a hundred millions of inhabitants, there sat in 1935, in its cabinet of 24, no fewer than 9 of these federal officials of the USSR. Among the 23 members of the cabinet of the Ukraine, there were also 9 such officials of the federation. In that of the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic there were also 9 out of 23. In that of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, with a total membership of no more than 17, these officials of the federal government at Moscow (9) constitute an actual majority.² The specific function of these federal officials is doubtless to see that nothing is done or even initiated by the constituent or autonomous republic that would be inconsistent with federal policy in federal affairs. But it is stated that, as members of the local sovnarkoms or cabinets, they do not confine themselves to any specific class of questions, and that they take part in all the cabinet's deliberations. It is clear that their mere presence in the local cabinet in such numbers, even with no more than an “advisory” or a consultative voice, must necessarily exercise a constant influence towards unity of policy and action throughout the whole of the USSR.

This peculiar official interpenetration goes even further than the local cabinets of the constituent or autonomous republics, which necessarily

¹ Chap. i. of “Fundamental Law of the RSFSR adopted for the USSR, July 6, 1923”; see *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 308; and pp. 297-298, where an obviously incorrect interpretation of the statute is given.

² In the three smallest constituent republics the representation of the USSR is equally strong. In the Uzbek Republic Sovnarkom there sit 9 delegates of federal commissars in a sovnarkom of 23. In that of Turkmenistan there were also 9 out of a total of 23. In that of Tadzhikistan there were 9 out of 22. In the 15 autonomous republics the numerical proportion of delegates of federal commissariats is similar.

meet at the local republic capitals. In a dozen or so other cities of the USSR, especially those at which any foreign consuls are stationed, or which are near an important frontier, or which are much frequented by foreign travellers, there will be found resident a responsible officer of the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow.¹ Doubtless the primary function of this "diplomatic agent" is to keep an eye on the activities of the foreign consuls, and to prevent any questions arising with regard to the treatment of foreign nationals. But it is of interest in this connection to notice that these official agents of the USSR federal government are usually, as a matter of course, made members of the highest administrative council meeting in the cities in which they reside. Thus the one at Leningrad is a member of the presidium of the executive committee of the soviet of the city of Leningrad; and the one who, down to 1934, resided at Kiev was a member of the corresponding body for the great oblast of Kiev—in both cases taking full part, and naturally exerting a great influence, in all the deliberations of these local authorities.²

Equally serviceable in ensuring unity of policy and action must prove the practice of what in the joint stock world is known as "interlocking directorates". Thus the seven presidents of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, who are generally the most influential of the 27 members of its presidium, were in 1932, all of them simultaneously, either the presidents of the Central Executive Councils of the several constituent republics or of their sovnarkoms of People's Commissars. Among the other 20 members of this all-powerful central presidium at the same date were 6 other People's Commissars or cabinet ministers of the constituent republics, not one of which was thus without an influential representative actually inside the most important federal body, of the membership of which they together made up one-half. The position remains substantially the same in 1935.

There is yet another variety of this official interpenetration. Under the statutory constitution the various public departments, for the administration of which each constituent republic is responsible in its "sovereign capacity", are classified as "unified" and "non-unified". The unified departments are now those of finance and light industries, together with the recently added separate USSR Commissariat for the

¹ Such "diplomatic agents" are stationed at Leningrad, Vladivostok, Alexandrovsk (Sakhalin), Alma Ata and Khabarovsk in the RSFSR; at Kharkov and Odessa in the Ukraine; at Baku, Batoum and Erivan in the Transcaucasian Federation; at Kerki and Kouchka in Turkmenistan; and at Termez in Uzbekistan. To these have lately been added Arkhangelsk, Blagovestchensk, Chita, Oida (Sakalin), Kamchatka and Verkhneudinsk.

² There is still a further official interpenetration to be mentioned. On the executive of the oblast in the RSFSR and the Ukraine, whether ispolkom in the oblasts properly so called, or sovnarkom in the autonomous republics, there sit officials representing the USSR People's Commissariats of Land Transport (railways) and Posts and Telegraphs. (See *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, p. 106.) Similar important officials of these and other federal departments sit on such powerful municipal soviets as those of Moscow and Leningrad, either by direct election in their capacity as citizens, or, where they are not thus elected, by cooption at the instance of the presidium.

collective farms (kolkhosi), with the still surviving independent peasantry. For these departments the People's Commissars of the federal government do not, as a rule, set up offices of their own in the constituent or autonomous republics, but are required, by statute, to make use of the local official staff, which is of course appointed and directed by, and immediately responsible to, the several People's Commissars of the different constituent or autonomous republics. In order to make this statutory provision work smoothly, the federal government has established a convention with the governments of the several constituent or autonomous republics, under which the official head of the local department concerned—usually but not necessarily a local "native" or resident—is always chosen after private consultation between the two governments, so that each may feel assured that the new officer will be faithful in the discharge of his curious double responsibility.¹ A similar unpublished convention is said to exist even with regard to the appointment of the People's Commissar himself, at any rate in finance, where the nomination is said to require the private sanction of the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR.

There remain the non-unified departments, significantly enough, those directly connected with the "cultural autonomy" which is what the local "national minorities" are most concerned to maintain against the centralising and unifying encroachments of a federal administration. Over these departments, such as education, health and social welfare,² the People's Commissars of the several constituent or autonomous republics have, at least in theory, sole authority, in each case subject only

¹ It is not without interest to find that this unpublished convention was described differently by the two parties to it. From one side it was said that, on the occurrence of a vacancy, the choice made by this state government was submitted to Moscow for concurrence. From the other side it was said that the choice made by the federal government was submitted to the state capital for concurrence. It was also remarked that such arrangements should not be too closely scrutinised!

² With regard to education, as already mentioned, there is now a commission on university and higher technical institutes; another on technical education generally and a third on scientific research and progress, all three appointed by and responsible to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR, in order to deal with such questions as the allocation of new institutions which transcend the view of any local authority, and new scientific developments in the way of exploration and important experiments.

Two of the non-unified commissariats in the constituent and autonomous republics have lately been suppressed. That for labour has been transferred to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions and its subordinate hierarchy of local trade union councils. The inspectorial activities of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection have been similarly transferred to the trade union hierarchy. But the disciplinary and other action taken as a result of these activities have been given to a new Control Commission responsible to the USSR Sovnarkom, in close collaboration with another new Control Commission appointed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Two others of the non-unified commissariats in the constituent and autonomous republics have been either suppressed or brought much more under federal control. These are those for agriculture, which have, as above stated, been placed essentially in the position of unified departments, subordinate to the new USSR People's Commissars for State Farms (sovkhosi) and for collective farms (kolkhosi) together with the remaining independent peasantry. And the work of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs has been partly transferred to the new USSR People's Commissar for Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), and partly subordinated to him as a unified department.

to his own Sovnarkom of People's Commissars and his own Central Executive Committee and Congress of Soviets. They have, however, all to realise that the formulation by the federal government of "basic principles" in these subjects, and its determination of the form of the economic organisation, together with its conduct of the whole of the nationalised industries and of foreign commerce—along with such all important matters as finance and taxation and land and water transport—must not be hampered or interfered with.

It should be added that, whilst, as we have seen, the federal government is very powerfully represented in the cabinet of each constituent or autonomous republic, as well as in all the "unified" departments, and in many of its great cities, the governments of the constituent and autonomous republics have not, under the constitution, the reciprocal privilege of being formally represented either at the federal capital of Moscow or at the capitals of the other constituent republics. All the constituent republics do, in fact, maintain their own offices in Moscow, at which some of their own officials reside for convenience of making any necessary enquiries or representations concerning any part of the federal administration.¹ But such enquiry agents have no formal status under the constitution, and they apparently do not exist at any other capital than Moscow.

The Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom)

The greater part of the higher executive work in the USSR is entrusted, by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), which directs the action of the principal government departments such as the groups of Cabinet Ministers do in parliamentary democracies. "What shall we call ourselves?" Lenin is reported to have asked Trotsky,² when, on finding themselves, in October 1917, in command of the state, they had to allot the offices among their colleagues. The designation "Minister" was rejected because of its association with tsarist autocracy and parliamentarianism. "People's Commissar" was viewed more favourably, and, after some discussion, adopted, at first for the RSFSR and then, successively, for all the constituent republics and even for the "autonomous republics" within them. The same designation was adopted in 1923 for the USSR. We need not trace the repeated

¹ Their names are printed in the official *Annuaire Diplomatique* published in French by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) of the USSR. The 12 autonomous republics within the RSFSR are stated to be similarly represented at Moscow, but this is not mentioned in the *Annuaire*.

² "Not Minister, that is a repulsive designation." "We might say Commissar," suggested Trotsky, "but there are too many Commissars now." "Perhaps Chief Commissars. . . . No, 'chief' sounds too bad. What about People's Commissars? Well, this may be all right." "And the Government as a whole, the Soviet of People's Commissars," continued Lenin; "this will be splendid, it smells of revolution."

The anecdote circulates in various versions. See *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 544; *Lenin*, by L. Trotsky, p. 132; *My Life*, by the same, 1930, pp. 337-338.

changes made during the past eighteen years in the number and in the functions of these People's Commissars. For the USSR there are now People's Commissars for the following departments :

- (1) Foreign Affairs (NKID).
- (2) Defence (NKOBORONY).
- (3) Foreign Trade (NKVNESHTORG).
- (4) Means of Communication (Railways) (NKPS).
- (5) Heavy Industries (NKTYAZHPROM).
- (6) River Transport (NKWT).
- (7) Posts, Telegraphs and Radio (NKSVYAZ).
- (8) Forestry and Wood Industries (NKLES).
- (9) Light Industries (NKLEGPROM).
- (10) Agriculture (NKZEM)—added to the federal organisation in 1932, specially for the collective farms (kolkhosi) in addition to the commissariats for agriculture in the several constituent autonomous republics.
- (11) State Farms (NKSOVKHOSI).
- (12) Food Industry (NARKOMPISHCH).
- (13) Internal Trade (NARKOMVNUTORG).
- (14) Finance (NARKOMFIN).
- (15) Internal Affairs (NARKOMVNUTDEL).¹

There are, in addition, half a dozen other government departments of great importance, which are always represented in the Sovnarkom, although their heads are not styled People's Commissars.

There is, to begin with, (16) the Office of Administrative Affairs, a department which has the duty of seeing to it that all the decisions of the Sovnarkom are promptly and accurately put in course of operation.²

There is the very important State Planning Commission (Gosplan) with a president and six vice-presidents, which is represented in the Sovnarkom by its president.

There is the Council of Labour and Defence (STO) consisting of a president, three vice-presidents and six other members ; and the " Commission of Fulfilment " of this Council, consisting of a president, a vice-

¹ The above list is the outcome of various changes. Thus there was, until November 26, 1932, a People's Commissar for Foreign and Home Trade, until a decree of that date replaced him by a People's Commissar of Supplies and a People's Commissar of Foreign Trade. In 1934 the former was relieved of wholesale and retail trading for which a separate People's Commissar of Internal Trade was appointed. Similarly, the burden of the People's Commissar for Transport was lightened on January 30, 1931, by transferring maritime and river transport, with ports and harbours, to a new People's Commissar for Water Transport. Later in 1931 a new central administration was set up for road transport in the USSR, assisted by similar central administrations for the main roads in each of the constituent republics.

² We are informed that there is now no separate Director of Administrative Affairs. But the " Bureau of Administration " was expressly charged in order to secure " the exact and timely execution " of ordinances of the Sovnarkom by all institutions and officials thereof (decree of February 17, 1924, of the Sovnarkom ; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 605).

We do not know whether the Sovnarkom has followed the new practice of the British Cabinet since 1914 of keeping regular minutes of even the most secret decisions.

president and three members--both these departments being at present represented in the Sovnarkom by their common president (Molotov).

There were also, in 1934, various other boards for special purposes, such as a State Yield Committee and a State Arbitration Committee, a Central Board for Road Transport and another for the Civic Air Fleet, a Concessions Committee and a Control Board of the North Sea Route. Some of these were only temporary. They may not enjoy representation in the Sovnarkom: their presidents may be summoned when their representative subjects come up for discussion.

Finally, but by no means least important, there was, until July 1934, the Union State Political Administration (the OGPU or GPU), whose permanent president, with his immense and almost uncontrolled authority within the wide sphere of his department, might be described as a facultative member of the Sovnarkom, as he went to its meetings whenever he chose to do so. This position was regularised, in July 1934, by the establishment of an All-Union People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), with its own People's Commissar in the Sovnarkom, under whose direction was placed the control and direction of the OGPU as "the Chief Department of State Security", alongside of five other "chief departments".

Lastly, we have to note the establishment in February 1934, at the instance of the Communist Party and in supersession of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, of a new and powerful organ of the USSR Sovnarkom, entitled the Commission of Soviet Control, consisting of sixty tried and trusted Party members nominated by the Central Committee of the Party. Its president will always be one of the vice-presidents of the Sovnarkom itself. This Commission of Soviet Control is charged specifically with seeing to it that every important decree or directive of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) or Sovnarkom is actually complied with and carried into execution in every part of the USSR.¹ For this purpose it will have its own inspectors, accountants and other agents, who will reside permanently in the various republics, krais and oblasts of the Union and will be independent of any local authority. It will act in close conjunction with a Commission of Party Control, appointed by the Communist Party, which will apply disciplinary action to Party members, whilst leaving to the Sovnarkom and the several People's Commissars to do what is required to remedy the defects and deficiencies discovered.²

This score or so of ministers of state form at present the All-Union Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), which may be taken to be the highest executive authority in the USSR, nearly corresponding to the cabinet in the governments of the western world; although it is by no means exclusively executive, and can enact decrees subject to ratification

¹ Its basic object is described as "the systematic, concrete and operative verification of the execution of the most important decisions of the government by all branches of the soviet and economic apparatus from top to bottom".

² See for this decree, *Pravda*, February 28, 1934.

by the Congress. In fact, in the USSR no small proportion of the constant stream of new decrees, definitely legislative in character and normally subject to eventual ratification by the All-Union Congress of Soviets, bear the signature of Molotov, as president of the All-Union Sovnarkom : this being often coupled with that of Kalinin, as president of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets ; and, since 1930, even more usually with that of Stalin, as general secretary of the Communist Party.

This USSR Sovnarkom, or one or other of its committees, is almost daily in session in the Moscow Kremlin all the year round. Its actual procedure is wrapped in a secrecy exceeding even that of the British Cabinet. No minutes or records of proceedings are ever published. Apart from its formal decrees or " directives ", commanding action to be taken, the Sovnarkom of the USSR issues no *communiqués* to the public or the press. Political gossip—which is rife and rank in the diplomatic circle at Moscow, and among the foreign journalists there—is severely discouraged among all grades of soviet officials. Although the foreign correspondents are, from time to time, addressed by one or other of the Commissars, or on their behalf, the soviet newspapers are strictly forbidden to give currency to political gossip, or even to mention unauthorised rumours about what the Soviet Government is discussing or intending. The foreign correspondents are asked to conform to this rule. On the other hand, almost every department publishes its own weekly or monthly journal, which is full of reports of all branches of departmental work. Every office has its own " wall newspaper " written by its own staff about the internal life of the office. Moreover, in no country do statesmen so frequently take the public into their confidence by the publication in full, in the widely circulating newspapers, of long and detailed " resolutions " come to by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) or by the Sovnarkom, going into all sorts of financial and technical details. Moreover, the newspapers are constantly being filled by verbatim reports of the lengthy addresses of ministers to conferences and meetings of all kinds, about the vicissitudes of the innumerable government undertakings, the new projects about to be put in operation and the general progress of the " Five-Year Plan ".

Of the way in which the ministerial organisation actually works, there is (as is normally the case in all countries) little available information. No one can describe the frequently changing relations that exist between the Sovnarkom and its president (Molotov) ; or between it and its other members ; or between it and the presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets ; or between it and such important bodies as the Commission of Labour and Defence (STO), in which Stalin and another important official of the Communist Party sit with eight People's Commissars ; or the secret working of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) ; or the position of the Union State Political Commission (Ogpu) in its new form of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs under the new commissar. It will be observed that among

the People's Commissars, or the members of the USSR Sovnarkom, we do not find the name of Kalinin, who acts as, and is commonly styled, president of the USSR, to whom the foreign ambassadors present their credentials and who is certainly one of the most influential of the presidents of the All-Union Congress of Soviets and of its Central Executive Committee (TSIK), and also of the presidium thereof. Nor do we find the name of Stalin, who is general secretary of the Communist Party, but who long held no government office other than that of one among the ten members of the Commission of Labour and Defence (STO). In 1935, however, Stalin was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), and likewise a member of its presidium, at the same time becoming chairman of the special commission for the revision of the electoral system. Menzhinsky, until his death in 1933 the president of the OGPU, though not a member, was definitely stated to have the right of attending the Sovnarkom whenever (and this was said to be rarely) he wished to do so. Probably Stalin and Kalinin have, in practice, the same privilege, and more frequently exercise it. Harmony among all these personages, and unity of action among the departments they control, are usually well maintained; but serious, and sometimes prolonged, public controversies over policy, with peremptory removals from office, and drastic exclusions from the Party, have taken place from time to time. Whatever changes of personnel may occur, no careful observer can doubt the essential stability of the government as a whole, and even its continuity of fundamental policy, coupled with a remarkable capacity for sudden changes in the forms and methods of its application, according to the lessons of experience.

We need not seek to detail the organisation of all the government departments which the ministers direct and control. One distinctive feature of the constitution has been, until 1934, that each People's Commissar was required, by statute, to have, besides one or more Assistants, a collegium of several persons of position and experience, with whom he was required confidentially to discuss all important proceedings or proposals.¹ This was professedly designed to ensure that he might take into account all relevant considerations, obtain all the available information and listen to the best advice. These colleagues of the minister were apparently not chosen always by himself, or even privately suggested for his approval, but were nominated by the Sovnarkom as a whole, sometimes deliberately as a check on too independent action. By a remarkable provision in the decree formally regulating the Sovnarkom, the collegium of each People's Commissar, and any member thereof, was given "the right of appeal" from any decision of the Commissar, "without suspending its execution, to the Sovnarkom as a whole".² We do not know whether this formal

¹ The collegium of the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade had more than a score of members.

² Decree of November 12, 1923, of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK); *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, pp. 599-604.

right of appeal was ever exercised, or how often. The members of the collegium were usually prepared at any time to act as deputies for the Commissar, or to take his place if he was absent or incapacitated by illness.

Upon a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1934 that the collegia should be given up, these have been, one by one, abolished by separate decrees of the Central Executive Committee, which effected, at the same time, a certain amount of reorganisation of the business of each commissariat.

The authority of the All-Union Sovnarkom and its People's Commissars extends all over the USSR. With regard to the so-called All-Union or federal narkomats (or, as we should say, ministries), such as those dealing with foreign affairs; military and naval affairs (now styled defense); foreign trade; land transport; water transport; posts, telegraphs and radio; and now heavy industries, forestry and supplies, the very considerable staffs throughout the entire area of the USSR, as well as those maintained in foreign countries, are appointed and directed by the several All-Union People's Commissars, to whom these locally resident officials are solely responsible, without regard to the government of the particular republic in the territory of which they may be serving. Moreover, as we have mentioned, each People's Commissar for an All-Union or federal narkomat sends a delegate or plenipotentiary to each constituent and each autonomous republic, who has the right of sitting as a member in the local sovnarkom, with either a "consultative" or a "decisive" voice, according as the Central Executive Committee of that republic may have decided. The delegate so appointed by the All-Union Commissar is normally entrusted by him with the direction and control of the local staff of the All-Union narkomat. In the case of the "unified narkomats", now only three (Internal Trade, Agriculture and Finance), the All-Union People's Commissar has, apart from the persons actually employed in the numerous "nationalised" enterprises, no office staff exclusively his own in any of the constituent or autonomous republics, over and above that attached to the narkomat office at Moscow; members of which may, however, be detached for travel or temporary residence. For the local executive work of his narkomat in the several constituent or autonomous republics, including the RSFSR, he has to rely on a "unified staff" which is appointed and controlled by the corresponding People's Commissar of each such republic, but which is required to carry out any instructions received from the People's Commissar of the USSR. In order to make such an arrangement work smoothly there has grown up the remarkable private convention between the two governments that we have already described, namely, that the head of each department of the constituent republic's "unified" staffs, and sometimes the local People's Commissar, should be chosen and appointed by the two governments in joint private consultation, in order that each of them may be assured of his necessarily bipartite loyalty.

The non-unified narkomats are those dealing with the subjects in

which the constituent republics have been conceded "cultural autonomy". For these subjects (which have long comprised justice and police—except for the sporadic intervention of the USSR Supreme Court and the OGPU—education¹ and public health) there are no All-Union People's Commissars and no All-Union staffs of officials, and each constituent and autonomous republic has its own, which are subject only to the supervision and control of each republic's own Sovnarkom, Central Executive Committee and Congress of Soviets. But it must not be overlooked that the All-Union Congress of Soviets and its Central Executive Committee (TSIK)—not to mention the Central Committee of the Communist Party—exercise a great influence upon the nominally independent organs of the various constituent republics, so far at least as the "general line" and the "basic principles" of legislation and administration are concerned.

It should be added that USSR Sovnarkom has always appointed standing committees from its own membership, often with the addition of a few other persons. The number, and also the activities, of these standing committees have varied from time to time; and some of them have lingered in existence, taking up one subject after another as required, long after their main purpose had been fulfilled or become exhausted. Committees of this sort were at their height during the period of war communism, 1918-1921, and they have declined in importance as the system of administration has become more settled.²

The Council of Labour and Defence

The oldest of the standing committees of the USSR Sovnarkom is now the Council of Labour and Defence (STO),³ which was appointed by

¹ With regard to universities and the higher technical institutes and the promotion of scientific research, which have more than a local significance, it has been found convenient, as already mentioned, to give the local People's Commissars for Education the assistance of three federal commissions appointed by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK).

The position with regard to internal affairs was changed in July 1934 by the establishment of a USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), who takes over much of the work formerly done by the local commissariats of Internal Affairs. Such a local commissariat had been abolished in January 1931, when its work in each constituent or autonomous republic was temporarily placed, partly under the local sovnarkom, and partly under a "chief office of communal authority". These functions are, from July 1934, discharged by the new USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

² The most important of these was the Supreme Economic Council, which, from 1918 to 1932, was in charge of the greater part of the industrial reconstruction; and to which we shall recur in our subsequent chapter on "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

³ See the decree of August 21, 1923, of the Sovnarkom as to the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), in *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, pp. 620-622; also the incidental references in *Soviet Russia*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, pp. 135-136; *Moscow, 1911-1913*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1934, p. 184; "The Organisation of Economic Life", by W. H. Chamberlin, in *Soviet Economics*, edited by Dr. G. Dobbert, 1933, p. 27.

The competence of the STO is defined as under:

(a) The consideration and practical carrying through the appropriate organs of the economic and financial plans of the Union of SSR.

the Sovnarkom's decree of August 21, 1923, embodied in the Code of Laws, 1932, "in order to carry on the economic and financial plans of the USSR, to verify them in accordance with economic and political conditions, as well as for the purpose of close direction of the commissariats of the Union in the sphere of economic activities and defence". It was from the outset placed permanently under the chairmanship of the president of the Sovnarkom for the time being. It is essentially a joint-committee of those People's Commissars who are principally concerned with economic issues and national defence. It now consists of a dozen members, specially appointed by the Sovnarkom, and including the People's Commissars for finance, railways, agriculture, food supplies, heavy industry and defence; the president of the planning department (Gosplan); the principal assistant of the People's Commissar of finance, who is also president of the state bank; and last but certainly not least, Stalin, who is the general secretary of the Communist Party.

The resolutions of STO come immediately into operation, but they must be forwarded at once to the Sovnarkom, which has the right to suspend or cancel any of them. Moreover, each member of STO, and also any People's Commissar of the Union, has a right to appeal to the Sovnarkom within three days; and the Sovnarkom of any constituent republic may also appeal without any time limit.

The student of the work of the Council of Labour and Defence will, we think, conclude that its work has been steadily decreased in scope and importance by the growth of other authorities, sometimes those springing directly from itself. For instance, the State Planning Department (Gosplan), with which we shall deal elaborately in our chapter entitled "Planned Production for Community Consumption", originally appointed by STO, and regularly established by statute of August 23, 1923, has become a gigantic and virtually independent department, directly represented by its president in the Sovnarkom, as well as in the Council of Labour and Defence. By the steadily improving plans that it lays for ratification before the Sovnarkom, the Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, it practically formulates the course for the year of every economic factor in the USSR. The Council of Labour and Defence (STO) still continues to be appointed annually, and to be an important influence, but its duties appear now to consist largely of odds and ends not assigned to any particular People's

(b) The consideration of problems concerning the defence of the country and the taking of measures for improvement of military affairs.

(c) The consideration of the condition of various provinces of the economic life of the country (finance, industry, trade and transport) which are of All-Union significance, and the taking of measures necessary to bring about their development.

(d) The direction of People's Commissariats of the USSR in the field of state economy and of the defence of the republic.

(e) Direct direction of economic councils (conferences) of union republics, of standing commissions and committees attached to the STO and consideration of their reports (as laid down in the Code of Laws, 1932, No. 15, article 85, par. 1).

(Decree of August 21, 1923.)

Commissar; such as appointing committees on particular subjects of economic importance; and acting from time to time as a mediating or arbitrating body between the competing projects or differing opinions of two or more of them.¹ Among the busiest of its several departments seems to be the Bureau for Inventions (BRIZ), which deals with the extraordinarily large number of suggestions and inventions and other improvements in industrial and other administration, which are submitted by workmen and others to the managements concerned. Naturally, their examination takes time, and is possibly sometimes perfunctory. The result is much complaint, and a more or less formal appeal of which the Bureau of Inventions (BRIZ) takes cognisance.

The Commissariats

So much for the constitution of the Sovnarkom as a whole, and its relation to the Central Executive Committee and the All-Union Congress of Soviets, on the one hand; and, on the other, to the governments of the constituent and autonomous republics and the autonomous areas. The volume and importance of its work has naturally steadily increased with the growth of industrialism and the development of collectivism among the peasantry as well as among the factory workers. The life of a People's Commissar of the USSR is one of continuous labour and worry in coping with the difficulties with which every department is confronted. "It is commonly said in Moscow that there is hardly a commissar whose health has not been undermined as a result of overwork."² The cabinet ministers in other countries, for the most part, find time for a great deal of social intercourse in the wealthy society of the capital and the country houses, often interspersed with sport and amusements, and even occasional travel. So far as the authors have been able to form an opinion, the work of the USSR People's Commissars is more continuous and unremitting, as well as far less highly paid, than that of ministers elsewhere.

¹ "For example, in February 1932 it elected the committee for the holding-ready of agricultural products, a committee formed to conduct the campaign for the accumulation of agricultural stocks, formerly a work for which each economic commissariat was held responsible" ("Organisation of Economic Life", by W. H. Chamberlin, in *Soviet Economics*, edited by Dr. G. Dobbert, 1933, p. 27).

Other standing committees of STO may be mentioned, such as that on the development of the "sub-tropical" areas within the USSR; that on the provision of agricultural products (storage); that on the kустar industry and the incoops; that on standardisation; that on merchandise funds and trade regulations; that on reserve foodstuffs; that on goods traffic difficulties; that on the shortage of live-stock; that on grain elevators; and that on the metric system.

² "Captains of Soviet Industry", by Professor Heinrich Poppelmann, in *Soviet Economics*, edited by Dr. G. Dobbert, 1933, p. 81. The German professor adds "coupled with privation". The People's Commissars, like all other Party members, have to live simply and sparsely; but we doubt whether their health has suffered from anything to be properly termed privation. It would have been most unwise and imprudent for the USSR Government not to have seen to it that its ministers were adequately fed, clothed and housed.

This is involved, we suggest, in the fact that the government of the USSR undertakes a task that no other government has ever undertaken. In every other country, the government, whilst mildly interested in this or that particular reform that may, from time to time, seem to be required, habitually assumes that its business is to maintain the *status quo*. No government outside the USSR has ever frankly taken as its task the complete recasting of the economic and social life of the entire community, including the physical health, the personal habits, the occupations and, above all, the ideas of all the millions for whom it acts—in short, the making of a new civilisation.

We need not trouble the reader by describing each of the score or more of ministerial departments or commissariats, but, in order to bring out the difference between them and the ministries of western Europe, we are compelled to comment on the peculiarities of some among them.

The Commissariats dealing with Production and Trade

The greatest distinction between the Sovnarkom of the USSR and the cabinets of capitalist countries is in the nature of the business dealt with. In the capitalist countries by far the greater part of the production and distribution of commodities and services is conducted by private persons, with the object of making profit for themselves; and not by public departments aiming directly at the service of the community. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, practically the whole of the heavy industries, and the larger part of the light industries, together with nearly all transport and foreign commerce, are conducted by public departments, which are in the main established, controlled and directed by the federal government.¹ The members of the Sovnarkom of the USSR accordingly find themselves charged with work of great magnitude and variety, with which the cabinet ministers of capitalist countries have little or nothing to do. The People's Commissars of the USSR are responsible, jointly or severally, not only for the railways and waterways, the posts and telegraphs, the currency and the taxation of an immense and widely scattered population, but also for the direction of the ten thousand or more separate manufacturing establishments in the USSR; the five thousand or more state farms (*sovkhosi*); the thousand or more mines of coal, ironstone, manganese, lead and other metals; the gigantic oil-plants, steelworks, electric generating stations, the considerable foreign trade, the growing mercantile marine, and what not.

For the greater part of this work of what the capitalist world would regard as business administration, eight separate People's Commissars are now, after many successive changes, individually responsible. The whole

¹ The enterprises of the various associations of owner-producers in industry and agriculture, and those of the consumers' cooperative societies, are described in the chapters relating to those subjects. The extent to which independent self-employment prevails in the USSR, and the spheres assigned to free trade and free competition, are described in the chapter "In Place of Profit", IX. in Part II.

of the exporting and importing of any commodities whatsoever, to or from any place outside the USSR, is directed by the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade (Narkomvneshtorg), who has his own subordinate commissions, or (in accordance with the law of the foreign countries concerned) even joint-stock companies, and his own network of commercial agents, all over the world. A large part of the service of food production and distribution for the population of the USSR was for several years under the People's Commissar for Food Supplies (Narkomprod). He has been replaced by two People's Commissars, one of Food Industry, dealing mainly, not with grain, but with all other foodstuffs (and with alcoholic drinks and tobacco) which need processing, preparing or canning; and the other of Internal Trade, charged with the organisation or control of all distribution of commodities, whether wholesale or retail. There is also a People's Commissar for the State Farms (sovkhosi), which are administered as if they were factories of grain, flax or cotton, beet, live-stock or dairy produce. The difficulties in getting in the harvest, especially in the North Caucasus and in certain parts of the Ukraine, led, in 1932, to the subordination of all the seven People's Commissars for Agriculture in the constituent republics to a separate All-Union People's Commissar for Agriculture (including the kolkhosi as well as the supervision of the surviving independent peasantry), in order to organise and direct the extensive "drive" on the incompetent, negligent or recalcitrant peasants in the collective farms from one end of the USSR to the other. The "heavy" industries, which include the mining of coal, peat and lignite, and of iron, manganese, lead and other ores; the extraction of oil and the manufacture of numerous oil products; the making of pig-iron and steel; and the manufacture of machinery of every kind, are placed under the new narkomat of Heavy Industries (NKTYAZHPROM). The "light" industries, principally engaged in making commodities from textiles or leather for household use, are now subject to a new narkomat for Light Industries (Legprom). Another new narkomat, that for timber industries, directs the exploitation of the forests (les), which, it is believed, can be economically combined, at different seasons, with the agricultural work on the collective farms (kolkhosi); and the same People's Commissar will direct the manufacture of paper and other timber products, on the one hand, and of innumerable articles of furniture on the other.

In accordance with the directions of these eight People's Commissars, and of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), the full description of which we reserve for a subsequent chapter, all the innumerable separate industrial establishments in the USSR (other than those of the consumers' cooperative societies, and those of the artels organised in industrial cooperatives) are grouped under boards or commissions called sometimes trusts and sometimes combines.¹ These boards or commissions are

¹ We gather that the term trust is now usually employed in the USSR for what is, in our language, a "horizontal" combination, in which factories or other establishments

appointed by the People's Commissar in each case. The usual form has been a board consisting of a president, a secretary and from three to a dozen other members, all of whom give their whole time to their duties, which combine those of a director and a manager in an important English industrial company. The aim has been to secure, among these members of each trust or combine—so an American enquirer was informed in 1932—"a 'Red' director, a technical director, a factory director, a commercial director and a general director. All except the 'Red' director must have had experience in the industry",¹ qualifying each of them for supervision and direction from their several angles of vision. But the exact forms of the trusts, as well as their grouping under particular commissariats, are frequently changed, as experience indicates defects in organisation or improvements in efficiency.

The industrial enterprises in the USSR are, on the average, much larger than those of other countries (even the United States), many having over 20,000 employees and some over 50,000 (comparable rather with Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited, or the United States Steel Corporation). Each combine unites a number of enterprises that produce for other members of the combine. Each trust has to manage a number of factories manufacturing the same class of commodities, either in a particular region or else widely dispersed throughout the whole USSR. Each trust or combine, with more or less confirmation by the People's Commissar, and with the concurrence of the workers in their several trade unions, appoints, for each factory or plant, a general manager; and often assigns to the enterprise particular specialist technicians, either Russian or foreign. The general manager, often styled director, with more or less consultation with his leading officials and recruiting committees, appoints the whole staff of the factory, and, with many responsible heads of departments, continuously directs all their operations, including every associated section, such as that of medical supervision and treatment of all the

producing similar commodities are united for management and sales. The term combine or combinat seems to be used for what in our language is a "vortical" combination in which establishments are included which produce materials or components that other members of the combination require, as coal-mines may be united, on the one hand, with forests producing pit props, and, on the other, with blast furnaces and waggon works.

A useful source of information is the British Government S.O. Paper of 1931, "The Organisation of Foreign Trade of the USSR", by G. Paton, C.B.E. See also *Fifteen Years of the Foreign Trade Monopoly of the USSR*, by A. P. Rosenholz, People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, Moscow, 1933, 30 pp.

¹ *Russia in Transition*, by Elisha M. Friedman, 1933, p. 240.

Stalin thought that too much of the detailed management of the industries was assumed by the board itself and done by writing minutes one against the other. In his address of June 1931, to a meeting of industrial leaders, he said: "It is necessary that our combines should replace management by collegium with individual management. The position at present is that in the collegium of a combine there are ten or fifteen men, all writing papers, all carrying on discussions. To continue to manage in this way, comrades, will not do. We must put a stop to paper leadership, and adopt genuine, business-like Bolshevik methods of work. Let a chairman and several deputy chairmen remain at the head of the combine. That will be quite enough to take care of its management. The remaining members of the collegium should be sent to the factories and mills" (*New Conditions: New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin, 1931, p. 20).

employees, and that of the canteen and restaurant which serves their meals; and (by a recent decree) also the former "consumers' cooperative" attached to the enterprise, which now produces for consumption by the employees all sorts of farm produce, and retails to them nearly all the other commodities that they purchase.

We reserve for our subsequent chapter on "Planned Production for Community Consumption" detailed analysis of how all this governmental enterprise works. But we may observe, at this point, that, vast as is the aggregate of business in the USSR, its organisation and management by a hierarchy of boards and directors will not appear, to the American financier, as novel or as impracticable as it does to the British economist or banker. It is comparable to nothing more extraordinary than the organisation of one or two hundred industrial leviathans like the United States Steel Corporation or Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited; and their subjection to a supreme coordinating directorate of half a dozen "supermen"—a consummation easily imagined by the potentates of Wall Street! It is the purpose of the enterprise in the USSR, not the method of its organisation, that is so novel. To provide for the well-being of the whole people, on a steadily rising standard of life, rather than the securing of profit for a relatively small minority, is the fundamental purpose of the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars.

The State Planning Commission (Gosplan)

What has become one of the most important departments of the Soviet Government, the State Planning Commission, had its start in Lenin's conception of a vast plan of electrification covering the whole area of the USSR. This became a programme by its adoption by the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets in December 1920. A commission, appointed in April 1921, was transformed by a decree of December 22, 1922, into a permanent State Planning Commission, and by another decree of August 21, 1923, its scope was extended to the whole of the USSR. The modestly named "control figures" of Gosplan were, in 1927, given the form of a Five-Year Plan of Production for the USSR, which was formally adopted by the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party in 1928, and by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK).

Gosplan, which now consists of a president and seven other members or assistants, has a staff of statistical and technical experts that exceeds a thousand in number. In every constituent republic and every autonomous republic or oblast, and in every town having more than twenty thousand inhabitants, there are planning commissions subordinate to the central department at Moscow. We reserve our account of this unique administration for Part II. of this book.

The People's Commissar of Finance

There can be no doubt of the commanding position in the soviet economy that is held by the USSR Commissariat of Finance ;¹ but this position is not easy to define in the terms employed by western governments. The People's Commissar of Finance may be relatively quite as powerful as the British Chancellor of the Exchequer or the American Secretary of the Treasury ; but his sphere of action differs markedly from that of either of them. The huge Budget of income and expenditure that he annually presents to his ministerial colleagues includes much that is not under his control. Even much of the taxation is assessed and collected, not by any service under his own command, but by officers on the financial staffs of the governments of the constituent republics. And he has to submit his Budget proposals for the concurrence of the president of the Planning Department even before he can lay them before the Sovnarkom. These are vital differences in financial structure that call for analysis.

The first peculiarity of the Budget of the Soviet Union is that it is not confined to the public services of the Union itself, but includes, in addition to every department of federal administration, all the departments of the several Union and autonomous republics, the complete Budgets of which have to be incorporated by the USSR People's Commissar in his own. In a sense, indeed, it comprehends and covers much more. For though the Budget of each Union or autonomous republic does not include separately every item of receipts and outgoings of every subordinate authority,² from the autonomous area, the krai or the oblast

¹ Voluminous as are the Russian sources for taxation and finance, there is relatively little about the actual organisation and working of the soviet departments themselves. Of what is easily accessible to the western student, the most important work is that entitled *Soviet Policy in Public Finance, 1917-1928*, by G. V. Sokolnikov and associates, edited by L. Hutchinson and Carl C. Plehn, 1931. The most systematic and complete survey is that given in *Das Steuer-system Sowjet Russlands*, 1926, and *Die Finanz und Steuer-Verfassung des USSR*, 1928, both by Paul Haensel, of which a popular summary, very critical in tone, was published by him as *The Economic Policy of Soviet Russia*, 1930. See also the articles on "Taxation in Soviet Russia" and "Financial Reform in Soviet Russia" and "The Financing of Industry in Soviet Russia", by Margaret S. Miller, in *Slavonic Review* for 1925, 1927, 1930, 1931 and 1932; *Russian Economic Development since the Revolution*, by Maurice Dobb, 1928; *Currency Problems and Policy of the Soviet Union*, by L. N. Yurovsky, 1928; *Die russische Währungsreform des Jahres 1924*, by H. J. Seraphim, Leipzig, 1925; *Russian Currency and Banking, 1914-24*, by Z. F. S. Katzenellenbaum, 1925; *Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction*, by Leo Pasvolosky and H. G. Moulton, 1924.

Detailed figures as to finances are to be found in the *Soviet Year-Book* for 1930 (the last published in English), pp. 380-446; and in the corresponding volumes annually published in Russian. A good description (in German) by the People's Commissar of Finance (G. F. Grinko) himself will be found in *Das Finanzprogramm des USSR für das vierte und letzte Jahr der ersten Fünfjahresplan*, Moscow, 1932, 62 pp.

² By the decrees of August 21, October 10 and December 10, 1921, it was sought to separate the Budgets of the local authorities from those of the central government, on the principle of "covering local expenditure from local resources". By further decrees of May 26 and 26, August 17 and 31 and November 16, 1922, the financial obligations of local authorities were further defined. On November 12, 1923, the so-called "Temporary

down through the rayon and city to the village soviet itself, the Budget of each constituent republic depends in the main on the finances of the local authorities below it. They all possess a large measure of practical autonomy in local expenditure on education and health, roads and bridges, agriculture and the needs of labour, and they keep for themselves most of what they locally collect. But they are mainly dependent on the grants that they receive, or the allocations (or deductions) which they are allowed to retain out of the centralised taxes, together with the surcharges which they obtain permission to make for their own benefit on certain of them. Their separate Budgets have to be approved by their immediate superior authority, and these Budgets are expected to balance. But the balance is usually reached only by increasing the aforesaid grants, allocations and surcharges made out of the aggregate revenues of each republic as a whole. Rather more than half the total expenditure of the RSFSR, the Ukraine and the other constituent republics goes in this way in subventions to their subordinate local authorities.¹ And thus it is the USSR Commissariat of Finance that has, in effect, to meet the net charge of all the public expenditure of every authority in the USSR.

This situation is all the more peculiar to western eyes in that the USSR Commissariat of Finance has no staff of its own in the innumerable areas of all the selosoviets, rayons, cities, oblasts and republics whose financial needs ultimately fall upon the USSR Budget. Finance is a subject standing between those which are exclusively federal in administration (such as railways and foreign trade) and those which are exclusively local in administration (such as those of elementary education and local sanitation). Finance is committed in each union or constituent republic to a "unified" commissariat, appointed by and responsible to the People's Commissar of Finance of the republic; but directed equally to carry out the instructions, in matters interesting the Soviet Union generally, of the USSR People's Commissar of Finance. In order to make this arrangement work smoothly, there has come to be, as we have already explained, a convention that the chief permanent official of each unified commissariat shall be appointed only after consultation between the two People's Commissars, to whom the official will owe a peculiar loyalty.

It should be added, however, that the USSR People's Commissar for Finance is dependent on the administrations of the several Union or constituent republics only for a relatively small part of his resources. Apart from taxation, there are the large receipts from the railway service and those from the post office and telegraphs, which are managed centrally by his own colleagues on the Sovnarkom, the People's Commissars for

Regulations", modified by the law of October 29, 1924, and the "ruling" of April 25, 1926, systematically organised both income and expenditure. But the desired end of securing a balance between the two sides of the account was attained only by a continuous increase in the grants, allocations and surcharges, by which the burden was largely assumed by the finances of the republics.

¹ See the figures from 1924-1925 to 1927-1928 in *Soviet Policy in Public Finance*, by G. Y. Sokolnikov, 1931, pp. 405-406.

those departments. He has also at his command the extensive proceeds of the federal government's mines and oilfields, and of its enormous manufacturing and trading enterprises. These receipts, on which he has only to agree with his ministerial colleagues in charge of the various departments, amount to several times as much as is raised directly by taxation, either by the federal government or by any of the local governments.

When the single Budget for the Soviet Union has been drawn up, incorporating the separate Budgets of the Union or constituent republics—and this is the work of the Budget Department of the USSR Commissariat of Finance—it is not the People's Commissar of Finance who has the last word, either on the items of expenditure to be incurred or on the taxation to be levied. The draft has first to be submitted to Gosplan (the State Planning Commission), which goes over every item on both sides, scrutinising it from the standpoint of the economic prospects for the ensuing year. For instance, the quantities involved in the various enterprises, alike of materials, components and labour force, have to be brought within the anticipated total output. The cost of any imports required has to be provided for by a corresponding value in exports, which will involve a deduction from the amount of commodities that would otherwise have passed into internal consumption. "This", it is authoritatively stated, "is the subject, every year, of frequent and warm controversies between the Narkomfin (People's Commissariat of Finance) and the Gosplan, when the control figures are being fixed."¹ Gosplan is practically in a position to insist on whatever modifications in the Budget that such considerations involve. Then, at last, the Budget, so modified, can be laid before the USSR Sovnarkom, which will decide any difference of opinion on the Budgets between the People's Commissars of Finance of the several Union or constituent republics, or between any of them and the USSR People's Commissar of Finance. Finally, the USSR Budget, together with those of the several Union or constituent republics incorporated in it, will be ratified and become law by decision of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR.

Notwithstanding all this complication of authorities, and this dispersion of powers, the USSR Commissariat of Finance has, in the past eighteen years, secured a vast improvement in financial accounting, supervision and control. The Budget figures, once finally decided, cannot be departed from without express authority. Transfers (*virements*) from item to item are allowed only sparingly and then by the highest authority only. The principle is generally enforced that all the revenues derived from various sources must be paid to the single treasury of the USSR under the People's Commissar of Finance; and this treasury becomes the source of all state expenditure, both of the Soviet Union and of the separate republics. As far as possible, it is insisted that all receipts of every public authority should be immediately paid in to one of the numerous branches of the State Bank. To see to all this, and to keep things straight, the

¹ *Soviet Policy in Public Finance*, by G. Y. Sokolnikov and others, 1931, p. 333.

(Commissariat of Finance has become a huge congeries of departments, including those for (1) the Budget; (2) Currency; (3) State Revenue; (4) Taxation; (5) Economics and Finance; (6) Control and Audit; (7) Local Finance, together with (8) Central Administration. In addition, the Commissariat includes (9) the State Savings Bank; (10) the State Insurance Department (Gosstrakh), insuring against death, fire, hail, cattle plagues and loss of goods in transit; and (11) the office for note and currency issue, with its printing works and mint.

We need say little of the system of taxation properly so called. It is, of course, avowedly based, not on principles of "equality of sacrifice" or maximum yield, but on those of "building up the socialist state", by penalising any remnant of profit-making enterprise (which is regarded as criminal); and as even Jeremy Bentham recommended, by drastically taxing relatively large incomes and inheritances, whilst exempting from any direct imposts the mass of poor folk. The main direct taxes are now few and simple. The principal is a tax on the output or turnover of all industrial enterprises of any magnitude, which are now all state-owned; coupled with a single agricultural tax on all agricultural enterprises according to their size or importance. In both cases the assessment is mitigated in various ways in favour of the collectivised concerns, and of those enterprises which it is part of public policy to encourage, to the detriment of the surviving individual peasant or producer. Along with these main instruments of revenue rank the taxes on incomes¹ and on inheritances, which are drastically progressive, so as to operate in a similar direction. The indirect taxation, including excise (mostly on alcoholic drinks and tobacco), customs (very small in yield) and stamps on legal transactions, has been steadily modified in the direction of simplification and (with the great exception of sugar) concentration upon undesirable luxuries and upon expenditure not much incurred by the mass of the people.²

¹ The rates of Income Tax are extremely complicated, varying not only with the income, but also according to the category in which the taxpayer is placed. The lowest rates are those payable by workers and salaried employees, which are from 80 kopecks per month to (for those getting over 500 roubles per month) 3½ roubles per month for the excess over 500 roubles. The rates for persons of the "first category", including authors, artists and inventors, rise from 1 per cent to (for income in excess of 20,000 roubles monthly) 38 per cent. In the second category are kustars, not employing hired labour; dentists, holders of patents, etc. These pay from 2½ per cent up to (for excess over 24,000 roubles per month) 50 per cent. In the third category come non-cooperative kustars employing hired labour; retail traders; the clergy and others living on unearned income. Their tax rates rise from 5 per cent up to (for excess over 24,000 roubles per month) 87 per cent (Regulations of May 17, 1934, in (Russian) *Economic Life*, May 24, 1934). The high incomes are, of course, extremely rare; though popular authors, dramatists and singers occasionally obtain very large amounts.

² "The general plan [of taxation] may be stated simply as follows:

"(1) The authority for any and all taxes (and purposes of expenditure) emanates by legislation on decrees from the central government. (2) Certain taxes are uniform throughout the country, but old local taxes, deep rooted in the local history, are maintained. (3) The republics, the component commonwealths of the Union, are permitted (a) to retain a large part, even up to practically all, of certain taxes collected within their boundaries (this is what is called the 'method of deductions'), and (b) to levy surtaxes or

Where the USSR People's Commissar of Finance is free from interference by the governments of the several constituent republics is in the important domain of currency and banking, where he has his own mint and issue department, handing out the notes printed at his own establishment. We need not describe the efforts that were necessary to rise from the swamp of a universal depreciation of the rouble through unlimited printing of paper money during the Civil Wars. Under the able direction of Mr. G. Y. Sokolnikov, who became People's Commissar of Finance in 1924, the rouble was rehabilitated through the chervonetz; and has now, it is claimed, attained a new status of its own superior to that of the dollar and the pound. What is remarkable and peculiar is the soviet policy of secluding its currency from contact with that of any other country. No rouble or kopeck can lawfully be taken out of the USSR, and none can be brought in. Whatever is purchased from abroad is paid for in *valuta*, procured by exporting sufficient commodities to realise in *valuta* the amount of the obligations to foreigners. It is thus only that the variations in world prices of the oil, timber, furs, manganese and wheat that the USSR exports (whether these variations are caused by over-production or by any other factor) trouble the USSR People's Commissar of Finance, not the fluctuations in the foreign currencies themselves. The catastrophic fall in the world price of textiles, whether due to Japanese economics in production costs or to the depreciation of the yen, do not disturb the USSR Government, which buys just as much or as little of Japanese textiles as it finds convenient.

Banking and Saving

The complete control over currency and credit is facilitated by the federal government's monopoly of banking. The State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank), with its couple of thousand branches all over the country, has now become the only bank at which any of the state industrial enterprises is allowed to have a current account. Gosbank is now required to limit its overdrafts or other accommodations, not only to the amounts prescribed for each enterprise in the General Plan, but also to the separate operations that have to be undertaken at each season of the year. All sales by the enterprise must be paid for not in currency but by transfer, by the purchaser, of the price to the seller's current account. Immediately the bank notices any falling behind in receipts, or any excess in expenditure, beyond the figures in the Plan, this has to be notified to the Sov-

rates over and above the Union tax rates, on certain other taxes which are primarily for the Union (this is called the 'method of additions'). . . . (4) A number of purely local taxes have been continued, with modifications, for the use of the republics or of their local subdivisions. Finally there are the 'grants in aid', handed down by the central government and by the republics, for designated government purposes, such as schools. There are in addition, the grants to industries for the 'development of' national economy; which are spoken of as non-governmental outlays, since there are few corresponding direct grants of that sort in other countries" (*Soviet Policy in Public Finance*, by G. Y. Sokolnikov and associates, 1931, p. 394, footnote by the American editors).

bankom, by whom instant notice is taken. The other banks operating in the USSR have been reduced to four, confined respectively to the special purposes of affording long term credit to state enterprises for industry and electrification, or for agricultural improvements in the sovkhosi and kolkhosi, and for carrying out the financial transactions involved in foreign trade.

The State Savings Bank with its own 20,000 branches, and its use of the local post offices in all the cities and substantial villages of the USSR in which it has no branch, is also under the People's Commissar of Finance. The number of depositors, and the total sum standing to their credit, increases annually at a great rate. These popular savings, in 1934 amounting to more than one thousand million roubles, by twenty-five million depositors, are encouraged by interest at the rate of 8 per cent, and by total exemption of such deposits from income tax, inheritance tax and various stamp duties. The total assets of the Savings Bank are invested in the USSR Government loans.¹

Insurance

A useful department of the USSR Commissariat of Finance, of which little is heard abroad, is that of insurance, which in the USSR is a state monopoly. Insurance has long been compulsory, outside the cities, on buildings against fire, on crops against storms of hail, and on horned cattle and horses against disease. In the cities it is optional on buildings and their contents, as well as against losses in transit upon goods of all kinds. Life insurance is also undertaken on an entirely optional basis.

In order to make the economic security of the village as complete as possible the system of compulsory insurance was reformed and greatly extended by a decree of the USSR Sovnarkom in July 1934.² This provides for the compulsory insurance of property, crops and stock, in collective farms, hunting, fishing and other primary producers' cooperatives in village districts. The insurance is to apply to all buildings, equipment, tools, etc., means of transport, agricultural products for consumption or sale, raw materials and stores of goods. These are insured against fire, flood, earthquake, landslides, storms, hurricanes, cloudbursts, lightning and boiler explosions. Greenhouses are insured against hailstorms;

¹ The following statistics will be of interest:

Year	Number of Branches and Sub-offices	Depositors' Balances, in millions of roubles	Number of Individual Depositors, in thousands
1929	20,364	315.8	7172.1
1931	35,184	494.4	13671.7
1933	57,556	974.0	23903.3
1934	48,573	1192.6	25120.0

² The decree will be found in (Russian) *Economic Life*, July 20, 1934; and in *Russian Economic Notes* of the United States Department of Commerce, August 30, 1934. Notwithstanding the government monopoly, the consumers' cooperative societies are allowed to have mutual insurance funds of their own for insuring their own property against fire.

seedings and plantings of orchards, vineyards, etc., against hailstorms, cloudbursts, storms and fire; plantings of crops and vineyards against freezing, heating and flooding; special and technical plants, as listed, against elemental destruction, insect and other pests and plant diseases; plantings of flax and hemp against drought; seedings of red clover against drought and freezing; stock 6 months old and over against the risk of death; horses, camels, asses, mules, hinnies and reindeer from 1 year old up, and pedigreed stock from 6 months up, against death; sheep, goats and hogs from 6 months, against death; hunting- and fishing-boats against elemental destruction while afloat and on stocks; and hunting- and fishing-equipment and gear against elemental destruction. Collective farm members, individual farmers, workers, employees, cottage (kustar) workers and trade workers must insure their individual buildings and workshops against fire, flood, earthquake, etc., in the same way as collective property, and their crops, plantings, orchards, vineyards, stock, hunting- and other boats, on the same basis as those belonging to collectives. This extraordinarily complete insurance is to apply in all sections of the country where similar insurance has been in force hitherto, and may be adopted in other districts where it has not prevailed. Industrial and special crops other than those listed may also be insured against elemental destruction by agreement between the governments of the constituent republics and the Gosstrakh (State Insurance Agency). They may also arrange higher rates for an insurance against deterioration of quality of tobacco and makhorka as the result of hailstorms.

Property belonging to "kulak" households and to individuals rated in category III. of the Income Tax schedule, also to others deprived of the vote, may not be insured.

The decree lists in detail the amounts paid in case of loss, also the premiums to be paid by collective farms and farmers, showing an average reduction of 7 per cent from the rates in force in 1934. Young stock up to 6 months or 2 years, according to kind, are insured without premium, as are areas seeded above the seeding plan. As an encouragement to cattle-raising and increasing the market supply of animal products, a 20 per cent reduction is made in premiums for pedigreed animals and for stock on stock-farms. Collectives with approved fire protection, and showing a good record in raising and caring for stock, enjoy reductions in premiums of from 25 to 50 per cent, according to equipment. A 50 per cent reduction also applies for the first year for colonists moving to a new settlement. Special reductions of part or all of premiums apply to collectives and individual farmers in the nomadic and semi-nomadic districts of Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, the Kazak and Kirghiz republics, the Kalmyk oblast, and the Far North. A similar reduction is made for certain classes of collective farmers, as "heroes of the Union", former and present military and other similar servants and families of those who have fallen in the struggle with the kulaks or of forest workers killed on duty. Collectives and individuals who have suffered from elemental destruction

in districts where insurance did not prevail may be granted partial reductions in premiums, according to the circumstances, but not more than 90 per cent of the premiums.

Unfortunately we have no recent statistics as to the amount of property thus insured, but it is known to have been steadily increasing. The compulsory insurance of peasants' buildings against fire, which had long existed under the *zemstvos*, covered in 1928 over twenty million homes at an average of 302 roubles. At the same date sixty million desyatins or hectares were insured against hail, and thirty million horned cattle and nine million horses against disease. About 12 per cent of these, being those of the poorest peasants, were insured without premium. But whereas the average fire premium charged by the *zemstvos* was, in 1914, 1.08 per cent, that charged by the Government in 1927-1928 was only 0.72 per cent. The total sum thus compulsorily insured against these various calamities was in 1928-1929 over 11,000 million roubles, the annual premium receipt over 109 million roubles, and the total payments for losses 95 million roubles.

The various branches of voluntary insurance have increased even more than those under compulsion. Premiums paid for voluntary fire insurance in 1927-1928 amounted to 57 million roubles, and those for voluntary insurance of goods in transit to 7½ million roubles. Life insurance proceeds more slowly, but the 145,900 persons insured for 97 million roubles in 1925-1926 had grown to 385,000 for 214 million roubles in 1928.¹

The Commissariat of Defence

One of the USSR Commissariats that is both like and unlike the corresponding ministry in a western country is that dealing with the armed forces. The People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs—a post held in succession by Trotsky (1918-1923), Frunze (1923-1926) and, since 1926, by K. E. Voroshilov—stood formerly at the head, not of an ordinary

¹ Another branch of popular finance, widely extended in western Europe—that of pawnbroking, *mont de piété*, or "lombard"—is not much in evidence in the Soviet Union. We are told that pawnbroking offices, dating from tsarist times, are maintained only in about twenty-six cities, and there exclusively by the city soviets. They are now nominally under the supervision of the USSR Commissariat of Finance, but are not regarded with favour. Pawnbroking, as carried on for profit, necessitates the periodical sale by auction of unredeemed pledges. This practically involves the existence of a class of dealers who make a practice of buying such unredeemed pledges, in order to sell them at a profit—a practice which has, in the USSR, been made a criminal offence. Hence the surviving municipal pawnshops find a difficulty in disposing of their unredeemed pledges. Their occasional auctions are sometimes held inside the great factories, where the only purchasers are the workmen buying for family use. Sometimes admission to the auction is confined to persons presenting a card of trade union membership. We gather that it is hoped that pawnbroking can eventually be superseded, on the one hand, by the friendly loans of the Mutual Aid Societies (see pp. 713-715), and, on the other, by the numerous retail shops maintained by the city municipalities for the sale of unwanted commodities on a commission of 25 per cent. The practice of pawning winter clothing on the advent of spring, in order to get it protected from theft or moth during the summer months, may be superseded by a system of communal storage.

collegium, but of a "Revolutionary Council of War", consisting of ten members, appointed by the Sovnarkom mainly from among officers of experience in the various branches of the service. In 1934, in accordance with the general decision to abolish all the collegia attached to the USSR Commissariats, the Revolutionary Council of War was brought to an end; at the same time—perhaps as a gesture, emphasising the conclusion of so many Pacts of Non-Aggression—the commissariat was given the new title of People's Commissariat of Defence.¹ The Revolutionary Council of War has been replaced by a purely advisory Military Council consisting of 80 members, over whose meetings the People's Commissar himself presides. This council includes the principal commanders of the various departments of the defence forces, including specifically the Far Eastern Army and the Military Air Fleet, together with the president of the great voluntary organisation called Osoaviakhim.

This Commissariat of Defence has, of course, an extensive organisation of its own throughout the whole Union, for the maintenance, training and education of the nine hundred thousand men under arms in the army, navy and air force. We can ourselves say nothing useful as to the military efficiency of these three forces, which are combined in a single administration. It is a mere matter of observation that the troops seen in the streets or travelling by train or steamboat, in camp or in barracks, are obviously not only well fed and well clothed but also relatively intelligent and well behaved. Military experts declare these forces to be competently drilled, well armed and highly mechanised; some even going so far as to say that the USSR is at least as well prepared for war as any other nation.² The air force appears to be exceptionally formidable and in a state of great efficiency.

The Commissariat of Defence is organised in two main divisions, administrative and operative. Under them there are half a dozen separate branches, each headed by a commander of a competence proved in long service. The Commissariat is specially represented by confidential agents in the various constituent and autonomous republics.

The Army as a School

The feature in which the military forces of the Soviet Union seem to us to differ most significantly from those of western Europe (and also of

¹ Decree of USSR Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of June 20, 1934; in pursuance of decree of March 15, 1934, on governmental and industrial organisation by the same authority, in conjunction with the USSR Sovnarkom; and the resolutions of the Seventeenth All-Union Congress of the Communist Party. The *Moscow Daily News* of June 22, 1934, comments on the change significantly.

² It is curious that some of the critics of the USSR, who declare that the government and the workers alike show hopeless incompetence and inefficiency in industrial production, transport and agriculture, often go on to say that the highly mechanised and scientifically equipped army of the Soviet Union, with its extensive service of home-made automobiles and aeroplanes, as well as guns and munitions of every description, has reached a degree of technical efficiency so great as to render it a menace to the rest of the world!

Japan)—a feature that may well be of the greatest importance to the community—is the role that this part of the social structure plays in the cultural development of the whole people.¹ “The Red Army”, it is officially stated, “is not only a military school; it is also a school of culture.” “The Red Army”, it is also declared, “is essentially a school of citizenship.” Nothing is more resented by the communist than the conception of an army trained only as a military force, separate and apart from the mass of the people. Thus, in the Red Army the greatest care has been taken to prevent the upgrowth of anything approaching to a military caste. Neither the commanders (meaning the officers), even of highest grade, nor the rank and file think of themselves as separate from, or in any way superior to, other people who are serving the community in industry or in agriculture, in medicine or in civil administration. Whilst serving their time with the colours, both commanders and men temporarily suspend their membership of their trade unions and associations; but they take part as citizens in all elections, and with equal votes choose their own members for the soviets, wherever they happen to be stationed. They form their own cooperative societies, which elect their own committees of management, and belong to Centrosoyus, the apex of the whole movement. They are encouraged to keep up their correspondence with their relatives in the villages and cities from which they have been drawn; and even to act as local correspondents to the newspapers. They not only remain citizens whilst serving in the ranks; they become even influential citizens. The peasant who is serving in the army can always command a hearing. Many are the instances in which a son who is a “Red Army man” (the word soldier is not used) has been able, by intervening from a distance, to obtain redress for his father and family who have been suffering from some petty tyranny or injustice at the hands of a local official.

The Red Army is, like all Continental forces, recruited by compulsory service. It is strictly confined to the offspring of “workers and peasants”, no child of the former nobility or *bourgeoisie* being admitted. Service (for the infantry) is for two years, for the air force three years, and for the navy five years. Only about one-third of those eligible to serve and sound in health are taken for the Red Army.² What is unusual is to find

¹ Apart from the abundant Russian material, the most accessible information as to the Red Army will be found in the *Military Year-book of the League of Nations*, 1932; and in the chapter entitled “The Army” in *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 222-234; chap. i, “The Redarmyist”, in *Making Bolsheviks*, by S. N. Harper, 1931, pp. 132-152; *Eastward from Paris*, by Edouard Herriot, 1934, pp. 228-234; and (for an earlier and more critical view) *La Révolution russe*, par Henri Rollin, Paris, 1931, vol. ii, pp. 133, 343, etc.

See also the anonymous pamphlets published in Paris, entitled *Le Soldat de l'armée rouge*, 1929; and *L'Armée rouge et La Flotte rouge*, the latter with preface by P. Vaillant-Couturier, 1932.

² All the rest are placed in a territorial militia, in which they retain their civil employments, but are called out for instructional service for a few weeks at a time. In the course of five years they will have served in this way for eight or ten months. When so called up, their civil situations are guaranteed to them; they continue all their social

the conscription not unpopular. This is partly due to the unique informative and propagandist methods of the recruiting department. Prior to each annual conscription a specially selected commander (the word officer is not used) visits the village and convenes a meeting of the young men, and such of their elders as choose to attend. He explains, not at all as a person of superior class or rank, but in an atmosphere of comradeship, the rôle of the Red Army, the conditions of service, the educational and other advantages provided, and the varied amenities of the life ; and then he invites questions, which are put by the score, and answered to the best of his ability, as between friends and equals. The result is that, in marked contrast with the practice in tsarist times, those on whom the lot falls mostly go, not only without reluctance or amid the tears of their families, but willingly. Many who are not conscripted actually volunteer for service. They find the army conditions, in fact, superior to those of the independent peasant or the miner, the factory operative or the worker on the oil-field. The commanders, and even those whom we should call non-commissioned officers, treat the Red Army man with respect. All ranks, address each other as equals. In the field, as at drill, or on manoeuvres, prompt obedience to orders is enforced, discipline is strict, and some formality is observed. But off duty all ranks meet together on equal terms, sit next to each other at places of amusement, travel together, and even play games and engage in amateur theatricals together ; the wives of the commanders often playing parts along with members of the rank and file ! To the Red Army man his commander is merely a man of special knowledge, who, when all are on duty, has the function of leader, just as the manager of a factory has in the industrial field.

Probably such an army could achieve no military efficiency unless all ranks were educated. Accordingly, in the Soviet Union, as much care is taken in the appropriate education of the rank and file as in the specialised training of the commanders. At every military centre there are club-houses, school-rooms, lecture courses, libraries, theatre and cinemas. The aggregate number of volumes now included in the thousands of libraries of the defence forces is reported to be somewhere about twenty millions. If any men still join as illiterates, they are promptly taught to read and write both their own vernacular and Russian. All are put through an educational course lasting throughout their whole service, in which not only geography and history, but also economics and " political grammar " (naturally Marxian), are imparted by instructors trained to be both simple and interesting in their expositions. All men are taught to sing, and, as many as desire it, to play one or other musical instrument. There are a number of special newspapers for the defence forces with an aggregate circulation of a quarter of a million. The men have also a quite exceptional amount of vocational training, for which the modern mechanised army

insurance benefits, whilst they receive two-thirds of the wage they have been earning. Up to the age of 24, all are in the first reserve ; from 24 to 40 in the second reserve, to be called up only in the greatest emergencies.

offers abundant opportunity. Moreover, as this under Soviet Communism offends no private interest, the troops are continually being called out to help, not only in the agricultural operations of the locality, but also in all sorts of industrial work in which extra labour force is urgently needed, to avert a breakdown or prevent injurious delay, whether in such operations of civil engineering as roads and bridges, railways and embankments, or in repairing buildings, restoring telegraphic communications, or mending machines of every kind. Incidentally it may be said that considerable attention is paid by the Communist Party to the promotion, among all the recruits, of the orthodox Marxian faith. There are one or more cells of the Party in every military unit or barrack, as well as one or more groups of the League of Youth (Comsomols), to the number, in the aggregate, of more than 10,000.¹

Every year nearly half a million Red Army men, who have completed two or more years of this training, return to their homes and resume their civil occupations. As there are some 600,000 villages, hamlets and cities in the USSR, this means that, during the past decade, an average of three or four such men have re-entered each village and hamlet between the Baltic and the Pacific; about forty to the area of each selosoviet. These young men in the early twenties, relatively well informed and widely read, trained to good habits and filled with a sense of order and efficiency, easily become presidents of many of the 70,000 village soviets; delegates to congresses and conferences; managers of cooperative societies or collective farms; and in various ways influential leaders of the local community. In another decade their number in each village will have been doubled. It is, we think, impossible to over-estimate the importance of this continuous impregnation of what used to be the "deaf" villages of the remote steppe or the Siberian forest, alike in the promotion of national unity, in the stimulation of rural thought, and in the universal penetration of the communist faith.

The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), which has been presided over successively by Trotsky (1917-1918), Chicherin (1918-

¹ These cells are busy "coordinating the activity of the 120,000 communists (that is, Party members) in the official total of 562,000 Red Army-ists; a total now raised to nearly a million. The Communist League of Youth has an even larger representation, numbering 150,000. In the senior commanding personnel, and among the 'political workers' in the Red Army, the percentage . . . is even higher. Every year several tens of thousands of new Party members are recruited from the Red Army-ists in active service" (*Making Bolsheviks*, by S. N. Harper, 1931, p. 135). In 1934 the proportion of Party members was placed as high as 60 per cent (*Eastward from Paris*, by Edouard Herriot, 1934, p. 231). Such a figure, however, applies more correctly to the officer corps. Among regimental commanders the proportion of Party members in 1935 reached 72 per cent, among division commanders, 90 per cent, and among corps commanders, 100 per cent. Among the rank and file, 49.3 per cent were members of the Party or Comsomols (Speech by Tukhachevski, Assistant People's Commissar of Defence, at Seventh All-Union Congress, *Moscow Daily News*, February 2, 1935).

1930) and, since 1930, by Litvinov, who had long been assistant to Chicherin, has gradually become an extensive and elaborately organised department, at least as well equipped for negotiations and for the orderly maintenance of international relations as the corresponding departments of other governments.¹ The People's Commissar has still two assistants or deputy commissars, but was, in 1934, relieved of his collegium. Besides the usual branches for the protocol, for archives, for the press, for the staff of diplomatic couriers, and for the consular service (in 1934 stationed at eighty-six foreign cities) there is a legal department and an economic department, both of which have manifested their competence. Continuous relations are maintained with the score of representatives or diplomatic agents in the chief cities of the USSR. In constant communication with the thirty soviet embassies or legations abroad,² there are five separate departments dealing with the relations with particular governments. Three of these departments manage the intercourse with the western world; the first taking Poland and the Baltic and Scandinavian states; the second Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece; and the third the United Kingdom and all its dependencies, France, Italy, Spain, the United States and South America. Two departments tackle the eastern world; the first dealing with Turkey, Arabia, Yemen, Persia and Afghanistan; and the second with Japan, China and Mongolia.

The Commissariat of Internal Affairs

In 1934 a new All-Union People's Commissar for Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel) was appointed (the office being revived from its former existence in the RSFSR down to 1922), principally to take over the functions that have, during the past dozen years, developed upon the OGPU, which had always been a federal department. This development had long been in contemplation. As long ago as January 1931, so a leading

¹ With the gradual resumption of diplomatic relations with other governments, the necessity was felt of a systematic analysis of the position of the USSR as a socialist island in a capitalist ocean. This was worked out in two treaties (in Russian), the first named translated into German, namely, *International Law in the Transition Period, as the Basis for the International Relations of the Soviet Union* (1929), by E. A. Korovin, professor of the University of Moscow; and *The Law as to Ambassadors and Consuls in the Soviet Union* (1930), by Professor A. Sabanin, head of the Legal Section of Narkomindel. See *Le Caractère et la situation internationale de l'Union des Soviets*, by Professor Otto Hoetzsch, 1932, pp. 46, 49, 103; *Die völkerrechtliche Anerkennung Sowjetrusslands*, by Peter Kleist, Berlin, 1934; and *The Soviet Union and International Law*, by T. A. Taracougio, New York, 1935.

Since 1927 there has been an *Annuaire Diplomatique* issued by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) at Moscow, giving a mass of particulars likely to be useful to the diplomatic circle. A useful account of Narkomindel will be found in *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, pp. 120-121.

² It may be added that the USSR is now (1935) recognised *de jure* by all the governments of Europe (except Switzerland, Holland, Portugal and Yugoslavia), and by all those of Asia (except Iraq and Siam), as well as by that of the United States. Of the states of Central and South America, only Uruguay has yet (1935) entered into formal relations with the USSR.

Ukrainian exile complains, "Moscow suppressed the commissariats of Internal Affairs in all the Union republics, alleging that 'in the circumstances of the socialist reconstruction of national economy these commissariats had become superfluous ballast in the soviet apparatus' ". The duties of the liquidated commissariats were entrusted partly to newly created "chief offices of communal economy" and partly to the "Central Executive Committees of the separate Union republics, their Councils of (People's) Commissaries, and the commissariats of labour and justice".¹ The completion of this process was delayed until it was convenient, after the death of Menzhinsky, its president, in April 1934, to suppress also the separate existence of the Ogpu. By decree of July 11, 1934, the long-expected All-Union Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel) was established, with functions stated to be "the guarantee of revolutionary order and state security, the protection of socialist property, the registration of civil acts (births, deaths, marriages, divorces), and the protection of the frontiers". The new commissariat consists of six principal departments, namely "the Chief Department of State Security, the Chief Department of Workers' and Peasants' Militia, the Chief Department of Frontier and Internal Protection, the Chief Department of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Settlements, the Department of Civil Acts, and that of Administrative Business".²

It is difficult, without further experience of the actual working of the new commissariat, to appreciate, with any accuracy, the extent and nature of the constitutional change that has been effected. We may, however, note, at once, an increasing centralisation of authority and administration. The constituent and autonomous republics, together with the municipalities and the other local authorities, hand over to the USSR People's Commissar what had hitherto been their sole control and administration of the "militia"³—that is to say what in western Europe and the United States is called the local constabulary or police force. The control of the local constabulary has now to be shared between the city soviet and the new central authority. The same may be said of the registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces, which now becomes a function of the USSR Commissariat of Internal Affairs, though the local soviet retains a share in the administration.

The Ogpu

The supersession of the Ogpu, which has hitherto been directly responsible to the USSR Central Executive Committee (TSIK); and the

¹ "Ukraine under Bolshevik Rule", by Isaac Mazepa, in *Slavonic Review*, January 1934, p. 341.

² For the decree of July 10, 1934, see *Pravda*, July 11, 1932; and *Russian Economic Notes of the United States Department of Commerce*, August 30, 1934.

³ This was foreshadowed in 1933 when, on the institution of permits of residence (called passports) in Moscow and some other cities, the issue of those permits was entrusted to the militia, who were placed under the direction of the Ogpu for this purpose.

assumption of its functions by the new USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, is not a case of increased centralisation. There may well be administrative advantages in placing, in separate branches of the commissariat, equal in independent status, such distinct functions as "guaranteeing revolutionary order and state security" on the one hand, and, on the other, the control of the local constabulary forces in the several localities, the frontier guards, and "the corrective labour camps and labour settlements", all of which the Ogpu submerged in a single, secret administration. But apparently the principal change involved in the absorption of the Ogpu in the new commissariat is the splitting off of its strictly judicial functions, which are to be transferred, in accordance with the legal requirements, to the competent judicial organs to which all the cases investigated by the new commissariat in any of its sections are to be sent for trial and judgment. Cases under the "Department of State Security" (the former Ogpu) are to be directed to the Supreme Court of the USSR; whilst all cases of high treason and "espionage" will go to the military collegium of the Supreme Court, or to the competent military tribunals. That a substantial transfer of work on these lines is contemplated may be inferred from the published intention to increase the judicial staffs of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the supreme courts of the constituent and autonomous republics, the provincial and regional courts and the military tribunals.

On the other hand, it is apparently not intended completely to separate administrative from judicial proceedings. A "Special Conference" is to be organised under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which, on the basis of definite regulations, is to be empowered to apply, by administrative order, such decisions (which will apparently not be called judicial sentences) as banishment from or to particular localities within the USSR, or exile beyond its frontiers, or detention in corrective labour camps for a period not exceeding five years. It is to be feared that this provision will cause critics to declare that it is only the name of the Ogpu that has been changed! It will be fairer to await experience of the action taken under the new decree.

The Supreme Court of the USSR

We have still to deal with what is, from one standpoint, the most important branch of the federal power, namely the Supreme Court of the USSR, together with the powerful department of the Procurator. This should involve a complete survey of the system of law and justice under Soviet Communism (for which we have no competence) and an examination of the conception of prisons for ordinary criminals as institutions not punitive but exclusively reformatory. We shall recur to the activities of the Ogpu in Part II. of this book, and we must content ourselves here with a brief account of the judicial structure from the federal angle.¹

¹ An excellent summary description will be found in "The Russian Legal System" by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, pp.

The administration of justice, like the prevention of crime and the maintenance of prisons, is, in the constitution of Soviet Communism, not one of the subjects assigned to the federal government. There is, accordingly, in each of the nine constituent republics (including the three united in the Transcaucasian Federation), a People's Commissar for Justice, with a system of courts, police and prisons under his direction; a Procurator with an extensive staff; and also a corresponding department, with that or some equivalent designation, in each of the autonomous republics and autonomous areas, great or small. But among the authorities appointed by and directly responsible to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR is the Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction over the whole territory. This USSR Supreme Court "has power to review by way of supervision . . . the judgments of the Supreme Courts of the seven [nine] constituent republics; it has original jurisdiction (which it has never yet been called upon to exercise) over disputes between constituent republics; and it exercises criminal jurisdiction in rare cases involving either persons of high position or charges of exceptional importance; by its military department it also exercises original jurisdiction over military officers of high rank, or exceptionally important charges against military defendants, as well as cassational jurisdiction over the decisions of the military courts. The Supreme Court has, strictly speaking, no other judicial functions; but the plenum [that is to say, the general meeting] of the court, consisting of the president, the deputy president, the three departmental presidents, four of the ordinary judges of the court selected for the purpose, and the president of the supreme court of each of the constituent republics [these not being members of the Supreme Court, but making the so-called plenum up to 18] issues explanations and interpretations of law and of legislation, and exercises certain limited powers of review both over the acts and decrees of the central executive committees (the ostensible seats of direct executive and legislative power) of the constituent republics, and over the decisions of their supreme courts".¹

145-176; see also Mr. Pritt's article "The Spirit of a Soviet Court", in *The New Nation*, December 24, 1932. A later account is *Justice in Soviet Russia*, by Harold J. Laski, 1935, 40 pp. The subject is dealt with in greater detail in *Soviet Administration of Criminal Law*, by Judah Zelitch, of the Philadelphia Bar (Pennsylvania University Press, 1931, 418 pp.). The civil law will be found (in French) in *Les Codes de la Russie soviétique*, by J. Patouillet and Raoul Dufour, 3 vols., 1923-1928 (Bibliothèque de l'Institut du droit comparé de Lyon); or (in German) in *Das Zivilrecht Sowjetrusslands*, by Heinrich Freund, Berlin, 1924, or *Das Recht Sowjetrusslands*, by N. Timaschew, N. Alexejew and A. Sawadsky (Tübingen, 1925). These valuable codes do not yet seem to have engaged the serious attention of British lawyers, but we have heard them spoken of by Continental jurists with admiration.

As is so often the case in Soviet Communism the law and the courts of justice in the USSR ignore the classifications and the categories of the rest of Europe. There is no distinction between civil and criminal courts, and very little between the procedure in civil and criminal actions.

A convenient summary of the history of the Russian law prior to the revolution will be found prefixed to vol. i. of *Les Codes de la Russie soviétique*, by J. Patouillet and Raoul Dufour (1923).

¹ "The Russian Legal System", by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, p. 148.

The judges of the Supreme Court, as of all other courts in the USSR, are, like those in other countries of continental Europe, not appointed from the professional advocates, as they are in Great Britain. So far as they are "whole time", and, so to speak, permanent, they are, as in other European countries, professionally qualified members of what we should call the Civil Service. Almost every court of first instance in the USSR consists of one permanent judge, appointed from year to year at a fixed salary about equivalent to that of the earnings of a highly paid skilled mechanic; and two co-judges (*narodnye zasedateli*, literally people's co-sitters), drawn for about a week at a time from a panel of persons, mostly manual-working men or women, normally in industrial employment, but carefully instructed in their judicial duties; and compensated merely for their loss of earnings during the week in which they sit. Although in theory these co-judges possess equal rights with the permanent judge, and can therefore outvote him on the bench, they serve, in practice, very much the same purposes as a British jury.¹

Now it is interesting to find that the same principle is adopted in the constitution of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The permanent judges, including the presidents, deputy president and thirty others, as members of this Court (and likewise the judges of the military courts), are appointed directly by the presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), from among persons possessing the electoral franchise and qualified by their legal attainments, and by previous service in the judicial hierarchy for a prescribed minimum period. But they do not sit alone. In every court of three, even for cases of the greatest importance, one member (the people's co-sitter) is a layman, although this co-judge is, for the USSR Supreme Court (as for the RSFSR Supreme Court) taken from a special panel of forty-eight co-judges, approved by the presidium of the Central Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of the USSR sits whenever required, normally in public (though with power to hold sessions in camera if the court thinks necessary); and not always in Moscow, but in special sessions wherever may be thought convenient.

¹ A cassational court, practically corresponding with our court of appeal, consists only of three permanent judges.

It is explained by Mr. Pritt that "cassation is the quashing or setting aside for some informality or irregularity, as opposed to appeal, which is, in theory, a rehearing. In Russia there is technically no appeal; but the grounds of cassation are so wide, both in definition and in practical application, that the distinction is immaterial" (*ibid.* p. 148). . . . "Side by side with the provision as to cassation, there exists a somewhat remarkable power in the courts to reverse or modify erroneous decisions of lower courts through 'review by way of supervision'. At any stage of a case, however early or however late (even after cassation is barred by lapse of time, and when a case has long been finally concluded in the inferior court), the president or the procurator of a court may call upon any inferior court to produce the record of any case, and they examine the whole proceedings, and if necessary set aside the decision itself or any preliminary step or decision. . . . The procedure is constantly invoked, and leads directly to the correction of wrong verdicts, and indirectly, no doubt, to much greater efficiency and vigilance" (*ibid.* p. 153).

The Procurator

side by side with the Supreme Court in each of the constituent republics of the USSR, is a department which is unfamiliar to the Englishman, namely that of the Procurator. The Procurator, who is, in every continental country, one of the principal officers of the Minister of Justice (in the RSFSR he is the Deputy People's Commissar), is all that we mean by Public Prosecutor, together with much of what we mean by Attorney-General, and a great deal more besides. In the RSFSR, and in the other constituent republics, where both he and his deputy are appointed by the presidium of the Central Executive Committee, he has "the general duty of supervising in the public interest the operation of all government organs, in the widest sense of the phrase; and to enable him to fulfil this duty he is placed in a position of virtual independence of all departments",¹ though always in general subordination to the People's Commissar for Justice. He is responsible (as no official in England is) for the state of the law, with the positive duty of suggesting to the Sovnarkom or the Central Executive Committee any new legislation that is required, or any repeal or amendment of existing laws. He is supposed to keep a continuous watch (which no one in England is charged to do) on the activities of all judges, investigating officers, advocates, the local police and others connected with the administration of justice; and to institute proceedings against them, either administrative or disciplinary or criminal, whenever required.² He may intervene in civil actions when he thinks necessary, in order "to safeguard the interests of the state and of the toiling masses". But the largest part of the work of the extensive department of the Procurator is concerned with the investigation, in preparation for possible criminal proceedings, of deaths or physical casualties, damage or destruction of property, and mere pecuniary loss, so far as concerns any cases in which it is alleged or suspected that there has been a serious breach of the criminal law. The judicial systems of all civilised countries make more or less systematic provision for investiga-

¹ "The Russian Legal System", by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, p. 160.

² "It is not an uninteresting feature of the Procurator's duties that he is particularly active in connection with prison administration. He has to see that sentences are properly carried out, that any persons unlawfully detained are released, and that prisons are properly managed. He visits prisons regularly, generally as often as once in six days, and receives and investigates complaints by individual prisoners. The public are earnestly encouraged to take their complaints to his active and powerful organisation, and they are not slow to do so" (*ibid.* p. 160). Over a thousand such visits to prisons each month of the year were paid in 1923 and 1924 by the members of the Procurator's Department (*Soviet Administration of Criminal Law*, by Judah Zelitch, 1931, p. 124).

Incidentally, as we are informed, this continuous inspection of the prisons by the Procurator's department leads to a considerable number of discharges or remission of sentences. Each constituent or autonomous republic has an item in its budget for prison expenses, which it is loth to exceed. When the prisons get full, an excess on the year is threatened. As a practical expedient, the number of prisoners is then reduced by the Procurator recommending for immediate discharge a sufficient number of those whom he thinks most likely to be favourably affected by such leniency.

tions of this kind, partly in order to ensure that no criminal goes undetected and unprosecuted, and partly in order to sift out, from the mass of trivial causes of assault, petty larceny or contravention of bye-laws, those calling for more drastic treatment. The English system is exceptional in leaving this function in the main, partly to the local police forces, rarely specialised into a Criminal Investigation Department (in cases of death, also to the ancient coroner) and partly, if he can afford the expense, to the private person aggrieved, who may now, in serious cases, sometimes be able, by comparatively recent reforms, to enlist the services of the Treasury Solicitor or the Public Prosecutor, if not of the Attorney-General. In the constituent republics of the USSR, as in most other countries, this work is undertaken as a matter of course by the government, in an extensive department known as that of the "Procurator".¹ In all allegations or suspicions of certain classes of crime, and in any other case in which it is thought desirable, the Procurator's Department makes an investigation, in which every person supposed to be able to give relevant information, whether or not suspected of being the criminal, and including experts as well as witnesses, is interrogated in private by a qualified judicial officer, called in the USSR an inquisitor or investigator. At this stage, no person is accused (although a person strongly suspected may be detained in prison) and no one can legally be compelled to answer questions; whilst anyone may appeal, summarily and without expense, to the Procurator himself, against any sort of maltreatment at the hands of the investigator. The enquiries and interrogations are, in many cases, necessarily searching and prolonged (as we have lately learned about those in similar cases made by our English policemen). But there is reliable testimony, so far as the RSFSR is concerned, that efforts are made to bring out impartially the whole of the relevant facts, whether or not pointing to a crime having been committed, and whether for or against any suspected person. The idea seems to be that, if a crime has been committed, it ought to be "reconstructed" from the facts before a decision is come to that any particular person should be prosecuted as the probable criminal. When this "reconstruction" has been made, to the satisfaction of the Procurator, he decides whether the facts point to any particular person as the probable criminal, and if so, the case is then remitted to the court for trial. Only at this stage is the indictment, which for the first time specifies precisely the breach of the criminal law that is alleged to have been committed, drawn up and communicated to the defendant,

¹ The student will find this function of the USSR Procurator precisely described in minute detail in *Soviet Administration of Criminal Law*, by Judah Zelitch, 1931, chap. vi., "Proceedings prior to the Trial", pp. 153-196.

Until July 1933 the Procurator, and his extensive department, was exclusively a branch of the administration of justice of each constituent republic, the USSR itself having none. There has now been appointed a Procurator for the USSR, having all the wide powers and functions of the Procurator for the RSFSR. In addition, this new federal Procurator (Akulov) is charged with the "supervision. . . of the legality and regularity" of the activities of a most important federal department, the OGPU, to which we have already referred.

who can then obtain the assistance of an advocate and prepare his defence.

Whether this system of preliminary official investigation by searching interrogation in private—which prevails all over the European continent—is or is not more efficacious than the peculiar British arrangement in like cases, either in securing the conviction of criminals, or in protecting the innocent from annoyance or danger, we do not presume to judge.

The College of Advocates

It is instructive to notice the reasons assigned for the fact that the profession of advocacy plays a smaller part in the USSR than in other countries. "The simplicity", we are authoritatively told, "of the procedure; the greater thoroughness in criminal cases of the preparatory work done before the case comes to court; the absence of rules of evidence and of similar technicalities; the greater certainty of the law arising from the absence of a vast fungus of reported cases; the freedom from all the hindrances that excessive wealth, on one side or the other, can place in the way of justice—all tend to make it less essential to employ an advocate. Nevertheless advocates are frequently employed, and the organisation of the profession is interesting."¹

After passing through various vicissitudes during the first five years of the revolution, the legal profession in the USSR (which does not distinguish between solicitors and barristers, any more than between these and juriconsults, notaries or conveyancers) is, by the Advocacy Law of 1922, organised as a College of Advocates.² Admission is open to anyone (not belonging to one of the "deprived" categories) who qualifies, either by two years' service in the soviet judiciary system in a grade not lower than that of an investigator, or by graduating at the Institute of Soviet Law, or even by studying at evening classes and passing an examination. Since 1926 the number of members has been restricted. On admission as a member of the College, he or she becomes available for consultation by anyone seeking legal advice, or for assignment to act for any litigant, in civil or criminal action. The applicant for advice or the litigant requiring advocacy is, if recognised as "poor", such as a non-working invalid or aged pensioner, charged no fee. Industrial workers, peasants, clerks and handicraftsmen may be charged a small sum, which may be made payable by instalments. Anyone pecuniarily better off pays a fee according to a fixed scale, dependent partly on the amount of service rendered and partly on the pecuniary position of the client. But these fees, whatever they may be, are taken by the College of Advocates.³ Its members receive

¹ "The Russian Legal System," by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, p. 158.

² Law No. 36 of 1922, since slightly amended by the Judicature Laws of 1923, 1924 and 1926; *Soviet Administration of Criminal Law*, by Judah Zelitch, 1931, pp. 140-144.

³ Apparently anyone wishing to do so may agree with the advocate to pay him a special and additional fee.

fixed salaries, which are reported to vary according to their several abilities and to the amount of work required from them. Professional discipline is maintained by the College, or rather by its presidium which the members' meeting elects, always subject to appeal to the Provincial Court. In the USSR, advocates, as well as judges, are, at least in theory, liable to suspension, disqualification and even criminal prosecution, for any breach of professional duty, even if no more than neglect, by reason of which any litigant or other client suffers loss or injury. It is to be noted that most of the advocates, like most of the doctors and many of the authors, do not seek to become Party members. This is not, in most cases, because they are not communists in opinion and sympathy, but because there is a feeling that the demands of Party discipline might prove incompatible with full performance of their duty to their clients and their profession. Thus, it is said that 85 per cent of the members of the College of Advocates are non-Party. Although the contrary has been stated, without evidence, at least one competent observer reports that advocates are quite free to present the cases of their clients fearlessly and without smarting for their freedom.¹

The Problem of National Minorities

We have yet to add to our description of the pyramid of soviets, an account of how the Bolsheviks believe that they have solved the problem presented by the existence, in the vast territory for which a constitution had to be provided, of a hundred or more distinct nationalities. One of the difficult problems presented to political science by the geographical unity of the Eurasian plain has always been that of the extreme diversity of the population found upon it, in race, religion, language, degrees of civilisation and culture, habits of life, historical tradition and what not. The continuity of land surface from the Gulf of Finland to the Pacific Ocean prevented the rest of the world from recognising in the tsarist régime what was essentially a colonial empire, ruled from St. Petersburg by the upper class of a superior race—not without analogy to the colonial empire of Holland, ruling its East Indian dependencies from the Hague; or indeed to that of the Britain of the eighteenth century, ruling its heterogeneous colonies from Westminster. The systems of the Dutch and the British appealed to the Bolsheviks no more than those of the Spanish and the French. The compulsory "russification" aimed at by the Russian autocracy was not only manifestly impracticable, but also in the highest degree unpopular.

Lenin and his colleagues in the Social Democratic Party of Russia had not failed to notice, from the very beginning of the twentieth century, how strong and persistent was the popular discontent caused by the tsarist insistence on the "russification" of all the national minorities

¹ "One of the most eminent advocates, who had appeared for many persons accused of counter-revolutionary activities, stated that he never felt the least embarrassment or difficulty in presenting his case as strongly as he thought fit" ("The Russian Legal System", by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, p. 159).

within the Empire.¹ Ignoring the indications in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, as to proletarian supremacy leading to the passing away of national differences, and resisting the growing feeling through Europe in favour of united nationalist states, Lenin insisted that the Bolsheviks should declare themselves in favour, along with the right of self-determination of even the smallest nationality, also of the concession of "cultural autonomy" to national minorities included within states. This proved to be an important factor, so far as the national minorities of Tsarist Russia were concerned, in securing their participation in the revolutions of February and October 1917.

How were the insistent demands of the various nationalities to be met? The Provisional Government had left this problem, along with so many others, to the prospective Constituent Assembly. But in October 1917 Lenin and his colleagues found themselves in power, before anyone had worked out any scheme of organisation that would satisfy the national minorities without endangering the strength and unity of the central authority. This did not prevent the new government from issuing a flamboyant proclamation promising autonomy in return for support.

"Mohammedans of Russia," it began, "Tartars of the Volga and Crimea; Kirghiz and Sartes of Siberia and Turkestan; Turks and Tartars of Transcaucasia, your beliefs and customs, your national institutions and culture, are hereafter free and inviolable. You have the right to them. Know that your rights, as well as those of all the peoples of Russia, are under the powerful protection of the Revolution, and of the organs of the soviets for workers, soldiers, and peasants. Lend your support to this revolution, and to its government."²

The working out of the problem of national minorities was entrusted to Stálin, who, as a member of one of the innumerable tribes inhabiting the Caucasian mountains, had long had a personal interest in the subject. In 1913, indeed, he had published a pamphlet in which he endeavoured to reconcile cultural autonomy with the supremacy of the whole proletarian mass.³ He was made People's Commissar for Nationalities, with the opportunity of concentrating his whole energy on the task.

Cultural Autonomy

It took Stalin four years to get his ideas even formally embodied in the constitution. He had first to secure the confidence of the national

¹ Already at the London Conference of 1903, Lenin got carried a resolution stating that "The Conference declares that it stands for the complete right of self-determination of all nations"; to which the Second Congress of the Party in August 1903 added the important words "included in any state". The Central Committee of the Party, at the meeting of September 25, 1913, emphasised the necessity of guaranteeing "the right to use freely their native language in social life and in the schools".

² *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 109. A French translation will be found in "Le Bolshévisme et l'Islam", by Castagne, in *Revue du monde musulman*, Paris, vol. xxxi, pp. 7-8.

³ *Marxism and the National Question*, by Josef Stalin, 1913 (in Russian).

minorities in European Russia, a task which was, in the turmoil of the civil war, for a long time impossible. "In its earlier years", it has been well said,¹ "the Commissariat of Nationalities was an agency for the propagation of the communist faith among the non-Russian peoples." It was, as well, "the arbiter of differences arising between autonomous states and the guardian of the interests of the national minorities, and was generally active in promoting cooperation among the several self-governing peoples. . . ." "As early as March 1918, Stalin signed a decree calling for the formation of a Tartar-Bashkir Republic. The civil war intervening, the measure remained a dead letter. The first ethnic group actually to achieve autonomy were the German settlers on the Volga, who, even under the old régime, had had certain privileges. They were organised in 1918 as a so-called 'Labour commune', which later became an autonomous republic. The establishment of the Bashkir State followed a year later. This was the first soviet state with an Oriental, that is, Turkish and Moslem, population. Upon soil once ruled by the khans of the Golden Horde the Tartar Republic was proclaimed in 1920. The Volga Tartars are the dominant nationality here, and the ancient city of Kazan is the administrative and cultural centre. About the same time the Karelian Republic was formed on the Finnish border, while the territories occupied by the Kalmyks, the Votyaks and the Mari were given the status of autonomous regions. Within the next two years the Crimean Republic came into being, the Komi people of the north was allotted a spacious region of its own, and the Chuvashian territory, now a republic, also became an autonomous region. Thus, by 1922 all the more important ethnic groups in the European part of the Russian federation had become masters of their own houses."²

In the Fundamental Law for the RSFSR, which was adopted on July 10, 1918, provision had been made for the possible combination or union of the soviets of "regions which are distinguished by a particular national and territorial character". It was even foreseen, by Article II., that these autonomous regional organs might "enter into the RSFSR on a federal basis". But none of them existed at the time, and (perhaps because they were at all times already inside the unitary state) none of them ever did "enter into the RSFSR on a federal basis".

Nevertheless the work done by Stalin, during his four years' tenure of office as People's Commissar for Nationalities, was of great and lasting importance. What he worked out in the vast domain of the RSFSR was not federalism (which came only in 1922-1923, when the nationalities outside the RSFSR joined with it in the federal USSR) but the concession of "cultural autonomy", coupled with an actual encouragement of the admission of members of the national minorities to the work of local administration. The autonomous republics and autonomous regions established within the RSFSR during the years 1918-1922 do not seem to

¹ *The Jews and other National Minorities under the Soviets*, by Avraham Yarmolinsky, 1928, pp. 131-133.

² *Ibid.*

have had in law any powers or duties, rights or functions differing essentially from those of the local authorities of the remainder of the territory of the RSFSR. They were, in practice, between 1918 and 1922, as they are to this day, dealt with by the central authorities at Moscow, *apart from matters of cultural autonomy*, almost exactly as if they were simply *krais* or *oblasts*. And when we realise that the most important of these enclaves had less than three millions of inhabitants; and that the aggregate population of the whole couple of dozen of them did not, at the time, exceed five millions; whilst the rest of the RSFSR had nearly a hundred millions, we shall not be inclined to take too seriously their several pretensions to federal status.

What the People's Commissar for Nationalities achieved between 1918 and 1922 was to stretch the provisions of Article II. of the Fundamental Law to cover the organisation of particular "regional unions of soviets" into what were called, in a dozen of the more important localised communities, "autonomous republics", and in another dozen cases "autonomous areas". Their regional congresses of soviets were recognised as having authority over all the soviets of the villages or cities or other districts within the territories assigned to these newly created "autonomous" parts of the RSFSR. Such of them as were called autonomous republics have even been allowed, in flat contradiction of the Fundamental Law,¹ to call their principal officials People's Commissars, and to group them into a *sovnarkom*, or Cabinet of Ministers. This harmless concession to regional pride was safeguarded by the express stipulation in the decree that, for all the "unified" *narkomats* or ministries² the appointment of People's Commissar was to be made only after consultation with the corresponding People's Commissar at Moscow. There was not even any concession of "cultural autonomy" explicitly embodied in the instruments constituting the new local authorities. It was, however, granted in administration. Stalin had sufficient influence with his ministerial colleagues, and with the Central Executive Committee, to induce them to refrain from using their powers of disallowance and cancellation in such a way as to interfere with the practical autonomy of these autonomous areas in purely cultural matters of local concern.

So far the important concession of cultural autonomy had involved little or no difference in political structure between the areas recognised as occupied by distinct nationalities and the other parts of the RSFSR organised in congresses of soviets for provinces (*gubernia*), counties (*uezd*) and rural districts (*volost*). The various minorities were, in fact, induced

¹ Article 48 declares that "the title of People's Commissar belongs exclusively to the members of the *sovnarkom* who administer the general affairs of the RSFSR, and cannot be adopted by any other representative of the central or local authorities" (Fundamental Law of July 10, 1918, Article II.; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 88).

² The "unified" commissariats, *narkomats* or ministries comprise the more important of the departments under local administration (see p. 79), such as those of finance, food supplies and light industries, and (until 1934) also labour, and workers' and peasants' inspection. To these was added in 1934 the commissariat of agriculture dealing with the *kolkhosi* and the independent peasantry.

to adopt, in substance, the same constitutional structure as the rest of the RSFSR. What the concession of cultural autonomy amounted to between 1918 and 1922 was merely that the central authorities of the RSFSR did not, in practice, prevent those of each autonomous republic and autonomous area from adopting its own vernacular as the official language; or from using it in councils and courts of justice, in schools and colleges, and in the intercourse between government departments and the public. The local authorities could give preference to their own nationals as teachers and local officials, and were even encouraged to do so. Their religious services were not interfered with by the Central Government. They could establish theatres, and publish books and newspapers in their own tongues. These were exactly the matters in which local autonomy was most warmly desired.¹

A further stage in dealing with the problem of nationalities was marked by the reorganisation of Stalin's own Commissariat (Narkomat) by decrees of May 19 and December 16, 1920. There was then created (but merely as a part of Stalin's own ministerial department) a "soviet of nationalities" consisting of the presidents of delegations of the various autonomous republics and areas, who were to sit with five of Stalin's own nominees under his presidency. This body was merely to advise the minister in his duties, which were on the same occasion defined anew, without mention of federation, as "all measures guaranteeing the fraternal collaboration of all the nationalities and tribes of the Russian Soviet Republic". This taking directly into council the heads of the national minorities within the RSFSR was an act of statesmanship; but how far this "fraternal collaboration" was from federalism, or even genuine autonomy, may be seen from the fact that the People's Commissar for Nationalities was expressly empowered to appoint his own resident agent to the capital city of each autonomous region "to watch over the execution of the decrees of the federal central authority of the Russian Soviet Republic".

The Adoption of Federalism

The high constitutional importance of Stalin's work as People's Commissar of Nationalities was, however, not adequately realised until the

¹ The limits to this "cultural autonomy" should be noted. Apart from the highly important matter of local administration by the natives, it is mainly a matter of permitting the use of the vernacular for all activities that are lawful in the Soviet Union; not a new right to conduct any activities that may be alleged to have been part of the vernacular culture. Thus it must not be assumed that the Ukrainians, the Georgians or the Germans, in the autonomous areas of the USSR, were to be given unlimited freedom to maintain or enter into relations with persons of the same nationality outside the USSR, including *émigrés* or exiles. In the concession of cultural autonomy within the USSR loyalty to the régime of the country was presupposed. In short, cultural autonomy (as distinguished from native government) was a reversal of the tsarist policy, of "russification", and nothing more. "The Soviet Government," it has been said, "is not Russian, but proletarian: it does not seek to russify the peoples of the Union, but to train them as communists like the Russian people itself, partners in the building up of socialism" (*Nationalism in the Soviet State*, by Hans Kohn, 1934, p. 112).

time came in 1922 when steps could be taken for the federal union between the RSFSR on the one hand, and the Ukraine, White Russia and the Transcaucasian Federation on the other. Then, as we have described, the autonomous republics and autonomous areas which Stalin had established within the RSFSR were all accorded independent and equal representation, nominally upon the same basis as the incoming independent republics, and indeed, as the RSFSR itself, in the federal organ entitled the Soviet of Nationalities, which is one limb of the bicameral Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR.¹

It remains to be said that, during the dozen years since the formation of the Soviet Union in 1923, the position of nearly all these autonomous republics and autonomous areas has been largely transformed. It is not that there has been any important alteration in their political structure, or in their nominal relation to the central authorities of the constituent republics within which they are situated, or to those of the Soviet Union. Their position of cultural autonomy has, indeed, been strengthened not only by long enjoyment of their privileges, but also by the scrupulous care taken at Moscow always to treat the minority cultures with respect, even on occasions when counter-revolutionary aspirations of a nationalist character have had to be sternly repressed. This policy has not been maintained without an occasional struggle. From time to time it has been complained that the recognition of all these national minorities and their cultures was costly in money and detrimental to educational and administrative efficiency;² and, worst of all, that it was admittedly made use of occasionally as a cloak for "separatist" machinations. But the Communist Party declared against such "Pan-Russian chauvinism", as being even more subversive than "local nationalism".³

The number of autonomous republics and autonomous areas has been, in fact, from time to time increased. Even the Jews, who are dispersed all over the Union, have been encouraged and assisted to form locally autonomous groups, especially in Southern Ukraine and the Crimea, and have been formally granted an autonomous oblast (in due course to be promoted to an autonomous republic) at Biro-Bidjan in Eastern Siberia.

¹ The functions of the Commissariat of Nationalities included "(a) the study and execution of all measures guaranteeing the fraternal collaboration of the nationalities and tribes of the Russian-Soviet Republic; (b) the study and execution of all measures necessary to guarantee the interests of national minorities on the territories of other nationalities of the Russian Soviet Federation; (c) the settlement of all litigious questions arising from the mixture of nationalities" (Decree No. 45 of May 27, 1920; see also that of No. 99 of December 23, 1920; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, pp. 118-199).

² The State Bank, in 1925, issued a circular to its numerous branches forbidding their use of the various vernaculars in the books of account or in correspondence with Moscow or with each other. This attempt to "establish for itself a common language for its bureaucracy" was objected to by a delegate to the Third All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925, who declared that "such projects should not be introduced" (Shorthand report of the Congress, p. 133; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 649).

³ *Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, by Hans Kohn, 1934, pp. 103-107; see also *How the Soviet Government solves the National Question*, by L. Perchik (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1932, 68 pp.).

* The Soviet Government has even begun to "settle" the gypsies, who swarm restlessly in the USSR as elsewhere.¹

It would be too much to expect the reader to examine, in detail, the varying developments of the twenty-seven autonomous republics and autonomous areas.² No fewer than twelve of the autonomous republics are within the RSFSR; and these autonomous republics alone extend to more than eight million square kilometres out of the total area of that constituent republic of less than twenty million kilometres, though including only sixteen and a half million inhabitants out of more than one hundred million.³

¹ "In Moscow there live 4000 members of this ancient and mysterious race. In other countries they are left to themselves; the Soviet Government has formed a club among the few active elements in the gypsy youth; it is called in the gypsy language "Red Star". It has some 700 members, of whom until quite recently only about 5 per cent could read and write. It is active in the liquidation of illiteracy, arranges lectures, organises excursions to factories and museums, and issues the first wall-newspaper in the gypsy language. Alongside this cultural activity an attempt is being made at the economic reorganisation of gypsy life. The gypsies have been given land. Under the leadership of the Moscow club, 7000 gypsy families have been settled on holdings; workshops have been started; and an obstinate struggle has begun against the past life of the gypsies. In harmony with the efforts of the Soviet Government on behalf of national cultures, the popular gypsy songs and dances have been developed and freed from the elements which had been interpolated in them through performance in places of public entertainment. The first play staged by the club in the gypsy language dealt with the transition to a settled life" (*Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, by Hans Kohn, 1934, p. 130).

² Actually the first to be granted cultural autonomy as a region in 1918, and as a republic in 1923, with the right to give preference in filling local offices to its own nationals, was the Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans, a settlement founded as long ago as 1764. This has now 631,300 inhabitants, mostly peasants, of whom two-thirds are German by extraction and language, one-fifth Russians and one-eighth Ukrainians. Fifteen years ago 15 per cent of the families owned 75 per cent of the land, more than three-quarters of the whole having to work as wage-labourers. The 15 per cent who had added field to field had a higher standard of farming and education, and more sustained industry and thrift, than their indigent neighbours; and they were long reluctant to cooperate in collective farms, to unite their scattered plots into fields permitting mechanisation, and to adopt methods of joint working which allowed the fuller use of an improved equipment. After pleading in vain to be let alone, or to be permitted to emigrate *en masse*, those who were not deported as recalcitrant kulaks (whose sufferings had in many cases been great) were eventually compelled to accept the kolkhosi system, of which they have apparently made an economic success. There are now 361 kolkhosi, 431 sovkhosi, with 99 machine and tractor stations, and over 90,000 peasant householders. The republic, the area of which is now almost wholly collectivised in sovkhosi or kolkhosi, is divided into 12 rayons, in six of which the language in use is German; in two, German and Russian; in two, German and Ukrainian; and two others, German, Russian and Ukrainian. Whereas fifteen years ago there were said to be only some 200 volumes of books in the whole republic, there are now 82 libraries, 178 village reading-rooms and tens of thousands of volumes. The nationality law of the republic of the Volga Germans is described in two publications in German, which also give a valuable account, though not unbiased, of the general nationality policy of the Soviet Government (Rudolf Schulze-Molkau, *Die Grundzüge des volgadeutschen Staatswesens im Rahmen der russischen Nationalitätenpolitik*, Munich, 1931; and especially Manfred Langham Ratzenburg, *Die Volgadeutschen, ihr Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, zugleich ein Beitrag zum bolschewistischen Nationalitätenrecht*, Berlin, 1929. And see, generally, *Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, by Hans Kohn, 1934, p. 125.)

³ The one autonomous republic in the Ukraine extends to only a small part of its total area; and those of the Transcaucasian Federation to no great proportion of its total area. White Russia contains no autonomous republics or areas. On the other hand, the

The Tatar Republic

We must content ourselves with a particular account of a single specimen, in its progress perhaps the most remarkable of all: the Tatar Autonomous Republic which the authors had the advantage of visiting in 1932. Twenty years ago its present area was an indistinguishable part of the vast gubernia or province of Kazan, with a poverty-stricken agricultural population almost entirely of Tartar race; 85 per cent illiterate; the women veiled; and the whole people completely debarred from self-government; and indeed, outside the city, left almost without administrative organs of any sort. There were a few dozen small elementary schools of the poorest kind, and only three places of higher education, in which but ten Tartar students, none of them the sons of peasants or wage-earners, were to be found. To-day there are over 1700 elementary schools, with more than 99 per cent of all the children of school age on the register, including girls equally with boys. The vernacular colleges and institutes of higher education are numbered by dozens, and filled with Tartar students, the great majority coming from peasant or wage-earning homes, whilst many more are to be found in colleges in other parts of the USSR. All the women are unveiled, and are taking their share in every department of public life. When the authors interviewed the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars (all of Tartar race) we found one of them a woman, who was Minister of Education. The health service for the village is an entirely new creation. Doctors (mostly women) and small hospitals (including lying-in accommodation), now cover the whole rural area, whilst at the capital, the city of Kazan, there are not only specialist central hospitals, but also a completely reorganised medical school, now filled mainly with Tartar students. More than two-thirds of the peasants have joined together in collective farms, which cover three-quarters of the entire cultivated area, and which, alike in 1932, 1933 and 1934, were among the first in the Union to complete their sowing, whilst they harvested more than 100 per cent of the planned yield. Fifteen years ago Tartar industry was practically non-existent; in the years 1931 and 1932 the planned industrial output was respectively 239 and 370 million roubles; and in each of the past three years the plan was more than fulfilled. The Tartar People's Commissar of Health, evidently a competent medical practitioner, explained how the crude death-rate for the republic as a whole had steadily declined year by year, whilst the infantile death-rate had been halved. There are, as we saw, still a few Mohammedan mosques functioning in Kazan, but the great majority of the population appear to have dropped Islam, almost as a spontaneous mass movement. There is a flourishing

three newest constituent republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan) may be considered to be wholly composed of national minorities.

"The autonomous republics in the RSFSR have a total area of 8,054,855 square kilometres and a population of 16,782,047; without these republics, the RSFSR has an area of 11,693,441 square kilometres and a population of 84,075,538" (*Territorialnoe i administrativnoe delenie SSSR*, 17; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 631).

state publishing house, which pours out a continuous stream of Tartar books and pamphlets, for which there is a large sale. There are Tartar theatres and cinemas, Tartar public libraries, and a well-frequented museum of Tartar antiquities and modern art products. In all sorts of way the Tartar autonomous republic demonstrates how proud of itself it has become !

The Jews in the USSR

We cannot omit to mention one important and peculiar minority, racial and religious rather than national, with which the Soviet Union has had to deal, namely that of the Jews. Under the tsars their oppression had been severe and unrelenting.¹ "When the autocratic régime fell, the crash reverberated in Jewish ears as though all the bells of freedom were ringing. With a stroke of the pen the Provisional Government abolished the complicated network of laws directed against the Jews. Suddenly their chains fell off. Disabilities and discriminations were cast on the refuse heap. . . . The Jews could straighten their backs and look to the future without fear." ²

Unfortunately there were still to be undergone the three or four years of civil war and famine, during which, at the hand of the contending armies, the bulk of the Jewish population suffered the worst excesses. All that can be said is that, on the whole, the White Armies were the most brutal, whilst the Red Army did its best to protect these poor victims, notwithstanding the fact that, for one or other reason, the majority of the Jews were, for some time, not sympathetic to the Bolshevik Government. Its condemnation of profit-making trading, as of usury, bore harshly on the Jews of White Russia and the Ukraine, whose families had been for centuries excluded alike from agriculture and the professions, and confined to the towns of the Jewish Pale. In 1921 the New Economic Policy temporarily enabled many of them to resume their businesses ; but by 1928 the all-pervading collectivist enterprises of the trusts and the co-operative societies, aided by penal taxation and harsh measures of police,

¹ It is manifestly impossible for us to cite the extensive literature relating to the three centuries of history of the Jews in Lithuania, Poland and Tsarist Russia. There have been Jews in the Ukraine for 1000 years ! The student will find more than enough references in such works as *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, by D. M. Bubnov, translated from the Russian by I. Friedlander, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1916-1920 ; *A History of the Jewish People*, by M. L. Margolis and A. Marx, Philadelphia, 1927 ; *Economic Conditions of the Jews in Russia*, by I. M. Rubinov, Washington, 1908 ; *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, by A. D. Margolis, New York, 1926 ; *The Jews of Russia and Poland*, by I. Friedlander, New York, 1915. For conditions since the revolution see the admirable succinct account *The Jews and Other National Minorities under the Soviets*, by Avraham Yarmolinsky, New York, 1928, 194 pp. ; *The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1913*, by E. Heifetz, New York, 1921 ; the documents of the Jewish Distribution Committee, 1921, etc. ; and those of the Jewish Colonisation Society of the USSR (OZET), 1928-1935 ; *On the Steppe*, by James N. Rosenberg, New York, 1927 ; "Les Colonies juives de la Russie méridionale", by E. Despreaux, in *Le Monde juif*, June 1927 ; "Biro-Bidjan", by Lord Marley, in *Soviet Culture* for March 1934.

² *The Jews and other National Minorities under the Soviets*, by Avraham Yarmolinsky, New York, 1928, p. 48.

had killed practically all the little profit-making ventures to which the Jewish families were specially addicted. The handicraftsmen were somewhat better off, and the younger ones, at least, could obtain employment in the government factories.

The Jewish problem, as it presented itself to the Soviet Government, was twofold. It was important to rescue from misery, and to find occupation for, the families of the ruined traders and shopkeepers of the small towns of White Russia and the Ukraine. Moreover, it was obviously desirable to secure the loyal allegiance to the Bolshevik régime of the whole three millions of Jews of the USSR. For the economic rehabilitation of the Jews—apart from those whose education and ability enabled them to obtain official appointments or entrance to the brain-working professions—the main resource was placed upon the establishment of Jewish agricultural settlements, at first in Southern Ukraine and the Crimea, and latterly in the extensive territory allocated for this purpose at Biro-Bidjan on the Amour River, in eastern Siberia. Largely by Government help with land and credit, assisted by a whole series of philanthropic associations promoted by the Jews of the United States (notably the Jewish Distribution Committee), as well as those of the USSR in the great voluntary Jewish Colonisation Society (OZET), something like forty thousand Jewish families, comprising a hundred and fifty thousand persons, have within the past fifteen years, been added to the agricultural population of the Soviet Union,¹ one-fourth of them in Biro-Bidjan, which has already been made an “autonomous region”, ranking as an oblast, and will become a “Jewish autonomous republic” as soon as it obtains a sufficient population.²

To all the aggregations of Jews, although not recognised as a nation, the Soviet Government concedes the same measure and kind of cultural autonomy as it accords to the national minorities properly so called. “Jewish soviets exist wherever there is a considerable Jewish group. They have been formed in the Crimea as well as in White Russia. Here there are eighteen petty soviets, four of them rural. In the Ukraine . . . a minimum of 1000 Ukrainians or 500 non-Ukrainians is entitled to form a soviet. No less than 25,000 Ukrainians or 10,000 non-Ukrainians may elect a regional soviet. On April 1, 1927, there were 115 Jewish soviets

¹ This is at least twice as many as the number, mainly from Poland, settled on the land in Palestine during the same period.

² For a recent description of Biro-Bidjan—a territory half as large as England—traversed through its centre by the Trans-Siberian Railway; practically vacant of indigenous inhabitants; well-adapted to agricultural settlement, and apparently amply supplied with mineral resources as yet unworked—see Lord Marley's article in *Soviet Culture* for March 1934. “In order to encourage settlers, the Soviet Government has offered free transport, free housing and free land to suitable Jewish families in good health and trained in agriculture, or in one of the professions or industries available in the new republic, who are willing and desirous of settling in Biro-Bidjan, and would be willing to participate in the normal communal life of that area” (*ibid.* p. 5). There are already nearly a hundred primary schools, some fifty collective farms, seventeen small hospitals, and about fifty medical practitioners or assistants, for a total population of about 50,000, largely Jewish where not indigenous.

of the lowest category, both rural and semi-urban, and one Jewish regional soviet in the Kherson district. The seat of the latter is in the old colony of Seidemenukka, now renamed Kalinindorf for the president of the Union. It was convened for the first time on March 22, 1927, and the session was the occasion of much rejoicing. . . . The area of the rayon is 57,636 dessiatines, 27,000 of which are occupied by Jewish settlers; and the population of 18,000 includes some 16,000 Jews, all farmers. Delegates to this regional soviet come from seven rural soviets, six of which are Jewish. . . . There is a Jewish police commissioner, with a force of three men at his command, not to mention a ramshackle two-roomed jail. . . . It is expected that more such soviets will come into existence in the near future in the districts of Krivoi-Rog, Zaporozhie and Mariupol. . . . In the Jewish soviets practically all the transactions, both oral and written, are in Yiddish; it is the language of the sessions, of all instruments and of the correspondence. . . . There are also a number of lower courts (36 in the Ukraine and 5 in White Russia) where the business is conducted entirely in Yiddish. . . . Yiddish is, of course, the language in which Jewish children get their schooling, and is also employed in a number of Jewish homes, where Jewish children are cared for. . . . Of the Jewish population . . . a little over ten per cent in the Ukraine elects its own soviets.”¹

The policy of the Soviet Union with regard to its Jewish population has not been universally approved by the leaders of that community throughout the world. The condition of thousands of Jewish families in White Russia and the Ukraine is still one of poverty, relieved only by the alms of their co-religionists. The old people cannot make a new life for themselves. But they suffer, not as Jews but as shopkeepers and money-lenders, whose occupation has become unlawful. They are protected from violence as never before. They retain their synagogues and their vernacular speech. Their sons and daughters find all branches of education, and all careers, open to them. Many thousands of families have been assisted to settlement on the land. Wherever there is a group of Jewish families together they have their own local government and their cultural autonomy. They are not prevented from maintaining their racial customs and ceremonies. But all this falls far short of the ideals cherished by so many of the Jews in the USSR as elsewhere. “The Jewish Soviet Republic”, it has been said,¹ “envisaged by the orthodox communists, differs fundamentally from Herzl’s polity in Zion, as well as from the Territorialists’ Homeland. It is not intended to furnish the Jewish race throughout the world with the political life that it has lacked for so long. Nor is it intended to become the seat of the putative civilisation of the race. . . . For the present, the state extends to the Jewish masses what it offers to the other minorities: government institutions using their own language, and instruction entirely in their own tongue. In spite of the

¹ *The Jews and other National Minorities under the Soviets*, by Avraham Yarmolinsky, New York, 1928, pp. 105-106.

fact that everything relating to religion is excluded from the schools, the children who pass through them are imbued with the Jewish spirit. The racial experience is transmitted to them through the medium of the Yiddish writers on whose works they are brought up ; and whose language they use, not only in the home but also in the classroom."

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that all the blessings of security from pogroms and freedom to enter professions that the USSR accords to the Jews involve, in practice, their acceptance of the soviet régime ; and make, on the whole, for assimilation. The policy of the Soviet Union accordingly meets with persistent opposition, and even denigration, from the world-wide organisation of the Zionists, among whom the building up of the " national home " in Palestine brooks no rival.

The Solution of the Problem

It is, we think, owing to the whole-hearted adoption of this policy of cultural autonomy, and even more to its accompaniment of leaving the local administration to be carried on mainly by " natives ", that the Soviet Union, alone among the countries of eastern Europe, can claim, with a high degree of accuracy, that it has solved the difficult problem presented by the existence of national minorities within a strongly centralised state.¹ It has found this solution, not, as France has done, along the road of absorbing the national minorities by the creation of an overpowering unity of civilisation from end to end of its territory ; nor, as Tsarist Russia sought in vain to do, along that of forcibly suppressing all other national peculiarities in favour of those of the dominant race ; but by the novel device of *dissociating statehood from both nationality and race*. In spite of the numerical dominance of the Russian race in the USSR, and its undoubted cultural pre-eminence, the idea of there being a Russian state has been definitely abandoned. The very word " Russia " was, in 1922-1923, deliberately removed from the title of the Soviet Union. All sections of the community—apart from those legally deprived of citizenship on grounds unconnected with either race or nationality—enjoy, throughout the USSR, according to law, equal rights and duties, equal privileges and equal opportunities. Nor is this merely a formal equality under the law and the federal constitution. Nowhere in the world do habit and custom and public opinion approach nearer to a like equality in fact. Over the whole area between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea and the Central Asian mountains, containing vastly differing races and nationalities, men and women, irrespective of conformation of skull or pigmentation of skin, even including the occasional African negro admitted from the United States, may associate freely with whom they please ; travel in the same public vehicles and frequent the same restaurants and hotels ; sit next to each other in the same colleges and places of amusement ; marry wherever

¹ See, for the whole problem, *National States and National Minorities*, by W. C. Macartney, 1934.

there is mutual liking ; engage on equal terms in any craft or profession for which they are qualified ; join the same churches or other societies ; pay the same taxes and be elected or appointed to any office or position without exception. Above all, these men and women denizens of the USSR, to whatever race or nationality they belong, can and do participate—it is even said that the smaller nationalities do so in more than their due proportion—in the highest offices of government and in the organised vocation of leadership ; alike in the sovnarkoms and central executive committees of the several constituent republics and in those of the USSR, and, most important of all, in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (and its presidium), and even in the all-powerful Politbureau itself. The Bolsheviks have thus some justification for their challenging question : Of what other area containing an analogous diversity of races and nationalities can a similar assertion be made ?

The policy of cultural autonomy and native self-government is, indeed, carried very far. It is not confined to the more powerful national minorities, nor even to groups of magnitude. Wherever a sufficient minimum of persons of a particular race or culture are settled together, the local administration allows for their peculiar needs.¹ Hardly any of the distinct races or cultures, not even the Russians who count so large a majority, are without their local minorities, dwelling amid alien local majorities. On the other hand, some of the races are wholly dispersed, and are to be found everywhere. Hence the autonomy has to be, and is, carried so far

¹ "There is scarcely a people in the Soviet Union which has no members who form a minority in one, or very often in many member states or regions. The Soviet Union has accordingly enacted very elaborate minority legislation, assuring to the minorities their schools and the employment of their mother tongue ; wherever minorities live together in villages or districts they have been brought together in administrative units in which their language and their national characteristics have full play" (*Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, by Hans Kohn, 1934, pp. 69-70).

"The lower steps in the ladder of soviet national (minority) political organisation are the ten national (minority) circuits (or oblasts), 147 national (minority) rayons, and about 3200 national (minority) soviets (in village or city). These units represent small national (minority) groups in the midst of larger units that are permitted to develop their own national (minority) cultural life. In fairness to the soviets, it must be said that the national minorities are given every opportunity to develop their cultural interests" (*The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, p. 26).

"For example, in the RSFSR there are ten national districts, 147 national regions and 3200 national village soviets. In the Ukrainian SSR, among the 380 regions, there are 25 national regions : 8 Russian, 7 German, 3 Bulgarian, 3 Greek, 3 Jewish and 1 Polish. Among the great number of national village soviets of the Ukrainian SSR there are 16 Moldavian, 10 Czech, 4 White Russian and even 1 Swedish and 1 French. In the Abkhazian SSR there is even a negro soviet" (*How the Soviet Government solves the National Question*, by L. Perchik, Moscow, 1932, p. 27). It is currently asserted in 1935 that there are in the USSR, 5000 national soviets.

The existence of a negro village, with a soviet of its own race, is, we imagine, unique in Europe. Persons of African descent, though relatively few in number in the USSR, are more than usually supposed. Besides the scattered workmen in many occupations who have drifted in from the United States, and a small number of highly educated negro specialists who have been engaged to assist in cotton-growing, etc., there are, about the shores of the Black Sea, quite a number of descendants of the African slaves whom the wealthy used to buy in the slave market of Constantinople. It will be remembered that Pushkin, the first great Russian poet, was of negro descent.

as to secure, for even the smallest minority group, its own autonomy, as regards primary school and local officials, even against the dominant minority culture.

The Maintenance of Unity

Yet the state as a whole maintains its unity unimpaired, and has even, like other federal states, increased its centralisation of authority. It is only in the USSR that this centralisation involves no lessening of the cultural autonomy of the minorities, and even occurs concomitantly with the strengthening of the various regional cultures. This unbroken unity, and this increasing centralisation of authority, is ensured in ways that will become plain as our exposition proceeds. It will suffice for the present to note, first, that, legally and formally, the powers of the superior authorities in disallowance and cancellation, are the same over the autonomous republics and autonomous areas as over other oblasts, rayons, cities and villages; the cultural autonomy, though formally established in principle by general law, being essentially a matter of administrative practice. Next, the great levelling influence of the economic relations exemplified in widespread industrialisation and collectivism, which operate irrespective of race or nationality, or any geographical boundaries, constitute a silent but continuous unifying factor. Finally, the ubiquitous guidance and persuasion of the essentially unitary Communist Party, composed of members of every race and every distinctive culture in the USSR, ensures not only unity but also all the centralisation that is necessary.

Alongside this maintenance and strengthening of the minority cultures, there has been an unmistakable rise in the level of civilisation. Note first, and perhaps as most important, a marked increase, among the national minorities, of their own self-respect. It is, indeed, the many backward populations, which had suffered so much under tsarist repression that they had nothing that could be destroyed, which have gained most from the nationalities policy of the Soviet Government. They have, to a considerable extent, already lost their "inferiority complex", and gained in confidence and courage. The women, in becoming literate, have become effectually free, alike from the veil and from the control of husband or father. The children have been almost universally got to school, and have been provided with technical institutes and colleges of university rank, using the vernacular. The health of the whole people has been improved. With hospitals and medical services, epidemics have been got under, and the death-rate has everywhere been greatly reduced. All this has been carried out by the local administration, largely in the hands of "natives", but with the constant guidance of the various commissariats of health and education, and of the Communist Party, with abundant encouragement and financial assistance from Moscow, always under conditions of "cultural autonomy". Even more influential in change has been the economic development. The nomadic tribes have, to a great extent, become settled agriculturists, grouped in collective farms; the

peasants have been helped to new crops ; the collective farms have been mechanised ; the surplus of labour has been absorbed in extensive industrial enterprises in mining and manufacturing, largely in the various localities themselves ; additional railways have been constructed ; and dozens of new cities have sprung up. This has been, in the main, the outcome of the First and Second Five-Year Plans of 1929 and 1933.

A New Basis for Statehood

Fundamentally what the Bolsheviks have done, and what Stalin may be thought to have long been looking for, is something which does not seem to have occurred as a possibility to western statesmen. In devising the federal organisation that we have described, they threw over, once for all and completely, the conception that statehood had, or should have, any connection with race or nationality. Political science had, for the most part, come to see, during the nineteenth century, that statehood need have nothing to do with the colour of the skin or with the profession of a particular creed. It had even sometimes contemplated the possibility of doing without a dominant national language. But right down to the resettlement of European boundaries according to the Treaty of Versailles and its fellows in 1919, the political scientists have allowed statesmen to cling to the value, if not the necessity, of a unity of race as the basis of perfect statehood. This conception is connected with, if not consciously based upon, that of an inherent and unalterable superiority of one race—usually one's own race—over others ; and with the belief, for which neither history nor biological science knows of any foundation, that what is called "purity of blood" is an attribute of the highest value. The Bolsheviks put their trust in a genuine equality of citizenship, as completely irrespective of race or language as of colour or religion.¹ They neither undervalued nor overvalued the national minority cultures. What they have sought to do is to develop every one of them, in its own vernacular and with its own peculiarities. They refused to accept the assumption that there is any necessary or inherent inferiority of one race to another. They declared that scientific anthropology knows of no race, whether white or black, of which the most promising individuals could not be immeasurably advanced by appropriate education and an improvement in economic and social environment. The Bolsheviks accordingly invented the conception of the unnational state. They abandoned the word "Russia". They formed a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in which all races stood on one and the same equal footing. And just because it is not a national state, belonging to a superior race, the Soviet Union has set itself diligently, not merely to treat the "lesser breeds without the law" with equality, but, recognising that their backwardness was due to

¹ "Their way of dealing with Home Rule and the nationalities is a masterpiece of ingenuity and elegance. None of the able statesmen of to-day in other lands has attempted to vie with them in their method of satisfying the claims of minorities" (*Russia To-day and To-morrow*, by E. J. Dillon, 1928, p. 228).

centuries of poverty, repression and enslavement, has made it a leading feature of its policy to spend out of common funds considerably more per head on its backward races than on the superior ones, in education and social improvements, in industrial investments and agricultural reforms. The record of the USSR in this respect during the past eighteen years stands in marked contrast with the action towards their respective lower races of the governments of Holland or France, and even of that of the United Kingdom, which has been responsible for the government of India, and many of the West Indian islands, and much of Africa, for more than a century.

It is interesting to notice how the absorption of such a heterogeneous population as that of the Soviet Union into a strong and in many respects centralised state has been facilitated by the system of soviets, using the expedient of indirect election, instead of a parliament directly elected by mass votes. No widespread empire has yet found it possible to establish a parliament effectively representing its whole realm; ¹ just as none has yet attempted to carry on its whole production and distribution of commodities and services by a cabinet responsible to a single popularly elected parliamentary assembly. But the USSR finds it quite practicable and useful to let each village in Kamchatka or Sakhalin, or beyond the Arctic circle, elect its own selosoviet, and send its own deputies to the rayon congress of soviets, and so to the congress of soviets of the oblast or autonomous republic, and ultimately to the All-Union Congress of Soviets at Moscow, in exactly the same way, and with exactly the same rights, as a village in the oblast of Moscow or Leningrad. Such a remote and backward village, it must be remembered, which uses its own vernacular in its own schools and its own court of justice, enjoys, likewise, the privilege of filling the local offices, even the highest of them, with its own people. And what is of even greater importance, its residents are eligible, equally with persons of any other race or residence, for the Order or Companionship undertaking the Vocation of Leadership, which their leading members are encouraged and even pressed to join, and for which, as we shall hereafter describe, they are provided gratuitously with the necessary intensive training, returning to their homes equipped for filling any of the local offices, and even for promotion to the highest places in the Union. Not without reason, therefore, is it claimed that the soviet system has, for a far-flung empire, certain advantages over that of a directly elected parliamentary assembly.

In the foregoing lengthy analysis of the soviet organisation for the representation of "Man as a Citizen", and for his participation in the

¹ No one can seriously suggest that the admission to the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and even, very occasionally, to minor ministerial office, of members nominally elected by the people of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Reunion, Pondicherry, Guiana, Senegal or Cochin China (omitting Algeria, Tunis, Madagascar, etc.), amounts to any solution of the problem.

administration of public affairs, the reader might assume that he has had placed before him the constitution of the USSR. Needless to say this would be a mistake. Not all the solidity of the base of the pyramid of soviets—not all the varied specialisation of its successive tiers of councils and the administration organs connected with them—not all the centralisation of supervision and direction in the highest governing groups of statesmen, would have enabled the Soviet Union to carry through successfully, either the extensive and rapid industrialisation of so heterogeneous a country, or the extraordinary transformation of agriculture now in progress over one sixth of the earth's land surface, without an equally elaborate organisation of "Man as a Producer", in the trade union hierarchy of all kinds of wage or salary earners, and in the various associations of owner-producers ineligible for trade union membership. There will then still remain to be considered the representation, through the consumers' cooperative movement, of "Man as a Consumer", in order to secure the maximum practicable adjustment of the nation's production to the needs and desires of every member of the community. Moreover, we suggest that not even these three particular forms of democracy, through which, as it is claimed, every adult in the USSR, with small and steadily dwindling exceptions, finds a threefold place in the constitution, would have sufficed for such a unique task as that undertaken by the Bolsheviks—the transformation, from top to bottom, of the economic, social and cultural life of the whole community of the USSR—if provision had not also been made in the constitution, by remarkable forms hitherto unknown to political science, for the continuous exercise of the Vocation of Leadership; that leadership without which there can be no consistent or continuous government of any populous state, however democratic may be its character and spirit. Before the reader can adequately appreciate the part of the constitution of the USSR that deals with "Man as a Citizen", he must take into account also the parts dealing with "Man as a Producer" and "Man as a Consumer"; and, last but certainly not least, also that dealing with the Vocation of Leadership, all of which are described in the ensuing chapters. What we have given here is therefore not a summary of the soviet constitution: this has necessarily to be reserved for the final chapter of Part I., entitled "Dictatorship or Democracy?"

CHAPTER III

MAN AS A PRODUCER

THROUGHOUT the USSR man as a producer is organised in two separate groupings, differing widely in their political, economic and social characteristics. First and foremost there are the trade unions, with inner circles of professional and craft associations, in conception derived from western Europe, more especially from Great Britain and Germany. Secondly, there are the associations of owner-producers, which—ignoring for the moment certain miscellaneous forms¹—may be either manufacturing or agricultural, springing out of the old Russian *artel* or *mir*. These two types of mass organisation, though on friendly terms and frequently helping each other, are mutually exclusive. No member of any association of owner-producers can be a member of a trade union.

SECTION I

SOVIET TRADE UNIONISM

The important place held by the trade union as a part of the constitution of the USSR has been explicitly affirmed by no less an authority than Stalin himself. Stalin was describing the various mass organisations, each of them extending from one end of the country to the other, and serving—to use his own terms—as “belts” and “levers” and “guiding forces”, all essential to what Lenin had described as the “broadly based and extremely powerful proletarian apparatus” of a federal constitution, rendering it both “supple” and effective. “What are these organisations,” Stalin continued. “First of all there are [not, be it noted the soviets, but] the trade unions, with their national and local ramifications in the form of productive, educational, cultural and other organisations. In these the workers of all trades and industries are united. These are not [Communist] Party organisations. Our trade unions can now be regarded as the general organisation of the working class now holding power in Soviet Russia. They constitute a school of communism. From them are drawn the persons best fitted to occupy the leading positions in all branches of administration. They form a link between the more advanced and the comparatively backward sections of the working class, for in them the masses of the workers are united with the vanguard.

“Second [only secondly, be it noted] we have the soviets with their manifold national and local ramifications taking the form of administrative,

¹ Such as the fishermen and the peculiar group of “Integral” cooperatives in the Far North, together with some special groups like the “war invalids” (partially disabled ex-soldiers), to be described in a subsequent section of this chapter.

industrial, military, cultural and other state organisations, together with a multitude of spontaneous mass groupings of the workers in the bodies which surround these organisations and link them up with the general population. The soviets are the mass organisations of those who labour in town and country. . . .

"Thirdly, we have cooperatives of all kinds with their multiple ramifications. . . . The cooperatives play a specially important part after the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the period of widespread construction. They form a link between the proletarian vanguard and the peasant masses whereby the latter can be induced to share in the work of socialist construction. . . .

"Lastly, we come to the party of the proletariat [the Communist Party], the proletarian vanguard. Its strength lies in the fact that it attracts to its ranks the best elements of all the mass organisations of the proletariat. Its function is to *unify* the work of all the mass organisations of the proletariat, without exception; and to *guide* their activities towards a single end, the liberation of the proletariat. Unification and guidance are absolutely essential. There must be unity in the proletarian struggle; the proletarian masses must be guided in their fight for power and for the upbuilding of socialism; and only the proletarian vanguard, only the party of the proletariat, is competent to unify and guide the work of the mass organisations of the proletariat."¹

*Trade Union History in the USSR*²

We need not describe the slow beginning of Russian trade unionism in the last decades of the nineteenth century under conditions of illegality

¹ *Leninism*, by Josef Stalin, vol. i., 1928, pp. 29-31.

We need not take too seriously the relative positions that Stalin assigned to the various blocks of the constitutional structure of the USSR—either when he puts the trade unions first, or when he puts the Communist Party last!

² The book and pamphlet literature on soviet trade unionism during the past sixteen years has been enormous. We may cite first the publications of the International Labour Office of the League of Nations, such as *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (1927, xii and 287 pp.); and *Wages and Regulations of Conditions of Labour in the USSR*, by S. Zagorsky (1930, viii and 212 pp.). To these may be added *Selection of Documents Relative to Labour Legislation in Force in the USSR* (British Government Stationery Office, 1931, 200 pp.).

Perhaps the most informative book down to 1928 is the admirable monograph entitled *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn (1928, New York Vanguard Press, ix and 238 pp.); and down to 1931, *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman (1932, vii and 408 pp.); and *Die russischen Gewerkschaften; ihre Entwicklung, ihre Zielsetzung und ihre Stellung zum Staat*, by Michael Jakobson (Berlin, 1932, 188 pp.). See also "Wages Policy in Soviet Russia", by S. Lawford Childs and A. A. Crotchet, in *Economic History*, January 1932; "The Transformation of Soviet Trade Unions", by Amy Hewes, in *American Economic Review*, December 1932; *The Trade Unions, the Party and the State*, by M. Tomsky (Moscow, 1927, 22 pp.); and *The October Revolution and the Trade Unions*, by A. Abolin (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1933, 54 pp.). Much is to be learned from *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924; *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, 1929, and *Making Bolsheviks*, 1932, both by Professor S. N. Harper; *Soviet Russia*, by William G. Chamberlin (1930, viii and 453 pp.); and *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, by Calvin B. Hoover, 1931. *The Report of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions* (in English, Moscow, 1933) is invaluable. Several of the above give extensive lists of Russian documents and works.

and constant police persecution.¹ It is sufficient to note that, in the revolutionary movement of 1905, combinations of industrial wage-earners spontaneously arose in all the industrial areas. These trade unions, together with the contemporary soviets of "workers and peasants", were, in fact, the organs of the popular upheaval. In 1905, and again in 1906, an All-Russian Trade Union Conference was held in Moscow, representing some 600 separate unions, with about 250,000 members. In 1907 a second conference opened up relations with the trade union movement in western Europe, and actually sent a delegation to the International Labour and Socialist Congress at Stuttgart. All this activity was summarily suppressed by the Tsar's police in 1908, when 107 unions were dissolved by a single ukase, and in the following years the Russian trade union movement was practically destroyed.² Various industrial centres, however, kept alive "underground" groups of "illegal" propagandists. "The industrial boom," Trotsky tells us, "beginning in 1910, lifted the workers to their feet and gave a new impulse to their energy. The figures [of strikes] for 1912-1914 almost repeat those for 1905-1907, but in the opposite order; not from above downwards but from below upwards. On a new and higher historical basis—there are more workers now, and they have more experience—a new revolutionary offensive begins. The first half-year of 1914 clearly approaches, in the number of political strikes, the culminating point of the year of the first revolution. But war breaks out and sharply interrupts this process. The first war months are marked by political inertness in the working class, but already in the spring of 1915 the numbness begins to pass. A new cycle of political strikes opens, a cycle which in February 1917 will culminate in the insurrection of soldiers and workers."³

It has been estimated, however, that, on the outbreak of the revolution in February 1917, the total membership of all the trade unions throughout the Russian empire cannot have exceeded a few tens of thousands. During the interval between the February and October revolutions, trade unionism spread with startling rapidity through all the industrial areas. By June

¹ The earliest attempts at trade unionism in Russia appear to date only from 1875, when Zaslavsky, "an organiser and propagandist of talent", established at Odessa a "Union of the Workers of Southern Russia", having industrial as well as political aims, which was promptly suppressed with severe punishment, no word about it being allowed to appear in the newspapers. In 1879 a similar "Union of the Workers of Northern Russia" was established at St. Petersburg by a carpenter named Slevan Khaltourine, whose efforts were suppressed in 1881 (*Histoire du parti communiste de RUSSIE (parti bolchevick)*, par E. Yaroslavsky, Paris, 1931, pp. 24-25; see also *From Peter the Great to Lenin*, by S. P. Turin, 1935, p. 34).

² "The unions were prohibited from assisting strikers; they were closed down for attempting to intervene in the great strike movement; members of the executives were arrested and exiled to Siberia; funds were confiscated, and books were taken to the police stations; police were present at all meetings, which were closed down on the slightest pretext, and very often without any reason at all. . . . The iron fist of the victorious reaction ruthlessly crushed the labour organisations at their birth" (*Trade Unions in Soviet Russia*, by A. Losovsky, p. 15; *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 16).

³ *History of the Russian Revolution*, by L. Trotsky, 1932, vol. i, p. 55.

1917 there were already 967 separate organisations, with an aggregate membership of a million and a half. In that month the third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions was held, when a standing committee or executive board was appointed to guide the policy of the movement. By October 1917 the total trade union membership had come to exceed two millions.

Meanwhile there had developed a sharp rivalry between the trade unions, based on organisation by trades and directed mainly by the Mensheviks, and the "Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies", based on organisation by factories which were being permeated and presently dominated by the Bolsheviks. Both the trade unions and the new soviets were intimately connected with the factory committees, which had sprung up spontaneously in most of the large establishments in Leningrad and Moscow. We give the issue in the words of a subsequent trade union leader. In June 1917 he writes: "At the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference (the first after the February revolution of 1917), the trade unions split into two wings on one of the fundamental questions of Leninism - that of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into a socialist revolution. The Mensheviks, the Bundists [the separate organisation of the Jewish workmen] and the Social Revolutionaries, mainly representing the non-industrial unions and the small urban centres (of the industrial unions, the only one which constituted a firm bulwark of the Mensheviks, and that only temporarily, was the printers' union), based their argument on the premiss that the revolution which was developing, both in its objective political sense and in its content, was a bourgeois revolution; and they therefore held that the only tasks of this revolution were those of bourgeois democratic reform. The Bolshevik premiss was the opposite. The Bolsheviks held that the growing revolution was a proletarian and socialist revolution, and that it would also incidentally complete the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution."¹ In his admirable work entitled *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, Professor S. N. Harper has described this internal feud and its relation to the structure of soviet trade unionism. "An All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees was held on the very eve of the October revolution. It was called on the initiative of the Bolsheviks, to compete with the executive board set up by the trade union conference of June (1917), at which the Mensheviks had the majority. This struggle between the rival party factions for the control of the organisations of the workmen was decided by the October revolution. After the victory of the Bolsheviks, the factory committees and the trade unions were combined, the former becoming the primary units of the latter." In January 1919 the first All Russian Congress of Trade Unions was convened in Petrograd. It claimed an authority superior to that of the previous conferences. It decided to support the "dictatorship of the proletariat" established by Lenin, and to assist vigorously in building up the socialist

¹ *The October Revolution and the Trade Unions*, by A. Abolin, p. 7 (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1933, 54 pp.).

state throughout the RSFSR. "For this purpose", it declared, "factory committees must become local organs of the union, and must not carry on an existence separate and apart from the trade union."¹ The central committee of the factory committees was therefore to be abolished. Some of the unions, records Professor Harper, or at any rate some of their branches, such as that of the Moscow printers, "would not recognise the congress", continuing for a time their independent existence, as a protest against the Bolshevik seizure of power.

During the ensuing decade the position and functions of the trade unions in the soviet state became the subject of acute controversy. If we are to realise where they now stand in the constitution, we must briefly summarise the successive stages of this hotly contested dispute. For the first few months after October 1917, as we shall subsequently describe, the workmen assumed that they were, by their committees in the several factories, to take over the whole function of the owners and managers of the enterprises in which they were employed. In some cases, the workers' committee formally appointed, not only the foremen, but also the previous proprietor, whom they made their manager. Nor was this conception confined to the Petrograd factories. There was a brief period during which the running of the trains on the Petrograd Moscow railway was decided by the station staffs. Even on vessels of the Soviet mercantile marine, the captains took their navigation orders from the committee elected by the ship's company. Within six months, however, Lenin decided that such a form of workers' control led only to chaos, and that there must be, in every case, a manager appointed by and responsible to the appropriate organ of the government. But for a long time the workers' committees in the factories retained a large measure of control. They had to be consulted by the manager on every matter in which they felt an interest. In many cases they appointed the manager's chief assistant. Even the captain of a ship had such an assistant, who scrutinised every decision. But the workmen's most effective control over industry was afforded by the fact that the government's boards or commissions had, in their membership, a large proportion of the leaders of the trade unions. The trade unions were strongly represented on the Central Executive Committee and the Supreme Economic Council. They nominated the

¹ In addition to Professor S. N. Harper's *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, the student should compare, for this controversy, the valuable summary in *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 142, etc.; and the interesting pamphlet by A. Abolin, *The October Revolution and the Trade Unions* (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1933, 54 pp.). The last-named work gives the following statistics showing the gradual triumph of the Bolsheviks: "At the Third Conference of Trade Unions, held in June 1917, the Bolsheviks and their adherents constituted 36.4 per cent, whilst the Mensheviks and their adherents constituted 55.5 per cent. At the First Congress of Trade Unions, held in January 1918, the Bolsheviks and their adherents represented as much as 65.6 per cent, whilst the Mensheviks and their adherents were only 21.4 per cent. At the Fifth Congress of Trade Unions, the Mensheviks and their sympathisers were represented by only 2.2 per cent, while the Bolsheviks numbered 91.7 per cent" (*ibid.* p. 13).

People's Commissar for Labour. It was very largely they who manned the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

Upon this confusion of powers and responsibilities there supervened the Civil War, which submerged all controversy. The trade unions threw themselves whole-heartedly into the struggle, and supplied a large part of the government's fighting forces. The union offices became principally recruiting centres, whilst the work of nearly every industrial establishment was concentrated on supplying the needs of the Red Army. The unions became, in substance if not in form, government organs. Membership was, by mere majority vote in each factory, made compulsory for all those at work. Trade union dues were simply stopped from wages, and any trade union deficit was met by one or other of the forms of government subsidy.¹

With the final expulsion from soviet territory of the last of the hostile armies, and the oncoming of the great famine, there came in 1921, as the only means of providing the necessaries of life whilst the government was building up the heavy industries, the New Economic Policy (NEP), temporarily allowing a limited amount of private capitalist enterprise for individual profit. What, then, was to be the position of the trade unions? Trotsky argued, from his military experience, that the industrial workers could best be organised as a labour army, and that the trade unions should be formally incorporated in the state machinery as government organs, through which common action could be ensured and industrial discipline maintained. Lenin, on the other hand, objected to this as a monstrous extension of bureaucracy. He realised also that NEP would inevitably produce the old trade disputes, for dealing with which an independent trade unionism was indispensable. Moreover, in the large enterprises, which were to remain governmental, there could be no going back from management by qualified technicians and administrators, who must be appointed by such state organs as the trusts. Lenin argued that the unions would have their hands full, at least for some time to come, with defending the interests of the workers against exploitation by the private "Nepmen", even more than against the evils of bureaucracy in the governmental trusts. It was accordingly officially decided, in December 1921, that the trade unions should be made independent of government machinery and control, and that, whilst they should continue

¹ "During the period of War Communism, we went through a stage of inflation, falling currency, and we could not collect our trade union dues regularly . . . at that time we took money from the state. The state subsidised us. Now we have a stable currency, we take no subsidies from the state, except that which is provided for by the constitution and the law, and which flows logically from the very nature of the proletarian state. The code of labour laws, paragraph 156, runs: 'In accordance with statute 10 of the constitution of the RSFSR, all organs of the state must render to the industrial unions and their organisations every assistance, place at their disposal fully equipped premises to be used as Palaces of Labour, charge reduced rates for public services, such as posts, telegraphs, telephones, railway and shipping rates, etc.' These are the privileges and subsidies afforded to us" (*The Trade Unions, the Party and the State*, by M. Tomsiky, Moscow, 1927, p. 20).

to be essentially schools of communism, their specific function should be to improve their members' material conditions, both by resisting exploitation by private employers, and "by rectifying the faults and exaggerations of economic bodies so far as they proceed from a bureaucratic perversion of the machinery of the state". "The chief task of the trade unions," it was stated, is, "from now onward, to safeguard at all times in every possible way, the class interests of the proletariat in its struggle with capitalism. This task should be openly given prominence. Trade Union machinery must be correspondingly reconstructed, reshaped and made complete. There should be organised conflict commissions, strike funds, mutual aid funds and so on."¹

It will be seen that, in setting up the several trade unions as independent defenders of the material interests of their members, primarily against the newly revived profit-making employers, their relation to the government as employer was left in some ambiguity. It was therefore natural that each trade union should push for higher wages for its own members, irrespective both of the effect on the workers in other industries and of the wider interests of the community as a whole. So long as the profit-making capitalism of NEP continued, this ambiguity in the trade union relation to government employment remained undecided. The trade unions did not object to the view that, whilst the working day should be shortened, the total output had to be augmented. They willingly agreed to an almost universal adoption of piecework rates, under which both output and individual earnings were increased. But when the policy of NEP was reversed, and government or cooperative employment became universal, it was not easy for the workers to realise that they, as a class, had no enemy left to fight. Any further increase in their wages, beyond that accompanied by an equivalent increase in production, could no longer be taken from the income of a private profit-maker. It now involved a definite encroachment on the amounts to be set aside for the social services and for the desired multiplication of factories and increase of machinery, development of electrification and so on, which, to the whole community of workers, were, in the long run, as necessary as their wages.

With the introduction of the Five-Year Plan matters came to a crisis. At the Eighth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, in 1928-1929, a sharp conflict took place. Tomsky, who had been President of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), the supreme organ of the whole trade union movement, bluntly put the position of the trade unions in the USSR as being substantially the same as in the capitalist states. He emphasised the importance of the complete freedom of each of the trade unions to press, as far as it could, for further and further improvements in the material conditions of its own members, on the assumption that it was in such increases in wages in particular industries that the

¹ Report of commission (of which Lenin was a member) of December 1921, summarised in *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn (New York, 1928), pp. 26-27.

prosperity of the nation consisted. It was not for the trade unions, he declared, to press for improvements in factory technique, even if these would lead to increased productivity. He (or one of his supporters) is reported to have said that the government must indeed be hard up if it wanted "socialist competition" among the workers to increase output! He did not see how the trade unions could control the industries on the basis of commercial accounting, and be at the same time the representatives and defenders of the interests of their own members.

Against Tomsky's view of trade union function,¹ the whole influence of the Communist Party was thrown. It was not for such an anarchic scramble after rises in wages by the strongest trade unions, irrespective of their effect on the required universal increase of industrial productivity, that Lenin had restored trade union independence. The very existence of the Soviet State, it was held, depended on the bound forward of industrial productivity being universal; and, even if only from the standpoint of permanently securing higher wages for their own members, it was this universally increased production that it was the duty of the trade unions to promote. At the very congress, in December 1928, at which Tomsky, then making his last stand, so bluntly expressed his own views, the majority of the delegates were induced to elect to the all-powerful presidium of the AUCCTU, L. M. Raganovich, an assistant secretary of the Communist Party, who had been specially selected for this service, and who devoted himself for the next two years to a continuous educational campaign among the committee-men and other "activists" in trade unionism, leading to a far reaching reorganisation of trade union executives in personnel as well as in policy. This was accompanied, at the beginning of 1930, by a general purge in all departments of the state, as a result of the suspicion aroused as to lack of cordial cooperation in soviet policy by persons not sprung from the manual labour class. It was found that "on January 1, 1930, only 9 per cent of the personnel of the AUCCTU were of working-class origin. The percentage of former members of other parties to the total number of communists [Party members] was as follows: In the AUCCTU 41.9 per cent; in the central council of metal workers 37 per cent; in the central council of printers 24 per cent, etc. The purge exposed 19 persons of alien class origin in the newspaper *Trud*, persons originating from among the merchants, nobles, priests, etc. There were 18 descendants of nobles and merchants in the central committee of the trade union of soviet employees. In eleven central committees of trade

¹ Tomsky's view of the task of trade unionism seemed, in 1927, quite satisfactory to an exceptionally competent and sympathetic American observer. "As long as the wage system exists in any country," says Chairman Tomsky of the AUCCTU, "... the worker will naturally demand higher wages than he receives. It is the duty of the trade unions to know the industry and each factory unit and its possibilities for meeting the demands of the workers" (*Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 82). But soviet theory holds that the demands of the workers should not be related to the productivity of "each factory unit", but to that of the industry as a whole; and not even to that of a particular industry, but to that of soviet industries in general, preferably advancing as nearly as possible uniformly all along the line.

unions 53 personages were found who, in the past, were actively alien and hostile to the proletariat."¹ These disaffected elements were eliminated.

When the time came for the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, in 1931, the current of opinion among the organised workers had been changed. Tomsky had, in the interval, on other grounds, fallen out with the Central Committee of the Communist Party; and had retired in 1929 from trade union leadership, at first from ill health, eventually taking another honourable but less influential office.²

After the Congress of 1928-1929, the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), under Kaganovich's influence, enjoined all trade unionists to "face production", and look to the output, not merely of their own factory, or even of their own industry, but of soviet industries as a whole. The Sixteenth All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, in 1930, decided that it was the duty of the trade unions actually to take the lead in promoting "socialist competition", and also to organise "shock brigades" (udarniki) in order to raise to the utmost the productivity of the whole community. Not unnaturally, this lesson was hard to learn. It has taken nearly a decade to persuade the strongest defenders of trade unionism that its function as an "organ of revolt" against the autocracy of each capitalist employer, and as an instrument for extracting from his profits the highest possible wage for the manual workers whom he employed, had passed away with the capitalist employer himself.³ It required long-continued instruction to convince all the workmen that when they, in the aggregate, had the disposal of the entire net product of the nation's combined industry, it was not in the "profits" of each establishment, but in the total amount produced by the conjoined labours of the whole of them, that they were pecuniarily interested; and that what trade union organisation had to protect was, not so much the wage-rates of the workers in particular industries, as the earnings, and, indeed, the whole conditions of life, inside the factory and outside, of all the wage-earners of the USSR.

Trade Union Structure in the USSR

We are now in a position to appreciate the difference between the structure of the trade unions in Soviet Communism from that of those of

¹ *Report of Ninth Congress of Trade Unions, 1931*, pp. 25-26.

² He was appointed in 1931 to be director of Gosizdat (subsequently called Ogiz), the great state publishing establishment of the RSFSR. The struggle is summarised in *Die russischen Gewerkschaften*, by Michael Jakobson, 1932, pp. 141-143.

³ This has to be perpetually impressed, not only on young recruits but also on experienced foreign trade unionists working in the USSR. "The primary task of the trade unions in the Soviet Union", declared Shvernik, the Secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of the Trade Unions, in an address to 130 foreign worker delegates, in the Moscow Palace of Labour (*Moscow Daily News*, November 12, 1932), "is to make workers realise that, as the sole owners of the means of production, they must learn to take responsibility for the maintenance of these means." Hence, he continued, "the soviet trade union is not an isolated body, but an integral part of the entire soviet system, assisting in the fulfilment of production programmes by organising socialist competition and shock brigades, and attending to the cultural and economic requirements of the workers".

Britain or the United States. The British or American trade union, being formed to fight the employers in each industry against any lowering of the wage-rates of particular crafts, and using for this purpose the device of collective bargaining to prevent the cut-throat competition among unemployed workmen for particular jobs, takes the form of a combination of workers of a particular craft, or, in the alternative, of a particular industry, seizing every opportunity for extracting higher wages from the employers of the particular establishments in which the members are employed. Each craft or industry, desperately anxious to save its own members from the morass of unemployment, accordingly fights for its own hand, irrespective of the effect on the cost of production of the establishment as a whole, or on the wage-rates of other crafts or industries. The soviet trade union, on the other hand, is not formed to fight anybody, and has no inducement to prevent the competition among workmen for particular jobs. The pecuniary interest of its members is found in the productivity of soviet industry in general, which is made up of the productivity of all the factories in which they work; and it is this aggregate productivity, not anybody's profits, on which the standard wage-rates of all of them will directly depend. Moreover, apart from money wages, the soviet trade union is interested in its members' protection against industrial accidents, and the amenity and healthfulness of their places of work; in discussing and advising on the plans on which the factory is carried on; in conducting the comrades' courts in which the members themselves deal with minor delinquencies of their own number; in the amount of food and other commodities that, in the "factory cooperative" (including the newly developed factory farms), can be got for the money wage; in the administration of the sickness and accident and old-age pension insurance, which is entrusted to the local committee that the factory elects; in the "legal bureaux" which it maintains for the aid of its members in obtaining their rights; in the housing accommodation secured for the personnel; in the club-house which the factory provides for the members' recreation and education; in the holiday resorts, opportunities for travel, and tickets for theatre and opera that the union secures for its members. It will be noted that in all this large and ever-growing sphere of trade union functions, the trade union acts as an organisation not of producers, for its members do not produce these services, but of consumers, in which all the workers in the enterprise are equally concerned.

This brings us to the most important difference in structure between trade unionism in the USSR and that in other countries: as the soviet trade unions have not to fight profit-making employers, but to share in the organisation of the industry in which they are engaged, it is the establishment as a whole, not any particular craft within it, and the whole of the establishments turning out the same kind of product, not any particular branch of the industry, that is made the unit of trade union structure. And as all those working in the establishment are cooperatively creating the product, and not only those of any particular craft, or grade,

or age, or sex, trade union membership logically embraces the whole staff or personnel of the establishment, from the general manager to the office-boy, from the foreman to the apprentice, from the most scientifically qualified specialist to the least skilled general labourer.¹

Hence the trade union in the USSR is neither a craft nor an industrial union. It is nearest to what has been called, in Great Britain, an employment union, in its most ideal comprehensiveness in a national monopoly. All those who work within any one establishment – the manager, the technicians, the clerks and book-keepers, the foremen, the artisans and labourers, the factory doctors and nurses, and even the canteen cooks and cleaners, and this entire personnel in all the establishments producing the same commodity or service throughout the USSR – are included in one union, whether the object of the nation-wide enterprise be extracting, manufacturing, transporting or distributing commodities, or rendering administrative or cultural services of any kind.

A further principle, following from that of looking to the product instead of to the profit, is that of nation-wide organisation by establishments. All the tens of thousands of establishments in the USSR are grouped together for trade union purposes according to their several predominant products. This involves that all the wage-earners in each establishment should belong to the particular trade union in which the establishment is included. There are now no local trade unions, any more than craft or industrial unions. The number of separate unions, which has varied from time to time, was brought down to 23; then raised in 1931 to 47; and on the comprehensive reorganisation in 1934, further increased to 154, having memberships ranging from less than a hundred thousand to half a million or so. We may add that, at the end of 1933 the aggregate contributing membership of the trade unions amounted to about eighteen million persons—far more than in the trade unions of all the rest of the world put together—representing a total census population of something like forty millions, being at least one-fourth of that of the whole of the USSR.²

¹ It is to be noted that "the one-shop one-union principle" was laid down as axiomatic at the Second Trade Union Conference of 1906, and has ever since been increasingly believed in (*Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, pp. 13-14). The railway workers' union (AZRG), which was the first effectively to establish a union for the whole country, included from the outset all grades of railway employees, in all districts, from the highest superintendents to the lowest firemen (*Die russischen Gewerkschaften*, by Michael Jakobson, 1932, p. 9).

² The non-unionists among the wage-earners, of whom at any particular date there may be as many as four or five millions, comprise in the main: (a) newly engaged peasants fresh from the farms, and other recruits for the first three months of their service; (b) seasonal workers returning periodically to peasant households, though some sections of these, like the Leningrad dock labourers, are strongly unionised; (c) workers in newly established isolated factories distant from industrial centres, to which trade union organisation has not yet spread; (d) isolated wage-earners or small groups, engaged at wages by *kustar* articles or on peasant farms; (e) a steadily diminishing proportion of boys and girls under sixteen; and (f) an uncertain number of the "deprived" categories, statutorily excluded from trade union membership, but unobtrusively allowed to continue in employment at wages or on salaries, sometimes because their services are particularly useful.

The aggregate membership in past years is given as under :

1917 . . .	1,475,000	1920 . . .	5,122,006
1918 . . .	1,946,000	1921 . . .	8,418,362
1919 . . .	3,706,779		

The total then fell to 5,846,000, largely due to the exclusion of individual independent handicraftsmen (*kustari*) and members of cooperative associations of owner producers, or of the old *artels*. It continued to decline until 1923. It then rose as under :

1924 . . .	5,822,700	1926 . . .	8,768,200
1925 . . .	6,950,000	1927 . . .	9,827,000

The trade union hierarchy--we use this word, as already explained, without any implication of dependence upon a superior authority--like the other parts of the USSR constitutional structure, is built up, in each trade union, by a series of indirect elections based at the bottom upon direct popular election by the members of that union, whether paid by wages or salaries, irrespective of sex, craft, vocation, grade or amount of remuneration; assembled in relatively small meetings of men and women actually associated in work, whether by hand or by brain, in any kind of industrial or other establishment. This trade union organisation has been only gradually formed into a broadly based pyramid uniform in its constitution in all trade unions all over the USSR, and this evolution has even now not reached complete identity. As it stood in 1933 it was well summarised in a speech by Shvernik, the General Secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). "We have at present", he said, "forty-seven unions, each headed by its own central committee. The central committees . . . have regional committees . . . under them; then come the factory committees [*fabkom*] and the local committees [*mestkom*] in soviet institutions; and in addition to these the trade union group organisers. This principle of building up the trade unions . . . has enabled us to bring all enterprises, all soviet and [trading] business

In September 1934, Shvernik (Secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions), in propounding the scheme of reorganisation, complained that 22 per cent of all those employed for wages or salary in the USSR were outside the trade unions; he said that the agricultural state farm workers' union had only 49 per cent, and the stock-breeding state farm workers' union and that of the peat workers only 54 per cent of the persons employed, whilst the railway-construction workers had no more than 61 per cent. Even the machine-tractor station workers had only 73 per cent, the building trades workers only 74 per cent, and the miners only 77 per cent in their respective unions (*Moscow Daily News*, September 10, 1934).

The rules for admission, as revised in September 1931 by the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions (AZRG), run as follows: All permanent wage (or salary) earners may join a trade union during the first days of employment. Seasonal workers may be admitted as soon as they have completed two months' uninterrupted work, and this waiting period may be waived if they were engaged as seasonal workers in the previous year. Members of collective farms engaging in industrial, transport or building work as wage (or salary) earners may at once join the appropriate union (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, September 16, 1931).

institutions within the sphere of trade union organisation. [There are now 513,000 trade union groups, but] the basic nucleus . . . is the factory committee [fabkom] and the local committee or *mestkom* in soviet and [commercial] business organisations. There are 186,640 . . . committees of this kind. There are 888 regional departments . . . and . . . 47 central committees of trade unions. . . . All branches of national economy are covered by the trade union organisations, which unite in their ranks 75 per cent of the total number of those working [for wages or salaries] in our national economy.”¹

The basis of the trade union hierarchy is the meeting or meetings for the choice of the factory committee (fabkom) which, in government offices and trading establishments and in all non-industrial institutions, is called the local committee (mestkom). The rule is to have one such committee covering the whole of each establishment. But in the great cities there are enterprises so small that several of them have to be grouped together to elect one factory committee. Such a tiny unit is, however, more characteristic of the non-industrial establishments, such as hospitals or other medical institutions; schools, colleges and universities, and research institutions; and the local offices of government departments. As was the case also before the revolution, the characteristic industrial establishment (or “plant”) in the industry of the USSR has thousands of workers employed in its various departments, in numerous separate buildings erected upon an extensive site, which often exceeds in area a square mile. Thus the Rostselmash Agricultural Machine Works at Rostov-on-Don, which is not by any means the largest plant, but which employs as many as 13,000 workers, has 32 separate shops, in which there are no fewer than 481 “brigades”.² Each brigade has its own meetings for discussion, and also for the election of its own trade union organiser and “educational organiser”, these being usually unpaid officers. There should also be an unpaid “dues-collector” for each, and one or more “insurance” delegates. Each shop also holds its own shop meetings, at one of which a “shop committee” of seven members is elected for the ensuing half-year, with a president and a secretary. For the factory committee in this great establishment the trade union members assemble half-yearly in their several “shops”, 32 in number, each of which elects one delegate, or in the larger shops two or three, making 51 altogether. The total number of members of the 186,640 fabkoms and mestkoms in the USSR is estimated at something like two millions, to which must be added another million or so of members of the various sub-committees or commissions working under these committees. Thus, apart from the

¹ *Speech of Welcome to Foreign Delegates*, by N. M. Shvernik, General Secretary of the AUCCFU, delivered May 8, 1933 (Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1933, p. 6). The number of trade union groups given in Shvernik's speech to the Ninth All-Union Trade Union Congress itself; see “The Soviet Trade Unions on the Threshold of the Second Five-Year Plan” in *Report of the Ninth Trade Union Congress* (same publishers, p. 94).

² A brigade may be a particular shift, or a group engaged on a common job.

officers, paid and unpaid, at least 15 per cent of the trade union members are actively engaged in committee work.¹

Trade Union Elections in the USSR

It must not be supposed that these trade union elections are tame and lifeless affairs. The resolutions of the Sixteenth All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, repeated in substance at the Fifth Plenum of the AUCCTU in 1931, went into elaborate detail as to the steps to be taken, in every establishment in every trade union in every part of the USSR, to make the election an occasion for a stirring campaign among all the wage-earners, in which the "activists" - those who actually took part in the campaigning work—numbered more than two millions; in Moscow alone more than 160,000.²

Nor was the trade union election campaign of 1931 an exceptional effort. In 1933 we find the AUCCTU, which is the apex of the trade union pyramid for the whole USSR, again issuing detailed instructions for a still

¹ It may be noted that these popular meetings for trade union business (including elections of delegates to other councils and committees) differ in the following respects from the meetings of workers, also held in the factories, offices or institutions but separately and at different dates, from which emanate the soviet hierarchy. The trade union meeting (a) admits workers under eighteen, but is confined to those of all ages contributing to the trade union; (b) its decisions within its own sphere of action, and not contrary to law, can be vetoed only by the higher authorities of the trade union hierarchy, not by those of the soviet hierarchy; (c) it has nothing corresponding to the non-factory meetings where the so-called unorganised workers, being either domestic workers or those who are not working for wage or salary, can vote for the soviet.

The trade union meetings are invariably held on the premises of the factory, office or institution, which have to be placed gratuitously at the disposal of the trade union for this purpose, either in the evening or at some other time outside working hours that is most convenient to those entitled to attend. Although the minimum age for admission to trade union membership is sixteen, only those who have attained the age of eighteen are entitled to vote at elections. Those employed part time in more than one factory, office or institute may attend the meetings of all of them, but may vote only once at any election.

² See Shvernik's speech to Ninth All-Union Trade Union Congress ("The Soviet Trade Unions on the Threshold of the Second Five-Year Plan", 1933, p. 96). As an immediate outcome of this campaign throughout the USSR no fewer than 1,200,000 applications were made for trade union membership, more than 150,000 for membership of the Young Communist League (Komsomols), and 160,000 for membership of the Communist Party. "The ranks of the shock-workers were reinforced by the addition of 920,000 new workers. 130,000 new shock-brigades and business-accounting brigades were organised and 250,000 workers' recommendations submitted (to the managements). . . . As a result of this campaign a number of enterprises began to overhaul their industrial and financial plans. Summing up the work of the trade unions in connection with the election campaign we must say outright that in no other country save the USSR, in no other trade unions save those of the soviets, is there such a highly developed trade union democracy" (*ibid.*).

In the "collective agreement campaign" at Dnepropetrovsk in 1933, "in preparation for the approaching Ninth Congress of Trade Unions", "the 40,000 workers of the Dnepropetrovsk steel plant responded . . . with great enthusiasm. During this period 282 new shock-brigades and 98 cost-accounting brigades were organised. The Communist Party recruited 286 new members; 60 joined the trade union. More than 75 per cent of the workers attend technical schools" (pamphlet by L. Kaufmann, published by the Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1932: see also *Moscow News*, weekly edition, March 23, 1932).

greater campaign.¹ It commands that, for 1933, these elections "must be made the occasion for resolute proletarian self criticism, both through voluntary 'check-up' brigades of the workers, reviewing the work of their representatives, and through 'mass-accounting' meetings, where every trade union official, from the group dues-collector to the president of the factory (or 'plant') committee, must report, to union members and non-members alike, what he has accomplished during the year. The 'election campaign' must help in the drive against absenteeism, in training new workers and taking them into the union, and in spreading knowledge of constructive achievements. It should give a new impulse to socialist competition and shock-brigade work, as well as in action for improving workers' living conditions. . . . All the work of the election campaign should be based on socialist competition between the various trade union groups within the plant (establishment), and between plants, for the best mobilisation of the working masses to carry out the Plan; the greatest improvement in living conditions; 100 per cent attendance at election meetings; enrolment of new workers into the union." Prior to the actual election meetings, there are to be preliminary "accounting" meetings, when every officer and representative must give an account of his stewardship; and also discussion meetings in the groups formed by brigades or shifts. The account of the work done must be put in the "wall newspapers", which should be renewed daily whilst the campaign lasts; and full use must be made of the radio, the movies, the local press, "evenings of questions and answers", meetings of wives and children of workers, and so on, in order to "mobilise the masses" to take part in the elections and to understand the problems. To draw up the programme of the election campaign, and to fix the dates of the various meetings, together with the publication of the names of candidates and the actual conduct of the election, will be the work of special election commissions for each shop and for the whole establishment, chosen by trade union members at the accounting or special meetings, and confirmed by the next higher trade union authority. Nominations may be made orally at a meeting, or by handing in a signed list of names. Five days before the election, the list of candidates must be posted in all main shops, departments, clubs, "Red Corners", residential barracks and workmen's trains, together with the production experience of, and the social work accomplished by each candidate, with the name of his nominator. At the election meeting there must be 75 per cent present of the trade union members actually working on that date. Voting is by show of hands, to be counted by special counters elected by the meeting. To be elected, a candidate must be approved by at least 60 per cent of the voters present. A mere plurality cannot elect.

We have no information as to the extent of the "liveliness" of these

¹ See the lengthy and detailed instructions for the "election campaign" published in the official trade union organ *Trud*, of which a summary appeared in the *Moscow Daily News*, December 12, 1932.

trade union election campaigns throughout the whole country; and it may well be that, over so vast an area as the USSR, with electorates of very different habits and capacities, the well meant instructions emanating from the highest trade union authority will not always be fully obeyed. But we have been impressed by various testimonies on the subject. The workers' meetings are frequent and well attended, to the extent of 50, and sometimes even 75 per cent of the whole body, and by women as well as by men. They are the occasions for much unrestrained discussion of persons, as well as of industrial policy, and local conditions of life. There is a laudable desire to encourage the newer and younger members, and to recruit the committees with new blood. And what seems to us very noteworthy—the members of the Communist Party, who undoubtedly constitute most of the "activists" giving liveliness to an election campaign, do not monopolise the places. On the contrary, they definitely promote the election of a considerable number of "non-Party" candidates, in order, as they quite frankly say, to bring them effectively into the work of administration, which to be successful, needs to be based upon proper representation of the whole people.¹

The total number of meetings in the USSR for the election of factory committees, even within each of the 154 trade unions, has not been ascertained, but is evidently very large—in some of these unions running into tens of thousands. For the entire eighteen million membership of the whole 154 unions, the number of such meetings concerned in the election of no fewer than 513,000 groups, brigades or shifts, and about one-third of that number of committees, must run into something like a million. As these members' meetings are held at intervals throughout the year—though only once or twice a year for the purpose of electing the factory committee—their aggregate number, in the whole USSR, must be in the neighbourhood of five millions in every twelve-month—certainly a broad popular base for the trade union hierarchy!

But these members' meetings are much more than the base of a hierarchy. The political science student must not allow the excitement of the election campaigns in the trade unions to obscure the more solid daily work of the various committees and commissions, regional councils and central committees of each union, in which, as we have seen, apart from the salaried officials, not fewer than a couple of million members are continuously engaged. It must be remembered that the *fabkom* and *mestkom* have a large part to play in the current administration of the factory, office or institution. The meetings for these purposes are frequent and lengthy, often with elaborate agendas, which differ from enterprise to enterprise. The manager or director, with the technicians most nearly concerned, meet, on terms of equality, the representatives of every grade

¹ For the Rostov Agricultural Machine Works (*Rostsolmash*) we happen to have the figures. Of the 51 members of the factory committee, only 24 were, in 1932, members of the Communist Party. Much the same proportion was found in the 32 shop committees, and among the 400 trade union officials (mostly unpaid).

in the establishment. Often more striking to our western eyes than a factory meeting is the administration, by such a committee (*mestkom*) of a non-industrial institution. We ourselves attended, during our voyage, a meeting of the "ship's soviet", belonging to the Seafarers' Trade Union, at which the captain laid the ship's accounts before the meeting of the entire crew and explained the items. One of the electricians presided, and all sections of the ship's company, including several women, were represented. As the accounts indicated a loss on the voyage, various criticisms were made on the expenses. One sailor asked why the ships used such a costly wharfage site on the Thames. The captain replied that it was worth the rent to be so near the butter market. One of the stewards asked why such a high speed had been maintained on the last voyage; only to be told that a better price was expected for the cargo if it could reach the Thames before a specified day. Many other questions and answers followed. It was impossible not to be impressed with the educational value of the discussion, as well as by the complete sense of comradeship among all ranks, and the feeling of being engaged in a common task.

We add another sample, in an account by an American nurse, of an ordinary meeting of the Medical Workers' Union in a Leningrad hospital. "The routine meetings of these unions are apt to be vivid occasions, with a picturesque red-kerchiefed laundry worker in the chair, a woman doctor graduated from the Sorbonne as recording secretary, and committees including the tolerant, humorous-eyed director of the institution, who may have been a famous specialist fifteen years ago, an excitable young doctor who is equally enthusiastic for communism and for medical research, a sleepy stove-man whose high boots reek of poorly cured leather, and several rows of whispering, stolid nurses and orderlies. The meetings last long into the night, as much of the detailed administration of the hospital or clinic is discussed and decided here. Complicated technical details have to be put into slow and simple language, a process often exacting heavy toll from the patience of the nimble-witted doctors, but when the session is at last over there has usually been worked out a rather remarkable understanding of the situation, together with the intelligent cooperation of different groups among the staff. These union meetings are a real school of democracy."¹

The Trade Union Factory Committee

The trade union factory (FZK) or institution committee (*fabkom* or *mestkom*) of between 5 and 50 members, has important, varied and continuous functions. Its plenum meetings may not be more frequent than once a quarter,² but it always elects annually a president and secretary, who in all the larger units generally give their whole time to trade union

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, p. 33.

² In the large industrial plants the committees of the various shops, shifts or brigades, to which reference has already been made, usually meet three or four times a month, independently of the meetings of the *fabkom*.

work ; and a presidium of half a dozen to a dozen members, which usually meets every week or two.¹ It undertakes, as regards all those employed in the factory, office or institution, the detailed administration of the various branches of social insurance ; the arrangements for sending workers to convalescent or holiday homes ; the management of the factory club, the factory canteen or dining rooms, and any factory cultural undertakings, and even the allocation among the workers of theatre and concert tickets placed at their disposal. For any or all of these duties separate commissions may be appointed, on which trade union members not elected to the factory committee may be asked to serve.² The officers and presidium of the committee are in constant relations with the management of the factory, office or institute, over which they have no actual control, but which must always inform the factory committee of proposed changes, discuss with them any of the workers' grievances, hear their suggestions, and generally consult with them as to the possibility of increasing the output, lessening waste and diminishing cost. It is the factory committee which organises shock brigades, and, on behalf of the workers, enters into "socialist competition" with other factories, offices or institutions, as to which can achieve the most during a given period.

Collective Bargaining in the USSR

The soviet trade unions play such a large part in social administration, and have so many different functions, that the foreign observer is apt to underestimate the amount and the importance of their work in collective bargaining. Far from there being less collective bargaining in the USSR than in Great Britain or the United States, or in Germany before the Hitlerite dictatorship, there is actually very much more than in any other country in the world. To make this clear we must anticipate what will be explained in greater detail in our subsequent chapter entitled "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

In the USSR, as in every country in which trade unionism has passed from the stage of small local combinations to that of national unions comprising whole industries, the standard time-rates in each industry are settled, not by the several establishments or localities in which the industry is carried on, but in negotiations between committees representing respectively the whole of the workers and the whole of the managements in the country. So far as concerns the basic rates of time wages in each

¹ Among the usual subcommittees or commissions under the factory committee are those (1) for the protection of workers and the promotion of their health, including safeguarding of machinery, housing, day nurseries, rest-houses, etc. ; (2) for "cultural-educational matters", including technical classes, libraries, wall newspapers, theatre tickets, etc. ; (3) wage assessments and disputes ; (4) production, including all possible improvements in productivity ; (5) auditing ; (6) finance ; (7) international workers' relief ; (8) cooperative society ; (9) club management, and often many others.

² Those who give their whole time to trade union duties receive from trade union funds salaries equal to their earnings in the factory. All others are allowed "time off", without any objection by the management, without loss of pay, to perform any duties for which their fellow-workmen have chosen them.

union, and the coefficient of increase to be applied to these for the ensuing year throughout the whole of soviet industry, this collective bargaining is concentrated, in the main, in one prolonged and manifold discussion, in the early months of each year, between the AUCCTU and the central committees of all the 154 trade unions, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Sovnarkom and the managements of the various trusts and public services on the other. The note in these discussions is not one of conflict and struggle between two hostile parties, each endeavouring to deprive the other of something to which it clings for its own benefit, but rather one of objective examination of the statistical facts and the considerations of public policy, to which both parties agree to defer. "The peculiar feature of the soviet collective agreements", said a trade union representative, "is the absence of the enemy party." It is, indeed, not so much a new rate of wages that has to be determined as the "General Plan" of soviet industry for the ensuing year or years, in which, as will be explained in a subsequent chapter, the amount of wages is only one of several determining factors. The collective bargaining of the trade unions is far from being merely series of tussles between "labour" and "capital", as to the shifting boundary-line between wages and profits. What emerges from the discussions is specific allocation of the entire net product of the community's industry, arrived at by agreement as to the nature and amount of the aggregate sums to be set aside for particular objects of common concern. Although there is no tribute of rent or profit to be abstracted, it is recognised that the whole produce cannot be distributed as "personal wages". A substantial part must annually be devoted not only to repairs and making good the depreciation of plant, but also to the extension of the nation's industry, and the building and equipping of additional mines, factories, ships and railways. This expansion is universally recognised as necessary, not merely to meet the clamorous demand of the workers themselves for additional commodities but also in order to make the USSR as far as possible independent of the hostile capitalist states. There is no limit within view to this effective demand for more goods, and better; and as we shall show, in a subsequent chapter, there is no reason to suppose that any such limit will ever appear. It is, indeed, one of the essential conditions of "Planned Production for Community Consumption" that it provides for the popular demand being always "effective demand", either for commodities and services, or for holidays and a shortening of the hours of labour. But the annual increase of industry is necessarily limited by the forces then and there available, and in particular by the labour power of the ever-increasing population, swollen by the peasants whom the mechanisation of agriculture is constantly dispensing with. Here the statistics annually worked out by the State Planning Commission carry irresistible weight. It is to no one's interest to waste any of the labour force that will be available, and thus allow unemployment to recur. Then there are the necessary "overhead charges" of the nation to be provided for; the cost of all the government

departments, national defence, and the administration of justice, together with a matter in which the workers of the USSR are more keenly interested than those of any other country, namely, scientific exploration and research. Here, too, the calculation is largely a matter of statistics of how much can be immediately undertaken out of the programme already decided on by the people's representatives. Finally there is the total estimated cost of the extensive and ever-expanding social services, including not only the whole educational and "pre-school" system, with all its maintenance scholarships; the far-flung state medical service in its innumerable forms; the endless task of sanitation and rehousing for the whole population; the constantly growing social insurance to which the workers make no individual contribution; the publicly organised provision for physical and mental recreation of every kind, and so on. This whole expenditure—now amounting to about 50 per cent of what the workman draws in cash as his wages—is significantly known as the "socialised wage". It is always the subject of trade union pressure, but of pressure for its increase, notwithstanding the obvious fact that every kopek of increase lessens the balance that is available for distribution as "personal wages". For it is the whole of what remains, after the above-named "cuts" have been made from the estimated product of the year, that the trade unions accept as the lump sum available for the personal wages of the whole aggregate of workers by hand or by brain. It is the amount of this residue divided by the total number of workers that enables the coefficient of increase of standard time-wages—the percentage by which last year's wage-rates can be augmented—to be calculated.

Exactly how this aggregate wage-fund shall be shared among the whole army of workers employed at wages or salaries is left, very largely, to be worked out by the central committees of the 154 trade unions, in consultation with their joint body, the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). We can give here only a brief summary of the way it is done, leaving to our subsequent chapter entitled "In Place of Profit" a fuller exposition alike of principle and practice. It must here suffice to say that the trade unionists in the USSR, after various experiments in the nature of "trial and error", agree in a common system of grading, which is continually being better adjusted to the technical peculiarities and the changing circumstances of the various localities in which each industry is carried on. Separate provision has to be made for the remuneration, on the one hand, of apprentices and other novices, and such indispensable but non-material workers as gatekeepers and clerks; and, on the other, for that of specialist technicians and administrators, all of whom, it will be remembered, are members of the trade union concerned. In all these cases it has become plain to all concerned that the decisive factor is the necessity of attracting to each industry and each locality the necessary "cadres" of each kind of skill and ability. The problem is not one of trying how little the indispensable people can be got for, but of discovering by what inducements and special provision for training the existing

shortage in these "cadres" can be most effectively diminished. Then the main body of manual workers are divided into eight or more grades, as may be found most suited to the industrial processes; grades not according to craft or function, but according to degrees of skill or capacity, very largely based on its relative scarcity. The grades are, in fact, grades of wage-rates; fixed according to what is called "social value", which means, in effect, according to the relative scarcity of any particular kind of capacity to perform the operations required. These graded wage-rates rise by steps from one for the unskilled worker to two, four or eight times that amount per month for different degrees of skill or capacity. Any worker may enter any grade for which he can perform the work. The zealous and ambitious young man in the lowest grade (say grade one) may at any time claim to be promoted to grade two. "Very well," is the response, "you can have a fortnight's trial. If in that time you make good, to the satisfaction of the management and of the trade union official, you will remain in grade two, and draw its higher rate of wage. If not, you will revert to your lower grade." Presently the workman claims to be able to proceed to grade four, when the same procedure is gone through. The result is that a very large proportion of the young workers—in one factory we were told, it ran up to 90 per cent—are found to be voluntarily studying in evening classes (which charge no fees), endeavouring to "improve their qualifications". As there is no risk of unemployment, and as all the workers in each industry are in one and the same union, there are no "demarcation" disputes. As every increase in skill and capacity means increase of output and decrease of "spoilage" or waste, the management, and equally the trade union, has nothing but welcome for its unskilled labourers turning themselves into skilled mechanics, and even into scientifically educated engineers. All that is essential is that the growth of net output should at least keep pace with the increased wage-bill.

So much for the principles and methods by which the collective bargaining over the national wage-rates is conducted. But in all industries, and in every country, the sphere of collective bargaining comprises much more than the national scale of wage-rates. Over all the rest of the field, it is the local organisations of each union in the USSR that enter into protracted discussions with the management of the particular factory in which the members are working. In the first place, there is the perpetual business of fixing the piecework rates for each task or process. Here the national timework rate for each hour's work has to be translated into an equivalent payment for each job, so that any worker accepted for employment, and not subject to any physical disability, should be able, with ordinary diligence, to earn at least the standard rate for each month. What is indispensable in fixing piecework rates is equality as between different tasks or processes. Those workers who work more quickly or more efficiently, than the common man will, with the full approval of the management, and to the eventual advantage of every person in the factory, take home higher earnings, which are amply compensated for

by the increased output by which everybody gains. In the USSR it is the trade union's own official, the rate-fixer for whose training in the principles and practice of rate fixing the trade union has often paid, who has the initiative and the greatest influence in fixing the piecework rates, on the basis of equality between different jobs, and of equivalence, for the common man of ordinary diligence, of the earnings by time and by the piece. The management has its own officials, who may object to any proposed rate as not conforming to these principles. If the experts on each side cannot agree, the matter goes to arbitration. But, in the USSR, the management has no pecuniary inducement to "cut" the rates!

We have, however, far from completed the exploration of the sphere of collective bargaining in the USSR. For the workman in that land of proletarian dictatorship, the factory is not merely the place in which he earns a toilsome wage. It is very largely the centre of his life. It often provides his dwelling-place and his club, his children's nursery-school and kindergarten, his own and his wife's technical classes, their excursions on free days and their annual vacations, their extensive and varied social insurance. All these things and much else are dealt with by the trade union. What is novel and unexpected is to find them matters of collective bargaining with the factory management, to be provided, wholly or partly by the management itself, as part of the overhead charges of the undertaking, though almost entirely administered by the trade union committees. The foreign observer is surprised to find the safety and amenity of the places of work, the provision of hospital and sanatorium beds, the measures taken for the prevention of accidents, the provision of additional or better dwelling accommodation for the persons employed, the establishment of crèches and kindergartens for the young children; the workmen's clubhouse and the technical classes provided to enable them to improve their qualifications—and many other matters of importance to the workmen's daily life, dealt with in the detailed agreement (*koldogovor*) drawn up annually in March between the management and the various workmen's committees, in time to allow the management to provide, in the budget for the factory operations, the necessary increases in factory expenditure, which have all to find their place in the General Plan. These increases are sometimes considerable. "Four million roubles", we read, "have been granted for workers' housing by the Petrovsk and Lenin metal plant of Dnepropetrovsk, according to the Planning Department of the AUCCTU. Two more children's nurseries will be built. The workers, in turn, agree to increase output 38 per cent. Their wages will go up 24 per cent. Metal workers up to now have occupied the nineteenth place on the wage list. In the present wage revisions they will be elevated to third place."¹ As there are no tributes to private persons of rent or profit out of which these expenses can be drawn, the argument turns on the necessary limits to such a disposal of the aggregate product, and the

¹ Pamphlet by L. Kaufmann (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in USSR, 1932); see *Moscow News*, weekly edition, March 28, 1932.

mutual relation of the shares allotted respectively to these "socialised wages" and the "personal wages".

In these annual discussions with the management of each factory, it is astonishing to see how large is the proportion of the workmen who are drawn in to take part. In March 1932 Shvernik said: "The attendance of workers and employees at the meetings where drafts of the new collective agreements were discussed has, in a number of enterprises, been as high as 95 or 100 per cent. The number of workers who took part in drawing up the collective agreement at the 'Hammer and Sickle' plant amounted to 98.6 per cent; at the Stalingrad Tractor plant, 97 per cent; at the 'Red October', 97 per cent; at the Yaroslav Brake plant, 100 per cent; at the Shinsky Textile plant, 100 per cent."¹ Even if this participation in the collective bargaining, of practically the entire local membership of the trade union, amounts to no more than attendance at the meetings, listening to the speeches, occasionally asking questions, and then unprotestingly adopting a unanimous decision, this must be admitted to be in itself no little political education, and not a bad method of arousing in the rank and file that "consciousness of consent" which is necessary to effective democracy. Moreover, the treaty is never unilateral. "An agreement made by soviet workers", writes a trade union representative, "is in reality a promise they make to themselves and their fellow-workers to fulfil certain self-determined conditions. No outside coercive power exists. . . . In capitalist countries collective agreements are the armistice terms of two hostile forces. In the negotiations the employers strive to force the worst possible conditions on the workers. . . . Here there is no enemy. No one tries to give as little as he can for as much as he can."²

Apart, however, from the annual discussions, there is a great deal of collective bargaining going on throughout the whole year. New determinations of piecework rates have to be made for novel jobs; there may be special bonuses to be given for particular jobs or exceptional service; and there is the inevitable stream of complaints from individual workmen about real or imaginary ill-treatment, expressing discontent with the piecework rates for their particular jobs, or appealing against dismissal or other disciplinary action. Actual suspension of work by a strike is, by this time, practically unknown; but this does not mean that there are no divergences of view between the management and whole groups of workmen. As we have already mentioned, any such dispute is promptly referred to what is popularly termed "the triangle", an arbitration court within the factory, office or institution, formed for each occasion and

¹ Pamphlet by L. Kaufmann (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in USSR, 1932); see *Moscow News*, weekly edition, March 28, 1932.

² Shvernik's speech in *Report of Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933*, pp. 64-65.

These "koldogovor", or annual agreements between the factory employees and the factory management, are elaborate and lengthy printed documents. That of the "Red Plough" works at Moscow for 1933 ran to 70 pages, 16mo; that of the Electrocannabinat to 59 pages; that of the First State Factory of Spare Parts to 44 pages; and that of the Railway Transport Workers Union to 64 pages. We print in the appendix a slightly abbreviated translation of the koldogovor of a large factory at Gorki.

composed of a representative of the management, a leading official of the trade union within the establishment and the local official of the cell or group within the establishment consisting of members of the Communist Party. This informal domestic tribunal almost invariably settles the dispute on common-sense lines, in a way that is accepted by the disputants. Either party could, however, always appeal to the RKK (workers' control commission) on which there sit members of the trade unions as well as officers of the trusts; or, indeed, to the Commissariat (ministry) of Labour of the constituent republic within the territory of which the establishment is situated, and even, ultimately, to the People's Commissar for Labour of the USSR.¹ Now that these People's Commissars, whom the AUCCTU has always nominated, have been superseded by the AUCCTU itself, it is to this highest trade union body that such an appeal would be made.

It is, however, one thing to get the obligations of the management to the workers and those of the workers to the management enshrined in a "koldogovor", or mutual agreement for the year, and quite another thing to get these reciprocal obligations exactly and punctually fulfilled. "There are still", observed Shvernik at the Ninth All-Union Trade Union Congress in 1932, "a number of very real defects in the way of collective agreements to be handled. The most important of these defects is the absence of a systematic method of checking up the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken under the collective agreement both by the workers and by the administration. Many trade union organisations do nothing from year's end to year's end but record the fact that both parties to the agreement have failed to fulfil their obligations, thus limiting their activities to the campaign for the conclusion of a new agreement—a campaign which is conducted but once a year. This sort of thing must be put a stop to once and for all. It should be the everyday duty of all trade union organisations to check up the way the collective agreements are being fulfilled. We must succeed in making both our economic bodies and our trade union organisations fulfil all the obligations of the collective agreement. Only then can the collective agreement become a real weapon in the struggle of the whole working class for the fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan, for raising the productivity of labour and for improving the material and general living conditions of the workers."²

Thus the factory committee has extensive and important duties throughout the year. For all this business, including the desk work and interviewing by its officers, and committee and members' meetings, the enterprise which it serves is required to allocate convenient and properly furnished premises with heating and lighting, all free of charge.³

¹ In 1928-1929 there were still as many as 47 strikes sent up for consideration by the People's Commissar for Labour. In 1929-1930 there were only 7 (*Die russischen Gewerkschaften*, by Michael Jakobson, 1932, p. 164).

In both years the number was insignificant for so vast an area as the USSR, and for so many millions of trade unionists, employed in ten or fifteen thousand separate establishments.

² Shvernik's speech in *Report of Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1932*, pp. 64-65.

³ The Labour Code of 1932, section 15, ordains that "the management of the undertaking, institution or enterprise shall grant the committee (fabkom) the use of a room free

The factory committee, by means of volunteer "dues-collectors" collects the trade union contributions of the whole of the trade union members within the factory, office or institution. These contributions - - at one time paid by the management as a charge on the undertaking—are now fixed by the highest delegate congress of each union, and may include extra subscriptions for special funds for educational activities, various sorts of "mutual aid" and sundry voluntary associations, to which only a part of the trade union members belong.¹ By new regulation of the AUGCTU, dating from September 1, 1933, the trade union dues have been universally reduced to a fixed one per cent of wages, whilst the number and amount of other contributions are cut down to a minimum. Trade union members may belong to several societies, but may not pay subscriptions to more than two.² Membership dues are now universally collected by the sale of stamps to be affixed to the members' trade union cards.

of charge, with the necessary equipment, heating and lighting, both for the business of the committee itself and for general and delegate meetings".

¹ "Where the system of individual payment of contributions is in force (now nearly universal) it is generally considered necessary to have one collector [presumably thus engaged only after his day's work] for every 20 or 30 members. The collector makes one round a month. Besides the trade union contributions properly so called, he also collects other contributions (clubs, mutual aid societies, various associations) and gives a temporary receipt to the payer, whose account book he takes and transfers to the factory committee concerned. The factory committee subsequently issues official receipts for the payments made. In many organisations, however, these arrangements work badly; in certain cases, in order to simplify the work of the collectors, proposals and experiments have been made in paying contributions by means of stamps specially issued for the purpose" (*The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, I.L.O., League of Nations, 1927, p. 82).

It took a long time to put on a proper footing all trade unions and in all parts of the USSR the system of individual payment of trade union dues, in substitution of the former system of automatic deductions from wages. Not until the Seventh All-Union Congress of Trade Unions (1926) could it be reported as completed. The scale then fixed was 30 kopeks per month for all receiving not exceeding 25 roubles per month earnings, rising gradually to 10 roubles per month on earnings exceeding 400 roubles per month. The trade union may, with the consent of the All-Union Congress of the particular union (AZRG), add a supplement not raising the total contribution to more than 4 per cent of the highest grade of earnings. This supplement is often from one-half per cent to two per cent of the monthly earnings, and is usually devoted to the expenses of the fabkom or mestkom. Of the regular dues, 10 per cent is usually allocated for the expenses of the lateral or inter-union organisations, whilst the remainder provides for the upper stages of the vertical hierarchy, particularly the All-Union Congress of each trade union, and the central committee which it elects (ZK). There are often small special funds for cultural activities, and (now less frequent) for unemployment and the occasional small strikes (*Die russischen Gewerkschaften*, by Michael Jakobson, 1932, p. 127; *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 70).

² Resolutions of the TSUK, Sovnarkom and VTSSPS of August 16, 1933: see *Izvestia*, August 17, 1933. Trade union members' dues to the Communist Party (to which between one and two millions of them belong) were at the same time fixed as under:

20 kopeks	on a wage or salary up to 100 roubles	
60 "	" " " of 101 to 150 roubles	
1 rouble	" " " 150 to 200 "	
1.50 roubles	" " " 201 to 250 "	
2 "	" " " 251 to 300 "	
2 per cent	" " " 301 to 500 "	
3 "	" " " above 500 "	

Not without warrant can it be claimed by an American observer that "the trade union *fabkom* is a growing force in the Soviet Union. It brings workers not only into the unions, but into the whole economic activity of the country. It is the principal organ of workers' democracy in a government and an industrial system operated by and for workers. In no other country does this type of workers' council have so much power. . . . In no other country does it have such varied and important functions. Nowhere do its members have so much freedom and responsibility as in the USSR. It acts as the fundamental contact point through which the worker begins to take part in factory as well as in social life, to exercise his rights as a worker in this community; and to participate in building up the nationalised industries."¹

The Regional Council of the Trade Union

The next stage to the factory committee in each trade union hierarchy in all but the smaller unions is now the regional council, representing all the establishments belonging to the particular trade union within a particular area, which is generally coterminous with the soviet area of the oblast, or in the case of the largest cities, with the city itself, but is sometimes demarcated so as to correspond more conveniently with the geographical distribution of the establishments belonging to the union.² Altogether there are, among the hundred larger trade unions, approximately 900 regional councils.

The trade union regional council is elected by a delegate meeting representing the factory committees of all the establishments belonging to that particular trade union within the region. This delegate meeting meets as a plenum very infrequently, and usually only when it has to elect its president and secretary, who always give their whole time to their trade union work, with a presidium of half a dozen members, for whose desk-work and meetings the regional council of each trade union maintains everywhere its own regional office.

¹ *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 45.

² It was laid down at the Second Trade Union Congress in 1919 that "the type of organisation which best corresponds to the fundamental duties of the trade union movement must embody All-Russian central unions, with sections and sub-sections in the provinces (linked up by inter-trade union councils based on the formation of the All-Russian council and factory committees, or employees' committees in non-industrial undertakings). The territorial division into sections and sub-sections is to be determined by the central organ of the All-Russian trade union concerned, and every attention is to be given to the geographical distribution and numerical importance of the various industrial groups. At the same time the division into groups must correspond as far as possible with the administrative areas of the country" (*The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, International Labour Office, League of Nations, 1927, p. 57).

We gather that in each trade union the subsectional council has been abandoned and the sectional councils are now styled regional councils, above which there are, in the smaller constituent republics, for some of the trade unions, republic councils, which (together with the regional councils of the RSFSR) elect an All-Union Congress of the particular trade union (AZRG), from which a central committee for the union (ZK) is chosen.

In the reorganisation of 1934, so far as concerns the 49 smaller unions, the regional council has gone the way of the subsectional council, thus bringing the central committee of each of these unions in immediate contact with all its *fabkoms* or *mestkoms*.

The most interesting function of the regional council of each trade union and one to which we shall presently refer may be that of entering into lateral relations with the other unions within the region.

The Republic Council of each Trade Union

The highest stage of the trade union hierarchies within the six smaller constituent republics (not in the RSFSR) is the congress of delegates elected, in the hundred or so larger unions, by all the regional councils which the particular union has within the area of the republic; and in the forty-nine smaller unions which have no regional councils by the factory or institution committees. Such trade unions may thus enjoy several "republic" congresses, being one for each of the smaller constituent republics in which the particular trade union has a considerable and completely organised membership.

The All-Union Congress of each Trade Union¹

Each trade union has still to create its central organ for the administration of the affairs of its whole USSR membership from the Baltic to the Pacific. Each trade union accordingly has its own "All Union" congress, formed of delegates chosen by its several congresses of the highest grade, in the RSFSR those of the regions, whether cities or oblasts or, in the six smaller republics, those of the constituent republics over which its own membership is spread. This All-Union delegate congress (AZRG), which varies in size according to the magnitude of the aggregate membership of the trade union, meets usually only every other year for a few days' general discussion and for the election of a standing central council (ZK) and of the usual president, secretary and presidium, by whom the supreme administration of the trade union is practically conducted. It is this authority by which, in close consultation with the USSR joint trade union organ still to be described (AUCCTU), are arranged the dozen or two grades of wage-rates applicable to as many grades of workers, among which, with some local variations and various exceptional cases, the entire membership of the trade union finds itself working. Moreover, it is this All-Union authority for each trade union that, in similar close consultation, actually conducts on behalf of its entire membership between the Baltic and the Pacific—so far as concerns the standard wage-rates in the several trade unions; the coefficient of increase to be adopted for the ensuing year, and the aggregate of wages and salaries in the USSR—the collective bargaining between the trade union and the organs representing the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars for the USSR, together with Gosplan, and the various trusts directing the nationalised industries. It was authoritatively laid down in 1932 that "the central committees of the unions must concentrate their efforts primarily upon questions of regulating wages and settling rates and categories, upon the organisation of

¹ The term "All-Union" invariably means the whole of the USSR; never all trade unions.

labour and production, upon housing construction, upon the improvement of the working and living conditions of their members".¹

But although this hierarchy of trade union councils, from the brigade or shift or shop, through the Factory or institution committees, and the regional councils, right up to the trade union authorities of each republic and those for the whole of the USSR, undoubtedly serves to unite the whole membership of each union, and to concentrate its final influence, it must not be supposed that there is any corresponding dissipation of authority in the settlement of policy. It was quite definitely laid down by the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions that "the republican, regional and district councils of trade unions, while not renouncing responsibility for problems of wages, production, etc., must give up the duplication and replacement of union organisation, and *concentrate their major attention upon checking the fulfilment of the directives of the Party, the government and the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU)*".²

The All-Union Congress of Trade Unions

There is, it will be seen, yet a higher and in some ways even more important body than the supreme USSR authority for each trade union, namely, a congress acting, not for one union only, but for the whole of the 154 unions, and for their aggregate membership throughout the USSR. This joint congress, the authority for soviet trade unionism as a whole, is made up of a couple of thousand delegates elected approximately in proportion to trade union membership, by the several congresses, whether regional or republic or All-Union, of the 154 trade unions, or rather by their highest elected committees. This All-Union Trade Union Congress meets only every other year, for general discussion and for the election of an All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), and of the invariable president, secretary and presidium.

The All-Union Congress of Trade Unions is, however, no mere parade, but a live forum of popular discussion. We quote a description by an American observer in 1926. "Walk into a congress of Russian workers, the last (seventh) All-Union Congress of the AUCCTU for example. One finds about 1500 delegates present. They are not, as in many countries, all the representatives of the central committees of national unions. In fact all of them were elected at provincial congresses, and two-thirds of them are men and women from the provinces. About one-sixth of them have come directly from the lathe and the loom and the plough. Only one-sixth are officials from the higher ranks of the national unions, who have been selected at provincial congresses. Some thirty-three nationalities are represented, and nearly one hundred women delegates are present."³

But important and influential as may be the discussions at the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, the fact that it meets only every other

¹ *Report of Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, 1932*, p. 386.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 162.

year necessarily throws all its powers into the hands of the central committee (AUCCTU) that it elects. Although this central committee itself meets as a plenum only every few months,¹ the officers, instructed and supervised by the presidium, and giving their whole time to the work, are almost continuously engaged throughout the year, largely in dealing with minor issues that arise between the different unions, and in adjusting differences and divergences likely to become injurious or acute. But the most important function of these inter-union officers is to centralise and supervise the collective bargaining between the central representatives of the several trade unions and the committees and officials representing the Sovnarkom (or Cabinet) of People's Commissars, Gosplan, and the various state trusts and other enterprises, especially in the annual settlement, and the continuous detailed adjustment, of the General Plan. It was this body, for instance, that made the momentous collective agreement with the Supreme Economic Council in September 1931, for the fundamental remodelling of the wage scales in the coal and iron and steel industries, by which the difference between the earnings of skilled and unskilled workers was greatly enlarged and the higher grades were better remunerated, as a means of increasing the total productivity.² It is, in fact, this body as the repository of the power conveyed from the (literally) millions of members' meetings all over the USSR, through the whole hierarchy of councils of each of the 154 gigantic trade unions, that exercises the effective government of the trade union movement. "The All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU)", it was authoritatively declared, "must base all its work directly upon the work of the central committees of the trade unions, furnishing them with concrete aid, and constantly checking and providing concrete leadership for their activity. . . ." "The congress instructs the AUCCTU to take all necessary measures toward improving financial discipline, insisting on prompt payment of membership dues, and improving the financial relations between the central committees of the trade unions and the AUCCTU, in the direction of increasing independence of the industrial unions."³

¹ There were six plenums of the AUCCTU between the Eighth All-Union Trade Union Congress in 1928-1929 and the Ninth All-Union Trade Union Congress in 1931, during a most important period of reorganisation.

The plenum was, in 1934, directed to meet regularly every two months. Its membership was at the same time reduced from 502 to 338, in spite of the division of the 47 trade unions into as many as 154.

² *New Methods of Work, New Methods of Leadership*, by J. Grabe (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in USSR, Moscow, 1933), p. 31.

³ *Report of Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, 1932*, p. 387. A recent development of the AUCCTU has been the formation of a "Foreign Bureau" (Insnaab) in order to maintain a closer contact with the foreign workers employed in the USSR and to investigate their complaints. Such a trade union Foreign Bureau exists actively in Moscow and is supposed to exist in every trade union District or City Council in which there are foreign workers with an "Insnaab Control Commission" elected by the foreign workers themselves. These are not to interfere with the functions of other trade union organisations, but to bring the foreign workers into closer contact with these organisations, and to see to it that all their grievances are promptly dealt with (*Moscow Daily News*, May 10, 1932).

The work of the AUCCTU in 1934 was reorganised into 9 departments, namely:

And the AUCCTU does not hesitate to strike hard when it is necessary. When the Central Committee of the Union of Workers in the Sugar Industry had allowed the organisation of that union to go to pieces, and had failed altogether to prevent all sorts of malpractices in the state farms of Soyuzsakhark, where so many of its members were employed, the AUCCTU itself discovered what was going on. The presidium of the AUCCTU presented a damning report to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Union of Workers in the Sugar Industry, in which a drastic change in leadership was demanded. The members of the union plenum were convinced, and substituted a new presidium for that which had so hopelessly failed.¹

Lateral Structure in USSR Trade Unionism

So far we have described only the vertical hierarchy of the trade unions, by which the stream of power may be said to pass from the 186,640 factory and local committees (fabkom and mestkom), elected in the innumerable members' meetings, right up to the 154 central committees of the several unions and the single central committee representing all of them, the AUCCTU—there to be transformed into the authority by which the whole eighteen million trade unionists between the Baltic and the Pacific are governed. We have, however, yet to notice the equally elaborate lateral structure at each stage of the vertical hierarchy, by means of which the activities of the various trade union committees within each local area are coordinated, and inter-union conflicts are avoided. The factory and local committees (fabkom and mestkom) of the establishments belonging to one trade union within the area of a city or a district may send delegates to a city or district committee for that particular trade union. But such an organisation will deal only with matters relating to the one trade union, and is not universal. What is universal, in every large city and every industrialised district outside the cities, is a district trade union council, formed of delegates, either from the city or district committees of particular trade unions where such exist, or, more usually, from the factory or local committees (fabkom and mestkom) of all the establishments within the area, to whatsoever trade unions they belong. There seem to be nearly 3000 of such inter-union district or city councils in the USSR. In this way, something analogous to the organisation of the local trades councils of the British trade union movement is formed, dealing, however, not with municipal politics, which occupy so large a proportion of the attention of the British trades councils, but almost entirely with trade union matters. When it is remembered that nearly all the 154 soviet trade unions include some workers of the same craft or vocation—whether general labourers or unspecialised clerks; or such craftsmen as carpenters, engineers and electricians common to nearly all

(1) Responsible Instructors or Organisers; (2) Planning of Wages; (3) Bureau of Social Insurance; (4) Labour Inspection; (5) Clubs and Cultural Work; (6) Accounting; (7) Finance; (8) General Administration; and (9) Physical Culture.

¹ *Report of Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, 1933*, p. 27.

industries; or professional specialists such as doctors and nurses— and that these are incessantly moving from one establishment to another, frequently thus transferring to other trade unions, it will be seen that innumerable questions must arise between them.

These lateral connections exist at each stage of the trade union hierarchy. There are about 70 republic or regional councils of the various trade unions, having each its own office with its own officials. In some of the republics at least (as in the Ukraine) this organisation (OVWR) exists for combined action of all the trade unions within the particular constituent republic.

The Trade Union Officials

So extensive an organisation, operating over so vast a territory, naturally requires a considerable army of officials. As we have already indicated, the bulk of the work of collecting the subscriptions, managing the elections and administering the local business, is performed voluntarily without remuneration by duly elected unpaid officers and committee men, possibly as many as a million in number, in their leisure hours. But in every industrial establishment of any magnitude, trade unionism requires the whole-time service of one or more experienced officials, to whom the union pays salaries approximately equal to the earnings of skilled mechanics. The lateral inter-union organisations, as well as the central committee of each union, employ whole staffs of similar officials. It is, however, the work of the most important body, the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), that calls for the most extensive and responsible civil service. It is in this part of the trade union bureaucracy that the scheme of reorganisation of 1934 has wrought the greatest changes. In its relations with all the unions, the AUCCTU had gradually developed an elaborate "functionalism", each branch of the work having its own specialised officials, by whose written communications and personal visits the fabkoms and mestkoms were being perpetually harassed. In 1934 Shvernik got adopted a reform by which these specialised or "functional" officials were wholly replaced by a single service of "instructors"—who in England would be termed organisers or inspectors—who are to be for all purposes the channel of communication between the central body on the one hand and both the separate trade unions and the innumerable fabkoms or mestkoms on the other. Henceforth it will be these trained "instructors" who will both supervise or inspect the work of the 154 unions and their local organs, and convey to them the criticisms or "directives" of the AUCCTU. In the larger unions the central committees will have, in addition, their own staff of similar "instructors", assisting and controlling their various branches and local committees in all the details of their work. The colossal industrial establishments, having each tens of thousands of members, may even find "instructors" permanently assigned to each of them. This far-reaching reconstruction of the trade union civil service, by which it is hoped to economise in the total numbers employed, will plainly make more effective the influence

of the central body representing all the 154 unions, as well as that over the local organs exercised by the central committee of each union. The reform may be expected to bring to the assistance of the local administrators the advantage of consistency in policy, and the lessons of a larger experience than any one of them can command. But how far this increasing centralisation of authority will increase trade union efficiency as a whole must be left to experience to reveal.

The Transference of the Commissariat of Labour to the Trade Unions

With the growth of trade union membership to eighteen millions, the work falling on the trade union administrators had become colossal. It was destined to be still further increased. In 1933 a momentous addition was made to the trade union business: by a decision and decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the office of the USSR People's Commissar of Labour together with those of the People's Commissars of Labour of all the constituent and autonomous republics were summarily abolished. Practically all the functions of these commissariats were transferred to the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, and to its elected Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), with its subordinate hierarchy of committees and officials. The duties thus transferred from the soviet part of the constitution to the trade union part are of considerable magnitude and importance. They include the supreme direction of all branches of social insurance; the whole responsibility for factory inspection; the provision and management of the rest-houses and convalescent homes enjoyed by the trade union membership, with the farming enterprises for their "self-supply" that have lately been developed; and, in supersession of the labour exchanges, now abolished along with involuntary unemployment, the organisation of all labour recruiting for the constantly expanding industries.

This constitutional change is a remarkable recognition of the position that trade unionism holds in the soviet state. The magnitude of the funds, outside the members' subscriptions, which will now be administered by the trade union organisation is impressive. The social insurance budget for 1933 totalled 4432 million roubles, levied by a contribution upon every kind of enterprise of $1\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 per cent of its wage-total; and providing 814 million roubles for sickness, 532 millions for old-age and infirmity pensions, 203 millions for rest-homes, 35 millions for dietetic restaurants for the sick, 930 millions for hospitals, 189 millions for crèches and 600 millions for workmen's dwellings. These services, moreover, are growing by leaps and bounds. The 1934 budget of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), *without including the expenditure of the 154 trade unions themselves upon their accustomed functions*, amounted to no less than 5050 million roubles. It provided 1514 million roubles in sick pay and invalidity pensions; 1040 millions in repayment of the cost of medical services and hospitals; 57 million roubles for special diets for

sick workers ; 215 millions for their rest-houses ; 327 millions for nursery schools and kindergartens to set the mothers free for industrial service ; 750 millions for education ; 885 millions for workers' dwellings ; 41 millions for factory inspection ; 50 millions for insurance administration ; and 170 millions for the necessary working balance or reserve. The corresponding budget for 1935 amounted to no less than 6079 million roubles. The administration of such extensive services in which, be it noted, the trade unions act as organisations of consumers or users of the services, not as producers—throws a great work on their active members, even more onerous and responsible than their previous duties in the administration of the wage agreements.¹

This vast addition to the work and influence of the soviet trade unions has been curiously misunderstood in some quarters, as a degradation of their position to nothing more than friendly societies ! But the trade unions retain and continue to exercise all the influence and authority in the administration of the factory and in the settlement of wages that they have possessed for the past fifteen years. The new control over social insurance and the entire administration of funds and services of such magnitude can hardly fail to strengthen the trade unions in their work of raising the standard of life of the workers, and even to knit more closely together their far-flung membership.

Those foreign critics, on the other hand, who are appalled at the idea of handing over to the trade unions such vast funds, not derived from the contributions of their members, may, we think, be reassured. The constitutional change, important as it is, will not make so much difference to the administration of social insurance as might be imagined by those conversant only with the constitutions of western Europe or America. It is not, for instance, in any way comparable to the abolition, in the United Kingdom, of the Minister of Labour, and the transfer of his functions, with regard to unemployment insurance and wages boards, to the British Trade Union Congress and its General Council ! The People's Commissar for Labour was, it is true, in every republic and in the USSR itself, a member of the Sovnarkom, and thus, as we should say, a Cabinet Minister. But he had long been appointed on the nomination of the AUCCTU, with whom he was always in the closest relations.² Thus the change

¹ The transfer was accompanied by a great change in the machinery for payment of the cash benefits. Each trade union has now its own head paying and accounting office, dealing through its branches exclusively with its own members. There are, accordingly, more than 150,000 pay stations. At the same time each union became responsible for the continuous "inspection" of its members on benefit, in order to prevent abuse. This has involved the appointment of 80,000 members as inspectors, many of whom have not yet become efficient.

² Moreover, the officials of the Commissariat of Labour have long been nominated by the trade unions. "The trade union councils of the various republics select the labour commissar for their area of their respective congresses. All lower officials of the labour commissariat are likewise selected by the corresponding subordinate trade union body. The local trade union council selects the labour inspectors, who must be trade union members, and the sanitary and technical inspectors employed by the Commissariat of Labour. These inspectors work in close cooperation with the trade unions and report to

might even be taken to involve, in one of its aspects, the exclusion of a direct representative of trade unionism from the highest councils of the state. The actual work of the Commissariat for Labour, voluminous in magnitude and detailed in its nature, has long been dealt with in an extensive official department, which must necessarily continue in existence. What has been transferred is the supervision and direction of this department, for which a responsible chief is now appointed by the AUCCTU, instead of being only nominated by that body for inclusion in the Sovnarkom. In the various constituent and autonomous republics there has been a corresponding transfer of direction and authority, from a local official partly responsible to the People's Commissar for Labour at Moscow, to the highest organ of each trade union within the area, whose chief official will, we assume, have a like double responsibility, to his own trade union by which he is appointed, and to the director at Moscow appointed by the AUCCTU.¹ The change accordingly represents a great increase of responsibility for trade unionism in the USSR, without, necessarily, any great alteration in current administration. The practical abolition of involuntary unemployment in the USSR, which we shall describe in a subsequent chapter, and the consequent cessation of unemployment benefit, probably renders the change less open to criticism than other countries might be disposed to imagine.

The Office-work of USSR Trade Unionism

No one can adequately realise the magnitude, the ubiquity or the activity of this complicated trade union organisation who has not seen something of its work in different cities of the USSR. Yet so vast is the

their congresses. The unions are well represented in the social insurance departments throughout the country. All labour legislation, including all laws which affect labour in any way, is drawn up in consultation with the trade unions" (*The Soviet Worker*, by J. Freeman, 1932, p. 122).

¹ See *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions: the Merger of the People's Commissariat of Labour in the AUCCTU*, by N. Shvernik, 1933.

An experienced American observer refers to this change in the following terms: "With very little ado and practically no press comment, an edict has merged the Commissariat of Labour into the All-Soviet Trade Unions, so that control of the many-billion-ruble social-insurance fund, the sanatoria, rest-homes, all workers' medical services, and the protection of labour passes from the hands of the government to the trade unions. Thus, formally at least, the process by which, under socialism, the state dies a slow death through attrition has advanced another step. Back in 1920, Trotsky advocated a reverse development: the suppression of the unions and the organisation of official labour battalions. Nevertheless, as usual, some foreign observers have styled the recent Soviet decree a 'Trotskyist move'. Professional anti-Trotskyists, on the other hand, viewing the 1920 Lenin-Trotsky trade union controversy in the new light of Italian and German fascism, find ideological points of contact between the Duce, Hitler and the sage of Prinkipo. While these salon polemics rage, we shall wait to see whether the latest change, which gives the unions broader functions, also gives them greater independence" ("Russia's Last Hard Year", by Louis Fischer, in *The Nation* (New York), July 12, 1933).

It is interesting to the constitutional student to find this decree was signed not only by M. Kalinin, as president of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), and V. Molotov, as president of the Sovnarkom, but also by N. Shvernik, as secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). See the text in *Moscow Daily News*, September 17, 1933,

area that no one person can catch more than a glimpse. We may appreciate something of the volume of the work when we learn that the aggregate number of salaried full-time officials in the service of the 154 trade unions, and of their joint or federal bodies, throughout the USSR, in spite of the attempt of the AUCUTU to reduce the number of this salaried bureaucracy, exceeds 30,000, whilst the number of unpaid or part-time officials, apart from members of committees, is estimated to amount to at least ten times as many. We add something to the definiteness of the impression when we merely look at the structural accommodation that has had to be provided for their offices and meetings. It was, we think, a wise statesmanship that saw to it that the whole trade union organisation should be decently housed at the public cost.¹ For every structural requirement of the trade union work within each establishment, whether factory, office or institution, the establishment itself has to provide, as we have mentioned, free of charge, including rooms for permanent office use, and others transiently for members' meetings, with lighting, heating and ordinary furniture. But all the couple of hundred thousand district, regional, republic and central committees and councils and All-Union congresses require offices and meeting-halls. These have been provided free of charge, and a free telephone service added, by the Soviet Government itself, in one or other of its grades, or by one or other of its departments. We do not think it is usually understood how greatly the efficiency of trade unionism may be increased, and its very character raised to the height of a service of public utility, merely by the provision of structural accommodation equal in dignity to that of a government department, in which all the several unions in each locality may be worthily housed together. The Soviet Government was fortunate in finding in its hands, in every city, an array of deserted buildings suitable for this purpose. Among the very first acts of Lenin's administration was the assignment to the trade union movement of some of the best and stateliest of the buildings left derelict by the flight of the nobility and the wealthy. At Leningrad and Moscow the splendid palaces of the nobles' clubs and similar magnificent premises were thus transferred to new uses, rightly regarded as of public character. In other cities, great and small, the best available buildings, previously used as residences of the rich merchants or manufacturers, or as clubs or hotels for their use, or as boarding-schools for their daughters, were, between 1918 and 1920, similarly converted into central trade union offices for the locality. All around these cities we find suburban or rural homes, once occupied by capitalist families, now placed gratuitously at the disposal of the trade unions, and used, either as convalescent homes on medical order or as rest-homes, by their tens of thousands of members on their weekly rest days or their annual holidays. No less remarkable is the accommodation provided for the trade unions

¹ Exceptionally, in the densely peopled industrial district of the Donets Basin, where few wealthy people had deigned to live, the coal-miners' trade union has built for itself a dozen "labour temples" (*Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, pp. 2-3).

in the smaller cities. At Vinitza, in the Ukraine, an obscure city of 11,000 inhabitants, an American observer¹ found the trade union offices occupying the whole of the tallest building in the city, and the only one with six stories, formerly the best hotel; and subsequently discovered this to be "fairly typical of Labour Palaces throughout the Soviet Union. . . . Every room housed some busy trade union branch, some department of union life—the offices of the 23 unions of the district as well as the local trades council; the district social insurance department, with union appointees in charge of it; a dining room; the workers' students section; the educational department; a library; committee rooms and a meeting-hall. We found union members coming to the building in connection with all sorts of matters touching their daily lives—rents, jobs, dues, insurance, vacation allowances, cooperatives, doctors' permits, transportation, rest-home recommendations, scholarships and the scores of needs and benefits that are somehow related to union membership in the USSR."

The Shock Brigades and Cost Accounting Committees

The work of the trade unions is greatly assisted by a number of subsidiary organisations. In nearly every industrial establishment of any magnitude there have been formed one or more "shock brigades", the members of which (*udarniki*) are recruited from volunteers among the trade unionists. These shock brigades take as their function the acceleration of production, coupled with improvement in quality and lessening of cost. They undertake collectively special tasks in their own establishment, or they may volunteer to go to some other establishment which has fallen behind. They bring to their work exceptional energy, speed or skill; they labour more assiduously than is common; or they put in extra time in *subbotniki* (voluntary work). They do this out of zeal, for which they receive honour and applause. They seldom or never have a higher wage-rate and usually no extra bonus, though when working by the piece their increased output automatically brings higher earnings. They often receive preference in the allocation of places in the holiday rest-houses, and, where necessary, in the convalescent homes, as well as in the distribution of the theatre tickets allotted to their trade union. They are put forward as candidates for the factory committee or for the local soviet. The outstanding ones may be awarded the Order of the Red Banner. And as an expression of the honour and applause which are spontaneously accorded to them, they are often given their meals in a separate apartment of the factory restaurant, in a comfortable, quiet privacy, with the highest grade of rations, and such little amenities as tablecloths and flowers, and occasionally special dainties.² Of these shock brigades, or *udarniki*, there are reported to be, in the USSR, many millions.

A special application of shock brigading began early in 1931 when a

¹ *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 2.

² *Die russischen Gewerkschaften*, by Michael Jakobson, 1932, p. 147.

foundry worker in the great "Lenin" factory at Leningrad suggested in a letter to *Trud*, the weekly journal of the AUCCTU, which has a circulation of several hundred thousands, the advisability of "narrowing down the work of the brigade to certain specific tasks or operations", with the definite intention of lessening cost by improvements in method, following on the adoption of precise cost accounting. The project was energetically pushed by *Trud*, and was presently approved by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.¹ It spread like wildfire. Within a couple of years there had been formed, in the USSR, no fewer than 150,000 cost accounting brigades, which are reported to have effected a whole series of improvements in the methods of working, by which the production costs of thousands of different articles have been appreciably reduced.²

This spontaneous development of an elementary form of "costing", by which a particular brigade discovers the cost in material and labour time of each part of its own process, and is thus enabled to discover where time might be economised and "scrap" diminished, is, in the USSR, as in most of capitalist industry, only just beginning to be applied by comparative costings of every process in all the establishments turning out the same product. This, we gather, is being taken up in the statistical branch of Gosplan, now transformed into a Cost Accounting Department.

In January 1933 there was an "All-Union Udamnik Day" at Moscow, when about 80,000 shock brigaders, from about 120 separate industries or trades throughout the USSR, were brought together to be fêted and exhorted, and incidentally to confer among themselves as to the shortcomings still characteristic of soviet production, and how these can best be made good. In preparation for this great celebration, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) had directed the trade union committees everywhere to call together the various shock brigades and cost accounting committees in each establishment, which were not only to sum up their achievements and to talk over their plans for the ensuing year, but also to designate for special honours (including portrait painting, and exhibition at the cinemas) their own leading udamniki. The All-Union Council wanted reported to this Moscow celebration "the state of labour-productivity, labour discipline, socialist competition and shock work, and cost accounting brigades. They should determine whether the

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, June 23, 1932.

² "On February 1, 1931, we could number only ten business accounting brigades in the USSR, comprising 130 persons. By April 1, 1932, their number had increased to 155,000, comprising one and a half million workers. The number of plants, and still more of separate shops, where there is hundred-per-cent business accounting is continually increasing. Leningrad takes the first place. It was in Leningrad that the first initiative towards organising business accounting brigades took its rise, and now no less than 70 per cent of the workers there are included in business accounting brigades. In the Moscow district, there are 30,000 business accounting brigades in the Ukraine, comprising 300,000 workers" (Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, 1932, speech by Shvernik, general secretary, p. 31).

The work of a business accounting brigade is described in detail in *A Business Accounting Brigade*, by A. Nikolayev, a worker in the Baltic shipyards (Moscow, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1932, 40 pp.).

1932 industrial and financial plan is being carried out as regards both quantity and quality ; whether the *udarniki* are carrying out their pledges, whether lack of responsibility and equality of wages for unequal work have been rooted out. They should test whether the enterprise, as well as its departments and units, its restaurants, farms, cooperative store and management, are ready to accomplish the 1933 programme.”¹

Professional Associations within USSR Trade Unionism

The trade union organisation, in which all those employed by each enterprise, and all the enterprises in the USSR, having the same predominant purpose, are associated in a single trade union, irrespective of craft or vocation, is accompanied, at any rate for certain crafts or vocations, by a certain amount of separate organisation, irrespective of establishment or industry, in which workers of the same craft or kind throughout the USSR are associated together. Thus the medical practitioners employed at salaries in all the various factories and farms, hospitals or institutions, who are, along with the nurses and ward maids, practically all members of the Medical or Public Health Workers' Trade Union, one of the meetings of which we have already described, are also united in an exclusively medical organisation—nominally only a section of that union, but having its own regional branches and an All-Union congress, at which are discussed all the subjects in which the medical practitioners have a special interest.²

In the same way the brain-working specialists in applied science, whether engineers or electricians, chemists or biologists—more than half of whom are now “soviet-trained”—employed in mines, power stations, factories, oil-fields or farms, anywhere in the USSR, have their own associations, supplementary to their membership of the several trade unions in which their establishments are included. These intellectuals are reported to be “organised into sections at all levels of the trade union

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 28, 1932.

See also *ibid.*, January 3, 1933, for report of meeting of shock brigaders at the Moscow Auto Plant (Amo), which had over 16,000 of its workers taking part in socialist competition.

² In pre-war times, from 1870 onward, the various grades and sections of medical practitioners (doctors, pharmacists, midwives, nurses, etc.) formed professional societies for mutual aid. By 1905 there were nearly a score of such societies, most of which united in publishing the *Medical Workers' Journal*. In the subsequent years of repression these organisations declined in membership and activity. In 1918 most of the societies of the humbler grades dissolved themselves in order to form the All-Russian Medical Workers' Union. The pharmaceutical workers' society merged into this in 1920, together with the veterinary workers and the sanitary inspectors. The doctors still stood out, insisting on retaining their separate association. In 1920 the now powerful All-Russian Medical Workers' Union appealed to the Central Council of Trade Unions (which became the AUCCFU); and this body compulsorily dissolved the doctors' separate society, and insisted on the Medical Workers' Trade Union being recognised as the sole authority for all grades and sections of the profession. Many doctors joined at once, but others long resisted, considerable ill-feeling resulting. This gradually subsided when a special section for medical practitioners was formed within the Union (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, pp. 30-32).

structure. They are united at the top into a central body known as the Inter-Union Bureau of Engineers and Technicians of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Membership is entirely voluntary, and funds are set aside from the dues of these members to cover their particular work. They usually have their own special technical magazines. . . . These sections hold their own conferences nationally as well as provincially; they have executive bureaux elected at these congresses. . . . Over 500 delegates attended one of the congresses convened in 1927. . . . Reports to this congress show over 105,000 members in the sections."¹ Another congress, still more numerously attended, and claiming to represent an enrolment of 125,000 members, was held in 1932, when it was welcomed by both governmental and scientific dignitaries. It is significant that the principal oration was entrusted to Shvernik, the general secretary of the AUCCTU, who addressed the congress at great length, urging on them the continuous study of industrial technique, with a view to its further improvement. "The local trade union groups", he urged, "should strengthen their links with the engineers and other specialists, and support their work, keep them from being snowed under with petty routine, so that they can give real leadership. And the unions should see that these intellectual leaders get better living conditions."²

The most ancient, and in the intellectual world the most important, of these associations of intellectual specialists is the Academy of Science, under the presidency of the aged Karpinsky, now over eighty, which counts on the assistance of more than a thousand scientific professors and researchers in ninety institutes. These are scattered throughout the USSR, though predominantly in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and Kharkov. In equipment and resources many of these institutes excite the envy of scientists of other countries. Besides its numerous scientific meetings, at which papers are read on every branch of science, the Academy now holds a certain number of public receptions, at which less technical addresses are given on particular subjects of general interest. "Zaslavsky", we are told, "vividly describes the scene. In the body of the hall the proletariat, fresh from factory, plant, technical school, docks. On to the spacious stage file the academicians amid thunderous applause from the gathering. Here are names famous throughout the world in astronomy, physiology, biology, geology and other sciences. Here, leonine frosted heads, broad stooped shoulders, many of the traditional figures of the scientists of the bygone era. Some still wear the ancient frock coat of ceremony, with the traditional contempt of their kind for clothes."³ The Academy of Science — not without some struggle — has accepted the régime of Soviet Communism. In so far as its members receive salaries from their institutes, as most of the academicians do, they are eligible for membership of the trade union to which their institute belongs, many of them have joined, and

¹ *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 67.

² *Moscow Daily News*, November 23, November 27, December 3, 1932.

³ *Ibid.*, November 27, 1932.

some of these have now become active members of the trade unions with which the academy had formerly no connection.

There are, however, other academies. Thus the Academy of the History of Material Culture unites a membership of 10,000 archaeologists,¹ mostly employed in museums and universities in the various parts of the USSR, where they are members of the trade unions to which their institutions belong. Besides local meetings and periodical national congresses for the promotion of its studies, this academy equips and sends archaeological expeditions to various parts of the USSR, and undertakes or supervises excavations.

We are unable to give anything like a complete list of these professional associations of intellectual workers; not, as in Britain and the United States, parallel with and scarcely conscious of the trade union organisation, but forming integral parts of it; superimposed nationally, so to speak, on the universal organisation by establishments. There is a central association of teachers; there is a press writers' section of the typographical trade union, and a scientific workers' section of the educational workers' trade union. There is a special section for statisticians and accountants in the commercial workers' trade union. The professors and scientific workers in museums, libraries and laboratories have a section of their own, with a membership (in 1927) of 14,000, organised in fifty branches in as many cities. The authors have been organised in several societies; one of them was confined to members of the Communist Party, which tended to a certain asperity against "non-Party" writers. By a decision of the Central Committee of the Party, in April 1932, this exclusive organisation was dissolved, in order that all authors who support the soviet régime, and who attempt to participate in socialist construction, whether or not they are Party members or candidates, may constitute a single society of soviet authors.² There is an All-Union Sectional Bureau of Engineers and Technicians (YMBIT), which at the instance of Shvernik, secretary of the AUCCTU, resolved to participate actively in the "agricultural machinery repairing campaign" on the 32 repair-shops of the machine-tractor stations; and also in the "drive for technical education for Comsomols".³ There is also a Society of Soviet Architects, founded in 1932, with 6 branches in the RSFSR and a monthly journal of its own.⁴ All these segregations of professionals, formally authorised by the Seventh All-Union Congress of Trade Unions in 1926, have for their object the promotion of their special cultural activities; not forgetting, however, the raising of their members' salaries, the improvement in their housing conditions and the establishment of special pension systems.⁵

On the general trade union reorganisation in September 1934, Shvernik, the secretary of the AUCCTU, fully recognised the utility and importance of these professional associations uniting for specific purposes the members

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Manchester Guardian*, May 1, 1932.

³ *Moscow Daily News*, October 28, 1933.

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 17, 1933.

⁵ *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, pp. 67-69.

of various trade unions. It was, he explained to the present writers, contemplated that there would be several such sectional associations associated within most, if not all, of the 154 trade unions among which the 47 older unions were distributed. It had, however, not been possible to complete this organisation by September 1934, and it would have to be postponed until 1935.

This specialist segregation within the trade union organisation is not confined to the intellectual workers. The limitation in 1931 of the number of unions to 47 involved the association in one union of many different kinds of artisans and labourers. The trade union of food workers, for instance, united operatives in flourmills with those in slaughter-houses, candy factories, bakeries, fish canneries and tobacco factories. In many cases, accordingly, at the instance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, specialised sections have been formed, especially with a view to a more detailed study of processes as a means of increasing productivity, as well as to a better-instructed collective bargaining on behalf of particular kinds of workers throughout the USSR. "Parallel with the establishment of these sections," said the C.C.C.P., "the holding of special meetings and production conferences according to trades must be put into practice (foundry workers, moulders, machinists, examiners, mechanics, stoppers, tractor mechanics, assistant foremen, cotton printers, etc.); and in the shops a delegate representing the leading trade must be designated along with the shop delegate."¹ We find the AUCCTU, whilst dutifully promulgating this policy of sectionalisation, not forgetful of the possible danger to the trade union organisation of such "particularisms". "The sections", the Trade Union Bulletin of the AUCCTU had pointed out as early as 1926, "must not be regarded as an initial step towards dividing the unions, or turning the sections into independent bodies. The sections must be created within a union, as auxiliary bodies which can better examine into the special industrial and living conditions of the members and serve them more satisfactorily."²

Similarly, in the case of the Inter-Union Bureau of Engineers and Technicians, to which we have already referred, it has been ordered that decisions of section bodies have to be submitted to and confirmed by the governing body of the particular union to whose members they relate before they become effective.³

The Profintern

The preceding description of the complicated trade union organisation of Soviet Communism does not complete the analysis of the pattern. As we have seen in the case of the soviet hierarchy, and as we shall presently describe in the case of the Communist Party, what is contemplated is membership of a far-reaching international organisation which is eventually

¹ *Report of Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, 1933*, p. 110 (Kaganovich's report). A stopper is a miner working a stoper or layer.

² *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, p. 60.

³ *Ibid.* p. 67.

to be world-wide. For man as a wage-earning producer there is to be eventually a world trade unionism of the soviet pattern. The whole trade union organisation of the USSR accordingly belongs to the International Council of "Red" Trade Unions, commonly known as Profintern, which was formally established at an international gathering at Moscow summoned by the AUCCTU in 1921.¹ There was already in existence an International Association of Trade Unions, centred at Amsterdam, which had secured the adhesion of the great bulk of European trade unionism, irrespective of political opinions. With the spread of social democratic views among the workmen, this "trade union International" had become associated with the "Second International", the alliance of Labour and Socialist societies established in 1889, at Paris, to which the socialist parties of western Europe were affiliated. These very generally took up an attitude of hostility to Bolshevism, principally because of its intolerance of opposition and its suppression of the Menshevik section of the social democratic party. Hence, just as the Comintern was set up at Moscow in opposition to the "Second International", so the Profintern was set up there in opposition to the "Amsterdam International".

The Profintern is professedly governed by an annual congress of delegates from the several national organisations of communist trade unions. Such congresses were, for nearly a decade, held at Moscow, but opinions differ as to the extent to which they can be said ever to have been effectively either international or representative of trade unions as such. At the congress held in 1927, for instance, when the "Red Trade Union International" claimed to speak for 13,862,209 members of affiliated organisations, 10,248,000 were trade unionists of the USSR, and 2,800,000 were members of Chinese societies of various kinds, which were promptly dissolved or have simply faded out. The other three-quarters of a million included a few communist trade unions, chiefly in Germany, France and Czechoslovakia, but was mainly composed, as Lozovsky himself reported, not of trade unions at all but of a varied array of nondescript bodies, including minority groups, illegal associations and miscellaneous committees in some forty or fifty other countries, including North and South

¹ The published reports and pamphlets relating to the "Red International" (Profintern) are very numerous, and many of them exist in English, French and German versions. A useful list with an elaborate chronicle of proceedings (down to 1926) will be found in *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, League of Nations, 1927, pp. 262-263). A later list appears in *Handwörterbuch des Gewerkschaften*.

Among those available in English, French or German, see, in particular, *Resolutions, Proclamations and Manifestos of the First Congress of Trade and Industrial Unions*, Moscow, 1921; *Minutes of the International Council of Red Trade Unions*, Moscow, 1921; *The Red Trade Union International*, Moscow, 1921-1926; *The World Trade Union Movement before and after the War*, 1924, and *Moscow or Amsterdam? 1924*, both by A. Lozovsky; *World Communists in Action*, by J. Piatnitsky, 1931; and *Les Questions vitales du mouvement révolutionnaire internationale*, Paris, 62 pp., by the same. The British Government Blue Book (Cmd. 2682 of 1926) contains a miscellaneous mass of documents of the Red International seized by the London police in October 1925. Many similar documents may at any time be found published in *Imprecorr* (*International Press Correspondence*). See also *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn, 1928, pp. 222-252; *Soviet Russia*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, pp. 267-274.

America, Australia and New Zealand, India, and Africa,¹ hardly any of which had sent anyone to Moscow expressly as delegates to the congress. The subsequent congresses have been of the same kind. The delegates consist of those appointed by the AUCCTU of the USSR, together with a tiny number of persons actually sent for the purpose by foreign trade unions, supplemented by others sent by the nondescript groups above mentioned, as well as by communist trade unionists of foreign birth or nationality, residing and working in Moscow, and even stray visitors of like opinions who happen to be there. This congress appoints an executive council, with presidium, president and secretary, most of them habitually resident in Moscow. The representative validity so far as foreign trade unions are concerned and the practical effectiveness in other countries of an international organisation of this kind appears to be of the slightest. We do not wish to imply that the Profintern does not express the views of large numbers of communists in other countries, who have occasionally gone to the ballot-box in millions, and who exercise in their respective countries an influence, not only among the unemployed, but also in trade union memberships and meetings, which have, except in a few instances, as yet not achieved control of the trade unions themselves. It is the claim of the Red International to represent foreign trade unions as such which is disputed, not its representation of the opinions of the communist members of the wage-earning class.

The Central Council of the Profintern is a body including four of the leading members of the Communist Party of the USSR, with two persons belonging to each of the large industrial countries. The real work is done by an Executive Bureau of seven members, two of them belonging to the USSR. The proceedings of the Executive Bureau, though often lacking in accurate knowledge of the position of labour in other countries, have not been without vigour and dexterity. There is a polyglot secretariat, paid for out of the dues levied by the Profintern on its affiliated bodies, and thus largely by the trade unions of the USSR. This secretariat is departmentally organised by countries, and includes communists belonging to one or other of the principal nations dealt with. Its extensive correspondence with all sorts of communist organisations in the different countries has, in the past, frequently included detailed "directives" as to how these bodies ought to proceed. These instructions, the tone of which excites some resentment, have been, in the past, occasionally accompanied by substantial remittances under various disguises, usually in aid of strikes. Since 1929, however, it is believed that these subsidies have, except in some cases when communist officials have required legal

¹ The character of the affiliations was described by the President of the Congress in 1930. "You know that the trade union movement which is united in the Profintern is most varied in so far as organisational structure is concerned. Independent organisations, illegal trade unions, semi-legal organisations, and further, trade union oppositions, or minorities inside trade unions, all belong to the 'Profintern'" (Extract translated from A. Lozovsky's report to the Moscow Conference of Active Workers in Trade Unions, September 9, 1930, on "The Results of the Fifth Congress of the Profintern").

defence in criminal prosecutions, dwindled to minute sums, designed more to maintain connection than with any idea of fostering a world upheaval.

The story of the proceedings of Profintern during the past dozen years is largely taken up with the continuous controversy with the "Amsterdam International", which, in 1932, commanded the allegiance of many millions of trade union membership in nearly all countries except the USSR (also, for other reasons, except the United States of America), and with its satellites, the 27 international federations of the trade unions of separate industries. Profintern has been tireless in its incessant attempt to arrange for what it calls a "united front" against capitalism throughout the world. It cannot, however, bring itself to unite with an organisation formed on the basis of trade unionism as it exists in capitalist countries which, in the present interests of these members as wage-earners, avowedly forgoes any attempt to overturn by force the existing order in which these members actually find their living. On the other hand, the Amsterdam International refuses to make any kind of alliance, or undertake any common enterprise, with a body which glories in existing for purposes definitely criminal under the laws of the states in which the trade unionists live, and which is avowedly directed from Moscow, and is universally supposed to be under the control of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of the USSR. Apart from usually fruitless manoeuvres for a "united front", the Red International does all it can to encourage and support strikes and industrial disturbances in all capitalist countries, and, wherever possible, the active propaganda of communism itself. Its vision of a future world organisation of trade unions, *under a universal communist régime*, is not without merit. But in the meantime, with trade unionism facing capitalist employers and unfriendly governments, we cannot help thinking that, as in the case of the Comintern, the avowed interference of Moscow in the internal affairs of other countries actually militates, by the nationalist resentment that it creates, against the progress of communism itself.

How does Soviet Trade Unionism compare with British Trade Unionism?

Trade unionism in the USSR, it will have been realised, is a large and powerful organisation, more extensive than trade unionism in any other country, more busily engaged in a wider range of functions, and more closely connected with the other organs of the state. It is, we think, unique in the intense interest that it takes in increasing the productivity of the nation's industry; in its inclusion within its own membership of the directors and managers who have taken the place of the capitalist employers, and in its persistent desire to reduce costs. We shall describe in a subsequent chapter how cordially it has accepted the various arrangements—in substitution for the capitalist's incessant desire to increase his profits—for securing the utmost possible output at the lowest possible expense to the community.¹ But what, it may be asked, does the trade

¹ See Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

union in the USSR retain from its model in British trade unionism? Put summarily, it may be answered that the soviet trade union, like the British, is emphatically the organ of the wage-earners as such: it is based on optional individual membership and subscription; it appoints and pays its own officials and manages its business by its own elected committees; it conducts, through its highest committees and its national officials, the collective bargaining with the employing organisations by which the general scheme and standard rates of wages are fixed; piece-work rates are settled in each factory, job by job, after discussion with the union's local officials and not without their consent; these officials may actually be specialist "rate-fixers", for whom the union organises special training; it takes part, through its chosen representatives and appointed officials, in almost every organ of government; finally, its essential function is that of maintaining and improving the worker's conditions of life - taking, however, the broadest view of these, and seeking their advancement only in common with those of the whole community of workers.

Not so easy to explain is the relation of the soviet trade union to the other organs of the Soviet State. "Are the trade unions", asked Tomskey in 1927, "dependent on or independent of the state? If this is to be understood in the formal interpretation which Western European trade unions usually give to the question, then, of course, we are independent, for the trade unions are managed by their own democratically elected organs, have their own funds, and are in no way subject to the state. In the wider meaning of the word, in the sense of class politics, the unions are dependent, as organs of a united class, for the state is our state. But this dependence is based on mutual dependence, for equally the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government is dependent upon the trade unions. How can they be independent when we have 4 representatives in the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government and 60 representatives in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets itself; when we have a consultative vote in the Council of People's Commissaries on every question that arises therein; when the Council of People's Commissaries cannot decide a single question concerning¹ the life of the workers without our final decision in the matter; when we have the right to remove from the agenda of any high state organ any question whatever, by a mere telephone call saying, 'Just a moment. You want to discuss such and such a matter: but you have not asked us our opinion. We have something to say on the matter. Be good enough to postpone that item'? And we know of no case when this has been refused us. The trade unions have the right to call upon any of the People's Commissaries to appear before them to make a report, and no one of them has the right to refuse us on the grounds that he is not formally responsible to the unions in question."¹

We suggest that the relation of soviet trade unionism to the other

¹ *The Trade Unions, the Party and the State*, by M. Tomskey, Moscow, 1927, pp. 18-19.

organs of the soviet state cannot be accurately estimated until the position and influence of the Communist Party is appreciated. To this we devote a subsequent chapter entitled "The Vocation of Leadership" (Chapter V. in Part I.).

SECTION II

THE ASSOCIATIONS OF OWNER-PRODUCERS

It was characteristic of Lenin's genius that he set superlative value on the principle of multifariousness in social organisation, not only for the sake of that universal participation in government which, as he held, could alone make democracy real, but also as a "guarantee of vitality . . . a pledge that the common and single aim will be successfully achieved". Only on this principle, it was urged, could men and women of diverse temperaments and talents, antecedents and circumstances, be all enrolled for the supreme task of building the socialist state. Hence we find, in the USSR, alongside the trade union of the wage and salary earners employed by state, municipal and consumers' cooperative enterprises and institutions, an entirely different one might almost say a contradictory—type of organisation, the self-governing workshop or collective farm. In this type the members are not recipients of salary or wage; indeed, not employed under any contract of service at all. They are, individually or jointly, owners or part owners not only of the instruments of production but also of the products of their labour. This method of organising man as a producer has been, in western Europe, for over a century, continuously advocated, and frequently practised under the name of cooperative production, as a desirable and practicable alternative to the organisation of industry under the capitalist profitmaker. As such it has been the subject of heated controversy; is it either a desirable or a practicable alternative to the wage system? Incidentally, it may be said that the present writers replied in the negative,¹ at any rate within the framework of the capitalist system. Hence we have been all the more interested to discover that, within the framework of Soviet Communism, associations of owner-producers, of one or other kind, have, within the past decade, become actually the predominant type in the agriculture of the USSR; whilst they have apparently demonstrated their advantages in various branches of manufacturing industry, and in such widespread methods of earning a living as hunting and fishing.

(a) THE SELF-GOVERNING WORKSHOP

We start our analysis of the constitutional structure of associations of owner-producers in the USSR, not with the largest and in every way

¹ See *The Cooperative Movement in Great Britain*, by Beatrice Potter, 1891; *Industrial Democracy*, by S. and B. Webb, 1898; *The Consumers' Cooperative Movement*, by the same, 1922.

the most important group, namely, that of the collective forms, but with that which stands in most marked contrast with what we have described in our preceding section on trade unionism, namely, the associations of owner-producers in manufacturing industry, or what in England is called the Self-Governing Workshop.¹

The typical "manufacturer" of Russia in the nineteenth century was neither the capitalist entrepreneur nor the wage-paid artisan, but the individual handicraftsman, working alone or in a family group, on the wood or iron, wool or flax, bone or leather that he made up into commodities for household use, to be sold for his own subsistence. At all times a group of these handicraftsmen would unite in a labour "artel" (the word dates from the twelfth century). "This", we are told, "was a temporary association of individuals for a definite industrial undertaking, usually of a temporary character, conducted on a basis of joint management and responsibility." It was unrecognised by the law, and enjoyed no official or legal protection; but was habitually not interfered with by the government. Many artels were formed for work at building construction or manufacturing in the cities. Others existed in the villages for the production of commodities for sale. Many were formed "annually for each year's campaign, and dissolved after the accounts for the goods delivered and sold in the season had been settled".² A small proportion of them latterly took a more durable form as cooperative societies for production. On the other hand, a much larger proportion had, by 1914, lost their economic independence, and had fallen into the hands of capitalist middlemen, who either gave out their own materials to be made up at a "sweated" rate, or sold them on credit to the associated handicraftsmen, taking back the product in furniture, toys, leather goods, textile stuffs or articles of clothing at ruinously low prices.³ In 1914 the aggregate

¹ For information as to the past and present of the kустar handicraftsmen, their artels and their cooperative societies, the most accessible sources are *The Cooperative Movement in Russia during the War*, by E. M. Kayden and A. N. Antsiferov (Economic Social History of the War, Yale University, New Haven, 1929, 436 pp.); *Les Voies du développement de la coopération de production en URSS*, par W. Tikhomirov, 1931, secretary of central council of cooperative societies; see also by the same, *Die Genossenschaften im sozialistischen Aufbau* (Berlin), 1927, p. 36; *The Soviet Worker*, by J. Freeman, 1931, pp. 238-240, gives a useful summary. How it appeared to the Russian orthodox economist (and to the Tsarist Government) will be seen in the report of the Commission impériale de Russie à l'Exposition Universelle de Paris, 1900, entitled *La Russie à la fin du 19^e siècle*, ouvrage publié sous la direction de M. W. de Kovalevsky (Paris, 1900, pp. 625-658). There is a useful collection (in Russian) of all the decrees on handicraft cooperation and kустar industries by L. A. Seltzky and L. R. Koisky, edited by Professor D. M. Genkin, Moscow, 1928. With this must be read the important decree and resolution of July 23, 1932, by the Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom of the USSR, rearranging the whole organisation.

Other works in Russian are *Zakonodatel'stvo o promkooperatsii* (The Legislation on Incops), by D. M. Genkin, Moscow, 1933; *Ten Years of Incops in the USSR*, by V. Gnoussev and I. P. Chernishev, Moscow, 1932; *Parlovo* (a collection of stories and essays on Incops in Pavlovo), by V. Korolenko and K. Pazhitnov.

² *The Cooperative Movement in Russia during the War*, by E. M. Kayden and A. N. Antsiferov, 1929, pp. 4, 367.

³ *Les Voies du développement de la coopération de production en URSS*, par W. Tikhomirov, 1931.

number of these owner-producers in industrial pursuits was given as five and a quarter millions, constituting a census population of some fifteen or twenty millions, representing as much as one-eighth of Tsarist Russia at that date. Their gross output was estimated at 2400 million roubles, equal to one-half of that of the factory industry of the time. During the seven years of war and civil war, 1914-1920, although some of the unions of artels "achieved important results in the service of the country and the army",¹ two-thirds of this population of handicraftsmen faded away, the bulk of the survivors being found, in 1921, in the more remote villages which suffered least from the ravages of the contending armies.

Under the Soviet Government these independent owner-producers have been, from 1919 onwards, and especially since 1932, revived and encouraged, as an approved alternative form of production (particularly for household supplies) to that of employment at wages in the industries conducted by government or trust, municipality or consumers' cooperative society. Lenin's original policy was "to maintain and develop energetically cooperative production", not only as a way of alleviating the condition of the peasants, but also as the means by which the small industry could, as he then believed, "develop into mass production, on the basis of free associations of workers".² Consequently the handicraftsmen were, from the outset, enabled freely to form productive cooperative societies, which have been, at times, granted state credit for the purchase of materials at the lowest possible prices. Sometimes small factories or workshops, abandoned by their owners, were handed over to such societies. In other cases they have been helped to buy machinery and workshop equipment. Occasionally the experts of a trust, or of a particular modernised plant, have assisted one of the larger artels to change its whole system of production in such a way as greatly to increase its output.³

The various government departments, central or municipal, together with the manufacturing trusts and the consumers' cooperative societies, have, during the past decade, willingly supplied their own needs by contracting to take from the manufacturing associations of owner-producers (incops), at agreed fixed prices, a large proportion of their output, thus ensuring for long periods a profitable market for their wares. Nor have the isolated independent handicraftsmen been left entirely unaided. The incops have been asked to do everything possible to bring

¹ *The Cooperative Movement in Russia during the War*, by E. M. Kayden and A. N. Antsiferov, 1929, p. 366.

² *Les Voies du développement de la coopération de production en URSS*, par W. Tikhomirov; quoting from vol. xx. p. 466 of the Russian text of Lenin's *Works*.

³ "Thus, upon the paper's (*Trud*) initiative, a factory let us say manufacturing shoes, undertakes to assist a shoemaking artel in improving and increasing its output. An artel is a cooperative enterprise, which unites sometimes as many as five or six hundred artisans who formerly worked in their own little shops. Although in numbers these artels often present sizable factories, the method of work too often remains as of old, each man doing a complete job without attempting to sectionalize the work. Under the guidance of experts from a factory employing modern production methods, it has been possible to so arrange the work of the artels as to increase the output many times" (*Moscow Daily News*, June 23, 1932).

them into the network of organisations, and meanwhile to assist them by contracting to take their individual products so as to assist their marketing.¹ Especially since the establishment of the Five-Year Plan in 1928 have these manufacturing associations of owner-producers multiplied and developed. The result has been, not only the progressive revival of the great bulk of the kустar industry,² but also the enlargement of its scope, and its assumption of definite constitutional forms according to the pattern common throughout the soviet system. By a remarkable decree of July 23, 1932, by the Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom of the USSR, the whole system was further developed and drastically re-organised.³

At the beginning of 1932, in addition to an uncounted host of isolated individual handicraftsmen who still exist, in the cities as well as in the villages, to the aggregate number of a million or more, the number of definitely organised cooperative societies of this kind was estimated at about 20,000, with 30,000 workshops or other establishments, having a total membership of 2,350,000 men and women, representing a census population of seven or eight millions, with an aggregate gross production of commodities valued at about four and a half thousand million roubles. Another calculation of later date, and including a wider range of societies, puts the amount, in 1932, of "output of the producing cooperative associations, including invalids and timber-working cooperatives" (to which we refer elsewhere), at "6230 million roubles, calculated at planned prices of 1932".⁴ Whereas before the war the great majority of the handicraftsmen worked at home, now fewer than a third do so, and of the members of the cooperative societies fewer than one-eighth. These societies, in half a dozen instances, now run small coal-pits, producing, in the aggregate, more than two million tons per annum, and, in one case, at Rechesk in

¹ When unemployment was rife, the labour exchanges occasionally pressed a cooperative society, whose little factory was manufacturing successfully, to admit as additional members individual handicraftsmen who had failed to maintain themselves by independent production; or to accept unemployed youths as additional apprentices and eventual members; sometimes selecting one half from sons of existing members and the other half from the labour exchange.

² So greatly has the nationalised and municipalised industry increased that all the handicraft industry accounts only for one-fifth of the manufacturing production of the USSR, in 1933, instead of the one-third of that of Tsarist Russia with which it was credited in 1913.

³ These associations of owner-producers in industry (incops) have been classified as under by the latest Russian authority on the subject (*The Legislation of Incops*, by D. M. Genkin, Moscow, 1933):

(1) Associations for Supply and Sale, in which every member works at home, but sells the whole or part of his output through the society, from which he obtains his raw material and adjuncts. Members, who must themselves work, enjoy a reduction of income tax on the part of their output sold through the society.

(2) Associations for Joint Production, in which the members all work at home, but materials and product alike belong to the society, and not to individual members.

(3) *Artels*, which maintain a common workshop in which members are associated in a particular craft or branch of industry (the law forbidding an 'artel composed of workers in different crafts).

⁴ *Summary of Results of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933, p. 61).

the Urals, even a blast furnace.¹ There are, in Kazakestan, lead mines under incops; elsewhere various small machine-making factories; many quarries, brickfields and lime-kilns, and even small chemical plants producing soap, acetic acid, iodine, nicotine and various radio supplies.² But the incops mainly devote themselves, to the extent of more than half their work, to the preparation of various kinds of food products and to the production and repair of all sorts of commodities for household use, such as furniture and kitchen equipment, boots and shoes, barrels and baskets, every description of textile stuffs and made-up clothing, mats and rugs of all kinds, toys, leather goods, artistic wood and iron work, pottery, and even hand painting on wood, by those who formerly produced religious icons. For sale to the public in the cities, these cooperative societies have over a thousand shops, and more than that number of stands. Their members, indeed, have come to form an important element in the urban population. Whereas, in 1926, the handicraftsmen in the cities numbered only half a million, or 2.1 per cent of the population, in 1931 the urban registration disclosed their numbers as about two millions, or 6.2 per cent of the population.³

The Members' Meeting

The base of the constitutional hierarchy, in which these organised groups of industrial owner-producers are represented, is everywhere the meetings of members of their several incops or industrial cooperative societies, which may each include anything from a few dozen to a thousand or more workers; the average being a little over a hundred. In the smaller incops these meetings, which every member over 18 years of age is expected to attend, take place frequently, according to the rules of the particular society, usually every few weeks. The course of the incop's business is reviewed by the president, manager or other official, and any subject of interest to the members can be discussed. Once a year the president—often also a manager—and, to constitute the presidium, half a dozen other members are elected, together with the prescribed number of delegates to other bodies. The incops in a given locality, and manufacturing the same kind of commodities, may also join together in a specialised "union" for common convenience, as for the joint supply of tools, raw materials or auxiliary components, or joint representation in dealings with state

¹ The Rechesk plant, in the Urals, produces 15,000 tons of pig-iron a year, practically all of which supplies the needs of other incops. In other cases there are rolling mills, which refashion scrap iron and steel obtained from the plants under the direction of the Commissariat of Heavy Industries. The coal-mines of the incops in the Donbas and elsewhere in the Ukraine and in East Siberia supply indifferently other incops, or the local industries, or USSR enterprises.

² Much of the work of timber-cutting, as well as that of fashioning the timber into planks, doors, plywood, etc., is done by groups of workmen associated in artels. These, however, are not included in the incops organisation, but have a union of their own (*Vsokopromlessoyus*), which works in conjunction with the newly formed Commissariat of Timber (*Narkomles*). These timber artels are grouped, not by the Union republics but by oblasts or krajs; and, in some special cases, by autonomous republics.

³ *Summary of Results of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933, p. 189).

departments. But the principal delegation is to the regional council, to which all incops within the region (usually an oblast or krai), irrespective of the particular commodity that they manufacture, are now required to belong. The members' meeting elects also in each case a committee of revision, whose main duty is to audit the accounts. According to law this committee ought to include in its membership some members of other incops. It is this committee of revision that decides the occasional disputes that arise in the society, subject to appeal to the regional council. If the membership of the incop does not exceed 300, it is the ordinary meeting of members which makes this election of delegates. If, however, as is increasingly coming to be the case in the large cities, the incop has many hundreds of members, the aggregate meeting is held only annually, to elect a smaller executive council of a few dozen members; and it is this executive council which chooses alike the incop's own officers and its delegates to the regional council.

Under the revised arrangements of 1932, the regional councils (soviets), whilst aiding the incops by instruction, planning, advice, and settlement of disputes, do not themselves have any operative functions. They do not, that is to say, themselves engage in production or distribution,¹ nor are the incops in any way hampered in their several industries. Each incop is freely to obtain for itself the materials that it requires, with the exceptions of wool, cotton, flax, hemp, silk cocoons and hides other than pig-hides. These may be obtained how the incop pleases, but only within the geographical districts prescribed by the Supplies Committee of the Council of Labour and Defence (STO). Each incop is also to be free to acquire from any of the state enterprises such industrial remnants, waste and refuse (including metal scrap, textile waste, rags, rejects and waste timber) as it may need, and all state enterprises are directed to enter into contracts for these supplies at prices to be agreed upon. The incops are to be free to obtain from the state bank the credit that they require, and to sell their products as and wherever they choose, including the open markets in the towns and their own retail shops. Except when working on materials provided from state funds, the incops are no longer required to dispose of any part of the output to any state department, but all state departments are directed to place with the incops such orders as they can. Orders for its own manufactured products may now be sought and obtained by each incop direct from the consumers' cooperative movement, or from state or municipal departments, or from any of the government trusts, as well as from individual purchasers. Prices are left to be settled by agreement or contract in each case. The one transaction that is strictly prohibited is "speculation", meaning buying commodities with the intention of selling them again at a profit—in other words, the incops are not to engage in mere dealing. It should be noted that, although

¹ There seems to be one exception. The Vsekopromssoviet has under it a "metal-promsoyus", or group of incops working in metal, which itself performs "operative functions" in conjunction with these incops.

the incops are founded on the principle of a partnership of the workers themselves, they are allowed, by way of exception, to employ non-members at wages, as specialists (such as engineers) or as subsidiary or seasonal workers, to the extent of not more than one-fifth of the membership, or than 30 per cent of the combined total of members and candidates for membership. The non-members thus employed at wages, who are generally members of their respective trade unions, must all receive the rates current in their several industries ; as agreed to by the trade unions. Nothing in the nature of undercutting is allowed.

The Regional Council of Incops

The decree of July 23, 1932, whilst abolishing various intermediate and All-Union federal bodies of industrial cooperative societies,¹ established an obligatory association of the incops within a given region ; not for the purpose of control or of interference with their business enterprises—in which they were to enjoy an enlarged independence—but solely for their assistance in fulfilling the tasks which they had undertaken. The region for this purpose was to be either each of the six smaller constituent republics, or else, in the RSFSR and in other districts of highly developed industry, the oblast or krai, or an area specially defined. Each such region has now a council of delegates from its constituent incops, which are represented approximately in proportion to their several memberships, as fixed by the council itself from time to time. This council no longer decides on the levy to be made upon the funds of each incop for regional and All-Union administration and other purposes. All such levies are to be kept down to a minimum, and to be made by a special meeting for the purpose, at which specially delegated representatives of the several incops within the region will confer with representatives of the regional council. That council will be responsible for supervising the audit of the societies' accounts by their own committees of revision, and, where necessary, for supplying competent auditors to assist any society. The regional council is also responsible for supervision of the general direction of the incops' several activities but solely for the purpose of securing the due fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by each of them. The greatest possible independence in management is to be left to each incop, on the understanding that they are, for the most part, primarily to supply the household commodities needed by the rural community, to the extent at least of 70 per cent of their production. The incops declare that their aim is

¹ Thus the decree peremptorily "liquidates" the All-Union Federation of Food Industry Cooperatives, the All-Union Federation of Heavy Industry Cooperatives, and the All-Union Federation of Industrial Cooperatives ; and lays down that "under no circumstances is it permitted to create in the regional councils of incops cumbersome apparatus, once the organisation has been permitted in the structure of the All-Union Federation of Incops of specialised groups for the fundamental forms of the incops". Republic Associations of the heavy metal industry are to continue ; and also the All-Union Cooperatives of the Timber Industry, but "without creating associations of these cooperatives in the various republics".

to make this percentage at least 75 per cent, but it is admitted that this amount has not yet been reached.

The All-Union Council of Industrial Cooperatives

In place of the Central Federation (Vsekopromsoyus) established in 1922, as a directing and coordinating centre, there is now established an All Union Council of Incops (Vsekopromsoviet), to which all the regional councils send representatives, and which also acts as republic council for the RSFSR. It is expressly laid down in the decree that this "Council of the Incops of the USSR and RSFSR shall not perform operative functions of any kind". It is to be supervisory, not executive. What is to this council expressly "reserved" is "the organising work, accountancy, directorial, and prospective planning and representation of the incops in government organisations (concerning credits, funds of supply, protection of state laws, grants to the incops)".¹

In 1932 was held the first All-Union Congress of the reorganised producers' cooperatives² (incops), at which some 200 delegates attended. Such a Congress will presumably be held every few years, but had, in 1934, not yet been repeated. The Congress elected an executive council to meet as a plenum once in every few months, with a president, and other members of a presidium, by whom the work of supervising the whole 20,000 incops is done. During 1933 and 1934 the executive council invited to Moscow for consultation the heads of most of the incops from time to time.

There has never been a People's Commissar for cooperative production, any more than for the consumers' cooperative movement. Such supervision and attention as has been given to the subject by the government at the Kremlin has come within the province of the Council of Labour and Defence (STO). It is interesting that the president for the time being of the All-Union Council of Incops (Vsekopromsoviet) is admitted, when he chooses to attend, to the meetings of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), the Sovnarkom and the Council of Labour and Defence (STO); in each case with only a consultative voice. Perhaps the most important relation into which the All-Union Council enters is its participation with the officials of Gosplan in the annual settlement and the almost continuous adjustment of the General Plan, so far as concerns the societies forming its membership. The preliminary plan is drawn up by Gosplan itself, but it is based on the separate reports which the Executive Committee obtains from every one of the 20,000 incops, stating what they have pro-

¹ The membership of the central federation for previous years is given as:

1922	.	.	.	84,000	1928	.	.	.	1,004,000
1923	.	.	.	187,000	1929	.	.	.	1,454,000
1924	.	.	.	248,000	1930	.	.	.	1,944,000
1925	.	.	.	344,000	1931	.	.	.	2,363,000
1926	.	.	.	467,000	1932	}	.	.	
1927	.	.	.	599,000					

² *Moscow Daily News*, December 28, 1932.

duced during the preceding year, and what they think they can produce for the ensuing year. The provisional decision by Gosplan of what kind and what amount of production should be undertaken by the incops, arrived at in consultation with the Executive Committee, after consideration of the needs of the USSR as a whole, is then submitted to the several regional councils, who pass on each part of it, with criticisms and suggestions, to the several incops, whose officials and committees have promptly to give it their serious consideration, and return it with any objections or counter-proposals. If any incop finds a difficulty in undertaking the manufacture of any of the commodities that the Plan requires from it, the regional council may arrange for the technical instruction of some of its younger members at a special district school maintained for the purpose.

The educational provision made by the incops for their own members and their families, apart from and in addition to that made by the soviets under the People's Commissars of Education in the several constituent or autonomous republics, is extensive and steadily increasing. In 1934 no less than 98 million roubles was appropriated for this purpose by the Executive Committee. All the larger units maintain their own trade schools and evening technical classes. In some of the principal cities there are university colleges, exclusively for members of incops or their sons and daughters—that at Leningrad had, in 1934, 2400 students all over eighteen, pursuing five-year courses. In addition, more than sixty technicums are maintained. Three-quarters of the students are provided with stipends, sometimes more liberal than those of the students of the state institutions. There are special club-houses for incop members. Their new "Palace of Culture" at Leningrad cost ten million roubles, and claims to be the best in the city. The incops have also their own holiday homes and sanatoria.

Members of the incops are not covered by the general scheme of social insurance. The All-Union Council has accordingly provided its own fund, by a levy on all the incops, in which the whole membership is included, including the wage-earners whom they employ. This fund had in 1933 an accumulated capital of over a hundred million roubles, being eight times as much as in 1929. The fund provides medical attendance and medicines, and secures admission to hospitals and convalescent homes, for all the members and their wives and children throughout the USSR. All confinements are treated in hospital, with sixteen weeks full wages, as in the state scheme. This is wholly independent of the People's Commissars of Health, except that the assistance of the state medical service is obtained, on a contract involving the payment of forty million roubles annually, in districts in which the number of incop members is insufficient to warrant an independent medical service.

We see, in this reorganisation of the old kustar artels, an extraordinarily rapid development of what has again become, alongside the state and municipal factories, an important element in the industry of the USSR. It is one more example of the tendency to multiformity affording oppor-

tunity for ever-wider participation in the organised life of the community. The report of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) in 1933 may rightly claim that "cooperative industry . . . in which the form of handicraft associations predominates . . . plays a great part in the industrial life of the country. It is in connection with state industry, and supplements it in a number of ways (supplies supplementary raw material, produces auxiliary materials, works up state raw materials, and semi-finished goods, produces articles for the general market, etc.). At the same time the industrial cooperative industry comes forward as the special means for the socialist remoulding of the small home worker, and, on the basis of the cooperative organisation of production, draws him into the common socialist channel of industrial development."¹

It is interesting to witness, in the Soviet Union, the successful adoption of a form of industrial organisation which has been extensively tried, during a whole century, in various capitalist countries, but seldom with any considerable or lasting success. Neither in Great Britain nor in France, neither in Germany nor in the United States, nor yet in any other country of advanced industrialism, have manufacturing associations of owner-producers, themselves jointly owning the actual product of their daily labour—that is to say, self-governing workshops—been able to make any considerable headway against systems of industrial production in which the working producers do not own the product of their labour, but are remunerated only by wages or salaries. Why is it different in the USSR? We suggest that the answer is to be found partly in the different environment provided in a country from which the profit-making capitalist has been entirely eliminated; and partly in the deliberate limitation and regulation of the sphere allotted to the cooperative associations. It is noticeable that the incops of the USSR seldom or never compete in the market with the state trusts or municipal enterprises. On the contrary, these latter are on the most friendly terms with the artels and incops, which are accorded a function of their own, duly recognised and specified in the General Plan, and are constantly being helped to fulfil it. In other countries the associated workers find themselves ruthlessly competed with and undercut even to the point of extinction, by the mass-production of gigantic establishments eager to obtain a monopoly of the markets. But experience shows that associations of producers in capitalist countries also succumb in another way. Here and there, very exceptionally, usually by creating a speciality of their own, or attaching to themselves a special clientele, they have successfully withstood the warfare of their capitalist rivals, even to the point of sometimes making considerable incomes for the cooperating members. These have then, almost invariably, sooner or later, limited their numbers, and shrunk into small partnerships, including shareholders who are not working members, and employing non-members at wages. Tempted by what are, in effect, high profits, they eventually become indistinguishable from the capitalist profit-makers

¹ *Summary of Results of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933, p. 61).

themselves. In the Soviet Union this process of degeneration is watched and effectively prevented. When an incop shows signs of closing its body of members to recruits from outside, it finds itself unostentatiously required to fill up vacancies so as at least to keep up its number. When it becomes too prosperous, so that its members could share among themselves incomes markedly in excess of those secured by the trade unions for their own members in state industry, it is sharply reminded that this is against the law under which incops are formed. The excess profits may be carried to a reserve fund, or added to the insurance fund, but they may not be shared among the members. In most cases a new arrangement of prices takes place, either in the rates at which the incop buys its materials and components, or in the prices it obtains from the purchasers of its wares. When a manufacturing association of producers obtains most of its materials from the Government, and sells much of its product either to some branch of the Government, or to one or other department of *Centrosyus*, it is not difficult to prevent the annual shares of the members in their own products from rising substantially above the earnings of similar workers in the state factories or the consumers' cooperatives. Moreover, the members are required always to work at piece-work rates, as the basis of the advances that they receive in lieu of wages : and there is no provision allowing payment of interest or profit to non-workers. Thus protected and safeguarded, the manufacturing associations of owner-producers in the USSR do no harm to the collectivist organisations, in the interstices of which they live. On the contrary, by the positive addition that they make to the aggregate of commodities and services brought to market, they benefit the community as a whole. And they can add the further boon of an ever-widening variety in the supply of the commodities and services that they contribute. It is a net gain to associate for handicraft production during the winter, the members of one or more collective farms ; or the dock labourers of an ice-bound port. Nor are the incops confined to production by manual labour. There are incops of artistic workers of more than one kind, including painters and sculptors. Associations of writers are formed to do their book production and publishing. There seems no reason why this form of organisation should not afford a socially useful means of livelihood to members of the "deprived" categories, who are admitted as members if they are prepared to work loyally with their hands ; and who might, at their option, unite among themselves to form new incops to render some special service calling for individual taste or skill, or not yet performed by any state or municipal enterprise.¹

(b) THE COLLECTIVE FARM

It is with a sudden acceleration of "Bolshevik tempo" that we pass, in the survey of the organisation of man as a producer, from the associa-

¹ There is reason to believe that somewhere in the neighbourhood of 4000 or 5000 persons belonging to the "deprived" categories are to be found among the membership

tious of owner-producers in industry to associations of owner-producers in agriculture.¹ In industry, as the reader will have realised, the new

of the incops, though they have not as yet formed societies of their own. The "social structure" of the membership of incops making returns on April 1, 1931 (these covering 719,000 members, or 45 per cent of the aggregate), was as under :

	City Incops, per cent	Village Incops, per cent
Former workmen or landless peasants	26.2	6.25
Members of kolkhosi	8.6	23.8
Poor peasants	12.7	23.95
Middle peasants and kulaks not employing hired labour	45.3	41.4
Former employees	5.4	0.6
Former kulaks employing hired labour	1.1	0.2
Kulaks, traders, employers and "deprived" persons	0.7	0.2
	100.0	100.00

(See *Ten Years of Incops in the USSR* (in Russian), by V. Gnossov and I. P. Chornischer, Moscow, 1932, p. 24.)

¹ The information available on agriculture in the USSR, even apart from that only in Russian, is as great in bulk as it is uneven in accuracy or relevance. The history and the geographical conditions of Russian agriculture are elaborately described in the erudite monograph by Vladimir P. Timoshenko, *Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem* (Leland Stanford University, California, 1932, p. 571); also in *Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by C. G. Robinson, 1932; *The Russian Peasantry*, by Stepniak, 1895, should also be read in this connection. The problem and its difficulties are well stated in the chapter "Russian Agriculture", by R. G. Tugwell, in *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase, R. Dunn, and R. G. Tugwell (New York, 1928). *Russia, Market or Menace*, by Thomas D. Campbell, 1932, gives a valuable report by an American expert on large-scale wheat-farming. Upon the peasant psychology, the four books by Maurice Hindus, *Broken Earth, Humanity Uprooted, Red Bread and The Great Offensive*, are invaluable. See also *The Russian Land*, by A. R. Williams (New York, 1928); *Collective Farm "Trud"*, a moving recital by a peasant woman, Eudoxia Pazukhina, of how she started a collective farm (London, 64 pp.); *Red Villages*, by J. A. Yakovlev (London, 1930, 128 pp.); and *Collective Farming in 1932* (Moscow, 1932), by the same. Stalin's own account of the policy from 1929 to 1931, together with the "model statutes", is given in *Building Collective Farms*, by J. Stalin (New York, 1931, 184 pp.). A valuable description of the internal organisation of the collective farms is given (in Russian) in *Distribution of Income in the Kolkhosi*, by N. Tataev (Partizdat, Moscow, 1932). A well-informed and generally adverse criticism will be found in the chapter on "Agriculture" by Professor Dr. Otto Auhagen, in *Soviet Economics*, edited by Dr. Gerhard Dobbert (1933). For recent hasty glimpses over a wide area, see the chapter on agriculture by John Morgan in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole (1933); *From Peasant to Collective Farmer*, by N. Buchwald and R. Bishop (1933); the five articles contributed to the *Manchester Guardian*, October 17-21, 1933, by its then correspondent W. H. Chamberlin; and *Reise durch hundert Kollektivwirtschaften*, by L. P. Boross (Moscow, 1932, 190 pp.). The publications in German are voluminous, and apparently of greater expertise and authority, if also more critical, than those in English. Those of Dr. Otto Schiller, the agricultural expert attached to the German embassy in Moscow, are published in *Berichte über Landwirtschaft*, the latest being (Sondeshett 79) *Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion* (1933, 82 pp.). See also his previous articles, "Die Kollektivisierung der russischen Landwirtschaft" and "Die landwirtschaftliche Problems der Sowjetunion, 1931-1932". These lengthy and valuable reports, although very critical, do not, in our opinion, support the adverse conclusions of the pamphlet entitled *Collectivised Agriculture in the Soviet Union*, published by the School of Slavonic Studies (London, 1934, 32 pp.).

and predominant type is the trade union, including all kinds and grades of workers by hand or by brain. In agriculture, though state farms, with the appropriate trade unions, are increasing in number and variety, it is the millions of individual owner-producers associated in collective farms that occupy the centre of the picture. Moreover, whilst the development of the kустар artels into industrial cooperative societies (incops) has been pursued without serious controversy, and without a trace of civil disorder, the advent of the collective farm (kolkhos), as the pattern organisation for the vast hordes of peasant cultivators on one-sixth of the earth's surface, has been accompanied, not merely by heated controversy, both public and private, but also, among the peasants themselves, by widespread sullen resentment, and not a little recalcitrance, which cannot be assumed to have yet (1934) been completely overcome. Indeed, it might almost be said that the partially enforced collectivisation and mechanisation of agriculture during 1929-1934 represents the final stage, not yet completed, of the rural uprisings of 1917, that effectually liquidated the private landlord.¹ The question inevitably arises, why did the Soviet Government of 1928, in face of prolonged and heated discussion within the Communist Party itself, attempt so drastic, and, as it seemed, so hazardous an experiment. The answer is that the situation was such as, within their framework of reference, to leave no other course open to them.

The Unproductive Peasant

Candid observers of the Russian mujik during the past half-century, whilst differing in their estimates of his "souful" qualities, agree in the testimony that as an agriculturist he has hitherto been, in the mass, either per head or per hectare, the least productive of all the peasantries of Europe. Whether as the result of nature or of nurture; of climate or of race; of centuries of oppression and illiteracy; or of generations of virtual slavery and peonage; or of a religion that imposed no code of conduct and amounted to little more than propitiatory rites, the typical mujik—when not under coercion by landlord, tax-collector, usurer or employer—failed to grow enough food, taking bad years with good, even to maintain his own family in full health and strength.² And the "bad

More impartial, and therefore specially cogent, is the able historical summary contained in two issues of the *Political Science Quarterly* (New York, January and June 1934), entitled "Collectivisation of Agriculture in the Soviet Union", by W. Ladejinsky. Other recent works are *Die Getreidewirtschaft in den Trockengebieten Russlands*, by B. Brutzkus, W. von Polotika and A. Von Ugrimoff; and *Das Agrarexperiment Sowjetrusslands*, by Dr. H. Zorner. *Die Bilanz des ersten Fünfjahrplanes der Sowjetwirtschaft*, by Dr. Otto Auhagen (Breslau, 1933, 75 pp.) gives great place to agriculture.

¹ Three substantial books recently published should be added, especially as each author takes a different view of what one of them has termed the "first revolution in agriculture anywhere since the bourgeois industrial revolution made the serf a peasant and a farmer". These are *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935; *Soviet Journey*, by Louis Fischer, 1935; and *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus.

² Let us, in fairness, briefly recapitulate some of his difficulties. His holding was, on the average, minute in area; and in the repeated redistributions, actually becoming smaller year after year. It was usually made up of numerous small strips, often miles

years" recurred with fatal frequency. During the first half of the nineteenth century, from 1800 to 1854, there are reported to have been no fewer than 35 years in which there was a more or less serious failure of the crops. In the 20 years from 1891 to 1910, there were only 4 good harvests, with 13 poor harvests, and 3 famine years. During the first decade of Soviet rule, 1918-1927, there were only 3 years of good harvests, 5 years of poor harvests and 2 famine years. This habitual unproductivity of the Russian peasant was masked, to the uncritical observer, by the fact that, so long as the landlord was in a position to exact his rent, the tax collector his taxes and the village usurer and employer the profits that they could squeeze out of their impecunious neighbours, some grain was always sent to market, even if the village starved. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the aggregate area, was, down to 1917, cultivated in the large farms of the improving landowners, and in the smaller but often substantial holdings of the kulaks, who had "added field to field" by their oppression of the poorer villagers. Thus, so long as the landowners remained, and the tax collector used force, and the kulaks' characteristic "thrift" was unrestrained, there could be, in all but the worst years, not only an adequate supply for the relatively small city populations but also, occasionally, a substantial export. Meanwhile the poor peasant was being increasingly "driven off the land"; and in bad years—during the past century, every other year—the infants, the aged, and often the nursing mothers were dying by thousands of inanition, typhus or enteric. We shall describe in a subsequent chapter¹ how frequently, in the present century, the peasants rose against their most obvious oppressors, the landlords; whose mansions they burnt, whose stores they plundered and whose land they divided. This almost continuous *jacquerie* was not the work of the Bolsheviks, who were not yet in office. Nor did it result in any substantial or lasting improvement in the condition of the mass of poor peasants, or in any increase of marketable foodstuffs. It did not even enlarge the area of the average peasant holding, nor give him an iron plough, nor any horse or ox to draw the plough. In 1917, with the swarming back of the men from the armies, and the workers from the factories, all demanding shares of the land of the village to which they belonged, the redistribution of the large estates merely increased the number of starving peasant holdings from some fourteen or fifteen millions in 1916 to some twenty-four or twenty-five millions in 1926.

apart, which had to be cultivated according to the common practice of his neighbours. He had hardly ever any adequate equipment (one-third of all the holdings had no iron plough, but only a wooden stick; at least one-fourth had no horse or ox with which to plough). Manuring of any kind was at a minimum, and artificial fertilisers were scarcely known. There was next to no rotation of crops. The minimum of labour was spent on weeding. Reaping was by the sickle, and thrashing by the flail; marketing practically limited to the passing visits of the grain dealer. To sum up, as compared with the peasant of France or Flanders, South Germany or the Tyrol, the majority of the Russian mujiku were, in 1900, still in the fourteenth century.

¹ See Part II., Chapter VII., "The Liquidation of the Landlord and the Capitalist".

The Crisis in Foodstuffs

Ever since the Bolshevik seizure of power, the maintenance of the food supply for the population of the cities and the Red Armies had been a constant preoccupation of the Soviet Government. This perpetual anxiety as to how the people could be saved from hunger, to which the British and French Governments in times of peace never gave a thought, was not directly due to any socialist measure taken by Lenin and his colleagues. On the contrary, it sprang from their inability, during a whole decade, to deal with the extreme individualism and primitive conditions of Russian peasant agriculture. During the years of War Communism, all the grain that could be discovered was simply taken by force for the feeding of the Red and the White Armies, which naturally led to the peasants limiting their cultivation either to what sufficed to feed themselves or what they saw their way to hide. The situation became desperate enough to drive Lenin to the New Economic Policy of 1921, under which a revival of limited capitalist enterprise, with market prices left free to be settled by "supply and demand", encouraged the kulaks to bring out their hidden grain in exchange for the commodities that they desired. It could not, however, avert the serious famine of 1921, which was the result, not merely of adverse weather conditions, but also of the widespread desolation wrought by the Civil Wars. The subsequent opening of the "scissors"—the disparity between the exchange values of primary products and manufactured articles—had grave consequences on the peasant mentality.¹ The great bulk of the peasantry, whether poor or relatively prosperous, had supported the Bolsheviks in overthrowing the Provisional Government, because this collapse of authority enabled the peasants, including the kulaks, to drive away the landowners and share their estates among the villagers. On similar grounds the peasantry had everywhere eventually supported the Red Armies against the Whites, because these latter threatened to reinstate the landlords in their possessions. But once that danger had disappeared, the peasants, poor, middle or kulak, now imagining themselves proprietors of the land they tilled, demurred to parting with their produce to feed the cities, even at free market prices, so long as these prices did not enable them to obtain the manufactured commodities they desired at something like the old customary rates. The peasants, moreover, even the very considerable proportion of them to whom the revolution had given land for nothing, resented, like peasant proprietors all over the world, the levying on them of any direct taxes.

¹ The obstinate divergence between the general level of exchange values for household commodities and that of exchange values for grain—the persistent wide opening of the "scissors"—was doubtless aggravated by the determination of the Soviet Government, for good and sufficient reasons of general policy, to press on the erection of new factories and the increase of machinery, rather than the immediate production of additional clothing and household necessities. But it must be remembered that the phenomenon of markedly higher exchange values for manufactures than for primary products has been, since 1921, common to all the world, irrespective of communist or any other policy, or even of currency systems or fiscal devices.

Nor did the marked development, in the village, of the characteristic peasant vices of greed and cunning, varied by outbursts of drunkenness and recurrent periods of sloth, produce anything like general prosperity, nor even any common improvement in agricultural methods. What became apparent was that the peasant, formerly servile, was becoming rebellious.

Mr. Maurice Hindus, who was born and bred in the Russian village, vividly describes his own astonishment at discovering, in a village meeting, the typically rebellious mujik.¹ The chairman of the village soviet had been speaking to an audience which gave him rapt attention. "Of a sudden, somewhere from the fringe of the audience, there boomed out a deep voice as startling as a thunderclap. 'Words, words, words—only words!' It was an elderly mujik speaking. Barefooted, bareheaded, with a flowing beard and in a soiled linen shirt, he raised his arms high as though to quiet the murmur of protest that his interruption had called forth. 'All for the benefit of the foreign visitor,' he drawled mockingly. 'Showing off. Look at me, *inostranetz*,' and he pounded his fists on his bulging chest. 'I am the truth, the sole putrid truth in this beastly land.' Denunciations hailed on him from every direction, but he paid no heed to them. 'I am sixty-five years of age. The soviets did give me land, but what shall I do with it? Can I eat land? I have no horse and what can I do on land without a horse?' The chairman himself, and several of his associates, sought to quiet him, but he raved on unperturbed. 'In the old days,' he shouted, raising his voice above the tumult that had broken out, 'we had a Tsar, landlords, exploiters, and yet I could always buy a horse if mine died, and boots too, and all the calico I could pay for. And now there is no Tsar, there are no landlords, there are no exploiters, and yet—no horse, no boots, no calico, nothing. Remember that, stranger.'

"I stared at the mujik, at the disturbed chairman, at the heaving mob. It seemed so unbelievable that anyone in Russia would dare to lift his voice in such haughty disdain, in such flaming defiance of the proletarian dictators—least of all a mujik. I remembered him so well in the old days, this lowly miserable creature of a mujik. How meek he seemed in the presence of officials. How humbly he would bow before a man in a uniform, or sometimes only in city clothes. With what alacrity he would remove his hat before anyone he deemed his superior. Shy he was, this unwashed, hairy, big-boned mujik, and cautious in his choice of words, in voicing a grievance, lest he give offence to the man representing *pravitel'stvo*—government—and when he noted in the expression of the official's face a sign of annoyance or disapproval he shrank back, apologised, begged for forgiveness. In his heart he may have cherished only hate for the official, but when face to face with him he was all meekness and docility. But now in this desolate village, I witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of a bedraggled, mud-bespattered mujik, actually denouncing and haranguing officials—all government—with no more restraint or compunction than as if he were scolding his son or whipping his horse. It seemed so terribly

¹ *Humanity Uprooted*, by Maurice Hindus, 1929, p. 149.

unreal, so unbelievably heroic!" This mujik proved to be typical of many in the succeeding years.

Matters were made not better but worse by the growing prosperity in the village of the more thrifty and more industrious, but also the more cunning and more oppressive of the agriculturists, to whom the opprobrious name of kulak (fist) was applied. The inequality of conditions, to which Stolypin's reforms had given an impetus, was not removed by the multiplication of starveling holdings and not lessened by the monopoly of resources by a minority of hated usurers. Though the kulaks might be climbing steadily into capitalists, the army of the landless was rapidly growing. What was, however, most serious of all was that the national food supply was rendered thereby not less but even more precarious than before. Whenever the harvest was relatively good, practically all the peasants consumed a larger and took to market a smaller proportion of the yield. In years of threatened scarcity, the kulaks had the cities at their mercy.

Experimental Improvements

It would, however, be unfair to the mujik, and an inaccurate description of the dilemma of the statesman, to ignore the various experiments in agricultural organisation which had been, in one locality or another, pretty extensively tried between 1917 and 1927. In the first place, there had been, among the more prosperous of the peasants, a great extension of agricultural cooperation of the ordinary type. Voluntary cooperative associations of independent peasants abounded in 1927, to the aggregate number, it was reported, of some 80,000 societies for several dozens of different purposes with literally millions of members.¹ This once powerful voluntary movement has now almost entirely ceased to exist. Its place has been taken by the so-called kolkhosi, or collective farms, in which the members united either the whole or some of their resources in capital and labour, in order to share among themselves as copartners an increasing output. Of these collective farms, of which some thousands had spontaneously come into existence between 1918 and 1927, with varying degrees of success, we may distinguish three types. There was, first, the association of members merely to the extent of combining their labour forces for joint tillage; for working in company in ploughing, sowing and harvesting a particular crop upon their several holdings of land, and sharing the proceeds among themselves. A second type, usually styled

¹ This agricultural progress had started, under Stolypin's reforms, even before the Revolution; but after 1917 it was greatly extended. By 1927 there were, in the USSR, no fewer than 80,000 agricultural cooperative societies, of nearly fifty different kinds—credit societies, marketing societies, creameries, societies for purchasing machinery and forty different kinds of specialist societies for developing particular crops or animal products. These 80,000 entirely voluntary cooperative societies numbered, in the aggregate, ten million members (many in more than one society). There were nearly 10,000 kolkhosi of the joint labour type, some 10,000 of the artel type, and more than a thousand communes. But all this enterprise, much of which is now superseded by the systematic organisation of sovkhosi and kolkhosi, left two-thirds of the peasant population almost untouched.

an *artel*,¹ was that of the association in which were united not merely the labour force but also the ownership of the capital employed (the land-holdings, the implements and the farm buildings), but only in so far as concerned the production of cereals or other specified crops, sometimes also with a common flock or herd; leaving in individual occupation and management the dwelling-houses, the garden grounds, the poultry, the bees, the domestic pig and sometimes a cow, for the particular care and profit of the several families. The third type was called the *commune*. In this, not only the fields and buildings connected with cereal cultivation, but also all the other rural enterprises, were owned and administered in common, and the whole proceeds were shared, together with the dwelling houses and all the improvements and amenities for common enjoyment that the settlement could afford. Some of these communes, in various parts of the USSR, had already proved remarkably successful over periods of several years, reaching a level of productiveness, and sometimes of amenity, amounting to what the western world would deem civilisation, superior not only to the average of the peasantry, but even to most of the collective farms of the *artel* type. It appeared, however, that the commune, to be permanently successful, required in its necessarily voluntary membership a considerably higher level of personal character, and also of managerial capacity, than other forms of village settlement, a level which could not reasonably be expected to become universal, or even to be commonly attained within a generation. If it was necessary to obtain, over the USSR as a whole, any considerable increase in the quantity of marketable grain even in good years—still more, if it was imperative, in the interest of the whole community, to ensure that there should be no actual shortage in the bad years that were certain to come—it did not seem possible for the government to sit down with folded hands to await the slow and gradual extension, to the entire peasantry, either of agricultural cooperative societies or of collective farming of any type whatsoever. Some way of quickening the tempo and enlarging the area of agricultural improvement had to be found. (On the other hand, the state farms (*sovkhozi*), which the Soviet Government had managed to retain in its own administration, and had been for nearly a decade struggling to cultivate exclusively with wage-labourers, had so far failed to produce, after their staffs had been fed, even in good years, more than a small net addition to the aggregate of marketable grain. It seemed impossible, in the near future, to transform these “grain factories” into an effective and, in bad years, a certain source of the nation’s food supply.

¹ The form of the *artel* was used for cooperative associations in agriculture (apparently for the first time) towards the end of 1895 by N. V. Levitsky, in the province of Kherson, afterwards spreading to Simbirsk, and some parts of Siberia, not in all cases extending to joint cultivation, and mainly for joint purchase of implements and other necessities, and generally the use of cooperative credit (*La Russie à la fin du 19^e siècle*, par M. W. de Kowalesky, 1900, p. 656). In its simplest form, the association for joint tillage, it reminds the student of the voluntary working “bee” of the American pioneer farmers, except that the latter deals successively with individual holdings, instead of simultaneously with all of them.

The Prolonged Discussion as to Policy

The problem for the Soviet statesmen was desperately difficult. It may surprise those who assume the existence of a dictatorship, and deny that of free speech, to learn that, for nearly three years (1925-1928), the issue was the subject of heated public controversy in articles, pamphlets and books, widely circulating in large editions, as well as prolonged committee debate in the Central Executive Council and within the Communist Party. There were those (such as Trotsky) who declared that the growth and development of the kulaks (here meaning merely the more prosperous minority of peasants, who employed wage labour) was, by rebuilding capitalism, endangering, if not destroying, the whole achievement of the Revolution. This faction demanded the most drastic measures for the suppression of the kulaks, but failed to make clear by what means it proposed to increase the agricultural output of the minute holdings of the majority of poor peasants otherwise than by the slow spread of one or other form of voluntary cooperation. There were those who laid more stress on the multiplication of state farms (sovkhozi), employing labourers at wages as in the state factories, which, it was said, would prove the only efficient and reliable source of the foodstuffs required. But no one showed how to develop state farms at a rate that would avert the peril of mass starvation. Accordingly, those for whom Bukharin and even A. I. Rykov were for some time the spokesmen urged that, as the state farms would take a long time to develop to the extent required, and as it was hopeless to look for agricultural improvements to the great mass of tiny holdings, it was only the more energetic and enlightened of the peasants, who had already obtained the use of relatively considerable holdings of land, with superior equipment and improved agricultural systems, who could promptly make any appreciable contribution to the increased aggregate production that was immediately needed. These, therefore, it was said, though often oppressive kulaks, should be encouraged and assisted to enlarge their enterprises, as the only available means of national safety, even at the price of temporarily reducing many more of the poor peasants to the position of wage labourers!¹

The Policy of Universal Collectivisation

In the end, the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets (TSIK), in conjunction with the Central Committee of the Communist Party, hammered out during 1927 an alternative policy, for which, we think, Stalin deserves most of the credit. As proclaimed by him in 1928, the decision of those committees prescribed, for immediate execution, nothing less than a second agrarian revolution, in which the whole of the

¹ It is interesting to notice that Stepniak (*The Russian Peasantry*, 1895), though hating the kulak, could at that date see no better prospect for the peasantry as a whole than being driven off the land by the kulak class, in order that, in some distant future, they might, as landless proletarians, be inspired to revolution. This, too (though without contemplation of even a future revolution), was virtually the line of Stolypin's great agricultural reforms of 1907-1910.

individual peasantry would be transformed within less than a decade. This was to unite (a) the utmost rapid development of the state farms (sovkhosi) with (b) a far more extensive gradual combination of the poorer and middle peasants, under government persuasion, in collective farms (kolkhosi) of the artel type; ¹ in both cases in order that (c) agriculture might be universally mechanised by tractors and harvesting combines to be supplied by the government; whilst (d) the output upon the enlarged farms could be further increased by rotation of crops and the use of fertilisers. Practically the whole of the individual peasantry was to disappear, and to become workers on relatively large amalgamated areas, either as cooperative owner-producers (on kolkhosi) or (in sovkhosi) as farm labourers at wages. Only in this way, it was suggested, could the twenty-five or twenty-six million tiny holdings be merged within the necessary time into a few hundred thousand relatively large farms on which the use of machinery would be practicable. Only in this way, it was urged, could the whole peasant population, and not merely an exceptional minority, be raised to the comprehension of improved systems of agriculture. Meanwhile, the kulak was to be taxed more severely, denied the use of the new government tractors, and harried in every possible way, with a view to his complete "liquidation" as a class, within a few years. It is this policy which has, since 1928, covered all parts of the USSR with collective farms, formed by peasants who have, nominally voluntarily, but often after intense propaganda, and at times under considerable local pressure, merged their little holdings in larger units, belonging to themselves jointly instead of to themselves individually. In this way, there has been created, for agriculture (at the cost of driving out the universally hated kulaks and the recalcitrant Ukrainians or Don Cossacks by tens or even hundreds of thousands of families), something analogous to the kустар artels, or cooperative societies of owner-producers in manufacturing industry, that we described in the preceding section.

We may pause to consider the magnitude and the difficulty of this transformation. To convert, within less than a decade, even two-thirds of a population of 120 millions of peasantry steeped in ignorance, suspicion and obstinacy, accustomed for centuries to individual cultivation of the little holdings that they now deemed their own, with all the cunning and greed that such a system develops, into public-spirited cooperators working

¹ See, for instance, the explicit descriptions of the three types in "Dizzy with Success", reprinted from *Pravda* of March 2, 1930, in *Leninism*, by Joseph Stalin, vol. II, pp. 283-284, 1933. "Is it the Associations for Joint Tillage? No, it is not. The Associations for Joint Tillage, in which the means of production are not yet socialised, represent a stage in the collective farm movement which has already been passed. Is it, perhaps, the agricultural communes? No, it is not the agricultural communes. The communes are still isolated phenomena in the collective farm movement. The conditions are not yet ripe for the agricultural communes as the predominant form, in which not only all production but distribution also is socialised. The key link in the collective farm movement, its predominant form at the present moment, which we have now to seize hold of, is the agricultural artel. . . . It is on this that the 'Model Statute' for collective farms—the final text of which is being published to-day—is based."

upon a prescribed plan for a common product to be equitably shared among themselves, might well have been deemed hopelessly impracticable. At least, it would have been said, by anyone acquainted with a peasant population, that such a transformation—the “real agrarian revolution in Russia”¹—must require a whole generation of persistent effort.

The Struggle for Efficiency in the Kolkhosi

The past five years have, indeed, seen a tireless struggle in nearly all parts of the USSR, to induce the gigantic membership of the kolkhosi, which had often been achieved only by considerable governmental pressure, to remain loyally in membership, and to work their cooperative enterprises with honesty and adequate efficiency. At first, by widespread propaganda and reckless promises of tractors and harvesters, improved ploughs and selected seeds, the process of conversion was altogether too quick. Whilst only 20 per cent of collectivisation had been contemplated during the first year, something like 55 per cent was attained. For so rapid a transformation the Soviet Government was not prepared; and more than half the new collective farms could not be given the aid of tractors. The zeal of the government agents had led, on the one hand, to something very like compulsion of the hesitating peasants to join the collectives; and, on the other, to unduly large and repeated levies upon such of them as were successful, representing what was claimed to be the government share of the harvest. The middle peasants, feeling themselves condemned to a merger that was repugnant to them, in many instances slaughtered, in 1929-1930, their cattle and horses, sheep and pigs, rather than bring them into the common stock.² So widespread was the outcry that the central committees were driven to instruct Stalin to issue his manifesto entitled “Dizzy with Success”, in which the zeal of the government agents was rebuked; the voluntary character of membership of the collectives was emphasised; permission to withdraw was conceded; and proper consideration of the varying stock brought in by different members was insisted on. Nevertheless the animals continued to be slaughtered and the total membership to fall off. Partial failures of crop in 1931 and 1932 deepened the discontent. This was especially

¹ “The truth is, the real agrarian revolution in Russia occurred towards the end of 1927, as an outcome of the enactments of the 15th Congress of the Party” (“Agriculture”, by Professor Dr. Otto Aulagon, in *Soviet Economics*, edited by Dr. Gerhard Dobbert (1933), p. 212).

The 15th Party Congress did, in fact, adopt a report from the Central Committee containing the following passage: “Where is the way out? The way out is in the passing of small disintegrated peasant farms into large-scale amalgamated farms, on the basis of communal tillage of the soil; in passing to collective tillage of the soil on the basis of the now higher technique. The way out is to amalgamate the petty and tiny peasant farms gradually but steadily, not by means of pressure but by example and conviction, into large-scale undertakings on the basis of communal, fraternal collective tillage of the soil, supplying agricultural machinery and tractors, applying scientific methods for the intensification of agriculture. *There is no other way out.*”

² The magnitude of this holocaust of live-stock is seldom realised. The following table shows that, in one year, 1929-1930, more than sixty million animals were slaughtered, being one-quarter of the whole; and in the course of the next three years, 1931-1933,

the case in some parts of the once-favoured community of the Don Cossacks, where the loss of the special privileges, in which a large proportion of the population had shared under the Tsars, was still resented. The recalcitrance took on the gravest aspect in some parts of the Ukraine, where the aspirations of some of the intelligentsia after national independence had been kept alive by continuous incitement and occasional secret emissaries from the Ukrainian exiles at Paris and Prague. The whole organised movement for an independent Ukraine was, we are told, from 1928 onwards, directed towards stimulating the peasants to resist collectivisation. The forms taken by this resistance, it has been frankly stated by one of the Ukrainian *émigrés*, "have greatly varied. At first there were mass disturbances in the kolkhosi, or else the communist officials and their agents were killed; but later a system of passive resistance was favoured, which aimed at the systematic frustration of the Bolshevik plans for the sowing and gathering of the harvest. The peasants and workers, seeing the ruthless export by their Bolshevik masters of all food produce, began to take steps to save themselves from starvation in the winter time, and to grasp at any means of fighting against the hated foreign rule. This is the main reason for the wholesale hoarding of grain and the thefts from the fields—offences which, if detected, are punishable by death. The peasants are passive resisters everywhere; but in Ukraina the resistance has assumed the character of a national struggle. *The opposition of the Ukrainian population caused the failure of the grain-storing plan of 1931, and still more so, that of 1932.* The catastrophe of 1932 was the hardest blow that Soviet Ukraine had to face since the famine of 1921-1922. The autumn and spring sowing campaigns both failed. Whole tracts were left unsown. In addition, when the crop was being gathered last year, it happened that, in many areas, especially in the south, 20, 40

over eighty millions more. In 1933, the total live-stock was less than four-ninths of the total in 1929.

LIVE-STOCK IN THE USSR

(In millions of head)

	1916	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Horses	35.1	34.0	30.2	26.2	19.0	16.6
Large-horned cattle	58.9	68.1	52.5	47.9	40.7	38.6
Sheep and goats	115.2	147.2	108.8	77.7	52.1	50.6
Pigs	20.3	20.9	13.6	14.4	11.6	12.2
	229.5	270.2	205.1	166.2	124.0	118.0

(Stalin's report on the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, in *Proceedings (in Russian) of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU*, 1933, p. 30.) See, in confirmation, *Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion*, by Dr. Otto Schiller, 1933; and *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, Boris Brutzkus, 1935, p. 211.

This colossal slaughter, repeated in successive years, has been subsequently excused as having been due to lack of wheat or oats for fodder, owing to government exactions. But why did they slaughter sheep and pigs, and even goats?

and even 50 per cent was left in the fields, and was either not collected at all or was ruined in the threshing.”¹

Towards the close of 1932, when the extent of this continuous deliberate sabotage had become manifest; when the too persistent rains of the summer had ruined the prospect of an abundant harvest, even where the agricultural operations had been loyally carried out; and when it was realised that the reserves had been specially depleted owing to the measures taken in order to stave off a Japanese invasion, the food situation again looked desperate. There is reason to believe that those in authority did not know where to turn. Finally, in January 1933, Stalin announced an administrative campaign, designed to reach the nerve-centres of every one of the 225,000 collective farms; a campaign which for boldness of conception and vigour in execution, as well as in the magnitude of its operations, appears to us unparalleled in the peace-time annals of any government. The desperate situation had to be saved. And, aided fortuitously by good crops in 1933 and 1934, it was saved. How this was accomplished will appear in the following pages.

The Magnitude of the Problem

We must first emphasise the magnitude of the problem. The rush of some seventy million people into the collective farms had not been accompanied by any sufficient provision of agricultural machinery, seeds and fertilisers even for those who were loyal; and certainly not by any adequate means of supervision and control of such of them as might be disloyal or recalcitrant. The total number of collective farms of all types in the USSR, which was less than 20,000 in 1927, had grown by the first quarter of 1933 to 211,000, actually cultivating about 85 million hectares, or an average for each enterprise of over 400 hectares (1000 acres).² The total number of households is variously stated as between 14 and 15 millions, making a population of some 70 millions, and giving an average for each collective farm of between 65 and 70 households. We may contrast these statistics of collective farms with those of the village soviets (selosoviets). The number of village soviets in the USSR is about 70,000, governing some 600,000 villages and hamlets—thus there are, on an average, three collective farms in the area of each village soviet. But as in some districts the collective farms are still scanty, the average per village soviet in the rest of the USSR must be much higher than three; and, as some of the areas of the village soviets have more than ten times the population of others, there must be areas under a single village soviet which each contain six or even a dozen collective farms. Collective farming “is most complete in the rich grain districts of southern and south-eastern Russia, and least advanced in the northern provinces, with their

¹ “Ukraine under Bolshevik Rule”, by Isaac Mazepa, in *Slavonic Review*, January 1934, pp. 342-343. The writer was Premier of the Ukrainian Republic of 1919, and is now professor at the Ukrainian Agricultural College at Prague.

² The Moscow Narodny Bank's *Monthly Review* (vol. vi., April 1933, No. 4) gives a convenient summary of the statistics showing the number of peasant households united

poorer soil, and in some of the autonomous republics inhabited by non-Russian nationalities ”.

The State Machinery for the Control of the Collective Farms

(a) The New People's Commissar

The new policy of universal collectivisation involved a far-reaching reorganisation of the machinery of government.¹ The first step was the establishment of federal control. Hitherto agriculture had been a subject retained by the several Union or constituent republics, in each of which (and also in the autonomous republics) there had been, since 1923, a People's Commissar of Agriculture, responsible only to his own Sovnarkom (cabinet of ministers) and central executive committee. There were now appointed by the USSR Government two new People's Commissars to deal with agriculture throughout the whole Union. One of these, the People's Commissar for state farms (sovkhozi), took complete command in collective farms and the percentage they form of the total households in each of the principal agricultural areas in the USSR, in the first quarter of 1933 :

Area	No. of Peasant Households	Percentage of Total
<i>Producing areas (areas which produce a surplus over their own requirements) :</i>		
Ukraine	3,100,000	70
Northern Caucasus	960,000	70
Lower Volga	660,000	80
Central Volga	930,000	78
Urals	700,000	68
Western Siberia	750,000	63
Central Black Soil Region	1,300,000	68
Bashkiria	350,000	68
Crimea	65,000	80
<i>Consuming areas (areas which do not produce enough for their own requirements) :</i>		
Moscow Province	650,000	55
Western Provinces	530,000	47
Gorky (Nizhni-Novgorod)	600,000	45
White Russian Republic	330,000	45

“ The average cultivated area per collective farm is over 400 hectares, which compares favourably with that of well-to-do peasants who, in the past, used to cultivate from 15 to 20 hectares per household. The total number of collective farms now exceeds 211,000.”

¹ This “ radical change in agricultural administration ” was described by Kalinin at the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (TSIK) in January 1933. “ Formerly ”, he said, “ we had only the national People's Commissariats [for agriculture, in each of the seven Constituent Republics], which were each adapted to the local peculiarities of a scattered rural economy which they assisted to improve. Everything was reversed with collectivisation [in collective and state farms], which raised the last layers of rural backwardness with the strengthening of agriculture and the coming of tractors and combines. The old [and during the Revolution one year counts as ten] organisation structure had outlived its usefulness. The production of agricultural goods was rapidly mechanised, and this required more centralised direction on an All-Union scale ” (*Moscow Daily News*, January 26, 1933).

of these wherever they were or might hereafter be established. The other, the People's Commissar for Agriculture, was to deal both with the collective farms (kolkhosi) of all types, and with the still surviving individual peasantry. The existing People's Commissars of Agriculture in the several constituent or autonomous republics were not removed, nor were their offices abolished. What happened was that, at one fell swoop, the whole score of them were stripped of a large part of their autonomy; passing suddenly from governing, as they chose, "non-unified" departments (like that of health), which were responsible solely to themselves, to presiding over "unified" departments (like that of finance), in which they had to follow the plans and execute all the orders received from the USSR Peoples' Commissar, and in which their local staffs were required to render loyal service both to the local People's Commissar, and also to his superior, the USSR People's Commissar.

(b) The New Agricultural Departments

In each of the constituent republics, there had existed a Land Department, descended from the various Land Committees which were supposed to direct the division among the peasantry of the land of the monasteries and the Tsar's family, and those estates from which the landlords had been expropriated. These offices had become somnolent with the completion of the division, and actually fulfilled few functions. They were now reorganised into Agricultural Departments, having in charge the supervision alike of the independent peasantry and of the rapidly growing kolkhosi of various types. These departments had much to do with the adjustment of boundaries of the several kolkhosi, and with the settlement of disputes. Their whole work was brought under the supervision and the orders primarily of the People's Commissar of Agriculture of the republic; but with the obligation of loyally carrying out any commands and instructions of the USSR People's Commissar.

In the autonomous republics, as in the oblasts or krais of the RSFSR and the Ukraine, there are also Agricultural Departments subordinate to those of the several constituent republics. In the case, however, of the very extensive oblasts or krais of the RSFSR, such as those of East and West Siberia and the Urals, and in the case of the larger among the autonomous republics, it became the practice for their Agricultural Departments to be in direct communication with the USSR People's Commissar of Agriculture at Moscow, where there had been a special kolkhos centre, obtaining all statistical and other information about the kolkhosi throughout the whole USSR. This kolkhos centre became a part of the new USSR Commissariat of Agriculture.

Beneath the oblast or krai, or autonomous republic, there was also a Land Department for each rayon. These had apparently wholly gone to sleep, to be rudely stirred by Kaganovich at the Seventeenth Party Congress. "Our rayon Land Departments", he said, "are in a state of neglect, they are in an interregnum as it were, they do not seem to be

able to grasp what their functions are. Very often the planning work of the rayon Land Department resolves itself into their mechanically distributing the production quotas among the collective farms without taking into account their traction facilities, their labour power, and their economic possibilities. The rayon Land Departments must be organised in such a way that they may know the situation in every collective farm.”¹

(c) Supervision by the Village Soviets

Then the village soviets (selosoviets) were made to realise that it was an important part of their duty to watch the administration of all the collective farms within their several areas, so as to prevent them from going so far wrong as to threaten a failure of supply. It was pointed out that the kolkhos, even more than the individual peasant, owed a positive duty to the state, in the form of the utmost production of foodstuffs on the nationalised land that had been entrusted in usufruct to each little community; and that the performance of this duty had to be enforced. The president of each village soviet was reminded that he was personally responsible for the proper conduct of each collective farm within the area under his charge, so far at least as using all his personal influence was concerned, with instructions to report without delay when he perceived anything going wrong.

The Soviet Hierarchy grips the Collective Farm

This soviet hierarchy now took hold of the administration of the collective farms. From one end of the USSR to the other, every kolkhos had to be firmly gripped—to be merely supervised, aided and praised, if its agriculture was successful; to be admonished and warned and threatened, if the sowing, the weeding, the reaping, the threshing and the warehousing of the grain were not loyally and efficiently conducted; and in all cases to be helped and instructed and supplied with seed, fertilisers and machinery. The problem, Kaganovich had pointed out as early as 1930, was to bring the state machinery as close as possible to the villages and hamlets, of which there were, as we have mentioned, no fewer than 600,000. “At present”, he continued, “the centre of gravity of collective farm construction has been shifted to the rayon. Here are gathered up the threads of collective farm organisation and all other economic work of the villages, cooperative and soviet, credit and supply. Are the rayon organisations sufficiently equipped with the necessary workers to deal with all this varied work? There can be no doubt that they are extremely inadequately supplied with workers. Where is the way out?”

What was done in 1930 was to decree the abolition of the okrug (the intermediate council between the oblast and the rayon); and to distribute its staff among the congresses of soviets of both the latter authorities. In addition some 25,000 selected Party members were sent to

¹ *Proceedings of Seventeenth Congress CPSU*, speech of Kaganovich, pp. 67-69.

"the agricultural front". This, however, proved during 1931 and 1932, even when the active help of the village soviet could be secured, insufficient to watch over the administration of every collective farm.

The Machine and Tractor Stations

An effective lever for lifting to prosperity every collective farm that was not deliberately wrecking its own agriculture was presently found in the Machine and Tractor Station (MTS), in which the supply of machinery to the farms had gradually been concentrated. Between 1930 and 1933 the number of these M. and T. stations was increased to over 2600, with nearly 700 repairing shops and 80,000 tractors; ¹ their repairing shops were raised to a high level of efficiency; and their administration was made the means of persistent supervision of all the fifty to one hundred farms within the area, averaging about fifteen square miles, that each station served. Their activities were described by an adverse critic in the following terms. "The erection of Machine [and] Tractor Stations, the first of which was set up in the Odessa region in 1927, had a significant influence on the subsequent developments. These stations may (each) have on hand as many as 100 tractors and more, together with all the necessary accessories, as well as threshing-machines, repair shops and technical personnel. Each station undertakes to draw up agreements with near-by village communities or collectives on the basis of a share in the harvest in exchange for technical assistance. To-day these stations are the so-called heavy artillery of the 'forced' collectivisation; they are established by order of the government; and instructions are given to ensure that the peasants within the working radius of each station are linked up with them. It is arranged for each station to have a maximum field of operation of 50,000 to 60,000 hectares. For the year 1930 there were 313 stations in operation; by 1931 this figure had increased to 1400, and in 1932 it is planned to have 3100. One-third of the summer and winter sowings in 1932, roughly about 48 million hectares, are to be carried out

¹ See *What are MTS (Machine and Tractor Stations) ?*, by L. Valersetin and A. Leon-tiev (Moscow, 1932, 24 pp.). "During the last three years there have been created 2600 machine [and] tractor stations, which include 1306 stations serving grain farms, 329 stations for sugar-beet farms and 217 stations for cotton farms: The value of their equipment now exceeds 600 million roubles. It includes 80,000 tractors, which are operated by about 200,000 drivers; 2000 combines; thousands of other improved implements, including reapers and so on. In connection with the machine [and] tractor stations, some 685 repair-shops have been established to maintain the agricultural tractors in good repair" (Moscow Narodny Bank's *Monthly Review*, vol. vi. No. 4, April 1933).

The above statistics were left far behind by the great campaign of 1933. Stalin announced to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party on January 26, 1934, that there were then in the field "204,100 tractors; with a capacity of 3,100,000 horsepower; 25,000 combines; 30,101 motors and traction engines; 58,000 threshing machines; 1505 installations for electric threshing; 24,400 motor lorries and 4600 cars". (This represents something like a fourfold increase of machines of all kinds within three years.) "At the same time," continued Stalin, "the government had trained and sent into agriculture 111,000 technicians and agronomists, over 1,900,000 tractorists, combine operators, drivers, etc., and more than 1,600,000 men and women for managerial and administrative posts."

with the assistance of these stations.”¹

During 1933, the relations of the Machine and Tractor Stations with the collective farms within their several districts were reorganised in the light of the experience of the previous years. Whilst the thousands of tractor drivers and mechanics that descended on the villages necessarily exercised a considerable missionary effect, their relations with the collective farms were to be strictly on the basis of a business contract mutually agreed to. In addition to advice and help in preparing plans, so many tractors or other machines, kept constantly in good working order, bringing their own petrol, would execute so much work in ploughing, sowing, reaping and threshing, including fallow-land and winter sowing, in return for fixed and specified percentages of the yield mutually agreed to, the percentages for each group of collective farms being fixed with some regard to its prospective harvest. The percentage for threshing was henceforth to be calculated not on the amount of wheat brought to be threshed, but on the actual amount of the yield in grain. And when the work for each collective farm is completed, the management board of the farm, in conjunction with the MTS, is to draw up jointly a special protocol showing exactly the work done and its results in quality as well as quantity, and the amount due. Similar arrangements to those of the 1192 MTS serving grain farms would be made by the 348 in sugar-beet regions, 246 in flax, 238 in cotton, 151 in vegetables and 85 in potatoes.²

The Soviet Hierarchy is reinforced by the Communist Party

It was, however, not enough to reorganise, from top to bottom, the soviet departments responsible for agriculture, and not enough even to place in their hands the lever of 3000 or 4000 Machine and Tractor Stations, with an aggregate park of artillery of 200,000 tractors and combines, served by thousands of competent drivers and mechanics, provided with unlimited petrol. In the USSR, perhaps even more than in western countries, there is always an immense “lag”, alike in time and in space, between the creation or reorganisation of a government department, and the actual accomplishment—everywhere and completely—of the task that it is set to do. In so vital a matter as the food supply, Kaganovich, with Stalin’s full support, was taking no risks. He turned to the zealous and trustworthy members of the Communist Party to see that, not only the immense soviet organisation, from the USSR People’s Commissariat, down to the most remote village soviet and the furthest flung Machine and Tractor Station, but also the 225,000 collective farms with their several boards of management and their fifteen million families, all of them actually did their duty. It was decided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to create some 3000 new local organs, termed “politotdeli”, being special sections or committees of selected Party members,

¹ “Agriculture”, by Professor Dr. Otto Auhagen, in *Soviet Economics*, edited by Dr. Gerhard Dobbert, 1933, p. 130.

² *Moscow Daily News*, weekly edition, February 5, 1933.

charged with seeing to it, in the several regions assigned to them, that the government policy was actually put in operation by the persons immediately responsible for each part of it. These "Policy Sections" as we shall call them—the usual translation of "Political Sections" being, we are told, not precisely accurate, and certainly misleading—represent a unique projection from Moscow of the highly centralised Communist Party.

The Work of the Policy Sections

This throwing into the field, all over the USSR, of a "hand-picked" and trustworthy second army of some 25,000 members of the Communist Party, chosen, we are told, out of a much larger number of eager applicants for the adventure, and seconded out of all sorts of departments and factories for this special service, and especially their organisation in some 3000 Policy Sections, was acclaimed as a master-stroke of policy, which, as we read the evidence, contributed more than anything else to the marked success of the agricultural campaigns of 1933 and 1934. The members of these Policy Sections were carefully instructed in their duties by Kaganovich himself, and despatched in batches from Moscow to some 3000 chosen centres in all parts of the USSR. Each Policy Section consisted of at least five persons and often more, including a director, an organiser of Party work, another of work by the Comsomols, with a woman to organise the women workers; together with an editor, not only of posters and leaflets, but also of the little local newspaper that was everywhere started.¹ The duty of each section, with the assistance of all the Party members and Comsomols in the area, was primarily and specifically to see to it that everyone—whether on the staff of the Machine and Tractor Stations, or in the service of the oblast or rayon, or of a village soviet, or in that of a collective farm—did his or her duty. Many of the Party members thus sent to "the agricultural front" also undertook one or other office, either in the Machine and Tractor Station, or in the village soviet or in the management of a collective farm. This attitude of inspection and control, coupled with the actual filling of particular posts, naturally brought the members of the Policy Sections into delicate and somewhat ambiguous relations with the local soviet officials on the one hand, and, on the other, with the Party fractions and provincial Party agents, with the result of not a little friction and some open quarrels, which had to be straightened out. We get a vision of the difficulties and dangers encountered by these missionaries in the correspondence of one of those who went out in the first batch in 1930. Gregor Injevatkine, who, after bringing to a high degree of organisation the district of Turkestan to which he was sent, was eventually assassinated by a group of recalcitrant peasants. His letters to his wife, to his comrades in the Moscow factory in which he had been

¹ We have been told that the tens of thousands of members of the politotdeli were all carefully selected by the official staff of the special commission of the Communist Party; and even that they were all personally interviewed by Kaganovich himself—perhaps this applied only to the director of each politotdel—who rejected those of whose capacity and fidelity he was not satisfied.

employed, and to the Party authorities afford a moving picture of the life of these devoted Party missionaries.¹ The establishment of the Policy Sections, and the selection in 1933 of a second army of Party members to man them, arose, we are told, directly out of the disclosure to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the continued recalcitrance and sabotage in the North Caucasus. Their instructions were briefly summed up on the phrase that what they had to do was to "make the kolkhosi bolshevist and the members thereof more prosperous".²

We are able to give a useful account of the actual methods and results of a politotdel at work as a whole in a recent description by an American student who was spending a year among the kolkhosi. "As each collective farm completes [its harvesting], the Policy Section issues directives regarding grain deliveries to the government [and] the past, present and future activities of the farm. These sum up the accomplishments and failures . . . discuss its special problems and give instructions for the future . . . stating whether the directives need to be discussed with the kolkhos board of the district executive committee before being carried out. The directives begin with a statistical report on the fulfilment of grain deliveries, and a statement of the success of the collective in relation to its own history and the achievement of other collective farms in the district. The kolkhos is reminded of its contract with the Machine and Tractor Station, that it must pay the MTS in kind a percentage of the crop for the use of the machines. The directives then take up the collective needs of the kolkhos, the needs of special groups within it, and, finally, special directives are given in regard to families and individuals. A fund must be laid aside for seed and insurance, arrangements made for invalids and orphans and a kolkhos social fund created. . . . Care is exercised to secure justice for groups of individuals. The collective farm which has accomplished specially fine work sometimes receives a tractor or a truck as an award from the MTS. On one farm where repairs were urgently necessary, and there were not sufficient funds to care for the whole kolkhos, the policy section has directed that the cottages housing the largest families should be repaired first. Faithful and efficient farm members, or a brigade which surmounted great difficulties, are credited with a 10 or 20 per cent increase on their work days. Very careless workers receive a like deduction. Where a collective farm worker has retrieved a bad reputation, his deduction may be cancelled or cut in half. Those kolkhos udarniki who are without a cow are singled out to receive a calf from the kolkhos dairy. In one instance a family had received no payment last year because of the kulak sabotage which disrupted the farm; this year the political section has ordered a 15 per cent increase in its work days [addition to its units of sharing] in partial restitution. . . . The directives deal with innum-

¹ *One of the 25,000: the Story of a Shock Worker*, by A. Isbach (Moscow, 1931); *Un des 25,000: la brigade de choc de la collectivisation: documents rassemblés par A. G. Izbasch* (Paris, 1931, 72 pp.).

² *The Politotdel* (in Russian), by M. Karavai (Moscow, Partizdat, 1934, 150 pp.).

able other details, with every phase of kolkhos life ; ploughing, bee-keeping, poultry-keeping, etc.”¹

Was there a Famine in the USSR in 1931- 1932 ?

From one end of the USSR to the other we must visualise the Agricultural Departments of the oblasts and rayons, with the village soviets and the Machine and Tractor Stations, continuing to supervise and assist the couple of hundred thousand collective farms, the whole organisation being guided and directed by the 3000 Policy Sections, inspired and driven by the incessant activity of Kaganovich at the head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. What has been the result of this attempt to cope with climatic difficulties on the one hand, and on the other with the inertia, the ignorance and the suspicion of the peasantry of the immense area that had to be dealt with ? Was there or was there not a famine in the USSR in the years 1931 and 1932 ?

Those who think this a simple question to answer will probably already have made up their minds, in accordance with nearly all the statements by persons hostile to Soviet Communism, that there was, of course, a famine in the USSR ; and they do not hesitate to state the mortality that it caused, in precise figures—unknown to any statistician—varying from three to six and even to ten million deaths.² On the other hand, a retired high official of the Government of India, speaking Russian, and well acquainted with Tsarist Russia, who had himself administered famine districts in India, and who visited in 1932 some of the localities in the USSR in which conditions were reported to be among the worst, informed the present writers at the time that he had found no evidence of there

¹ Article by F. E. Hurst, on the Ustiabinsk Machine and Tractor Station, North Caucasus, in *Moscow Daily News*, October 16, 1933.

² Scepticism as to statistics of total deaths from starvation, in a territory extending to one-sixth of the earth's land surface, would anyhow be justified. But as to the USSR there seems no limit to the wildness of exaggeration. We quote the following interesting case related by Mr. Sherwood Eddy, an experienced American traveller in Russia : “ Our party, consisting of about 20 persons, while passing through the villages, heard rumours of the village of Gavrilovka, where all the men but one were said to have died of starvation. We went at once to investigate and track down this rumour. We divided into four parties, with four interpreters of our own choosing, and visited simultaneously the registry office of births and deaths, the village priest, the local soviet, the judge, the schoolmaster and every individual peasant we met. We found that out of 1100 families three individuals had died of typhus. They had immediately closed the school and the church, inoculated the entire population and stamped out the epidemic without developing another case. We could not discover a single death from hunger or starvation, though many had felt the bitter pinch of want. It was another instance of the ease with which wild rumours spread concerning Russia ” (*Russia To-day : What can we learn from it ?* by Sherwood Eddy, 1934, p. xiv).

We had this investigation described to us in detail by one of the interpreters who took part in it, and who had the not inconsiderable task of arranging the transport for a journey of a hundred kilometres away from the railway over almost impossible highways. It became well known among Russian journalists at the time (see, for instance, *Leise durch hundert Kollektivwirtschaften*, by L. P. Boross, Moscow, 1932, pp. 161-163), but no British or American correspondent seems to have mentioned it.

being or having been anything like what Indian officials would describe as a famine.

Without expecting to convince the prejudiced, we give, for what it may be deemed worth, the conclusion to which our visits in 1932 and 1934, and subsequent examination of the available evidence, now lead us. That in each of the years 1931 and 1932 there was a partial failure of crops in various parts of the huge area of the USSR is undoubtedly true. It is true also of British India and of the United States. It has been true also of the USSR, and of every other country at all comparable in size, in each successive year of the present century. In countries of such vast extent, having every kind of climate, there is always a partial failure of crops somewhere. How extensive and how serious was this partial failure of crops in the USSR of 1931 and 1932 it is impossible to ascertain with any assurance. On the one hand, it has been asserted, by people who have seldom had any opportunity of going to the suffering districts, that throughout huge provinces there ensued a total absence of foodstuffs, so that (as in 1891 and 1921) literally several millions of people died of starvation. On the other hand, soviet officials on the spot, in one district after another, informed the present writers that, whilst there was shortage and hunger, there was, at no time, a total lack of bread, though its quality was impaired by using other ingredients than wheaten flour; and that any increase in the death-rate, due to diseases accompanying defective nutrition, occurred only in a relatively small number of villages. What may carry more weight than this official testimony was that of various resident British and American journalists, who travelled during 1933 and 1934 through the districts reputed to have been the worst sufferers, and who declared to the present writers that they had found no reason to suppose that the trouble had been more serious than was officially represented. Our own impression, after considering all the available evidence, is that the partial failure of crops certainly extended to only a fraction of the USSR; possibly to no more than one-tenth of the geographical area. We think it plain that this partial failure was not in itself sufficiently serious to cause actual starvation, except possibly, in the worst districts, relatively small in extent. Any estimate of the total number of deaths in excess of the normal average, based on a total population supposed to have been subjected to famine conditions, of sixty millions, which would mean half the entire rural population between the Baltic and the Pacific (as some have rashly asserted), or even one-tenth of such a population, appears to us to be fantastically excessive.

On the other hand, it seems to be proved that a considerable number of peasant households, both in the spring of 1932 and in that of 1933, found themselves unprovided with a sufficient store of cereal food, and specially short of fats. To these cases we shall recur. But we are at once reminded that in countries like India and the USSR, in China, and even in the United States, in which there is no ubiquitous system of poor

many thousands—die each year of starvation, or of the diseases endemic under these conditions ; and that whenever there is even a partial failure of crops this number will certainly be considerably increased. It cannot be supposed to have been otherwise in parts of the southern Ukraine, the Kuban district and Daghestan in the winters of 1931 and 1932.

But before we are warranted in describing this scarcity of food in particular households of particular districts as a "famine", we must enquire how the scarcity came to exist. We notice among the evidence the fact that the scarcity was "patchy". In one and the same locality, under weather conditions apparently similar if not identical, there are collective farms which have in these years reaped harvests of more than average excellence, whilst others, adjoining them on the north or on the south, have experienced conditions of distress, and may sometimes have known actual starvation. This is not to deny that there were whole districts in which drought or cold seriously reduced the yield. But there are clearly other cases, how many we cannot pretend to estimate, in which the harvest failures were caused, not by something in the sky, but by something in the collective farm itself. And we are soon put on the track of discovery. As we have already mentioned, we find a leading personage in the direction of the Ukrainian revolt actually claiming that "the opposition of the Ukrainian population caused the failure of the grain-storing plan of 1931, and still more so, that of 1932". He boasts of the success of the "passive resistance which aimed at a systematic frustration of the Bolshevik plans for the sowing and gathering of the harvest". He tells us plainly that, owing to the efforts of himself and his friends, "whole tracts were left unsown", and "in addition, when the crop was being gathered last year [1932], it happened that, in many areas, especially in the south, 20, 40 and even 50 per cent was left in the fields, and was either not collected at all or was ruined in the threshing".¹

So far as the Ukraine is concerned, it is clearly not Heaven which is principally to blame for the failure of crops, but the misguided members of many of the collective farms.² What sort of "famine" is it that is

¹ "Ukrainia under Bolshevik Rule", by Isaac Mazepa, in *Slavonic Review*, January 1934, pp. 342-343. One of the Ukrainian nationalists who was brought to trial in stated to have confessed to having received explicit instructions from the leaders of the movement abroad to the effect that "it is essential that, in spite of the good harvest (of 1930), the position of the peasantry should become worse. For this purpose it is necessary to persuade the members of the kolkhosi to harvest the grain before it has become ripe ; to agitate among the kolkhos members and to persuade them that, however hard they may work, their grain will be taken away from them by the State on one pretext or another ; and to sabotage the proper calculation of the labour days put into harvesting by the members of the kolkhosi so that they may receive less than they are entitled to by their work" (Speech by M. Postyshev, secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party, to plenum of Central Committee, 1933).

² It can be definitely denied that the serious shortage of harvested grain in parts of southern Ukraine was due to climatic conditions. "In a number of southern regions, from 30 to 40 per cent of the crop remained on the fields. This was not a result of the drought which was so severe in certain parts of Siberia, the Urals and the Middle and Lower Volga regions that it reduced there the expected crops by about 50 per cent. No act of God was involved in the Ukraine. The difficulties experienced in the sowing, harvesting and grain

due neither to the drought nor the rain, heat nor cold, rust nor fly, weeds nor locusts; but to a refusal of the agriculturists to sow ("whole tracts were left unsown"); and to gather up the wheat when it was cut ("even 50 per cent was left in the fields")?

The other district in which famine conditions are most persistently reported is that of Kuban, and the surrounding areas, chiefly inhabited by the Don Cossacks, who, as it is not irrelevant to remember, were the first to take up arms against the Bolshevik Government in 1918, and so begin the calamitous civil war. These Don Cossacks, as we have mentioned, had enjoyed special privileges under the tsars, the loss of which under the new régime has, even to-day, not been forgiven. Here there is evidence that whole groups of peasants, under hostile influences, got into such a state of apathy and despair, on being pressed into a new system of cooperative life which they could not understand and about which they heard all sorts of evil, that they ceased to care whether their fields were tilled or not, or what would happen to them in the winter if they produced no crop at all. Whatever the reason, there were, it seems, in the Kuban, as in the Ukraine, whole villages that sullenly abstained from sowing or harvesting, usually not completely, but on all but a minute fraction of their fields, so that, when the year ended, they had no stock of seed, and in many cases actually no grain on which to live. There are many other instances in which individual peasants made a practice, out of spite, of surreptitiously "barbering" the ripening wheat; that is, rubbing out the grain from the ear, or even cutting off the whole ear, and carrying off for individual hoarding this shameless theft of community property.¹

Unfortunately it was not only in such notoriously disaffected areas as the Ukraine and Kuban that these peculiar "failures of crops" occurred. For instance, the Machine and Tractor Sections that were sent to far-off Turkestan found, as we learn from the intimate private letters of the

collection campaign of 1931 were man-made" ("Collectivisation of Agriculture in the Soviet Union", by W. Ladojinsky, *Political Science Quarterly* (New York, June 1934, p. 222). "It is evident", writes another of the leaders of the Ukrainian émigrés at Prague, himself the Foreign Minister of the short-lived Ukrainian Republic of 1919, "that this famine was not the result of natural causes. . . . The peasants are absolutely hostile to a system which runs counter to all their habits for centuries past. . . . The Ukrainian peasant has always been an individualist . . . and sees no reason why he should work for the profit of others" ("Ukraine and its Political Aspirations", by Alexander Shulgin, in *Slavonic Review*, January 1935).

Mr. Chamberlin himself now ascribes at any rate some part of the relative failure of the harvests of 1931 and 1932, not to any climatic conditions, but "largely as a result of the apathy and discouragement of the peasants", which made the yield "much lower than it would have been in normal years" ("Russia Through Coloured Glasses", in *Fortnightly Review*, October 1934).

¹ The practice led to the employment of children (members of the "Pioneers" organisation) to guard the growing crops against thieves. Presently it was found necessary in some places to erect wooden watch-towers and to post sentinels night and day, in order to prevent the whole crop from being looted. (In China, one member from each family habitually watches the household plot as soon as the plants appear above ground, to prevent their being stolen.)

martyred Party member that we have already cited,¹ just the same recalcitrance among the ignorant and suspicious peasants, whether nominally enrolled in collective farms or persistently obstructing their formation.² These were the dupes and victims of the ceaseless machinations of the kulaks and others, whose position was threatened with destruction. How serious the situation appeared to Kaganovich we may gather from the lurid denunciation that he made in January 1933.³ To any generally successful cultivation, he declared, "the anti-soviet elements of the village are offering fierce opposition. Economically ruined, but not yet having lost their influence entirely, the kulaks, former white officers, former priests, their sons, former ruling landlords and sugar-mill owners, former Cossacks and other anti-soviet elements of the bourgeois-nationalist and also of the social-revolutionary and Petlura-supporting intelligentsia settled in the villages, are trying in every way to corrupt the collective farms, are trying to foil the measures of the Party and the Government in the realm of farming, and for these ends are making use of the backwardness of part of the collective farm members against the interests of the socialised collective farm, against the interests of the collective farm peasantry.

"Penetrating into collective farms as accountants, managers, warehouse keepers, brigadiers and so on, and frequently as leading workers on the boards of collective farms, the anti-soviet elements strive to organise sabotage, spoil machines, sow without the proper measures, steal collective farm goods, undermine labour discipline, organise the thieving of seed and secret granaries, sabotage grain collections—and sometimes they succeed in disorganising kolkhosi."

However much we may discount such highly coloured denunciations, we cannot avoid noticing how exactly the statements as to sabotage of the harvest, made on the one hand by the Soviet Government, and on the other by the nationalist leaders of the Ukrainian recalcitrants,

¹ *One of the 25,000 : the Story of a Shack Worker*, by A. Ishaich (Moscow, 1931).

² Much the same recalcitrance had been manifested in 1927-1928 when the wide opening of the "scissors" caused the relatively well-to-do peasants to withhold their grain from the market. "A genuine and severe economic tug-of-war between the Soviet Government and the more prosperous peasants occurred during the winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928, and seems likely to go on indefinitely, perhaps in milder forms. As early as the fall of 1927 it became evident that the peasants were holding back their grain to a degree which not only destroyed any possibility of exporting it but even seriously menaced the bread supply of the cities. How did this 'grain strike' come about? It is very hard to answer this question. There is certainly no widespread secret organisation among the peasants which could coordinate their activity or instruct them all to do the same thing at the same time. And yet they sometimes display an uncanny faculty for apparently unconscious spontaneous action, as when they deserted from all parts of the front and swarmed on the landlords' estates in 1917. Something of this faculty must have come into play in the autumn of 1927, when in Siberia and Ukraine, in Central Russia and the North Caucasus, the same phenomenon of peasant unwillingness to part with grain made itself felt" (*Soviet Russia*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, p. 195).

³ Report of Kaganovich on Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), January 20, 1933.

corroborate each other. To quote again the Ukrainian leader, it was "the opposition of the Ukrainian population" that "caused the failure of the grain storing plan of 1931, and still more so, that of 1932". What on one side is made a matter for boasting is, on the other side, a ground for denunciation. Our own inference is merely that, whilst both sides probably exaggerate, the sabotage referred to actually took place, to a greater or less extent, in various parts of the USSR, in which collective farms had been established under pressure. *The partial failure of the crops due to climatic conditions*, which is to be annually expected in one locality or another, was thus aggravated, to a degree that we find no means of estimating, and rendered far more extensive in its area, not only by "barbering" the growing wheat, and stealing from the common stock, but also by deliberate failure to sow, failure to weed, failure to thresh, and failure to warehouse even all the grain that was threshed.¹ But this is not what is usually called a famine.

What the Soviet Government was faced with, from 1929 onward, was, in fact, not a famine but a widespread general strike of the peasantry, in resistance to the policy of collectivisation, fomented and encouraged by the disloyal elements of the population, not without incitement from the exiles at Paris and Prague. Beginning with the calamitous slaughter of live-stock in many areas in 1929-1930, the recalcitrant peasants defeated, during the years 1931 and 1932, all the efforts of the Soviet Government to get the land adequately cultivated. It was in this way,² much more than by the partial failure of the crops due to drought or cold, that was produced in an uncounted host of villages in many parts of the USSR a state of things in the winter of 1931-1932, and again in that of 1932-1933, in which many of the peasants found themselves with inadequate supplies of food. But this did not always lead to starvation. In innumerable cases, in which there was no actual lack of roubles, notably in the Ukraine, the men journeyed off to the nearest big market, and (as there was no deficiency in the country as a whole) returned after many days with the requisite sacks of flour. In other cases, especially among the independent peasantry, the destitute family itself moved away to the cities, in search of work at wages, leaving its rude dwelling empty and desolate, to be quoted by some incautious observer as proof of death by starvation. In an unknown number of other cases—as it seems, to be counted by the

¹ "The peasant resisted by frauds, exaggerating their demand for seeds and cattle food, under-estimating their crops. They fought very hard against compulsion. Moreover, when they saw that they had to give over a great part of their output, they diminished the output, with the result that there was an immense slaughtering of the cattle, and a very serious diminution of the crops. The régime had the great good luck of the great harvest in 1933. Before that there was hunger in large sections of the country" ("An Economist's Analysis of Soviet Russia", by Arthur Peiling, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1934, pp. 153-157).

² "In general, the harvesting and threshing processes were carried out by the collectivised peasantry of the Ukraine in such a manner that from 34 to 36 million quintals of grain were wasted in the fields. This amount alone could have covered two-thirds of the grain the Ukraine was to have delivered to the State" ("Collectivisation of Agriculture", by W. Ladejinsky, *Political Science Quarterly*, p. 233).

hundred thousand—the families were forcibly taken from the holding which they had failed to cultivate, and removed to distant places where they could be provided with work by which they could earn their subsistence.

The Soviet Government has been severely blamed for these deportations, which inevitably caused great hardships. The irresponsible criticism loses, however, much of its force by the inaccuracy with which the case is stated. It is, for instance, almost invariably taken for granted that the Soviet Government heartlessly refused to afford any relief to the starving districts. Very little investigation shows that relief was repeatedly afforded where there was reason to suppose that the shortage was not due to sabotage or deliberate failure to cultivate. There were, to begin with, extensive remissions of payments in kind due to the government.¹ But there was also a whole series of transfers of grain from the government stocks to villages found to be destitute, sometimes actually for consumption, and in other cases to replace the seed funds which had been used for food.²

Of the enforced removals there have been two kinds. In 1929 and 1930 drastic measures were taken against those elements in the villages which were seriously interfering with the formation of kolkhosi, often by personal violence, and wilful damage to buildings and crops. These disturbers of the peace were in many cases forcibly removed from their homes. "The usual assumption outside the Soviet Union", writes one who witnessed the proceedings of 1930, "is that this exiling occurred through drastic action by a mystically omnipotent GPU. The actual process was quite different: it was done by village meetings of poor peasants and farm hands who listed those kulaks who 'impede our collective farm by force and violence', and asked the Government to deport them. In the hot days of 1930 I attended many of these meetings. There were harsh, bitter discussions, analysing one by one the 'best families', who had grabbed the best lands, exploited labour by owning the tools of production, as 'best families' normally and historically do, and who were now fighting the rise of the collective farms by arson, cattle-killing and murder. . . . The meetings I personally attended were more seriously judicial, more balanced in their discussion, than any court trial I have attended in America: these peasants knew they were dealing with serious

¹ "The basic decree, promulgated on May 6, 1932, states that the grain collections from the collectives and the individual farms must be decreased by 43.2 million quintals in comparison with the 1931 programme" ("Collectivisation of Agriculture in the Soviet Union", by W. Ladojnsky, in *Political Science Quarterly* (New York), June 1934, p. 231).

² Thus: "On February 17, 1932, almost six months before the harvesting of the new crop the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, directed that the collective farms in the eastern part of the country, which had suffered from the drought, be loaned over six million quintals of grain for the establishment of both seed and food funds" (*ibid.* p. 229).

Later, we read: "Certain areas, such as the Ukraine and North Caucasus which . . . had to consume all the available grain, remained with little or no seed funds. In this case the Soviet Government loaned to the collectives of the Ukraine almost 3.1 million quintals of seed, and to those of North Caucasus, over 2 million quintals" (*ibid.* p. 243).

punishments, and did not handle them lightly. . . . Those who envisage that the rural revolution which ended in farm collectivisation was a 'war between Stalin and the peasants' simply weren't on the ground when the whirlwind broke. The anarchy of an elemental upheaval was its chief characteristic: it was marked by great ecstasies and terrors: local leaders in village township and province did what was right in their own eyes and passionately defended their convictions. Moscow studied and participated in the local earthquakes; and, out of the mass experience, made, somewhat too late to save the live stock, general laws for its direction. It was a harsh, bitter and by no means bloodless conflict. . . . Township and provincial commissions in the USSR reviewed and cut down the lists of kulaks for exile, to guard against local excesses."¹

Later, when the sabotage took the form of a widespread "general strike" against even cultivation of the collective farms, the Soviet Government found itself on the horns of the same dilemma that perplexed² the administrators of the English Poor Law. To provide maintenance for able-bodied men whose refusal to work had brought them to destitution would merely encourage them, and their families, and eventually countless others, to repeat the offence. Yet deliberately to leave them to starve was an unacceptable alternative. The English Guardians of the Poor, early in the eighteenth century, invented the device, which was readopted in 1834, of relieving the able-bodied and their families only on condition that they entered the workhouse, and there performed whatever tasks of work could be set to them. The Soviet Government had no workhouses available and no time to build them. Its device was forcibly to remove the peasants who were found to be without food from the villages which they were demoralising to places at a distance where they could be put to work at the making of railways, roads or canals, at the cutting of timber, or at prospecting or mining for mineral ores—all tasks of discomfort and occasionally of hardship, by which they were enabled to earn the bare subsistence wage of relief work. It was a rough and ready expedient of "famine relief", which undoubtedly caused much suffering to innocent victims. But candid students of the circumstances may not unwarrantably come to the conclusion that, when the crisis of possible starvation arrived, as the result largely of deliberate sabotage, the Soviet Government could hardly have acted otherwise than it did.²

¹ "The Soviet Dictatorship", by Anna Louise Strong, in *American Mercury*, October 1934; *Dictatorship and Democracy*, by the same, 1934.

How one village came to its decision in 1930 to suppress the small minority which had persistently sought, by every kind of criminal act, to ruin the local kolkhos, is described in the artless recital of a peasant woman, *Collective Farm Trud*, told by Eudoxia Pazukhina (Moscow, 1932, pp. 60-61).

² The enforced expropriation of these peasants has seemed to foreign critics an extreme injustice. Were not the peasants, in limiting their production, merely doing what they liked with their own? In fact, the peasants in the USSR are not owners of the land they till, but merely occupants of nationalised land, for the purpose of cultivating it. But whether or not they are in the same position as the peasant proprietors of France or Flanders, there seems nothing unreasonable or inequitable in the view that, wherever the land is entrusted to a peasant class by the community, it is on the paramount condition

With the characteristic Bolshevik habit of "self-criticism", the Soviet Government blamed its own organisation for having let things come to such a pass. "The village Party and Young Communist organisation," declared Kaganovich in January 1933, "including the groups in state farms and machine-tractor stations, frequently lack revolutionary feeling and vigilance. In many places they not only do not oppose this anti-soviet work of hostile elements with class alertness and an everyday Bolshevik drive to strengthen soviet influence over the broad non-Party masses of the collective farmers and state farm-workers, but they themselves sometimes fall under the influence of these sabotaging elements; and some members of the Party, who entered for careerist purposes, line up with the enemies of the collective and state farms and the Soviet Government, and join with them in organising thieving of seed at sowing time, grain at harvesting and threshing time, hiding grain in secret granaries, sabotaging state grain purchases, and really draw certain collective farms, groups of kolkhozniks and backward workers of state farms into the struggle against the soviet power. It is particularly true of state farms, where frequently the directors, under the influence of anti-soviet elements, undergo a bourgeois degeneration, sabotage the tasks set by the Soviet Government, enter upon out and out treachery to the Party and Government, and attempt to dispose of state farm products as if they were their own personal property."

But with no less characteristic Bolshevik persistence, the occasion was taken to intensify the campaign, so as to ensure that 1933 and 1934 should see better results than 1931 or 1932. It was recognised, and frankly confessed, that a serious error had been made, often owing to the mistaken zeal of local agents, in making successive levies on the successful kolkhosi, when these were found in possession of unexpectedly large crops. Many peasants had lost confidence in the government's financial measures, always fearing that the results of their labours would be taken away from them. Hence the whole system was changed. The government relinquished all right to take produce by contract any more than by requisition. Henceforth nothing more was to be exacted from the collective farms by way of agricultural tax (apart from the agreed payment for the use of the tractors) than the one official levy of grain, meat, milk and other produce, definitely fixed in advance, in exact proportion so far as arable produce was concerned, to the normal harvest on the number of hectares that had to be sown and weeded and reaped. Similar assessments were made for other produce. However great might prove to be the yield, the government would claim no more. Even if a larger area were sown than had been required, the government pledged itself not to increase its demand upon the zealous kolkhos. As soon as this definitely fixed levy had been paid for the whole district, each kolkhos

that they should produce, up to their ability, the foodstuffs required for the maintenance of the community. Any organised refusal to cultivate must inevitably be met by expropriation.

was to be free to sell the surplus to outsiders as it pleased; even to selling it, in the open market, to the highest bidder.¹ At the same time the whole organisation was drastically overhauled. Many hundreds of local officials were, during 1932, found guilty of gross neglect, or wanton mis-handling of machinery, stores and crops. These were severely reprimanded and in many cases dismissed from office. Hundreds of the worst offenders were sentenced to imprisonment, and at least several dozens to be shot. The members of the kolkhosi themselves, including the managers and accountants, were also faithfully dealt with. What was most difficult to cope with was the deplorable general sullenness, in which many, and some times most, of the peasants had ceased to care whether or not the normal harvest was reaped. Where the ploughing had been only feebly performed; the weeding left undone; and the scanty growing grain fished from the fields by night, the whole kolkhos was drastically shaken up; the most guilty of the saboteurs, often ex-kulaks, were expelled; the negligent managers and peccant accountants were dismissed from office; collective farms which had wilfully neglected or refused to till their land were sternly refused relief when they found themselves without food, so as not to encourage further recusancy; and in some of the worst cases the inhabitants of whole villages, if only in order to save them from starvation, were summarily removed from the land that they had neglected or refused to cultivate, and deported elsewhere, to find labouring work of any sort for bare maintenance. It is not denied that in these summary removals, as in those of individual kulaks who had refused to conform to the government's requirements, great hardship was inflicted on a large number of women and children, as well as on the men. Without such cost in suffering, it is argued, the rapid reorganisation of peasant agriculture, which seemed the only practicable means of solving the problem of the national food supply, could not have been effected.

In the result there seems to us no doubt that this peculiar stiffening of the local rural administration by a chosen army of zealous and specially instructed Party members, in direct communication with Kaganovich and the special department for agriculture of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was, during 1933 and 1934, remarkably effective. Kaganovich himself was during both these years constantly touring the country, looking minutely into everything, and giving orders which had to be obeyed.² The Soviet Government was lucky in a critical year (1933)

¹ This single tax, as we may call it, was assessed in grain at three rates: the normal on those kolkhosi which had the use of the government tractors, for which a separate fee had to be paid; a higher rate where no tractor fee had to be paid because none was used or desired; and a still higher rate on the individual peasant or the kulak, whose very existence it was wished to discourage.

² "An amusing turn was given to the congress when the speech of Tobashev, of Moscow Province, was interrupted by Kaganovich, Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the Party. 'When Kaganovich came to our farm,' declared Tobashev, 'our chairman said, "This is the way to the office." Kaganovich replied, "It would be much better to see the barns and get an idea how you carry on work here." He saw everything and everywhere pointed out shortcomings; our equipment, for instance, was kept in a shed,

in a harvest which, even if its excellence was exaggerated, was at least vastly better than those of the preceding years. But there would not have been anything like so great a yield if this extraordinary administrative activity had not seen to it, in practically all the 240,000 farms, that the sowing was actually undertaken and completed at the right time; that the harrowing was not scamped; that there was everywhere much more systematic weeding than had ever before been undertaken; that the tractors and harvesters were supplied to nearly every collective farm, and maintained in unwonted efficiency; that the harvest was got in without procrastination; and that the grain was guarded from theft and stored in safety. In the following year (1934) the harvest was apparently, on the average, not quite so great as in 1933; but the universal testimony was to the effect that the behaviour of the peasants had greatly improved. Some of the villages that had been among the most recalcitrant in cultivation during 1932, and had hungered most in the winter of 1932-1933, were among the most diligent in 1934, and abundantly reaped the reward of their increased labours. As a consequence it was reported that the government obtained in the aggregate almost as large an amount of grain, in return for its machinery and seed, as its share of the less abundant harvest of 1934, as it had received out of the bumper crops of 1933. And now that the worst members of the collective farms have been drastically expelled, whilst the others have been actually shown how the work should be done, and have been made to realise that, even after paying all that the government requires from them, *they have much more to their individual shares than they have ever in their lives made out of their tiny holdings*, they may perhaps be expected to be able to dispense with much of the hustling by which Kaganovich and his myrmidons in 1933 and 1934 pulled the USSR through a dangerous crisis.¹

Life on a Collective Farm

Let us now turn from the exciting campaign by which Kaganovich, as we think, saved the situation; and relieved the Soviet Government from its grave anxiety as to the feeding of the city populations and the Red Army. What is the life that is normally led by the seventy millions of people in the USSR who make up the collective farms?

"Superficially", remarked the late Michael Farberman, "a collectivised the door of which did not close properly." 'I remember,' interjected Kaganovich, 'that snow came in through the roof.' (Laughter.) 'Quite right,' returned Tobashov, 'but now we have repaired it.' 'Very good,' returned Kaganovich, 'I'll return soon to find out.' 'We know perfectly well,' concluded Tobashov, 'that you would not take our word for it. We are waiting for you to come back.' " (*Moscow Daily News*, February 18, 1933).

¹ We may quote the testimony of an impartial Canadian expert: "Because of the increased area of holdings and higher yields in the collectives, as a result of the greater use of tractors and modern implements and production methods, the income per household on the average collectivised farm has increased at least 150 per cent as a nation-wide average, and by more than 200 per cent in numerous localities" (*Russia, Market or Menace*, by Thomas D. Campbell, 1932, p. 65). This author, who was in two separate years sent for by the Soviet Government to advise them how to cope with their agricultural difficulties, successfully conducts a 95,000-acre wheat farm in Montana, U.S.A.

village looks very like the traditional Russian village. But essentially it is something quite new. The life of a peasant in such a village differs almost entirely from that of the old-fashioned muzik. Instead of being confined to a petty world in which he had to till the various narrow strips that comprise his holding with the aid of a single horse, he has become a partner in a big estate and has to adapt himself to large-scale methods of cultivation and the use of all sorts of machines of which he had never even heard before. Moreover, he has suffered a social and political as well as an economic change. His share in the cooperative effort is involving him in various new experiences with his neighbours. Of these the organisation of work is naturally the most important.”¹

The Members' Meeting

The basis of the administration of the collective farm, as in the soviet and trade union hierarchies, is the periodical meeting of all the members over the age of eighteen. At such a meeting, at least once in every year, and in many cases more frequently, there is elected the chairman, and several other members to form the board of management (*pravlenie*), which constitutes the effective executive for all purposes. It is by this body, in the atmosphere of day-by-day discussion among all the members, and subject to periodical report and debate in the members' meeting, that all the necessary decisions are taken: what crops shall be raised on what parts of the farm; when the various operations of ploughing, sowing, weeding and harvesting shall be undertaken; which members shall be assigned to each of the innumerable separate tasks, and all the thousand and one detailed arrangements that even the smallest collective enterprise necessarily involves.

The Management of a Collective Farm

The actual organisation of work within each collective farm, together with the arrangements for sharing the product among the members, vary from farm to farm. The 240,000 farms, indeed, differ indefinitely from each other in almost every respect, according to the local conditions and to the capacity and honesty of the leading members. At first, everything was of the simplest. All the members worked pretty well as they chose, at any of the varied tasks. It was often assumed that the year's product could and should be shared equally among all the little community, on the basis of the number of mouths to be fed, irrespective of age, sex, capacity or the work actually performed. Gradually this simplicity was abandoned in favour of a definite assignment of tasks and offices, by decision of the members' meeting, but on the recommendation of the responsible officers and the board of management. In all the well-organised *kolkhosi* the workers are allocated to brigades, to each of which is assigned a specific task. In order to fix responsibility each brigade has a particular area of land to cultivate, with its own set of implements, and

¹ "Creating a New Agricultural System", in *The Economist* (London), October 15, 1932.

is required to concentrate its work on a particular crop, whether wheat or rye, flax or beet, cotton or sunflower, throughout the whole agricultural year upon the same area, in the successive operations of ploughing, sowing, harrowing, weeding and harvesting. In the same way a specific brigade takes charge, throughout the whole year, of the horses, cattle, sheep or pigs that the kolkhos possesses in common, so that there may be no doubt as to responsibility for their maintenance in health.

Experience soon proved the necessity of changing the basis of sharing from mouths to be fed to days of work performed, often supplemented by an allowance for children under working age. The share for each day's work had then to be differentiated not by sex or age but according to the laboriousness or disagreeableness of the task.¹ The importance of the functions of management and accounting soon came to be increasingly recognised. But in order to keep down the overhead charges the number of members who may be employed otherwise than in actually productive work, such as management, secretarial duties, accounting and measuring, is strictly limited; and it is laid down that their hours of work must be reckoned, in the sharing, at no more than the average per hour of the whole body of adult workers.

When it was found at the end of the harvest that a considerable surplus remained, after all the advances to members had been covered, and all the required transfers or payments to the government had been made—and this has undoubtedly been the case in successive years in many collective farms, and during 1933 and 1934 in, at least, many tens of thousands of them—the disposal of this surplus has been the subject of prolonged discussion among the members, leading up to a decision by the members' meeting.² How much should be devoted to capital improvement and how much to distribution as a bonus in money or in produce; whether to build a new barn, a new cow-house, a new silo; or a village hall, a club-house, or a cinema; or a children's crèche, a primitive apartment house for the young and unmarried men, or a clinic for the visiting doctor—all these have been talked over, and here and there, one at a time, in whatever order desired, actually undertaken.

How Disputes are Settled

In the working life of such a community there must inevitably occur disputes which even a vote cannot settle. For these, as in the factory,

¹ "The value of work done by members of kolkhosi is reckoned in labour days. But what is a labour day? A labour day is a fixed quantity and a fixed quality of work done by a member of the kolkhos" (Tataev, *The Distribution of Income in the Kolkhosi*, Partizdat, Moscow, 1932, p. 24, in Russian).

"In the Instructions issued by Kolkhoscentre as to rates of pay for work it is stated that no matter by whom the work is done—whether by a man, by a woman or a young person—this work, if equal in quantity and quality, must be reckoned as an equal number of labour days, and must be paid for in a corresponding share of the income" (*ibid.* p. 28).

² In order to ensure that nothing is decided without general consent, it has been prescribed by law that the objects of the proposed expenditure must be within the kolkhos itself; and that no proposal shall be deemed to have been carried otherwise than by a

there is increasingly resort to "the Triangle". "We have all heard", writes a recent observer, "of the Triangle in the factories: management, Party and trade union. But on the collective farm there is no trade union. What then? Have we forgotten the village soviet? A village is occupied by collective farmers and a few artisans, the sales clerks in the cooperatives, school teachers, and so on. . . . The village soviet is the organ of government; the kolkhos board the economic and labour control of the farm. Their interests can never clash; they are complementary. The Triangle on the kolkhos . . . [is] composed of the chairman of the board, the chairman of the village soviet and the Party secretary. And this triangular form of representation is carried down through the farm structure. On each brigade there is also a member of the village soviet, elected from the brigade, who, with the brigadier and the brigade Party organiser, forms the brigade Triangle. Brigadiers are appointed by the farm board at a general meeting, when these appointments may be discussed, opposed or confirmed."¹

Democracy in Agriculture

No one can possibly visit all the 240,000 collective farms spread over an immense area; and no visitor of half a dozen or so can form any useful idea of the extent to which such a sample—no larger than one-twenty-thousandth part—is typical of the enormous mass, either in general efficiency or in amount of product. What most impresses the political student is the vision of these 240,000 separate communities scattered throughout the length and breadth of the USSR, severally working out their own life-conditions, within the framework of the law and the regulations common to them all, not as separate families but as members of a cooperative society in which all have a common interest.² What an education must be the endless discussions of the frequent members' meetings! How refreshingly novel must be the atmosphere in which the twenty or thirty million children of these collectivised peasants are now growing up!

At the same time the peasants are, with the aid of their families, also

clear majority in a meeting at which not less than two-thirds of the membership were present and voted.

¹ Article by Charles Ashleigh describing collective farms in North Caucasus, *Moscow Daily News*, September 3, 1933. The Triangle is, however, not yet universal on collective farms, though it may be that it is tending to become so.

² Competent observers testify to signs among the peasantry of a mental revolution. "Very striking tendencies can be observed in the buying activities of kolkhos peasants. None of them would think of buying a horse. He has no right to buy a horse. Here is a real farmer. But he would no more think of buying a plough than a factory working man would think of saving up to buy a turbine. The Russian peasant, in other words, can spend a decreasing amount of money on the acquisition of capital. He will use his money, instead, to eat more, clothe himself better and live more comfortably. This is another agent, Russians say, in undermining the capitalistic instincts of the mujik. I wish I could convey the momentousness of such psychological changes. They amount to a national mental revolution" ("The Evolution of Collectivisation", by Louis Fischer, in *British Russian Gazette*, September 1933).

developing that part of the production which is left in their own hands. The magnitude and range of the individual enterprises of the members of the collective farms is seldom adequately realised. The "Model Constitution" recommended on February 17, 1935, states that "each household in collective farms in tilling districts which have a well-developed livestock industry may have at its personal disposal two or three cows, apart from calves, from two to three pigs with their offspring, a total of 20 to 25 sheep and goats, and an unlimited number of poultry, rabbits and up to 20 beehives. . . . The area of the land around the dwelling-place which is personally used by the kolkhos farmstead (exclusive of the land occupied by the dwelling) may range between a quarter and half an hectare, and in certain districts one hectare." (The hectare is 2.47 acres.)

The Commune

We need say little, at this stage, of the completely collectivised settlement known as the commune. Here the little community has all its material possessions in common ownership, and unites all its activities under common management, very much as was done by the numerous societies formed during the past hundred years, in America and elsewhere, under the influence of Robert Owen, Cabet and Fourier, or among peculiar religious denominations such as the Shakers. In the USSR at least a couple of thousand communes have been established in various places during the past decade without any religious basis; and many of them have now had several years' successful experience. We may cite as an example the commune named Seattle in the Salski district of North Caucasus province, which was founded in 1922-1923 by a group of Finnish Socialists, originally centred at Seattle in the State of Washington (U.S.A.). They were attracted to the USSR, as a country free from the oppressions of capitalism, in which they could apply, on a cooperative basis, the American agricultural machinery that they brought with them. Welcomed by Lenin, they were assigned 5291 hectares of unbroken steppe, twelve miles from the railway. Here the members, whose numbers had grown by 1935 to about 400, making a total population of approaching 1000, now comprising sixteen different nationalities, have erected substantial dwellings supplied with running water, provided nurseries and schools, sunk wells, built barns, granaries and silos, and brought under continuous cultivation more than 10,000 acres, selling the wheat annually to the Government Grain Trust.¹ The commune had, in 1933, over 100 cattle

¹ An interesting article by Richard Gerbacy, a member of the commune, in the *Moscow Daily News*, October 20, 1933, described the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the settlement. On our visit in 1932, we were not only freely supplied with information, but also presented with a lengthy pamphlet (in Russian) entitled *From the Country of the Capitalists to the USSR: the American Commune Seattle*, by P. J. Thadæus (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1930), which, in translation, has enabled us to form a vivid picture of the early trials and the present organisation of this prosperous community.

The pamphlet *A Student in Russia*, by Paul Winterton (Cooperative Union, Manchester, 1929, 64 pp.), gives an attractive account of a commune in southern Ukraine, which had then enjoyed several years of prosperity and increasing civilisation, under enlightened leadership.

and nearly 200 pigs. It maintains a large wood-working shop and extensive brick-kilns, by which it is constantly adding to its buildings. An efficiently fitted machine shop not only keeps all the machinery of the neighbouring farms in repair, but also manufactures new parts and gears. The members of the commune enter freely into the local life of the district, take part in the elections to the village soviet (selosoviet), and send delegates to all the conferences and congresses that they are entitled to attend. All over the USSR the quarter of a million population of the couple of thousand communes takes the same part in the civic organisation, local and national, as do the kolkhosi. Whether or not these latter will gradually develop into communes, as many people suppose, but as the Soviet Government does not encourage, is a question of the future. At present it looks as if there was a tendency for individual ownership to reappear inside the commune. In order to increase the aggregate of livestock, the USSR People's Commissar of Agriculture has decreed that "every member of an agricultural commune has a right to acquire for his individual economy a cow, small producers' livestock and fowls."¹

The Hierarchy of Owner-Producers in Agriculture

The organisation of the owner-producer in agriculture stands plainly at a more rudimentary stage than that of the owner-producers in industry, which we described in the preceding section. The severe crisis of the past few years has stood in the way of any adoption of the hierarchical or pyramidal form of democratic centralism. No district councils representative of kolkhosi exist, nor is there any sign at present of the institution of an All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers. There is, accordingly, no central executive committee which such a congress would appoint. A preliminary stage to that of a representative "All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers" may have been the large gathering of "collective farm shock-brigaders" (udarniki) which was summoned to Moscow in February 1933. At this conference, attended by over 1500 local leaders of collective farm administrations from nearly all parts of the USSR, the difficulties and the prospects of these owner-producers were made the subject of stirring addresses by such outstanding ministers as Molotov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Voroshilov and Yakovlev, together with Stalin himself. This conference at Moscow was followed during the spring of 1933 by others held for particular provinces.² A "Second All-Union

¹ "Collectivisation of Agriculture in the Soviet Union", by W. Ladejinsky, in *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1934.

² See the reports of speeches made at such conferences of udarniki in *Moscow Daily News*, February 15-20, 1933, and also February 1935; also *International Press Correspondence*, March 2 and May 26, 1933; *Speech at the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigade Workers*, by J. Stalin (Moscow, 1933, 24 pp.); *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, ch. vi. "Collectives", pp. 95-116.

At these conferences the delegates were invited, and their expenses were paid, by the USSR People's Commissar for the kolkhosi and peasantry, but invitations were issued in blank, a due proportion being sent to each province. The actual selection was made locally by vote among the whole number of udarniki. It was explicitly stated that many, if not most, of the delegates were non-Party men or women.

Congress of Kolkhos Udarniks " held at the end of 1934 adopted a detailed and elaborate model constitution for all kolkhosi, which was formally approved by the Sovnarkom of the USSR and by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 17, 1935. This model constitution was strongly recommended for adoption by the members' meeting of each of the 240,000 kolkhosi ; now approaching 250,000.

The permanent central office in Moscow (Kolkhoscentre), from which was exercised some general supervision over all the collective farms in the USSR—or by which, at any rate, statistics were collected for the whole movement—has now been absorbed in the new commissariat, and is directly administered by the USSR People's Commissar for Agriculture (kolkhosi and peasantry). Probably one of the most important constitutional relations, apart from those with the Agricultural Commission of the Communist Party, are those with Gosplan, with which it must be frequently in consultation as to the annual formulation of the control figures of the General Plan, and the continued minor modifications which have to be made and adjusted.

Any hierarchical organisation of councils rising, tier after tier, from the members' meeting to an All-Union Congress of elected delegates is, in the case of the collective farms, frankly postponed. The authoritative regulation of such of the 240,000 farms as are imperfectly administered is, at present, more obvious than any organised expression of the desires and ideas of the fifteen million families who form the aggregate membership.

The vast majority of the 240,000 collective farms are, in fact, not yet wholly self-governing cooperative societies.¹ Such of them as have already made their agriculture successful, to the extent of maintaining their members, and their families, and of yielding to the government the amount of its levies for the agricultural tax, and in return for the use of its tractors and harvesters, its seeds and its fertilisers, do, in fact, manage their own affairs, by their own members' meetings ; and get from the government, beyond the machines that they hire, no more than supervision and advice. For the rest there has had to be devised an elaborate system of administration by which the members' meetings have been, by an ingenious combination of education and persuasion, economic pressure and, in the last resort, drastic coercion, shown how they should go.

The Results in 1933

It is possibly useless to adduce aggregate figures of the yield of wheat during 1933 for the whole USSR—showing a considerable increase on any previous year—as evidence of the successful working of the system of collective farms. Nor can this success be proved by particular instances,

¹ But it seems ridiculous for a contributor to the pamphlet of the School of Slavonic Studies entitled *Collectivised Agriculture in the Soviet Union* (London, 1934, p. 30)—one who has been unable to visit the USSR to see for himself—to declare "that the legal status of the members of collective farms is for all practical purposes equivalent to bondage".

any more than failure is proved by the most agonising letters of complaint, often of doubtful authenticity, which have been published abroad. It will, however, complete the picture if we give a summary of the report of one kolkhos, named "Successes of Stalin", in the Middle Volga region. This collective farm, it will be seen, made a great success in 1932, without waiting for the campaign of the Policy Section or relying on the advice of the Machine and Tractor Stations. "This collective farm, comprising 234 families, had just completed the distribution of its income for the current year, after fulfilling the year's programme of grain deliveries by August 15. A total of 227 tons of grain was sold to the government out of a total grain crop of 619 tons.

"The gross income of the farm for the year, estimated on the basis of the official prices for agricultural products, is close to 95,000 roubles. In addition to 235 tons of rye, 337 tons of wheat, 26 tons of oats and 19 tons of millet, the farm produced 66 tons of potatoes, 18 tons of sunflower seed and 1000 tons of hay and straw. After selling to the government the set quantity of agricultural products, the farm proceeded to collect a seed supply to be used for next year's sowing. In addition, a supply of grain was collected for the feeding of the horses, sheep and hogs owned by the collective. Some grain was also set aside to supply those peasants who have left to work in the cities, under agreements signed with industrial organisations.

"The total net monetary income of the collective farm from the sale of grain to the government and from other sources, amounted to 50,000 roubles. From this sum, the farm paid agricultural taxes of 1750 roubles, and insurance 1700 roubles. A 3300 rouble loan was repaid to the State Bank: 10 per cent of the gross income of the farm was turned into a common fund, which is used largely for capital construction on the farm. By decision of the farm members, an additional 4 per cent of the gross income was set aside for cultural purposes, to pay bonuses and similar expenses. Two thousand roubles were invested in stocks of the Tractor Centre and Incubator Centre, which supply the farm with the required tractors and incubators. About 4000 roubles was spent for kerosene and lubricating oil for the tractors, for repairs, and for administrative expenditure.

"After all these expenses were met, the farm still had nearly 27,000 roubles in cash, as well as 185 tons of wheat and considerable quantities of other agricultural products.

"Up to September 20, when the distribution was effected, 26,000 working days had been put in by the members of the collective. It was estimated that in order to complete the work on hand some 85,000 working days more will be required before the end of the year. The average pay for a working day will therefore be: 78 kopeks, plus 6.5 kilograms of grain, 2.0 kg. of hay, 14 kg. of straw, and various other farm products. *These amounts are from four to six times larger than the money and products received by the members per working day last year.*

"To stimulate better work, the two best field brigades (the groups in which the members work) received 10 per cent more per working day than the average, while two other brigades whose work was not up to the required level received 15 per cent less than average pay. . . . The collective farm members cultivate their own gardens and keep their own cattle and horses. This provides considerable additional income."¹

Let us end this complicated analysis of the "campaign on the agricultural front" by a description by an eye-witness of one of the members' meetings when the harvest had been got in. "On September 7," writes the American student whom we have already quoted, "the collective farm 'Matvaeva' celebrated the distribution of the first half of the grain shares. . . . The individual shares for the whole period ranged from 100 to 500 poods. Later in the day at the meeting . . . farmer after farmer rose to speak of the harvest, the problems that had been met and solved by the help of the head of the political section. . . . One elderly woman rose, shook her finger at the meeting, and reminded them '*when we read in the papers how such a harvest was possible we didn't believe it; now it is an accomplished fact.*' . . ." As an example of what has been accomplished in a brief seven months through the work of the political section, the collective farm 'Bolshevik' may be cited. Completely disorganised last year by kulak sabotage, the Bolshevik farm failed to harvest all its grain, failed in its grain deliveries, and the members themselves were short of grain. This year that same kolkhos is one of the leading farms in the district, and has been placed on the roll of honour for the whole of the North Caucasus. . . . There is new life in the villages."²

Such descriptive accounts by eye-witnesses of particular collective farms, although they may be quite accurate, do not enable us to come to any confident conclusion as to what is happening in the whole 240,000 of them. They are doubtless deliberately selected instances; and, in fact, they make no pretence of being anything else. Equally graphic descriptions can be obtained of the complete failure of collective farms to obtain any harvest at all, owing largely, as it is not denied, to the concerted refusal of the members to do any effective work at ploughing, weeding or harvesting, even to the extent of leaving themselves without seed, and occasionally without food during the winter.³ It is too soon to judge,

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, October 15, 1932.

² Article by R. E. Hurst on the Ustiahinsk Machine and Tractor Station, North Caucasus, in *Moscow Daily News*, October 15, 1933. Other successful kolkhosi are described and interesting descriptions of their working are given in *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, pp. 95-100.

³ We note that Mr. W. H. Chamberlin, who has now been transferred from Moscow to Tokyo, continues to assert (in various magazine articles in 1934-1935, and in his book *Russia's Iron Age*, 1935) that there was a terrible famine in 1932-1933, "one of the greatest human catastrophes since the world-war," which caused, from disease and starvation, some four or five million deaths beyond the normal mortality. After carefully weighing Mr. Chamberlin's various assertions we can find no evidence of there having been any "natural" or "climatic" famine in 1931-1934. There is abundant testimony from many sources that the shortage in the crop was, for the most part, "man-made". It is, indeed, not seriously disputed that in 1932 there was widespread refusal to sow,

on the one hand, whether the successful kolkhosi will repeat, in less favourable years, when the official pressure is lightened, the material successes of 1933 and 1934; or, on the other, whether the stern measures taken against those who failed to cultivate the land entrusted to them can overcome the ingrained habit of mind of the individual peasant, incapable of recognising his own gain in any product, however considerable, which has to be shared with others. German expert observers declare that the agricultural difficulties in the USSR are not yet over, and that not for several years can the food position be declared to be safe. There are two principal grounds for this conclusion. Whatever may be done by drastic administration to compel the sullen farmers to cultivate effectively, this will not restore the slaughtered horses and cattle, sheep and pigs. The diminution of livestock had, in 1933, not yet stopped (except for pigs); although it is claimed that in 1934 the decrease was arrested in all but horses. Even if the aggregate total begins to rise during 1935, it must take several years to bring to maturity the animals now being born.

The second ground taken by those who know best the mind of a peasantry in any European country, is the sheer impossibility of persuading the elder kolkhos member to change his ideas and his habits. He has not yet got over his resentment at being deposed from his position of family autocrat,¹ nor will he easily be weaned from his habit of seeking always to do less work than his fellow-members, on the argument that only in this way can he hope to "get even" with them, as they will, of course, be seeking to do less than he does! It is not enough, such critics declare, to leave to the kolkhos member the full product of his own garden, his own poultry, his own beehives, his own pig and even his own

neglect to weed, and failure to reap, just as there had been in previous years deliberate slaughter of every kind of livestock, amounting to no fewer than 150 million animals. This "man-made" shortage it was that Mr. Chamberlin calls a famine. How far food scarcity was aggravated by undue exactions by the government agents from a population manifestly guilty of sabotage may well be a matter of controversy. We find, in the statements of Mr. Chamberlin and other believers in the famine, nothing that can be called statistical evidence of widespread abnormal mortality; though it may be inferred that hardships in particular villages must have led, here and there, to some rise in the local death-rate. The continuous increase in the total population of the Ukraine and North Caucasus, as of the USSR as a whole, does not seem to have been interrupted, though the migration from the rural districts to the cities has continued, and may even have increased. The controversy is discussed in Louis Fischer's book *Soviet Journey*, 1935, pp. 170-172, in which he incidentally says, "*I myself saw, all over the Ukraine in October 1932, huge stacks of grain which the peasants had refused to gather in, and which were rotting. This was their winter's food. Then these same peasants starved.*"

¹ In many collective farms a way of dealing with the apathy and sullenness of the elderly peasants, who were frequently found sitting gloomily on the seat in front of their houses, whilst the young people were working in the fields, has been found. They have been formally appointed "inspectors of quality", and given the duty of superintending the work and reporting on the quality of the crops harvested. They wear a badge, and walk about with an air of authority! (see the cases cited in *Reise durch hundert Kollektivwirtschaften*, by L. P. Boross, Moscow, 1934, p. 176). This ingenious encouragement of the aged has been carried even further. In various districts, congresses of these inspectors of quality have been held, attended by hundreds of elderly peasants from the neighbouring kolkhosi, who have been addressed by leading statesmen, and treated as persons occupying key-positions in the local agriculture!

cow. This concession to individualism may, it is said, even make matters worse, by tempting the disloyal collective farmer to put all his energy into his private enterprise. We do not ourselves pretend to a judgment. But we suggest that the Bolshevik Government may not be wrong in putting its hopes, in the kolkhosi, as elsewhere, on the young people, who (as it is not always remembered) constitute about half the population. These will have increasingly been nurtured in a collective atmosphere; and, according to all accounts, they like it much better than the life of the individual peasant. So, it seems, do most of the women. If the women and the children, and the young people, who together constitute three-fourths of the whole population, prefer the kolkhos, the kolkhos will endure. This, at least, is the judgment of the observer who probably knows the Russian peasant better than any other writer. "Of one thing we may be assured," declares Mr. Maurice Hindus, "so long as the soviets endure there will be no return to individual farming. I have the feeling that, even if the soviets were to collapse, Russian agriculture would remain collectivised with control in the hands of the peasants instead of the government. The advantages of collectivisation as a method of farming are indisputable. There are even now scores of highly successful collective farms in the Black Earth region and in the Ukraine. Collectivisation has within it the power to convert Russia from a backward to a progressive agricultural nation, as individual landholding with its inevitable small acreage never can."¹

(c) MISCELLANEOUS ASSOCIATIONS OF OWNER-PRODUCERS

Needless to say, the advantages of association in the work of production are not confined to the cultivators and handicraftsmen, and other producers in agriculture or small scale industry. We shall describe in the following chapter the entirely distinct consumers' organisation of the distribution of commodities, together with the productive services incidental thereto. But even specifically within the sphere of production, where the two main types of manufacturing *artel* and collective farm count by far the largest numbers of members, we have to notice, as part of the social structure of production in the USSR, various other kinds of "cooperatives", often "mixed" in type, which are seldom described, but which cannot be ignored.

We must, however, first write off, as superseded by subsequent developments, practically all the array of independent agricultural cooperative societies that existed in the USSR as recently as 1927.² At that date

¹ *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, p. 114.

² Apart from the voluminous Russian sources, the following more accessible publications may be cited: *The Cooperative Movement in Russia*, by J. V. Bubnoff (Manchester, 1917, 162 pp.); *The Cooperative Movement in Soviet Russia*, by Elsie Terry Blane (New York, 1924); *The Cooperative Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1925); *Die Konsumgenossenschaften in Sowjetrussland*, by Lubinow (Berlin, 1926, 20 pp.); *Consumers' Cooperation in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics*, by P. Popoff (London, 1927, 46 pp.); *Die Genossenschaften in sozialistischen Aufbau*, by W. Tikhomirov (1927); *The Russian Cooperative Movement*, by N. Barou and E. F. Wise (1927); *Die landwirt-*

there were specialised societies for the assistance of the makers of butter and cheese and other milk products; societies for poultry and eggs; for potatoes; for grapes and wine; for horse- and cattle-breeding and the rearing of sheep; for tobacco; for cotton; for flax; for sugar-beet; for the production and distribution of various kinds of seed; for bee-keeping and what not. There were a number of credit societies on a mutual basis. But most of these societies, or the various federations and unions that they formed among themselves, combined the joint marketing of their members' produce with whatever preparation for sale could conveniently be undertaken collectively. Thus, there were cooperative creameries and cheese factories by the thousand; many hundreds of cooperative workshops and mills for the preparation of flax; hundreds of cooperative factories and distilleries for the manufacture both of food preparations and of alcohol from the extensive potato crop. In almost all cases the cooperative society supplied the technical instruction appropriate to the enterprise; selected seed; the best kinds of implements, and plans and models of improved buildings. It undertook the collection and storage of the produce; arranged bulk sales to the consumers' cooperatives or the government trusts; opened up new markets; organised exhibitions in the cities, and concerted with the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade as to the widening of the range of the export trade. A large proportion of all the agricultural produce of the USSR, apart from cereals, was, in 1927, handled by these independent cooperative associations. In the cases of milk products, flax, potatoes, tobacco and sugar-beet, these associations dealt with 60 to 90 per cent of the whole production of the country.

This extensive development of voluntary and independent organisations of agricultural producers, which in 1927 numbered 80,000 separate societies, uniting as many as eight or nine million peasant households in voluntary cooperation, had, by 1932, completely disappeared from view. So far as the present writers could learn, all the 80,000 societies have ceased to exist as such; their numerous federal associations have been "liquidated"; and the various "centres" that they maintained at Moscow have been absorbed into the new USSR Commissariats of State Farms and of Agriculture respectively. A certain proportion of the local cooperative societies (including the Siberian creameries) have simply become collective farms (*kolkhosi*). Wherever the collective farms have been established, the credit societies have become unnecessary, as the individual members have little need of loans, whilst the State Bank supplies any credit required by the *kolkhos* itself. The great development

schäftlichen Genossenschaften in der Sowjetunion (Berlin, 1928), translated as *Agricultural Cooperation in the Soviet Union*, by G. Ratner (London, 1929); *The Cooperative Movement in Russia during the War*, by Kayden and Antsiferov (1930); *Les Voies du développement de la coopération de production en URSS*, by W. Tikhomirov (1931); *The Year Book of Agricultural Cooperation* (London, 1933); and, as to credit societies, *Economic Survey* (Gosbank), November and December 1930, and *Russian Cooperative Banking*, by N. Baron (London, 1931); and for all forms now existing, *Consumers' Cooperation in the USSR*, by Leslie A. Paul (1934).

of scientific institutes, which now place at the peasants' disposal all the facts and suggestions that he requires, may have rendered unnecessary much of the service of advice and instruction rendered by the specialist cooperative societies and federal unions. Yet it cannot be ignored that the summary "liquidation" of so extensive a growth of social tissue involves a loss to the peasantry which may not yet have been entirely made good to the whole twenty-five million households, by the more systematic organisation of state banks and commissariats, institutes and kolkhosi. Some miscellaneous developments of these we have now to describe.

The Fishermen's Kolkhosi.—In no part of the organised structure of Soviet Communism do we find a more striking example of Lenin's principle of constitutional multiformity than in the industry of fishing, in which the USSR has now a greater annual output than Great Britain or Norway, and stands second only to Japan among all the nations of the world.¹ This industry is almost entirely a creation of the last fifteen years. Prior to the war there was practically no Russian deep-sea fishing, no other preserving than salting, no canning of the catch, and only an extensive but unorganised individual shore and river fishing, which sank under the disturbance of war and famine to its lowest point in 1921. In 1929 the Soviet Government began the establishment of deep-sea fishing (including whaling), with an ever-increasing development of refrigeration and other methods of preservation; processing of various kinds; various incidental manufactures, and, finally, canning on a large scale. The capital investment in up-to-date fleets of motor vessels, shore depôts and factories, and the canning industry, during 1929-1934, amounts to nearly 500 million roubles. At the present time (1935) there are at work more than 100 ocean-going trawlers, as well as larger vessels; 8 shipbuilding wharves for repairing and increasing this fleet; 21 refrigerating establishments; 9 ice-making works; 26 barrel factories; 250 radio transmitting and receiving stations; 27 fish-waste factories, and many incidental establishments. The annual catch of this state fishery department now amounts to nearly half a million tons of fish, or about twice as much as the total catch of all the fishermen of 1921; a remarkable achievement of only five years' constructive work.

But the Soviet Government, in establishing this great industry, in which all the workers are directly employed at salaries or wages, had no wish or intention to establish a monopoly, or to supersede the coast and river fisheries, by which some hundreds of thousands of fishermen are

¹ The latest accessible information about the USSR fisheries is given in the article by Professor A. Petrov, entitled "The Fisheries of the Soviet Union, a New and Efficient Industry", in the Supplement of *The Financial News* (London), November 5, 1934. This, however, says little about the fisher kolkhosi, for which should be consulted the decrees and regulations of July 1931 and September 1932, and an article by I. Ivanovsky, entitled "The Collective Fishery System in the USSR", in *Voks Socialist Construction in the USSR*, vol. vi., 1934. See also *Das Fischerwesen Russlands*, by William F. Douglas (Berlin, 1930, pp. 206).

earning an independent living. On the contrary, these self-employing "owner-producers", all round the coasts of the USSR, and in all its great lakes and rivers, have been systematically encouraged; helped in their equipment and marketing; and finally brought together in a network of self-governing kolkhosi. The result has been that, concurrently with the rapid development of the state fisheries, the output of the self-governing owner-producers has also increased year by year, so that they can claim, in 1935, to be catching, in the aggregate, something like 60 per cent more weight of fish than they did in 1921, with a larger average income per head, and greater security and amenity.

We cannot recount all the stages in this friendly cooperation between the Soviet Government and the independent fishermen. The first few years after the revolution witnessed various not very successful attempts at a revival of the industry. In 1921 there began an apparently spontaneous organisation of the coastal fishermen in local artels, or *communes*, which presently established district and provincial unions for common purposes, and in 1923 the All-Russian Cooperative Industrial Union of Fishermen (*Vsekopromyrbaksoyus*), with a centre at Moscow. But there was still comparatively little intercourse between the fishermen of the different coasts of the USSR, and many villages of fishermen remained untouched by the new movement of thought. In 1931, partly as a result of the growth of the new state fisheries, the various organisations of fisher kolkhosi were reorganised on a common plan, and united with some others which had meanwhile joined the hunters' associations, in an All-Union Congress of Fishing Kolkhosi (*Rybakolkkhossoyus*). Since that date nearly all the professional fishermen in the USSR, some 300,000 in number (other than the wage-earners of the state fishery department),¹ have joined one or other of the 1500 fisher kolkhosi which now form the federal association.

The special note of this federation seems to be the considerable autonomy retained by the several fisher kolkhosi, and their deliberate limitation of the functions entrusted to their delegates to little more than marketing, the supply of equipment at wholesale prices, and the giving of technical instruction and advice. The 1500 kolkhosi elect delegates, roughly in proportion to membership, to the annual session of the congress of the particular regional union to which each of them belongs. The 42 regional union congresses (12 of them representing exclusively the kolkhosi fishing the fresh water of lakes and rivers) maintain each the smallest possible secretarial and accounting staff. The All-Union Congress, composed of delegates of the 42 union congresses, meets only once a year to re-elect

¹ The wage-earners employed in the government fishing fleet are members of the Fishermen's Trade Union (in 1934 divided into the three trade unions of the fishermen of the northern, eastern and southern seas). There are still a small number of independent fishermen in the north and east of Siberia, who are mostly united in kolkhosi forming part of the "Integral" cooperative federation, presently to be described. It should be added that a few of the consumers' cooperative societies carry on, by employment at wages, small freshwater fisheries for their own needs.

its Executive Board of thirty five members, and discuss the annual report. This Executive Board, which is unpaid, meets in Moscow only very occasionally, and leaves the daily work to the presidium of five members whom it appoints. These five salaried members, who give their whole time to their duties, regard themselves not as leaders or administrators of a great industry, but merely as organisers and technical advisers, two or three of whom, at all times, are on visit to the distant kolkhosi.

What, then, does the cooperative organisation provide for its members? The writers had an opportunity, in 1932, of seeing, on the shores of the Sea of Azov, one of these fisher kolkhosi from the inside. The North Caucasus Krai included several regional fisher unions, to which, at that date, there belonged, 77 fisher kolkhosi,¹ with some 18,000 members, all working on the Sea of Azov or on the neighbouring shores of the Black Sea. The federal organisation provided the fisher kolkhosi with equipment, advice and instructions. It supplied its members with excellent thigh boots, nets and other equipment at wholesale prices. It provided advice in fishing methods, information as to weather and other prospects, and instruction in book-keeping. Each kolkhos, containing between one hundred and three hundred fishermen, owned collectively the boats, nets and other equipment, including sometimes a team of oxen to drag the heavily weighted net to land. It worked in brigades of several dozen men and boys each, who united in the operations under the direction of a leader of their own choice. Each catch, involving an hour or two's work, was straightway landed on the wharf belonging to the state fish trust, or other purchaser, where the fish were at once cleaned, salted or iced, packed and despatched. The fisher kolkhos was thus concerned only with catching the fish. It was governed entirely by its own members' meeting, which elected a president, as well as delegates to the regional congress.²

The financial organisation was peculiar. In 1932 each kolkhos made its own contract for the sale of a specified proportion of the fish arising from its catch during the ensuing three months. Anything beyond the quantity contracted for, the kolkhos might sell as and where it pleased. These contracts were, in 1932, made simultaneously for the whole district at a meeting of representatives of the kolkhosi as sellers, and of the state

¹ Only one of these kolkhosi, namely, that of Anapa, was in 1932 a completely collectivised commune.

Some of the fisher kolkhosi maintain their own subsidiary enterprises by wage labour, such as the weaving and repairing of nets, and even the raising of crops of foodstuffs for the members' households!

² In the autonomous republic of the Crimea there were, in 1932, 13 fishing kolkhosi along the coast between Eupatoria and the Sea of Azov, with 4500 members, supplying the land-dwellers with sturgeon, turbot, mullet, eels and pitchards. "We no longer work for masters," said the seventy-three-year-old leader; "our boats, our nets, our fish are ours. We discuss our shortcomings in production conferences. . . . The bad results of this year have been largely our own fault. The youngsters in our collective must learn how to catch fish. Again and again I tell them that there's no luck for a fisherman. It's all in knowing how to do it. And we'll best serve the revolution when we know how to provide the tons of fish needed by the country" (article on "Udarniks of the Sea", by Ed. Falkowski, in *Moscow Daily News*, October 15, 1932).

fish trust, as well as some consumers' cooperatives and large factories as buyers. It was usual, we were told, for the prices for each weight of fish to be willingly raised for the seasons in which the catch is normally least. The kolkhos paid no subscription towards the expenses of the regional organisation, or of the All-Union central office. It was the buyer who paid a fixed contribution for these purposes - in 1932 $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the price paid for the fish - to the regional organisation. Thus, the kolkhos was free to dispose of the whole of the contract price as its members might determine. What it habitually did was to allocate 35 per cent of the proceeds of each catch to a fund for renewal or increase of capital equipment (including amortisation of any loan); and the remaining 65 per cent to the members of the brigade making each particular catch. This lump sum was shared according to a fixed ratio, among five grades of men and boys, the lowest apprentice counting for one, and each of the four higher grades getting one-fifth in excess of the grade below it; the highest, therefore, counting for two. Of the commission of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the price, payable by the purchaser direct to the secretary of the regional council, 4 per cent was retained for this council's expenses; 2 per cent was allotted downward to the local council, whilst the remaining $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent was remitted upward to the Moscow centre.¹

On the remodelling of the federation in 1932, the marketing arrangements were so far changed as to give the government the advantage of a systemised All-Union arrangement. Now the government annually enters into a simple contract to buy a specified uniform quota of the aggregate catch, from each kolkhos in membership, which is arranged by negotiation between the Commissariat of Supplies and the presidium of the All-Union Federation, and embodied in a general contract ratified by the Executive Board, specifying not only the amount, but also the price, the dates of delivery and the method of payment. In addition, each kolkhos negotiates supplementary conditions about details with the local state factories at which each catch is delivered.

The price paid by the government, which, it is claimed, the fishermen's board of thirty-five virtually fixes, with merely the concurrence of the government, is, roughly speaking, 20 per cent lower than could be obtained by the kolkhosi if they sold their catch in the open market by retail. But the kolkhosi get, for the government quota, the advantage not only of a fixed price all the year round without the trouble of obtaining transport, or the risk of waste, or the expense of retail selling, but also the privilege of obtaining the products of the state factories of equipment, etc., at wholesale prices.² If the Executive Board cannot agree with the govern-

¹ The financial arrangements have since been changed. The government or other buyer now pays only the price agreed upon. The expenses of the organisation are met by levies on the kolkhosi, usually of no more than 3 or 4 per cent of the proceeds of sales.

² We understand that the Executive Board does not always find it easy to convince the separate kolkhosi that the price demanded for the government quota is as high as might reasonably be asked of so large a buyer. It is not always remembered that the government provides the motor engines and other equipment, thigh boots and special

ment as to the price, this is settled by arbitration. All fish in excess of the quota may be disposed of as each kolkhos pleases. Supplies of fresh fish are eagerly sought by such independent buyers as the consumers' cooperative societies and the departments of "self supply" of factories, mines and railways; and fresh fish finds also a ready sale at any accessible open market. To these buyers the kolkhosi habitually charge a higher price than that obtained for the government quota, in order to compensate for the trouble and risk involved in such separate sales. The associated kolkhosi have, since 1932, abandoned to the government all methods of "processing" the fish, whether by way of refrigeration or other ways of preserving, or by preparation of caviare, or by canning, all of which can most economically be conducted on a large scale.

The only tax levied by the government on the fishermen is one of 3 per cent on the aggregate value of the total year's catch, in return for the use of the public waters and for the fish taken therefrom. The kolkhosi are all willingly cooperating with the Commissariat of Supplies in measures for protecting the fishing grounds from exhaustion, and now annually return to the water some fifteen billions of under-sized fish.

The 1500 fisher kolkhosi own over 65,000 fishing boats, mostly built by the members themselves, of which some 5000 are equipped with petrol motors supplied by the government on easy terms. The men are now demanding more powerful motors, even up to 150 horse-power, to enable them to fish at greater distances from shore. Meanwhile they are assisted, in about thirty of the fishing-grounds, by motor-boat stations maintained by the government for service on payment by any brigade or kolkhos desiring them.

The earnings of the kolkhos members are said to be steadily rising. In many districts they are reported to be between 2000 and 2500 roubles a year for the average man; but in others they do not reach so high a sum. Considerable "cultural" advances are reported. In some districts hundreds of women take part in the work, and become kolkhos members. There are floating clubs, with libraries and musical instruments, maintained by some of the kolkhosi. There are crèches for the infants. Nearly all the members join the local consumers' cooperative societies, whose recently rising demands for books and gramophones, wireless sets and bicycles, indicate an increasing margin of unbespoken income.

Integral Cooperatives.—This association, unique in constitutional form and in its peculiar combination of functions, was established only in July 1934, as the outcome of a decade of experience with organisations of other types.¹

clothing, and many foodstuffs, at specially low prices. Sometimes a kolkhos will be exceptionally successful in its sales to other purchasers, and is reluctant to take into account its frequent losses by failure to get prompt transport, etc. When the catch has been unexpectedly small, appeals are made to the government to make an addition to the agreed price; and this, we are told, is frequently conceded.

¹ Not much has been published, even (so far as we know) in Russian, upon Integral Cooperation; and our information is derived mainly from personal enquiry. A volume

We trace its origin to the hierarchy of local associations established in 1924 by and for the large numbers of hunters and trappers of wild animals. The membership included hunters of different types, whether (a) "professional" hunters and trappers, who lived entirely by this vocation and formed only 15 per cent of the membership; (b) semi-professionals, who accounted for another 50 per cent, and who pursued the vocation for gain or "for the pot", but combined it with another occupation; and (c) finally, also those "amateurs", about one-third of the whole, who hunted only for amusement. The local associations and their regional unions set themselves to render the services that each of these classes required. They provided in some districts a certain amount of watching of the forests and the game. They supplied the hunters with all the implements of their vocation at little above wholesale prices. They stored and sold, when desired, the products of the chase. But the hunters' associations in some parts of the USSR did more than this. In the sparsely inhabited regions of the north (as, for instance, Tobolsk, Tomsk-Naryn, Turukhansk, Kirensk and Priangarsk), where few other institutions exist, the hunters' societies united the features of other kinds of cooperatives; developing fishing and the breeding of reindeer; providing fish canneries and meat factories; supplying all the necessities of the villages, and marketing all their disposable products. Practically the whole adult population of these areas belonged to the hunters' societies, to which they contributed several hundred thousand members. The hunters' cooperative societies in other areas of the USSR came to number nearly 1000, with some 600,000 members, organised in about 6000 groups. Each society was governed by general meetings of its members, who elected a president, and usually a small presidium. The societies were grouped in thirty-five regional federations, with councils of delegates from the societies within each region. These regional federations sent delegates to meet in occasional All-Union Congresses of hunters and trappers from all parts, and maintained an active central office in Moscow.

But this widespread cooperative organisation proved lacking in stability. Both its membership and its functions were too heterogeneous for lasting unity, over a geographical area so vast as the USSR. The divergence of interest between the professional hunters and trappers, on the one hand, and, on the other, the sporting amateurs and the peasants who hunted only occasionally, led to perpetual conflicts. In 1933, by decree of TSIK and Sovnarkom of the USSR of August 17, the "integral" societies of the Far North, consisting largely of "national minorities", were set up as an independent system on the principle of the kolkhos. At last the All-Union Federation of Hunters was finally dissolved, and a new and more limited federal body, confined practically to Northern and Far-Eastern Siberia, but maintaining a central office at Moscow, was established

(in Russian) entitled *The Far North, a Collection of Materials* (Moscow, 1934, 170 pp.), being a reprint of a special supplement of the journal *The Soviet North*, contains (p. 106, etc.) details and statistics as to Integral Cooperation.

on July 25, 1934, by a congress of delegates representing local cooperative societies in these areas.

The new body was, so far as hunting was concerned, from the first dominated by those for whom the pursuit of game is a constant means of livelihood, taking up at least half their time; and these are now very largely concentrated in Northern and Eastern Siberia. The amateurs throughout the Union now find their wants supplied and their interests attended to by the voluntary organisations dealing with "sport" of every kind. The peasants, occasionally hunting "for the pot", are now mostly members of collective farms, and dispose of their furs directly by communicating with the nearest agents of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, or its Fur Trust.

The new federation, however, retains in membership the main bulk of the "mixed" cooperative societies within the geographical area with which it deals, whether these unite, in one and the same society, both production and distribution, or take on the form of *kolkhosi*, specialising either on agriculture or on fishing, or on reindeer breeding. We are told that, in this area, largely inhabited by different tribes of non-Russian stock, the people are at a stage of development too primitive to allow of their becoming members of various cooperative or other bodies having distinct and separate purposes. Whatever cooperative societies they establish almost invariably take on a "mixed" form, which is styled "integral", and which permits them to include, in one and the same society, hunting, fishing, agriculture, stock-breeding, the marketing of produce of every kind, and the retailing of all the commodities that their members desire. It is a curious example of the feeling in favour of multi-formity that the vast geographical area over which this form of cooperation prevails¹ is abandoned to the societies preferring it. Equally, it is an instance of the policy of "cultural autonomy" that no attempt is made by the USSR Government to impose on these "national minorities" what, in other parts of the USSR, has proved a superior form of organisation.² Neither *Centrosoyus*, representing the consumers' cooperative societies, nor *Vsekorybaksyus*, representing the fisher *kolkhosi*, seeks to extend to this area, nor endeavours to entice away the local membership. The USSR Commissariat of the Timber Industries and the State Fishery Department of the USSR Commissariat of Supplies penetrate into this territory without competing with the "integral" societies, which sell their furs direct to the Fur Trust of the USSR Commissariat of Foreign

¹ The area of the activities of the Integral Cooperatives is described as including the Northern Krai, the Ostyak okrug, the Vogulsk okrug, the Naryn Krai, the East Siberian Krai, Buriat Mongolia and the Far Eastern Krai. The membership, alike of the *kolkhosi* and of the primitive productive cooperative societies—amounting in all to something like 300,000 adults—is reported to be about half made up of "national minorities" (*The Far North* (in Russian), Moscow, 1934, p. 106, etc.).

² Thus the *kolkhosi* of the Far North are not pressed to assume the form in which all the land-holdings are merged in one undivided field. They are left in the stage in which each member retains his own instruments of production, and combines only for labour in specific operations of agriculture, or during the seasons for hunting or fishing.

Trade and their fish to the RSFSR Commissariat of Local Supplies, or to any other purchasers whom they can reach. The RSFSR Commissariat of Local Trade maintains in the area, principally in the more considerable centres of population, its own trading depôts (*Gostorgoviya*); whilst the USSR Commissariat of Foreign Trade, through its Fur Trust, and the USSR Commissariat of Supplies, through such organs as Soyus Pushmina, Rybfrest, etc., contract with all or most of the local productive societies to buy a specified quota of their output at agreed prices.¹

The Association of Integral Cooperatives included, in 1934, 869 societies termed simply "integral"; 610 consumers' societies, mostly more or less "mixed" in function; 243 cooperative productive associations, many of whom deal also in commodities for their members' consumption; and over 700 *kolkhosi*, predominantly for agriculture or reindeer breeding, but including some mainly for fishing. These separate societies are all governed by periodical meetings of their members, which elect a president or manager, and a small presidium. Nearly 1000 of them, which carry on retail trading in household commodities, have specific trading districts assigned to them, varying in extent from about 3000 square kilometres (*Nenetsky okrug*) up to about 23,700 square kilometres (*Chukotsky okrug*). But all the societies, including the *kolkhosi*, are united in 263 regional unions by rayons, okrugs, oblasts or krais (of which there are 239 for rayons, 21 for okrugs and 3 for oblasts and krais). It is presumably these 263 local unions that will elect delegates to the Congress of Integral Cooperative Societies that may be periodically summoned.

The organisational structure of the "Far North" of Siberia is plainly in an inchoate condition; unlikely, as it seems to the present writers, to remain long without substantial change, as to the nature of which no prediction is offered.

War Invalids.—The seven years of war, 1914–1920, left in the USSR an incalculable number of partially disabled men, whose existence imposed on the Soviet Government a problem transcending in magnitude and difficulty that of any other of the belligerents. It was dealt with on different lines from those followed by the other countries. The absence, in the USSR, of any vested interests of profit-making employers, and of any objection by soviet trade unionism, made it possible for the Soviet Government to set the partially disabled men to work, on their own account, upon any productive enterprise within their capacity. The form usually adopted was that of the *artel*. The "war invalids" capable of any productive work were invited to join a widespread federal association of owner-producers, largely self-governing in character, which in 1927 numbered 2861 little local societies, with over 38,000 working members. The association has been liberally assisted from government funds, in order to enable it to start a large number of industries for its members,

¹ The "plan" for fish in 1934 was fixed at 698,000 centners, whilst that for furs, etc., amounted to 9,980,000 roubles' worth (*The Far North* (in Russian), p. 106; Model Agreement (in Russian) for the supply and delivery of furs and skins: Moscow, Koiz, 1934).

usually on a small scale, by which the disabled men are enabled to earn a proportion of the maintenance allowed to them, the deficit being met from public funds. The separate enterprises, in 1927 numbering over 7000, are of the most varied kinds. There are small flour mills and oil factories, little distilleries and cheesemaking centres, together with fruit and vegetable gardens, growing for the local market. There are bakeries making confectionery; shoe-making and tailoring workshops, and furniture factories. Some men keep bees and poultry; others man the numerous book and newspaper stalls on the basis of a commission on sales; or drive carts and lorries in the execution of a succession of jobs of transportation. The gross income of the association in 1925-1926 was 264 million roubles, of which rather more than one-third was the net product of the members' own labour, the balance being found from public funds.

In due course, as the number of war invalids capable of work gradually decreased, the same organisation was utilised for the "invalids of industry", men or women partially disabled by accident or industrial disease in the factory or the mine. At the present time these invalids of industry far outnumber, among those at work, the men disabled in the war. Out of a total of about 100,000 members of the federation who are in one or other form of employment, about 70,000 are members of manufacturing artels, whilst the others are in artels of service, supplying part of the personnel of hotels, theatres, cinemas, the large retailing establishments and other government departments, clubs, hospitals and educational institutions. All partially disabled men are encouraged to join one or other of these artels and to continue to perform such work as they can, as this is so much better for them than vegetating in idleness on a meagre pension. Such workers are often trained free of charge in special technical institutes for the disabled. They have often their own clubs for suitable recreation, and their own sanatoria and rest-houses in the Crimea or elsewhere. There are special summer schools in the country for the children of the disabled. A few of these manufacturing artels of partially disabled men have become completely self-supporting, and able to allow their members a small bonus in addition to their stipulated wages. Members may work in these artels whilst receiving the pensions awarded to them in respect of war disabilities, or those in respect of disabilities due to industrial accidents or diseases, or merely for old age after long service.¹ It is argued that the addition that they make to the aggregate supply of commodities and services is clearly a national gain, whilst the pensioners themselves benefit both physically and mentally by continuing to perform such work as is within their powers. This double advantage, it is claimed, far outweighs the cost to the public funds of the possible overlapping of

¹ The pensions to war invalids and those to the widows and children of deceased men of war service, like allowances to the blind, the deaf and dumb, the crippled, etc., are awarded and paid by the Commissariats of Social Welfare of the several republics. The pensions payable in respect of disabilities due to industrial accidents and diseases, like those in respect of old age after long service, are payable from the social insurance funds, now administered by the trade union organisation.

pension and subsidy. There seems, in the USSR, no more reason for denying to any worker the wage that he earns, merely because he enjoys a pension awarded to him in respect of previous service, than merely because he owns a balance in the Savings Bank.

(d) ASSOCIATIONS OF ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL PRODUCERS

Artistic and Intellectual Workers.—It is difficult to keep account of the various other associations of owner-producers, of which there are possibly, in the wide expanse of the USSR, many hundreds. Incredible as it may seem to those who believe the USSR to be groaning in one all-pervading tyranny, these bodies form and dissolve and reform at the will of the members, with the least possible legal or official formalities. Equally difficult is it to discover which of them remain outside the federation of incoops that has been already described. Thus, to cite only a few examples, the artists (chiefly painters, sculptors and architects) had, in 1931, an association of some 1500 members, called *Khudozhnik* (the Artist). This society provides its members a certain amount of accommodation in collective studios, runs for their service a small but efficient colour factory, organises exhibitions for the sale of their works, and even gives them credit when they are more than usually hard up! The photographers, whose art is highly developed in the USSR, have an artel of their own on similar lines. Those who are associated with the art side of the equipment of the theatre have another. A special group of artistic workers in wood and lacquer, largely concentrated in the little town of Palekh, who have for generations lived by carving and painting religious icons, have reorganised their industry in a cooperative society for the production of what is now in greater demand, namely, wooden boxes, trays and *plaques*, beautifully painted and lacquered, without religious associations.

The authors seem to have had from time to time, in addition to their professional associations of authors and journalists as such, a whole series of cooperative publishing societies of one sort or another. There is a society of scientists at Leningrad which publishes works on physical and biological science; not in rivalry with the gigantic state publishing enterprise of the RSFSR, but in supplement of its work. There are similar publishing societies in one or more of the other constituent republics for works in their own languages. A separate enterprise at Moscow is that of the Cooperative Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, which issues, for the instruction of the German, American and British residents, a series of books and pamphlets in their own language, most of them describing particular features of soviet industry, agriculture and social institutions.¹

¹ Publishing is a side-line of many of the other organisations that we have elsewhere described, from trade unions to universities, from the various kinds of cooperative societies to the multitude of voluntary associations with their extraordinary diversity of objects and purposes; not excepting the Red Army and the Communist Party itself. Sometimes they have their own printing press. They always have to get paper from the People's Commissars in charge of the government paper mills and of all imports. All alike are

The World of Labour in the USSR

The dominant impression made by the survey of the organisation of Man as a Producer will, we think, be one of multiformity. There could hardly be a wider divergence in constitutional structure than that between the 154 highly centralised trade unions (in round numbers eighteen million members) and the loosely federated twenty thousand cooperative societies of owner-producers in industry (three million members); or between either of these bodies and, on the one hand, the 240,000 kolkhosi, or collective farms (thirty million members), or, on the other, the 1500 fisher kolkhosi (300,000 members). To add even further to the multiformity, there is still to be reckoned the strange breed of "Integral" cooperatives (300,000 members), whose chief peculiarity seems to be to jumble up together many of the characteristics in which all the rest differ from each other; not to mention also the exceptional variety afforded by the federation of partially disabled men and women, who work at every conceivable occupation, and find their ground for separate association in the common feature of physical disability of one or other kind.

These fifty-odd million men and women working in the production of commodities and services are, it will be noted, of different kinds or grades. Some would be classed as brain workers, others as manual workers. Their personal remuneration, and, with it, their standards of living, vary considerably; and whilst the level is undoubtedly rising all round, there is visible no tendency either to identity or to that equality which is stigmatised as a dead level. But amid all the multiformity of constitutional structure, and all the heterogeneity of work and grade, of wages and standard of living, there is one feature that is constant and ubiquitous in all the "productive" organisations. There is no segregation by wealth, or social class, or position in the hierarchy. In every enterprise, large or small, urban or rural, the directors and managers, the technicians and specialists, the book-keepers and the gate-keepers, the skilled mechanics and the general labourers are members of one and the same organisation, whether it be called a trade union, an industrial cooperative society, a collective farm, a fishermen's collective, an integral cooperative, or a society of war invalids. The ground for their common membership is their common interest in the enterprise in which they find themselves associated, and their similar common interest in the other enterprises engaged in the same branch of production throughout the USSR. Not only in their daily work and their monthly pay is there this common interest among all grades, but also in their other conditions of life. The hours of labour; the safety and amenity of the place of work; the provision of medical attendance and hospital treatment; the whole range of

subject, just as the government publishing houses themselves are, to the universal censorship. All of them, moreover, work in friendly cooperation with Ogiz (the principal state publishing house at Moscow) and with the publishing houses of the various constituent and autonomous republics.

social insurance; the adequate provision and proper maintenance of dwelling-places; the arrangements for the care and education of children; the means of recreation, holidays, clubs and rest-houses, music and the theatre and endless other matters concern workers of all kinds.

What, in all this upgrowth of collective organisation, practically all new or remade since the Revolution, has happened to "workers' control"? ¹ Less than half the aggregate of "producers" in the USSR, it will be seen, are working under a contract of service at all (the eighteen million members of trade unions, together with the four million co-workers who, for one or other reason, are, as yet, non-members). Much more numerous are the various kinds of owner-producers for whom the trade union form is inappropriate. These owner-producers, whether in industrial arts (three millions), in collective farms (thirty millions) or in fishermen's associations (300,000), are themselves the owners of the commodities they produce, from the sale of which, after defraying all expenses and the government taxation, their remuneration is derived. They themselves direct, by their own members' meetings, their individual and combined labour, together with the conditions under which they work, and the speed and regularity of their exertions. But they have no monopoly. They have themselves to decide, in meeting assembled, and in constant competition with other forms of production, and other kinds of commodities, how they will satisfy the demands of the consumers of their products, and the users of the services that they are prepared to render. Their subjection is to the consumers whom they directly serve.

There is, of course, the further alternative to wage-labour of independent production by individual men or women, or by the family group. It is not usually realised that this still (1935) furnishes some sort of maintenance to as many as fifteen millions of adult men and women in the USSR. There are in the cities innumerable dressmakers and washerwomen; droschky drivers and shoeblacks; casual "handymen" of all kinds; "free-lance" journalists and authors, unsalaried artists and scientists. In the vast rural districts between the Baltic and the Pacific the independent peasants still number half a dozen million households, comprising perhaps twelve million adults, to say nothing of the independent fishermen, the hunters, the "prospectors" of minerals and what not, together with the nomads passing from one grazing ground to another. Those who regard work under a contract of service as necessarily of the nature of "wage slavery" may possibly imagine these fifteen million wholly independent producers under Soviet Communism as enjoying complete control over their own working lives! But, however attractive such complete control may be to some natures, and at some periods of their lives, and however remunerative may be such independent production

¹ In a subsequent chapter on "The Liquidation of the Landlord and Capitalist", we shall describe how, immediately after the revolution of October 1917, most of the factories in Petrograd passed under the management of workers' committees; and how, in a very short time, this was found to be an unsatisfactory form of organisation.

in exceptional cases, it is the common experience of mankind that it is not in such an isolated existence that the widest freedom is found. Work in combination with others nearly always makes a larger product, and therefore affords a greater width of opportunity, than isolated effort. The question is in which form of associated work does the worker obtain the most control over his working life.

It seems to us clear that, in the great industrial establishments that have for half a century been characteristic of Russian industry, the eighteen millions of trade unionists, whilst not actually entrusted with the management of their several industries, do control, to a very large extent, in their constant consultation with the management, and with all the organs of government, the conditions of their employment—their hours of labour, the exercise of factory discipline, the safety and amenity of their places of work, and the sharing among themselves of the proportion of the product that they agree should be allocated to personal wages. In like manner, the trade unions not only control, and actually manage by their own committees, the disposition of that other part of the product which they agree should be allocated to the whole range of social insurances, education, medical attendance, holidays, and organised recreation of all kinds. Only, this “workers’ control” is exercised, not by any worker as an individual, but jointly by the workers’ committees; and, very largely, not for one establishment by itself, but for each industry as a whole; and, in some cases, where this seems most appropriate, for the whole body of producers in the USSR. The influence, upon every organ of government, of the eighteen million trade unionists, is immeasurably great. It is, in fact, this which is acclaimed as the Dictatorship of the Proletariat!¹

Compared with the amount of control exercised by those workers who are enrolled in trade unions, that enjoyed by the different kinds of owner-producers is at once much less and much greater. It is much less at long range, and over a wide area. It is much greater over the particular farm or fishery, factory or workshop, in which the associated owner-producers work. It is not the thirty million men and women members of the kolkhosi or the three million members of the incops, or the 300,000 associated fishermen, who dominate the counsels of the USSR Sovnarkom or the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or carry weight with the State Planning Commission, but much more the smaller number of the trade unionists, whether factory workers, miners, railwaymen or labourers in the sovkhosi. But the superiority in control that the worker in the great industry enjoys over the larger area carries with it a lesser control within each particular workshop. Here the worker who is actually a partner with his fellows in the ownership and management of the little enterprise that is run as an industrial cooperative society may well feel that he enjoys a larger liberty to indulge his own caprices than the worker

¹ With what accuracy this claim is made, and subject to what other influences, we examine in Chapter VI, of Part I., “Dictatorship or Democracy?”

who has to obey the factory bell. In the Soviet Union the worker has an effective freedom to choose which form of associated labour he prefers. For nothing stands out more clearly from our survey of the World of Labour in the USSR than the inaccuracy of the assumption that Soviet Communism involves either universal state ownership of the instruments of production, or the existence of but one possible employer of labour, or of only one method of gaining a livelihood.

CHAPTER IV

MAN AS A CONSUMER

WE have seen how the inhabitants of the USSR are represented, in their capacity of citizens, in the soviet hierarchy. We have noted also that they are separately represented in their capacity of producers in three different ways. If they are wage or salary earners they are in the hierarchy of trade unionism. If they are not engaged at salary or wages, they are in one or other of the twin organisations of owner-producers, working respectively in manufacturing artels or incops and in collective farms. But, in all but the simplest societies, mankind has also a third capacity, in which wishes and ideas need a vehicle of expression, and individual activities a mechanism of collective control. As consumers, men and women think and act differently from what they do either as citizens or as producers. Moreover, in all but the smallest communities, to organise, with exact regularity, a daily distribution, among the whole body of consumers, of the innumerable commodities they desire, is a task of immense magnitude and difficulty, calling for its own distinct administration. Before assuming power, Lenin saw clearly and confidently that this task would have to be undertaken by the consumers' cooperative societies, with a membership becoming universal.¹ We may doubt whether he, or anyone else, realised that, in the circumstances of the USSR, the organisation of distribution would prove at least as difficult as the organisation of production; and that it would actually take longer to raise to any common standard of efficiency.

¹ There is an extensive literature in Russian relating to the consumers' cooperative movement, whilst elaborate statistical and other reports are issued, chiefly by Centrosyus. The following books in other languages may be more conveniently consulted: *The Cooperative Movement in Russia*, by V. V. Bubnov (Manchester, 1917); *The Russian Cooperative Movement*, by F. E. Lee (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920); *The Cooperative Movement in Russia*, by Elsie Terry Blanc (New York, 1924); *Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders (New York, 1927); *Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der USSR* (Berlin, 1927, 72 pp.), translated as *Consumers' Cooperation in the USSR* (Manchester, 1927) by N. Popov (director of the Education Department of Centrosyus); *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, New York, 1928, ch. xi. "The Consumers' Cooperative Movement", by Paul Douglas, pp. 253-267; *Die Konsumgenossenschaften in Russland*, by S. Sapir, Berlin, 1928, 260 pp.; *The Cooperative Movement and Banking in the USSR*, by N. Barou (1928, 48 pp.); *The Cooperative Movement in the USSR and its Foreign Trade*, by N. Barou (1929, 30 pp.); *The Cooperative Movement in Russia during the War: Part I. —Consumers' Cooperation*, by Kaydon (Oxford, 1929); *Consumers' Cooperation in Soviet Russia*, by E. F. Wise (Manchester, 1929); *The Consumers' Cooperative Movement in the Soviet Union*, by N. Nekrassov (Centrosyus, Moscow, 1929); *Russian Cooperation Abroad: Foreign Trade 1912-1928*, by N. Barou (1930, 96 pp.); *Les Coopératives de consommation en l'URSS*, par A. E. Badoieff (Amiens, 1930); *Russian Cooperative Banking*, by N. Barou (1931, 82 pp.); *Cooperative Banking*, by N. Barou (1932, 350 pp.); *Russia: USSR*, edited by P. Malovsky-Malevich, New York, 1933, "Cooperation" pp. 572-83; and for the present position, *Cooperation in the USSR*, by Leslie A. Paul (1934, 160 pp.); and *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel (1934, 176 pp.).

Let us consider, at the outset, some of the troubles that, in any country whatsoever, beset the organiser of a systematic distribution of foodstuffs and other household commodities. There is, first, the difficulty of getting an honest and efficient personnel. This matters far more in distribution than in production. The factory operative may contrive to be idle spasmodically, but this can be largely prevented. What is more to the point is that the materials and products that he handles are seldom such as to tempt him to purloin them for his own or his family's consumption. To the salesman or warehouseman in a cooperative store, on the other hand, or to the lorry driver or porter, at a time when food is scarce and his children at home are hungry, the provocation, if he happens to be pecuniarily distressed, to abstract something to take home is well-nigh irresistible. The temptation is increased by the practical difficulty of ensuring, in a vast number of separate stores, a demonstrably accurate audit of anything except money or stamps. Many kinds of goods in bulk cannot easily be checked on delivery from hand to hand, either by counting or by weighing; whilst stocktaking is a process demanding for accuracy the highest skill and the utmost technical knowledge. Moreover, there must be an allowance for "waste" in retailing, and even in storing; and no one can say with confidence how much. And nearly all commodities depreciate and spoil, to an extent that cannot easily be either checked or estimated. The vagueness in the ascertainment of how much there is produces a laxness in the disposing of it. Even the elected committeemen and the higher officials of the cooperative movement, just because they are always handling relatively large quantities of food and drink, are found—we think, in all countries—to be more disposed to treat themselves lavishly "out of the stores", than are the corresponding committeemen and officials of the trade union movement.

Efficiency behind the counter involves, however, much more than honesty and precise accounting. The productive efficiency of the handicraftsman or factory operative is practically not lessened by occasional bad manners, nor even by habitual incivility or boorishness. For all that matters, these wage-earners can usually be stimulated to zeal and celerity, and continuity of effort throughout the whole working day, by systems of piecework remuneration. But the salesman behind the counter, like the cashier at the pay-desk, is required, all day long, whatever may be his own feelings, to manifest, to one customer after another, unfailing civility of manners and actual zeal in trying to suit the customer's desires, without a trace of resentment of the customer's stupidity or capricious changes of mind. When we cut adrift from the profit-making motive, this efficiency of service in the store cannot easily be pecuniarily stimulated or rewarded. Piece-work rates of wages are often impracticable; and even the system of more or less arbitrary bonuses for good conduct or smart salesmanship usually fails to effect any considerable improvement.

And there is a further trouble in organising distribution that is not always borne in mind. The man who actually makes cabinets or boots,

or who joins with others in constructing a house or a colossal hydroelectric plant, may find joy in his work and pride in his production. But it is not easy for the most virtuous of salesmen to get up any enthusiasm for the daily service of handing out, to an indiscriminate crowd of purchasers, bread and potatoes, cabbages and groceries. It is not for nothing that retail shopkeepers have everywhere been despised by other vocations. In Russia, even more than in other countries, the little trader, often a Tartar or a Jew, or the village usurer or vodka seller, has long lived in an atmosphere of contempt, manifested alike by the handicraftsman and the factory operative, the merchant and the brainworking professional. The result has been a repugnance among the Russians to take to retail shop-keeping, which has not been wholly removed by its transformation into a public service. It has been noticed that relatively few active socialists, and especially few members of the Communist Party, have been at any time salesmen or clerks under the committees of the consumers' cooperative societies.¹ All these considerations, which apply even more to the Russian people than to some others, make the construction of a satisfactory system of distribution perhaps the most difficult of all the tasks to which Soviet Communism has set its hand.

Unfortunately, the previous history of the Russian consumers' cooperative movement and the position in which it stood in 1917 were not such as to facilitate its accomplishment of the task that Lenin had, in thought, assigned to it. Consumers' cooperation had been introduced into Russia from England and Germany half a century before, but only in the way of paternal philanthropy by exceptional employers, and in a form which may not have remained entirely free from the evils of the truck system. Consumers' cooperation as a democratic outcome of independent workmen's organisation may be said to have begun sporadically in Russia with the twentieth century, and to have made headway only with the revolutionary movement of 1905. As an independent organ of working-class opinion, it only barely survived the tsarist repression of the subsequent years; but the movement continued to grow, in city and country, under watchful police supervision, as a non-political outcome of enlightened "liberalism", making for individual thrift. During the three years of war (1914-1917), the consumers' cooperative societies in many cases rendered great service, in association with the patriotic efforts of the *Zemstvos*, in maintaining the supply of necessities both for the army in the field and for the civilian families at home. When the 1917 revolution occurred, the consumers' cooperative movement, which counted a quarter of the families in Russia in its membership, was almost wholly under the influence of anti-Bolshevik leadership. At any rate, the hundred or more representatives whom the movement sent to the Democratic

¹ "The best Bolsheviks," we have been told, "despite a Party resolution urging a change in spirit, have disdained to work in the cooperative stores, manifesting a certain superior, one might almost say aristocratic attitude towards the business of selling, buying and merchandising."

Conference (or "Pre-Parliament") summoned by Kerensky's government in September 1917, ranged themselves "unanimously with the Kadets and Compromisers".¹ Especially in the Ukraine had the cooperative movement an invidious intellectual heritage. At Kiev, and generally in the Ukrainian cities, the movement was frankly nationalist in spirit, desiring no connection with Moscow. In 1917 it supported the Menshevik uprising in the Ukraine and backed up Kerensky. In the following years it sided with Petlura, and supported Denikin and the counter-revolutionary efforts. Not until the population of the Ukraine had become disgusted with the reactionary character and the excesses of Denikin's army were there any overtures to Moscow. The leading cooperators of the Ukraine had, however, by this time so clearly indicated their intellectual position that they were naturally distrusted.

When the Bolshevik Government was firmly in the saddle, the cooperative societies went on struggling with the increasing difficulties of supplies; and Lenin's administration, whilst noting their manifest lack of sympathy with its programme, took no immediate action against them. Presently, however, in the welter of war communism, the whole organisation of these societies was absorbed into the government machinery, their buildings and local organisation being autocratically utilised for the distribution of the state rations. This, however, was not the end. There is reason to believe that Lenin remained faithful to his conception of a voluntary organisation of consumers—a hierarchy of consumers' cooperative committees—as an essential part of the constitution, undertaking the whole distribution of household commodities. With the acceptance of the New Economic Policy (NEP), came the restoration to independence of the consumers' cooperative societies. These were placed anew on a legal basis by the legislation of 1923-1924. On this revival of the voluntary societies, steps were taken to exclude from the leadership of the movement, as far as possible, those who had been prominent in it prior to 1919 and to bring to the front the Bolshevik members. The "activists" of the Communist Party nearly everywhere saw to it in the cities that the elections brought about the necessary preponderance of "well-disposed" cooperators on the committees, and the Central Board of Centrosoyuz has ever since been in complete accord with the "General Line".

In spite of all these inherent difficulties and temporary defects, the cooperative membership and turnover have, throughout the past decade,

¹ "Having up to this time (1927) occupied no place in politics, the cooperators . . . began to appear as the representatives of their 20 million members—or, to put it more simply, of some half the population of Russia. The cooperators sent their roots down into the village through its upper strata. . . . The leaders of the cooperators were recruited from the Liberal-Narodnik and partly the Liberal-Marxist intelligentsia, who formed a natural bridge between the Kadets and the Compromisers. . . . Lenin mercilessly denounced these 'chefs of the democratic kitchen'. . . . Trotsky argued in the Petrograd Soviet that the officials of the cooperatives as little expressed the political will of the peasants as a physician the political will of his patients or a Post Office clerk the views of those who send and receive letters" (*The History of the Russian Revolution*, by Leon Trotsky, vol. ii. (1933), pp. 331-332, 337; vol. iii. pp. 17-18, 31, 67).

increased by leaps and bounds, because no family could wish permanently to forgo the advantage of belonging to a cooperative society. It became unnecessary to retain such attractions to recruiting as the dividend on purchases, and even the payment of interest on share capital.¹ The continuance of rationing, and the increasing limitation of purchases by the use of cards, issued to the producers as such, made it almost necessary for every member of the family over fourteen years of age to be separately enrolled in order to be eligible to share in the distribution of the commodities from time to time in short supply.² The result has been that, although membership of a consumers' cooperative society has remained legally quite optional, its practical advantages have made it—leaving out of account the “deprived” categories on the one hand, and the nomadic races and some still savage tribes on the other—almost coterminous with the adult population of the USSR. Unfortunately, as we shall relate, this astonishing increase in membership and turnover has sorely tried the capacity of the movement. Year after year the leaders and committees have been incessantly struggling to keep pace with the rapid multiplication of their customers, and at the same time to make good one defect after another that experience has revealed in the organisation. But we must first describe that organisation as it exists to-day.³

The Hierarchy of Consumers' Cooperation in the USSR in 1935

The aggregate membership of consumers' cooperative societies in the USSR at the end of 1934 is stated as seventy-three millions, enrolled in 45,000 local or primary societies, which now extend to every part of this vast area. These societies are of three main types: namely, (1) the village store, which is by far the most numerous; (2) the city society with a shareholding membership open to all comers (except such as may be individually excluded as belonging to the “deprived categories”); and (3)—a speciality of the USSR—the vocational society or “closed cooperative”, in which membership is restricted to the persons employed,

¹ Any surplus is devoted, not to interest or dividend, but to some public object of use to the membership. But surpluses are not encouraged. Prices ought to be kept as low as possible.

² “By a decision of *Centrosoyus* the normal profit of a village cooperative shop is limited to from 1½ to 2 per cent” (*Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, pp. 98-99).

³ We are informed that not all societies admitted members under eighteen, though many accepted them at fourteen, without power to vote until they reached the age of eighteen.

⁴ We take the following statistics from a detailed publication of *Centrosoyus* (in Russian) entitled *The Consumers' Cooperative Societies in 1929-1933* (Moscow, 1934, 215 pp.). Excluding the closed societies now transferred to the factory managements (ORS), the number of societies rose, in the cities, from 1403 in 1929 to 3782 on October 1, 1933; and in the villages from 25,757 in 1929 to 40,920 on October 1, 1933. The number of their trading units rose in the cities from 31,512 to 44,811; and in the villages to 122,632. The total sales in the cities rose from 5984 million roubles to 10,663 million roubles; and in the villages from 3925 to 7814 million roubles—the aggregate total being nearly doubled.

either in a particular establishment or in a particular vocation.¹

A majority of all the cooperative members are to be found in the 41,000 relatively small village societies in the rural areas, and these, whilst adding branches in the neighbouring hamlets (averaging three per society), remain mostly of the simplest type. These are united in 2355 rayon Unions. These again, along with the 4000 city societies, having over 40,000 branches, are united in 32 provincial Unions for the six smaller constituent republics and the 26 divisions of the RSFSR. From the councils of these 32 provincial Unions are drawn the representatives who constitute the Central Board of the Central Union of the USSR and RSFSR (Centrosoyuz).

The Members' Meeting

At the base of the cooperative pyramid is the open meeting of all the members over eighteen of each of the local or primary societies. These meetings, which are held as desired, usually every two or three months throughout the year, are reported to be well attended, even to the extent of 50 or even 75 per cent of the total membership,² women being almost as numerous as men. The officers and committeemen of the society

¹ At all times during the present century the workers employed in each of the gigantic establishments characteristic of modern Russian industry have tended to establish their own consumers' cooperative society, originating exclusively among their colleagues in work, and remaining practically confined to them. With the relatively large turnover among these workers, such societies came increasingly to include in their membership many who had left the establishment and were working elsewhere. In 1930, largely owing to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient supplies, a demand arose for making these societies definitely closed to any but persons actually in employment at the particular establishment, together with their dependents. This step was rapidly carried out during the next two years, until nearly every large factory had its "closed cooperative". Meanwhile a similar policy had led to societies established exclusively for the members of particular vocations wherever they happened to be working. In 1933 and 1934 about 350 of the largest of these "closed" cooperative societies, comprising nearly three million members, were converted into departments of the factory organisation with which they connected, and thus ceased to be cooperative societies. There still remain, in 1935, about 2300 cooperative societies that have a closed or restricted membership. This restriction of membership is regarded as a purely temporary measure, certainly destined to pass away when supplies become abundant, and at a date not more distant than a couple of years.

² Members are usually admitted at fourteen if desired, but they do not become "active" until eighteen years old. It should, however, be said that the "deprived categories" already described are still statutorily excluded, not only from the soviet franchise but also from cooperative as from trade-union membership. The "open" societies freely sell to non-members any but "deficit commodities" or rationed goods. The share which members are required to take up and pay for, though the amount is always payable by easy instalments, is now usually equal to one month's earnings of the particular candidate. Since 1930 no interest is paid upon shares, any more than "dividend on purchases", but the shares remain nominally withdrawable, and they are easily transferable to another society.

The whole surplus is now specifically devoted, according to the decision of the members' meeting, for various common purposes, such as educational work of different kinds, the provision of a library and reading-rooms, a benevolent fund for members falling into distress or needing help in sickness, and subscriptions to sundry patriotic associations.

In the rural districts the attendance at the members' meetings during the summer may fall to as little as 25 per cent, but rises to over 75 per cent in the winter. It is evidently pressure of work that keeps members away; not severity of weather!

are expected invariably to attend. They report the current business of the society, hear the members' complaints and give explanations. The meetings are reported to be usually very lively, many complaints and suggestions being made. Once a year the members have to elect the president and the members of the committee, and also the society's representatives to the rayon, together with a "control committee" or "revision committee", which has the important duties, not only of stock-taking and audit, but also of general supervision of the society's work. Except in the smallest village societies, it is the duty of the group of members of the Communist Party within the society to prepare a "slate", or list of candidates recommended, not excluding a due representation of outstanding "non-Party" men and women; and then to be active in securing its adoption by the election meeting. But in many of the smaller villages, the members of the Party are not numerous, and may, indeed, often be non-existent, and it is common for the committee to contain a large majority of non-Party members, whilst the president is frequently a Party man or woman.

The Committee of Management

In all the rural societies the whole work of management is carried on by the directly elected committee or board, in consultation with the separately elected control committee or revision committee. The manager, as well as the secretary, is appointed by the committee of management, whilst the subordinate staff of salesmen, porters, drivers, etc., is selected by the manager subject to approval by the committee. It is the committee of management that appoints one or more representatives of the society to the meetings of the rayon Union. Membership of the rayon Union is not obligatory, but is almost universally found to be convenient; and the attitude of the rayon Union council to the local or primary society is one of helpfulness rather than control.

The Rayon Union with the Rayon Council (Raisoyus)

The rayon council, representing all the consumers' cooperative societies that are members of the rayon Union, is elected annually, together with a revision or control committee, by a conference of delegates from these societies, which is attended also by the retiring rayon council. This rayon conference, at which, on an average, about a score of societies are represented by two or three times that number of delegates, is held either once a quarter or once every six months, to hear complaints and discuss the cooperative business of the rayon. The rayon council elects its own president and several other members of a presidium, who, with a separately elected revision committee, jointly constitute its only executive. The rayon council usually elects also the rayon representatives to the next higher authority, the conference of the oblast or republic Union to which the rayon belongs.

The rayon Union councils are now required to become members of the higher stages of the hierarchy, and to act under their instructions in carrying out the tasks prescribed by the General Plan. They also assist in the development and strengthening of another cooperative network, in which, over a large part of the movement, cooperative societies of all types—consumers' societies, manufacturing associations of owner producers (artels or incops) and agricultural associations of owner-producers (collective farms)—voluntarily come together in periodical local conferences to discuss the arrangements, such as those for the supply of commodities, that can be made for their common advantage.

The Oblast or Republic Union with its Council (Oblsoyus)

Each of the six smaller constituent republics (not the RSFSR) gathers together in a republic Union the rayon councils within its area, and, along with each of them, the local or primary cooperative societies of the cities. In the case of the Ukraine (with Moldavia) this Union (Wiekopsilka) represents a specially large body of cooperators, comprising over 400 rayons, in which are included some 12,000 local or primary societies, open or closed, for villages or cities or particular factories or industries; having nearly twelve million members. In addition to the six republic Unions, there are similar Unions for the 26 separate divisions of the RSFSR, comprising 8 for its autonomous republics, 10 for its national minorities in other autonomous areas, 6 for its oblasts and 2 for the large cities of Moscow and Leningrad. In all these are included, not only the numerous village societies, but also the consumers' cooperatives in the cities, whether open or closed, including (down to 1932) some 350 of the largest closed societies confined to the workers in particular factories, establishments, industries or vocations. Each of these societies elects its representatives to an oblast conference, which the oblast Union council also attends. This oblast conference is held once or twice a year. It appoints annually the oblast Union council and also the oblast's representatives to the All-Union Cooperative Congress. The oblast council meets every few weeks throughout the year, and appoints annually its president and presidium by whom the work is mainly conducted.

The All-Union Congress of Consumers' Cooperatives, with its Central Board for the USSR and the RSFSR (Centrosoyus)

The whole system culminates in the Central Board of Centrosoyus at Moscow, to which all the consumers' cooperative societies in the USSR are definitely affiliated. Two or three times a year the representatives of the 32 oblast or republic Unions, together with those separately elected for this purpose by the city societies, at the rate of one delegate for each 75,000 membership, meet in conference with the Central Board to discuss the whole course of its business. Periodically, too, the Central Board

summons to a conference the presidents of all the oblast or republic Unions. Every two years the Central Board itself, together with a revision committee (whose business includes auditing), are elected at a specially summoned meeting of a much wider body, the All-Union Congress of Consumers' Cooperatives, comprising the authorised representatives of all the 2355 rayon Unions in the USSR, as well as of the 32 oblast or republic Unions. This congress elects the president of the Central Board, but the presidium of the Central Board is elected by the Central Board itself.

The business of Centrosoyus, combining as it does the functions of the English Cooperative Union with those of the English and Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Societies, and acting for a cooperative membership ten times as numerous as that of the United Kingdom or Germany, dispersed over an area many more times as extensive—is almost unimaginably gigantic and complex. With its extraordinarily rapid growth in membership, amid the obstacles of a constant inadequacy of production, the consumers' cooperative movement in the USSR, taken as a whole, has lived in a perpetual struggle to overcome its difficulties, whilst its structure has been almost continually in a state of readjustment and reorganisation which is never completed.

At present (1935) the work of Centrosoyus is organised as follows. The Board itself, composed of seventy members, must meet at least once a quarter, and in practice it sits about every ten days. Its prolonged sessions are usually attended by some forty members, together with a number of executive heads of departments without votes. Once a year it elects from among its own members a vice-president and ten others to form, with the president, a presidium which acts as an executive committee. These members meet almost daily, and give their whole time to the Board's service. The Board now elects from its own members also a "Committee of Control and Execution" which has its own official staff, and is charged with the duty of seeing that all the numerous decisions of the Board are actually carried out.

The large staff of officials is organised in seven autonomous sections and some forty distinct departments, all working under the close supervision of the presidium of the Central Board and its Committee of Control and Execution, as well as under the eyes of the entirely independent Revision Committee which is elected by and directly responsible to the All-Union Congress. Each of the seven sections specialises on a particular set of workers, as to whom it is deemed of particular importance that their supplies should be without interruption maintained at a high level, so as not to jeopardise the fulfilment of the General Plan. These sections have their several bank credits, and their several stock accounts. They comprise the following:

(a) The Transport Section, which coordinates the work of the railway employees' closed cooperative societies, according to the control figures and instructions supplied by the Central Board. It draws up plans for improving the supply of commodities to the various railway workshops,

depôts, locomotive centres, and particularly to the members of the shock brigades working therein.

(b) The Water Transport Section, which coordinates all the closed cooperative societies which cater for the workers employed in the sea and river transport service, in order to protect their interests as consumers; making provision for cheap and good food for passengers and crews on board ships.

(c) The Fisheries Section, which controls the activities of the closed societies of the fishery workers, and makes itself responsible for satisfactory supplies of food and articles of prime necessity for all workers connected with sea, lake or river fisheries.

(d) The Timber Section, which caters through a network of lumbermen's cooperatives for all workers connected with the timber trade. It sends foodstuffs and manufactured goods to the places where the trees are felled, and seeks to raise the productivity of labour through improved supplies.

(e) The Peat Section, which supplies through the cooperative societies in the peat-producing districts, all the workers employed in this industry, in order to enable them to make the required output.

(f) The Cattle-Breeding and State Farm Section, which organises the work of the consumers' cooperatives in the cattle-breeding and grain state farms, and sees to the carrying out of the price policy.

(g) The Central Army Cooperative Administration, which sees to the network of closed cooperatives wherever the defence forces are stationed.

Apart from this specialised sectional supervision of particular groups of closed cooperatives, the vast Centrosoyuz office has the following forty-odd departments, styled "associations", sections, groups or sectors, and each of them enjoying a large measure of autonomy under its own manager, who is directly responsible to the Central Board and its Committee of Control and Execution. The following summary of this extraordinary organisation is of interest as indicating not only the immense size and range of its operations, but also the characteristic way in which it has grown up by the addition of a new department to cope with each new emergency.¹

1. CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS AND GROUPS.

Departments :

- (a) Purchase of stocks of goods.
- (b) Accounting.
- (c) Training of new staff.
- (d) Planning and finances.
- (e) Foreign affairs.
- (f) Cooperative upbuilding and recruiting of new members.

¹ The list of departments, under various designations, is constantly changing, and usually increasing in complexity; see *Cooperation in the USSR*, by Leslie A. Paul, 1934, pp. 70-74.

- (g) Administrative department.
- (h) Secretariat of the Presidium.

Groups :

- (a) Transport.
- (b) Capital constructions.
- (c) Industrial enterprises.
- (d) Recording and distribution of cooperative workers.
- (e) Central arbitration.
- (f) Sanitary service.

2. BOARDS OF TRADE (INDUSTRIAL GOODS).

Departments :

- (a) Textile.
- (b) Ready-made clothing.
- (c) Leather goods.
- (d) Planning.
- (e) Circulation of goods and inter-district bases.
- (f) Inspection.

3. BOARD OF COOPERATIVE RESTAURANTS (VSEKOOPT).

4. BOARD OF COOPERATIVE BREAD-BAKING.

5. ALL-UNION COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS.

A. Trade :

- (a) Huberdashery.
- (b) Educational goods.
- (c) Handicraft goods.
- (d) Groceries.
- (e) Matches.
- (f) Shop equipment.
- (g) Import Department.
- (h) Parcels Department.
- (i) Sale of non-planned goods.
- (j) Bureau of supply and demand.
- (k) Containers and warehouses.
- (l) Supplies, repairs of cars, etc.

B. Production :

Tea Association.

C. Purchase and storing of goods :

- (a) Fruits and vegetables.
- (b) Milk, dairy products, poultry and eggs.
- (c) Raw goods.
- (d) Purchase of meat.
- (e) Grain and flour.
- (f) Fisheries.

6. AUDITING COMMITTEE.

The Mechanised Bakeries

Perhaps the most outstanding single achievement of the consumers' cooperative organisation in the USSR is the abolition of the primitive and insanitary cellars and hovels in which was baked the bread that forms so large a part of the diet of all the inhabitants. These small hand bakeries, which were universal in all the cities of Europe a century ago and still persist, to a greater or less extent, in all countries except the USSR, have been replaced in nearly all the cities of European Russia by large, new and completely mechanised plants. Those in Moscow and Leningrad are not only the largest in the world, but also the most magnificent in their equipment and arrangements, exciting the unstinted admiration of those who are acquainted with the best that other countries can show. They are also, what is not always the case in the USSR or elsewhere, both economically and financially successful; reducing the cost of production to such an extent as to permit not only of increases of wages and reductions of hours to all the workers employed, and successive reductions in the price to the consumer, but also the reimbursement of the whole capital outlay within less than five years.¹

The first partly mechanised bakery was hastily established under the stress of war by the St. Petersburg Municipal Council in 1915. This was successively enlarged and improved by the Bolshevik Government, but not for a whole decade was it found possible to decide to supersede the hand bakeries. Meanwhile they were in Moscow and Leningrad gradually concentrated by amalgamations and extensions into half their former number. In about a score of cases partial mechanisation was effected, sometimes in new buildings. In March 1925 the Council of Labour and Defence (STO) adopted, in principle, the plan of complete supersession by newly erected and entirely mechanised establishments. Leading administrators, accompanied by engineers, were sent to the principal cities in Western Europe and the United States to inspect the latest achievements in bakery equipment, and to purchase all the necessary machinery, none of which was at that time produced in the USSR. During the years 1926-1929 the first three completely mechanised bakeries were constructed in Leningrad and Moscow. Meanwhile considerable improvements were invented by the Soviet engineer Marsakov, notably in the conveyer system, which enabled much more labour to be dispensed with than in even the most advanced American, Dutch or British bakeries. The whole of the machinery was then constructed in the soviet machine-making establishments. By the end of 1932 there were at work in the principal cities of the USSR more than 300 more or less mechanised bakeries of large size (including eleven claiming to be "entirely auto-

¹ The best account of these bakeries is that by their chief administrator in Moscow, who was awarded the Order of Lenin (*Mechanised Baking in Moscow*, by A. Badayev, with a foreword by I. Dobrynin, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1934, 84 pp.). See also *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, pp. 145-152.

matic"), turning out daily over 15,000 tons of bread of several varieties. Moscow and Leningrad, with a combined population exceeding six millions, are now (1935) wholly supplied by a score of gigantic completely mechanised bakeries, which are palaces of scientific sanitation, in which the workers enjoy not only the seven-hours day and regular holidays on full pay but also all sorts of amenities. Not only the industry but also the conditions of labour have been revolutionised to such an extent as to render almost incredible the descriptions in the English Parliamentary Papers of a century ago, and what Maxim Gorky himself experienced half a century ago. This has been one of the most successful achievements of the soviet administrators, in which L. M. Kaganovich played a large part; and which stands to the credit of the Leningrad and Moscow Cooperative Unions, as well as to that of the members of the Board of Cooperative Breadmaking of Centrosoyus, by whom the whole network of mechanised bakeries is directed.

Cooperative Education

Special mention must be made of the extensive network of educational organisations maintained by the consumers' cooperative movement. Whilst elementary education is left to the schools everywhere maintained by the soviets, the cooperators apply themselves to providing the additional education required by an active cooperator, and still more by every committeeman and employee in the service of the movement. There are, accordingly, a whole array of vocational classes, and even schools, devoted to subjects which every cooperator ought to know. These were reported, in 1933, to have some 60,000 pupils. In every oblast there is at least one cooperative "technicum" (institute of secondary grade) under the supervision of the cooperative Union of the oblast. These cooperative technicums have now something like 10,000 students. At Moscow there is a cooperative academy, and at Leningrad a cooperative institute, both of them claiming university rank, and restricted, by entrance examinations, to students over 18 qualified to enter on advanced studies. Each oblast or rayon in the USSR has the privilege of nominating its quota of students to these cooperative universities, paying for them in fees covering all the instruction, and in stipends meeting the cost of maintenance of each student. From the graduates of these two institutions are drawn an increasing proportion of the principal officers of Centrosoyus, and the managers of many of the more important primary societies. The system of cooperative education in the USSR is by far the most extensive in the world.¹

The Results Achieved

The cooperators of the USSR pride themselves, not without warrant, on the marvellous growth of their movement, in turnover as well as in membership, and in the range and variety of the commodities supplied, now comprising at least 70 per cent of the total retail trade within the

¹ See *Cooperation in the USSR*, by Leslie A. Paul, 1934, pp. 113-131.

Union. There seems to be scarcely a centre of population west of the Urals, and none of any magnitude in Siberia or Transcaucasia, which is not served by a local consumers' cooperative society, usually covering several villages and hamlets. Every year the membership, the trade turnover, the capital employed, and the numbers of separate buildings or other "selling points" and of the persons engaged in the work, goes on increasing, apparently without check. The range and variety of the commodities supplied, at any rate by *Centrosoyus*, and in the central stores of the city societies, has steadily increased, and many of the local or primary societies, especially in the cities, have taken increasing advantage of this widening of the range of supplies.

Thus the large Leningrad City society, which has some 400 branch shops for its 980,000 members, opened in 1933 a magnificent central store, stocked with 25,000 different commodities, the contents alone being insured against fire for 25 million roubles; including, for instance, a score of different penknives, and forty different varieties of boots and shoes, in a dozen different sizes. Nor is this provision of variety in any way unique. The children's toy department in a central Moscow store was found, in 1934, to have 400 kinds of toys in stock, and was severely rebuked for having so limited a variety! The stock was immediately increased to 1500 kinds of toys, and in 1935 it is to have 2000. Already in 1932 various cooperative societies in the cities were advertising their willingness to supply clothing made to measure and specially fitted to each customer's figure. This refinement will be facilitated by the promised establishment of a separate department of the government clothing factories, which is to specialise in "bespoke tailoring", and expects to employ a staff of 1500 expert cutters and fitters and coatmakers, to execute individual orders upon the measurements taken by the local societies. In all sorts of ways the convenience of the customer is being increasingly studied. Thus, it could be authoritatively claimed in 1934 that "delivery of goods to the home has been developed on a large scale in recent years. In Leningrad over 200,000 persons have their orders delivered to their homes; in Moscow there is a similar number; at Dnieprostroi 16,000 families (or 50,000 persons) have theirs delivered; at Kuznetskstroi 16,000 persons, and so on. Delivery orders are executed by special warehouses or branches of the big retail shops. . . . The system of subscription books for the purchase of staple commodities such as bread, milk, vegetables, etc., has lately become quite popular. . . . In Leningrad, since the beginning of 1933, nearly half the bread has been sold on monthly subscription books purchased at the beginning of each month. The subscription book covers the quantity . . . required for the month; its use eliminates daily cash purchases, and speeds up the sale of the bread to each customer."¹ Meanwhile, in various cities, "vigorous

¹ *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, pp. 51-52. The numbers stated for Leningrad and Moscow seem exaggerated. The difficulty of obtaining sufficient motor-lorries has stood in the way of extending this service.

efforts have been made, in recent years, to establish so-called house-shops in the big workers' apartment houses. The house-shops aim at organising the supply of food products and other necessities to the tenants of the house. These shops, as a rule, are open only a few hours a day, and the tenants themselves help in the work (the salesmen generally work only part of their time in the shop and are elected from among the tenants of the house)."¹

This multiplication of retailing points and increasing attention to the customers' varying demands has gone hand in hand with concentration of mass production in a smaller number of gigantic factories. Thus, as we have mentioned, the making of bread in nearly all large cities, and also throughout the Donbas coal-mining area, has been practically monopolised by highly mechanised cooperative bakeries on a gigantic scale. From these huge bread factories a fleet of motor-lorries deliver several varieties of bread several times a day to hundreds of bread shops in each large city. The concentration of production permits of the most systematic and prompt distribution of the staple article of Russian diet, through a vast network of selling points, which, in Moscow and Leningrad, reaches the high figure of one in the midst of each 400 families.

Another extension of the past few years has been the development of communal feeding, by the provision of cooperative dining establishments, supplying plain meals at low prices. This has gone very far. Not only does every factory, every large office, and every educational institution, from the elementary school to the university college, provide meals for its own people, on its own premises, but there are also large public dining-halls open to all comers. The work is too great to be undertaken under a single direction. "Communal feeding", we are told, "is carried on by two organisations; Soyusnarpit, a special trust subordinated to the People's Commissariat of Supply, and Vsekopit, a trust subordinated to the *Centrosoyus*. Soyusnarpit controls communal feeding establishments in Moscow, Leningrad, Donbas, Kharkov and the Urals. In all other cities, and in villages, communal feeding is organised by Vsekopit . . . [through] the cooperatives operating in the given factory, town or village."²

There has been a corresponding development of cooperative supplies in the villages, but less generally in operation. Village cooperative societies are sharing in the wider range of supplies offered by *Centrosoyus*. In many cases the village has organised its own communal feeding arrangements, either through the collective farms or through the village cooperative society. Usually they work together. "The aim of a village cooperative society in the USSR", it has been said, "is not merely to sell goods, but to sell them in a way which will strengthen the collective farm; help to complete the sowing, harvesting, threshing as speedily as possible; help to carry out all agricultural operations in the best manner. That is

¹ *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, p. 51.

² *Ibid.* pp. 140-141.

why, in the spring, all cooperatives carried part of their work into the field; that is why, during reaping and threshing, tens of thousands of stalls are opened in the fields, so that the collective farmer does not have to go to the village for goods, but can get them on the spot where he is working."¹

Enterprise of this kind is, however, not universal. Some of the village committees of management, and their managers, are still content to obtain only the commonest kinds of customary necessities, ignoring the steadily widening of range of available supplies and not giving scope for their members' new wants. The oblast cooperative councils are accordingly now trying to "educate the demand". Experimental shops are being opened by these councils in local centres of population, in which goods of better quality, and in greater variety, are exposed for sale, for the purpose of bringing to the notice of committeemen, managers and members alike how greatly the range of cooperative supplies has increased. The increasing prosperity of the peasantry, in tens of thousands of collective farms, is (1935) leading to novel demands for wireless sets, gramophones, books, bicycles, watches, fur coats, leather jackets, and especially leather boots and shoes, in kinds and qualities heretofore outside the experience of the manager of a village cooperative society. It is a sign, not necessarily of any worsening of the service, but, more frequently, of an awakening of new desires and of a consciousness of higher standards, that the members continue to grumble at the shortcomings of the distributing organisation that they themselves control.

The popular dissatisfaction with the cooperative societies has arisen in the past very largely from the inadequacy of the supplies to meet the constantly growing demands of the consumers. The severe rationing of this or that foodstuff; the limitation on the amount of this or that commodity that may be supplied by the society to any one member within each year; even the total failure, at this point or that, of the supply of certain commodities—all this has been plainly not so much the fault of the consumers' cooperative movement as one of the shortcomings of the organisation for production, caused, in the main, not by any falling off in the supply either of food or of household commodities, which, in the aggregate, goes on steadily increasing year after year, but by the enormous growth in the effective demand, with which it is almost impossible to keep pace. The popular complaints have, however, this amount of justification, that the Central Board has never yet wholly succeeded in preventing unnecessary delays and stoppages in the transmission of supplies from farm or factory to the store counter. There have been not a few occasions when village and even city stores have been clamouring in vain for particular supplies, when these have been lying unopened, and even forgotten, at some intermediate point. More usually the manager and even the committeemen of the village store are found to be sunk in a routine of repeating their old orders, strictly limited in range to a few commodities

¹ *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, p. 100.

that they know will go off quickly, rather than seek to fulfil their customers' unexpressed yearning for a wider choice. Whatever inspection the Central Board maintains over the working of the 41,000 village stores, this has apparently not yet succeeded in stirring to a livelier imagination the minds of those who ought to be on the alert to satisfy the customers' desires.

In the cities much of the complaints have, in the past, related to the queues, and the frightful amount of time that shopping requires. This is not due so much to the inadequacy of supplies—which the consumers' cooperative movement cannot completely amend—as to the working of the whole distributive apparatus of the Soviet Union; and particularly the primitive cooperative arrangements for selling, which have been in constant course of improvement, but at a rate never quite keeping pace with the growth of population. In the large cities, there have hitherto been not enough shops. Inside the shops there is, even now, not enough length of selling counter; indeed, at times, not even enough standing room for the customers. There are often not enough salesmen and cashiers to avoid the formation of queues within the shops; and, on the commodities, not enough legible price-tickets visible to the customers, so as to enable them promptly to make up their minds.¹

Behind all the complaints to which the shortcomings of the consumers' cooperative movement have, from time to time, given rise, there is a popular suspicion that the movement has not yet been able wholly to rid itself of elements out of sympathy with the Communist Party, and that such unfriendly influences may even intentionally lessen efficiency at all points.² Until a few years ago, the movement certainly retained on the

¹ It is to this inadequate selling accommodation and staffing, which is constant and ubiquitous, rather than to the merely local and periodical short supply of particular commodities, that is to be attributed the characteristic feature of Soviet shopping, namely, the queue, with its invariable accompaniment of extraordinarily slow service at the counter and at the pay desk. It is not usually any short supply of commodities that causes a queue, but the failure to dispose of each customer's shopping as quickly as additional customers arrive. Where any such delay occurs, a queue will inevitably be formed, even if supply is more than adequate to the whole demand, or (as in the sale of postage stamps, at the principal post office) even unlimited. The queue phenomenon is not confined to Soviet Russia, but may be witnessed at any British railway station when numerous passengers arrive nearly simultaneously at the window of one ticket-issuing clerk. As soon as additional windows are opened, enabling additional clerks to issue tickets, proportionately to the gathering crowd, the queue quickly disappears, quite irrespective of the adequacy of the supply of tickets.

It should be added that, in the USSR in 1934, queues had become rare, even in the largest cities; and had come to be most obvious at the railway ticket offices, the post offices, and some of the public dining-halls, in none of which were they due to any shortage of supply.

² In a few cases members of the Communist Party or of the League of Youth (Comsomsols) have taken complete charge of a consumers' society, by request of the members. These have sometimes been run as model stores. Thus we learn that "Cooperative store No. 41 of the October district, Moscow, staffed entirely by Comsomsols, is known as the best shop in the district, thanks mainly to the efforts of Boris Levit, Comsomol manager. With a previous record of embezzlements, queues and underweighing, for the ten months that the Comsomsols have been in charge of the store there has not been a single complaint.

"Levit himself does not wait for goods to be brought to the store—he goes out to get them. There had been no cigarettes—Levit went direct to the tobacco trust and saw

staff an unusually high proportion of persons disaffected towards the communist régime. In 1930 it was found that Centrosoyus was employing no fewer than "136 former Mensheviks, members of the Bund, Social Revolutionaries, Kadets (constitutional democrats), Popular Socialists, anarchists and others; 11 ministers of former governments; 109 former merchants; 82 ex-officers, of whom 34 served in the White Army. . . . Those figures were obtained only during the special purge that was carried out in 1930."¹ The total personnel employed by the movement now reaches one million; and it has so far proved impossible to enrol anything like that number of trained and zealous, honest and industrious salesmen, cashiers and accountants. "The cooperative personnel", it has been said, "has been distinctly inferior; bureaucrats on top; slow, indifferent and rude employees on the bottom. . . . There have been more speculators, embezzlers, thieves and bureaucrats in the cooperative system than in any other branch of soviet enterprise." Nor are there available in the USSR the 40,000 or 50,000 competent store managers that are requisite. In the four-fifths of the cooperative societies that operate in the villages, it is still usual for the committees of management to fill all the salaried posts from among the village residents, very largely from members of the committeemen's own families.² It is against much local opposition that

to it that the store was supplied with cigarettes. He did the same regarding fruit. When food of poor quality is sent in, this Comsomol shop does not pass it on to the consumer but sends it back with complaints.

"The 3300 consumers attached to this shop—no small number to cater to—are workers employed in two printshops. The Comsomol store keeps in touch with the workers, informing them when new assortments are received, and arranges that the stuff be sold immediately after work-hours. Levit himself has made reports in departments of the printshop and has succeeded in fulfilling demands and doing away with defects that were pointed out.

"Salesmen of the vegetable department were awarded premiums amounting to 40 per cent of their wages during August and September for good work. All vegetables were carefully handled, the winter supply of potatoes was quickly and carefully unloaded. Not only did the Comsomols stop after work hours to see that the vegetables were properly unloaded, but they attended subotniks in other warehouses. This store is spotless. Each salesman takes turn in superintending the cleaning. Accounts are in perfect order. Each worker has passed the technical norm examination, and all are active in social and political work" (*Moscow Daily News*, October 3, 1933).

There are, we fear, very few cooperative societies of which such an enthusiastic report could be made, even by their warmest admirers.

¹ *Fifteen Years' Soviet Building* (in Russian), 1932, p. 256.

² Drastic measures are being taken to raise the standard of these cooperative employees. Thus it was reported in June 1933 that "About 100,000 workers employed in 6500 stores of the consumers' cooperative system have recently undergone an examination by special committees set up to decide their fitness for work in cooperatives. Over 12,000 of them have been found unfit and will be dismissed.

"In some regions the percentage of misfits was found to be extremely high. In the Odessa Province 57.7 per cent of the cooperative workers were disqualified by the examination committees; in Baku 38 per cent of the workers were dismissed; in Northern Ossetia 21 per cent.

"The cleaning was accompanied in many cities by special meetings called in the factories and offices to discuss the work of the cooperative stores. Here the store committees reported on their work and in a number of cases the complaint books were read to ascertain the quality of the service rendered by the cooperative workers" (*Moscow Daily News*, June 15, 1933).

the Central Board strives continually to improve the training, and even the manners, of the huge staff of the movement. For the higher positions of greater responsibility than salesmen, for whom, as we have mentioned, an elaborate scheme of cooperative education exists, reliance has still to be placed, to a great extent, upon men and women qualified only by their long experience in the movement, some of whom have only reluctantly accepted the Bolshevik régime, and are only very doubtfully in sympathy with the policy embodied in the successive Five-Year Plans.¹ There is accordingly ample explanation of the inability of the consumers' cooperative movement to undertake, at present, the whole vast service of distribution of commodities.

The Rivals of the Consumers' Cooperative in Retail Distribution

The task of the consumers' cooperative movement in the USSR has not been made easier by the fact that a whole series of encroachments upon what might have been considered its sphere have been made. In 1930 the USSR Commissariat of Trade was reorganised into a Commissariat of Supplies, with a view to the more systematic regulation of the whole internal trade within the USSR, whether wholesale or retail (as distinguished from production, which was, at that date, left to the control of the Supreme Economic Council). Primarily, it seems, the duties of the People's Commissar of Supplies were to be concentrated on the distribution of foodstuffs (including sugar) from the farm or the factory right down to the consumer, who was to be increasingly served in the cities by a system of food factories, mechanised kitchens and public dining-halls. Six great combines were at once established as independent financial entities, but under the direct superintendence of the People's

¹ It is certainly widely believed in the USSR that "ever since the beginning of the revolution, the enemies of the soviets have given a great deal of their attention to the food supplies, that is, to the most vulnerable spot in the soviet organisation, attacking it on two fronts—on the production front in the kolkhosi, and on the distribution front in the cooperatives". Thus *Pravda*, in commenting on the decree of December 4, 1932, referred to the "anti-soviet elements of the consumers' cooperative movement, who have unfortunately not yet been expelled from *Controsoyus*".

The following quotation from the local newspaper of Nivastroy in October 1932, given in the *New Republic* (New York) of May 24, 1933, typifies the readiness to attribute evil to the cooperative personnel, but it must not be taken for truth: "At the very moment that our Communist Party is making a determined effort to improve workers' food supplies, class enemies are penetrating into our cooperatives, undermining their work and creating endless food difficulties. . . . The impudence of our class enemies is boundless. They overcharge, pocketing the money, thus disrupting the price policy of the government. They steal and privately sell foodstuffs of which there is a shortage—butter, meat, sugar. . . . Of the nineteen persons now on trial, almost every one is a lishenets (one deprived of his right of citizenship), or a kulak, or a former merchant who had concealed his identity and wormed himself into the workers' cooperative of Nivastroy. . . . The harm they have done is enormous, and, under present conditions, especially grave. There should be no mercy. The sentence of the proletarian court must remind all those who would misappropriate public [socialist] property, who would try to attack us from the rear, that the punitive arm of the proletarian dictatorship will bring down upon them in every instance the extreme penalty provided by the law of August 7."

Commissar, for bread, meat, fish, vegetable oils, preserves and refrigerating stores. These combinations were to be joined by all undertakings large enough to be of "All-Union" or even of "republic" significance; whilst all smaller ones had to submit to the general direction and control of the combines in order to ensure that the whole area was properly served. The Commissariats of Trade already existing in the republics, and the oblast councils of the consumers' cooperatives, became, within these several spheres, the representatives and agents of the USSR People's Commissar of Supplies. It is not easy to ascertain to what extent this ambitious scheme of coordinating under a People's Commissar all the agencies engaged in trade came practically into operation. In September 1934 this commissariat was divided into two. The People's Commissar of Supplies will now devote himself entirely to managing and increasing the supplies of all foodstuffs (including vodka and tobacco) which require any kind of preservation or "processing". When ready for retailing to the consumer, these supplies will pass under the direction of a new People's Commissar of Internal Trade, who will exercise a general control over all arrangements for retailing, by whatsoever organisations. He will be responsible for sanctioning the number of retail shops in each area, and for determining schedules of maximum prices. Under these two new USSR Commissariats there has begun a great development of direct government retailing of all sorts of commodities in most of the large cities. "During the two years 1931 and 1932 the Government commercial system was extended almost five times (from 14,700 shops on January 1, 1931, to 70,700 on January 1, 1932)."¹ These "commercial shops", which vary from great department stores down to the smallest kiosk or market counter, selling a limited range of foodstuffs, or a particular line of goods in demand, charge relatively high prices, considerably above those of the "closed" cooperatives, but often below those prevailing in the "bazaar", or open market, which it is desired to bring down.

In addition to these new "government shops", there have been, from time to time, various other retail shops for which the USSR Sovnarkom is ultimately responsible, namely, those opened in Moscow, Leningrad and some other cities, by various manufacturing trusts or combines, for the supply directly to the public of their own products. We may instance the shops selling textile fabrics opened by Textorg, a subsidiary of the Textile Combine; and those selling goloshes and other rubber goods, opened by the Rubber Trust. This undisguised encroachment on the sphere of the consumers' cooperative societies was much resented; and as it produced an obvious duplication of effort, its extension was not encouraged. Much of the retailing by the trusts has therefore been abandoned. Some of the trusts have, however, persisted, finding this independent access to the consumers of great use in enabling them to follow more closely the variations in their desires.

A newer rival in the field of retailing, maintained by the USSR People's

¹ *Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, p. 31.

Commissar for Foreign Trade, is that of Torgsin—the name given to the extensive chain of shops in prominent positions, together with sales counters in hotels and tourist offices, now opened to the number in the aggregate of over one thousand, in scores of cities and towns, for the sale of all sorts of commodities, exclusively for foreign valuta, gold and silver, or precious stones. This enterprise, begun in 1930 on a small scale in Moscow and Leningrad, and at first restricted to foreign customers, had for its object, not so much the making of profit for the state, as the collection of foreign valuta for use in paying for imports. It proved so successful, and seemed to meet such a keenly felt need, that the doors of the Torgsin shops were presently opened to all comers, irrespective of nationality, provided only that they were able to pay for their purchases in gold, silver or precious stones, as well as foreign valuta, including drafts on Torgsin resulting from deposits made abroad—thus affording to foreign friends a convenient alternative to the despatch of parcels containing presents.

The consumers in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev are even promised, at an early date, probably in 1936, the opening of “one-price stores”, after the model of the Woolworth establishments in the American and western European cities. These will be maintained by the Administration of Department Stores Department of the USSR Commissariat of Supplies. They will begin by retailing household necessities, haberdashery, knitted goods, perfumes and cosmetics, in one, three and five rouble departments. There will also be 50 kopek counters for ribbons, pins, rubber bands, pencils and shoe laces. There will also be a cafeteria, where purchasers will purchase special slot coins to enable them to help themselves to iced coffee, hot rolls and various pastries.

We come now to retailing enterprises of particular local bodies. We may mention first the huge retail trade long done by the Commissariat for Supplies of the RSFSR in some of the larger cities of that republic. Though these shops and kiosks are organised according to oblast or city boundaries, and usually bear a local name, they do not usually belong to the local governing bodies but to the RSFSR People's Commissar of Supplies. In Moscow he has an enormous department store in the centre of the city, which is extremely well equipped and liberally stocked with every conceivable commodity for household use. Smaller departmental stores exist in streets in other quarters of the city, together with special shops for the sale of shoes, clothing, wine and tobacco, and a large number of kiosks and street-stands selling candy, cigarettes, etc.—making a total of over 500 selling points, at which the People's Commissar for Trade deliberately competes with the consumers' cooperative societies; not, indeed, by lower prices but by more varied stocks, and chiefly, it is said, with intent to supply models in organisation and methods of retail distribution.

Second in magnitude only to the extensive retail trading of the RSFSR People's Commissar himself, is that conducted by various local authorities

in the RSFSR. Much the most important of these enterprises is that called "Mostorg", which was originally organised as a joint-stock company to retail the products of Moscow producing trusts, in which the executive committee of the Moscow oblast had, in 1928, 77.2 per cent of the stock, whilst 10.3 per cent was held by certain trusts in the oblast, 11.2 per cent by the Moscow Municipal Bank and 1.3 per cent by the USSR People's Commissar of Finance—thus entirely owned by public authorities. It was managed by a board of five directors, elected by the corporate shareholders, and assisted by a larger council on which the trade unions and the local governing bodies were represented. Already in 1929 its total capital was over 10 million roubles. It had then nine wholesale divisions, which supplied its retail departments with hardware, technical equipment, chemicals, building supplies, knitted goods, textiles, clothing, office equipment and jewellery. It supplied materials for all building works in the oblast, and contracted with factories for the supply of working-clothes and overalls of their staffs. It long had a monopoly of the supply of the Moscow public offices with lead pencils! Its total turnover in 1928-1929 was 288 million roubles; at a working cost of under 8 per cent. Already in 1929 it had 225 shops and stores (about half in Moscow city), and over 5000 employees. In 1933 it was entirely reorganised and placed immediately under the administration of the Moscow City Soviet.¹ On the other hand, the Leningrad City Soviet does not itself maintain any retail stores.

Another type of retailing organisation is that undertaken for their own products by trusts of local significance, and thus under the direction of the municipal or other local soviet. "Mosselprom", for instance, was long a Moscow trust, employing some 15,000 persons in factories producing candies, macaroni, fancy confectionery, beer, tobacco, toys and other small articles. Half its product was taken wholesale by the consumers' co-operative organisation, the USSR trusts or the state export organisation. But the other half Mosselprom marketed itself in Moscow through its own 40 stores and 400 kiosks, and a large number of agencies in restaurants, hotels, etc. It has now ceased to exist as a separate entity, and its production and distribution have been taken over by different commissariats and the Moscow City Soviet.

The Ukraine stands second only to the RSFSR in the magnitude and range of the retail trading conducted practically by its own Sovnarkom under various commissariats.

In another field we have to notice the district pharmacy or drug-store, which, as a part of the public medical service, is everywhere conducted by the People's Commissar of Health of the particular constituent or auto-

¹ We may mention here the seldom described commission shops maintained in most cities by the municipal authorities for offering for sale all sorts of miscellaneous articles, at prices fixed by the owners, on a commission of 25 per cent. These take the place of the pawnbrokers' establishments of western Europe as an easy means of disposal of unwanted oddments of personal belongings, misfits, discarded ornaments, cast-off clothing and "white elephants" of every kind.

nomous republic. These district pharmacies are, however, to be found only in the urban areas. In the rural areas drugs are dispensed by the visiting medical practitioner or his assistants.

Nor do all these shopkeeping enterprises of the USSR and republic governments, or of the oblast or municipal governments, or of the trusts and combines that they control, exhaust the list of rivals in retailing with which the consumers' cooperative movement has to contend. Other forms of cooperation also compete for the consumers' shopping. Some retail shops in the cities are maintained by the manufacturing associations of owner-producers (incops), for the sale of linen, embroidery, toys and small articles of wood or leather. There are artels of bakers who keep retail shops for confectionery. Much more important, however, is the competition, to which we shall recur in our subsequent chapter entitled "In Place of Profit", of the collective farms in entering into contracts directly with particular factories, as well as of the individual peasants, in the direct supply of city customers with all sorts of foodstuffs; from stalls in public markets or even from baskets in the streets, down to the ubiquitous offering for sale to travellers of cooked food at every provincial railway station.¹ This direct supply of the consumer was, during 1932, greatly widened, so far as concerns the two-thirds or four-fifths of the peasants who are members of collective farms, by the definite instructions of the USSR People's Commissar for Agriculture that the whole surplus of the collectivised product, over and above the fixed quota due to the government and after all the government exactions had been duly met, together with everything produced individually by the members, may be freely sold anywhere, at any price, to the consumers, either individually or collectively in the open market² or direct to the factories or trusts, or to the public restaurants and hotels, or to any of the consumers' cooperative organisations either in separate transactions or on standing contracts.³ Nothing is forbidden to the sellers except purchase for resale at a profit, and sale to known speculators.

¹ The restaurants at the railway stations, and the supply by trolley cars on the platforms, are provided by the local cooperative societies. The dining-cars on the trains are administered by the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Trade.

² This "open market" selling has been the subject of ever-varying decrees and municipal regulations. At times both before and after NEP, it has been encouraged and even stimulated, in order to supplement the insufficient supplies brought forward by the cooperative organisation. Then it has been discouraged and even repressed, partly because the market operations could not practically be restricted to direct sales from producer to consumer, and "speculation" (meaning buying in order to resell at a profit) became rampant; partly because the crowds of peasants were not only dirty and disorderly, but also obstructive to traffic; and partly because, in times of short supply, outrageous prices were asked, as the beginning of the bargaining characteristic of the Oriental bazaar. These were naively cited by foreigners as if they were the actual prices at which the commodities changed hands! One distinguished expert, sent out to discover the state of the crops, varied his agricultural investigations by spending an hour in the open market of every city he visited, making no purchases, but asking the price of everything, and carefully noting whatever he was asked, in due course reporting this as being the actual price level!

³ *Centrosoyuz* itself makes large purchases by standing contracts with *kolkhosi* and *incops*. But what stands in the way of an indefinite extension of this system of whole-

*Recent Encroachments on the Sphere of the Consumers'
Cooperative Movement*

Apart from the maintenance and even the increased development of the various rival distributing agencies that we have described, the last three or four years have witnessed a series of definite encroachments on the sphere heretofore assigned to the consumers' cooperative movement. It has become definitely part of the policy of the government to relieve both Centrosoyus and the local societies of part of the burden of their ever-increasing work. Although they have come to deal with over 70 per cent of the retail distribution of commodities in the USSR, there is no longer any idea of their eventually undertaking the whole of it. It is doubtless on other grounds that the associations of owner-producers, whether in manufacturing artels or in collective farms, have lately received, as already mentioned, so greatly enlarged a freedom to sell their products directly to the consumers, either in their own shops or at the public markets, instead of this supply necessarily going through the consumers' cooperative societies. There were other grounds, too, for the steady expansion of retailing by the central or local government that we have described. Possibly the most important of the recent encroachments on the actual or potential sphere of the consumers' cooperative movement has been the transfer to the factories themselves by decree of December 4, 1932, of the whole property and all the functions of the closed cooperative societies (ZRK) attached to the larger and more important factories, usually those having more than 2000 employees.¹ Under this decree, in which the Central Board of Centrosoyus reluctantly acquiesced, some 350 of the larger consumers' cooperative societies, with something like three million members, have been transformed. All their buildings and equipment, with their farms and other enterprises, have been transferred to the factories for the employees of which they catered, with no other compensation for the capital expenditure that had been incurred by the

sale supply with regard to foodstuffs is the necessity for submitting any large stocks to some process of drying or preservation, or else of constructing and maintaining huge cold-storage establishments.

¹ The decree of December 4, 1932, applies a similar principle to all the other closed cooperative societies (such as those for particular vocations and industries, those for the state farms (Sovkhoz) and those for the factories having fewer than 2000 employees), but not so drastically as in the case of the 262 factories, having each over 2000 employees, which were then specified. In other cases, the closed cooperative societies are to continue in existence, and in connection with the cooperative hierarchy headed by the Central Board of Centrosoyus, but to be also subject to the authority of the factory management.

"In all the factories where the closed workers' cooperatives were left intact (and these constitute a majority) the position of the factory director in regulating the utilisation of the products assigned by the State for the workers of the particular factory has been considerably strengthened. The factory administration provides transport facilities for the closed workers' cooperative, helps to organise vegetable gardens and invests considerable sums in the cooperative. The form in which the factory administration participates in the work of the cooperatives, and the financial aid given by it, are laid down in special agreements concluded between Centrosoyus and the People's Commissariats of each industry" (*Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, p. 87).

cooperative organisation than the nominal creation of loans to the factories, bearing no interest and without any term for repayment, which Centrosoyus may include in its balance sheet among the cooperative assets. The members of the transformed cooperative societies suffer, indeed, no pecuniary loss, not even that of the small sums paid up on their shares in the societies now dissolved, as these sums, bearing no interest, still benefit the same individuals as trade union members working in the particular factories concerned. But they now participate in the management of their food and other supplies, not as cooperative shareholders, but as factory workers who are members of their trade union; they attend the shop, brigade or shift meetings of their co-workers, in lieu of those of the cooperative society; and instead of voting for the committee of management of that society, they vote for the shop, brigade or shift representatives on the factory commission for supplies, and other committees, as they do for their main factory committee (FZIK). The production and distribution of food and the retailing of other commodities continues as before, but it now becomes an integral part of the work of the factory management. The superintendent or director of the factory, subject to the combine or trust and of the Sovnarkom, takes over the responsibility for these functions from the former cooperative society's committee of management, including the administration of farms and other cooperative departments, hitherto under the authority of the cooperative hierarchy, headed by the Central Board of Centrosoyus. The intention and object of this momentous decree was avowedly this very supersession of consumers' cooperative management by factory management. It was believed that greater efficiency in food supply, and retail distribution, and a more exact issue of ration cards,¹ would be secured by cutting away these large factory retailing establishments (ORS) from their dependence on the overburdened Centrosoyus, whilst leaving them free to purchase what they chose, whether directly from state or municipal departments acting either as wholesalers, manufacturers or agricultural producers, or from the manufacturing associations of owner-producers (incops), or the consumers' cooperative movement itself. A special commission or sub-committee of the factory committee for supplies is appointed to replace the cooperative committee of management. To manage what has become the new department of factory supplies, a deputy director, who will usually be the past president of the closed cooperative society, is appointed by the factory director, subject to the consent of this special commission of supplies. From the constitutional standpoint, in short, what has happened is a transfer of these 350-odd important enterprises from the consumers' cooperative hierarchy to the two hierarchies of the trade union and the soviets.²

¹ "A scrutiny of the persons formerly supplied through [74 of] these shops established the fact that, out of two million persons supplied by them, 273,000 persons had no connection with the 74 factories concerned, and no right to be supplied with factory rations" (*Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, 1934, p. 86).

² The decree of December 4, 1932, is available in English in various summaries, such as that in the *Slavonic Review* for the first quarter of 1933; *Moscow Daily News*, November

The Principle of Self-Supply

On the other hand, the consumers' cooperative societies have been repeatedly pressed, during the last four years (1932-1935), to extend their operations from distribution to agricultural production. Why should not every one of the forty or fifty thousand separate societies, instead of contenting itself with handling the commodities supplied to it by Centrosoyus, endeavour to make its members independent of the vagaries of the transport system, independent of the shortcoming of the central organisation, and, to a large extent, independent also of the sovkhosi and kolkhosi on which they could not always count? Hence each of the various societies of consumers was urged to take on the task of producing for its own members such things as vegetables and fruit, and the produce of piggeries and dairies, with which to eke out and vary the sometimes exiguous ration to which their cards as producers entitled them. We have here one more instance of that multiformity to which the USSR constitution is so much addicted. Many of the larger consumers' societies, and a few of the smaller ones, accordingly took to "self-supply" in this sense, with the result not only of making a perceptible addition to the nation's supplies, but also of satisfying more of their members' desires. Some idea of the magnitude already attained in this independent production by the consumers' societies may be gathered from the following statistics. At the end of the year 1933 no fewer than 4029 consumers' cooperative societies had their own *koopkhosi* or farms (excluding 1689 others maintained by the factory supply departments (ORS), representing former closed cooperative societies). The cooperative societies' farms sowed 305,800 hectares with potatoes, and 163,100 hectares with other vegetables. They produced 1,682,200 tons of potatoes, and 703,200 tons of other vegetables. They possessed 663,500 pigs and 299,300 horned cattle—truly a considerable addition to the nation's food supply! ¹

The Extent of the Market

It is not easy to forecast the future sphere of the consumers' cooperative movement in the USSR. With regard to the principal issue, there is, however, no doubt. The service of distribution will certainly remain under the control not of the producers of the particular commodities and services but of the consumers and users thereof. What cannot be foreseen is how this control will be shared among the various forms that may be taken by the consumers' organisation. There is to be considered the necessary provision for the needs of the future generations of citizens,

18, 1932, December 23, 1932; *Manchester Guardian*, December 6, 1932. The lengthy memorandum (in Russian) "On the Organisational Structure of the Consumers' Cooperative System", issued by the Central Board of Centrosoyus in January 1933, gives a significantly extenuating explanation of the decree.

¹ Article by Centrosoyus on "International Cooperative Day in the USSR", in *International Cooperative Alliance Review of International Cooperation*, October 1933, p. 375.

which cannot logically or safely be entrusted to the representatives of the actual consumers of to-day. There are some kinds of commodities and services --we may instance the manufacture of requisites for the defence forces and the postal service --of which the government itself is the only consumer or user. There are others, such as railway transportation and road maintenance, and nearly all kinds of municipal activities, for which there can scarcely be any practicable voluntary organisation of individual consumers as such, as distinguished from municipal citizenship. Finally, there is the problem of supplying the needs of such agglomerations of consumers as the workers in particular factories or other establishments, or persons engaged in particular vocations, when the distribution of commodities and services can perhaps be most conveniently administered by these particular agglomerations of "producers", as distinguished from geographically defined associations of consumers at large. As we have already described, the trade unions are, in the USSR, assuming not only the control but also the actual administration of vast services enjoyed by their members, such as social insurance. Thus there is certainly a place in the organisation of distribution for the state department and the municipality on the one hand, and for administration by industrial or other establishments on the other, or even by associations of producers such as the trade unions. How exactly the relative spheres of each of these, and of the various consumers' cooperative societies, can best be demarcated, in different communities, at different stages of social development, remains, we think, for the future to decide. It may be suggested that the answer to the enquiry may turn on the conditions in which it proves possible to secure, from one or other kind of social institution, the most efficient management of particular branches of distribution. The consumers' cooperative society may well continue to be the best alternative to the profit-making shopkeeper for the supply of household commodities to all the residents in the rural village, and, indeed, to all but closely segregated or exceptionally specialised groups of residents in the cities. It may be that, in the cities, some special groups of consumers may be able to secure more efficient management than a consumers' cooperative society is likely to supply, if the distribution of household commodities to such groups is dealt with (by the aid of advisory committees concerned only with supplies) as part of the administration of the establishments in which their members are employed. In either case it is distribution under the direction of the consumers of the commodities and services they desire, not under the direction of the producers of those particular commodities. Similarly, where the government or the municipality undertakes vast services for common use, or in the interests of future generations, it does so as a universal association of consumers, under the control of the citizens; and not under that of the particular workers who produce these services.

CHAPTER V

THE VOCATION OF LEADERSHIP

IN the constitution of Soviet Communism, as we have seen, the adult inhabitant, apart from specific legal disqualifications, finds separate provision made for his or her participation and representation in three distinct capacities, namely, as a citizen, as a producer and as a consumer. We have now to add, to this unparalleled elaborateness of the representative system, an artificially constructed category that we can best describe as one of super-citizens. These men and women are not withdrawn from ordinary life or common citizenship. They have a conscious responsibility greater and deeper than that of the plain man or woman. They are held to a higher standard of behaviour, under a more stringent discipline. They are, in fact, selected out of the mass for the exercise of a special vocation,¹ and the fulfilment of a particular duty based upon a definite creed, namely, that of "Marxism" as authoritatively interpreted from time to time. This select body, universally known as the Communist Party, or simply as "the Party"—everyone else being "non-Party"—may easily be deemed the most important part of the effective constitutional structure of the USSR.² It must, however, be noted that, unlike those parts of the constitution of the USSR that we have already described—the multiform democracy of Man as a Citizen, Man as a Producer and

¹ The English word "vocation" was, for the first few centuries of its use, limited to a "calling by God or by Jesus Christ". Since the sixteenth century it has increasingly been used indiscriminately for any specialised occupation, although usually with reference to one having some sort of professional organisation or qualification. Thus Hobbes could assert, in 1651, that "Some laws are addressed . . . to particular provinces; some to particular vocations, and some to particular men" (*The Leviathan*, by Thomas Hobbes, II. xxvi. 137). But political or any other public leadership has, in England, seldom been recognised as a specialised occupation.

² Innumerable manuals and pamphlets are to be had in Russian describing the constitution, principles and duties of the Communist Party, and its junior subsidiaries (Comsomols, Pioneers and Octobrists). There are also histories of the Party in Russian, such as *History of Russian Social Democracy, 1898-1907*, by L. Martov, Moscow, 1923; *History of the Russian Social Democratic Party*, by M. N. Lyadov, Moscow, 1906, 1925. Among sources more accessible may be mentioned *Civic Training in Soviet Russia and Making Bolsheviks*, both by S. N. Harper, University of Chicago, 1931; the good chapter entitled "The Communist Party", by Jerome Davis, in *Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase and others, New York, 1928; *Histoire du parti communiste de l'URSS (Parti bolchevik)*, by E. Yaroslavsky, Paris, 1931 (which is stated to have been translated from the Russian also into German, Spanish, Turkish, Tartar, Chinese and Yiddish); *Geschichte des Bolshevismus*, by A. Rosenberg, 1932, translated as *History of Bolshevism*, 1933; *La Révolution russe*, by Henri Rollin, vol. ii. entitled "Le Parti bolcheviste", Paris, 1931; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929; *The Soviet State*, by B. W. Maxwell, 1934, pp. 38-47; *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. M. Popov, 1935, translated from the 16th Russian edition; *The Seventeenth Conference of the CPSU in Questions and Answers*, compiled by S. Sheftel (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1933), affords a convenient view of present policy.

Man as a Consumer—the Communist Party has no organic connection with the Soviet Government by statute or other form of law. Neither the organisation nor the activities of the Communist Party are so much as mentioned in the “Fundamental Law”, or in any statutory amendments of it. Nor has the Party any legal authority over the inhabitants of the USSR, not even over its own members! The only sanctions that the Party can use to control its members are those of reprimand and expulsion; and these entail no legal disability. The Party members enjoy no statutory privileges. They are individually under the same obligation as other citizens to obey the law of the land; and they can be, and are, prosecuted and punished, like other people, for any action condemned by the law. The Communist Party appears, in fact, to have practically the same status under the law as a Roman Catholic order, such as the Society of Jesus, has, or used to have, in a Roman Catholic country. If the Party influences or directs the policy of individuals or public authorities, it does so only by persuasion. If it exercises power, it does so by “keeping the conscience” of its own members, and getting them elected to office by the popular vote. Even when not holding public office, the Party members act as missionaries among the non-Party citizens in the organisations of every kind throughout the USSR. It is in this way that the Party secures the popular consent to, or at least the popular acquiescence in, the policy that it promotes.

The Communist Party has, since its establishment, changed not only its name but also its function. It was created, as the Bolshevik section of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, primarily as the instrument of revolution. It was continued and strengthened, after the seizure of power, in October 1917, as the organ by which the revolution could be maintained and directed. It exists to-day, as the student of political science will realise, chiefly as the means by which the people of the USSR, in all their multiform participation in government that we have described, are continuously supplied with intellectual leadership. To give this leadership, not merely at the centre or from the heights, but ubiquitously, in the factory or on the farm, no less than at election meetings, is the service which the voluntarily recruited membership of this remarkable companionship adopts as its life-duty. There has, in fact, been created, as part of the constitutional structure of the USSR, a highly organised Vocation of Leadership.

How the Communist Party Arose

The student of the numerous books and pamphlets, articles and letters, emanating from the little groups of Russian revolutionary exiles during the first fifteen years of the present century will have no doubt about the origin and purpose of this organisation. Though the Social-Democratic Party—the definitely Marxian successor to half a dozen waves of revolutionary activity since 1825—was inaugurated at Minsk in 1898, it was Vladimir Ilych Ulianov, at that time not yet widely known as N. Lenin,

who, from 1900 onward, gradually gave the nascent party its unique form. Unlike his Russian predecessors—unlike every other party organiser Lenin had no use, within the Party, for mere sympathisers, for partially converted disciples, for adherents who based their acts on Christianity or a general humanitarianism, or on any other theory of social life than Marxism, nor even for those whose interpretation of Marxism differed from his own. It was not a body of electors prepared to give him their votes that he was collecting. Popular election had practically no place in Tsarist Russia. For the instrument of revolution that he was forging he needed something different from an electoral force, namely, a completely united, highly disciplined and relatively small body of “professional revolutionists”, who should not only have a common creed and a common programme but should also undertake to give their whole lives to a single end, the overthrow of the entire governmental structure of the autocratic “police state”. The creation of such a body was no easy task. In interminable controversies between 1900 and 1916, we watch Lenin driving off successively all whom he could not persuade to accept his model; all whom he considered compromisers or temporisers; opportunists or reformists; half-converted sympathisers who clung to one or other form of mysticism for which Karl Marx had found no place; the Mensheviks who accepted alliances with liberalism or had other “bourgeois” tendencies, and the Social Revolutionaries who, as he thought, dreamt that individual acts of terrorism would eventually evolve a new society out of the peasant community of the Mir. With all these elements it cannot rightly be said that Lenin was intolerant. He allowed that they were fully entitled to go their own way. His attitude was one of patiently explaining to them the superior efficiency of his own line of action, and of insisting on taking his own course, with however small a fragment of disciples. It was, as he was always demonstrating, neither he nor they, nor any group whatsoever, that would make the revolution, but the proletarian mass, which had to be inspired to the necessary action, and then guided and led in the social reconstruction that must follow. For this supreme purpose what was needed was a membership, whether small or great, that was devoid not only of division but also of dubiety; so disciplined as to be able to take combined action without hesitation as soon as the word was given; and so united in their socialism as to be capable of patiently embodying it in practical administration when the time for reconstruction came. If the reader will think of this membership, provisionally, as a united confraternity, a widely spread companionship, or as a highly disciplined order, professing a distinct and dogmatic political creed, and charged with a particular vocation, rather than as a political party, he will approach nearer to an understanding of its present-day characteristics and of its sociological significance.

During the Great War the cleavage between Lenin's party and all the other revolutionary sections became ever more acute. Lenin, from the first, took up the attitude that the war was, on both sides, an

"imperialist" quarrel, with which the socialists of every country had nothing to do, except in so far as, by opposing their several governments, they could, in every country, convert the war between different groups of nations into a revolutionary upheaval of the workers against the landlords and capitalists, probably entailing civil war. All the other sections in Russia rejected this "defeatist" attitude, and supported the government, more or less consistently, in the defence of the country. The growing unpopularity of the war among all classes played into Lenin's hands. The narrowly restricted band of "professional revolutionists" that he had been slowly forming during the preceding decade had grown, by February 1917, to what then seemed the respectable number of about 30,000, dispersed, throughout the cities of the tsarist empire. That all these were in earnest about the matter was to some extent guaranteed by the constant danger of prosecution, imprisonment and exile that the mere membership of a revolutionary party had involved.¹

But the unobtrusive recruiting, and the secret admission by local groups scattered all over Russia, were incompatible, alike with any scrupulously careful selection of members and with the elaboration of party machinery. During the eight months of the Provisional Government in 1917, the membership of the party, still called the Russian Workmen's Social Democratic Party (Bolshevik), grew rapidly to nearly 200,000. In 1918, after its accession to power, the highly disciplined Party

¹ To the efficiency of the organisation, and to the amazing success of the Party that Lenin had organised, Mr. H. G. Wells bore eloquent testimony in 1920: "From end to end of Russia, and in the Russian-speaking community throughout the world, there existed only one sort of people who had common general ideas upon which to work, a common faith and a common will, and that was the Communist Party. While all the rest of Russia was either apathetic like the peasantry, or garrulously at sixes and sevens, or given over to violence and fear, the Communists believed and were prepared to act. Numerically they were and are a very small part of the Russian population. . . . Nevertheless, because it was in those terrible days the only organisation which gave men a common idea of action, common formulas and mutual confidences, it was able to seize and retain control of the smashed Empire. It was and it is the only sort of administrative solidarity possible in Russia. These ambiguous adventurers who have been and are afflicting Russia, with the support of the Western Powers, Denikin, Kolchak, Wrangel and the like, stand for no guiding principle and offer no security of any sort upon which men's confidence can crystallise. They are essentially brigands. The Communist Party, however one may criticise it, does embody an idea, and can be relied on to stand by its idea. So far it is a thing morally higher than anything that has yet been brought against it. It at once secured the passive support of the peasant mass by permitting them to take land from the estates and by making peace with Germany. It restored order—after a frightful lot of shooting—in the great towns. For a time everybody found carrying arms without authority was shot. This action was clumsy and brutal but effective. To retain its power the Communist Government organised Extraordinary Commissions with practically unlimited powers, and crushed out all opposition by a Red Terror. Much that that Red Terror did was cruel and frightful, it was largely controlled by narrow-minded men, and many of its officials were inspired by social hatred and the fear of counter-revolution, but if it was fanatical it was honest. Apart from individual atrocities, it did on the whole kill for a reason and to an end. Its bloodshed was not like the silly aimless butcheries of the Denikin régime, which would not even recognise, I am told, the Bolshevik Red Cross. And to-day the Bolshevik Government sits, I believe, in Moscow, as securely established as any government in Europe; and the streets of the Russian towns are as safe as any streets in Europe" (*Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, pp. 61-64).

changed its name to the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). In 1922, on the formation of the Soviet Union, the Party became the Communist Party of the USSR (Bolshevik). By the end of 1932 its numbers (including "candidates" or probationers) had, without any lessening of the obligations of membership, and in spite of continuous "cleansing" and repeated purges, risen to more than 3,300,000. At the Seventeenth Party Congress of January 1934 considerable changes were made in the Party organisation, and in the nomenclature of some of its organs, the terms cell, nucleus and fraction being dropped. We have now to describe the Party of to-day, which, after the last drastic purge of 1933, counts, in 1935, nearly three million members and probationers.

The Party Membership

Admission to Party membership is, and has always been, conferred as a privilege, to which no one has any prescriptive right, and in conformity with definite rules, to which no exception is allowed. Applicants for admission must, of course, profess whole-hearted acceptance of the communist creed, as laid down by Marx and as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin. They must manifest this adhesion in their lives by being habitually politically "active" in their respective spheres; not only by displaying zeal in their daily work of production or service, but also by spontaneously undertaking extra duties of social influence. They must be warranted entirely free from Christian or any other religious or metaphysical "ideology", regarded as inconsistent with whole-hearted adhesion to Marxian communism. No member of the "deprived categories", such as ministers of religion or monks, kulaks or former landlords, capitalist employers or traders, can be admitted under any circumstances.¹ Nor must applicants have a "pretty bourgeois ideology", nor, indeed, any marked attachment to private property. A desire to live without work, or any considerable amount of personal possessions, would certainly be a bar to admission. Would-be members have to be formally recommended for admission to probationary membership (in which stage they are known as "candidates") by two, three or five Party members, who know them personally and who are held responsible for their recommendations, even to the extent of being summarily expelled from the Party for any negligence or improper partiality. Even on the highest recommendation, candidates are not finally accepted as members until they finish a probationary period of at least one year or two years, according to their class

¹ "Former members of other parties [meaning particularly the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries] are admitted in exceptional cases on the recommendation of five Party members, three of whom must be of ten years' Party standing and two of pre-revolutionary Party standing; and only through an industrial primary organisation; the admission of such a candidate must be endorsed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party irrespective of the social status of the applicant. . . . They have to go through a three years' period of probation" (Rules, I (c) and note to II. 12, in *Socialism Victorious*, 1934, pp. 693, 698). Such admissions are now extremely rare and entirely exceptional.

status at the date of application. During this period of probation the candidate pays the full membership dues, varying according to his salary or other income, and he is summoned to all open meetings; he is assigned tasks and generally treated as a member, except that he is not allowed to vote on Party decisions. More important is the fact that he is watched by his new comrades; his conduct is periodically reported on, and his character is carefully studied. If he is not considered in all respects satisfactory, his application will either be summarily rejected, or his period of probation will be extended.

The requirements for admission as candidates differ in detail according to age, occupation and social heritage.¹ Admission is most easily gained either by young people between eighteen and twenty, of workman or peasant parentage, who have been serving as Comsomols; or, with a similar parentage, by conscripts actually serving in the Red Army; or by outstanding manual-working wage-earners in productive industry. It is, in fact, from these three sources that the great majority of candidates now come. The preponderance in the Party membership of actual manual workers is carefully maintained, although not without some difficulty. Whilst it is comparatively easy, even with ubiquitous work in recruiting, to keep the aggregate of admissions duly balanced, so many of those of workman or peasant parentage, entering from the ranks of the Comsomols, the Red Army or the factory operatives, presently become salaried organisers or office workers, or obtain promotion in due course as administrators, lecturers or technicians, that the proportion of Party members at any one time actually working at the bench or the forge is always in danger of dropping below 50 per cent. To ensure a substantial majority to such industrial manual workers was one of the motives that led, in 1924-1925, to the simultaneous admission of the "Lenin contingent", in commemoration of the death of the great leader, when no fewer than 200,000 of the outstanding wage-earning men and women in

¹ Thus, whilst there is a universal minimum age for admission of eighteen years, youths of either sex under twenty years of age, if not actually serving in the Red Army, are admitted only after training and service in the League of Communist Youth (Comsomols), to be subsequently described. Industrial workmen with a production record of not less than five years must submit recommendations from three Party members of five years' Party standing, and are subject only to a year's probation. Industrial workers with a production record of less than five years; agricultural workers; Red Army men from among workers or collective farmers; and engineers and technicians working directly in shops or sectors must have five recommendations from Party members of five years' Party standing, and are subject to two years' probation. Collective farmers; members of handicraft or artisan arts; and elementary school teachers, must have five recommendations from Party members of five years' Party standing, and also the recommendation of a representative of the political department of the Machine and Tractor Station or of the Party District Committee, and are subject to two years' probation. Other employed persons must have five recommendations from Party members of ten years' Party standing, and are subject to two years' probation. In the case of a Comsomol of any of the above categories, the recommendation of the Comsomol District Committee is treated as equivalent to those of two Party members. The new class of sympathisers are admitted to Sympathisers' Groups by the local Party Committee on the recommendation of two Party members.

the factories and mines, chosen very largely by their non-Party fellow-workers, were accepted as candidates within a few months.¹

In connection with the general "cleansing" of the Party in 1933, which we shall presently describe, there was instituted a new class of associates, called "sympathisers", being those who, although loyal and zealous, proved to be intellectually incapable of explaining or expounding Marxism, or the General Line of the Party, in such a way as to make it plain to the outside enquirer. Such persons are excluded from the roll of Party members, and thus deprived of a decisive vote in Party meetings; they are to be formed into "Sympathisers' Groups", who are to be attached to the Primary Party Organs, the meetings of which these sympathisers are required to attend, and in which they may have a consultative vote.

The Rules of the Order ²

Apart from a relatively high standard of personal behaviour, there are three fundamental requirements that are strictly enforced. The first concerns unity of doctrine and practice. The Party member must unhesitatingly adhere to the "General Line" in communist theory and soviet policy, as authoritatively laid down from time to time; and must be guilty neither of "right deviation" nor "left deviation". There is, indeed, laid upon the Party member an obligation of union and loyalty far beyond that imposed on the non-Party masses. On new issues, and, in fact, in all matters not yet authoritatively decided on, there is, even for the Party member, complete freedom of thought and full liberty of discussion and controversy, private or public, which may continue, as in the series of Trotsky debates in 1925-1927, even for years.³ But once

¹ Of this mass-recruiting, Stalin remarked in April 1924 as under: "Our Party has recently added 200,000 new working-class members to its ranks. The remarkable thing about these new members is that they have not, for the most part, entered the Party on their own initiative, but have been sent by their non-Party fellow workers, who took an active hand in proposing the new members, and without whose approval no new members would have been admitted" (*Leninism*, by J. Stalin, vol. i., 1928, p. 164).

² The rules of the Communist Party will be found in English in various publications; see, for instance, that entitled *Resolutions and Decisions* [of the Seventeenth Party Congress] including *Party Rules* (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1934, 84 pp.); or the volume published in London entitled *Socialism Victorious* (Martin Lawrence, 1934), pp. 689-711.

The Party dues are as under:

20 kopeks per month on an income up to 100 roubles	
60 " " " 101 " 150 "	
1 rouble " " 151 " 200 "	
1.50 roubles " " 201 " 250 "	
2 " " 251 " 300 "	
2 per cent on incomes 301 to 500 roubles	
3 " " over 500 "	

In addition, there is an initiation fee of 2 per cent of the current wage payable on admission as a candidate.

³ Rule IX. 57 declares that "the free and positive discussion of questions of Party policy in individual organs of the Party, or in the Party as a whole, is the inalienable right of every Party member, derived from internal Party democracy. Only on the basis of

any issue is authoritatively decided by the Party, in the All-Union Party Congress or its Central Committee, all argument and all public criticism, as well as all opposition, must cease; and the Party decision must be loyally accepted and acted upon without obstruction or resistance, on pain of expulsion; and, if made necessary by action punishable by law, also of prosecution, deportation or exile.

The second requirement from the Party member is that of implicit and complete obedience to the corporate Party authority. He must take up and zealously perform any task or duty entrusted to him. In the exercise of this duty he must go wherever he is ordered, pursue any occupation assigned to him, reside wherever required, and, in the service of the establishment of soviet communism throughout the world, generally submit himself to whatever course of conduct is thought best by his superiors in the Party hierarchy. In this respect the position of the Party member seems to resemble that of the member of a typical religious order in the Roman Catholic Church.

The third requirement of the Party member is also analogous to that of the member of a religious order. He does not actually take a vow of poverty, but in applying for and in accepting Party membership he knowingly accepts the regulation bringing every Party member under strictly defined limits of salary or other earnings, which are based on the principle that his income should be not substantially greater than that of the skilled and zealous manual worker. This regulation, which embodies the communist objection to the usual practice of allowing, and even desiring, the work of government to fall into the hands of a wealthy class, or at least of a class of administrators having a markedly different standard of life from that of the people they are governing, was first made by the Paris Commune of 1871. It was at once approved by Karl Marx, and was, a whole generation later, adopted by Lenin for his nascent party of revolutionists, who in tsarist times, with very few exceptions, necessarily lived abstemious lives, whether as almost destitute exiles or as persecuted proletarians in "underground Russia". It has, from the first, been the rule of the Bolshevik Party; a rule which, though varying in details from time to time and even from place to place, is reported, even by hostile critics of the Party, to have been continuously maintained and substantially

internal Party democracy is it possible to develop Bolshevik self-criticism and to strengthen Party discipline, which must be conscious and not mechanical. But extensive discussion, especially discussion on an All-Union scale, of questions of Party policy, must be so organised that it cannot lead to attempts by an insignificant minority to impose its will upon the vast majority of the Party, or to attempt to form factional groupings which break the unity of the Party; to attempts at a split which may shake the strength and endurance of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the delight of the enemies of the working class. Therefore a wide discussion on an All-Union scale can be regarded as necessary only if (a) this necessity is recognised by at least several local Party organisations whose jurisdiction extends to a region or a republic each; (b) if there is not a sufficiently solid majority on the Central Committee itself on very important questions of Party policy; (c) if in spite of the existence of a solid majority on the Central Committee which advocates a definite standpoint, the Central Committee still deems it necessary to test the correctness of its policy by means of a discussion in the Party."

enforced.¹ There is a corresponding provision relating to extraneous earnings, such as those from authorship or journalism, which are much affected by Party members. Of all such earnings, in addition to the ordinary progressive income tax to which all residents in the USSR are liable, Party members have to surrender to the Party funds 20 or 30 per cent of the total, and in extreme cases even 50 per cent.² It need not be said that this prescribed maximum of personal income by way of salary or extraneous earnings is exclusive of all "functional expenses", which are provided to any extent that the task or duty appears to require.³ Thus, officials, whether or not Party members, have all travelling expenses paid, proceeding frequently by aeroplane. They have at their disposal a liberal supply of motor cars, which are not supposed to be used for pleasure. They very naturally enjoy, though as officials in the overcrowded cities and not as Party members, a valuable preference in the allocation of apartments (though without any privilege in the permissible extent of accommodation); and they, like many million industrial workers, are, again as government officials and not as Party members, entitled to shop at the retail stores maintained at their several establishments (the "closed cooperative societies"), with less restricted supplies of "deficiency" commodities, and more carefully limited prices, than are available to the unfavoured citizen. But, subject to all these necessary qualifications, it is a fact that the administrators of Soviet Communism in the USSR, even of the highest grades, including the People's Commissars in the Sovnarkom, and the heads of the great consumers' cooperative

¹ Until recently, the regulation appears to have been that the Party member may not take for himself in Moscow any salary higher than 300 roubles per month. With the rise in both wages and prices, this has lately been raised to 600 roubles per month. If his office carries a higher salary, the balance has to be surrendered to the Party. In some districts, assumed to have lower costs of living, the permissible maximum may be even lower. To this rule an exception was made in 1932, apparently by private Party circular; an exception which has led to the mistake, eagerly disseminated by enemies of the régime, that the Party maximum had been abolished. Where a Party member is employed as a technician, actually in the works, not merely in administration, he may now receive a salary equal to that paid to any non-Party technician in that establishment, not being a foreigner serving on a special contract. The highest case is said to be 900 roubles per month. The motive for this exception is said to have been a desire to encourage Party members to qualify themselves to replace in due course both the foreign and the non-Party specialists, whose services are at present indispensable. It should be added, as a possible further exception, that the latest arrangements allow the governing body of a trust or combine, having a surplus on the year's production in the nature of profit, to allocate a fixed proportion of this surplus not exceeding one per cent to any way of improving the enterprise that may seem to them expedient. There may thus be, in some cases, an extra payment to the responsible technicians by way of premiums for some exceptional device for extra production. These exceptions, which affect only a tiny proportion of the Party members, and these not the highest in authority, illustrate the stringency of the rule.

² If a Party member wins a high prize in the state lottery loans, the Party authorities decide what proportion of it he should surrender to the Party—in this case the sum being allocated to a special fund for pensioning superannuated members. Party members awarded a premium for a valuable industrial invention or winning a prize in the lottery loan often cede the whole of it to the Party, or to some public fund.

³ Thus, soviet embassies or legations in foreign countries may be maintained at any standard of expenditure, and with as much diplomatic entertaining, as is deemed expedient.

movement, unlike the leading administrators of every other great nation, are found occupying flats of three or four rooms, with their wives often going out to work for wages, and altogether living a life not substantially differing, in the total of personal expenditure, from that which is open to the most highly skilled manual workers of their own country.

The Meaning of Leadership

What, then, is the vocation that the two or three million Party members undertake on these terms in the USSR of to-day? They constitute, it is said, the vanguard of the proletariat, or, varying the metaphor, the spear-head of its activity, in the maintenance of the Bolshevik revolution and the building up of the socialist state.¹ But what does this mean in practice?

At all times more than half the Party membership, as we have mentioned, continues at its manual labour in the factory or the mine, in the oil-fields or at the hydro-electric plants, on the farms or in the railway or postal service, with the mercantile marine or the river-transport vessels. The specific Party duty of these million or more members is so to lead their manual-working lives as to be perpetually influencing the minds of the ten or twenty times as numerous non-Party colleagues among whom they work. They must set themselves to be the most zealous, the most assiduous, the most efficient workers of their several establishments. They must neglect no opportunity of raising their own qualifications and increasing their technical skill. They must make themselves the leaders among the wage-earners, employing every means of educating the non-Party mass in communist doctrine and soviet policy. In the meetings of the trade union and the consumers' cooperative society, as in the manufacturing artel and the collective farm, they must, in concert with their comrades in the concern, constantly take an active part, using their influence to guide the whole membership towards the most complete fulfilment of the function of the organisation in the socialist state, along the lines from time to time authoritatively prescribed. We see them, accordingly, filling the "shock brigades" and "cost-accounting brigades", by means of which the output is increased, "scrap" is diminished, waste prevented and the production cost per unit reduced to a minimum. With the same object they lead their shifts, teams, brigades or whole establish-

¹ The preamble to the Rules, as adopted in 1934, declares that "The Party effects the leadership of the proletariat, the toiling peasantry and all toiling masses in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the victory of socialism. . . . The Party is a unified militant organisation held together by conscious iron proletarian discipline. The Party is strong because of its coherence, unity of will and unity of action, which are incompatible with any deviation from the programme, with any violation of Party discipline or with informal groupings within the Party. The Party demands from all its members active and self-sacrificing work to carry out the programme and rules of the Party, to fulfil all decisions of the Party and its organs, to ensure unity within the Party, and the consolidation of the fraternal international relations among the toilers of the nationalities of the USSR, as well as among the proletarians of the whole world" (Preamble to Rules in *Socialism Victorious*, 1934, p. 691).

ments into successive "socialist competitions" with others working in the same field. They freely undertake the numerous "spare time" offices connected with their various organisations, which are either wholly unpaid or only slightly remunerated, such as insurance officers, dues collectors, social club officials, or secretaryship of this or that committee; realising that such service increases their influence upon their fellow-workers. It is to be noted that their power over the workers has to be entirely educational and persuasive in character, not authoritative. The Party members in any establishment cannot, as such, give any orders, either to the management or to their fellow-workers. They can impose no policy. They can change nothing but the minds of the men and women among whom they work. This persuasive training of the non-Party mass, continuously effected by a million of the principal manual-working leaders, unobtrusively organised in tens of thousands of Party cells, represents a social influence of incalculable potency.

For some 40 per cent or more of the Party membership, the vocation takes the form of salaried service in the innumerable kinds and grades of public administration, including trade union and cooperative, and even the voluntary organisations that we shall hereafter describe. These offices are by no means confined to Party members, or even to persons of communist opinions. It seems that, in various important branches of public administration, Party members are actually in a minority among those in receipt of departmental pay. In the factory operatives and villagers taken by conscription for the Red Army; among the band of nearly a million salaried employees of the consumers' cooperative societies; in the staff of half a million teachers in the elementary and secondary school service; among the eighty thousand members of the medical profession, and even in the tiny membership of the College of Advocates (corresponding to the British or American lawyers); in the host of subordinate civil servants, typists and attendants, even in the Moscow Kremlin itself, there is reported to be, for various reasons, an overwhelming non-Party majority. In the directly elected soviets, as we have mentioned, the proportion of Party members is increasing, but except in the cities they are usually in a minority; and, in the more remote or more primitive villages—largely from sheer lack of a sufficient number of Party candidates—they seldom fill more than a quarter of the seats. Out of nearly two million elected members of primary soviets in city and country in the whole USSR, it seems as if three-quarters of a million are Party members or Comsomols. In 1934 the Party members constituted 18.9 per cent, and the Comsomols, 11.5 per cent of all the village soviets; whilst in the city soviets their percentages were 42.0 and 11.9.

The Party Group (late fraction)

On the other hand, it is to be noticed that the Party members elected to any soviet, or finding themselves members of any other body in which

there are non-Party colleagues, are definitely instructed, whenever there are as many as three of them together, invariably to form a private caucus among themselves, which is called a Party Group. This caucus is imperatively directed to hold regular private meetings, in order to consider every subject coming before the whole body; and always to decide, by a majority, what shall be "the Party line" on each issue. Every Party member is then peremptorily required, as an incident of his Party obedience, to adopt as his own the decision thus arrived at. For the Party members on any public body to split among themselves, and vote otherwise than as their own majority decides, is one of the most heinous of Party offences, and one which is practically never committed. The Party rules prescribe, as the specific tasks of the Party Group "the strengthening of every side of the influence of the Party, the execution of its policy outside the Party, and Party control of the work of all the particular institutions and organisations concerned". For its current work the group may appoint a bureau and a secretary. With this universal organisation of Party Groups, the Party members obtain far greater weight in any public body than any other section; greater, even, than the usual superiority of these picked professionals to the bulk of the non-Party members would otherwise secure to them. For this as well as for other reasons, Party members will now usually be found in a majority in the various higher councils, and in the committees that the primary soviets elect; and this preponderance steadily increases, tier after tier, up each hierarchy, whether soviet, trade union, consumers' cooperative movement or manufacturing association of owner-producers (artels or incops). The highest governing bodies in all these hierarchies are found to be almost wholly composed of Party members, though even in these (excluding, of course, that of the Communist Party itself) there are usually a few non-Party persons.¹

This preponderance of Party members in administration is even more marked in the higher executive offices to which appointments are made by the congresses, conferences and councils. Thus, the People's Commissars (ministers of state), constituting the sovnarkoms (cabinets), alike of the USSR and of the constituent and autonomous republics of the Union, are invariably Party members, together with their assistants or deputies.² The various control commissions are invariably made up of Party members. Nearly all the trusts and combines are directed by boards composed (except for a few non-Party technicians), exclusively of Party members. All the higher commanders (officers) of the Red Army,

¹ It should be noted that the Party rules expressly prescribe that, "irrespective of their importance, the Groups are completely subordinated to the corresponding Party organisations. In all questions the Groups must strictly and undeviatingly adhere to the decisions of the leading Party organisations."

² We hear of only one exception. Mr. Winter, the universally respected and trusted Russian engineer of Dnieprostroi, though not a Party member, has been appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933). He has since joined the Party.

together with a majority of the junior commanders (subalterns) are Party members. Most of the directors of industrial establishments of all kinds are Party members, although the technicians whom they control still include a considerable proportion of non-Party persons. The same may be said of the institutions of higher education, whether university colleges or "technicums"; and likewise of the various medical institutions, and even of nearly all the "cultural" institutions, such as libraries, theatres and "parks of culture and rest". In short, the Party members who are office-bearers, and who are all pledged to complete obedience to the dictates of the Party authorities, have assumed as their main vocation the supreme direction of policy and the most important parts of its execution, in every branch of public administration in the USSR, where public administration covers a much larger part of the common life than it does in any other country. And just as the Communist Party cell in the factory or the institution co-ordinates and directs the influence which the Party members exercise among their fellow-workers, so the Communist Party Central Committee, and especially the inner Politbureau which it appoints, not only prescribes the general line to be pursued by all the Party cells throughout the USSR, but also coordinates and directs the policy and executive action of the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars, and of all the Party members who constitute the most important part of the staffs of these commissariats. It is in this way, in fact, that is exercised the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹

The Primary Party Organ (late cell or nucleus)

It is interesting to find the Communist Party in the USSR organised on substantially the same hierarchical or pyramidal pattern of Democratic Centralism as that we have described as common to the soviets, the trade unions, the consumers' cooperative societies and the incops or associations of owner-producers in industry. The base of the Party organisation is what used to be called the cell, or nucleus, but which the 1934 Rules call the Primary Party Organ. This is constituted among the members employed in any enterprise, whatever its object or character, or residing

¹ We may notice, as one of the numerous "projections" of the central Party organisation, the implicit obligation imposed on individual Party members to support, in any emergency, the constituted public authority, to maintain order, and to protect public property. Thus it is the duty of Party members travelling on the Volga steamboats to report themselves immediately to the captain, so that he may be able to invoke their assistance whenever required. If anything is going wrong, the Party members will consult together, as if they were a fraction; and they may collectively press the captain to take appropriate action (as, for instance, the summary dismissal of a steward or other member of the ship's company who is so drunk as to cause annoyance to the passengers). A Party member travelling on a train, or even passing along the road, will feel bound to intervene to maintain public order, and to prevent assault or robbery, or the destruction of public property. On announcing his Party membership, he will usually be able to secure obedience, or, if not, he can command any militiaman (police constable) or local official to take action. In many ways his position towards the public, and especially towards ill-doers, is not unlike that of an English "special constable", if not of a Justice of the Peace in the eighteenth century.

in any village where as many as three members of the Party are found. Thus, every industrial establishment, whether factory or mine, electric plant or poultry incubating enterprise, newspaper office or state farm, has at least one Primary Party Organ in each of its departments. Every other social institution, whether university, college or "technicum", hospital or maternity clinic, trade union office or cooperative store, kустар artel or collective farm, has its Primary Organ. The same may be said of every depôt or centre of the railway and postal services, of every branch of the provincial and municipal administration and of every department of the central government. Every vessel in the growing mercantile marine and every soviet agency in foreign countries is similarly equipped. Apart from all enterprises and specific organisations, there are Primary Party Organs for units, areas such as villages in which there are few Party members or none employed in agriculture for wages or salary, but in which members of the Party reside as school or post-office or railway employees, or as peasant agriculturists (not being kulaks), especially in collective farms, or as independent handicraftsmen. In fact as many as one-half of all the cells (comprising, however, a very much smaller proportion of the entire Party membership) are to be found in such villages. In 1933, on the institution of "politotdeli" or "policy sections" (which we have described in our chapter on Collective Farms) to cope with the crisis in agriculture, the Central Committee sought to reorganise the cells in the rural districts. "Very frequently", it was observed, "the village Party groups, consisting chiefly of communists employed in rural institutions such as the village soviet, the post office, the militia [local police], the schools, and so on, have little contact with the collective farms, and give little attention to their work. . . . In the future the communists working directly on collective farms will form a distinct nucleus, to be controlled by the policy sections; while those members of the Party who are employed in village institutions which have no immediate connection with the collective farms will be organised separately and be subordinated to the district committee. Where the number of communists in the collective farm is too small to be formed into a nucleus, they will be grouped together with the comsomols and sympathisers, and formed into a communist comsomol unit of the collective farm. . . . For purposes of further coordination of the work of the policy sections and district committees, the chiefs of the policy sections will act as members of the district committee bureau."¹

In normal times the procedure of formation of new primary organs is simple enough. A meeting is called of all the known Party members; a resolution constituting the cell is passed; a secretary and president are elected (who must be of at least a year's standing as Party members); and formal sanction for the new organ is sought and obtained from the next higher unit of Party organisation, the district committee. It is the duty of every Party member to accept membership of the Party Organ

¹ Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; in *Moscow Daily News*, July 17, 1933.

in the body in which he works, or in the village in which he resides, and to attend its meetings. As soon as the membership of the cell exceeds a dozen or a score, a bureau or standing committee will be elected for a term of six months. In great industrial works and extensive establishments of other kinds, there may be as many as hundreds of Party members, and in a few cases, of thousands, but in such cases separate organs are formed for the several departments, workshops, brigades, teams or shifts, among which the work is divided. All the organs in a single large factory or other establishment nominate representatives to a factory or institute Party committee, which is responsible for common action within the enterprise. In such cases permission may be obtained for one member—occasionally more than one—to be appointed at a salary, paid from Party funds, not exceeding the average of his past earnings, to give his whole time to the secretarial and organisation work of the organ. The three million Party members and candidates are, with few exceptions,¹ distributed among these organs, the number of which in the USSR now exceeds 130,000, giving an average of about a score of members and candidates to each Primary Party Organ. In the large factories, there may be hundreds of members in each organ.²

¹ In 1926, when there were about 30,000 cells, about one-fourth, or 7315, of them were in industrial establishments such as factories or mines; one-half, or 15,819, were in rural villages; 5167 were in government departments and institutions; 566 were in the Red Army; and 573 were in educational institutions. Out of more than a million members and candidates at that date there were only about 4000 classed as "solitary Communists", not in a position to be members of cells (*Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 23). The total number has greatly increased. "At the time of the Sixteenth Party Congress (1930) the number of primary Party organisations and candidate groups was 54,000: by October 1, 1933, the number had risen to 130,000." Kaganovich added, "I can give you data concerning 150 shop organisations in 85 of the largest enterprises in which a total of 700,000 workers are employed, of whom 94,000 are communists. Almost half the number of secretaries of shop Party organisations in these enterprises joined the Party after 1929, and only one-fourth joined the Party before and in 1925" (*Report on the Organisational Problems of Party and Soviet Construction*, by L. M. Kaganovich, 1934, pp. 115-116).

The few thousand Party members who are entirely isolated, and not attached to any establishment or enterprise of any sort, include such exceptional persons as those working in unsalaried independence as writers, artists or scientific researchers, or doctors confining themselves to private practice. There may also be a few of them among the surviving independent peasants, not being kulaks, outside the collective farm areas. But a much more considerable exception numerically is afforded by those who are superannuated and retired from work, whilst not abandoning Party membership, though excused from paying Party dues.

² The following explanation of the utility to the Party of the cell organisation is of interest. "Nuclei are set up in factories, enterprises, offices, departments, in shops, shifts and so on. What are the advantages of this? They lie in the fact that all members of a nucleus are occupied in the same work, premises or locality. They meet every day at work, know each at work as well as at meetings. All members share its interests. The nucleus and individual members have opportunities for a thorough study of all aspects of work, of the whole administrative staff in their factory, and of the non-Party members there. The nucleus carries on daily, hourly work among the masses bringing them nearer to the Party and to communism. Through its members the nucleus can find out the spirit of the masses, their dissatisfaction with the system of shifts, ventilation, etc., can carry on lively discussion of political questions, such as Stalin's letter on the collective farms, and so on" (*Bolshevism for Beginners*, by P. Kerzhentsev, 1931, pp. 19, 20).

The duties of the Party organ are precisely formulated and universally understood. It has no formal authority in the enterprise within which it has established itself. Neither the organ nor its standing committee, nor the factory or institute Party committee representing all the cells in the enterprise, nor any of their officers or members, can give any orders to the director or manager, or to the other workers, or to the trade union or cooperative officials or committees, or to the municipal soviet or officials. The organ cannot impose any policy or make any regulation for the enterprise. What the cell and its members have to do is to carry on a persistent education of the other workers, and, by persuasion and personal example, to be perpetually influencing the whole organisation within which it lives, familiarising everyone with the slogans and latest decisions of the Communist Party; in such a way as to attract, as new candidates for membership of the Party, the most suitable men and women; and, above all, in such a way as to ensure that all the operations of the enterprise conform in all respects to the "General Line".

For further elucidation of the working of the Primary Party Organ in every kind of industrial establishment in the USSR, we give general descriptions by two competent and well-informed American observers, who naturally used the former name of cell.

"After the General Line has been mapped out by the Party Congress and the Congress of Soviets, the government departments, combines, trusts and factories work out the detailed application of these policies. It is then the task of the Party cells in the factories and villages to see that instructions are carried out. They must call attention to defects in production and administration, and make special efforts to overcome difficulties. They attempt to accomplish this, not by direct interference with the management, but by working through the Party members who are in the factory management, the board of the trust or combine, the factory committees and the trade unions. Whenever necessary the cell can appeal to the higher economic and trade union instances. The Party cell, consisting primarily of workers in industry and agriculture, plays a leading rôle in increasing production, attaining higher labour productivity, improving labour discipline, and obtaining better labour conditions. Among other tasks, it is the duty of the Party cell to counteract bureaucracy and to protect the interests of the workers against any infringement on the part of the administration. The dominating elements in the individual management are the Party cell, the [trade union] factory committee and the management. This combination is known as the 'triangle of factory control'.¹

"The Party cell . . . holds meetings and decisions are reached in these meetings as to the position which the Party members are to take on any question which has arisen or is likely to arise. Then in trade union or other factory meetings the Party members vote unanimously for the previously agreed-upon decision. Its power therefore is very great. The

¹ *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman, 1932, pp. 96, 98.

Fabkom [trade union factory committee], since it is elected in a meeting in which the guidance has been given by the Party, is an organ which the Party cell not only dominates, but which is actually an organ of the cell. In other words, the Party cell is greatly superior in importance to the Fabkom. The Party cell is represented always by its secretary, and in practice it is he rather than the chairman of the Fabkom who is able to be a counterweight to the factory management. If any conflict arises, it is usually between the management of the factory and the secretary of the Party cell, who is naturally supported by the Fabkom. Conflicts between the Party cell and the management are not as likely to happen as might be thought, however, for the director of the factory is almost certain to be a communist (Party member) himself, and to have been appointed with the consent or even direction of the higher Party authorities. The Party cell, therefore, is by no means in a position to ride rough-shod over the decisions of the management. Furthermore, the point of view of the Party cell is not likely to be as antagonistic to that of the management, as would be true if the Fabkom were a counterweight independent of the Party. All orthodox members of the Party must support, heart and soul, the movement for rationalisation of industry, and for increasing the productivity of labour. The Party cell cannot, therefore, openly oppose the management in any move that it makes towards improving the efficiency and productivity of the factory. In this way the position of the Party in the factory organisation is an earnest that conflicts over attempts to increase productivity will be reduced to a minimum. . . . Indeed, the influence of the Party organisation in the whole structure cannot be overestimated. It is a force which works directly among the personnel of industry to obtain support for official industrial policies, and welds the management and the Party labourers into an organisation whose responsibilities and duties as Party members are of more importance to them than their position in industry, be it as officers of labour unions, managers of factories, directors of trusts and syndicates, or even members of the Supreme Economic Council itself.”¹

Among the 130,000 cells, in some tens of thousands of enterprises of the most varied kinds, working under all sorts of conditions, there must necessarily be an almost endless variety. We give a few examples of cell activity or inactivity.

In October 1932, when some alarm was felt about the crisis in agriculture, a correspondent of the *Moscow Daily News* gave a detailed account of the work being done by the two Party cells among the hundreds of persons employed on a particular state farm (sovkhos). “The two sections into which the farm was divided had each its cell, with 12 and 8 Party members respectively. These members, besides performing all the regular duties of a cell, had joined forces to drive their fellow-workers into a higher productivity. The twenty Party members had formed themselves into five unofficial committees, two undertaking special responsi-

¹ *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, by Calvin B. Hoover, 1931, p. 36.

bility for the care of the two herds of cattle, two seeing to the management of the tractors and the building of the necessary barns, whilst the fifth conducted the persistent education and agitation. The cattle committees had set up milk recording, with the result of demonstrating that the cows milked by Party members yielded, on an average, 5.1 litres per cow, as against only 4.2 litres per cow in non-Party hands. After getting the subject discussed at several meetings, 71 non-Party milk-women pledged themselves to increase cleanliness and regularity of feeding, with the intention of reaching an average daily yield of 6.5 litres. The committee on tractors held discussions with all the tractorists, who ultimately promised to reduce the average idle time of each machine from 45 to 20 per cent, and so carry out the plan of autumn ploughing well ahead of schedule time. Meanwhile all Party members and consomols have led extemporised brigades of non-Party workers of all ages in expeditions for collecting leaves, weeds and young shoots, which can be converted in the silo into fodder for the winter. The committee on education and agitation had got established two day schools for candidates on probation and an evening political school for all comers, working on a definite programme.”¹

Another vision of a cell is given in a resolution of severe reprimand passed by the central committee of the Communist Party in the Ukraine, about the failure of the cells and the Party factory committee in a great steel-works to get carried out the administrative reforms demanded by the Party authorities. “The Party organisation in the Stal steel-works has not yet introduced the principle of single manager in industry; it has not yet abolished the threefold intervention by the director of the works, the secretary of the works committee and the secretary of the communist factory cell in the administrative and technical management of work. It has not yet stopped the unjust persecution of technicians and the interference of the People’s Commissariat of Labour (SIC). The plenary session of the CC of UCP hereby declares that all local branches of the CP shall hereafter prohibit all kinds of interference by the administrative and judicial authorities in the industrial life of factories and workshops; they shall discontinue the intolerable triple interference in the management of works; and shall guarantee to the technical staff complete freedom in exercising their duties and free play to their initiative, for which they alone shall henceforth be responsible.”²

In offices and institutions of every kind, in the kustar artel and in the consumers’ cooperative society, in the kolkhos and the sovkhos, what we have now to call the Primary Party Organ has substantially the same functions as in the factory or the mine. Everywhere it is an organ of persistent political education of the masses among which its members

¹ “How the Communist Party functions in lifting the Output on a State Farm”, in *Moscow Daily News*, October 28, 1932.

² Resolution of CC of UCP, June 25, 1931, included in article by Sergius Prokopovich in *The Slavonic Review*, September 1931. The order which the guilty cells had ignored was that by the All-Union CC of the Communist Party relating to factory discipline described in *Russia in Transition*, by Elisha M. Friedman, 1933, p. 217.

work, and at the same time a persuasive instrument of extraordinary potency in securing— in the main, silently and unobtrusively— the putting in operation, by every kind of social or economic institution in the length and breadth of the USSR, of the policy as from time to time centrally determined. But, as the base of the hierarchy of committees and conferences of the Communist Party itself, the organ fulfils two other functions. It formulates and transmits the feelings and views of its own members, who, taken together, make up the entire Party, to the central directing authorities thereof. And it affords opportunities for members to prove their qualifications for the responsible work of government, whilst at the same time providing an avenue for promotion in the necessarily extensive staff of salaried officials in all the various branches of public work which is increasingly recruited from among the Party membership of proletarian or poor peasant extraction.

The District (Rayon) Conference

All the Primary Organs within a geographical area, usually coincident with the soviet administrative district called a rayon, annually elect in general meeting delegates to the Party rayon conference. This elects a president and secretary (who must have three years' Party standing, and his election has to be approved by the next higher Party unit), together with a presidium or standing executive committee. The Party rayon conference chooses delegates to the Party republic conferences.

The periodically meeting Party district or rayon conference, together with the district committee, has the duty of supervising and directing the work of all its constituent organs. It sanctions the establishment of new ones. It is expected that the work of each district committee will take up the whole time of two members in addition to the secretary, who receive salaries from Party funds.¹

The Republic Congress

Each of the six smaller republics, excluding the RSFSR, has its own Party congress, that of the Ukraine being of special importance and influence. In the Ukraine the republic Party congress is formed by delegates elected by the region Party conferences of that republic, and it elects, along with the inevitable Control Commission, a central committee of the Ukraine Communist Party, which supervises and directs all the Party work. In the five smaller republics there may be Party congresses called for the whole republic, but they are of considerably less importance.

¹ In both city and village the cells are also grouped geographically by local neighbourhood for coordination of work and mutual helpfulness. Thus, the larger cities have ward committees, uniting the cells within each ward. In the rural areas there is a committee representing all the cells of each district containing at least three cells. These committees are enjoined to meet regularly, not less than once a fortnight, in order to prevent inconsistent or uncoordinated action by individual Primary Party Organs.

The USSR and RSFSR Party Congress

The supreme Party congress for the whole USSR, including the RSFSR, consists of delegates elected by all the region conferences throughout the whole area, together with delegates elected directly by the republic Party congress of each republic.

The USSR Party congress used to meet annually, then usually every two or three years, and now apparently only every four years, when over a thousand delegates and alternates assemble at Moscow. So large and so infrequent a congress can do little but listen to set speeches, and formally ratify what has been done by the Central Committee of the Party (CC of CP) which it elects. It is, however, usefully supplemented by a less formal gathering, called an All-Union Party Conference, not mentioned in the Rules, but meeting prior to each congress—latterly one or two years before—and attended only by the presidents or secretaries of the local Party organisations.

The distinction in function between the All-Union Party congresses and the All-Union Party conferences is not clear to us, except that it is the congress which elects the Central Committee, together with the Commission of Party Control, and which ratifies their actions; and that it is only the decisions of the congress which are formally binding, those of the conference, if in the nature of new departures, requiring ratification by the Central Committee. The alternating congresses and conferences are both numbered successively; thus the Seventh Party Conference of 1918 preceded the Seventh Party Congress of 1919, and so on, the interval gradually widening until the Seventeenth Party Conference of 1932 preceded the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934 by nearly two years. But we cannot detect any difference between the usual business, or the subjects dealt with, by the one and the other. Both listen to long and elaborate accounts of the progress made in various departments of administration, together with ambitious projects for the future. Neither spend much time, if any, in dealing with Party, as distinguished from soviet, affairs. During the years 1924–1928 both were the scene of heated discussions on principles or theories of public policy between the spokesmen of opposing factions, which always ended in resolutions on matters of fact being passed by overwhelming majorities, or even unanimously. Both congress and conference serve, in reality, the same purpose of wide and resounding demonstrations of policy and progress; and both are made the means of impressing upon the local representatives the common policy of the Party, against which only theoretical objections have usually been made. Moreover, both are useful in bringing representatives from distant parts into touch with the supreme administrators at Moscow. It is to be noted that, whereas both these bodies originally met annually, and then biennially, each of them now meets only every four years, the congress two years after the conference.¹

¹ The proceedings of all the successive All-Union Party congresses and conferences can be most conveniently followed in *Histoire du parti communiste de l'URSS*, by E. Yaro-

The Central Authority

The Central Committee (CC of CP), consisting in 1935 of 70 members, with 68 substitutes or alternates, is the real governing authority of the Party. But as it meets at most only about a dozen times a year, its authority is practically exercised by the president, the general secretary (Stalin), the three assistant secretaries, and the two influential committees that it elects, together with the elaborately organised series of departments now developed under their supervision. The committees are (a) the Politbureau, now composed of 10 members and 5 candidates; and (b) the Orgbureau having 10 members and 2 candidates. The Party Congress also elects the Central Control Commission (now called Commission of Party Control), and the Auditing (formerly Central Revision) Commission, both of members not included in the above, who must be of ten years' Party standing. The duty of these commissions is to see that the decisions of the Party congress are carried out, and also to organise and direct the constant "cleansing" (chistka) and periodical "purging" of the Party membership. The Party Control Commission, which often meets jointly with the plenum of the Central Committee in order to become fully acquainted with its policy,¹ maintains the record of every Party member in the USSR, and deals with every accusation or suspicion of delinquency. Its operations locally were, until 1934, practically merged with the organisation of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which are elsewhere described.²

The Central Committee

In the Central Committee, to which the periodically meeting All-Union Congress of the Communist Party entrusts complete powers between Congresses, we come very near to the heart of the whole constitutional

slavsky, Paris, 1931; or in English, in the *Outline History of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. Popov, 2 vols., London, 1935, translated from the 16th Russian edition. (Neither of these works is free from bias in describing the factional differences.)

At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1935 there were 1225 delegates with full powers, and 736 candidates with only consultative voice. Among those with full powers, 598, or 48.5 per cent, attended for the first time. About 80 per cent of the whole had entered the Party before 1920, nearly a quarter of whom had done "underground work" prior to 1917. Three-quarters of the whole had fought in the Civil War. The number of delegates from among the workers in agriculture and transport was greater than ever before (*Moscow Daily News*, February 3, 1934).

¹ Thus it did so in January 1933 in what Kaganovich termed "a truly historical plenum. This plenum was held on the border-line between the First and Second Five-Year Plans. It summed up the tremendous construction of the First Five-Year Plan, gave an analysis of the political significance of these results, mapped out the roads for to-morrow, raised fundamental problems before our Party for a complete and lengthy phase of development. The plenum discussed four questions . . . the first the results of the Five-Year Plan. The second about the political sections of the machine-tractor stations, or essentially about the current tasks of the Party in the villages. The third, the inner Party situation, about the anti-Party grouping of Smirnov, Eismont and Tolmachev. Finally, the fourth question, about the cleansing of the Party" (*Moscow Daily News*, January 24, 1933).

² See Appendix VI. to Part I.

organism of the USSR.¹ The Central Committee varies slightly in numbers from time to time. As elected in January 1934, it comprised nearly as many alternates or substitutes as members. These candidates may attend the meetings, but do not vote unless they are chosen to fill vacancies. The committee must meet every three months, and now meets usually for two or three days monthly, when its members are supplied beforehand with reports and drafts for their consideration. These papers are prepared, and policy and decisions are provisionally formulated, by the standing sub-committees, the Politbureau and the Orgbureau, having at their command an extensive and highly trained secretariat, and consisting each of nearly a dozen members, at whose incessant meetings the current business is attended to. The Central Committee has a presidium of four members and four alternates, which consults with the Politbureau. It is agreed on all hands that it is in the Politbureau, which has always included the principal national leaders for the time being, nearly all of whom hold important executive offices in the Soviet Government, that the real power resides. This is, however, true only in the sense that the Politbureau, in consultation with the presidium of the Central Committee, can normally count on the support of the plenum of the Central Committee, the next meeting of which is at most only a few weeks off; just as the Central Committee itself presumes on the support of the All-Union Congress of the Party, whose next meeting may be three or four years off. But this support has not been (and even to-day is not) invariably forthcoming. "There has always been opposition within the Communist ranks", writes a careful observer.² In 1917, in 1921, in 1923, in 1926 and 1927, to say nothing of minor quarrels, there were, at the Central Committee and Party Congress, definite factions led by successive leaders advocating rival theories, which were fought out in repeated debates and oratorical controversies. There have been, at all times since 1917, not only differences of opinion within the Party, but even hot controversies among the leaders as to policy; sometimes, as in the struggle with the Trotskyists, extending over years, and arousing considerable public discussion.³ Thus, whilst

¹ *The Rules of the Communist Party*, edition of 1934, gives the following reference to the Central Committee: "The Central Committee during the interval between congresses, guides the entire work of the Party; represents the Party in its relations with other Parties (the Communist Parties of other countries), organisations and institutions; forms various Party institutions and guides their activities; appoints the editorial staffs of the central organs working under its control and confirms the appointments of the editors of the Party organs of big local organisations; organises and manages enterprises of public importance; distributes the forces and resources of the Party, and manages the central funds. The Central Committee directs the work of the central soviet and public organisations through the Party Groups in them" (*Rules*, par. 33).

² Jerome Davis, in *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase and others, New York, 1928, p. 157, where a useful summary of these factions is given.

³ As we have mentioned, the *Party Rules* actually prescribe discussion in the All-Union Party Congress in certain cases.

Moreover, there is provision for discussion in every local committee or cell, in connection with each successive Party Congress, first of the theses, on reports, which the Central Committee proposes to lay before the Congress, and, subsequently, of the resolutions and decisions passed by the Congress. This wide circulation among the entire Party

the majority among the little group of leaders normally gets its way, it does not do so without having to take seriously into account whatever conflicting opinions may be entertained among the colossal Party membership, as voiced by particular leaders on controversial points, and occasionally not without having to introduce into its policy the modifications necessary to secure unanimity.¹

What in the USSR is exceptional, and even unique, is the fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and its most important sub-committee, the Politbureau, which are not known to the written constitution, or to the codes, and are nominally not organs of the government at all, are constantly occupied, not with the internal business of the Communist Party itself, but mainly, and sometimes almost exclusively, with the policy and the practice, the legislation and the administration of every department of the soviet state. The members of the Politbureau plainly feel themselves to be personally responsible for the whole government of the country. Although the Party *Rules* declare (No. 28) that "the Central Committee regularly informs the Party organisations of its work", the committee naturally keeps its internal proceedings strictly confidential, and no account of the discussions is ever published.² But in April 1928 the widely circulating newspaper *Izvestia* gave, possibly by inadvertence, the prospective agenda for the ensuing half-year, not only of the plenum of the Central Committee, but incidentally also of the Politbureau, as confirmed by the Central Committee, in conjunction with the Central Control Commission. This skeleton agenda for the ensuing six months, which naturally does not include the matters of urgency demanding consideration at each meeting, makes evident how comprehensive is the control that the Party maintains, as a matter of course, over every part of soviet policy and its execution. We give the complete text, although we are unfortunately not in a position even to enumerate the elaborate reports which were evidently prepared for circulation before each meeting.³

membership is deliberately promoted as the best means of securing active concurrence in policy.

¹ The plenum of the Central Committee will even go so far in support of the majority of the Politbureau as summarily to remove from the Politbureau any member who persistently and obstinately sets his will against that of the majority. Thus in 1920, after Bukharin had been removed by the Comintern from the presidium of its own executive committee, "the plenum [of the Central Committee of the Party] decrees the removal of comrade Bukharin, who is the ideologist of Right Deviation, from the Politbureau".

² What is given to the press is a bare statement of the subjects considered. Thus, "the Plenum assembled on November 17, 1929. The Plenum examined the following questions: (1) instructions as regards the control figures of the national economy for 1929-30; (2) problems and further tasks of Kolkhoi construction; (3) report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine on work in the village; (4) Union of the Commissariat of Agriculture; (5) the fulfilment of the decisions of the July 1928 plenum of the Central Control Committee on the preparation of technical cadres."

³ In October 1927 it appeared that a member of the Central Committee, who dissented from the proposals of the Politbureau, complained—as such members in all bodies frequently do—that "the theses have been distributed to us, members of the Central Committee, only a few hours before the plenary meeting of the Central Committee. . . . To undertake a serious discussion of these theses . . . it is necessary to give more time to

THE AGENDA

- 1 April. Crop movement.
- 2 „ Programme of the Communist International.
- 3 May. Improvement of higher and middle technical educational institutions with a view to the training and use of "red" specialists and economic workers.
- 4 „ Radio and cinema betterments.
- 5 „ Universal obligatory primary education.
- 6 June. State and financial conditions of the railways.
- 7 „ Position and betterment of construction.
- 8 „ Seven-hour work day.
- 9 July. Reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Trade of the USSR.
- 10 „ Rationalisation of industry.
- 11 Aug. National defence.
- 12 „ Collective and soviet estates.
- 13 Sept. Control figures of people's economy for 1928-1929.
- 14 „ Industrial and financial plan for 1928-1929.
- 15 „ Execution of export and import and foreign exchange plans for 1927-1928, and plans for 1928-1929.
- 16 Oct. Execution of 1927-1928 budget and the budget plans for 1928-1929.
- 17 „ Results of bank mergers and reorganisation of the State Bank.
- 18 „ Political and economic work in the Ukraine.
- 19 Nov. Struggle with bureaucratism in the state and economic machine.
- 20 „ The Five-Year economic plan.¹

After confirmation by the plenum of the Central Committee, the decisions of the Politbureau are often published broadcast in the newspapers, either in the speeches of the leaders, or as long and detailed schemes of administrative reform in particular departments. Or they may take the form of actual decrees avowedly binding upon every member of the Communist Party, whether in his public capacity as people's commissar, member of a trust or combine, director or works manager; or in his private capacity as a citizen. Such decrees sometimes bear only the signature of Stalin, as General Secretary of the Party. Sometimes they are signed also by Molotov, as president of the Sovnarkom (or cabinet) of the USSR. Sometimes the co-signatory will be Kalinin, who has for so many years been the president of the presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (TSIK), who may be taken to represent the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the supreme legislative authority. We have been unable to

them than has been given by will of the Politbureau" (*Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 715).

¹ *Izvestia*, April 12, 1928; *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, pp. 714-715. It may be doubted whether any Cabinet of a Parliamentary Democracy organises so completely in advance its consideration of the subjects to which it can be foreseen that special attention will have to be given.

understand on what basis these signatures are chosen for particular documents ; or what exactly is the distinction between them and laws formally enacted by the All-Union Congress of Soviets with the concurrence of the two chambers of its Central Executive Committee.¹ But there can be no doubt that Stalin correctly described the situation when he referred to "the supreme expression of the guiding function of our Party. In the Soviet Union, in the land where the dictatorship of the proletariat is in force, *no important political or organisational problem is ever decided by our soviets and other mass organisations, without directives from our Party.* In this sense, we may say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *substantially*, the dictatorship of the Party as the force which effectively guides the proletariat."²

It must be emphasised that the Central Committee does not limit its intervention in the government of the USSR to what may be considered legislation, even in its widest sense. Acting with the Control Commission, now the Commission of Party Control, which is separately elected by the Party Congress, the Central Committee, at the instance of both its sub-committees, is perpetually directing the executive work of the far-flung Party membership. This we have already noticed with regard to the Primary Party Organs and Party Groups, through which the supervision and control are exercised over the lower stages of the soviet hierarchy ; and through the district committees of the Party, with the aid of the extensive salaried staff maintained by the Party itself at every nodal point throughout the USSR.³ During the years 1932 and 1933 there were three new developments, in what may be called direct "projections" of the authority of the Central Committee, outside the Party hierarchy, by which groups of Party members were placed actually within the administrations conducted by People's Commissars, in order to control them in

¹ An American observer notes this issue of decrees as a change of practice. "With the resumption of the socialist offensive under the leadership of the Party, the line between Party and government has all but disappeared. The Five-Year Plan was a Party plan, later formally sanctioned by the government. Then gradually the Party has adopted the practice of issuing orders which become legislative without any formal action by a government body" (*Making Bolsheviks*, by S. N. Harper, 1931, p. 8).

To the constitutional student it is no less interesting to find these decrees often signed also by the leading official of the organisation chiefly affected by them, signifying the concurrence of its own governing committee. Thus, a decree affecting the consumers' co-operative organisation will be signed also by Zelenski, the president of *Centrosoyuz* ; and one transforming trade union organisation or policy also by Shvernik, the general secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU).

² *Leninism*, by J. Stalin, vol. i., 1928, p. 33.

³ The staff of full-time salaried officers employed directly by the Party, and paid from Party funds, is both extensive and varied. The staff at headquarters alone now approaches a thousand persons. Throughout the USSR the Party staff was stated in 1927 as 24,000 (*Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase and others, New York, 1928, p. 150). It has since considerably increased ; although the fifty thousand or so members who were, in 1930 and 1933, "sent to the agricultural front", and in the latter year, also to the "transport front", are probably borne on the budgets of the commissariats for agriculture and railways.

The Party receipts from fees on a membership of between two and three millions must be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 million roubles a year. No accounts have ever been published, even to the Party members themselves.

the direction of reform. One of these developments, the establishment of Machine and Tractor Stations, throughout a large part of the agricultural area, we have already described in connection with the newly appointed USSR People's Commissar of Agriculture. Here we need only notice that all the chiefs of these Machine and Tractor Stations, and the majority of their working staffs, numbering altogether many thousands of men and women, were chosen from among trusted Party members of long standing and good reputation, by the responsible officers of the Orgbureau, under the direction of the Central Committee, by whom also their allocation to the several districts was determined. It should be said that the newly appointed USSR People's Commissar of Agriculture, himself a Party member, to whom the chiefs of the Machine and Tractor Stations were made nominally responsible, warmly welcomed this intervention of the Central Committee in the difficult administrative task that he had undertaken.

In the following year (May 1933) the Central Committee, again in concert with the USSR People's Commissar of Agriculture, suddenly made the appointment of about 25,000 selected Party members to constitute a new staff of "policy sections",¹ which were placed in virtual control of a large proportion of the state and collective farms, with instructions to "clean up" the mass of inefficiency, negligence and positive damage to public property into which the sullenness and individual greed of the "old man peasant", who had been pressed into the new collective organisations—if not also the factor of deliberate sabotage by disaffected citizens—had brought some of the sovkhosi and many of the kolkhosi. All these policy sections were placed under a special chief, very carefully selected by the Central Committee, who was to work in the Commissariat of Agriculture itself, and be second only to the People's Commissar. Under the direction of this Chief of the Policy Sections, assisted by the new Assistants also selected by the Central Committee, the "policy sections" were to have charge of all the Party work on the farms; they were to "distribute the Party forces" as might be required; and they were to coordinate their activities with the territorial Party committees, which were instructed to render all possible assistance in their work. It is to be noticed that the blame for the inefficiency was placed on Party members and non-Party workers alike. The task of the new policy sections was generally to spur the Party members and the active non-Party men to higher achievements; to enforce "proletarian discipline"; to combat "absentecism and loafing"; to raise the technical qualifications of both Party and non-Party workers; and to "conduct a systematic struggle against class enemies, kulaks and wreckers who are at present rather

¹ What is often translated as "political sections" (*politotdeli*) has nothing to do with "politics", in the ordinary usage of that word. What the *politotdel* is appointed for, is to put in operation a given "policy", which may relate to agriculture or railway administration or anything else. It corresponds most closely in England with a "government commissioner" sent by the Cabinet to a Crown Colony or to a provincial centre in order to "get done" certain specific things.

being encouraged by the easy going attitude taken towards them by the Communists".¹

The third of these developments concerned the Commissariat of Railways, where a similar mass of inefficiency had become apparent, with the result that the lines had become overwhelmed with the continually increasing passenger and freight traffic. In June 1933 the Central Committee decreed the appointment of some thousands of trusted Party members as "policy sections" in the railway administration, stationing them at every railway dépôt, warehouse, engine-house and important junction. Here, under the orders of a newly selected Chief of the Railway Policy Sections, who took up his abode in the Commissariat of Railways, as second only to the People's Commissar, the Party members detailed for the policy sections were instructed peremptorily to "cut out red tape", to put an end to delays and stoppages, to expose and dismiss employees of any grade who are guilty of idleness or negligence, or even of failure to improve their technical qualifications; whilst new scales of pay were to be introduced, finally "liquidating the petty bourgeois ideal of equality of wages, which stands in the way of effective organisation of an efficient service".

At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 the temporary projections of the Party into the agricultural districts were regularised by being absorbed into the regional Party organisations themselves. The policy sections (*politotdeli*) attached either to the Machine and Tractor Stations, or to the *kolkhosi* and *sovkhosi*, cease to exist as such, and their memberships are added to those of the Primary Party Organs and the regional Party committees, which have to be reorganised into half a dozen separate branches corresponding with those of the Central Party organisation. The policy sections were considered to have successfully accomplished the task assigned to them of changing the mentality of the *kolkhos* members and of ensuring the protection of public property. But experience had proved that the policy sections were no longer sufficient to conduct the greatly increased and more complex work of the present-day *kolkhos* village. It was no longer a question of organising sowing, harvesting and grain collection, for which the policy sections were formed, and it was felt that the normal Party and soviet organisations were more competent to deal with all the political, economic, educational, social and other work of the villages.²

The Motives for Party Membership

Those who are sceptical about the achievements of Soviet Communism, and, indeed, all students of social organisation, will naturally ask what

¹ See the lengthy resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the Communist Party, in the Report of L. M. Kaganovich, which filled eight columns of the *Moscow Daily News*, January 16, 1933.

² *Report on the Organisational Problems of Party and Soviet Construction*, by L. M. Kaganovich, to the Seventeenth Party Congress, 1934, 156 pp. With regard to the policy sections (*politotdeli*) assigned to the railway system, it may be inferred that, as Kaganovich in 1935 became People's Commissar for this service, these will be gradually absorbed either into the railway service itself, or into the local Party organisations connected therewith.

can be the motives that induce large and ever-increasing numbers of men and women—throughout 1930-1934 to the number of thousands every week—voluntarily to join the Communist Party. Why should they seek membership of a body which requires of them a relatively high standard of personal behaviour; a life of implicit obedience to the commands of superior authorities; perpetual submission to a discipline enforced by penalties which are often severe; and the abandonment of individual acquisitiveness of pecuniary wealth? First, we may place the impulse of a faith—to be subsequently described—which communists will not allow us to call a new religion, but which has all the impelling force that religions have elsewhere possessed. Whatever may be thought of Soviet Communism, it certainly seems to give to its adherents not only a sure and certain conviction of absolute truth, but also the consciousness of a special mission for the improvement of humanity, a mission intensely attractive, in the twentieth century, to young and ardent spirits. Of its eventual success, in the complete transformation of human society throughout the world, they entertain no doubt. Difficulties do not daunt them. Hardships and suffering, even on the largest scale, do not slacken the recruiting.

Secondly, there is the desire, much more widely spread than is commonly supposed, for fuller opportunity to exercise one's personality; the wish to wield influence in the little world in which every individual lives; the ambition to rise to work of "greater responsibility"—in short, the craving, even of the ordinary man or woman, for power. It is noteworthy that, as will be subsequently described, the main object and purpose of public education in the USSR, from the nursery school up to the highest technical institute and university college, is to arouse in the pupils, even those of the poorest parents, this desire for individual expansion, and in every way to foster its development in as large a proportion of the population as possible. With the accumulation of personal wealth barred, membership of the Party offers, in the USSR, at any rate to all but the infinitesimal number of artistic or intellectual geniuses, the only opportunity of "rising in the world".

These motives, it will be allowed, are not in themselves unworthy of respect. With the statistics of the past eighteen years before us, we cannot doubt their proven efficacy in securing the recruiting of millions of members. But does the incentive last? Can a Party grown to such magnitude maintain throughout its colossal membership Lenin's standard of personal conduct; devotion to Party duty; implicit obedience to the common will, and pecuniary self-abnegation? Communists freely admit the frequent presence, in the Party membership, of backsliding and sloth; of hypocrisy and self-seeking; of disgraceful personal misconduct; of "right" and "left" deviations from the General Line; of jealousies and perverted ambitions, leading to intrigues and factionalism. These evil influences, they suggest, cannot be wholly excluded. But they can be kept down by vigilant and perpetual scrutiny of the behaviour of all the members, and by the drastic disciplining, even to peremptory expul-

sion from the Party, that is constantly going on, of members found guilty of offences against communist ethics.

This disciplining, and removal of offenders against communist ethics, and the periodical "purging" of the lists, is carried on in a manner and to an extent which is, we think, unknown in any other organisation in the world. Any member of the Party who falls below the standard set for a Party member is dealt with, first by the Party organ to which he belongs, and further by the Central Commission of Party Control, which investigates every accusation or report that is received. There is, accordingly, in the present gigantic membership, a constant hail of cautions and reprimands, private or public, followed if necessary by disciplinary removal or demotion; suspension from membership for a year or more; or summary expulsion from the Party, coupled, in serious cases, by notification throughout the departments that the delinquent is to be refused employment in any responsible position; or, where necessary, by communication of the offence to the department of the procurator with a view to criminal prosecution.¹

The misconduct of the Party member to which serious attention is called may be of various kinds. Any manner of life habitually inconsistent with "communist ethics" will lead to trouble. Thus, drinking is not forbidden, nor a failure to live continuously up to the highest sexual standards. But habitual drunkenness which impairs health and judgment, or a loose living that causes public scandal, is severely dealt with. Peculation or embezzlement, involving public loss, not only entails expulsion from the Party but is also referred to the Procurator for criminal prosecution; as may also a high degree of negligence causing waste or damage. Ostentatious expenditure, or a luxurious standard of life incurs criticism, and may easily lead to censure as being "inconsistent with communist ethics". On the whole, there appears to be a steadily rising standard of personal conduct from one end of the USSR to the other. With the increasing influence of the consomols, there seems even to be a

¹ Seibert gives the following table "compiled from figures published by the Party":

	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Expulsion	25,900	25,500	25,622	20,004	24,589	16,718
Voluntary and Mechanical withdrawals	14,100	15,300	7,501	12,094	21,088	27,340

"The Party press publishes an accurate list giving the names of the expelled and the causes of expulsion. Tabulating these lists for the first quarter of the year 1928 I found that nearly half of all the expulsions had been effected on the ground of 'official derelictions' (embezzlement and venality), and on account of drunkenness, or (a special head) 'systematic drunkenness'. I do not think that the frequency of these offences in the expulsion list signifies that such offences are really very common in Bolshevik party life, for I hold, rather, that the figures indicate the importance the party attaches to the good behaviour of its members. Certainly, in view of the general frequency of alcoholism in Russia, the number of drunkards in the list of the expelled is not large. I want to emphasise the fact that nowhere have I met so large a number of fanatical teetotallers as among the Bolsheviks, whose ranks likewise contain an increasing proportion of non-smokers—which also means a great deal in Russia." (*Red Russia*, by Theodor Seibert, 1931, p. 143).

growing "puritanism" in manners and morals expected from the Party member. This we describe in our subsequent Chapter XII., entitled "The Good Life".

The Purging of the Party

In addition to this perpetual Party "cleansing" in detail, the entire membership, the whole of the millions, are periodically subjected, one by one, to a simultaneous public inquisition into their individual character and conduct, with the intention and result of eliminating, even by the hundred thousand, those who are deemed unworthy of retention in the Party.

Of these systematic and simultaneous Party purgings there have already been several. The first was made on Lenin's suggestion in 1921, "when the Party consolidated its ranks at the time of the transition to the New Economic Policy"; and some 250,000 members and candidates—about one-third of the then total—were excluded.¹ This first Party purging was followed in the subsequent years by a series of partial measures. Thus, in 1924, there was a systematic testing of the members and candidates in all the cells not engaged in productive industry, then comprising about one-fourth of the Party membership; and of this number about 60 per cent were expelled from the Party. In 1926 there was a similar but less complete testing of the cells in the villages, with numerous exclusions. A complete re-registration of members was made in 1927, when some 46,000—chiefly persons guilty of "deviation" from the General Line—were quietly dropped. The second complete Party purging, mainly directed against industrial malingerers or persons of disgraceful conduct, together with those who had neglected or refused to carry out the Party policy, was decided on at the November plenum of the Central Committee in 1928, and undertaken in 1929, on the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan and the campaign for the development of the collective farms; when the exclusions numbered over 100,000, or nearly one-tenth of the whole. The third purging of the Party took place in the first year (1933) of the struggle for the Second Five-Year Plan, when about a quarter of a million, or one-eighth of the whole, were removed from the membership.

¹ The Control Commission was established . . . in 1920, when it became evident that communists in important positions were becoming involved in actions that compromised their political principles. At first a communist convicted of taking bribes, of drunkenness or of misuse of power would be summarily shot. But when the promulgation of the New Economic Policy greatly increased the number of communists who were actively concerned in the management of trade and industry, and so put additional temptations in their way, the earlier method of summary discipline was abandoned in favour of a judgment pronounced in the Party court, the Control Commission. The first act of this unique commission was to require all members of the Party to apply for re-registration. Every one of its 600,000 members had therefore to submit to an investigation before he was readmitted to the Party. In this way more than 250,000 members considered to be of the activist and careerist type lost their Party ticket in 1921. Since then the watch kept by the Control Commission and the periodical cleansings of the Party have been considered the surest way of countering the changed psychology and outlook of members" (*After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 63).

roll. This "third Party purging", so the Central Committee of the Party declared, "must be thoroughly organised . . . its main intention must be directed to improving the qualitative composition of the organisation. Only those comrades can remain in the Party who are wholly devoted to the working class: who places the interests of communism and the Party above everything."

The special features of the purge of 1933 appear to have been (a) the attention paid to ensuring that every member should have a competent knowledge of the Party programme and the most important decisions, so as to be able to explain them to the non-Party masses; (b) the strict examination, in "the nuclei attached to the non-productive undertakings", of the conduct of those who "abuse the Party position for personal ends, embezzlement, nepotism, careerism, bureaucratic attitude towards the masses"; and (c), in the rural districts, the sharp scrutiny of the way each member "is fighting for the . . . fulfilling of the obligations of the collective farms . . . against the kulak and his agents", and "how he is protecting the socialist common property", especially on the sovkhosi and the kolkhosi. But it was recognised by the Party authorities, apparently for the first time, that not every one of the three million members and candidates could successfully demonstrate a complete understanding of Marxism; and many were relegated to a new category of subordinate connection with the Party, under the designation of "sympathisers". "It not infrequently happens", reported *Pravda*, "that a comrade, although he may be personally quite loyal to the soviet power, as a Party member may damage the movement in practice, even without willing it, if he is not yet in a position to lead the collective peasants or the non-Party workers in the interests of the Party. Here is the case, not of a Party member, but of a comrade who sympathises with the Party. Such sympathising comrades often hasten to join the organisation, not understanding that there is a difference between a comrade who wishes to help the Party, and a Party member, who must possess the necessary preparation in order to be able to lead the non-Party masses under the slogans of the Party."¹

How is so huge an operation as the individual testing and examination of more than three million members carried out? The whole purging is conducted under a Central Cleansing Commission, specially appointed by the Central Committee, which forms cleansing commissions for each

¹ "The Party purging in the USSR", *Pravda*, December 12, 1932, summarised in *International Press Correspondence*, December 15, 1932; *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by S. N. Harper, 1929, pp. 20-21 (a previous account); many references in *Moscow Daily News* during May and June 1933 may be referred to. An illuminating address by L. M. Kaganovich to a meeting of active Party members at Moscow on May 27, 1933, was published (in English) under the title *Purging the Party* (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1933, 32 pp.). A fuller account will be found in *Bolshevik Verification and Purging of the Party Ranks*, by E. Yaroslavsky (Moscow, 1933, 66 pp., same publisher). This gives, for each year, 1921-1932, the statistics of recruiting, resignations and expulsions; and also, for 1905, and for each year 1917-1932, the percentage of workers, peasants and others in the membership.

RSTSR province and each of the smaller republics, consisting of half a dozen tried and trusted members of long standing. These provincial commissions appoint district cleansing commissions of three members each. If the Party membership in a given district is less than 500, these district commissions take direct charge of the cleansing. If the membership is more than 500, the district commission appoints cell or nucleus commissions, also of three members each, who must be of at least seven years' standing, and never having belonged to any other Party, or to any of the former factions within the Party. Factories employing 2000 or more Party members have their own cleansing commissions, similar in functions to the district commissions, and setting up separate commissions for departments or branches. These commissions choose their own chairmen, who have to be approved by the provincial commission. Before the general cleansing starts, the members of the district cleansing commission must go through their own cleansing at open meetings of the cells or nuclei to which they belong, together with any members of the public who choose to attend the meetings taking place before members of the provincial commission. Similarly, members appointed to the nucleus cleansing commissions have to go through their own cleansing before members of the district cleansing commissions at public meetings of their own nuclei. The cleansing commissions may decide on Party expulsion, transfer of members to candidature, or from candidature to the new category of sympathisers. They have no right to remove people from employment, or to shift them from one employment to another.

A widespread campaign was, in the spring of 1933, ordered throughout the newspaper press and at public meetings, in order to make the whole population, and not merely the Party membership, aware of the objects and methods of the testing and purging. The testing, according to the formal instructions of the Party congress in 1928, and of the central commission in 1929, takes place in public, in the presence, not only of each member's immediate colleagues, but also, as it is expressly required, "openly before non-Party workers or the poor-peasant village masses". Anyone may put questions to the member "on the stand", as to anything relating to his duties as a member; including, therefore, his knowledge and his opinions on "Marxism"; his attitude towards current "deviations", left or right; his "activeness", whether in tasks imposed on him, or in his daily work, or in voluntary social duties; his zeal and performances as a "shock-brigader"; even on his irregularity of attendance at Party meetings; his obedience to Party decrees and decisions; his work on committees or commissions, or as member of a "fraction"; and, last, but by no means least, on alleged unconformity between his manner of life or personal behaviour and "communist ethics". It should be added that the Central Commission, "having presented every member of the Party with definite demands in respect of his moral level, his connection with the masses, his active participation in the work of the Party, in the construction of socialism, etc.", went on, in 1929, to "offer

a warning against distorting the testing into a trivial and captious burrowing into the Party member's private life"—a warning which, it is to be feared, is never likely to be scrupulously observed by every one of the 50,000 crowds before which the two or three million members have individually to submit themselves for examination. It should, however, be said that there is a wide range of graduated penalties for those found guilty of one or other grade of imperfection or delinquency. Expulsion from the Party, with or without criminal prosecution or future exclusion from responsible public employment, is reserved for serious offenders. Others may be suspended from membership for a term of a few months or a year, or relegated to the lower grade of candidates, or merely have their period of probation extended. Others, again, may be found to fall short, not in character or conduct, but merely in knowledge of Marxist doctrines, or in ability to expound soviet policy to the non-Party masses; and these may either be relegated to the new category of sympathisers, or only be directed to attend the educational classes organised by the Party. Every decision regarding a Party member must be concisely "motivated", and the minute has to be accompanied by documentary evidence of the charges brought against the member. Membership cards must not be taken away from those expelled until the expulsion has been approved by the district cleansing commission.¹ Moreover, there is, from every local decision, an effective right of appeal within one month; or, more correctly, to a rehearing, before a higher tribunal, and this appeal may be pursued, without payment of any fees, right up to the Central Cleansing Commission at Moscow. In fact, the final decision lies nominally with the ensuing All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, which may be appealed to if the decision of the Central Cleansing Commission is unsatisfactory.

We may conclude this account of the purgings by a few scenes from that of 1933, as reported in the newspapers. "About 1500 Moscow Communists have already gone through the Party cleansing since the beginning of the month, and a similar number in Leningrad, according to the latest reports. The cleansing has roused the masses of Party members and of non-Party people to greater political activity and study.

"Among the first to go through the cleansing were the local leaders. In Moscow, for example, the political secretaries of province, city and

¹ Instructions of the Central Cleansing Commission, in *Moscow Daily News*, May 22, 1933.

These instructions were ratified by the following paragraph in the Party *Rules* of 1934. "By periodic decisions of the Central Committee . . . purgings are held for the systematic cleansing of the Party of class-alien and hostile elements; double-dealers who deceive the Party and who conceal their real views from it, and who disrupt the policy of the Party; overt and covert violators of the iron discipline of the Party and of the state; degenerates who have coalesced with bourgeois elements; careerists, self-seekers and bureaucratised elements; morally degraded persons who by their improper conduct lower the dignity of the Party and besmirch the banner of the Party; passive elements who do not fulfil the duties of Party members, and who have not mastered the programme, the rules and the most important decisions of the Party" (*Rules*, I. 9; p. 695 of *Socialism Victorious*, 1934).

district Party committees passed through the cleansing at open meetings of their organisations.

"The cleansing commission for province and city leaders consists of Knorin, Chairman of the Moscow Cleansing Commission; Stasova, one of the oldest members of the Bolshevik Party and an associate of Lenin, now internationally known for her activity in the International Labour Defence; and Piatnitsky, known for his work in the Communist International.

"The political secretaries of the district committees of the Party passed the cleansing at factory meetings."¹

At Moscow, for instance, "in the meeting hall of the Society of Old Bolsheviks", two of the most venerated members went on the stand, before taking up their duties as members of the district cleansing commission. "The entire cleansing commission of Moscow province, headed by Knorin, presided. Knorin opened the meeting by stating that the life and political activity of the two appointees are well known to all present. . . . Knorin thereupon declared that the meeting had not been called to hear the biographies of the two Old Bolsheviks who had to go through the cleansing, but in order to find out whether the society had any objection. . . . A member of the society, Enisian, took the floor and declared he did not believe anyone would have any objection to raise. . . . After several other members of the society had spoken, the chairman asked whether anyone still had any objections to raise. The reply was a unanimous 'No'. 'In this case we can consider Comrades Smidovich and Samoilovich as having passed the cleansing,' announced the chairman."²

"THE CLEANSING STARTS AT MOSKVOISHVEI

"There was great excitement the other day at Moskvoshvei No. 3 Clothing Factory. 'We are beginning the chistka [Party cleansing] to-day,' I was told in the factory Party office. The first to be questioned was Bugacheva, secretary of the Party cell. She came into the office while we were talking, dressed in black skirt and white blouse. 'Look how she dressed up,' someone commented. 'Watch out, don't be cleansed.' We all smiled. She blushed.

"The workers of the second and fourth floor met in the dining-room to listen to the report on the purpose of the cleansing and to participate in it.

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, June 10, 1933.

² *Ibid.* May 30, 1933.

The Society of Old Bolsheviks was an unofficial social organisation open to all Party members whose membership dated from before 1917. It had excellent premises assigned for its use, and was long a pleasant club in which pre-revolutionary memories were revived and exchanged. Latterly its steadily ageing membership showed signs of developing into a coterie not always in sympathy with modern decisions on policy of the Central Committee, which naturally came to include an increasing proportion of Party members who had grown up since 1917. Possibly in order to prevent its becoming a centre of perpetual criticism, the society, and also the similar society of Old Exiles, were summarily dissolved by the Central Committee in 1935.

“ ‘ Let me speak, let me speak,’ insisted a tall girl with a red kerchief around her head. ‘ We have some Party members on our floor who don’t care a bit for our department. If a machine gets out of order or something happens, they don’t pay any attention. On the other hand, we have some Party members who raise hell when anything interferes with production. These keep up the good record of our department, but the others I think should be cleansed out. They care only for themselves. A good Party member should care for all of us, for our department and for the whole factory.’ ”

“ Her statement was greeted with applause. During the discussion the district cleansing commission arrived and was given a rousing ovation.

“ The chairman called upon Bugacheva to tell her story, to explain how long she had been in the Party and what she is doing as a Party member. Everybody listened attentively.

“ ‘ I was born in 1886 in the village in Pskov district. My father was a poor peasant. In 1905 I was married and soon ran away with my husband to Moscow. At first I worked as a servant in the houses of the rich. You don’t know what it meant to be a servant under the régime of the tsars. I was unable to stand it very long and went to work in a tailor shop. In 1912 I joined the union. I learned quite a bit. During the war I learned still more. In 1917 I joined the Party. During the October days I participated in the struggle in the Krasnaya Presnya district. Later on I was elected a member of the district soviet. Was a member of the control commission of the soviet. Was sent to work by the Party to different institutions.

“ ‘ Since 1928 I am back in the tailor shop. First as a machine worker. Now working as Party secretary on the fourth floor. Our floor carried out the production plan 119 per cent. This month we expect to exceed this figure. There is no ‘ brak ’ on our floor. The loan went over big. I may say that our department is one of the leading in the factory. Don’t know what else I may tell you. Better ask questions.’ ”

“ The chairman stood up.

“ ‘ Does anybody want to ask any questions or does anybody want to say anything about Bugacheva ? ’ ”

“ Several hands were raised. A non-Party worker was given the floor.

“ ‘ I have known Natalia Bugacheva for several years. She is one of the best communists we have in our factory. If you ask her a question, whether political or on production, she will always explain in detail and in such language that we non-Party workers can understand. During the loan campaign she used to come to the factory at seven in the morning and remained in the factory till eleven at night. I wish others would take an example from her.’ ”

“ Another stood up.

“ ‘ I am secretary of the factory MOPR. Last year Bugacheva won some money in the MOPR lottery, but when I informed her about it she

refused to take the money and donated it back to the MOPR. It is not the money part that I want to mention, but the fact that Bugacheva acted in this case as she always does, as an example to other workers. She is worthy of the honour of being a member of the Bolshevik Party.'

"We are not asking for praise, we want criticism of Bugacheva," declared the chairman.

"But we can't say anything wrong about her," shouted a red-haired girl. She was supported with applause. An old Party worker took the floor.

"I have known Bugacheva from the first day she came to our factory. At that time we had a group of Right-wingers and Trotskyites on the fourth floor. We sent her to that floor. She fought them, annihilated them. From a backward department, always lagging, she led it to the front, over-fulfilling the production plan. She always carried out successfully the work entrusted to her. I know I can recommend her in the name of the whole factory as a good Bolshevik Party member.' Thunderous applause.

"The chairman got up again. 'This is a very serious business. The Party wants to weed out all who are in the Party but really don't belong there. There are many weaklings, many two-faced people who are trying to misuse the trust put in them by the Party. We call upon the non-Party workers to disclose all these things among the Party members. We want to know all the bad things even about good Party members. To-day we hear only praises. Isn't there anyone who wants to say anything against Bugacheva?'

"No! No!" came a chorus of voices.

"The commission discussed the matter for a few minutes and the chairman announced the decision:

"We consider Bugacheva worthy of membership in the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party.' Again thunderous applause shook the hall. The meeting was declared closed and almost everybody rushed to the platform to shake hands with the excited Bugacheva. The first Party member at Moskvoshvei No. 3 had come through the 'chistka' (cleansing)."¹

A CULPRIT EXPOSED

"The Party cleansing is taking place in the engineers' and udamniks' dining-room in the Kalinin (Fraise) Cutting-Tool Plant. . . . Darting a sharp, hurried glance at the microphone that is to carry all his words to thousands of listeners-in throughout the Moscow province, Gorachev begins to speak. He holds himself calmly, even jokes a bit. But one is instantly aware that he has thought over carefully beforehand every word that he is saying now. He speaks slowly and weighs each word before it leaves

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, June 3, 1933.

his mouth. . . . 'I was the son of a fitter who later quit his trade and sold fish for 20 years. After the October Revolution he opened up a hardware stand in the Danilov market.'

"Gorachev is going to be honest and straightforward. He will tell frankly everything of the past. 'But why did you hide your social origin when you entered the Party?' interrupts Sakhat-Muradov, a Turkoman, the chairman of the cleansing commission. 'Why did you write in the application you filled out before entering the Party that you were the son of a worker?'

"'Oh yes, a mistake crept in there,' says Gorachev. 'I should have written "worker-trader".' Everybody laughs.

"After a cross-fire of questions, the audience learns that, for hiding his social origin during the 1929 cleansing, the cleansing commission had deemed it necessary to keep him in a lower position for five years. But Gorachev does not like lower positions. After wandering from factory to factory looking for the best job, he finally lands at the Fraise, where he secures the important post of secretary of the factory trade union committee.

"How did Gorachev hold down this position? Several of the workers get up to speak. . . . One tells of the incident when Morozov, technical director, rudely upbraided and discharged the lathe hand Chernov because he forgot to turn off the motor on his lathe one day. It was a secret to no one that Morozov repeatedly assumed a haughty attitude towards the workers. The factory paper and social opinion in the plant rose in defence of Chernov. But despite this, Gorachev backed up Morozov in discharging Chernov.

"Another speaker reveals the curious method of giving out premiums that was sanctioned by Gorachev. When on the fifteenth anniversary of the October Revolution premiums were granted to the best udarniks in the Fraise plant, thanks to the 'blessing' of Gorachev, premiums were given to 30 members of the engineering and technical staff and . . . one worker!

"'He did not protect the interests of the workers,' said another, 'but protected, instead, the interests of his own pockets.' The funds of the factory trade union committee were a 'mutual aid society' for Gorachev and his cronies. Loans that were not returned, and thefts, were part of the heritage that was received from Gorachev by the staff of the trade union committee. Six thousand roubles were squandered in a short time by him. A significant portion of this sum went directly into his pockets.

"Here is an example of how Gorachev managed the trade union money. He was tired. He decided to take a rest. So he got a hospital bulletin and went to a sanatorium as a sick man. As a sick worker is entitled to his wages in the Soviet Union during the period of his illness, Gorachev received his money. But this was not enough. On coming back, he took a vacation for himself. This was enough, it would seem? No! In addition, he took a large sum of money for an unused vacation. Semenov, a worker in the trade union organisation, gets up and says that no decision

was passed by the trade union committee ratifying the giving of any . . . money for unused vacation to Gorachev. . . . 'I was finally removed from my post for mismanagement,' says Gorachev. . . .

"Gorachev got married. Now getting married is a big event. One ought to celebrate it properly. But to celebrate properly one needs a bountiful feast with plenty of good things to eat. . . . So Gorachev gets one of the factory trucks one night, goes down to the store, and piles into the truck a small mountain of cookies, apples, sugar, butter, candy.

"The factory [news] paper caught him red-handed, and after a long denial Gorachev finally confessed to his guilt. He was relieved of his position of secretary of the factory trade union committee and sent to work on the production line at a lathe.

"But Gorachev, as we have seen, does not like lower positions. And a short while later we see a new figure: Gorachev—assistant personnel manager of the milling cutter department. His Party job is a Comsomol organiser. . . . 'Here,' admits Gorachev, 'my leadership was not efficient.'

"That's not quite correct,' says a Comsomol. 'You didn't give us any leadership at all.' Others get up and put the finishing touches to the portrait of Gorachev, as the careerist, cheat, self-supplier, squanderer of trade union funds.

"When Gorachev steps down from the stand two and a half hours later, he is no longer smiling. His career is ended. Once more he is sent back to the production line. This time he will stay there . . . until he becomes a different man."¹

The Results of the 1933 Purging

The "Party Cleansing" of 1933 was practically completed before the opening of the Seventeenth Party Congress, to which one of the two vice-presidents of the Sovnarkom reported its results. He described its special objects, therein differing from previous "cleansings", as the discovery of (1) the extent to which the members, admittedly loyal in theory, were still actively taking part as "fighters at the front of socialist construction"; and (2) the degree in which such members were intellectually equipped to explain to the non-Party masses the Marx-Lenin-Stalin faith that they held. True to soviet custom, Rudzutak found much for outspoken criticism. He complained that, in many cases, the local Party organisation had failed to maintain contact with their individual members. Party education was far from adequate. The directives and decisions of the Central Committee were often neglected, or else acted on in a formal and lifeless way. The percentage of members expelled by decision of the district and primary cleansing commissions was 17, whilst 6.3 per cent more had been reduced to the new grade of sympathisers. These percentages would be somewhat reduced after the hearing of the appeals.

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, September 3, 1933.

Leningrad and Moscow had the smallest averages of exclusions, at 12.7 and 13.6 per cent; whilst East Siberia had no less than 25.2 per cent; the Urals, 23.1 per cent; Odessa, 21.9 per cent; the Far Eastern, 21.9 per cent; and Karelia, 20.3 per cent.¹

The Internal Reorganisation of 1934

In the course of the year 1934, following the decision of the Seventeenth All-Union Congress of the Party upon proposals presented by L. M. Kaganovich,² considerable alterations were made in the administrative structure of the central Party authority. The Central Control Commission of the Party³ was reappointed, but under the new name of Commission of Party Control, and with a membership reduced to 61, whilst its functions were, as we understand it, very largely transformed. Whilst retaining its duty of continuous supervision of the whole Party membership, and the investigation of all complaints and accusations against individual members, it ceased to act in close conjunction with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which has hitherto been represented by an officer of the standing of a People's Commissar in the several Sovnarkoms of the USSR, the constituent republics and the autonomous republics. All these were, in the course of the year, simply abolished, whilst the work of the specially commissioned juries of inspection and enquiry was transferred to the trade union organisation, under the All-Union Central Committee

¹ See Rudzutak's report in *Moscow Daily News*, February 6, 1934.

² See the lengthy exposition in *Moscow Daily News*, January 6 to 10, 1934; also *Forward to the Second Five-Year Plan of Socialist Construction—the Resolution of the XVII Party Conference* (Moscow, 1934, 40 pp.).

³ The Central Control Commission, established by Lenin in 1920, had increased steadily in magnitude and influence. Its membership grew from 7 in 1922 to 50 in 1923, to 151 in 1925, to 163 in 1926, and to 195 in 1927. Since 1927 it has remained at about 200. These carefully chosen members do not hold office in conferences or committees, but attend all Party meetings as observers, reporting to an executive committee of about 25 members, which is responsible to a plenary meeting held in Moscow every four months.

At the Party Congress in 1935 Stalin gave the following account of the Commission, and reason for the change. "As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily, and mainly, for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split in the Party. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organisations succeeded in averting the danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But there is an imperative need for an organisation that could concentrate its attention mainly on the work of supervising the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. The only organisation that could fulfil this function is a Commission of Party Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU working on the instructions of the Party and of its Central Committee and having its representatives in the districts, who will be independent of the local organisations. It goes without saying that such a responsible organisation must wield great authority. And in order that it may wield sufficient authority, and in order that it may be able to take proceedings against any responsible worker, including members of the Central Committee, who has committed any misdemeanour, the members of this Commission must be elected and dismissed only by the supreme organ of the Party, viz. the Party Congress. There cannot be any doubt that such an organisation will be quite capable of securing the control of the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of tightening up Party discipline" (*Report to Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, by Josef Stalin, Moscow, 1935, pp. 93-94).

of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). In place of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in the several Sovnarkoms, there was established, as we have already described, a new Commission of Soviet Control for the whole USSR, nominally appointed by and directly responsible to the Sovnarkom of the USSR as a whole. For the first appointment of this central Commission of Soviet Control of the USSR Sovnarkom, the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party took upon itself to nominate the entire membership of 70, from tried and trusted Party members. It is with this body, in substitution for the abolished Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, that the reorganised central Commission of Party Control acting for the Communist Party will act in the closest concert. We understand that, whilst the information obtained will be at the disposal of both sides, the division of duties will be the following: Any changes required in the constitutional organisation, or in the personnel of the various offices, will be made, formally, by the appropriate authority in the soviet hierarchy, from the USSR Sovnarkom down to the village soviet. On the other hand, any disciplinary action against Party members as such, and the issue to them of any necessary "directives", will be matters for the Commission of Party Control, acting for the Communist Party.

But the most important change in the new arrangements is not so much in the manner in which any necessary action will be formally taken, as in the reorganisation of what has gradually become an extensive array of central departments of the Communist Party itself. What we may describe as the internal office administration of the Communist Party has been completely transformed. The recent extensive developments of "policy sections" (*politotdeli*) in the machine and tractor stations and collective farms, and at every railway or water-transport centre, in which possibly as many as 50,000 of the most zealous and active of the Party members are now employed, have made necessary a sweeping rearrangement of departmental administration.

Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its two main committees there are now to be no fewer than nine separate departments, namely, (1) the Agricultural Otdel; (2) the Industrial Otdel; (3) the Transport Otdel; (4) the Planning, Finance and Trade Otdel; (5) the Political-Administrative Otdel; (6) the Otdel of the Leading Centres; (7) the Otdel of Culture and Propaganda of Leninism, and two other "sectors"; (8) the Administrative Sector; and (9) a Special Sector not yet otherwise designated. In May 1935 the Otdel of Culture and Propaganda of Leninism was subdivided into five branches, namely, (a) the Otdel of Party Propaganda and Agitation; (b) the Otdel of the Press and the Publishing Houses; (c) the Otdel of Schools and Universities; (d) the Otdel of Educational Work, dealing with libraries, clubs, sport organisations, radio, cinemas, theatres and authorship; and (e) the Otdel of Scientific and Technical Inventions and Discoveries. All these departments are to be accommodated at the enlarged Moscow offices of the Communist Party.

The Party's departments in the provinces are being reorganised along similar lines. Under the Party Committees of the republics and lesser authorities, there will be, in each case, six separate departments, namely, (1) the Agricultural Otdel; (2) the Transport and Industrial Otdel; (3) the Soviet Trade Otdel; (4) the Otdel of Culture and Propaganda of Leninism; (5) the Otdel of the leading Party organs (cities and rayons); and (6) a Special Sector. The existing secretariats under the oblast or krai Party Committees and those under the various Executive Committees of the Party in the constituent and autonomous republics will be abolished; and only two secretaries in each case will be allowed. "All questions which require discussion must be raised direct in the bureaux, and the working out of practical problems must be entrusted not to special commissions, but to the heads of departments, and to the responsible workers in the soviet, trade union, cooperative, comsomols and other organisations."

The Party administrations in the rayons and smaller cities are being similarly reorganised, so that they may be directly concerned with the various branches of production. They are to be specifically and intimately connected with the local Party organisation, such as the primaries and groups in the village soviets (selsoviets), collective farms (kolkhosi), and state farms (sovkhosi); and with all the "policy sections" that are in the field (politotdeli).

Instead of the otdeli hitherto existing under the rayon Party committees (raycom) and those (gorcom) of all but the largest cities, there are to be appointed responsible travelling instructors or organisers, who are to be *ex officio* members of the raycom or gorcom; and who are each to be attached to a group of primary Party organisations, where they are expected to deal with all branches of the Party work, whether cultural, political propaganda, mass agitation, organisation, etc. It will be for the secretary and his deputy or assistant to control and supervise the work of these travelling instructors or organisers, their distribution in the field, and the carrying out of the instructions given to them.¹

What is the motive and intention, or the governing idea, behind these sweeping measures of what we might at first sight regard as essentially office reorganisation? As we understand it, the reform is intended to set up, from one end of the USSR to the other, a double system of inspiration, direction, inspection, criticism, and especially of continuous "check up" of the actual putting in operation of all the various decrees and "directives" of the Soviet Government. The student of political science will be interested to trace, in this reorganisation, the proposed establish-

¹ We gather that, at the outset, the work of the two commissions will be carried on in 28 specially demarcated divisions of the USSR. There seem to have been appointed, as a start, 22 divisional officers of the Commission of Soviet Control and 11 of the Commission of Party Control. In 5 of these divisions there are to be officers of both commissions; in 6 others only officers of the Commission of Party Control; and in the other 22 only officers of the Commission of Soviet Control. There is to be an organised office in each division, and perhaps more than one, to which complaints may be sent.

ment not of one but of two separate centralisations. The USSR Sovnarkom of People's Commissars, with its elaborate hierarchy of soviets from the All-Union Congress down to the selsoviet of the village; and its corresponding hierarchy of departments, federal or provincial, unified or non-unified, all subject to the new Commission of Soviet Control, represents the Temporal Power. Henceforth there will be, alongside this Temporal Power, another hierarchy, equally penetrating and ubiquitous; headed by the new Commission of Party Control; directed not from the Moscow Kremlin but from the adjacent central offices of the Communist Party; having no statutory or other legal authority; and using only its influence on the minds of the Party members. Nearly one-half of all these Party members happen, indeed, to have been elected or appointed to most of the key positions of either the local or the central government. Provision is made, in a way which we do not doubt will be successful, for consistent unity in the decrees and directives emanating from either of these parallel authorities; and for complete harmony in the action taken.¹

The Comsomols

Second in importance only to the Communist Party itself, is its multi-form junior organisation headed by the "All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth" (YCL), which we shall refer to under its common appellation of Comsomols.² This latter is an entirely voluntary body of some five millions of young people between fourteen and twenty-three, with an extension of term for those elected to office, and (as consultants merely) for such others as may be locally desired.

Perhaps the most striking feature is the magnitude of the growth and

¹ The political science student cannot but be reminded of Auguste Comte's proposals for the establishment of a "Spiritual Power", devoid of any "authority"; parallel with the whole corps of officials of the government, having all the "authority" in their hands. We must point out, however, that Comte's Spiritual Power, though excluding all reference to the supernatural, was to be a hierarchy in the old ecclesiastical sense of the word, wholly directed and appointed from above. The Communist Party of the USSR, however great and far-reaching may be its corporate influence, is, as we have explained, itself dependent on the whole body of its members, who vote in their primaries and their Party groups, and in the rayon committees, right up to the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, which acts as a final Court of Appeal and can at any time change the whole policy.

² We have found the fullest account in English of the Comsomols in Professor S. N. Harper's *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* (1929) and *Making Bolsheviks* (1931), on which we have drawn freely. In *Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward (1933), incidentally affords a vivid account of the spirit manifested by the Comsomols. See also *Die Jugend in Sowjet-russland*, by Klaus Mehnert, Berlin, 1932, translated as *Youth in Soviet Russia*, 1933; and *New Minds New Men*, by Thomas Woody, 1932. *The Rules of the All-Union Leninist League of Youth* (in Russian), a booklet of which over a million copies have been issued, gives precise details. Descriptions of meetings and other proceedings of the Comsomols are frequently given in the *Komsomol Pravda* (in Russian), the principal organ of the organisation, and less frequently (in English) in the *Moscow Daily News*. A (Russian) pamphlet, *The Cell in the Kolkhos: Days and Works of the Savruchinsk Cell of the YCL*, by S. Kolesnichenko and T. Ussachev (published by Ogiz, Moscow, 1932), gives a vivid description of successful work by the Comsomol cell of a large collective farm. Similar publications dealing with the concerns of the organisation are innumerable.

the width of development of this army of Comsomols. As long ago as 1903, Lenin proposed and carried at the Social Democratic Party Conference a resolution recommending special party organisation among young men and women. In the following decade of industrial development the total number of young people employed in the ever-growing factories rose, by the end of 1916, to what was for Russia the large total of 300,000. During the revolutionary months of 1917 these young people, especially in Moscow and Petrograd, spontaneously formed political groups of their own, which played a prominent part in the meetings and demonstrations. The various revolutionary sections sought to attach these youthful groups to themselves, but success lay with the Bolsheviks, who, towards the end of 1917, were able to incorporate many of their members in the Red Guard. In October 1918 the first congress of Bolshevik youth organisations was held at Moscow, when 22,000 members were represented, and the Communist League of Youth was formally instituted. At the second congress in 1919 the membership had risen to 96,000. The third congress in 1920 counted no fewer than 400,000, including many recruits from the peasantry. Down to this date the note had been that of active service on the military even more than on the political front. Now that victory had been achieved, the membership fell away. Then came the command for study ; study to fit themselves for membership of the Party, as well as active participation in industrial and political work ; and, as new duties, energetic assistance in the education of the younger children, on the one hand, and, on the other, the promotion of the young workmen's interests on the economic front.

The consolidation of the organisation, and also the inception of its extraordinarily wide growth and varied development, may be dated from the fifth annual congress of 1922 with its institution of "class pride" and a Comsomol code of conduct. In all directions the organisation broadened out. Every form of communist training was developed and pursued ; the promotion of all healthy forms of recreation, from athletics to theatre-going ; every kind of intellectual study, from discussions and lectures to contributing to newspapers and publishing poems ; every branch of "activeness", from "liquidating illiteracy" and clearing away rubbish, to joining "shock brigades" and taking part in "cleansing raids" for checking "bureaucratism". By 1924 the membership, including candidates, had reached 632,000 ; by 1926, 1,612,372 ; by 1927, 2,250,000. The lists were then more strictly scrutinised, but in 1928 the membership was reckoned at 2,000,000 ; and by 1935 it had risen to something like 5,500,000, one-third from the industries of the cities and two-thirds from the agricultural villages ; being approximately 90 per cent of the total industrial youth, and 20 per cent of all the peasant youth, of the entire USSR, about one-fourth of all the members being girls and young women.

The Comsomols adopt the pattern of organisation common throughout the USSR. The whole membership is grouped in cells, formed not only

among the employees of factories and other industrial establishments, or of offices and institutions of all kinds, but also among the students enrolled in the higher educational institutions, and among the young people of the agricultural villages. The number of these cells in the USSR is now over 100,000, a majority of them either in the *kolkhosi* or in the villages. These cells are grouped geographically in districts (city or *rayon*), for which they elect district committees and officers. These district committees are, in the RSFSR and the Ukraine, united by provinces (*oblast* or *krai*), and elsewhere by the smaller five republics, each with its own committee and officers. These local committees send their officers every two years to an All-Union Conference at Moscow, specially for organisational purposes, and in the alternate years they elect delegates from the membership to a still more imposing All-Union Congress, which is much more than a glorified picnic. This congress listens to elaborate speeches, passes resolutions and appoints a standing central committee by which the whole organisation is practically governed. So close is the parallelism with the organisation of the Communist Party that Comsomols who find themselves serving on mixed committees, or belonging to non-Party organisations or institutions, invariably form themselves unobtrusively into a "fraction" or group, which decides a common policy, and is responsible to the Comsomol committee of the district or province in which the committee, organisation or institution works. At the lowest stage (the cell) the offices are all filled gratuitously, the personnel frequently changing, thus affording useful training to a large proportion of the junior membership, the duties being performed outside school or working hours. But already in the district committees and secretaryships the duties are sufficiently onerous to require the full-time service of one or more salaried officers in each case, and these become more numerous in the higher ranges of the organisation. These places are practically all filled from the ranks of the Comsomols themselves, but they tend to fall into the hands of the abler and more experienced of them.

The reorganisation of the League of Youth is to follow other lines than those of the Party itself. It was decided by the Comsomol Central Executive Committee (June 18, 1935), and declared by A. V. Kosarev, the Comsomol secretary, on behalf of Stalin himself, that their corporate activity is henceforth to be concentrated upon education—education of their own members, of the Pioneers, and of such workers, peasants and students as they can influence. Separate sub-committees are to direct the work among these several groups. The Comsomols are henceforth not to busy themselves so much with assisting production; and, above all, they are not to concern themselves about possible developments of the policy of the Party itself.

Hitherto no express confession of faith has been called for from the young applicant for membership. For youthful workmen or peasants of poor parentage, no recommendations are required, and not even any period of probation, whilst there is no assumption that the applicant will have

had any political training or experience. The children of middle peasants (serednaks), however, or of parents of any occupation reputed to be relatively wealthy, are not invited to join, nor are they, indeed, easily admitted, whilst those of kulaks are usually refused. Young people employed in soviet institutions, and the children of such employees, and any others not of workmen or peasant parentage, are required to present a recommendation from a member of the Party of two years' Party standing, together with two recommendations from Comsomol members. Young people who are the children of shopkeepers or other definitely "bourgeois" classes find some difficulty in joining, but may be admitted on good Party recommendations, and (unlike other applicants) subject to six months' probationary membership (the so-called candidates), during which they pay dues, attend meetings and participate in all activities except voting, and are watched and reported on as to conduct, character, and "civic activity". There is no attempt to maintain in the Comsomol membership a numerical preponderance of the industrial workmen. But the direction of the organisation is kept in the hands of the workmen and the kolkhos members, as well as secured to the Communist Party, by additional qualifications for holding office above the primary organ. Thus, the secretary of the district committee must anyhow be, not only a Comsomol of at least a year's standing, but also a Party member of a year's standing; and if he is a peasant, he must have two years' standing as a Comsomol, whilst, if he is one of the intelligentsia, he must be not only of three years' standing as a Comsomol but also of two years' standing as a Party member. For secretaryship of a provincial committee the required qualifications are still more stringent, and also similarly differentiated, so as to put barriers in the way of all but avowed and tried communists of working-class parentage.

The most important features of the Comsomol organisation are its educational purpose and the extent to which it disciplines its members. There is plainly no seeking to attract recruits under false pretences, or by any concealment of aims. The "tasks and duties of members of the YCL" as laid down by the ninth All-Union Congress, and embodied in the rules, expressly require that "the Comsomoletz [member] must be worthy of the name of his great teacher [Lenin]; he must be the most "energetic, honourable, daring fighter, supremely loyal to the revolution, and an example to all youth and all workers. He must work every day to enlist new members in the League. . . . The best members of the YCL will be admitted to the ranks of the Party. . . . The Comsomoletz fights persistently for the general line of the Party. He is obliged to study systematically the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin. . . . He is a loyal assistant to the Party in the struggle for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy, and the industrialisation of the USSR. . . . Every Comsomoletz is obliged to equip himself with essential technical knowledge, to master a leading technique and to work systematically for the raising of his qualifications. . . . The Comsomoletz who works for

wages must be a member of a trade union and must take an active part in its work. . . . The Comsomoletz in the village is an organiser of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. He must work for the realisation of the great task of liquidating kulakism. He must be an organiser and member of a kolkhos . . . and must work with all his energy for the strengthening of the union of the working class with the peasantry. . . . For heroic self-sacrificing struggle on the socialist construction front, the Comsomoletz is awarded the Order of the Labour Red Banner. . . . The Comsomoletz is an active worker on the cultural revolution front. He fights for the polytechnicisation of the schools. He is an active physical culturist. He must be prepared at any moment to defend the Soviet Union with arms. He must study military matters—and master one form of military discipline. . . . The YCL is the patron of the Red fleet and Red air force. . . . Every Comsomoletz must help the Pioneers to take part in socialist construction.”

These high and varied obligations of Comsomol membership are persistently enforced. “Self-criticism” is as constant a feature in the Comsomol cells and district organisations as in every other form of soviet activity. The pressure of public opinion in the Comsomol cell is reinforced by frequent admonitions from the higher authorities of the organisation, and made still more effective by the Comsomol newspaper press, the principal organ of which is the *Komsomol Pravda* published by the Comsomol Central Committee, which has a circulation running into many hundred thousands, from end to end of the USSR. This Comsomol press, which includes literally hundreds of local and specialist journals, though edited and directed by salaried officers, is largely filled with unpaid contributions from the vast membership, in which the exuberant vitality and enthusiasm is as marked as the youthful fanaticism.

Discipline is, however, also maintained within each cell by more direct means. Votes of censure on individual members, for breaches of rules or offences against communist ethics, are frequent. Many things that are not actually prohibited are “bad form” among Comsomols. Voluntary withdrawals of slack or unwilling members are common. Those who fail to attend meetings or participate in the activities of the body, or neglect to pay the dues,¹ are quickly dropped. Actual expulsions are reported to be even more numerous than from the Communist Party itself, and mainly for similar grounds. “Conduct unbecoming a Comsomol”, if persisted in, may in itself lead to expulsion; whilst habitual drunkenness or sexual looseness, and any form of behaviour deemed indecent or disgraceful, will certainly be so punished. The requirements of “political literacy” is insisted on. The young Comsomol must attend a “political

¹ The Comsomol membership dues are small, as many of the members are not yet self-supporting. A common rate is one-half of one per cent of the monthly wage. Many are excused on account of poverty. Those older ones who are also members of the Communist Party pay dues only to the Party. Thus the restricted money income of the Comsomols both necessitates and evokes a very large amount of individual service from the whole membership, extending even to unpaid organising and secretarial duties.

circle " or a special school until he has acquired a knowledge of the main principles of Leninism : and if after three years he is adjudged to be still " politically illiterate ", he will usually be removed from the membership roll.¹ Nor may he neglect his share of " political activeness ". Any member not performing a due amount of voluntary social service, in one or other form, is cautioned, reprimanded and eventually expelled.

An effective expedient for continual guidance of the whole communist youth is found in the frequent conferences and congresses. One of the authors' most vivid impressions was derived from attendance at a session of the seventh All-Union Conference of Comsomols, when 1200 young men and women, of many different races, leaders of Comsomol cells from all over the USSR, were brought to Moscow for eight days of strenuous attendance (varied by organised games, dances and visits to the opera) to be criticised and instructed by their own spokesmen and by distinguished academic professors and Party leaders. It was impossible not to be impressed with the enthusiasm and energy, the joy of new freedom and the eagerness for improvement of this exuberant youth. The official congratulations on their really considerable achievements were interspersed with warnings that discussion on theoretic issues must not interfere with practical productive work, especially in shock brigades ; that they must not neglect the duty of answering the letters of the younger Pioneers ; and that the practice of passing resolutions in the exact terms of others that they had received was not calculated to secure respectful attention. It was not by such means that they had already been influential in raising the position of the Comsomols. Their advice as to educational curriculum had been an important factor in such legislative reforms as the raising of the school-leaving age to fifteen ; the development of factory schools with three and a half hours' theoretic instruction and three and a half hours' applied science and practical work for those joining the factory before sixteen ; and the institution of the seven-hour work-day. They might well demand that their factory earnings should not, as was occasionally the case, be kept back as arrears ; and that even second-year apprentices should be entitled to transfer from time work to piecework. They should insist everywhere on the carrying out of the Central Committee's decision allotting to young persons 15 per cent of all the places in the Houses of Rest and 50 per cent of all those in the Sanatoria. Their concentration on the full execution of the Five-Year Plan need never be

¹ In 1932-1933 the YCL " political schools " were opened throughout the USSR from October 15 to April 15, with a curriculum varying according to local conditions. All young communists who had not previously passed through such courses were peremptorily required to attend, whilst those who had completed the elementary work were directed to continue their studies by attending Party schools or, where these are not accessible, by correspondence. The Central Committee of the YCL set aside 100,000 roubles as a prize fund, from which to provide rewards in cash or gifts of libraries from 1000 to 10,000 roubles for cells and district committees that organise the best schools. Secretaries and other officers will be awarded prizes of books, bicycles, watches or holiday trips, whilst groups of successful members will be sent on tours (*Moscow Daily News*, September 17, 1932).

pressed in such a way as to prejudice their own economic or hygienic interests as young workers. We could not help feeling that the practice of the Soviet Government of calling up to Moscow, for a general conference, the representatives from all over the vast area of the USSR—representing a considerable annual expense—was, in this, as in so many other branches of the public service, a most potent instrument alike of education and of administration.¹

The following description of a successful Comsomol cell at work inside a kolkhos is abbreviated from the account given in a general report prepared by the Middle Volga Krai committee of the Comsomols, in conjunction with the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, on the measures taken locally to carry out the Central Committee of the Party's (TSIK) decree of April 1, 1931. The cell began by working as a separate brigade in the fields, doing 15 per cent more than the other brigades. "Then, on the instructions of the local Party cell", the twenty-five Comsomols distributed themselves among all the brigades, for the purposes of "giving a lead to all the various farm sections", with a result that the whole "productivity was raised to a marked degree . . . the YCL membership on the farm was increased threefold—the system of organising work with four to ten YCL members at the head of each brigade became more and more efficient . . . dependent on the vigour with which the YCL cell promotes 'consciousness' among the non-Party mass of workers".²

In 1932-1933, when "the agricultural crisis" was at its height, a large number of Comsomols were selected for service in the Ukraine, the Volga Basin and the North Caucasus, as "harvesting overseers". They were to protect the grain from pilfering peasants or marauding bands; to organise and lead "gleaning detachments" so that nothing should be lost, and generally to "increase productivity". With regard to the sugar-beet harvest, the YCL All-Union Conference called for "socialist competition" among all Comsomol units, as to which could organise and conduct the most efficient arrangement. A prize fund of 200,000 roubles was to be formed with the aid of the Sugar Trust for distribution among the successful organisations.³

But for this agricultural work not all urban Comsomols proved themselves worthy. In May 1933 the newspapers reported the expulsion of seven young men as "deserters from the most important front of the class struggle". As young mechanics in the Stalin Auto Plant (AMO), they had volunteered for work on a state farm in North Caucasus. They were provided with railway tickets, and given a public send-off by the Moscow Comsomol Committee as heroes of the day. But before actually getting to the sovkhos, they heard such a discouraging account of "life on a farm", that they took fright and returned to Moscow. Brought

¹ See description of this conference in *Moscow Daily News*, July 3, 1932.

² From a Russian work entitled *The Cell in the Kolkhos: Days and Works of the Savrulinshinsk Cell of the YCL*, by S. Kolesnichenko and T. Ussachev, Ogiz, Moscow, 1932.

³ *Moscow Daily News*, September 8, 1932.

before the Moscow Committee, they frankly explained that they were told "that wages on the farm were lower than in the factory; farm life was too dull for them; there were very few people around in the village . . . that work would be very hard . . . we thought it would be tough out there; we simply took fright, and thought we might as well return". . . . The Moscow Comsomol Committee decided that "the whole group should be expelled as cowards and deserters, and factory organisers should be warned to be more careful in choosing volunteers for work".¹

The Pioneers and the Octobrists

The organisation of the younger population is undertaken by two junior bodies, "the Children's Communist Organisation of Young Pioneers in the name of Comrade Lenin"—universally known as the Pioneers—and less definitely, by what are called the "Little Octobrists", in honour of the month of 1917 in which the Bolsheviks achieved power. The "Little Octobrists" are children between 8 and 11, who act under the guidance of the Pioneers; whilst the Pioneers, between 10 and 16, are helped and directed by the Comsomols, aged 14 to 23, who are themselves, as we have seen, steered and controlled by the Communist Party itself, which may be joined at 18.²

The Pioneers

The communist organisation of children of an age below that of the Comsomols did not take form until 1923. It was preceded by various attempts of the nature of the "Boy Scout" movement, the first of no great duration, definitely militarist, and under capitalist and conservative influences (the "poteschny", 1906-1910); and the second, more pacifist, under "liberal" influences (1907-1919), which, after various attempts at adjustment to the new conditions, was gradually "liquidated" under "war communism". In 1921-1923 sporadic efforts were made to adapt the useful parts of the Boy Scout idea to the requirements of the Communist Party; and at the fifth Comsomol Congress in October 1922 the present pioneer organisation was founded. By October 1923 it had still under 5000 members, but the Soviet Government and the Communist Party then joined the Comsomols in helping the new body, and it sprang rapidly into colossal magnitude, having by 1925 no fewer than a million members. The name of Lenin was then taken into the title. The scope of the organisation was enlarged, and at the same time the Pioneers were given the task of bringing their younger brothers and sisters, as young

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, May 16, 1933.

² These ages, it will be seen, overlap, and, as it is said, by design, in order that each of the lower organisations may continue to include some who have already joined the next higher one, and who may therefore supply both leadership and encouragement in progression. Some Little Octobrists do not become Pioneers, and many Pioneers prefer not to undertake the onerous responsibilities of Comsomols; whilst only a selection from these are admitted to Party membership.

as eight years old, into groups of Little Octobrists. By 1926 the two junior organisations had over two million members (1,800,000 Pioneers and 250,000 Octobrists), actually exceeding in combined membership the numbers of the Comsomols at that date; and the two younger bodies have since kept pace in an expansion which has now (1935) reached six millions. Thus the Pioneers have enrolled about 8 per cent of all the children between ten and sixteen in the USSR, just over one-half of the members being the children of peasants, one-third being the children of industrial workmen, and one-sixth being of other parentage, including office-workers, "toiling intelligentsia" and the new bourgeoisie of NEP. About two-fifths of the members are girls and three-fifths boys.

The members are organised in brigades, of which there are probably 100,000, two-thirds in the villages and one-third in the cities and urban areas. In the cities each factory has its brigade, and this basis is preferred, so as to ensure proletarian influence. Other brigades are formed in or around workmen's clubs or children's homes, and, failing other nuclei, even in schools (but it is provided that in such cases the leader of the brigade must be an industrial workman, and not a member of the school staff). In the villages, on the other hand, the school nearly always has to be made the base of the brigade. The desire is, wherever possible, to base the Pioneers' brigade on a place in which material production is carried on.

The object and intention of the Pioneer organisation is stated with studied moderation by Madam Krupskaya, the widow of Lenin, who has always taken great interest in the movement. "The Pioneer Movement", she wrote, "reaches the children at that age when the personality of the individual is still being formed, and it promotes the social instincts of the children, helping to develop in them civic habits and a social consciousness. It places before the children a wonderful goal, that goal which has been brought to the fore by the period through which they are living, and for which the workman class of the whole world is fighting. This goal is the liberation of the toilers and the organisation of a new order in which there will be no division into classes, and no exploitation, and where all people will lead a full and happy life."¹

The *Guide for the Young Pioneer*, the official manual which is placed in the hands of every applicant for membership, puts the matter candidly and explicitly. The right to wear the red star of membership and the red kerchief, and to give the Pioneer's salute, is acquired only after making the solemn promise required of every full member. "I, a young Pioneer of the USSR, in the presence of my comrades, solemnly promise that (1) I shall stand steadfastly for the cause of the workman class in its struggle for the liberation of the workmen and peasants of the whole world; (2) I shall honestly and constantly carry out the precepts of Ilych [Lenin], and laws and customs of the Young Pioneers."

The five "laws" and the five "customs" are summarised as follows:

¹ Quoted in *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 61.

THE LAWS

(1) The Pioneer is faithful to the cause of the workman class and to the precepts of Hych [Lenin].

(2) The Pioneer is the younger brother and helper of the Young Communist and the Communist [Party member].

(3) The Pioneer organises other children and joins with them in their life. The Pioneer is an example to all children.

(4) The Pioneer is a comrade to other Pioneers, and to the workmen and peasant children of the whole world.

(5) The Pioneer strives for knowledge : knowledge and understanding are the great forces in the struggle for the cause of the workman.

THE CUSTOMS

(1) The Pioneer protects his own health and that of others. He is tolerant and cheerful. He rises early in the morning and does his settling up exercises.

(2) The Pioneer economises his own time and that of others. He does his task quickly and promptly.

(3) The Pioneer is industrious and persevering, knows how to work collectively under all and any conditions, and finds a way out in all circumstances.

(4) The Pioneer is saving of the people's property, is careful with his books and clothes, and the equipment of the workshop.

(5) The Pioneer does not swear, smoke or drink.¹

Admission to the Little Octobrists or to the Pioneers is easy. Any child within the limits of age, whatever its parentage, may be proposed and admitted to the grade of candidate, in which it must pass at least two months. The practice now is to accept, as members, candidates from any social class—even those of priests or of the new bourgeoisie, if they are, after probation, deemed likely to make good Pioneers. As candidates they are required to learn the “laws and customs” of the organisation, and show to their new comrades that they are observing them. Very often they are required to pass a formal examination on them. Only after such a period of testing is a candidate allowed to take the solemn promise, wear the badge and kerchief, and carry the membership card.

The organisation of the Pioneers is, as far as possible, closely attached to production in the factory or in the farm. Ten members constitute a “link”, four or five of which make a brigade. There are general meetings of each link and also of the brigade, to elect officers and discuss schemes of work. Each brigade is attached to a Comsomol cell, one of the members of which—young, physically active, full of life and a proletarian—is nominated to act as brigade leader. This is one of the ways in which

¹ The Little Octobrists have also their own laws and customs, viz. : “The Little Octobrists help the Pioneers, the Young Communists, Communists, Workmen and Peasants. The Little Octobrists strive to become Young Pioneers. Little Octobrists are careful to be neat and clean in body and clothes. Little Octobrists love to work.”

Comsomols discharge their duty of civic activity. Each brigade has its own soviet, consisting of the four or five link leaders, the brigade leader and a representative of the Comsomol cell. Each district committee of the Comsomols has a committee, the "Section on Pioneers", which directs and supervises the work of all the brigade leaders within its area; and the work of all the "Sections on Pioneers" is supervised by the corresponding committee on Pioneers which is appointed by the Central Committee of the whole organisation in the USSR, chosen at its biennial All-Union Comsomol Congress at Moscow.

The Little Octobrists have a parallel but simpler organisation. Five members form a link, which is given a Pioneer as leader. Five links form a group, to which is assigned a Comsomol as special group leader, appointed by the Comsomol cell to which the Pioneer unit is attached. Each Octobrist group forms an integral part of the Pioneer brigade. It should be added that the members of each link choose from among their own number an assistant leader to work with the Pioneer leader of the link and the Comsomol leader of the group.

It will be seen that from the bottom to the top of this organisation of youth, from 8 to 23 years of age, careful provision is made for unity of action, a graded leadership, continuous supervision by the seniors and control by the Party itself, through a special assistant secretary. Yet at the same time there is a constant stress upon initiative and independent activity by the links, cells, groups and brigades. Every member is expected and persistently urged to be an "activist", to be always doing something, and in particular to be constantly participating in the work undertaken by his unit. Games of all kinds, especially if of athletic nature, are not objected to, but each link or cell is expected to be actually performing some work useful in the building up of the socialist state. There is no end to the jobs that Pioneers find to do, or that Comsomols are pressed to undertake. They may clear away litter, sweep a street or help in a building operation. They may help to put down private as well as public drunkenness, and to "liquidate illiteracy" in their own or someone else's family. In the summer, where parties camp out in the woods, they will find it as good fun to help to get in the harvest as "to play at Indians". The elder boys and girls may form "shock brigades" in farm or factories, and thus usefully raise productivity. They swell the processions at demonstrations, and audiences at meetings, ready to help in any way required. And everywhere they march about behind their own skeleton bands, with much community singing and mutual speech-making.¹

¹ What is described as a "rousing address" was delivered by Madam Krupskaya at a conference of Comsomol workers among Pioneers in November 1933. "Lenin", she said, "always insisted on the need of seizing upon the main link in any given situation. The main link in the Pioneer detachment is its leader, who is appointed by the Comsomol cell. The leader should be able to exercise an influence on the children in his charge. Sound knowledge, political as well as general; social activity and the ability to approach children are the main qualifications for a Pioneer leader. The Young People should not

Most foreign observers are enthusiastic about this growing army of 10 or 12 million young people. It is not always remembered that they are the self-chosen *élite* of a much larger mass. Moreover, even among this *élite* there are numerous backsliders, who are constantly being weeded out. Those who persist and thrive under the discipline of organised association with their equals in age, manifest, as it seems, some significant shortcomings or defects, at any rate in manners. They may be thought "uppish" with their elders, and fanatically intolerant. It is very good to be devoted to hygienic living, but the habit of "opening windows in other people's houses" is complained of! In short, the enthusiastic Pioneer is apt to be, at any rate during certain years, a bit of a prig!

"These young people", says a recent American observer, "are formulating the answer to the question of what will happen when the older generation of revolutionaries, with their self-forgetting enthusiasm, is gone. They are engaged in a continuous revolution—destroying and replacing ancient ideas, attitudes and habits. . . . Soviet educators are saying that the youth who have grown up since the revolution constitute a new type. . . . They certainly have much clearer-cut mentality; they think more concretely and concisely. When you seek information from them, these younger men and women take out a pencil and ask for your exact question. Then rapidly they formulate their answers according to an exact outline, and usually you get precisely what you are after in the minimum of time. . . . Remembering the hours spent with small companies of these leaders of the masses in many places, one still feels the impact of their vitality; one realises also that it is as different from that of European students, as they, in their turn, are different from the students of the United States. The latter, with their doubting fear of life or their inability to find enjoyment unless it is paid for and provided by others, seem strangely world-weary alongside exuberant youth of more ancient lands, with their hikes and rest-houses; their unaffected group-singing and folk-dances. This quality of exuberance the Russians share; but

rest satisfied with formal education. Study must be continued in later life. In particular they should learn how to study, how to extract the maximum benefit from books and newspapers, as well as from observation. As a rifle is in battle, so is knowledge in general life. . . . The Pioneer should be an active social worker, thus providing an example for the children. He should firmly grasp the meaning of Lenin's words that the essence of communist morality is a readiness to sacrifice everything, one's life if needed, for the good of the working class. . . . The Pioneer leader should so approach an unruly child as to find out what interests him; then to stimulate and encourage that interest and so transfer his energy to new lines. . . . Their disdain for bourgeois child movements, especially the Boy Scouts, causes many Pioneer leaders to miss much that is instructive in their approach to the child. Their experience should be studied, of course, with discrimination. . . . It was not enough for the Comsomol cells to appoint the Pioneer leader, and to rest at that. The cell should provide him with facilities for self-improvement, and care for his material well-being" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 24, 1933).

Latterly, there has been some authoritative criticism of the magnitude of the demands for "social work" on the Pioneers and younger Comsomols. The young people, it was said, were being overstrained, and even over-excited, with the result that their education suffered, and even their health. It seems to have been directed that the pressure should be lightened; and that a watch should be kept for any evil result of excess.

they work while they study, and study while they work, uniting theory and practice, not in minor jobs whose outcome is private profit, but in a vast social upbringing. . . . They are enjoying life while they are changing it. . . . There shines from their eyes a concentrated and eager intensity such as I have never seen before outside a religious revival or a strike meeting. . . . Every American to whom I have talked, who has taught these youthful builders of socialism, agrees that the first and main difference between them and the more serious section of American college students lies in the fact that they are dominated by a great purpose. As a soviet educator put it, "they know where they are going; they know how; and they know why". . . . They know not only the transitional nature of the present period but to what it leads. . . . They regard the present conquest of the material means of life through new forms of organisation as the necessary preliminary to the opening up of a new freedom for the continuous development of all human capacities. . . . They have survived . . . the lean years of famine. . . . Their ruggedness has been filled with the greatest purpose that can enter into man. One feels that in them the life force has once again come to full floodtide. It is with this fact that those who dream of destroying what they are building must reckon."¹

The Comintern

Opposite the Moscow Kremlin, not inside its walls, and not to be confused, either, with the extensive offices of the Communist Party of the USSR, the visitor sees a considerable office building which is occupied by the "Comintern" or "Communist International". This Communist or "Third" International, dating from 1919, is—unlike its first and second predecessors²—neither in form nor in substance, a mere federation

¹ "Soviet Russia—Land of Youth", in *The Nation* (New York), August 3, 1932, by Harry F. Ward; see also his book *A Place of Profit* (1933).

² The first "International working men's association" was formed in London in 1864, under the influence of Karl Marx. It was considerably dislocated following on the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871, but lingered on until a formal dissolution in 1876 (*The History of the First International*, by G. M. Stekloff, 1928). It was reformed at Paris in 1889 (the "Second International") and soon attracted the affiliation of nearly all the Social Democratic Parties, as well as that of the principal trade unions of the world (except the United States). The Great War of 1914–1918, together with the ensuing dictatorships in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Germany, etc., have seriously damaged its influence. But already at the Prague Socialist Congress in 1912, Lenin was concerting, with the various "left-wing" sections, a new international organisation; and in March 1915 he expounded to a conference of Russian Socialists at Berne the necessity for a "proletarian" International. In September 1915, and April 1916, small conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal in Switzerland brought together representatives of socialist groups which had refused to support their governments in the war, and which wished to convert the struggle into one of proletarians against governments dominated by Imperialist Capitalism. In these conferences Lenin, with other Russian exiles, played a leading part in developing the idea of a new world organisation to replace the Second International. In January 1919, fifteen months after the Bolshevik conquest of power, the "first Communist International Congress" was summoned by wireless telegraphy from Petrograd, to meet at Moscow in March 1919 in order to "lay the foundation of a common fighting organ, which will be a uniting link and methodically lead the movement for the Communist International, which subordinates the interests of the movement in every separate country to the common

of national bodies, but an avowedly unified world organisation of the proletariat of all nations, all its members pledged to obey the orders of the central headquarters, wherever this may be situated. It is essential that the student should constantly bear in mind that it was not the government of a particular territory that the Bolsheviks had in view, or the dominion of a particular race. As we have described in a preceding chapter,¹ the conception of a territorial state, or of an empire extending over particular territories, was absent from their interpretation of Marxism.² What Lenin and his friends visualised was the establishment, in one country after another, almost as a continuous process, of a particular organisation of human society, what they termed the classless society. This was to be a new civilisation for the whole human race, in which the organisation of industry by the capitalist's employment of wage-labour for his own profit would be completely abolished, to be replaced by collective ownership and administration for the common good, on the basis of as near an approach to complete communism as might prove practicable for the time being.

It was with this view that the "Communist International" was established at Moscow in 1919 as a "general staff of world revolution", by a congress to which working-class organisations of all the world had been, by wireless telegraphy, summoned to send representatives. About 60 delegates were present when the congress assembled in March 1919; but the only body effectively represented was the Russian Communist Party, the few non-Russians being mostly individuals without mandate or influence. At subsequent congresses, down to the latest in 1935, always held at Moscow, delegates from the Party groups in scores of different countries have attended, and various of them have been placed upon the large executive committees by which the organisation is, in form, governed. In fact, however, the total membership even professedly represented from other countries has never reached as much as one-fourth of the membership of the Communist Party of the USSR. The congress and all its committees have always been completely dominated by the principal representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, who, as we have seen, also concentrate in their hands the supreme direction of the government of their own country.

It is therefore not without reason that writers on the constitution of the USSR include the Comintern in their description of its constitutional structure,³ as they do the Sovnarkom.

interests of the revolution on an international scale" (*Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1919; *L'Internationale ouvrière et socialiste*, vol. i., 584 pp., 1907, issued by Le Bureau socialiste international; *Secret History of the International Working Men's Association*, by Onslow Yorke (W. H. Dixon), 1872, 166 pp.; *The Workers' International*, by R. W. Postgate, 1920, 125 pp.; *The Two Internationals*, by R. Palme Dutt, 1920; and see the section entitled "Contradictory Trends in Foreign Policy" in our subsequent Chapter XII. on "The Good Life").

¹ See pp. 107-108, 118-120.

² For this reason we chose as the title of this book *Soviet Communism*, and not "Soviet Russia", or "The USSR".

³ For instance, *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, chap. xiii.; who also quotes *Konstitutsia SSSR i RSSR*, by S. Dranitsyn.

The formal constitution of the Comintern puts the relation in quite a different way. The supreme authority rests, not with the Soviet Union, but with the world congress of the Comintern, meeting every two, four or seven years, and composed of delegates of all the various affiliated Communist Parties throughout the world. The delegates of the Communist Party of the USSR have proportionately no greater representation, and nominally no more authority, than those from any other country. All alike are peremptorily required, under penalty of expulsion, to obey the orders from time to time issued by the Executive Committee which the Congress elects. The "Twenty-one Points" that Lenin expounded to the Second Congress of the Communist International, as the indispensable conditions on which alone membership could be allowed, are on this subject even more than usually incisive. "All decisions of the congresses of the Communist International, as well as the decisions of its Executive Committee, are binding upon all the parties belonging to the Communist International. . . . The programme of every party belonging to the Communist International must be sanctioned by the regular congress of the Communist International, or by its Executive Committee."¹ Members, who have to pay regular small dues, are admitted by the several affiliated "sections" of the Comintern, which are required to describe themselves as Communist Parties. Every member in such a Party is supposed to belong to a nucleus or cell, formed in the factory or other establishment in which he is employed. The primary duty of the nucleus is to convert the workers to communism by demonstrating the futility of every other form of organisation, especially the trade unions under their present leadership; nevertheless to urge them to remain members of these useless unions in order to upset their futile action; and, in particular, to foster "mass strikes", without much regard for the likelihood of their immediate success, as a means of "educating" the workers into revolutionary "class consciousness".²

It need not be said that the periodical congress of the Communist International is as little fitted to act as a deliberative or legislative body as the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, or as that of the All-Union Congress of Soviets. The crowd of so-called delegates from many countries, which at the congress in 1928 numbered not far short of a thousand and at that of 1935 about half that number, are

¹ "Conditions of Membership" (The "Twenty-one Points of Lenin") as adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International (*Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 766).

This complete centralisation of authority in Moscow has been maintained. In 1928 it was reaffirmed. "Unlike the Social Democratic Second International, each section of which submits to the discipline of its own national bourgeoisie and of its own fatherland, the sections of the Communist International submit to only one discipline, viz. international proletarian discipline, which guarantees victory in the struggle of the world's workers for world proletarian dictatorship" (Statement of "the strategy and tactics of the Communist International in the struggle for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", adopted by the Congress of 1928; *Programme of the Communist International*, New York, 1929).

² *Bolshevism for Beginners*, by P. Kerzhentsev, 1931, pp. 115-117.

necessarily, for the most part, unacquainted with each other. They meet only every few years for a week or two. Such an assembly could be no more than a parade or a demonstration. The Congress, in fact, was summoned to listen to a series of lengthy declamatory speeches by the leading members of the Party in the USSR, who entirely dominated the proceedings; whilst duly selected speakers from other countries came to the platform, sometimes to make complaints, but usually to fire off similar orations. Long statements of general policy called theses or programmes, couched in revolutionary phraseology, and specially abusive of every other kind of socialist or labour organisation, either national or international, were prepared in committees, to be submitted to the congress, to be adopted without detailed examination¹ or dissent, chiefly in order that they might be published in several languages in the *International Press Correspondence*, from which they were copied in the hundreds of little journals throughout the world that are under communist control.

The Executive Committee (IKKI or ECCI) that the Congress appoints, and to which it delegates all its authority until the next Congress, is, we think, less well informed, less well served by its agents, and therefore as a whole less effective than the corresponding standing executives of the USSR Communist Party and Soviets. It is composed, we were told, of between one and five delegates from each country, the USSR having no more than the number allowed to France, Germany and Great Britain. We have the opinion that it is, and has always been, dominated by the same little group of old-revolutionary Bolsheviks. One of them has always been its president.² It meets as a plenum only every six months, when half the membership constitutes a quorum, so that the current administration, and even the frequent decisions as to policy, are in practice committed to the standing presidium of which Stalin himself is a member. This inner executive, which should meet at least once a fortnight, and which appoints the political secretariat, is even more completely dominated by the representatives of the Kremlin than the plenum of the Executive Committee or the Comintern congress itself.³ The so-called representatives, on the executive committee and on its presidium, of the foreign sections of the Communist International are for the most part, and have hitherto always been, persons of little public standing among the wage-earners of their own countries. Most of them find it impossible to attend the six-monthly meetings in Moscow, at which they are

¹ "Foreigners", said Lenin at the Fourth Congress in 1923, "have to learn how to understand all that we have written about the organisation and upbuilding of the Communist Parties, which they have subscribed to without reading and without understanding it" (*Fourth Congress of the Communist International* (November 1923), *Abridged Report*, London, p. 119; see *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, 1929, p. 761).

² From 1919 to 1927 it was Zinoviev; since then D. Z. Manuilsky, a member of the Central Committee, has acted.

³ According to the invariable pattern in the USSR, the Comintern Congress also appoints a Control Commission, independent of the Executive Committee, which is supposed to investigate "matters concerning the unity of the sections affiliated", as well as the conduct of individual members—that is to say, to enforce the orthodox doctrine.

represented by substitutes resident in that city, who may speak but not vote.¹

We shall deal in a subsequent chapter² with the relations between the Comintern and the Soviet Foreign Office (Narkomindel). Here we need only express the opinion that the importance of the Comintern, whether in its international aspect, or as a part of the working constitution of the USSR, is no longer what it was. Its proceedings do not fit in so well with a policy of world peace as they may have done with a policy of world revolution. In a subsequent chapter we shall discuss how far the fundamental aim of a world revolution has been abandoned or substantially modified by the proceedings of the Seventh Congress, held, after many postponements, at Moscow in August 1935. Meanwhile the subventions that Moscow used to supply, under various designations, to many of the sections in other countries, appear to have dwindled down to almost insignificant amounts, chiefly for legal defence of manual workers prosecuted for their communist opinions.

The Nature of the Communist Party

We have done our best to set out precisely the constitution and functions of the Communist Party. Merely as a social institution, it is a

¹ The published materials for an account of the Communist International are, in half a dozen languages, abundant, so far as concerns manifestos, programmes, theses and "directives" to the Communist Parties of all countries. But the internal administration of the Comintern, and the actual proceedings of its control commission, Executive Committee and presidium remain entirely secret. The best single source for published documents is *International Press Correspondence*, issued by the Party almost weekly, in English as well as in other languages, primarily as free "copy" for the hundreds of little communist journals throughout the world, but supplied also to individual subscribers. The proceedings (abridged) of most of the Comintern congresses have been published as separate volumes in English and other languages. Batsell (*Soviet Rule in Russia*) and S. N. Harper (*Civic Instruction in Soviet Russia*) contain the most useful descriptions of the Comintern in volume form known to us; but for early history see also *The Second and Third Internationals and the Vienna Union* (1922), and *The Two Internationals*, by R. Palme Dutt, 1920, together with the histories cited above.

The finances of the Comintern for 1931 were thus summarised in dollars and cents, for publication by the Executive Committee:

	Income		Expenditure
Brought forward .	61,089.30	Administrative expenses .	372,347.80
Membership dues from 41 parties and 3,700,788 members	1,128,236.40	Postage and telegraph .	38,387.75
Collections and donations .	46,371.80	Subsidies to party newspapers, publishing houses and cultural work .	756,900.00
Receipts from publications, etc.	59,618.30	Travelling expenses .	52,732.00
		Carried forward .	74,948.25
TOTALS	1,295,315.80		1,295,315.80

YOL and 17 Parties were exempted from payment.

(*International Press Correspondence*, October 26, 1932, p. 1007.)

² See "Contradictory Trends in Foreign Policy", in Chapter XII. in Part II., "The Good Life".

specimen of the greatest interest to the student. Is it a new type in the world, and what are its characteristics ?

As we indicated at the opening of this chapter, the Communist Party in the USSR, in its structure and in some of its leading features, has a distinct resemblance to the religious orders established in past ages in connection with Buddhism, Christianity and other world religions. It is literally outside of the legal constitution of the secular state, and professedly independent of it. It repudiates any national boundaries, and claims a sphere that is world-wide, and independent of nationality, race or colour. It is self-selective in its recruitment, in that it augments its membership exclusively by co-option. It is pyramidal in form, broadly democratic at the base, but directing its self-management from the top downwards. Its test for membership is fundamentally that of acceptance of an ideology of the nature of a creed, from which is evolved an exceptional code of conduct, not imposed on the ordinary citizen, which all its members must obey, the ultimate sanction being expulsion from membership. It has even added, in its new category of "sympathisers", something analogous to the "lay brothers" of the religious orders. It has in substance, though not in name, a "holy writ", the authority and veracity of which must not be questioned, but which is subject at all times to authoritative interpretation. By means of this interpretation the organisation, through an elaborate hierarchy, directs the ideology and conduct of a membership of colossal magnitude. This membership has a distinct vocation to which it is pledged; accompanied by what are equivalent to vows of obedience and poverty, and by authoritative customs constituting a penumbra around the ordinary citizen's creed and code of conduct, a penumbra which may or may not be enforced by the legislature and judiciary of the country in which the organisation exists. Of the intensity of faith of the Party, and the strength of the devotion of its members, often leading to the greatest self-sacrifice and even martyrdom, no candid student can have any doubts. Finally, it tends to erect one man as its head, who is nominally no more than an ordinary member, and may not hold the highest or any office at all in the State, but who reaches the apex of the pyramid by popular acclamation, based on election, at first direct and afterwards indirect; but who, once chosen, is professedly the chief director, and who becomes, in time practically irremovable by the membership.

There are, however, other features in the Communist Party which definitely mark it off from any of the religious orders that have ever existed in the world; and which make it an entirely new and original type of social institution. In particular, there is one great unlikeness of the Communist Party which accounts for the indignation always manifested, by communists on the one hand and by Christians on the other, whenever it is suggested that this new organisation is of the nature of a religious order. Its purpose and its ideology (which we must not call a creed) are not only different from those of the religious orders past or

present, but also fundamentally antagonistic to every one of them. The Communist Party flatly rejects not only Christianity and Islam, but also every form of Deism or Theism. It will have nothing to do with the supernatural. It admits nothing to be true which cannot be demonstrated by the "scientific method" of observation, experiment, ratiocination and verification. Unlike any religion in the world's history, Soviet Communism, as we shall describe in a subsequent chapter,¹ is whole-heartedly based on science, the newest and most up-to-date science, meaning man's ever-expanding knowledge of the universe, which it eagerly adopts and confidently applies to every task or problem, and to the advancement of which it gives all honour and devotes considerable public funds. In fact, in the nature of its mentality, as in the direction of its activities, the Communist Party reminds us less of a religious order than of the organisation of the learned professions of Western Europe, such as those of the lawyers and doctors, engineers and public accountants. Like these and many other professional bodies, the Communist Party concerns itself exclusively with the affairs of this world. It resembles these bodies also in constituting an exclusive corporation, selecting, training, disciplining and expelling its own members, according to a code of conduct of its own invention. Where it differs from these organised professions is in standing outside the constitution of its country, and, whilst its members are individually subject to the law of the land like other citizens, in the corporate body itself being entirely free from outside control. Moreover, unlike the vocations of the lawyers and doctors, that which the Communist Party assumes, namely, public leadership, puts the ordinary citizen under no obligation to invoke the services of its members, even where these are most needed!

Why, in Soviet Communism, National Leadership requires an elaborate Organisation

The political student may ask what it is in the USSR that calls for such an elaborate organisation of leadership. No other country, whether governed by an autocrat or by a committee of Parliament, has felt it necessary to provide, in this way, deliberately and avowedly, for the continuous intellectual guidance, not merely of its people as a whole, but of all the people.

Thoughtful communists point out, as part of the explanation, that the Soviet Government differs from every other government in the world, in that it has a fanatically held and all-overriding purpose of social and economic change. Most governments have had no purpose of change of any sort. Their object is primarily the "maintenance of order"—which means the existing order—together with defence, or the repelling of any attack from within or without. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, avowedly exists for the deliberate purpose of changing the existing

¹ Chapter XI., Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

order, not eventually, at some distant date, but actually, and within the present generation ; and that not in mere generalities but in the most intimate circumstances of the people's lives. In the USSR, if the mass of the population is to be lifted out of barbarism to an advanced civilisation, it is held that the whole people must be freed from the subjection and control inevitably associated with the private ownership of the means of production. No less necessary is it that the aggregate wealth production of the whole community should be greatly and continuously increased ; that, to this end, the primitive processes of agriculture, as of manufacturing industry, must be transformed by the universal application of mechanical, physical and chemical science ; and that manual labour must be, as far as possible, superseded by power-driven machinery, without the toll elsewhere levied on production by functionless " owners " of either land or capital, or other " parasitic " consumers. How gigantic is the task thus undertaken by the Soviet Government can be realised only by those who take the trouble to estimate what nine-tenths of the population between the Baltic and the Pacific were like in 1913 ; or what were the economic and social conditions of the country as a whole after the Civil War of 1918 - 1920 and the famine of 1921.

Now, it is a feature of this task—a task such as no government has ever before dreamt of undertaking—that it cannot be completely accomplished without the active cooperation of practically every family in the land. Just as in a modern war it is not only the armies whose energies must be coordinated to the common end, but nearly the whole working population ; so the great struggle with nature for an immediate increase in economic productivity, without the so-called automatic adjustment of supply and demand on which capitalism so disastrously relies, cannot afford the luxury, either of non-participants, or of disunity among the executants. In war-time complete national coordination is sought by autocratic commands, to which obedience is secured by drastic penalties. The task of transforming the social and economic life of all the people is, however, different and more difficult than that of repelling an invading army ; and it cannot be achieved by peremptory commands and prohibitions. It involves changing the content of the minds of the whole people. It demands universal education and persistent propaganda, patient argument and personal example, brought to bear on every individual, at every age, in every place.

Such a transformation of society is, it is clear, not a change that is within the capacity of a mere dictatorship, even if this is exercised by the greatest of men. It is, in fact, not a case of creating " a leader " or " the leader ". It demands the active participation of millions of instructors. The lives to be influenced, the minds to be changed, the personal habits to be taught, can be dealt with, for the most part, only by direct personal contact in the hours of work as in the hours of leisure. In the USSR it is not the statesmen at the top who actually exercise this peculiar power, though they may direct it ; but the million or more of picked working

men and working women members of the Communist Party, whose ubiquitous personal intercourse with their fellows never ceases.

Western students will recognise that something can be done by the expedient of allowing and inducing practically the whole adult population to participate in the administration, in one way or another, so that the changes to which they are led come as the outcome of their own discussions, and are gradually embodied in the local regulations that they themselves formulate. That is one great advantage of the extraordinary multiformity of the constitutional structure of the USSR, with its millions of small meetings during each year of fellow-workers or neighbours asking questions or passing resolutions ; and of its threefold representation, in the several elected councils, of Man as a Citizen, Man as a Producer and Man as a Consumer. But a public meeting, large or small, without intellectual leadership, is but a mob. Such a meeting, in countries of long political experience, often spontaneously throws up its own temporary leader. But such transient leaders, the outcome of a million meetings, will, of themselves, certainly not create any uniform current of public opinion. It is the business of the members of the Communist Party everywhere to proffer to the crowd the guidance that it needs.

It has sometimes been argued that this persistent persuasion and personal example may be supplied, in capitalist countries, by the well-disposed members of superior social classes, such as the landed aristocracy, the retired officers of the army and navy, or the commercial community. Such superior social classes have ceased to exist in the USSR ; and there is no reason to believe that, if they did exist, they would honestly and loyally cooperate with the purpose of the Soviet Government, which demands, indeed, their complete elimination.

There seemed, to the Bolshevik authorities, no alternative. There would be no leadership given to the people, such as was required—a guidance continuous, persuasive, ubiquitous and consistent—unless it was deliberately planned and provided by an organisation for the purpose. Communists to-day believe that the Communist Party, with half its members always at the bench or in the mine, and its schemes of policy carefully worked out after elaborate debate in the various representative committees and conferences, often with prolonged publicity to allow of widespread criticism, is an organisation well suited to its purpose. Its leadership is plainly not less persuasive, but actually more persuasive, in that it is exercised less by peremptory laws, or even by universal schooling, than by personal example, intellectual argument and continuous propaganda. Whether or not a community under such guidance—a community so markedly unlike any other that has ever existed—can properly be described as a Democracy, will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY ?

ONE difficulty of accurately assessing and defining the essential characteristics of the constitutional structure of the USSR is the rapidity with which it changes. Even the so-called "Fundamental Law" defining the rights and obligations of citizenship has nothing of the rigidity of a formal constitution embodied in a special instrument, unchangeable except by some elaborate process. Any alteration that seems to be required need not wait for a plebiscite, or even a general election. Much of it is independent of any action by a legislative body. Whether or not the All-Union Congress of Soviets is in session, there are always at work standing committees empowered to make without delay any alterations, in any part of the constitution, affecting any section of the population, in any part of the country, that changing circumstances require. And in so vast a territory, with so huge and so varied a population, going through so tremendous an economic development, the circumstances are always changing. Hence the constitution of the USSR is far and away the most mobile of any known to political science. We cannot to-day simply take it for granted that it is supremely important that a constitution should be rigid. It is certainly not clear that the mobility of the working constitution in the USSR during the past decade has been, in itself, detrimental to the progress of its inhabitants in health or economic prosperity ; or that it has incurred popular disapproval.¹

The characteristic mobility of the constitution of Soviet Communism is, however, all the more perplexing to the student in that the several parts of the constitution change independently of each other ; and change, moreover, at different rates and in different directions. Thus, the hierarchy of soviets seemed relatively stable in form and in substance. It grew, indeed, in volume. The continually increasing electorate, the constantly rising total of votes cast at the innumerable electoral meetings, and the perpetual multiplication of councils of one or other kind, and of councillors to man them, involves the personal participation in government by an ever-increasing number of the citizens, women as well as men. To this characteristic of an ever-widening participation we shall recur. In 1935 another kind of widening was announced for adoption before the next

¹ It is interesting to notice that many of the advantages claimed for rigidity in constitutions have to do either (a) with the private ownership of land or other forms of personal wealth, which it is thought desirable to defend against confiscatory legislation or executive action ; or else (b) with the making of private profit, which might be hampered by unexpected or frequent changes in social institutions ; or else (c) with the maintenance of the privileges of a privileged class, whether aristocrats, landed proprietors, or a "superior" race. In a community in which neither personal wealth nor private profit-making exists, and no class has legal privileges, constitutional rigidity loses many of its supporters.

general election ; namely, the substitution, for indirect election upon a not quite equal franchise, of direct election by an entirely equal franchise, in an electorate that may then approach the colossal total of one hundred millions.

The continual growth in the volume of manufacturing industry, mining, transport, electrification, mechanised agriculture, social services and governmental departments, with the corresponding increase in the number of wage or salary receivers, has led not only to an ever-mounting trade union membership, but also to a continuous advance in trade union functions. The great work done by trade union committees in the administration of accident prevention, labour recruiting, factory schools and technical classes, social clubs, recreation and holiday arrangements, and all forms of social insurance, was emphasised in 1933 by the abolition of the office of People's Commissar of Labour, directly controlled by the Sovnarkom ; and the transfer of the direction of the actual administration of the huge ministerial departments concerned with every branch of social insurance to the All-Union Trade Union Council (AUCCTU).

An analogous growth is to be noted during the past few years in the less completely organised hierarchies of the manufacturing artels and of the widespread kolkhosi of the shore fishermen. During the same years an enormous extension has been made in the collectivisation of agriculture, on the one hand into sovkhosi, or state farms, and on the other into kolkhosi, or collective farms, principally of the artel type. Among the collective farms only the base of the pyramid has yet been laid, and the development of tiers of congresses of delegates for rayon, oblast, republic and All-Union deliberations has been postponed. In the consumers' cooperative movement, the rate and kind of change is difficult to assess with precision. Whilst continuing to increase its colossal membership, and even its aggregate volume of transactions, it has been losing ground in various directions, partly to those manufacturing trusts which do their own retailing ; partly to the " commercial " shops set up by the government itself ; partly to the republic and municipal soviets which multiply their retail " selling points " ; and partly, as elsewhere described, to the trade union hierarchy so far as concerns not only the retailing of household commodities but also the production of foodstuffs for the workers in the larger establishments. Moreover, a marked feature of the last few years, to be described in a subsequent chapter,¹ has been the growth and encouragement of wholesale trading between these different forms of organisation, in order that each of them may be in a better position to supply its individual customers. This has resulted in a vast network of free contracts, based on competition in an open market, among collective farms and trade unions and industrial artels and consumers' cooperative societies, each of them functioning alternately as an association of producers and an association of consumers.

Amid this unending flux, the student must note the significance of the

¹ Chapter IX. in Part II., " In Place of Profit ".

universal adoption and continuous retention, often without legislative prescription, for all the various parts of the constitution, of the common and nearly unchanging pattern of organisation which we have described, termed by its originators democratic centralism. This pattern, now pervading the whole social structure of the USSR, is not found in any other part of the world, nor in any previous constitution. Another characteristic of this pattern of social organisation is its extreme fluidity. The different parts of the constitution have often been set going one by one, by spontaneous activity, in areas hitherto without government—and, for that matter, also in areas professedly under other governments—without proclamation or formal authority, and irrespective of other parts of the USSR constitution, which have sometimes followed at later dates. Thus, in various popular accounts of the gradual organisation of primitive regions in the northern forest districts or in the recesses of Kamchatka we see the holding of a village meeting which elects a soviet, linking up with other soviets, and eventually sending delegates to the congress of soviets at Moscow. Presently the local residents coagulate as consumers into a cooperative society which gets eventually into communication with *Centrosoyus*. Stray members of the Communist Party form a nucleus or cell, now styled a primary Party organ, and presently constitute themselves a Party Group in the local soviet or in the cooperative society's committee; and they conform their activities to the latest "directives" from the Politbureau or Central Committee at Moscow. When mining or transport or manufacturing industry creates a class of wage-earners, these join their several trade unions, irrespective of municipal frontiers or racial differences; and they then begin to send delegates to the hierarchy of indirectly elected trade union councils, conferences and congresses, of which the highest periodically assembles at Moscow. The constitution formed on this pattern may, we suggest, appropriately be termed a multiform democracy, organised on the basis of universal participation with democratic centralism; a constitutional form so loose as to be exceptionally mobile and, for that reason, endowed with an almost irresistible quality of expansiveness.

In describing, in separate chapters, the organisation in the USSR of Man as a Citizen, Man as a Producer, Man as a Consumer and Man in the Vocation of Leadership, we may have seemed sometimes to imply that all these separate parts of the constitution of Soviet Communism are of equal status, each exercising supreme authority in its own sphere. This is not so. The Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, representing the totality of the inhabitants in the USSR, and not merely any fraction of them, stands supreme over all the ramifications of the trade unions, the consumers' cooperative movement and the various kinds of associations of owner-producers, just as it does over the tier upon tier of soviets.¹ As for the relation in which the

¹ It is, however, significant of the persistent striving towards participation and consent, that when alterations are made in the constitution or statutory obligations of either the trade union hierarchy or the consumers' cooperative movement, these authoritative

All-Union Congress of Soviets stands to the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party in the USSR, what can be said is that there has been no attempt by the soviet legislature to make laws for, or to interfere with the activities of, the Communist Party. The practical independence of the soviet authorities is not so apparent. Since 1930 all important decrees of the USSR Central Executive Committee or the Sovnarkom, whether legislative or administrative, have been issued over the signature, not of their president (Kalinin or Molotov) alone, but also over that of Stalin as General Secretary of the Communist Party. It is, moreover, significant that these decisive acts are, in all important cases, initiated within the Politbureau of the Communist Party; and they receive in due course the endorsement either of the Central Committee or of the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party. Indeed, as we explained in the preceding chapter, the Communist Party is perpetually issuing "directives", great or small, to its members exercising authority or influence within all the other organisations of the state. In the present connection it must be recalled that this remarkable companionship is not, in theory, an organisation within the USSR. It professes to be an organisation of the vanguard of the proletariat throughout the world, knowing neither racial nor geographical limits. Its highest authority is the periodical congress of the "Third International", representing the Communist Parties of all the countries of the world. This body acts normally by the directives which the Comintern issues to the faithful in all countries. It aims, in fact, at a world supremacy over all the administrations established by the proletariat of the several nations or countries. The historical student will be reminded of the supremacy which the Pope, as the head of the Catholic Church, for centuries maintained over Christendom. Whether, on the occasion of some great crisis, there will arise any effective rivalry, or any disturbing friction, between the secular government of the USSR and the ideological companionship or order which to-day dominates the situation, may be left as a fascinating problem for the sociologist of the future.¹

decrees are normally discussed, decided and actually signed, not only by Kalinin or Molotov or other authorities representative of the soviet, but also by the leading official representing the trade unions or the consumers' cooperative movement respectively.

¹ The question of the possibility of the governmental organisation becoming emancipated from the control of the Communist Party has more than once been discussed within the Party. "In 1925", so the French historian Henry Rollin puts it, Stalin himself pointed out the "danger of the disappearance of the tutelage of the Party". He showed how greatly the governmental organs, both administrative and economic, steadily increased in magnitude and influence with the reconstruction of the country. "The more they grow in importance, the more their pressure on the Party is felt, the more they take up an attitude of resistance to the Party. Hence the danger of the state apparatus shaking itself free from the Party." Against this danger Stalin pressed for a regrouping "of forces, and a redistribution of directing active members among the governmental organs, so as to ensure the directing influence of the Party in this new situation. This was the origin of the disgrace of Rykov, president of the Council of Commissars, and of Tomskey, president of the trade unions, as well as of the purging of the soviet apparatus that was completed in June 1929, in order to seat firmly the domination that Stalin exercised in the name of the Party" (*La Révolution russe*, vol. i., "Les Soviets", by Henri Rollin, Paris, 1931, pp. 269-270).

"The Party makes no concealment of the tutelage in which it holds the soviet organs.

We have to add, as a further elaboration of the constitution of the USSR, some reference to the circumambient atmosphere of voluntary organisation which it is perpetually creating and developing as a part of itself. Some people have asserted that government activity kills voluntarism. In the USSR, on the contrary, every government activity seems to create a vastly greater voluntary activity, which the people themselves organise up to a high point, always along the lines and in support of the government's own purpose and plan; always and everywhere led and directed by members of the Communist Party. We despair of conveying in a few pages any adequate idea of the magnitude, the variety or the range of action of these voluntary organisations linked up or intertwined with one or other government department.¹ We need not repeat our description of the ten million or more young people voluntarily enrolled as Little Octobrists, Pioneers and Consomols, in subordination to the extensive membership of the Party. We may more conveniently begin with the specifically patriotic society, formed "to cooperate in defence of the revolution" (OSO), and another "for aviation and chemical industries" (Aviakhim), both now merged in one huge contributing membership of a dozen millions (Osoaviakhim). These millions of members in village or city form cells, or sections, or circles, or corners, coordinated in a whole series of provincial and central councils. They are all pledged to active personal cooperation in the defence of the country, in peace-time as well as in war, against foreign invasion or external pressure. They seek to arouse general interest in foreign affairs by lectures, literature and discussion. They study military science, especially aerial bombing and chemical warfare. They form clubs for rifle practice and aviation. They maintain specialist museums and libraries, and "defence homes", which are practically social clubs. They have collected considerable sums for building additional aeroplanes for presentation to the Red Air Force. Organised bands of members have participated in the training manoeuvres of the Red Army. Other bands have, with equal zeal, undertaken the clearing of particular districts from noxious insects. Out of the vast membership, several thousand local societies for regional study have emerged, devoting themselves to exhaustive surveys of the physical and economic characteristics of their own neighbourhood, partly for the benefit of the local schools, in which regional study has its place.

Vying in size with Osoaviakhim is the League of the Godless, for the emancipation of the backward part of the population from the religion

Thus, on the check to collectivisation in March 1930, the Central Committee of the Party issued direct instructions of a purely governmental kind by a circular addressed to all the Party organisations and published in the entire soviet press on March 15. The official governmental organs could do more than put these decisions in a more official form a few days later" (*La Révolution russe*, vol. i., "Les Soviets", by Henri Rollin, Paris, 1931, p. 278).

¹ More detailed accounts of voluntary organisations in the USSR will be conveniently found in *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* (1929) and *Making Bolsheviks* (1931), both by S. N. Harper; *New Minds. New Men*, by Thomas Woody (1932); *Die Jugend in Sowjet-russland*, by Klaus Mehnert (1932), translated as *Youth in Soviet Russia* (1933).

that seems to the Marxist mere superstition, benumbing or distracting the spirit of man. This entirely voluntary organisation, made up for the most part of young people of either sex, corresponds essentially to the nineteenth-century National Secular Society of Great Britain; but enormously transcends it in activity, as well as in magnitude and range of operations. Its millions of members, organised in cells or branches from one end of the USSR to the other, campaign actively against the various churches and their religious practices; circulating atheistic literature; pouring scorn on any but a scientific interpretation of nature; clearing the icons out of the homes, and weaning the boys and girls alike from churchgoing and from the celebration of religious festivals.¹ We should fail to appreciate either the magnitude or the dogmatic intolerance of the crusade against supernaturalism in the USSR, conducted by these militant atheists, if we compared it with anything less than the campaign against atheism and heathendom carried on in all their fields of action by all the missionary societies and religious orders of all the Christian churches put together.

Another society of colossal magnitude, claiming indeed many millions of members, is the International Society for Assistance to Revolutionaries in other countries (MOPR). This has for its object, not only to bring "the broad masses into contact with the world-revolution", but also "to enable them to come to the assistance of those who are fighting for it". It disseminates information of doubtful accuracy about the progress of communism in all countries, but it is most interested in rebellions and riots, strikes and the various kinds of "martyrdom" to which, as it is alleged, the ruling classes everywhere condemn their working-class victims. The tens of thousands of branches of MOPR collect funds for the assistance of sufferers all over the world, from those in the prisons of Hungary or Poland to "Sacco and Vanzetti" and "the Scottsborough negroes". We could mention dozens of other voluntary organisations of the most varied nature. There is a "Down with Illiteracy" society, and a "Hands off China" society; a "Friends of Children" society (ODD), and a "Society for settling Jews on the Land" (OZET); a gigantic "Peasant Society for Mutual Assistance" (KOV), and a whole movement of working women's and peasants' conferences, to which tens of thousands of villages send delegates, and in which everything specially interesting to women is discussed and assisted and promoted. Nor must we omit the immense membership of all the various societies arranging every kind of athletic sports, under the supervision and with the constant encouragement of the Supreme Council for Physical Culture in the USSR, appointed by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), and the People's Commissars for Education in all the constituent and autonomous republics. It is active personal participation in games and competitions that is promoted, among an aggregate membership of all races running into tens of millions, in

¹ See the detailed account in *Religion and Communism*, by J. F. Hecker (1933); and see our Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind", especially the section headed "Anti-Godism".

Asia as well as in Europe ; not merely the organisation of spectacles at which the members look on, although this factor in the habit of athleticism is not neglected. Gigantic stadiums are being built out of public funds in many of the cities, including a " Middle Asian Central Stadium " at Tashkent. Even more remarkable is it to learn that the members of the sports associations include in their activities the rendering of personal assistance to the agricultural and transport departments, whenever required. " Uzbek, Tadjik and Turkoman athletes ", we read, " have helped considerably in the repairing of locomotives, in cotton planting and in harvesting, in the re-election of the soviets and in the quick response to the new internal loan." ¹

Whilst unable to exclude from our statement of the constitution some account of these auxiliary voluntary activities, we hesitate to make any estimate of their net worth. They take up time and energy. They may even distract attention from more urgent problems. But their colossal magnitude and ubiquitous activities make the voluntary organisations a very important part of the social structure. There can be no doubt about their enormous educational effect upon the half-awakened masses which still make up so large a part of the population of the USSR—especially upon the " deaf villages " of the interior, and upon what Marx and Lenin termed the " idiocy of village life ". The sharing in public affairs which the vast membership of these voluntary organisations secures, and the independent action which each cell or section, group or corner, learns to take in cooperation with the various departments of the soviet administration, constitute an essential part of that widespread " participation " in government which seems to us one of the most characteristic notes of Soviet Communism. It is, more than anything else, this almost universal personal participation, through an amazing variety of channels, that justifies the designation of it as a multiform democracy.

The Meaning of Dictatorship

Can the constitution of the USSR, as analysed in the preceding chapters, be correctly described as a dictatorship? Here we must deal one by one with the various meanings given to this word. In the popular British use of the term, a dictatorship means government by the will of a single person ; and this, as it happens, corresponds with the authoritative dictionary meaning, in strict accord with the undoubted historical derivation.² It is clear that, in form, there is nothing in the constitution of the

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, June 29, 1933.

² The *New English Dictionary* gives the following meanings: *Dictator*—" A ruler or governor whose word is law ; an absolute ruler of a state . . . a person exercising absolute authority of any kind or in any sphere ; one who authoritatively prescribes a course of action or dictates what is to be done ". *Dictatorship*—" The office or dignity of a dictator ".

" A dictatorship is the most natural government for seasons of extraordinary peril, when there appears a man fit to wield it " (Arnold's *History of Rome*, vol. i. p. 446, 1838).

USSR at all resembling the Roman office of dictator; or, indeed, any kind of government by the will of a single person. On the contrary, the universal pattern shows even an exaggerated devotion to collegiate decision. In the judicial system, from the highest court to the lowest, there is nowhere an arbitrator, a magistrate or a judge sitting alone, but always a bench of three, two of whom at least must agree in any decision or judgment or sentence.¹ In municipal administration there is no arbitrary mayor or burgomaster or "city manager"—not even a high salaried official wielding the authority of a British Town Clerk—but always a presidium and one or more standing committees, the members of each of which have to be continuously consulted by its president; or else a specially chosen commission, all the members of which have equal rights. Moreover, all of them have to be incessantly reporting in person their proceedings to the larger elected soviet, or its standing executive committee, from which they have received their appointment. From one end of the hierarchy to the other, the members of every council or committee, including its president, can always be "recalled" without notice, by a resolution passed by the body (or at a meeting of the electorate) to which they owe their office. At any moment, therefore, anyone taking executive action may find himself summarily superseded by his collectively chosen successor.

And if we pass from the soviet hierarchy, with all its tiers of councils, and its innumerable proliferations of committees, and commissions, and People's Commissars, and other executive officers—which collectively exercise the supreme authority in the state—to the semi-autonomous hierarchies finally subject to this supreme authority, whether they are composed of trade unions or of consumers' cooperatives, or of manufacturing artels or collective farms, or of cooperative hunters or fishermen, we find, as we have shown, always the same pattern of organisation. Nowhere, in all this vast range of usually autonomous, but finally subordinate authorities, do we discover anything involving or implying government by the will of a single person. On the contrary, there is everywhere elaborate provision, not only for collegiate decision, but also, whether by popular election or by appointment for a given term, or by the universal right to recall, for collective control of each individual executant. Thus,

¹ It may be added that even the OGPU was not governed by the will of a single person. It was a commission of persons, appointed annually by the USSR Sovnarkom (or Cabinet). Its last president was reported to be somewhat infirm, who, far from being even as much of a personal influence as his predecessor Dzerzhinsky, was reported to leave the control rather too much to the other members of the commission. Its practice was never to condemn people to death, exile or imprisonment without formal trial by a collegium of three judges; and even then the sentences had to be confirmed by the commission as a whole, whilst clemency could always be exercised by a decision of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets. The fact that the OGPU trials, and all its other proceedings, were behind closed doors—like the British proceedings against spies in war-time—may be abhorrent to us, but is not relevant to the question of whether or not it was in the nature of a dictatorship, in the strict sense of government by a single person. We refer to this in Chapter VII. in Part II, "The Liquidation of the Landlord and the Capitalist".

so far as the legally constituted legislative, judicial and executive authorities of the state are concerned, at any stage in the hierarchy, or in any branch of administration, it would, we think, be difficult for any candid student to maintain that the USSR is, at any point, governed by the will of a single person—that is to say, by a dictator.

Is the Party a Dictator?

But, admittedly, the administration is controlled, to an extent which it is impossible to measure, but which it would be hard to exaggerate, by the Communist Party, with its two or three millions of members. On this point there is complete frankness. "In the Soviet Union," Stalin has said and written, "in the land where the dictatorship of the proletariat is in force, no important political or organisational problem is ever decided by our soviets and other mass organisations, without directives from our Party. In this sense, we may say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is substantially the dictatorship of the Party, as the force which effectively guides the proletariat."¹ [How the Bolsheviks do love the word dictatorship!] It must, however, be noted that the control of the Party over the administration is not manifested in any commands enforceable by law on the ordinary citizen. The Party is outside the constitution. Neither the Party nor its supreme body can, *of itself*, add to or alter the laws binding on the ordinary citizens or residents of the USSR.² The Party can, by itself, do no more than "issue directives"—that is, give instructions—to its own members, as to the general lines on which they should exercise the powers with which the law, or their lawful appointment to particular offices, has endowed them. The Party members, thus directed, can act only by persuasion—presuasion of their colleagues in the various presidiums, committees, commissions and soviets in and through which, as we have seen, the authority over the citizens at large is actually exercised. The 50 or 60 per cent of the Party members who continue to work at the bench or in the mine can do no more than use their powers of persuasion on the ten or twenty times more numerous non-Party workers among whom they pass their lives. By long years of training and organisation this Party membership exercises a corporate intellectual influence on the mass of the population which is of incalculable potency. But the term dictatorship is surely a misnomer for this untiring corporate inspiration, evocation and formulation of a General Will among so huge a population.

¹ *Leninism*, by J. Stalin, vol. i., 1928, p. 33.

² Presumably this is the reason why, as already indicated, specially important "directives" to the Party membership which are in the nature of decrees or laws, to be obeyed also by the non-Party mass, though emanating from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, bear the signature (in addition to that of Stalin) of Kalinin, signifying the concurrence of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets; or that of Molotov, expressing the concurrence of the USSR Sovnarkom, each of which bodies can constitutionally enact new laws, subject to their subsequent ratification by the All-Union Congress of Soviets and its two-chambered Central Executive Committee.

For it is, as we have seen, the people themselves, and not only the Party members, who are incessantly called upon to participate personally in the decisions, not merely by expressing opinions about them in the innumerable popular meetings; not merely by voting for or against their exponents at the recurring elections; but actually by individually sharing in their operation.

Is Stalin a Dictator?

Sometimes it is asserted that, whereas the form may be otherwise, the fact is that, whilst the Communist Party controls the whole administration, the Party itself, and thus indirectly the whole state, is governed by the will of a single person, Josef Stalin.

First let it be noted that, unlike Mussolini, Hitler and other modern dictators, Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow-citizens, and not even over the members of the Party to which he belongs. He has not even the extensive power which the Congress of the United States has temporarily conferred upon President Roosevelt, or that which the American Constitution entrusts for four years to every successive president. So far as grade or dignity is concerned, Stalin is in no sense the highest official in the USSR, or even in the Communist Party. He is not, and has never been, President of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets—a place long held by Sverdlov and now by Kalinin, who is commonly treated as the President of the USSR. He is not (as Lenin was) the President of the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, the dominant member of the Federation; or of the USSR itself, the place now held by Molotov, who may be taken to correspond to the Prime Minister of a parliamentary democracy. He is not even a People's Commissar, or member of the Cabinet, either of the USSR or of any of the constituent republics. Until 1934¹ he held no other office in the machinery of the constitution than that, since 1930 only, of membership (one among ten) of the Committee of Labour and Defence (STO). Even in the Communist Party, he is not the president of the Central Committee of the Party, who may be deemed the highest placed member; indeed, he is not even the president of the presidium of this Central Committee. He is, in fact, only the General Secretary of the Party, receiving his salary from the Party funds and holding his office by appointment by the Party Central Committee, and, as such, also a member (one among nine) of its most important subcommittee, the Politbureau.²

¹ In 1934 he was elected a member of the presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK).

² He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Third International (Comintern), which is, like the Communist Party of the USSR, formally outside the state constitution.

A very critical, and even unfriendly, biographer gives the following characterisation of him: "Stalin does not seek honours. He loathes pomp. He is averse to public displays. He could have all the nominal regalia in the chest of a great state. But he prefers the background. . . . He is the perfect inheritor of the individual Lenin paternalism. No other associate of Lenin was endowed with that characteristic. Stalin is the

If we are invited to believe that Stalin is, in effect, a dictator, we may enquire whether he does, in fact, act in the way that dictators have usually acted ?

We have given particular attention to this point, collecting all the available evidence, and noting carefully the inferences to be drawn from the experience of the past eight years (1926-1934). We do not think that the Party is governed by the will of a single person ; or that Stalin is the sort of person to claim or desire such a position. He has himself very explicitly denied any such personal dictatorship in terms which, whether or not he is credited with sincerity, certainly accord with our own impression of the facts.

In the carefully revised and entirely authentic report of an interview in 1932, we find the interviewer (Emil Ludwig) putting the following question : " Placed around the table at which we are now seated there are sixteen chairs. Abroad it is known, on the one hand, that the USSR is a country in which everything is supposed to be decided by collegiums ; but, on the other hand, it is known that everything is decided by individual persons. Who really decides ? " Stalin's reply was emphatic and explicit. He said : " No ; single persons cannot decide. The decisions of single persons are always, or nearly always, one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective body, there are people whose opinion must be reckoned with. From the experience of three revolutions we know that, approximately, out of every 100 decisions made by single persons, that have not been tested and corrected collectively, 90 are one-sided. In our leading body, the Central Committee of our Party, which guides all our soviet and party organisations, there are about 70 members. Among these members of the Central Committee there are to be found the best of our industrial leaders, the best of our cooperative leaders, the best organisers of distribution, our best military men, our best propagandists and agitators, our best experts on soviet farms, on collective farms, on individual peasant agriculture, our best experts on the nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union, and on national policy. In this areopagus is concentrated the wisdom of the Party. Everyone is able to contribute his experience. Were it otherwise, if decisions had been taken by individuals, we should have committed very serious mistakes in

stern father of a family, the dogmatic pastor of a flock. He is a boss with this difference : his power is not used for personal aggrandisement. Moreover, he is a boss with an education. Notwithstanding general impressions, Stalin is a widely informed and well-read person. He lacks culture, but he absorbs knowledge. He is rough towards his enemies but he learns from them " (*Stalin : a Biography*, by Isaac Don Levine, 1929, pp. 248-249).

An American newspaper correspondent, who has watched both Stalin and the soviet administration in Moscow for the past decade, lately wrote as follows : " Somebody said to me the other day—' Stalin is like a mountain with a head on it. He cannot be moved. But he thinks.' His power and influence are greater now than ever, which is saying a great deal. He inspires the Party with his will-power and calm. Individuals in contact with him admire his capacity to listen and his skill in improving on the suggestions and drafts of highly intelligent subordinates. There is no doubt that his determination and wisdom have been important assets in the struggles of the last few years " (Louis Fischer, in *The Nation*, August 9, 1933).

our work. But since everyone is able to correct the errors of individual persons, and since we pay heed to such corrections, we arrive at more or less correct decisions.”¹

This reasoned answer by Stalin himself puts the matter on the right basis. The Communist Party in the USSR has adopted for its own organisation the pattern which we have described as common throughout the whole soviet constitution. In this pattern individual dictatorship has no place. Personal decisions are distrusted, and elaborately guarded against. In order to avoid the mistakes due to bias, anger, jealousy, vanity and other distempers, from which no person is, at all times, entirely free or on his guard, it is desirable that the individual will should always be controlled by the necessity of gaining the assent of colleagues of equal grade, who have candidly discussed the matter, and who have to make themselves jointly responsible for the decision.

We find confirmation of this inference in Stalin's explicit description of how he acted in a remarkable case. He has, in fact, frequently pointed out that he does no more than carry out the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Thus, in describing his momentous article known as “Dizzy with Success”, he expressly states that this was written on “the well-known decision of the Central Committee regarding the ‘Fight against Distortions of the Party Line’ in the collective farm movement. . . .” “In this connection”, he continues, “I recently received a number of letters from comrades, collective farmers, calling upon me to reply to the questions contained in them. It was my duty to reply to the letters in private correspondence; but that proved to be impossible, since more than half the letters received did not have the addresses of the writers (they forgot to send their addresses). Nevertheless the questions raised in these letters are of tremendous political interest to all our comrades. . . . In view of this I found myself faced with the necessity of replying to the comrades in an open letter, i.e. in the press. . . . I did this all the more willingly since I had a direct decision of the Central Committee to this purpose.” We cannot imagine the contemporary “dictators” of Italy, Hungary, Germany and now (1935) the United States—or even the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom or France—seeking the instructions of his Cabinet as to how he should deal with letters which he could not answer individually. But Stalin goes further. He gives the reason for such collegiate decision. He points out that there is a “real danger” attendant on the personal “decreeing by individual representatives of the Party in this or that corner of our vast country. I have in mind not only local functionaries, but even certain regional committee members, and even certain members of the Central Committee, a practice which Lenin had stigmatised as communist conceit. “The Central Committee of the Party”, he said, “realised this danger, and did not delay intervening, instructing Stalin to warn the erring comrades in an

¹ *An Interview with the German Author, Emil Ludwig*, by J. Stalin, Moscow, 1932, pp. 5, 6.

article on the collective farm movement. Some people believe that the article 'Dizzy with Success' is the result of the personal initiative of Stalin. That is nonsense. Our Central Committee does not exist in order to permit the personal initiative of anybody, whoever it may be, in matters of this kind. It was a reconnaissance on the part of the Central Committee. And when the depth and seriousness of the errors were established, the Central Committee did not hesitate to strike against these errors with the full force of its authority, and accordingly issued its famous decision of March 15, 1930."¹

The plain truth is that, surveying the administration of the USSR during the past decade, under the alleged dictatorship of Stalin, the principal decisions have manifested neither the promptitude nor the timeliness, nor yet the fearless obstinacy that have often been claimed as the merits of a dictatorship. On the contrary, the action of the Party has frequently been taken after consideration so prolonged, and as the outcome of discussion sometimes so heated and embittered, as to bear upon their formulation the marks of hesitancy and lack of assurance. More than once, their adoption has been delayed to a degree that has militated against their success ; and, far from having been obstinately and ruthlessly carried out, the execution has often been marked by a succession of orders each contradicting its predecessor, and none of them pretending to completeness or finality. Whether we take the First Five-Year Plan, or the determination to make universal the collective farms ; the frantic drive towards "self-sufficiency" in the equipment of the heavy industries, and in every kind of machine-making, or the complete "liquidation of the kulaks as a class", we see nothing characteristic of government by the will of a single person. On the contrary, these policies have borne, in the manner of their adoption and in the style of their formulation, the stigmata of committee control. If the USSR during the past eight or ten years has been under a dictatorship, the dictator has surely been an inefficient one ! He has often acted neither promptly nor at the right moment ; his execution has been vacillating and lacking in ruthless completeness.² If we had to judge him by the actions taken in his name,

¹ *Leninism*, by Josef Stalin, vol. ii. pp. 294-295.

² It is not easy to get hold of copies of the pamphlets surreptitiously circulated in opposition to the present government of the USSR, which is personified in the alleged dictatorship of Stalin. One of the latest is described as entitled *The Letter of Eighteen Bolsheviks* and as representing the combined opposition to the dictatorship of both "right" and "left" deviationists. The specific accusations are reported as relative, not so much to the manner in which policies are framed, or to their origin in a personal will, as to the policies themselves, which are now alleged to have been faulty on the ground that they have failed ! These policies were (a) the stifling of the activities of the Comintern, so that no world revolution has occurred ; (b) the confused and vacillating execution of the faulty Five-Year Plan ; (c) the ruinous failure of so many of the collective farms ; (d) the weak half-measures adopted towards the kulaks ; (e) the making of enemies, not only among the peasants and intelligentsia, but also within the inner governing circle, by failing to get them to combine on policy !

It will be seen that those criticisms of the USSR Government are exactly parallel in substance and in form with those that are made by a Parliamentary opposition to the

Stalin has had many of the defects from which, by his very nature, a dictator is free. In short, the government of the USSR during the past decade has been clearly no better than that of a committee. Our inference is that it has been, in fact, the very opposite of a dictatorship. It has been, as it still is, government by whole series of committees.

This does not mean, of course, that the interminable series of committees, which is the characteristic feature of the USSR Government, have no leaders; nor need it be doubted that among these leaders the most influential, both within the Kremlin and without, is now Stalin himself. But so far as we have been able to ascertain, his leadership is not that of a dictator. We are glad to quote an illustrative example of Stalin's administration, as described by an able American resident of Moscow: "Let me give a brief example of how Stalin functions. I saw him preside at a small committee meeting, deciding a matter on which I had brought a complaint. He summoned to the office all the persons concerned in the matter, but when we arrived we found ourselves meeting not only with Stalin, but also with Voroshilov and Kaganovich. Stalin sat down, not at the head of the table, but informally placed where he could see the faces of all. He opened the talk with a plain, direct question, repeating the complaint in one sentence, and asking the man complained against: 'Why was it necessary to do this?'

"After this, he said less than anyone. An occasional phrase, a word without pressure; even his questions were less demands for answers than interjections guiding the speaker's thought. But how swiftly everything was revealed, all our hopes, egotisms, conflicts, all the things we had been doing to each other. The essential nature of men I had known for years, and of others I met for the first time, came out sharply, more clearly than I had ever seen them, yet without prejudice. Each of them had to co-operate, to be taken account of in a problem; the job we must do, and its direction became clear.

"I was hardly conscious of the part played by Stalin in helping us to reach a decision. I thought of him rather as someone superlatively easy to explain things to, who got one's meaning half through a sentence, and brought it all out very quickly. When everything became clear, and not a moment sooner or later, Stalin turned to the others: 'Well?' A word from one, a phrase from another, together accomplished a sentence. Nods—it was unanimous. It seemed we had all decided, simultaneously, unanimously. That is Stalin's method and greatness. He is supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. Through his analysis he is supreme combiner of many wills."¹

There is, in fact, a consensus of opinion, among those who have watched Stalin's action in administration, that this is not at all characteristic of a

policy of a Prime Minister in a parliamentary democracy. They do not reveal anything peculiar to a dictatorship as such.

¹ *Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union*, by Anna Louise Strong, New York, 1934, p. 17.

dictator. It is rather that of a shrewd and definitely skilful manager facing a succession of stupendous problems which have to be grappled with.¹ He is not conceited enough to imagine that he has, within his own knowledge and judgment, any completely perfect plan for surmounting the difficulties. None of the colleagues seated round the committee table, as he realises, has such a plan. He does not attempt to bully the committee. He does not even drive them. Imperturbably he listens to the endless discussion, picking up something from each speaker, and gradually combining every relevant consideration in the most promising conclusion then and there possible. At the end of the meeting, or at a subsequent one—for the discussions are often adjourned from day to day—he will lay before his colleagues a plan uniting the valuable suggestions of all the other proposals, as qualified by all the criticisms; and it will seem to his colleagues, as it does to himself, that this is *the* plan to be adopted. When it is put in operation, all sorts of unforeseen difficulties reveal themselves, for no plan can be free from shortcomings and defects. The difficulties give rise to further discussions and to successive modifications, none of which achieves perfect success. Is not this very much how administration is carried on in every country in the world, whatever may be its constitution? The “endless adventure of governing men” can never be other than a series of imperfect expedients, for which, even taking into account all past experience and all political science, there is, in the end, an inevitable resort to empirical “trial and error”.

At this point it is necessary to observe that, although Stalin is, by the constitution, not in the least a dictator, having no power of command, and although he appears to be free from any desire to act as a dictator, and does not do so, he may be thought to have become irremovable from his position of supreme leadership of the Party, and therefore of the government. Why is this? We find the answer in the deliberate exploitation by the governing junta of the emotion of hero-worship, of the traditional reverence of the Russian people for a personal autocrat. This was seen in the popular elevation of Lenin, notably after his death, to the status of saint or prophet, virtually canonised in the sleeping figure in the sombre marble mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square, where he is now, to all intents and purposes, worshipped by the adoring millions of workers and peasants who daily pass before him. Lenin's works have become “Holy Writ”, which may be interpreted, but which it is impermissible to confute. After

¹ Mussolini describes very differently his own statutory dictatorship. He once said: “There is a fable which describes me as a good dictator but always surrounded by evil counsellors to whose mysterious and malign influence I submit. All that is more than fantastic; it is idiotic. Considerably long experience goes to demonstrate that I am an individual absolutely refractory to outside pressure of any kind. My decisions come to maturity often in the night—in the solitude of my spirit and in the solitude of my rather arid (because practically non-social) personal life. Those who are the ‘evil counsellors of the good tyrant’ are the five or six people who come each morning to make their daily report, so that I may be informed of all that's happening in Italy. After they have made their reports, which rarely takes more than half an hour, they go away” (*Through Fascism to World Power*, by Ion S. Munro, 1935, p. 405).

Lenin's death, it was agreed that his place could never be filled. But some new personality had to be produced for the hundred and sixty millions to revere. There presently ensued a tacit understanding among the junta that Stalin should be "boosted" as the supreme leader of the proletariat, the Party and the state.¹ His portrait and his bust were accordingly distributed by tens of thousands, and they are now everywhere publicly displayed along with those of Marx and Lenin. Scarcely a speech is made, or a conference held, without a naïve—some would say a fulsome—reference to "Comrade Stalin" as the great leader of the people. Let us give, as one among the multitude of such expressions of wholehearted reverence and loyalty, part of the message to Stalin from the Fifteenth Anniversary Celebration of the Leninist League of Young Communists (the five million Comsomols). "In our greetings to you we wish to express the warm love and profound respect for you, our teacher and leader, cherished in the minds and hearts of the Leninist Comsomols and the entire youth of our country. . . . We give you, beloved friend, teacher and leader, the word of young Bolsheviks to continue as an unshakable shock-detachment in the struggle for a classless socialist society. We swear to stimulate the creative energy and enthusiasm of the youth for the mastery of technique and science and in the struggle for Bolshevik collective farms and for a prosperous collective farm life. We swear to hold high the banner of Leninist internationalism, fearlessly to fight for the elimination of exploitation of man by man, for the world proletarian revolution.

"We swear to continue to be the most devoted aids to our beloved Party. We swear with even more determination to strengthen our proletarian dictatorship, to strengthen the defence of the socialist fatherland, to train hundreds of thousands of new exemplary fighters, super-sharpshooters, fearless aviators, daring sailors, tank operators and artillery corps, who will master their military technique to perfection. We swear that we shall work to make the glorious traditions of Bolshevism part of our flesh and blood. We swear to be worthy sons and daughters of the Communist Party. The Leninist Comsomol takes pride in the fact that under the banner of Lenin, the toiling youth of the country which is building socialism has the good fortune freely to live, fight and triumph together with you and under your leadership."²

It seems to us that a national leader so persistently boosted, and so generally admired, has, in fact, become irremovable against his will, so long as his health lasts, without a catastrophic break-up of the whole

¹ Trotsky relates in elaborate detail what he describes as the intrigues aiming at his own exclusion from among those who, at public meetings, were given popular honours as leaders. Presently, he continues, "then the first place began to be given to Stalin. If the chairman was not clever enough to guess what was required of him, he was invariably corrected in the newspapers. . . . It was as the supreme expression of the mediocrity of the apparatus that Stalin himself rose to his position" (*My Life*, by Leon Trotsky, 1930, pp. 499, 501).

² *Moscow Daily News*, November 1, 1933.

administration. Chosen originally because he was thought more stable in judgment than Trotsky, who might, it was felt, precipitate the state into war, Stalin is now universally considered to have justified his leadership by success: first in overcoming the very real difficulties of 1925; then in surmounting the obstacle of the peasant recalcitrance in 1930-1933; and finally in the successive triumphs of the Five-Year Plan. For him to be dismissed from office, or expelled from the Party, as Trotsky and so many others have been, could not be explained to the people. He will therefore remain in his great position of leadership so long as he wishes to do so. What will happen when he dies or voluntarily retires is a baffling question. For it is a unique feature in Soviet Communism that popular recognition of pre-eminent leadership has, so far, not attached itself to any one office. Lenin, whose personal influence became overwhelmingly powerful, was President of the Sovnarkom (Cabinet) of the RSFSR, or, as we should say, Prime Minister. On his death, Rykov became President of the Sovnarkom of the USSR, to be followed by Molotov, but neither succeeded to the position of leader. Stalin, who had been People's Commissar for Nationalities and subsequently President of the Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, had relinquished these offices on being appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party. It is Stalin who has, since 1927, "had all the limelight". No one can predict the office which will be held by the man who may succeed to Stalin's popularity; or whether the policy of "boosting" a national leader will continue to be thought necessary when Soviet Communism is deemed to be completely established. For the moment the other dominant personalities seem to be L. M. Kaganovich, one of the Assistant Secretaries of the Communist Party of the USSR and Secretary of the Party in Moscow, in 1935 appointed People's Commissar of Railways; Molotov, the President of the USSR Sovnarkom; and Voroshilov, the popular People's Commissar of Defence.

✓ *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*

We have yet to discuss the most ambiguous of so-called dictatorships, the "dictatorship of the proletariat". This high-sounding phrase, used more than once by Karl Marx,¹ and repeatedly and vehemently endorsed

¹ See, for instance, his statement of 1852: "What I added (to the conception of the existence of the class struggle) was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with certain historical struggles in the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship is itself only a transition to the ultimate abolition of all classes and to a society without classes" (Marx to Weydemeyer, March 12, 1852; see Beer's article in *Labour Monthly*, July 1922).

It may be helpful, in the interpretation, to consider what, in the view of Marx, was the opposite of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was emphatically not democracy in any of its meanings, but the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie". One or other dictatorship was, Marx thought, inevitable, during the transition stage, which might last for a whole generation. See the useful book *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, by Professor Sidney Hook, 1933, pp. 250-269.

by Lenin, has been accepted by those in authority as an official designation of the constitution of the USSR, in preference to any reference to the leadership of the Communist Party or to the early slogan of "All Power to the Soviets". We frankly confess that we do not understand what was or is meant by this phrase. As rendered in English it seems to mean a dictatorship exercised *by* the proletariat, *over* the community as a whole. But if the terms are to be taken literally, this is the union of two words which contradict each other. Dictatorship, as government by the will of a single person, cannot be government by the will of an immense class of persons. Moreover, if by the proletariat is meant the mass of the population dependent on their daily earnings, or as Marx frequently meant, the whole of the workers engaged in industrial production for wages, the dictatorship of the proletariat would, in highly developed capitalist societies like Great Britain, where three-quarters of all men of working age are wage-earners, mean no more than the rule of an immense majority over a minority. Why, then, should it be termed a dictatorship?

We do not pretend to any competence in determining what Marx may have meant by the dictatorship of the proletariat. More relevant is what Lenin meant by the phrase when he made it one of the cardinal principles of his revolutionary activity. This meaning we can best discover in the successive stages leading up to the first formulation of the constitution in 1918, and to its subsequent elaboration.

Lenin had long held that the revolution in Russia could never be carried out by, literally, the masses of the people. He differed profoundly from both the rival sects of revolutionaries, the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, as to the correct interpretation of the Revolution of February 1917, which they accepted as a "bourgeois" revolution, but which he insisted on making into a socialist revolution. But Lenin never believed that the actual transformations of social structure involved in the socialist revolution that he desired could be effected either by the hordes of peasants, whether still grouped in villages, or driven off their little holdings; or even by a mass movement in the cities. In Lenin's view, the socialist revolution could be carried into effect only by the long-continued efforts of a relatively small, highly disciplined and absolutely united party of professional revolutionists (which became the Communist Party), acting persistently on the minds of what he called the proletariat, by which he always meant the manual-working wage-earners in the factory and the mine, in mere alliance with the vastly more numerous, but for this purpose inert, peasantry, whether poor, middling or relatively well-to-do.

Thus Lenin expected and meant the social transformation itself to be, like all social changes, designed and promulgated by a minority, and even by only a small minority of the whole people. On the other hand, he had in view no such personal *coup d'état* as Louis Napoleon perpetrated in December 1851. He steadfastly refused to countenance any attempt at an overthrow of the Kerensky Government until he was convinced that an actual majority of the manual-working wage-earners in the factories

of Leningrad and Moscow had become converted to the support of the growing Bolshevik Party. It may, indeed, be said that all three stages of the Russian revolution, and, most of all, that of October 1917, enjoyed wide popular support, whilst the last was effected by a widespread upheaval among the city populations, supported by the mass of the disintegrating soldiery, and willingly acquiesced in by such of the peasantry as became aware of what was happening. The Russian revolution may therefore fairly be described as democratic rather than dictatorial.

But Lenin had long pondered over what Marx had come to realise after 1848, that it was much more difficult to maintain a revolutionary government than to put it into office. Whilst believing firmly in government by the people, much more firmly and more sincerely than most parliamentary democrats of the time, Lenin knew that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the mass of the people quickly subsides. The force of old habits of thought is rapidly reasserted. Long before the new government could possibly effect any improvement in material conditions, there must inevitably be an ebbing of the tide. Reactionaries within the city and without would promptly influence the mob, as well as the timid *petite bourgeoisie*, to sweep away a government which had brought only disillusionment. Hence it was indispensable that, if the revolution was to be maintained, there should be no immediate resort to popular election of the executive government. The members of the Constituent Assembly were accordingly promptly sent about their business, and all attempts to maintain their position were drastically suppressed by force. Pending the formulation of a constitution, Lenin and his colleagues undoubtedly ruled the state as an autocratic junta, ruthlessly suppressing all opposition, irrespective of the momentary popular feeling, whatever it was. The peasants, whom it was impracticable to consult, were induced to acquiesce by being left free to continue the anarchic seizure of the landlords' estates, and their redistribution among all those belonging to the village. To please the soldiery as well as the urban proletariat, the war was brought to an end as speedily as possible, on whatever terms could be obtained from the triumphant German army. Everything, even popular control, was temporarily sacrificed to the maintenance in power of an executive resolute enough, and strong enough, to prevent a popular reaction. This was the heyday of what had been foreseen as "the dictatorship of the proletariat". Lenin was quite frank about it. "The essence of dictatorship", he had written, "is to be found in the organisation and discipline of the workers' vanguard, as the only leader of the proletariat. The purpose of the dictatorship is to establish socialism, to put an end to the division of society into classes, to make all the members of society workers, to make the exploitation of one human being by another for ever impossible. This end cannot be achieved at one stride. There will have to be a transitional period, a fairly long one, between capitalism and socialism. The reorganisation of production is a difficult matter. Time is requisite for the radical transformation of all departments of life. Furthermore, the

power of custom is immense; people are habituated to a petty-bourgeois and bourgeois economy, and will only be induced to change their ways by a protracted and arduous struggle. That was why Marx, too, spoke of a transitional period between capitalism and socialism, a whole epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat."¹ Nor was this authoritarian control of the transition period to be in any sense partial or half-hearted. What Lenin meant by the oft-quoted phrase is clear. "The dictatorship of the proletariat", he said, "is a resolute, persistent struggle, sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, pedagogic and administrative, against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of the millions and tens of millions is a formidable force."²

But this autocratic executive action of the transition period had nothing to do with the constitution, which was adopted for the RSFSR at the earliest possible moment. Historical students habitually think of representative institutions, especially when based on popular election, as providing a check upon autocratic executive action. But every politician knows that there is no more powerful bulwark of a government than representative institutions which provide it with popular support. Lenin and his colleagues, whilst summarily dismissing the Constituent Assembly, actually hurried on the enactment of a constitution, deliberately as a means of strengthening the central executive authority. For their purpose there was no need for the constitution to create a dictatorship. Indeed, as enacted by the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918, within nine months from the seizure of power, this Fundamental Law contained no trace of anything that could possibly be termed a dictatorship. It vested "all power in the soviets", directly chosen by the people. Each soviet freely chose its delegates to the district and provincial councils, and these finally to a national assembly, which appointed not only the Cabinet of Ministers but also a standing Central Executive Committee and its presidium to control them. And though the city populations were given proportionately larger representation than the peasantry—at about twice the rate³—the numerical preponderance

¹ Lenin, *Works*; Russian edition, vol. xvi. pp. 226-227; adopted by Stalin in his "Problems of Leninism" in *Leninism*, by Josef Stalin, Russian edition, 1926; English translation, 1928, vol. i. p. 27.

² *The Infantile Disease of Leftism in Communism*, by N. Lenin (1920); English edition, 1934. Marx had clearly predicted a prolonged transition period. "Between the capitalist and communist systems of society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of one into the other. This corresponds to a political transition period, whose state can be nothing else but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" (from Marx's "Critical Analysis of the Gotha Programme of the German Social Democratic Party", translated in *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, by Sidney Hook, 1933, p. 255).

³ This habitual numerical over-representation of the cities in the USSR is usually overstated. The representation of the cities is at so many per thousand *electors*. That of the rural districts is at so many per thousand *population*, only about half of whom are over eighteen, and qualified as electors. We have analysed elsewhere the number and nature of the deprived categories excluded from the franchise—analogue, it may be suggested, to the exclusion of the women, the negroes, the paupers, the illiterate, the nomadic, and various other classes in this or that country counting itself civilised and democratic!

of the rural population was so enormous--more than four times that of the cities--that the delegates deriving their mandates ultimately from the village soviets at all times constituted the majority of the All-Union Congress of Soviets.

It is difficult to assert that the system of popular soviets and indirect election was deliberately chosen by Lenin or anyone else. This was the form into which representative institutions inevitably flowed in the Petrograd and Moscow of 1917, whilst the peasantry knew no other. But we may well believe that Lenin was alive to the fact that, whilst this "soviet system" satisfied the popular aspirations and provided for the constitution an invaluable basis of direct election on the widest known franchise, this same system gave the national executive the necessary protection against being swept away by a temporary wave of popular feeling. The soviet system left no room for a referendum, or even for a parliamentary general election. It was the reverse of government by the mob! The very multiplication into millions of the election meetings, and the interpolation of tier upon tier of councils, gave the fullest opportunity for the persuasive action of the highly disciplined companionship into which the Bolshevik party was shaped. We may say that, if the "dictatorship of the proletariat" continued after 1918 to be indispensable for the maintenance of the revolutionary government, as was undoubtedly thought to be the case, it was perpetuated, not in the representative structure, which might fairly claim to be a particular species of popular constitution, in fact just as truly "democratic" as the parliamentary government of Great Britain or the United States; but in the actual use made by the executive, with the aid of the Communist Party, of the powers entrusted to it under the constitution. Any government, whatever the form of the constitution, can use the powers entrusted to it in a manner that people will term dictatorial. As democrats confess with shame, it is undeniable that governments professedly the most democratic, in countries enjoying the blessings of parliamentary government and universal suffrage, have, on occasions, in peace as in wartime, distinguished themselves by their drastic use of force, and even of physical violence, against their opponents, just like the most dictatorial of the personal dictators that history records. Thus, if we must interpret the "dictatorship of the proletariat", as exercised in the USSR since 1918, we might say that it is not in the constitutional structure, nor even in the working of the soviets and the ubiquitous representative system, that anything like autocracy or dictatorship is to be found, but rather in the activities that the constitution definitely authorises the executive to exercise.

Is the USSR an Autocracy?

How far, and in what sense, the habitual action of the executive government of the USSR is in the nature of autocracy we have now to examine. A government is usually said to be an autocracy, or a dictatorship, if the,

chief authority enacts laws or issues decrees without submitting them beforehand to public discussion and criticism by the people themselves or their authorised representatives, in order to be guided by their decision. This safeguard of debate can, of course, only be obtained in the case of fundamental or important legislation. It would plainly be impracticable, in any populous country, to submit for public discussion the thousands of separate decisions that every government has to take from day to day throughout the year. In the USSR, as we have seen, the amount of public discussion of government decisions, before they are finally made, is plainly very considerable. From the trade union or cooperative society or village meetings, up to the frequent sessions of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and the biennial All-Union Congress of Soviets, the systematic discussion of public affairs, from one end of the USSR to the other, and in terms which are regularly communicated to the highest authorities, appears, to the citizen of the western world, simply endless.¹ But, in addition, there are occasions on which the highest legislative and executive authorities will publicly call upon the whole population to help in the solution of a difficult problem of government. We may cite two remarkable examples. In October 1925, after seven years' experience of the great freedom in sex relations which the revolution had inaugurated, when the proposals of the People's Commissar for Justice for an amendment of the law as to marriage were brought before the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), a heated controversy arose. What did this practically supreme legislature do? It resolved to submit the draft law, which excited so much interest, for discussion by the whole people throughout the length and breadth of the USSR. "The whole country", we are told, "was shaken to its depths by the question. In countless discussion meetings—from gatherings of thousands of workers in the large cities to the tiny debates in the peasant [village] reading-rooms—the separate

¹ "Under what form shall social ownership be manifested—municipal, federal or voluntary cooperative? Which industries are better handled by state-appointed managers? Which by small groups of workers selecting their own management? What relations shall exist between various forms of socially owned production, between city and rural districts? What relative attention shall be given to each of a thousand factories, trades, localities? Over this daily stuff of government, discussion and struggle goes on; and change and experiment. . . . Political life in rural districts starts around the use of the land. Sixty peasants in council—the collective farm of a small village—meeting with the representatives of the township (rayon) land department, or the farm expert from the tractor station, to draw up their 'farm plan'. Number of households, of people, of horses, ploughs, tractors, extent and type of land, must be included. The plan must take account of the little community's food and fodder needs, the past crop rotations, the marketable crop recommended by the State for their locality. Certain general directions come down from the central Commissariat of Agriculture, filtered through the provincial [oblast] land office, and adapted to their region; a two per cent increase in grain, or a rise in industrial crops is asked for. The sixty peasants in council consider by what concrete means they will expand or rearrange their fields for all these purposes; discussion after discussion takes place all winter through till the 'plan' is accomplished. Consciously they are settling problems of government on which country-wide, province-wide, nation-wide plans will be issued. From this simple base all other tasks of government spring" (*Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union*, by Anna Louise Strong, New York, 1934, pp. 7-8).

points of the new draft were threshed out again and again. The People's Commissariat [for Justice] received reports of more than 6000 meetings of this kind, but, of course, the number of debates actually held was much larger. The point about which the discussion chiefly revolved was the question whether an unregistered, so-called 'factual' marriage should be placed in its legal consequences on an equality with one that had been legally registered. . . . There were, in the Soviet Union, some 80,000 to 100,000 couples whose 'marriages' in no wise differed from those officially contracted, either in substance or form, except in the absence of registration. . . . The legal protection which the law provides in the case of registered marriages—which is of particular importance to the wife—ought certainly not to be withheld from the partners in these 'factual' marriages. A number of arguments were arrayed against this view. . . . But the other additional provisions and changes in the new code—the question of divorce, alimony and women's property—were also fiercely contested . . . especially . . . the provision of the new law that women's domestic work should be placed on an equal footing with men's work. . . . The discussion brought [to the Government] a flood of letters, largely from working women, as is usually the case in such circumstances in Russia. . . . The general discussion of the new marriage law lasted a whole year: doubtless the first case in which a whole people, a people of 160 millions, made a law for itself, not through elected representatives [nor yet, we may add, by mere assent or dissent to a finished law formally announced to them on referendum], but by all expressing their opinion. And when, in December 1926, the draft (revised in the light of the opinions popularly expressed) was introduced for the second time in the TSIK . . . the debate raged once more before it was finally decided, and for the last time the various opinions clashed." The new draft was adopted by a large majority, and came immediately into force (on January 1, 1927).¹

The popular discussion on the marriage law concerned a matter in which the people's interest was probably more intense than that of the legislators. We therefore take as a second example a difficult problem of statesmanship, in which only persons of trained and well-informed judgment could usefully pronounce an opinion. We have already described in our section on Collective Farms how the problem arose. The momentous decision to solve the problem of the national food supply mainly by what has been called the Second Agrarian Revolution—the brigading of the millions of individual peasants into some hundreds of thousands of collective farms, and the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class"—was not taken until after more than two years of public discussion and heated controversy, as well as long-continued debate in the legislative bodies. Moreover, the decision eventually arrived at, and announced by Stalin in 1928, was not exactly any one of the proposals which had been put forward at the outset of the debate in which the whole thinking and

¹ See the lengthy description in *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina W. Halle, published in German in 1932, and in English in 1933, pp. 109-136.

reading population, and not merely the members of the Communist Party, had been participating. It was itself the outcome of the debate, combining what seemed to be the best features of several of the proposals with safeguards against the dangers which discussion had revealed. Our own conclusion is that, if by autocracy or dictatorship is meant government without prior discussion and debate, either by public opinion or in private session, the government of the USSR is, in that sense, actually less of an autocracy or a dictatorship than many a parliamentary cabinet.

In whose Interest does the Government act ?

There is, however, yet another view of the much-debated phrase, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which must not be overlooked ; and which may well be thought to be wholly applicable to the government of the USSR from 1917 to 1927, and, in a wider sense, to that of the present day. It may be suspected that, when socialists or communists talk about the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, with some "dynamic passion" in "downing" a former ruling class, what they really mean is a government which, irrespective of its form, provides a strong and resolute executive, acting unhesitatingly in the interests of the manual-working wage-earning class. When such socialists or communists talk about the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie (or of the Capitalist), it is clearly not the form of the government that they have in mind, but merely its strong and resolute administration in the interests of the proprietary class. In the same sense, it is exactly accurate to describe the government of the USSR, at any rate from 1917 to 1927, as a Dictatorship of the Proletariat, meaning the urban or industrial manual-working wage-earners. Since 1928, that government may be deemed to have in view also the interests of the kolkhosniki, the owner-producers in agriculture who have joined together in collective farms. Perhaps the scope of the word proletariat is becoming enlarged, so that it now includes all those, whether mechanics or agriculturists, who will admittedly be qualified for citizenship of the future "classless state".

A New Social Form ?

We add a final comment. We have discussed, as a current controversy, the question whether the government of the USSR is a dictatorship or a democracy. But there is no more fertile source of error in sociology, as in any other science, than posing a question in the terms of ancient categories, or even of yesterday's definitions. Can we wisely limit our enquiries by such alternatives as "aristocracy, oligarchy and democracy" ; or "dictatorship versus democracy" ? History records also theocracies, and various other "ideocracies", in which the organised exponents of particular creeds or philosophic systems have, in effect, ruled communities, sometimes irrespective of their formal constitutions, merely by "keeping the conscience" of the influential citizens. This dominance

may be exercised entirely by persuasion. The practical supremacy at various times of the Society of Jesus in more than one country was of this nature. The Communist Party of the USSR frankly accepts the designation of "keeper of the conscience of the proletariat". Have we perhaps here a case—to use a barbarous term—of a "creedocracy" of a novel kind, inspiring a multiform democracy in which soviets and trade unions, cooperative societies and voluntary associations, provide for the personal participation in public affairs of an unprecedented proportion of the entire adult population? The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consist of a government and a people confronting each other, as all other great societies have hitherto been. It is a highly integrated social organisation in which, over a vast area, each individual man, woman or youth is expected to participate in three separate capacities: as a citizen, as a producer and as a consumer; to which should be added membership of one or more voluntary organisations intent on bettering the life of the community. Meanwhile, leadership is carried on by a new profession, organised, like other professions, as a voluntarily enlisted and self-governing unit; the only part of the constitution of Soviet Communism, by the way, that has no foundation in any statute. In short, the USSR is a government instrumented by all the adult inhabitants, organised in a varied array of collectives, having their several distinct functions, and among them carrying on, with a strangely new "political economy", nearly the whole wealth production of the country. And when, in addition, we find them evolving a systematic philosophy and a new code of conduct, based upon a novel conception of man's relation to the universe and man's duty to man, we seem to be dealing with something much greater than a constitution. We have, indeed, to ask whether the world may not be witnessing in the USSR the emergence of a new civilisation. But before we can adequately deal with this question, in the final pages of this book, we have first to study the social institutions in action, in order to discover, by an analysis of "social trends", in what directions this huge population is moving.

APPENDICES TO PART I

I. DIAGRAM OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE USSR, WITH EXPLANATORY TABLES	351
II. DIAGRAM OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE USSR, WITH EXPLANATORY TABLES	354
III. THE DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF JULY 13, 1923	355
IV. THE POWERS AND AUTHORISED FUNCTIONS OF THE VILLAGE SOVIET	358
V. THE SECTIONS AND COMMISSIONS OF THE CITY SOVIETS	363
VI. NOTE RELATING TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION	365
VII. THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF THE NARKOMAT OF SOVKHOSE	369
VIII. THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF THE NARKOMAT OF AGRICULTURE	374
IX. LIST OF THE 154 TRADE UNIONS AMONG WHICH THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE 47 TRADE UNIONS OF 1931 WAS DISTRIBUTED IN 1934	380
X. THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES	384
XI. THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT (KOL-DOGOVOR) OF THE FRAMING-LATHES WORKS AT GORKI FOR THE YEAR 1933-1934	391
XII. THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND SUMMARY OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN	410

I

Diagram of the Political Structure of the USSR

(Compiled by S.P.T. from the *Whole USSR, 1931, Ten Years of the Constitution of the USSR, 1933, and Collections of Laws and Regulations, 1934, 1935*)

TABLE 1

Political Structure

Seven Union Republics, 3 Soviet Socialist Republics in Transcaucasia, 14 Autonomous Republics in the RSFSR, 3 Autonomous Republics in Transcaucasia, 1 Autonomous Republic in the Ukraine, 12 Autonomous Oblasts in the RSFSR, 1 Autonomous Oblast in Tadzhik and 2 Autonomous Oblasts in Transcaucasia, 11 Krai and 21 Oblasts in the RSFSR (including 8 Oblasts in the Far-Eastern Krai and 6 Oblasts in the Kazak Autonomous Republic), 7 Oblasts in the Ukraine and 14 Okrugs in the RSFSR.

Seven Union Republics --

- I. The White Russian SSR
- II. The Transcaucasian SFSR
- III. The Turkoman SSR
- IV. The RSFSR
- V. The Uzbek SSR
- VI. The Tadzhik SSR
- VII. The Ukrainian SSR

Capital
Minsk
Tiflis
Ashkhabat
Moscow
Samarkand (now Tashkent)
Stalinabad
Kharkov (now Kiev)

Three Soviet Socialist Republics in Transcaucasia--

- VIII. The SSR of Azerbaijan
- IX. The SSR of Georgia
- X. The SSR of Armenia

Baku
Tiflis
Erivan

Fourteen Autonomous Republics in the RSFSR--

- A. Daghستان
- B. Bashkir
- C. Buryat-Mongolian
- D. Karelian
- E. Chuvash
- F. Kirghiz
- G. Tartar
- II. Crimean
- I. German Volga
- J. Kazak
- K. Yakut
- L. Kara-Kalpak
- M. Mordovsk
- N. Udmurt-sk

Makhach-Kala, January 20, 1921
Ufa, March 24, 1919
Verkhmendinsk (now Ulan-Uda), June 4, 1923
Petrozavodsk, July 27, 1923
Cheboksary, April 21, 1935
Frunze, February 1926
Kazan, May 27, 1920
Simferopol, October 18, 1921
Petrovsk (now Engels), July 19, 1923
Alma-Ata, October 1921
Yakutsk, April 20, 1922
Turtkul (now Nukus), May 11, 1925
Saransk, December 20, 1934
Izhevsk, December 28, 1934

Three Autonomous Republics in the Transcaucasian SFSR--

- O. Abkhaz (by convention within Georgia SSR)
- P. Nakhichevan (within Azerbaijan SSR)
- Q. Adzharia (within Georgia SSR)

Sukhum
Nakhichevan
Batumi

One Autonomous Republic in the Ukraine--

- R. Moldavian

Balta (now Tiraspol), October 12, 1924

Twelve Autonomous Oblasts in the RSFSR--

1. Kabardino-Balkarsk
2. Adygelsk
3. Karachaevevsk
4. Chechen-Ingush
5. North-Osetinsk
6. Cherkess
7. Khakass
8. Oirat
9. Marinsk
10. Kalmyk
11. Komi (Zyryan)
12. Jewish

Nalchik, January 1, 1921
Krasnodar, July 27, 1922
Mikoyan-Shakhar, January 12, 1922
Grosny, September 20, 1923
Vladikavkaz (now Ordzhonikidze), July 7, 1924
Batalpashinsk (now Sulinov), July 27, 1922
Abakan, 1930
Ula (now Oirat-Tura), June 1, 1922
Toshkar-Ola, November 4, 1920
Elisa, November 4, 1920
Syktyvkar, January 12, 1921
Biro-Bidjan, May 7, 1934

One Autonomous Oblast in the Tadzhik SSR--

13. Gorno-Badakhshansk

Khorog

Two Autonomous Oblasts in Transcaucasia--

14. Nagorno-Karabakh
15. South Ossetin

Stepanakert
Zikhnavli (now Stalinir)

Eleven Krai and 12 Oblasts in RSFSR

	<i>Capital</i>
16. Chita Oblast	Chita
17. North Caucasian Krai	Pyatigorsk
18. Leningrad Oblast	Leningrad
19. Moscow Oblast	Moscow
20. Kalinin Oblast	Kalinin
21. West Siberian Krai	Novosibirsk
22. East Siberian Krai	Irkutsk
23. Sverdlovsk Oblast	Sverdlovsk
24. Chelyabinsk Oblast	Chelyabinsk
25. Gorki Krai	Gorki
26. Kirov Krai	Kirov
27. Far-Eastern Krai	Khabarovsk
28. Kubyshyev Krai	Kubyshyev ¹
29. Orenburg Oblast	Orenburg
30. Stalingrad Krai	Stalingrad
31. Saratov Krai	Saratov
32. Kursk Oblast	Kursk
33. Voronezh Oblast	Voronezh
34. Northern Krai	Archangel
35. Western Oblast	Smolensk
36. Ivanovo-Industrial Oblast	Ivanovo-Voznesensk
37. Obshch-Irtysh Oblast	Tumen'
38. Asovo-Chernomorsky Krai	Kostrov-Don

Eight Oblasts in the Far-Eastern Krai—

39. Amur	Blagoveshchensk
40. Kamchatka	Petropavlovsk
41. Primorsk	Vladivostok
42. Sakhalin	Alexandrovsk
43. Khabarovsk	Khabarovsk
44. Zeyisk	Rukhlovo
45. Ussuriisk	Nicholsk-Ussuriisk
46. Nizhni Amur	Nickolaevsk on Amur

Seven Oblasts in the Ukrainian SSR—

47. Chernigov	Chernigov
48. Kiev	Kiev
49. Odessa	Odessa
50. Donetsk	Stalino
51. Dniepropetrovsk	Dniepropetrovsk
52. Kharkov	Kharkov
53. Vinitsa	Vinitsa

Six Oblasts in the Kazak Autonomous Republic—

54. South Kazak	Chimkent
55. West Kazak	Uralsk
56. East Kazak	Semipalatinsk
57. Karagandin	Petropavlovsk
58. Aktubinsk	Aktubinsk
59. Alma-Ata	Alma-Ata

Fourteen Okrugs in the RSFSR—

a. Naryn	Kolpashev
b. Vilimo-Olekminio	Kalakan
c. Taymyrsk	Dudinka
d. Komi-Permyak	Kudymkar
e. Ehenkinsk	Turinsk Kultbase
f. Ostyako-Vogul'sk	Samarovo
g. Jamal'sk	Salegard
h. Koryansk	Penzhinsk Kultbase
i. Ofukot'sk	Anadyr
j. Nenetsk	Nar'yan-Mar
k. Argayash	Argayash
l. Karkaralinsk	Karkaralinsk
m. Tarsky	Tara
n. Velikie Luki	Velikie Luki

CHANGES MADE BY THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF 1936

The seven Union Republics have become eleven by the dissolution of the Transcaucasian SSR into its three constituent republics and the promotion to Union Republics of two of the Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR, namely, those of Kirghiz and Kazak.

The fourteen Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR have become seventeen by (a) the above-mentioned promotion to Union Republics of Kirghiz and Kazak; (b) the transfer to the Uzbek SSR of the Autonomous Republic of Kala-Kalpik; and (c) the promotion to be Autonomous Republics of six Autonomous Oblasts, namely, Kabardino-Balkarsk, Kalmyk, Komi Marinsk, Chechen-Ingush and North-Ossetinsk.


The eleven Krai of the RSFSR have been reduced to five, namely, North Caucasian, West Siberian, Far-Eastern, Asovo-Chernomorsky, Krasnoyarsk (formerly the Chita Oblast).

The twelve Oblasts of the RSFSR have become nineteen by (a) the change from Krai to Oblast of the six above mentioned; (b) the addition of one new Oblast, namely, Yaroslavl; whilst (c) the Obshch-Irtysh Oblast is renamed Omsk Oblast.

¹ Formerly Samara and Middle Volga Krai.

Table II—Administrative Structure

(Compiled by S.P.T.)



II

Diagram of the Administrative Structure of the USSR

TABLE II

Administrative Structure

- | | |
|---|--|
| I. All-Union Congress of Soviets (AUOS). | |
| II. Central Executive Committee of the USSR (TSIK). | |
| III. Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom). | |
-
- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Council of the Union. (Union of Soviets.) | E. Presidium of the TSIK. |
| B. Presidium. | F. Presidents of the TSIK. |
| C. Soviet of Nationalities. | G. Secretariat of the TSIK. |
| D. Presidium. | H. State Credits and Savings Commission. |
-
1. Supreme Court (Verkhisud).
 - 1a. Procurator.
 2. Supreme Council of Physical Culture.
 3. Budget Commission.
 4. Supreme Council for Communal Economy.
 5. Central Archives.
 6. Committee of Higher Technical Education.
 7. Scientific Research Institutions Committee.
 8. Central Election Committee.
 9. Organisation and Soviet Construction Commission.
 10. Permanent Representatives of the Union's Republics.
 11. Yield of Crops Commission.
 12. Council of Labour and Defence (STO).
 13. Soviet Central Commissions.
 14. Government Arbitration Commission.
 15. Chief Concession Committee.
 16. Gosplan.
 17. Central Board of Economic Calculation (Khosuchet).
 18. Central Board of Roads and Transport.
 19. Central Board of the Civil Air Fleet.
 20. Central Board of the North Sea Route.
 21. Committee for the Supply of Agricultural Products.
 22. Central Commission for Special Freights.
 23. Central Convention Bureau for Decentralised Supply.
 24. Radio-Broadcasting Committee.
 25. Commodity Funds and Trade Regulation Committee.
 26. Handicraft Industry Committee.
 27. Land Settlement Committee.
 28. Central Board of Cinema and Photo Production.
-
- 12 All-Union People's Commissariats (Narkomats)
- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| a. State Farms (NKSovkhos). | g. Foreign Trade (NKVneshstorg). |
| b. Foreign Affairs (NKID). | h. Means of Communication (railways) (NKPS). |
| c. Defence (NKOborony). | i. Posts and Telegraphs (NKSVyas). |
| d. Internal Affairs (NKVnutdel). | j. Forest Industry (NKLes). |
| e. River Transport (NKVod). | k. Light Industry (NKLegprom). |
| f. Heavy Industry (NKTyazh). | l. Food Industry (NKPIKHCH). |
-
- 3 Unified Narkomats
- | |
|--------------------------------|
| m. Agriculture (NKZem). |
| n. Finance (NKFin.). |
| o. Internal Trade (NKVnutorg). |

III

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I (see p. 6)

*The Declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 13, 1923*¹

To all governments and to all the peoples of the earth: From the first moment of their existence the soviet republics were united by the bonds of close cooperation and mutual assistance, which subsequently assumed the form of treaties of alliance. The power of the workers and peasants united them into a single unit, with common needs, in their struggle against the attacks of foreign capitalist states and against the internal counter-revolutionary attacks on the soviet form of society. The solidarity of the labouring masses united them in their common task of establishing fraternal cooperation between the liberated peoples. Together they emerged from the victorious proletarian revolution, having overthrown the power of their land-owners and capitalists. Together they passed through the dire experiences of intervention and blockade, and emerged triumphant. Together they started the enormous task of restoring the national economy, on the basis of the new economic structure of society, after it had passed through unprecedented calamities.

Whilst rendering to one another constant fraternal assistance with all their strength and resources, they nevertheless for a long time remained separate states only united by treaties of alliance.

The further development of their mutual relations and the requirements of the international position have now led them to combine into one united state.

The strength of the world reaction and the aggressive aims of the imperialistic governments, with the consequent dangers of renewed attacks, made it imperative to unite the defensive forces of all the soviet republics in one central union government.

At the same time economic reconstruction in the soviet republics, ruined as they are by war, intervention, and blockade, is an impossible task unless they combine their forces, and can only be successfully realised by properly ordered guidance from one economic centre for the whole union.

¹ We take this translation from *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell, New York, 1929, a volume of lasting usefulness (in spite of the aberrations of its author) because of its extensive reproduction of texts. Nearly the same translation of part of the document was included in the British Government Stationery Office paper of 1924 entitled *Soviet Russia: a description of the various political units existing on Russian territory, to which is appended the Constitution of the USSR of July 6, 1923*. A pamphlet (56 pp.) was published in English at Moscow in 1932 entitled *The Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the USSR, together with the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the RSFSR*. A French translation, with some comments, will be found in *La Constitution de l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques*, par Stefan Yanoff (Bibliothèque de l'Institut du Droit Comparé de Lyon), Paris, 1929, vol. xv. Another will be found in the official *Annuaire diplomatique du Commissariat du Peuple pour les affaires étrangères*, distributed annually at Moscow.

An interesting summary of the subsequent changes will be found in the pamphlet (in Russian) edited by E. Pashukanis, and entitled *Ten Years of the USSR Constitution*, Moscow, Ogiz, 1933, p. 96.

The very nature of the workers' and peasants' state, in the gradual development and strengthening of the new structure of society in the soviet republics, is driving them increasingly towards union and towards the fusion of their forces for the realisation of their common aim.

At the soviet congresses held recently in the various soviet republics the peoples of these republics decided unanimously to form a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a single united state. This union of peoples with equal rights remains a purely voluntary union, which excludes all possibility of national oppression or the compulsion of any nation to remain within this united state, every republic enjoying the right to leave the union if it so desires. At the same time the door is left open for the voluntary entry into the union of other socialist republics that may be formed in the future.

The declaration and treaty of union accepted by the contracting soviet republics were ratified, and brought into operation on July 6 by the Union Central Executive Committee.

In view of the necessity to unite the defensive forces of the soviet republics against external attacks, an inter-union military and naval people's commissariat has been set up.

In view of the common needs and problems facing the soviet republics in their relations with the capitalist states, an inter-union commissariat for foreign affairs has been formed. The necessity for complete centralisation in the conduct of foreign trade on the basis of the state's monopoly, and to defend the soviet republics against the attempts of the capitalist states to bring about their economic subjection, has made it necessary to set up a single inter-union commissariat for foreign trade.

Further, the proper regulation of their national economy demands a united transport and postal and telegraph system, that is to say, the formation of inter-union commissariats for transport and for posts and telegraphs.

Other branches of state activity in the separate republics forming the Union are partly subordinated to the Union central institutions, while at the same time each republic retains its own corresponding central institution; and partly they remain exclusively in the hands of the separate republics.

The direct administration of national economy and finance, the organisation of the food supply, the state defence of the rights and interests of hired labour, the control over the whole state apparatus of the workmen's and peasants' inspection, will be in the hands simultaneously of the inter-union centre, in so far as guidance from a single centre is required, and of the separate centres of each republic, in so far as special control in the territories of the latter is essential.

Commissariats dealing with special national questions of ordinary daily life, such, for instance, as education, agriculture, internal affairs, justice, etc., will exist only in the separate republics, and will be under their sole control.

The unity of will of the labouring masses of the whole Union will be expressed in its supreme authority, the Union Congress of Soviets, but at the same time each nationality will have special representation in the Soviet of Nationalities, which will cooperate on equal rights with the Union Soviet elected by the Congress.

The Union of Soviet Republics, thus established on the basis of the fraternal cooperation of peoples, will place before itself the aim of preserving the peace with all nations. All the nationalities, with equal rights, and working together

in close cooperation, will together develop their culture and prosperity, and work out the problems facing the workers' government.

As the natural ally of oppressed peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics seeks to live in peace and friendly relations with all peoples and to establish economic cooperation with them. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics places before itself the aim of furthering the interests of the labouring masses of the whole world. Over the enormous territory stretching from the Baltic, the Black and the White Seas to the Pacific Ocean, the Union is already realising the fraternity of nations and the triumph of labour, but it is striving at the same time to bring about friendly cooperation between the peoples of the whole world.

Chairmen of the Union Central Executive Committee: M. I. Kalinin, G. I. Petrovsky, N. N. Narimanov, A. G. Cherviakov. Members of the presidium of the Union Central Executive Committee: A. S. Enukidze, L. B. Kamenev, F. Y. Kon, D. I. Kursky, D. Z. Manuilsky, A. F. Miasnikam, K. G. Rakovsky, Y. I. Rudzutak, A. I. Rykov, T. V. Sapronov, P. G. Smidovich, J. V. Stalin, M. P. Tomsky, M. G. Tskhakaya, Khibir-Aliev.

Secretary of the Union Central Executive Committee: A. Enukidze.

KREMLIN, MOSCOW, *July 13, 1923*

IV

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II (see pp. 20-22)

The Powers and Authorised Functions of the Village Soviet

THE powers and authorised functions of the village soviet in the USSR are elaborately set forth in the decree of the Central Executive Committee of January 1, 1931,¹ of which the following is a summarised translation :

We have, first, the general functions stated :

1. A Selosoviet is the supreme organ of power within its territory, through which the proletariat performs its dictatorship.

2. A Selosoviet carries out, in accordance with the laws and with the regulations of its higher authorities, the following tasks :

(a) It organises the poor-batraks and the middle-peasants masses of the village, carries out the work of social-economic life of the village, participates in the industrialisation of the country, and combats the kulaks and other class enemies and liquidates the kulaks as a class, by means of mass collectivisation.

(b) It carries resolutions on all questions connected with the village and discusses problems of the krai, oblast, republic, and of the entire Union of Republics, submitting its considerations to the higher authorities.

(c) It controls the activities of all its own institutions, enterprises and organisations, supervises the work of the institutions on its territory which are not subordinated to it, and renders assistance to all institutions on its territory.

(d) It takes the necessary steps to supervise the work of the institutions and citizens for the State.

(e) It combats all the activities which are contrary to the class proletarian policy and attends to the obedience of every citizen and official to the laws and regulations of the Soviet power.

The decree then enumerates an incredibly lengthy list of functions which the village soviet is supposed to fulfil :

6. In the election of the Selosoviet :

(a) It organises the election commission and controls the entire election campaign.

(b) It prepares a list of persons who ought to be deprived of the right of election, and keeps up to date the list of deprived persons, sanctioned by the Rayon Ispolkom.

(c) It elects delegates to the Rayon Congress of Soviets.

7. In the sphere of mass organisation :

(a) It attracts to its work workmen, batraks, kolkhosniks and the poor-middle elements of the village.

¹ Decree of the VTZIK of January 1, 1931 ; published in the Collection of Laws and Regulations, No. II. Part I. of March 26, 1931.

(b) It takes necessary steps to attract women to soviet construction work and facilitates their promotion to responsible posts.

(c) It conducts systematic work amongst the batraks and poor, improves conditions of work of their groups, and discusses with them all important questions of the agenda of the Selosoviet meeting.

(d) It conducts political and economic propaganda amongst the vast masses of labouring people.

(e) It forms the soviet and kolkhos cadres.

(f) It convokes general meetings of electors (not less than three times a year), reports there on its activities, and discusses all important problems of the soviet economic and cultural construction.

8. In the sphere of the national policy, the Selosoviet takes necessary measures in protecting the national minorities, in raising their political, economic and cultural standard, and in attracting them to the Soviet construction.

9. In the sphere of planning and statistics :

(a) It prepares a plan of the economic and social-cultural construction of the village and submits it to the Rayon Ispolkom.

(b) It sanctions the plans of its own institutions and controls their execution.

(c) It discusses the plans of other institutions on its territory, gives its opinion on them and collaborates in their execution.

(d) It elects the village statisticians-representatives and carries on all statistical work.

(e) It keeps the register of village households.

10. In the sphere of the socialist reconstruction and of the development of agriculture :

(a) It takes necessary steps to preserve the existing kolkhoses and to form the new ones.

(b) It discusses and sanctions the plans of collective farms and other cooperative organisations.

(c) It periodically arranges meetings for hearing the reports of the institutions dealing with the kolkhoses as well as the reports of the kolkhoses themselves, which are situated on its territory.

(d) It gives its conclusions as to requests for credits and equipment for the kolkhoses.

(e) It assists in the introduction of new methods in the collective farms.

(f) It supervises the distribution of labour and technical staff in the collective farms and attends to the discipline in the collective and soviet enterprises.

(g) It pronounces its veto on any illegal decisions of the collective farms and other cooperative institutions and reports immediately on this to the Rayon Ispolkom.

(h) It takes necessary steps to develop the collectivisation of farms and assists the batraks and the individual peasants in forming kolkhoses.

(i) It renders assistance to sovkhoses and to the M.T.S. (Motor and Tractor Stations).

(k) It takes all necessary measures in increasing the area sown, and in raising the yield, and encourages the development of all kinds of farming and the introduction of agricultural improvements.

(l) It assists the government in the nationalisation of lands and reports on all lands and fields which are in possession of collective farms or individual peasants and advises, if necessary, on their confiscation.

(m) It controls the activities of agricultural societies and liquidates them in the areas of mass collectivisation, with the sanction of the Rayon Ispolkom.

11. In the sphere of industry :

(a) It runs its own industry.

(b) It controls the use of sandstone and clay on its territory.

(c) It supervises its home industry and assists kустars in creating artels.

(d) It supervises all enterprises on its territory and renders them the necessary assistance.

12. In the sphere of forestry :

(a) It looks after the forests which have a local use.

(b) It develops timber and the wood-chemical industry.

(c) It supervises all woods and forests on its territory and renders assistance in preserving woods of national importance and protects all woods and forests from fire, damage, etc.

13. In the sphere of supply, cooperation and trade :

(a) It attracts the local population to cooperative organisations and improves their activities.

(b) It collects and controls funds for the purpose of cooperation and collectivisation of batraks (landless peasants).

(c) It controls the local trade and prices.

(d) It supervises local markets, fairs, etc.

(e) It fixes rents for shop premises and stalls.

14. In the sphere of finance and budget :

(a) It drafts the Selosoviet Budget and submits it to the Rayon Ispolkom.

(b) It deals with the approved credits.

(c) It collects taxes and rates.

(d) It deals with the deductions of local taxes and rates, with the terms of payment, etc.

(e) It collects fines and sells by auction the property of persons who have not paid them.

(f) It makes inventories of inheritances and communicates them to the Rayon Ispolkom.

(g) It takes part in building up the state credit system and in the floating of state loans, etc.

(h) It deals with the self-taxation of the population.

(i) It cooperates with the insurance schemes.

15. In the sphere of local government :

(a) It deals with all housing questions, school and hospital buildings, etc.

(b) It repairs local roads, bridges, etc.

16. In the sphere of communications the Selosoviet collaborates with the Norkompochtel.

17. In the sphere of labour :

- (a) It attends to the strict fulfilment of the Labour Code.
- (b) It registers and controls all collective agreements of batraks with their employers.
- (c) It attracts, if necessary, the local population to public works in making roads, organising transport, etc.

18. In the sphere of education :

- (a) It liquidates illiteracy and opens all kinds of educational institutions.
- (b) It supervises the public education of children, takes care of the homeless waifs, appoints trustees to them, etc.
- (c) It assists the government in establishing agricultural and technical education, distributes young persons amongst different schools and factories, etc.
- (d) It sees to the supply of boots, clothing and food to the poorest children.

19. In the sphere of health :

- (a) It supervises all the hospitals and sanitary establishments, which are maintained on the Selosoviet Budget.
- (b) It takes all necessary steps to the organisation of sanitary inspection and combats venereal diseases.
- (c) It advances the knowledge of personal hygiene and develops physical culture.
- (d) It appoints trustees to insane persons.

20. In the sphere of social insurance :

- (a) It keeps the register of insured persons and pays out the benefits.
- (b) It forms artels of invalids.
- (c) It takes a special care of the Red Army invalids, veterans of the Civil War, and of all persons who suffered from the kulaks and contra-revolutionaries. It forms them into collective farms.
- (d) It supervises the activities of the societies for mutual aid.
- (e) It appoints trustees to blind and dumb persons, etc.

21. In the sphere of the defence of the country :

- (a) It keeps the register of all persons liable for military service.
- (b) It registers horses, carriages and other requisites of war.
- (c) It assists in recruiting.
- (d) It takes care of the families of persons serving in the Peasants-Workers Army.
- (e) It undertakes all kinds of useful military training.
- (f) It participates in organisation of military training courses.
- (g) It deals suitably with persons avoiding military compulsory service.

22. In the sphere of judicial prosecution :

- (a) It forms a village judicial court.

- (b) It supervises the election of judges.
- (c) It attends to the strict fulfilment of the decisions of the court.
- (d) It deals with notarial acts.
- (e) It finds employment for persons sentenced to compulsory work.

23. In the sphere of revolutionary activities :

- (a) It attends to the maintenance of revolutionary order and combats all anti-soviet elements.
- (b) It arrests suspected persons.
- (c) It deals with domiciliary searches and inspection of documents.
- (d) It combats drunkenness, hooliganism and secret sale of alcoholic drink.
- (e) It appoints village executive officers (ispolnitel).
- (f) It collects administrative fines.

24. In the sphere of administration :

- (a) It registers deeds, issues identity cards, etc.
- (b) It keeps the register of all voluntary organisations on its territory and supervises their activities.
- (c) It attends to the strict fulfilment of the laws regulating religious societies.

V

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II (see pp. 38-42)

The Sections and Commissions of the City Soviets

(Extract from the Regulations as to City Soviets of October 24, 1925,
published by the Communist Academy, Moscow, 1927)

45. IN order to attract all members of the Soviet, and also wide masses of workers to the practical work of the city soviets and its organs, the city soviets are divided up into sections according to separate branches of municipal economy and administration. The sections assist in the work of the city soviet in general, and also supervise the work of the executive organs of the Soviet.

46. The number of sections and the functions of each are determined by the Soviet.

47. The following sections are compulsory for each city soviet :

(a) Communal economy, (b) finance and budget, (c) education, (d) public health, (e) cooperative trading. Other sections (administrative, legal, housing, labour, industry, social insurance, military, workers' inspection, etc.) are created by Resolution of the Soviet as required.

48. Members join any section from choice, but every member of the Soviet must work in one section.

49. In addition to members of the Soviet, membership of a section may include representatives of trade unions, of factory-works and local committees, of delegate meetings of women workers, of the Red Army and separate social organisations, as well as individual workers whose collaboration in the work of the section appears desirable.

Note.—The person in charge of the corresponding organ (the head of the department or of the sub-department) must necessarily be included in the membership of the section.

50. The Soviet, or its presidium, may temporarily relieve individual deputies from work in the sections.

51. All members of the section have a casting vote in its work.

Note.—Persons invited to attend separate meetings of the section such as experts, specialists and others, have a consultative vote.

52. A section—

(a) Considers the plans of work in its branch of economy and administration.

(b) Hears the reports of the corresponding organs and gives their conclusions upon them to the plenum or presidium.

(c) Considers the fundamental problems of the current work of the executive organs and gives its conclusions upon them.

(d) Studies the work in institutions, undertakings, etc., in the corresponding branch of economy and administration.

(e) Attaches members of the section to undertakings and institutions, who serve the city in their branch of work, in order to supervise and assist their work.

(f) Hears the report of the bureau as to the carrying out of the plan and of the resolutions of the section.

(g) Appoints standing commissions (sub-sections) to ensure closer contact with separate branches of the executive apparatus in the corresponding department of administration and economy.

(h) Appoints temporary commissions to work on separate problems.

(i) Considers the proposals, resolutions, etc., brought up by individual members of the section on their own initiative, and relating to the given branch of work.

(j) Considers similar projects and resolutions brought forward by various institutions, organisations and individuals in the corresponding branch of work.

(k) Takes part in the working-out of plans and projects relating to the fundamental problems of the work of corresponding executive organs in meetings and conferences, etc., called by them.

53. The resolutions of the sections are confirmed and executed by the presidium of the city soviet.

54. In cases where the section does not agree with the decision of the presidium of the city soviet it may put the matter before the plenum of the Soviet for their discussion.

55. Problems which require preliminary working-on are forwarded by the presidium of the city soviet to the corresponding sections.

56. The section meets at times fixed by the plenum or presidium of the Soviet and by the bureau of the section.

57. The section elects a bureau from among its members for the period during which it holds office ; the person in charge of the corresponding branch of work in the city must be included in this.

58. The bureau elects a chairman and also a deputy-chairman and a secretary of the section.

Note.—The person in charge of the corresponding executive organ must not hold office as chairman of the section.

59. The bureau is the executive and administrative organ of the section, and is responsible to the section for the preparation of matters to be laid before the plenum of the section ; it collects and systematises material, keeps the registers of members of the section and of its commissions, keeps registers of attendances at meetings, makes reports as to the activities of the section, forwards the resolutions of the sections to the proper quarters, sees that they are executed, and takes part in the meetings of the presidium of the city soviet through its delegates, who have a consultative vote in it.

60. The general direction of the work of the section is in the hands of the plenum and of the presidium of the city soviet.

61. For the consideration of general questions which affect two or more sections, the presidium of the city soviet may call joint meetings of the bureaux or plenums of these sections.

VI

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II (see p. 282)

Note relating to the Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin, or RKI)

ONE of the most remarkable of the executive departments of the USSR Government was the standing Commission of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which ranked as a USSR Commissariat under its president, who was always a member of the USSR Sovnarkom. A similar organisation existed in all the constituent and autonomous republics, the local head always sitting in the local sovnarkom. This unique department was instituted in 1919 and reorganised at the instance of Lenin himself and entrusted for the first few years to Stalin, when his special task of arranging relations with the non-Russian nationalities and other "cultural minorities" in the USSR had been practically completed. Lenin's object was to counteract the tendencies to an invidious "bureaucratism" which were becoming visible in the rapidly developing collectivism to which Soviet Communism was committed. To do this he wished to call in the ordinary citizens—the workers and peasants—as inspectors and critics of the working of every public department, great or small, so that they might eliminate the "red tape" characteristic of officialdom, and check the growing separation in habits and manners between the bureaucrats and the public at large. For this important service Lenin relied on the common sense and intuitive judgment of the mechanics and the villagers; but Stalin apparently realised that, for any accurate appraisalment of the organisation of a great enterprise, whether in the office or in the factory, trained observation and administrative experience was requisite, if only to direct the criticisms of the ordinary citizen, and to formulate wisely the reforming proposals in which the criticism eventuated.

The USSR Commission for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection came to have no fewer than five assistants, each at the head of a considerable department—so true is the common Russian joke that the only remedy for bureaucracy is the creation of more bureaucracy! It gradually accumulated in the service of the juries of laymen on its extensive staff, either at Moscow or at its numerous local offices, highly trained inspectors and auditors, including, we are told, "many of the oldest, most educated and most experienced Communists". It was closely connected and actually intertwined in work with the Control Commission of the Communist Party, which maintains a constant watch upon the conduct and the careers of every member of the Party, receiving complaints and accusations, and investigating every suspicion and rumour. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was actually carried out all over the USSR by specially appointed committees or delegations of men and women who took "time off" from their own factories, farms or offices, to visit other departments; interrupting the business of these, sometimes without notice, in order to ascertain how much work is actually being performed by the constantly increasing staffs, to detect instances of unnecessary forms and duplication of effort, and to suggest improvements.

The investigations of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection became an

important basis for the "chistka" or cleansing, to which every public department was from time to time subjected. This must not be confused with the "chistka" to which the members of the Communist Party, wherever they are employed, are subjected every three or four years. The "chistka" with which the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was concerned was irrespective of Party membership and related only to the persons employed in a particular establishment. "Periodically", records Mr. Calvin B. Hoover, "the technical and administrative staffs of industry are required to face the cleaning commission. . . . When hearings are held before the cleaning commission, all the workers of the industry are invited and expected to be present. As a matter of fact anyone can be present, and anyone can ask questions of the person who is being 'cleaned'. The process is not a pleasant one for the person 'at the bar', for every possible criticism which can be raked up is usually fired at his unlucky head. Every questionable act which he may have done, any indiscreet conversation, any part of his private life may be hauled out into the pitiless light of publicity. The janitor may accuse the director of the trust of having a bourgeois taste in neckties or of not providing proper safeguards for workmen in dangerous occupations. The ancestry of the victim is particularly examined into, and happy is he who can answer that his mother 'came from the wooden plough' and his father 'came from the loom', and thrice damned is he whose ancestry includes either kulak, bourgeois, or landlord. . . . Nevertheless, this institution gives a sense of power even to the individual workman, and it does serve to lessen any tendency on the part of the administrative personnel to be tyrannical in any special personal cases, lest the victim attain his revenge at the next chistka."¹

It should be added that the victims of the "chistka" had a right of appeal to superior authorities; and any unduly drastic decision of the commission was often reversed.

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection as a whole was described by Mr. W. H. Chamberlin, who had watched its operation over a number of years, as "a sort of permanent super-commission for audit and control; it is continually combing the other state departments for traces of graft, bureaucratism and other abuses. The Rabkrin has a far-flung net; its inspectors look into everything, from the management of the Moscow Art Museum to the building of a new industrial plant, from the civil service qualifications of the officials in Daghestan to the conditions of the peasant farms in the Kuban."² Naturally, such investigations are not popular in the offices subjected to them; and the mere cost of so extensive a service is a serious drawback. But the common opinion is that the Rabkrin ". . . seems to make out a good cause for its activity on the ground that the savings which it has recommended far outweigh the cost of its upkeep."²

Whatever doubts may be expressed about the technical efficiency of its inspections, or of the net advantage of the retrenchments that it recommends, it is clear that the activity of such a popular tribunal did much to maintain the conviction of the common people that they were in command. Its peripatetic inspections were also a potent instrument of popular education in public administration. It earned an enthusiastic eulogium from one of few British economists who have troubled to investigate the government structure

¹ *Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, by Calvin B. Hoover, 1930, pp. 262-263.

² *Soviet Russia*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, p. 119.

of the USSR. Mrs. Barbara Wootton, writing in 1934, declared that "It is much to be hoped that, even should the Russians relax their fierce repression of the now unpopular social classes, they will not lightly abandon their institution of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Undoubtedly the price of this meddling interference of the rank and file into affairs of which they must, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, understand nothing at all, is a considerable sacrifice of efficiency. But, even at that price, it may be argued that the safeguard which this affords against the odious vulgarities of class distinctions is well worth having. For those who are accustomed by the nature of their work to give commands, or are divorced from the crude physical realities of farm and mine and factory, what can be more salutary than some such direct personal reminder that they are no better than their fellows? The official intrusion of those who perform the simplest, the dirtiest or the most tedious jobs into the secret places of those whose work is skilled, responsible and interesting (and paid for as such) provides a means of contact between the one group and the other that might never be established in any other way; and it makes at the same time a magnificent assertion that none shall judge the one superior to the other. Nor is it unreasonable to hope that, as the standard of proletarian education rises, the price of this intrusion, even in terms of economic efficiency, may be gradually diminished. The better educated the rank and file become, the more will they realise and respect the province of the expert; the less will such criticisms as they make be directed to technical matters on which their opinion is valueless, and the more to human issues on which their judgment stands equal with that of others—on which those, upon whom their inspections descend, are no better qualified to pronounce than they; the more, in fact, will they concern themselves, not with the currency policy of the central bank, or the rotation of crops on a collective farm, but with the detection of those signs of personal ostentation and arrogance on the one hand, and of subservience on the other, which mark the insidious growth of class distinctions."¹

This interesting institution was, after fifteen years' existence, brought to an end in 1934, at the instance of the Communist Party. There seem to have been complaints that, in many parts of the country, the department was insufficiently organised to deal with anything like all the complaints that reached its local offices. There were excessive delays in remedying grievances. But the main purpose, as explained in the speeches of Kaganovich and Kuibishev to the plenum of the Party Control Commission (as reported in the *Moscow Daily News*, July 5 and 11, 1934), seems to have been a more thorough and continuous "checking up" of the loyalty, promptitude and efficiency of the subordinate officials of the various ministries, especially in the districts remote from Moscow, in carrying out the decisions of the Central Government. It was apparently the method of inspection by the workers and peasants that was objected to. *Pravda*, July 4, 1934, in an editorial, explained that "the method of inspection, which was the basic principle of the work of the Control Commission, is now replaced by the method of control and verification of fulfilment of the Party and Government decisions. The control becomes now the inseparable part of the administration. . . . The control of the reconstruction of the Narkomzen, Narkomput and of the Narkomvod has proved that the reconstruction was achieved only partially, and that it was concerned with

¹ *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, p. 265.

the central organs and their staffs, and did not yet affect the secondary and primary organisations of the Narkomats themselves or their local branches."

Whatever may have been the reasons, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, at its session of June 28, 1934, called for the complete supersession of the RKI department throughout the USSR, with a view to its functions being more efficiently organised. A separation was made between the work of inspection or detection of abuses, on the one hand, and on the other the duty of taking disciplinary action against officers found to be to blame, or other administrative action to remedy grievances. The work of inspection and detection has since continued under the direction of the trade union hierarchy, headed by the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. The duty of continuous "verification" to ensure that each new decree or directive is promptly carried out, and that of taking disciplinary or other administrative action, was entrusted to a new Commission of Control appointed by and responsible to the Sovnarkom of the USSR, the first members being nominated or suggested by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.¹ This new commission, which will have its own agents in all parts of the USSR, is to work in close collaboration with a separate Commission of Party Control, responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, whose function it is to maintain a constant scrutiny of the conduct of all the members of the Party. The whole area of the USSR has been divided into 28 districts, in each of which will be stationed either a member of the Commission of Soviet Control, or a member of the Commission of Party Control, or a member of each body. To local offices under such direction, all complaints and criticisms of any branch of public administration are to be directed; and to these offices the reports of the inspections by trade union local committees are to be sent. It remains to be seen whether, under the new system, these inspections will continue to be made.

¹ *Membership and Regulations of the Commission of Party Control and the Commission of Soviet Control* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1934), 34 pp.

VII

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II (see pp. 75, 192)

The Internal Organisation of the Narkomat of Sovkhosi

(Resolution of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. *Izvestia*, 23.4.34)

In order to do away with the shortcomings of organisation in the work and structure of the apparatus of the Narkomsovkhos of the USSR and of its local organs, and in order to improve their work and strengthen individual responsibility, the TSIK and Sovnarkom of the Union of SSR decree the reorganisation of the Narkomat of Sovkhosi of the USSR on the following lines :

I. CENTRAL APPARATUS OF THE NARKOMAT OF THE SOVKHOSI

1. The following departments and sections of the People's Commissariat of Grain and Live-stock Sovkhosi are to be abolished :

- (a) The Chief Department of Work and Repairs.
- (b) The Department of Organisation of Territory.
- (c) The Department of Registration and Distribution of the Labour Force.
- (d) The Department of Labour and Living Conditions.
- (e) The Department of Accounting and Statistics.
- (f) The Fuel Department.
- (g) The Finance Department.
- (h) The Department of Book-keeping.
- (j) The Department of Workers' Supplies.
- (k) The Scientific and Technical Department.
- (l) The Veterinary Department.
- (m) The Stock-breeding Department.
- (n) The Control and Disposals Section.
- (o) The Seed-cultivation Section.
- (p) The Protection from Fire Section.
- (q) The Law Section.
- (r) The Section for verifying execution.
- (s) The Section of Zernostroy (grain accumulation).

2. The following structure of the central apparatus of the Narkomsovkhos is laid down :

(a) The Chief Administration of Grain Sovkhosi, to carry out all functions relating to the management of the Grain-producing Sovkhosi of the Narkomsovkhos.

(b) The Chief Administration of Cattle and Dairy Sovkhosi, to carry out all functions relating to the management of Dairy and Cattle Sovkhosi of the Narkomsovkhos.

(c) The Chief Administration of Pig-breeding Sovkhosi, to carry out all

functions relating to the management of the Pig-breeding Sovkhosi of the Narkomsovkhosi.

(d) The Chief Administration of Sheep-breeding Sovkhosi, to carry out all functions relating to the Sheep-breeding Sovkhosi of the Narkomsovkhosi.

(e) The Chief Administration of Education, to which all higher educational institutions, technical schools and schools on the special register of the Narkomsovkhosi are to be subordinated.

(f) Policial Administration.

3. The Chief Administration of the Grain-producing Sovkhosi to consist of the following Departments :

- (a) Agrotechnical and Rotation of Crops.
- (b) Machine-technical.
- (c) Seeds.
- (d) Cattle-breeding.
- (e) Supply for workers.
- (f) Finance and Book-keeping.

Sections :

- (a) Planning.
- (b) Construction.
- (c) Labour Force.
- (d) Scientific and Research Institutions.

The Chief Animal-breeding Administrations are to contain the following departments :

- (a) Zoo-technical.
- (b) Veterinary.
- (c) Machine-technical.
- (d) Agrotechnical.
- (e) Breeding.
- (f) Finance and Book-keeping.

Sections :

- (a) Planning.
- (b) Construction.
- (c) Labour Force.
- (d) Scientific and Research Institutions.

In order to improve contact between the Chief Administrations with the Trusts and the Sovkhosi and in order to ensure proper guidance of the work of Trusts and of Sovkhosi, the Chief Administration of the Animal-breeding Sovkhosi delegates Assistant Chiefs of Administration to inspect the following groups of rayons :

(a) Chief Administration of Grain Sovkhosi :

1st Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of USSR, the Crimea, Northern Caucasus, and of the Azov-Black-Sea Krai.

2nd Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of the Stalingrad, Saratov, and of the Middle Volga Krai, of the Bashkir ASSR and of the Central Black Earth Oblast.

3rd Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of the Far Eastern Krai, of

the Eastern Siberian and Western Siberian Krai, of the Kazakstan, and of the Chelyabinsk Oblast.

(b) Chief Administrations of the Cattle and Dairy and Sheep-breeding Sovkhosi :

1st Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of USSR, the Crimea, Northern Caucasus, Azov-Black-Sea Krai, Stalingrad, and Saratov Krai and of the Central Black Earth Oblast.

2nd Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of the Western Siberian, Eastern Siberian, Northern and Middle Volga Krai, of the Sverdlovskaya Oblast, and of the Bashkir and Tatar ASSR.

3rd Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of the Chelyabinsk Oblast, of Kazakstan and Kirghizia.

(c) Chief Administration of Pig-breeding Sovkhosi :

1st Group.—Trusts situated in the territory of the USSR, Northern Caucasian and Azov-Black-Sea Krai.

2nd Group.—Trusts situated on the territory of the Saratov and Middle Volga Krai, Central Black Oblast, and of the Bashkir and Tatar ASSR.

3rd Group.—Trusts situated on the territory of Eastern Siberian and Western Siberian Krai, of the Chelyabinsk Oblast and Kazakstan.

4. The following central Departments of the Narkomsovkhosi of the USSR are to be organised :

- (a) Planning and Financial.
- (b) Accounting and Statistics.
- (c) Specialists.
- (d) Administrative and Management.
- (e) Secretariat of the Narkomat.

5. To create and attach to the Narkom :

- (a) A section for the registration and selection of the Labour Force.
- (b) A central Arbitration Court.
- (c) A Scientific Technical Council.
- (d) A group of inspectors to verify execution.

6. To reorganise "Sovkhossnab" into an office called "Supplies for Sovkhosi", to retain its function of supplying the Sovkhosi with machines, implements and mineral manures, according to the classification passed by the Sovnarkom of the USSR.

II. THE UNION TRUSTS OF GRAIN-PRODUCING AND ANIMAL-BREEDING SOVKHOSI

1. The following departments to be organised in the Union Grain Trusts :

- (a) Agro-field (crop rotation ?).
- (b) Machine-technical.
- (c) Seeds.
- (d) Cattle-breeding.
- (e) Planning.
- (f) Supplies for workers.
- (g) Finance and Book-keeping.

(h) Cost Accounting office with warehouses and shops for the sale of equipment and materials to the Sovkhosi.

(i) Building Office.

(j) Administrative and Management Section.

2 In the Union Animal-breeding Trusts the following Departments are to be organised :

(a) Zoo-technical.

(b) Veterinary.

(c) Breeding.

(d) Machine-technical.

(e) Agro-field.

(f) Planning.

(g) Finance and Book-keeping.

(h) Building.

(i) Cost Accounting office with warehouses and shops for the sale of equipment and materials to the Sovkhosi.

(j) Administrative and Management Section.

3. At the head of the Trust is the Director of the Trust with two deputies --of these one is a Deputy for the political work.

III. THE SOVKHOSI

1. At the head of the Sovkhosi is a Director appointed and dismissible by the People's Commissar.

The Director of the Sovkhus has one Deputy (in addition to his deputy for the political work) and one assistant for workers' supplies.

2. The following typical structure for Grain Sovkhosi is to be confirmed :

(a) Director of the Sovkhus.

(b) Political Department of the Sovkhus.

(c) Manager of the Department (according to the number of departments) with a Deputy for the political part.

(d) Senior Agronome of the Sovkhus and junior agronomes, according to the number of departments.

(e) Manager of the tractor park, who is directly responsible for the proper use and good condition of tractors and machines.

(f) Mechanics, according to the number of departments.

(g) Manager of the petrol station.

(h) ORS (Department of Workers' Supplies).

(i) Book-keeping Department.

The automobile column, road detachment and repair workshop are constituent parts of the Sovkhus and are directly subordinate to the Director of the Grain Sovkhus.

3. The following typical structure for Animal-breeding Sovkhosi is to be confirmed :

(a) Director of the Sovkhus.

(b) Political Department of the Sovkhus.

(c) Manager of each farm (according to the number of farms).

(d) Senior zoo-technician, and junior zoo-technicians, according to the number of farms.

- (e) Veterinary surgeon and veterinary *feldschers*, according to the number of farms.
- (f) Zoo-technician for breeding-work.
- (g) Agronomes for the Sovkhos.
- (h) Mechanic.
- (i) Manager of petrol station.
- (j) Book-keeping Department.

IV. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NARKOMAT OF SOVKHOSI

1. The Narkomat of Sovkhosi has its own representatives on the Sovnarkoms of the Union Republics.

2. The existing departments of representatives of the Narkomat of Sovkhosi in krais, oblasts and autonomous republics are to be abolished.

It is to be left to the sovnarkoms of autonomous republics, and to the krai and oblast ispolkoms, to have the right of control over the activities of the sovkhos trusts of the Narkomsovkhosi.

It is to be made the duty of the Commissariat of Grain and Animal Sovkhosi of the USSR to carry out the reorganisation of the organs of management of sovkhosi on the basis of the present decree not later than June 1, 1934.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of SSR :	M. KALININ
Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of SSR :	V. MOLOTOV
Secretary of the TZIK of the Union of SSR :	A. ENUKIDZE

Moscow, KREMLIN, April 22, 1934

VIII

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II (see pp. 75, 192)

The Internal Organisation of the Narkomat of Agriculture

(Resolution of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of SSR, *Pravda*, 5.4.34)

In order to do away with the shortcomings of organisation in the work and structure of the apparatus of the Narkomzem of the Union of SSR and of republican and local organs, and in order to improve their work and strengthen personal responsibility, the TSIK and Sovnarkom of the Union of SSR decree the reorganisation of the system of the agricultural organs of the Union of SSR on the following lines :

I. CENTRAL APPARATUS OF THE NARKOMZEM OF THE USSR

1. To liquidate in the Narkomzem of the USSR the following departments and sections, associations and trusts :

- (a) The Chief Grain Department of the MTS.
- (b) The Chief Department of Cotton MTS.
- (c) The Chief Department of the Beet MTS.
- (d) The Chief Department of Flax and Hemp MTS.
- (e) The Chief Department of Vegetable and Potato MTS.
- (f) The Chief Department of Machine-haymaking Stations.
- (g) The Department of Organisation of Kolkhos Labour and Distribution of Income.
- (h) The Department of Technical Propaganda.
- (i) The Fodder Department.
- (j) The Department of Chemicalisation, and Lime Bureau.
- (k) The Fuel Department.
- (l) The Department of Repairs and Work.
- (m) The Section of Control and Verification of Execution.
- (n) The Chief Department of Capital Construction.
- (o) The Department of Live-stock Kolkhos Goods Farms.
- (p) The Section of Economics of Labour and of Production Quotas.
- (q) The Union of Cotton Sovkhosi.
- (r) The " Glavvodkhos " Association.
- (s) The Association " Novlub ".
- (t) The " Soyusmenovod " Association.
- (u) The Association of Fight Wreckers.
- (v) The Flax Sovkhos Centre.

2. To organise the following Chief Administration of the NKZ of the Union of SSR :

- (a) Chief Administration for grain and oil-producing cultures, to carry out all functions for management of machine tractors and agro-field service for grain and oil production in all republics, krais and oblasts of the USSR.
- (b) The Chief Beet Administration—to carry out all functions for the

management of the machine tractors and the agro-field service for production.

(c) The Chief Flax and Hemp Administration.

(d) The Chief Cotton Administration.

The following Departments are formed within the Chief Administration for Grain and Oil-producing Cultures, the Chief Beet Administration, the Chief Cotton Administration, and the Chief Flax and Hemp Administration :

Agro-technical and Rotation of Crops.

Machine-technical.

To Fight Wreckers.

Seed.

Financial and Book-keeping.

Sections :

Planning.

Labour Force.

For Scientific Research Institutions.

In addition to this, the following Departments are formed in these Administrations :

In the Chief Grain Administration—a Rice Department.

In the Chief Cotton Administration—a Department of Cotton Sovkhosi, an Irrigation Department, a Department of New Textile Cultures, and a Department of Mineral Manures.

In the Chief Flax and Hemp Administration—a Department of Flax and Hemp Factories, a Department of Flax and Hemp Sovkhosi and a Department of Mineral Manures.

In the Chief Beet Administration—Department of Mineral Fertilisers.

(e) The Chief Administration for Live-stock Breeding, within which the following Departments are formed :

Horned cattle breeding.

Pig-breeding.

Sheep-breeding.

Sections :

Veterinary.

Fodder.

Planning and Financial.

(f) The Chief Administration for Horse-breeding : to carry out all functions relating to the management of horse-breeding sovkhosi, horse-breeding farms, and the breeding and maintenance of the number of horses in the country.

(g) The Chief Veterinary Administration.

(h) The Chief Administration for Sub-tropical Cultures.

(i) The Chief Department for Afforestation and Protective (?) Forests.

(j) The Chief Administration for Tobacco.

(k) The Chief Administration for Silk-worm Culture.

(l) The Chief Administration for Higher Technical Educational Institutions and Technical Schools.

(m) Political Administration.

3. In order to improve the contact of the Chief Administrations with the

krais and oblasts and in order to ensure proper guidance for grain production and live-stock breeding so that they may be adapted to the peculiarities of the principal regions of the USSR, Assistant Heads of Administrations are detailed in the Chief Administrations for Grain and Oil-producing cultures and the Chief Administration for Live-stock Breeding, to inspect the following groups of rayons :

1st Group of Rayons.—Ukrainian SSR, Crimean ASSR, the Central Black Earth Oblast, Azov-Black-Sea Krai, the Northern Caucasus Krai, the Trans-Caucasian JSSR, the Middle Asiatic Republics.

2nd Group of Rayons. The Moscow Oblast, the Gorki Krai, the Ivanovskaya Oblast, the Leningrad Oblast, the White Russian Oblast, the Northern Krai, the Tartar ASSR, the Sverdlovskaya Oblast, the Ob-Irtysk Oblast, the Western Oblast.

3rd Group of Rayons.—The Stalingrad Krai, the Saratov Krai, the Middle Volga Krai, the Bashkir ASSR, the Kazak ASSR.

4th Group of Rayons.—The Chelyabinsk Oblast, the Western Siberian, Eastern Siberian and Far-Eastern Krai.

4. The following Departments are to be formed within the NKZ of the Union of SSR :

- (a) Planning and Financial.
- (b) Accounting and Statistical.
- (c) Specialists.
- (d) Administrative and Management.
- (e) Secretariat of the Narkomat.

5. To lay down that the following are attached directly to the Narkom of Agriculture of the Union of SSR :

- (a) Section for Registration and Selection of Labour Force.
- (b) A group of inspectors to verify execution.
- (c) Central Arbitration Court.

6. To reorganise the Association "Selkhozsnabjenie" into an office called "Selkhozsnabjenie", this office to retain the functions of supplying the MTS and the sovkhosi of the NKZ of the USSR with machines, implements and mineral manure according to a limited list, confirmed by the Sovnarkom of the USSR ; the krai and oblast offices of the Association "Selkhozsnabjenie" with all their warehouses and shops are to be handed over to the krai and oblast Land Administrations.

II. APPARATUS OF THE NARKOMZEM OF THE RSFSR

The work of the Narkomzem of the RSFSR is to be concentrated upon guidance as regards production of vegetables and potatoes, orchards, land utilisation and improvement, local forests, poultry farming, rabbit-breeding and beekeeping ; the responsibility for guidance in this work in the krais, oblasts and autonomous republics of the RSFSR is to lie with the Narkomzem of the RSFSR.

In accordance with this, the following structure of the Narkomzem of the RSFSR is laid down :

- (I) Administrations :
- (a) Vegetable.

- (b) Potato.
- (c) Fruit-growing.
- (d) Land Utilisation.
- (e) Local Forests.
- (f) Poultry Farming, Rabbit-breeding and Beekeeping.
- (g) Special Higher Educational Institutions and Technical Schools for training cadres of mass qualifications (?) for breeding small live-stock, fruit-growing, vegetable-growing and land utilisation.
- (h) Industrial Sovkhosi.

(II) Departments :

- (a) Planning and Financial
- (b) Local Land Improvement and Peat.
- (c) Agriculture in the Far North.
- (d) Administrative and Management.
- (e) Secretariat of the Narkomat.

(III) Attached to the Narkom of Agriculture of the RSFSR :

- (a) Land Commission.
- (b) Section for Selection and Registration of Labour Force (Cadres).
- (c) Arbitration.

III. APPARATUS OF THE NARKOMZEMS OF REPUBLICS AND OF THE LAND ADMINISTRATIONS OF KRAIS AND OBLASTS (NKZ OF THE RSFSR EXCLUDED)

1. In the Narkomzems of Republics and in the Oblast and Krai Land Administrations the following Administrations are created :

(a) Grain (in all oblasts, krais and republics), Beet (in all oblasts, krais and republics which grow beet), Cotton (in all republics, krais and oblasts which grow cotton), and other Administrations (flax and hemp, vegetable, potato, forestry, orchard) according to the special bias of a given republic, krai and oblast.

- (b) Live-stock-breeding.
- (c) Horse-breeding.
- (d) Veterinary.
- (e) Political Section.

2. Departments :

- (a) Planning and Finance.
- (b) Accounting and Statistics.
- (c) Land Utilisation and Improvement.
- (d) Training of Labour Force.
- (e) Management.

3. Attached to the Narkoms for Agriculture in the republics and to the chiefs of krai and oblast Land Administrations :

- (a) Section for Selection and Registration of Labour Force.
- (b) Land Commission.
- (c) Arbitration.
- (d) " Selkhossnabjenie " Office.

IV. THE RAYON LAND APPARATUS

It must be recognised that the tendency which exists in certain krais, oblasts and republics towards the liquidation of the Rayon Land Departments is an erroneous one.

In order to strengthen the Rayon Land organs :

1. The Rayon Associations of stock-breeding farms are to be abolished as independent economic organs, and are to be made into sections of the Rayon Land Departments for stock-breeding.

2. The Rayon Land Departments are made responsible for operative guidance in agriculture in the kolkhosi which are not served by the MTS, and in individual homesteads ; operative guidance as regards stock-breeding in the rayon ; general planning [summary planning] of agricultural production in the rayon ; state supervision as regards quality of agricultural work in all kolkhosi and individual homesteads ; operative guidance in fruit-growing ; compilation of summary reports as to agricultural campaigns in the rayon ; management of state property and of forests of local importance.

3. To establish in accordance with this the following typical structure of the Rayon Land Department :

Manager of the Rayon Land Department.

Deputy Manager of the Rayon Land Department ; he also to act as manager of the section of Live-stock Breeding.

The Rayon Land Departments are to have no section beyond the Live-stock Breeding section.

The Rayon Land Department have :

Senior Agronomist.

Senior Land Arranger.

Senior Forester.

Senior Inspector for Accounting.

Technician for Construction.

4. To establish the following structure for the Section of Stock-breeding :

Manager of the Live-stock Breeding section.

Senior Zoo-technician.

Senior Veterinary Surgeon.

District Zoo-technicians and Veterinary Surgeons, attached to definite kolkhosi.

Zoo-technician for Horses.

5. A Land Commission is established and attached to each Rayon Land Department.

6. The incubator stations are directly subordinate to the Rayon Land Departments.

V. MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS

1. The post of Manager of MTS district is to be abolished, so that the tractor brigades are directly subordinate to the Director of the MTS, and so

that agronomes and travelling mechanics should be attached to definite groups of kolkhosi and tractor brigades, and should be directly subordinate to the Senior Agronome and Senior Mechanic.

2. The following typical structure of the MTS is fixed :

(a) Director of MTS.

(b) Polit-otdel of the MTS.

(c) Senior Mechanic (he is also manager of the tractor garage, and is held wholly responsible for the proper use and condition of tractors) and Travelling Mechanics.

(d) Senior Agronome, Agronomes for Special Cultures and Seeds, according to the bias of the work of the MTS, and Agronomes attached to definite Groups of Kolkhosi.

(e) Manager of the Petrol Station.

(f) Book-keeping.

The MTS to contain also, directly subordinate to the Director of the MTS, working on cost-accounting basis :

Motor Columns.

Road Detachment.

Repair Workshop.

VI

It is made the duty of the Narkomzem of the USSR to complete the reorganisation of land organs, according to the present decree, by May 15, 1934.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of SSR :	M. KALININ
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of SSR :	V. MOLOTOV
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of SSR :	A. ENUKIDZE

MOSCOW, KREMLIN, April 4, 1934

IX

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV (see p. 133)

List of the 151 Trade Unions among which the Membership of the 47 Trade Unions of 1931 was distributed in 1934

Old Unions	New Unions
Black metallurgy	1. Black metallurgy of the South
"	2. " " " East
"	3. " " " Centre
Transport machinery	4. Transport machinery
"	5. Shipbuilding
Electrical workers	6. Electrical machinery
"	7. Electrical low-tension current industry
"	8. Electro-stations
Auto-tractor industry	9. Aviation industry
"	10. Automobile industry
"	11. Tractor industry
General machinery	12. Tool and instrument makers
"	13. Machinery of fine precision
"	14. Heavy machinery
"	15. Military metal industry
"	16. Ordinary machinery
"	17. Metal goods
Non-ferrous metallurgy	18. Gold and platinum extraction
"	19. Non-ferrous extraction
"	20. " manufacture
Mining	21. Iron ore mining in the South
"	22. " " " East
"	23. Mining of non-metallic ores
"	24. Salt industry
"	25. Geological research workers
Coal-mining	26. Coal-mining in the Centre
"	27. " " " East
"	28. " " " Donbas
Petroleum	29. Petroleum in the Caucasus
"	30. " " " East
"	31. Petroleum distillation
Construction workers	32. Heavy industry of the Centre and South
"	33. Heavy industry of the Far East
"	34. Heavy industry of the Urals and Western Siberia
"	35. Light industry (timber and food products)
"	36. Housing and communal industry
Railway, posts and road workers	37. Railways and metropolitan works
"	38. Macadam road workers
Cement and ceramic	39. Fireproof clay workers
"	40. Cement workers
"	41. Brick workers
Timber and forestry industry	42. Timber and forestry industry of the South and Centre
"	43. Timber and forestry industry of the North
"	44. " " " East
Woodworking industry	45. Woodworking industry of the North
"	46. " " " Centre and South

Old Unions	New Unions
Woodworking industry	47. Woodworking industry of the East
" "	48. Furniture and musical instruments
" "	49. Matches and plywood
Chemical industry	50. Coke-chemical industry
" "	51. Nitrates and special chemicals
" "	52. Soda products and mineral mixtures
" "	53. Paint and pharmaceutical products
Glass and porcelain	54. Glass
" "	55. Porcelain
Cotton manufacture	56. Cotton manufacture in Moscow, Leningrad and elsewhere
" "	57. Cotton manufacture in Ivanovo oblast
" "	58. Manufacture of other fibres
Wool, silk and knitting industries	59. Woollen industry
" "	60. Knitting industry
" "	61. Silk industry
Linen and hemp industry	62. Linen industry
" "	63. Hemp industry
Sugar industry	64. Sugar-making
" "	65. Beet sugar—sovkhosi workers
Leather industry	66. Leather goods
" "	67. Boots and shoes
" "	68. Fur goods
Needlework	69. Needlework in the North
" "	70. " " South
Printing and publishing	71. Printing in the Centre and South
" "	72. " " North
" "	73. Publishing industry
Flour-milling, baking and confectionery	74. Baking
" "	75. Confectionery
" "	76. Flour-milling and Elevator Service in the South and Centre
" "	77. Flour-milling and Elevator Service in the East
Fish	78. Fisheries in the Far East
" "	79. " " North
" "	80. " " South
Workers in agricultural products	81. Tobacco workers
" "	82. Wine and distillery workers
" "	83. Brewery and starch-making workers
Workers in agricultural sovkhosi (state farms)	84. Grain sovkhosi
" "	85. Vegetable sovkhosi
" "	86. Garden crop sovkhosi
" "	87. Cotton sovkhosi
Workers in animal-breeding sovkhosi (state farms)	88. Pig sovkhosi
" "	89. Sheep sovkhosi
" "	90. Horse sovkhosi
" "	91. Other animal and game sovkhosi
" "	92. Milk and Meat sovkhosi of the Centre and South
" "	93. Milk and Meat sovkhosi of the Urals and Siberia
" "	94. Milk and Meat sovkhosi of Kazakstan and Middle Asia
Machine and tractor stations	95. MTS in the South and Centre

Old Unions	New Unions
Machine and tractor stations	96. MTS in the East
Meat and tinned food industries	97. Agricultural institutions
" "	98. Meat industries and refrigeration
" "	99. Tinned food industries
" "	100. Butter and fat-making
" "	101. Milk industry
Railway workers	102. Railway workers of the Centre
" "	103. " " " South
" "	104. " " " East and Far East
" "	105. " " " Middle Asia
Water transport workers	106. Railway workshops
" "	107. Sea transport
Autodivers and avion workers	108. River transport
" "	109. Aviation workers
" "	110. Auto drivers in Moscow and Leningrad
" "	111. " " in the South
" "	112. " " " East
Post and telegraph	113. Postal workers
" "	114. Telegraph, telephone and radio workers
Communal workers	115. Tramway workers
" "	116. Workers in communal enterprises
Municipal enterprises	117. Housing administration
" "	118. Municipal administration
" "	119. Fire brigades
" "	120. Haircutters
Public feeding workers	121. Consumers' cooperative public feeding enterprises
" "	122. State enterprises of public feeding
Cooperative and state distributive trades	123. Consumers' cooperative employees of the Centre
" "	124. Consumers' cooperative employees of the Ukraine
" "	125. Consumers' cooperative employees of the Caucasus
" "	126. Consumers' cooperative employees of Siberia and the Urals
" "	127. Consumers' cooperative employees of the East
" "	128. Employees in state trading
" "	129. " " in foreign trade
" "	130. " " in bookshops
Workers in state institutions	131. Workers in state institutions
" "	132. Workers in administrative institutions
" "	133. Workers in the Courts of Justice
" "	134. Workers in the institutions of National Economy
Cinema and other artistic workers	135. Photo-cinema industry
" "	136. Artistic industries
Medico-sanitary workers	137. Workers in medico-sanitary institutions of RSFSR
" "	138. Workers in medico-sanitary institutions of Ukraine
" "	139. Workers in medico-sanitary institutions of Middle Asia
" "	140. Workers in medico-sanitary institutions of Transcaucasus
" "	141. Workers in medico-sanitary institutions of White Russia

Old Unions	New Unions
Workers in educational institutions	142. Workers in colleges, high schools and scientific institutes
" "	143. Workers in primary and secondary schools of RSFSR
" "	144. Workers in primary and secondary schools of Ukraine
" "	145. Workers in primary and secondary schools of White Russia
" "	146. Workers in primary and secondary schools of Transcaucasus
" "	147. Workers in primary and secondary schools of Middle Asia
" "	148. Workers in pre-school institutions
" "	149. Workers engaged in institutions of political education
Finance and banking	150. Finance and banking
Paper-making	151. Paper-making
Rubber manufacture	152. Rubber manufacture
Peat workers	153. Peat workers
Agricultural machinery makers	154. Agricultural machinery makers

X

The Duties and Functions of the Factory Committees (see p. 140)

(Resolution of the II Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), on the Report of Comrade Shvernik, *Trud*, December 11, 1932)

(SUMMARY only. After a general introduction, there follow the paragraphs summarised below):

1. The collective agreement must, in fact, become the basis of the whole of the trade union work of the FZK (factory committee) in the undertaking. The FZK must so organise its work in the undertaking that the fight for the carrying out of the conditions laid out in the collective agreement—by management and workers alike—and the systematic watch that the collective agreement is being carried out, become the daily concern and the main subject of the activities of the Factory and Workshop Committees.

2. The FZK must increase their share in the work of planning and regulating wages in the undertaking by taking an active part in the classification of workers so that they can be put on wage-scales, and in determining technically possible quotas of output and payment in accordance with the Wage-Scale Schedule and the collective agreement. The FZK must see to it that the greatest possible use is made of piecework and that payment for work done is made on the basis of progressive premiums. Workers doing particularly important or difficult work must be dealt with separately.

The FZK must watch over the spending of the wages fund and prevent any waste or overspending which may occur as the result of the employment of excessively large staffs, of the use of overtime to any large extent, and to increases of wages paid to individual workers in breach of the collective agreement.

The FZK must keep watch that correct wages are paid to the workers, and must make a determined fight against the underpayment of workers and wrong entries of wages in the workers' wages books.

The FZK must watch strictly that the quotas of output should correspond to the technical conditions of production obtaining in the industry at the time.

3. The Plenum notes the quite inadmissible diminution of the part played by the RKK (Workers' and Peasants' Inspection)¹ and the slackening of their activities. The RKK must become the most important and authoritative organ in the settlement of conflicts in the field of fixing rates of pay and rates of output. The Plenum advises that membership of the RKK should consist of truly responsible representatives of the FZK and of the management—of persons who know the conditions of production and enjoy the confidence of the workers.

The activities of the RKK must be freed from all elements of red-tape and from a heartless attitude to the workers. The RKK must ensure the

¹ For the abolition of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection as an independent commissariat, and the transfer of its functions partly to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, and partly to the new Commission of Soviet Control, see Appendix VI, pp. 365-367.

speedy consideration of the workers' statements, and the workers concerned must be allowed to take part in this. The RKK must see to it that exhaustive and accurate decisions as to the problems raised are reached, and that the workers are informed of these decisions in good time by means of a compulsory display of these decisions in the workshops.

4. The Plenum draws attention to the fact that the decision taken by the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions as to the strengthening of Technical Rate-Fixing Bureaux (TNB) has not yet been carried out. This is quite inadmissible at the present time, when the technique of rate-fixing is becoming increasingly complex, and when its importance in the regulation of wage-rates is constantly growing.

The Plenum advises the FZK to see that this decision of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions is carried out at the earliest possible moment.

5. In view of the fact that spoliage and stoppages disorganise production, and thereby lead to the lowering of wages of the workers, the Plenum advises the FZK to carry out unwaveringly any decree of the Government as to payment for bad work and stoppages, and to combat energetically the causes which lead to this; the broad masses of the workers must be drawn into dealing with this most urgent problem.

6. The Plenum completely and wholly endorses the resolution of TSIK and of the Sovnarkom of the USSR, as to the fight against absenteeism, regarding this as a most important measure in strengthening labour discipline.

All trade union organisations are to have this decision of the Government explained to them at their meetings, so that it is really carried out.

Greater use is to be made of the Comrades' Courts, so that they become the most important weapon in the class education of workers and in the strengthening of socialist labour discipline.

7. While noting great advances in the activities of conferences to discuss production in groups and brigades, the Plenum observes a slackening in the work of workshop and factory conferences for the discussion of production.

The Plenum makes it the duty of the FZK to strengthen the activities of the workshops and of the factories in this respect, so that the conferences become practical schools for the training of broad masses of workers in the management of production.

8. In a number of undertakings the decision of the Party, of the Government, and of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions as to the part of Assistant Directors in production conferences has been distorted. The purpose of this measure was to raise the authority of production conferences within the undertaking, and to ensure the speedier carrying out of the workers' proposals. In many undertakings the managements (with the cognizance of the FZK and of the higher trade union organisations) have made use of the appointment of the chairman of production conferences as Assistant Director in order to make him do purely administrative work.

The chairman of the production conference (the Assistant Director) may be set free from all work which does not follow from his duties as organiser of production conferences, and the person dealing with the workers' suggestions. His part as one of the most important workers in the FZK in the field of directing factory, workshop and group production conferences must be strengthened, as well as his share in the entire work of the factory and workshop committees.

9. The Plenum notes that the FZK are paying less attention than before to the simple form of socialist competition between workers, namely, *udarnichestvo* (shock brigades); this must be improved.

A number of FZK are not taking their duties as regards making up lists of *udarniks* (shock-brigaders) sufficiently seriously, and include in them persons who are unworthy of the name. While fighting false *udarnichestvo* the FZK must achieve the systematic payment of premiums to the *udarniks* and also make sure that they get preferential treatment in the way of better food in the factory dining-rooms, and are allowed to buy goods the sale of which is unprofitable in the factory shops, etc.

10. The Plenum approves the decision of the TSUK of the Party as to the transfer of ZRK (closed cooperatives) of the larger undertakings to the managements, and as to the appointment of the chairmen of the ZRK as Assistant Directors in the remainder of the undertakings.

The Plenum draws attention to the fact that in this respect the work of the FZK will also increase. The FZK must detail their best workers into the supply organisations of the management; they must ensure their participation in the committees of supply in the undertakings, and work for the greatest possible increase of the stocks of supplies by factory managements, the ZRK and the dining-rooms.

The FZK must mobilise the masses for the fight against waste and criminal abuses in connection with the workers' food supplies; these are meant only for the workers in the given undertaking. The numbers to be supplied, and the quantities of supplies to be issued, must be checked by the FZK, and they must also keep a check on the issue of shopping books and food cards.

11. The FZK must give systematic help to the managements and to the ZRK in developing suburban farms and farm-yards; the FZK must see to it that at the earliest possible moment piggeries, dairy farms, rabbit farms, fish ponds, etc., become of real value in supplying the workers and their families with foodstuffs.

The experiment of the more advanced factories in attaching villages to themselves for the purpose of getting food supplies should be emulated; and the workers must themselves help in getting direct supplies from these attached villages, and also in establishing stores of food in the factories.

The FZK must also give every possible assistance to the workers and their families in organising their own allotments or gardens (vegetable, rabbit-breeding, piggeries, etc.), which would provide additional sources for the improved feeding of workers.

12. The Plenum considers that the work of the FZK, in so far as housing is concerned, is not satisfactory. They are recommended to make use of the experience of the campaign for the October Housing Fund, which has shown that by concentrating material and men in the most important sectors of building; by preliminary allotment of dwellings to workshops and individual workers' families; by mobilising local supplies of building materials; and by utilising the voluntary labour of the future occupiers, the supply of living accommodation in the undertakings can be largely increased. Special attention must be paid to better construction, and to the greatest possible use of local building material.

The FZK must increase the attention paid to the correct use of the living accommodation available; the best workers on the regular staff and the

udarniki (shock-brigaders) must have first claim upon this. The FZK must see to it that care is taken of the dwellings, and that they are repaired in good time, etc.

The FZK must also see to it that the workers' villages, apartments and lodging-houses are kept in good and sanitary order, and that day-nurseries and kindergartens are established in connection with these; expenditure on establishments for children must be carefully watched.

13. The Plenum notes that a number of FZK do not direct and do not systematically watch the work of the paying-out centres of Social Insurance in the undertakings. . . . The Plenum recommends to the FZK to strengthen the paying-out centres by appointing within a month their most active workers to act on them; their work must be carefully watched and special attention must be paid to the improvement of the medical service; to a more rational use being made of the insurance fund; to social service for the workers (crèches, kindergartens, the feeding of school children); to a wise and timely sending off of workers to sanatoria, houses of rest and watering-places; and to a full use being made of the travelling facilities allotted for these purposes.

14. The Plenum draws attention to the fact that the work of the FZK in the field of protection of labour and of safety appliances is clearly unsatisfactory, and that they do not work in conjunction with the inspectors; the Plenum advises the FZK to carry out a daily direction of the work of the inspectors, and to watch over the expenditure of funds set aside for improving safety appliances.

15. The Plenum puts before the FZK the task of improving radically and effectively, within the shortest possible time, the cultural work within all links of the trade union organisation in the undertaking, without any exceptions.

They must concentrate their attention on the general and technical instruction of adults; the instruction of children and young people; technical propaganda; political education. Special attention must be paid to new workers. The recreation of the workers must also be dealt with.

16. In the field of technical propaganda the FZK must take an active part in the measures taken by the technical propaganda departments of the management led by the Assistant Directors in the production conferences; they must do this by explanatory and organising work among the masses, and supplement this by technical propaganda in Red Corners and Clubs; by the distribution of technical literature, and by working with the authors of useful books and pamphlets. In all work among the masses in the field of technical propaganda the FZK must seek the support of the voluntary workers among societies of the workers themselves, and of the engineers and technicians (the society "To Master Technique"; and the scientific societies of engineers and technicians).

17. In their work among the masses the trade union organisations must see to the carrying out of the slogan "Every factory is a fortress of defence"; they must concentrate their attention, in the first place, on problems of anti-aircraft defence, rifle-shooting and gliding (?).

At the same time the defence work of the FZK must be still more inspired with the problems of the international education of the working masses.

The FZK must also increase their assistance in the development of physical culture.

18. The clubs must be considered by the FZK as one of the greatest levers

in communist education, and they must therefore reorganise their club work according to the resolution of the All-Union Central Committee of the Trade Unions of September 2, 1932. The FZK must direct the work of clubs and Red Corners primarily to explaining to the masses the policy of the Party and of the Government, the successes of socialist construction and the difficulties encountered; they must systematically raise the socialist class-consciousness, especially of the new workers. This political agitation work, which is also explanatory and which it is the duty of every trade union organisation and trade unionist to perform, must be built on concrete examples from their own undertaking (the execution of the promplan, examples of competition, the fight against absenteeism, spoilage, stoppages, carelessness with factory property, etc.). This work must systematically raise the consciousness of new workers to the level of understanding the interests of the workers' socialist state as a whole.

19. The Plenum notes that the FZK have not fully carried out the estimates for the spending of funds for cultural work; the Plenum puts before the FZK, and the leading trade union and inter-trade-union organisations, the task of systematic control over the correct and full spending of the funds for cultural service among the workers.

20. The FZK must give systematic help and real direction to the workshop committees and to the trade union group organs, and show them by precept how they must work in the field of dealing with the workers' complaints, of directing the activities of production conferences, of the regulation of wages, of directing socialist competition, the improvement of dining-rooms, the communist education of workers, etc.

The Plenum advises that the practice of fussing and disturbing the workers in workshop committees and group organs, in order that they may carry out functions which are in no wise connected with their service to the working masses and to production, should be stopped. Greater initiative and independence in deciding separate problems is to be given to the organs of the union in the workshop and in the group.

21. In order to attract wider masses of workers into the active work of the Union and the discussion of measures affecting the entire factory and all the workshops, the Plenum advises that conferences of trade union group organs be called regularly and periodically; general workshop meetings not less than once a month, and general factory meetings not less than once in two months. The Plenum empowers the presidium of the executive committees of the trade unions to determine accurately the rights and duties of group organisers.

22. The Plenum demands from the FZK an unconditional carrying out of the directions of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions as to proletarian democracy and election rights, and demands a most determined fight with those who contravene them.

The general meetings and conferences of workers in the factories are the highest leading organs of the trade union in the undertaking. The Plenum advises that these meetings and conferences be carefully prepared, that the most important problems, those which most interest or trouble the workers, be put before them; their decisions must be carried out as soon as possible.

The Plenum considers it necessary to have in the undertakings not less than one "Trade Union Day" a month in order to carry out mass trade union work.

23. The Plenum attaches special importance to the speedy and painstaking resolution of problems raised in the letters and complaints of workers which come to the FZK. The Plenum recommends that personal responsibility for this work be put upon one member of the presidium or of the plenum of the FZK. It is necessary to attract voluntary active workers to this activity, and to conduct the most determined fight against a red-tape official attitude to the letters and statements of workers. The Trade Union Press must lead in the fight for due attention being paid to the workers' letters.

24. The Plenum underlines the fact that one of the most important methods of fighting the bureaucratisation of the trade union work and of attracting the broad masses of their members to social work is to draw into the work of the FZK in all its aspects, into the work of the workshops committees and into the work of the group organs, of a large number of active volunteers; without these the FZK could not cope with the tasks before them. The Plenum accordingly advises all trade union organisations to increase their work in this field, to widen the circle of active volunteers by raising their political and cultural level and by directing and helping their work. In calling systematically conferences of the active volunteers to discuss separate problems (the collective agreement, the protection of labour, the organisation of the work of the trade union, etc.) the FZK must teach them by concrete examples how the work must be done.

25. The Plenum notes that the decision of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions as to the work of the FZK in respect of the leading trades is not being carried out satisfactorily by the FZK. The Plenum advises that delegate workers in the leading trades be selected in the workshops, and that workshop and factory meetings of these workers be called systematically; help is to be given to them in satisfying the needs of the workers in the leading trades.

26. The Plenum advises the FZK to conduct a daily and determined fight for the inclusion of new members into the trade unions; all forms of mass work are to be used in this—(meetings with non-members, patronage of regular workers over new workers, the press, the work of the Clubs, of Red Corners, etc.).

Special attention is to be paid to improving trade union discipline among the members of the unions. In particular, the FZK must fight arrears in the payment of membership fees; this is to be done by means of explanatory work among the masses and a better organisation of the work of collectors of membership fees. Present arrears in membership fees must be liquidated by January 15, 1933.

27. The Plenum notes the excessive number of investigations of undertakings carried out by the higher trade union organs, and advises the Presidium of the VTSIK of the Trade Unions to establish a system which would diminish the number of these investigations to a considerable extent.

In order to avoid duplication in the guidance of the work of the FZK by the union and inter-union organs, the Plenum underlines that the immediate direction of the FZK is the province of the oblast (krai) departments of the union. The oblast soviets of the trade unions guide the activities of the FZK through oblast departments, rayon trade union soviets, and concentrate their work upon the control and checking of what has been accomplished and upon help in the work of the FZK.

28. The Plenum notes that frequent changes in the personnel of the FZK are extremely detrimental to the work ; the Plenum advises all trade union organisations to stop this practice and to keep for long periods the better workers in the FZK and in the workshop committees, as well as group organisers. A change of personnel should, as a rule, occur only during re-elections.

All trade union organisations must use the present campaign of re-elections into the FZMK in order to maintain in office the better workers, and in order to verify whether the decisions of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions are being carried out.

29. The most important task of the oblast departments and of the TSIKS of the Unions is the selection of chairmen of the FZK. For this work must be put forward trusty persons, who enjoy the unquestioned support and authority of workers in the factory : their level must constantly be raised, they must be freed from petty supervision and from functions which are alien to them ; constant care must be taken of them and help must be given to them in their work.

After the conclusion of the re-elections of the FZK in the undertakings, short courses (without taking them away from their work) must be started for trade union group organisers, for members of the workshop committees and of the FZK. As from January 1933 a network of primary trade union circles for new members of the trade unions is also to be started.

XI

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III (see p. 146)

The Collective Agreement (Kol-dogovor) of the Fraising-Lathe Works at Gorki for the Year 1933-1934

THE elaborate collective agreements (Kol-dogovor) annually entered into between the managements of the industrial enterprises in the USSR and the trade union organisations are unknown to the western world; and have apparently never been translated. We therefore print, nearly in full, the translation that we have had made of a characteristic specimen from our own collection, which no one but a student of trade unionism, or of industrial organisation, need trouble to read! It may be explained that the unfamiliar word "fraise" means (*New English Dictionary*) "a tool used for enlarging a circular hole; also, in watchmaking, for cutting teeth in a wheel". A "fraising-lathe" is presumably a lathe bearing such a tool.

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT OF THE WORKERS, THE ENGINEERS AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (ITR) AND THE EMPLOYEES OF THE FRAISING-LATHE WORKS AT GORKI (NIZHNI-NOVGOROD), FROM MARCH 1, 1933, to MARCH 1, 1934

I. Mutual Obligations as to the Carrying-out of the Industrial and Financial Plan

1. It is the fundamental aim of the present agreement to carry out the six instructions of Comrade Stalin, the resolutions of the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions, and of the January Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Russian Communist Party; to ensure the most successful fulfilment of the industrial and economic duties of the undertaking during 1933—the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan—and, upon this basis, the continuous improvement in the material and cultural condition of its workers, engineers and technical personnel (ITR) and employees.

2. In order to carry out these tasks the Administration, the Factory Committee (zavkom), the workers, the engineering and technical personnel and the employees undertake to ensure the unconditional fulfilment of the qualitative and quantitative indices of the industrial and financial plan by strengthening the proletarian labour discipline, by the further development of socialist forms of labour such as socialist emulation, shock brigades (udarnichestvo), counter industrial and economic plans and cost-accounting brigades, and by the most speedy mastering of the technique and of the planned capacity of the equipment.

[Here follow detailed tables of Indices of Output, Indices for Increase of Productivity, and Statistics of the Factory Wage Fund and its distribution.]

3. The Administration undertakes:

(a) To transfer the basic productive workshops to the system of cost-accounting not later than June 1.

(b) To give instructions as to production to the workshops for the following

month not later than the 25th of each month, and to each working-place not later than the 30th. The Chief of PPS is responsible for this.

(c) For bringing not later than the 20th of each month, before the Factory Committee (zavkom), a plan showing the proposed productivity of labour, and the wages of the piece-rate categories of workers, with information as to the execution of the financial plan of production of the undertaking. The Chief of TES is responsible for this.

(d) For carrying out measures for instituting personal responsibility at all points of the work, and for establishing the clear responsibility of each worker and employee for the work given to him, and for the property entrusted to him. For this purpose, not later than May 1 :

(1) Workers must be allotted to definite working-places and definite shifts. The chiefs of workshops are responsible for this.

(2) Definite equipment and tools are to be attached to each worker, and a definite task fixed for him. Chiefs of workshops are responsible for this.

(3) Definite members of the administrative and technical personnel and of the serving personnel are to be attached to definite groups and shifts of workers. Chiefs of workshops and of the Departments of the Works Management are responsible for this.

(4) Individual responsibility is to be established for damaged goods, spoilt material and breakages of equipment, for the quantity and quality of the finished product, and of the semi-finished goods which are passed from one section to another, and from one workshop to another. Chiefs of workshops, and of OTK, OGM and OPP, are responsible for this.

(5) Preventive repairs are to be carried out according to plan, and the repairing staff is to be attached to the objects to be repaired. The Chief of OGM is responsible for this.

(e) To consider within ten days all proposals for rationalisation sent in by production conferences, workers, engineering and technical personnel (ITR) and employees, and to inform within the same period the author of each proposal as to the results of the proposal.

Within twenty days after a proposal has been accepted, to determine its economic effects and the premium to be given to the author of the proposal, in pursuance of the ruling as to premiums.

To establish the period within which each accepted proposal is to be introduced into the scheme of production, and to fix the persons who are to be responsible for its carrying out. The Zav. Briz. (factory invention committee) is responsible for this.

(f) To start keeping systematic records of the work done by shock brigades and by those engaged in socialist competition : and to present to the Factory Committee information as to the results of their work not later than the 10th of each month. The Department of Mass Works is responsible for this.

(g) Not later than within twenty days from the moment of receiving notice from a brigade that they wish to be transferred to cost-accounting, to determine from the point of view of the conditions of the technological process the possibility of transferring the brigade to cost-accounting ; and, within the same period, to prepare the necessary conditions for this, and to take the necessary official steps for the transfer of the brigade to cost-accounting,

including the making of the cost-accounting agreement.

The premiums are paid to cost-accounting brigades in accordance with the typical ruling as to cost-accounting brigades by the Commissariat of Labour and All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions.

The calculations of economics of premiums for the brigade are done every month. The premiums are paid at the same time as the wages

(h) To give premiums to the *udarniks* (shock-brigaders) and to the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) of the *udarnik* and cost-accounting brigades, and of separate workshops, for the best productive results of their work; for exceeding quantitatively and qualitatively their tasks; for showing initiative in developing socialist competition; and for exceeding the productive and financial plan.

Premiums are given to pupil *udarniks* in the same way as to adult workers for best progress at school and in production, for carrying out ahead of time the cost-productive programmes, etc. Nominations for receipt of premiums are brought forward by the Administration and the Factory Committee, and are discussed at the workshop conferences and at production conferences.

(i) To ensure the provision of technical guidance for night shifts, and the provision of services to the workers, in the same way as it is done for day shifts.

4. The Factory Committees undertake:

(a) To organise their political mass work and productive work in such a manner that, by means of proper regulation of wages, regulation of labour and daily care for the living and cultural needs of the worker, the carrying out of the productive tasks of the undertaking is ensured.

(b) To ensure the carrying out, in workshops and among groups of workers, of cultural-political work, and of social disciplinary action as regards persons who break the rules.

(c) To mobilise the revolutionary watchfulness of workers as regards the penetration of alien class elements into production; to mobilise the workers for fighting every kind of theft, and to organise, in the workshops, brigades for the protection of socialist property.

(d) To take an active part, and to give direct help to the Administration, in carrying out measures for the organisation of labour and fixing of technical quotas, and to organise brigades in the workshops for assisting in the fixing of such quotas.

(e) To ensure systematic direction of, and instructions for, the organisers of *udarniks* and cost-accounting brigades; to organise technical help by the ITR to the *udarniks* and cost-accounting brigades, and to workmen engaged in socialist competition; to organise the work of production conferences according to groups and trades, making sure of the full participation in them of the workers, of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) and of the Administration.

(f) Systematically, not less than once a quarter, to check the correct expenditure of the funds for the payment of premiums for socialist competition, for *udarnik* work and for inventions.

5. The workers, the ITR, including the foreign workers (INS), and foreign specialists, and also the employees, undertake:

(a) To strengthen labour discipline in every way, to liquidate absenteeism and late arrival; to get the utmost out of the working-day; to achieve the fulfilment and even the exceeding of the tasks set, while simultaneously improving the quality of the output; and liquidating stoppages and damaging of goods.

(b) To take an active part in the production conferences as regards technical problems, and in the improvement of production and organisation of labour.

(c) The ITR and skilled workers undertake to pass on their knowledge and experience as regards production to new cadres of workers.

II. *Labour Discipline*

6. In order to strengthen the socialist discipline of labour and to ensure the fulfilment and the exceeding of the industrial and financial plan, and of the tasks laid down by the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party as regards the improvement in the quality of the output, lowering costs of production and increased productivity of labour, the Administration and the Factory Committee take upon themselves the following obligations:

(a) The Administration and the Factory Committee undertake, as from May 1, to verify the measures necessary to adjust the registers of attendance; of lateness at work; of absenteeism; and early leaving of work, bearing in mind the instruction of the Commissariat of Labour (Narkontrud) as to registration of records.

(b) The Administration undertakes to put in operation without demur the decision of the Sovnarkom of the USSR of 15.xi.32 as to dismissals for absenteeism without sufficient reasons.

(c) The Administration undertakes, with the corresponding organisations, to take measures in order to improve the means of communication between the undertaking and the workers' residences; to abolish queues in the dining-rooms and cafeteria of the closed cooperative society (ZRK), etc.

7. The Factory Committee undertakes to carry out the mass political educational work for genuinely socialist labour discipline; to organise workers' brigades; to verify, in the homes of the workers, the reasons given for absenteeism; to make the persons guilty of encouraging absentees responsible for their actions. The Factory Committees are held responsible if they ignore or fail to carry out in full the law as to absenteeism; together with the Administration, the Factory Committee undertakes to cooperate in the improvement of the personnel of register-keepers.

8. The Administration and the Factory Committee undertake the following obligations as regards the creation of favourable conditions for Comrades' Courts: the Administration is to provide the necessary accommodation and the necessary material for the consideration of cases; the Factory Committee is to carry out concrete direction; to give regular instructions; to provide the personnel of the Comrades' Courts from the best udarnik workers; and to free the chairmen of the courts from too many other onerous social duties.

III. *Hiring of Labour, Transfers, Dismissals*

9. The Administration and the Factory Committee undertake to adopt drastic measures in order to discover and dismiss immediately alien class elements, not allowing them to penetrate into production.

10. The recruiting of labour is carried out in an organised way by the Administration, through making agreements with kolkhoses or organs of labour, and by attracting to production members of the families of the workers, of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) and of the employees.

The Administration makes the Head of the Department of Labour Recruiting responsible for taking on and dismissing workers.

The Administration must, within three days, inform the Factory Committee of every new worker taken on; and the Factory Committee has the right to lodge a reasoned objection within three days of being so informed.

11. The Administration undertakes to specify, in their quarterly plans as to the recruiting of labour, those employments in which women should be taken on in preference to men.

12. In filling vacancies the Administration undertakes to promote to the most skilled work, in the first instance, those *udarniki*, workers and employees who have completed their studies at the professional technological courses, and persons who have the longest records of work at the given undertaking.

13. The Administration undertakes to organise introductory courses, and to train in them all newly-taken-on workers and employees, both with a view to acquainting them with the peculiarities of production and to their obtaining the technical knowledge which is necessary for work in the establishment; the programme to be agreed in consultation with the Factory Committee.

Attendance at these courses is compulsory for all persons on their being newly taken on to work. The Technical Propaganda and the Staff Department are responsible for this.

14. A worker who, for reasons of production, is transferred to work paid at a lower rate has a preferential right to return to his old work if that is resumed within two months from the day of his transfer. A person who is transferred on account of illness to light work has, on convalescence, the same right. The Heads of Workshops and Departments are responsible for this.

15. Workers and employees who have been absent from work during not more than two months on account of illness, and then return to work, cannot be refused employment (this is exclusive of leave of absence for pregnancy and confinement).

Workers who have lost their capacity to work as a result of injuries received at work, and workers who are being pensioned, may be dismissed only after their incapacity for employment has been established by a medical control commission, and only when a leaving grant is issued to them according to law. The Chief of Labour Recruiting and Dismissals is responsible for this.

16. Members of factory, workshop and shift committees, workers of the workers' part of the Workers' Control Commission (RKK), members of the factory bureau of the engineers' and technicians' section (ITS) and members of the Comrades' Courts cannot be dismissed or transferred to other work without the sanction of the higher trade union organisation. The Chiefs of

Workshops and Departments are responsible for this.

17. In dismissals of superfluous labour force the following are given preference in being allowed to keep their jobs, other things being equal : udarniks, members of the trade union, women who have dependents, members of families of persons called up to the Red Army, workers who have given long service in production, and persons to be called up to the Red Army in 1933.

IV. *Training of Staff and Technical Education*

18. Within the limits of the funds allocated for this in the industrial and financial plan, the Administration undertakes :

(a) To impart to the workers the compulsory minimum of technical knowledge within the periods set out in the plan, making sure that these courses are provided with premises, leaders of study circles, and the necessary teaching equipment and materials. The workers in their turn undertake to attend these courses, according to the technical minimum programme, not less than once in six days. Absence from courses is considered to be equal to disregard of the rules of internal order and labour discipline.

(b) To provide adequate accommodation and upkeep for a mass technical library.

(c) To bear the expenses of production excursions [educational visits] of workers up to the sum of 1000 roubles, and to agree the list of persons to be sent in each case in consultation with the Factory Committee.

(d) To pay the fees of 15 workers at technical correspondence courses, and to organise constant technical advice for all workers.

(e) To subscribe to technical publications in their own language for foreign workers.

To provide with interpreters those production conferences in which foreign workers and specialists and workers belonging to national minorities participate.

To provide with leaders the circles of foreign workers and of workers belonging to national minorities.

19. The Administration undertakes, during the course of 1933, to train in the factory school (FZU) 120 pupils as below :

(a) To train and give refresher courses in the factory and works courses, and in the workers' evening schools, within the scope of the funds agreed by the industrial and financial plan.

(b) In order to improve the fixing of production quotas the Administration undertakes, within the limits of the funds agreed in the industrial and financial plan, to train and give refresher courses, during 1933, in special classes, to specialist clerks for calculating production quotas.

(c) Within the limits of the funds agreed in the industrial and financial plan, to send workers for instruction to courses outside the undertaking.

The selection of persons to be sent is made in consultation with the Factory Committee.

Note.—This undertaking is to be given official form in a supplementary agreement to be made between the Administration and the Factory Committee not later than May 1, 1933.

20. The Administration undertakes to use the 10,000 roubles allotted

according to the industrial and financial plan for completing the enlargement of the factory school (FZU) and the production workshops attached to it, during the second quarter of the year.

The Administration undertakes to employ in production the pupils who have completed their course of studies, according to their speciality, ensuring to them on their leaving the school the means necessary to raise their qualifications (attaching them to a definite working-place, giving them promotion as their qualifications improve).

The pupils of the factory school (FZU) undertake to improve the quality of their theoretical and practical work; not to miss wilfully any practical work or theoretical instruction; to carry on an unreconcilable fight with those who despoil socialist property (steal and spoil tools, materials, equipment, workshops and lecture-rooms, teaching equipment, books, copy-books, etc.); to combat the spoiling of goods and stoppages; to take an active part in the social and production life of the undertaking, in shock brigades, socialist competition, rationalisation and inventions, and in the work of production conferences.

The Administration undertakes, not later than June 1, to create instructional conditions for pupils in the practical work of production. It must attach them to highly skilled workers.

V. Wages

21. The wage-rate for workers of the first category, for a seven-hour working day, is fixed at 35.4 kopeks per hour for time-work; at 44.5 kopeks per hour for piece-work; and at 48 kopeks per hour for workers on piece-rates employed in operations of tempering.

The hourly day-rate for workers of the remaining categories is fixed in accordance with the following coefficients of the wage-rate scale:

Category:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Coefficients:	1	1.2	1.45	1.75	2.1	2.5	3.0	3.6

22. Piece-rates are calculated in accordance with the wage-scales for piece-workers fixing new rates for 1933, as soon as quotas are reconsidered. Until the reconsideration of quotas the existing piece-rates remain in force. The new scale makes no automatic change in rates.

23. Workers are placed in the various categories according to the work they perform. When allocating work, care must be taken to give it to the appropriate categories of workers.

Individual allocation of workers to the categories of the wage-scale is carried out independently by the chiefs of departments and workshops, within the limits of the average coefficient of the given department and workshop, in accordance with the Rates-and-Grading Directory in force in the machine-building industry for lathe-making. Disputes between workers and chiefs of workshops and departments as regards grading are dealt with by the Scales-conflicts Commissions of the department or workshop; if no agreement is reached, they are passed on to the Factory Control Commission (RKK).

If for thirty consecutive days a worker has done work of a higher category than his own, and if he has produced the quota appropriate to that category, and if there is sufficient work in that higher category, he must be transferred

to the higher category, except when he has been replacing a worker absent owing to illness, or on holiday or on an official mission.

If, however, for two months out of two and a half a worker has been doing work of a higher category, and continues to be so employed after that period has elapsed, he must be transferred to the higher category without having to make application, provided that he has fulfilled the quota and that his work is of the quality appropriate to that category.

In cases where there is enough work for a worker in his own grade, but he has, as an exception, been given urgent work of a lower grade, he has no right to refuse it; but wages in such cases are paid according to the worker's category.

In cases where a worker of a lower grade temporarily replaces a worker of a higher grade who is absent owing to illness, or on holiday or on an official mission, or is attending the *tersbor* (? territorial militia), the worker of the lower category is paid for the work he is actually doing, without being transferred to the higher category. When the person whom he has been replacing returns to work, the lower-paid worker does not, when he returns to his former work in his own grade, retain the right to the higher wage that he had been temporarily receiving. When a worker does work only one category lower than his own, he receives only the payment of that category.

24. For special categories of time-rate workers who do specially skilled and responsible work of a category not below that of category 6, the rate of category 1 is fixed at 40 kopeks per hour. But when their work is poor in quality or not sufficiently productive, the chiefs of their workshops have the right to pay them according to the general rate for time-workers.

For special categories of time-workers a special system of premium payments is to be introduced to correspond with the actual output of their labour, and in pursuance of a regulation to be worked out by the management together with the responsible Technical Expert Section (TES) by May 1.

In work where it is impossible to keep a record of the output of time-workers, they may be paid premiums based on valuation of their output by foremen and workshop engineers. The premiums are paid to time-workers only within the limits of the moneys saved as a result of their labour, and from a fund specially set aside for this purpose, within the limits of the wages fund sanctioned by the plan. The amount of this special fund is fixed by the management before the beginning of the month or quarter.

25. Hourly day-rates for pupils of the factory school (FZU), and also for individual and brigade instruction of the first category, are fixed at 18.3 kopeks. The hourly rates for other categories are fixed in accordance with the coefficients given in the following wage-rate scale :

Category :	1	2	3	4
Coefficients :	1	1.2	1.5	1.9

26. The management undertakes to admit pupils of the factory school (FZU) to piece-work as from the second year of their instruction, and at rates equal to those of adult piece-workers.

27. Skilled workers who have pupils attached to them for instruction in production, and who combine this work with their own work in production, receive a monthly compensation by way of additional payment equal to 25 per cent of the pupil's rate. Half of this is paid monthly, and the rest at the end

of six months if the pupil passes his test. If the instruction is given in a brigade of piece-workers, the skilled workers who have pupils attached to them are compensated in the same way. The same system of payment applies also to the training of adult workers. In training in brigades the management undertakes to attach all pupils to skilled workers. The output of pupils is credited to the Staff Department of the works.

28. Workers in the undertaking who are undergoing instruction with a view to changing their skilled occupation, or to improving their qualifications, are paid at the rate fixed for time-workers of category 1.

29. The engineering and technical personnel are paid according to the Grading Directory for Engineering and Technical Personnel of the Central Executive Committee of the Machine-Building Union for maximum and minimum salaries. The minimum rate for the first category is 130 roubles. The salaries for each separate post between the fixed minimum and maximum rates are fixed by the chiefs of departments and workshops in accordance with the wages fund. Differences of opinion are settled by the Workers' Control Commission (RKK).

Premiums for members of the engineering and technical personnel and for employees in workshops and works departments for overfulfilling the plan are to be paid in accordance with a regulation to be made by the works management by May 15. The Technical Expert Section (TES) is responsible for this.

30. Until such time as state regulation is adopted, the salaries of employees and of the subordinate staff (MOP) will be according to the scales of 1932, and in pursuance of the classification of employment attached to the present collective agreement. Within the limits of the wage-fund for this group of workers, their salaries are fixed by the chiefs of departments and workshops. Conflicts are settled by the RKK.

31. The Administration undertakes to place on a piece-rate basis all work suitable for the application of the production quota system, and to raise the percentage of piece-work to the total time worked according to the table given below :

Percentage of piece-work, I.vii.33	.	.	-75 per cent
" " I.xi.33	.	.	-80 "
" " I.i.34	.	.	-85 "

A plan for the effective introduction of piece-rates in workshops, and for different kinds of work, is appended.

Piece-work must be carried out in conjunction with the obligatory calculation of the individual output and earnings of each worker.

32. Piece-work rates for work done by brigades are calculated on the principle of division of labour according to the kind of operation and to the grade and skill of the workers involved. The earnings are divided among the members of the brigade in proportion to the hours worked and to the wage-rate scales of the several workers.

Work will be undertaken by brigades whenever the conditions of the technical process, the close interlocking of the equipment used, or the best use of the skill of the workers available, makes this advisable.

33. If the time necessary for making appliances, equipment or tools for a

piece of work has not been allowed for in fixing the quota, or has not been included in calculating the piece-rates for this work, the price of the extra-work entailed will be paid to the workers over and above their piece-rate wages, as if it were a separate piece of work.

34. When a piece-rate worker is transferred to other work within his own workshop, in his own trade and category and to the same kind of bench, his work is paid at the rate proper for the new work. No notice need be given of such transfer.

When a worker is moved from highly specialised work to other work, although it be of a lower grade, payment is made according to the work done.

35. In return for the wages paid to them in pursuance of the present agreement, the workers undertake to achieve the quota of production laid down by the works management, the work done corresponding in quality to the technical conditions. Repeated failure to fulfil the quota of output without good reason, or a product inferior in quality to that made possible by technical conditions, due to the worker's negligence, will lead to reduction to a lower category, or to dismissal.

36. Disputes between workers and the Administration about quotas of output, or calculation of wage-rates, are dealt with by the RKK. Until the dispute has been dealt with, the worker has no right to refuse to do the work allotted to him, though he may disagree with the wage-rate or the quota of output.

37. The Administration undertakes to carry out to the letter the conditions as regards the calculation of wage-rates; it undertakes not to permit over-spending of the wage-fund, and not to make any additional payments which have not already been provided for by the law or the collective agreement.

The Factory Committee (ZK) undertakes to keep systematic watch, and to establish the most rigid control, over the correct use of the wage-fund, both as regards separate groups of workers and workshops and the works as a whole. In all cases where the wages-scale discipline has been broken, or where the wage-fund has been over-spent, the Factory Committee undertakes to take all measures to stop these irregularities and to report them to the higher trade union organisation, while at the same time seeing that the culprits are brought to justice.

38. The factory management (ZU) undertakes to pay from its own resources the salary of one wage-rate clerk for the Factory Committee (ZK) and one clerk to calculate the output quotas.

39. Wages are paid twice a month, outside working hours; on the 25th of each month for the first half of the month, and on the 10th of the following month for the second half. Payments will be made first to those workshops which have over-fulfilled or fulfilled the programme of production.

VI. Production Quotas

40. Production quotas are worked out by the Administration as for a shock-worker, upon a basis of maximum utilisation of equipment, and of making allowance for unavoidable stoppages, for a normal percentage of spoilt goods and for time lost in necessary rest during working hours.

41. In order to ensure the proper organisation of labour, the Administration undertakes :

(a) To introduce during 1933 the production quota system, according to the table given below, in the following percentages of work :

By 1.vi.33	.	.	.	-45 per cent
„ 1.xi.33	.	.	.	-55 „
„ 1. i.34	.	.	.	-60 „

(b) To organise instruction in production, so that for each new production quota the worker is properly trained in the methods upon which the quota to be fulfilled is based.

(c) To keep count of the carrying out of the quotas in kind (not according to the wages paid), and also to keep count of the time taken to carry out the quota. To analyse daily the carrying out of the quotas, and to keep watch over the conditions upon which the quotas were calculated ; simultaneously, to let the workers have their instruction cards, taking care that these are issued for mass work in the first place.

(d) To complete the records of each item of equipment not later than by July 1. The Section of Technical Norms (STN) is responsible for this.

42. Quotas of production and piece-rates calculations will be constantly revised for planning purposes during the entire period that this collective agreement is in force ; and this must ensure the complete fulfilling of the indices given in the plan, and an increase in the productivity of labour at wages fixed by the plan. The plan of revision of quotas will be prepared by the management of the works and is to be agreed in consultation with the Factory Committee (ZK) not later than the 15.iv.33, and is attached to the collective agreement. Reduced quotas must be revised immediately, in order that their consideration should be completed not later than 1.iv.33.

The revised planned quotas are fixed for one year. Earlier reconsideration of quotas is permissible only where some technological process has been changed, where methods of rationalisation have been adopted, and where technical improvements and improvements in organisation have been introduced, so that the productivity of a worker's labour has been increased. For work to which the production quota system is being applied for the first time, the quotas of production and the wage-scales will be reconsidered by the Administration after they have been checked in practice for a period of not more than three months, after which they will be fixed for one year. Quotas of production and wage-scales fixed by the works management for basic and repetition work will be brought to the notice of the workers in the workshops and communicated to the Factory Committee (ZK) before being introduced. After seven days these quotas become operative.

43. Where output is increased as a result of improvements introduced by a worker on his own initiative, the Administration has the right to reconsider the quota of production with a view to raising it ; and the inventor, irrespective of the premium already paid to him, will work on at the old wage-rate for three months after the improvement has been carried out. For all other work in this, the wage-rates will be reconsidered at the same time as the production quotas.

44. In giving out piece-work to the workers, the Administration must

accompany it by an instruction, showing the piece-rate wage and the time to be taken. When he receives new work, the workman must hand over his instruction, showing the work he has finished, together with that which he has not yet completed, to the foreman.

If additional payments have to be made as a result of changes in the conditions upon which the quota of production was originally calculated, they must be made in accordance with an additional payment sheet, showing the reasons for the additional payment, the sum payable and the time for which the additional payment is being made.

45. The working of overtime, as a rule, is not permitted. Task work is not allowed. All work outside regular working hours, by whomsoever initiated, and irrespective of the payment to be made, is permitted only in exceptional cases, in the order and for the reasons laid down by law (such as shipwreck, and disasters due to the forces of nature, etc.). Overtime work is permitted only after the passing of the relevant resolution by the all-factory Workers' Control Commission (RKK) and after sanction for this has been obtained from the workers' inspectorate. It is not permitted to compensate for overtime by taking time off during working hours.

46. Payment for spoilt goods and time lost owing to breakdowns in machinery is made in accordance with the existing legislation dealing with this subject.

47. Supplies for workers and their living conditions : the Administration undertakes :

(a) To give financial assistance to the closed cooperative society (ZRK) within the limits of the sums ear-marked in the industrial and financial plan, in order to enlarge its circulating capital, to increase self-supplies and to improve the food provision.

(b) To give the accommodation necessary for dining-rooms and cafeterias, and to provide—according to the lists made out for the suburban farm—the means necessary for help in building a store-house for keeping vegetables, for building piggeries and rabbit hutches (see section relating to building of living accommodation).

(c) To give active help to the closed cooperative society (ZRK) during the whole period of the operation of the collective agreement, by providing traction power for sowing operations in connection with the works.

(d) By April 15 the works management will put one motor-car at the disposal of the closed cooperative society (ZRK), the latter being responsible for paying for the staff required and for repairs.

(e) To help, within the limits of the sums set aside for this purpose, in repairing the premises occupied by the canteen quarters (kitchen, dining-room, store-houses), and to give every assistance in adapting and re-equipping these premises with a view to providing the best possible service to the workers.

To give regular and timely information to the closed cooperative society (ZRK) as to the carrying out of the industrial and financial plan in the work-shops, and to find the necessary means, from the internal resources of the works, in order to ensure priority in supplying the shock-workers. The mobilisation of such means to be worked out in consultation with the shock-workers.

48. The Administration undertakes :

(a) To give help and assistance in the organisation of collective and individual non-subsidised farms.

(b) To organise dining-rooms and cafeterias for evening and night shifts in the same way as for day shifts.

(c) The works management undertakes to inform the organisations which supply wood for fuel of their requirements in good time, so as to ensure adequate supplies of wood to the workers for the winter, at rates fixed by the higher organisations; they further undertake to give every help to the workers' collective efforts in organising self-supplies of fuel. The management undertake to make sure that the residences for single workers and for pupils of the factory school (FZU) are adequately heated.

(d) Within the limits of the estimates, the management undertake to make sure that the pupils of the factory school (FZU), who live in the residences attached to the works, are supplied with bedding, tea equipment, etc.; that they have baths free of charge, not less than twice a month, in the works baths. They undertake to have the pupils' linen washed free of charge, not less than twice a month, and to continue to provide free breakfasts for poor pupils, twenty in number.

49. The Factory Committee undertakes:

(a) To establish effective supervision of workers over shops, dining-rooms and other undertakings, and to select thirty workers to strengthen the personnel of the ZRK for this purpose.

(b) To give practical assistance to the Administration in the organisation of self-supplies, by attracting to this the workers and their families, on a large scale.

(c) To improve the sowing, weeding and collection of the harvests in suburban farms by organising an extensive participation in this work of workers and their families. The suburban farms as a whole must produce 749 tons of vegetables and 20 tons of meat, so as to improve the provision of food for the workers.

(d) To give every help to the Administration in raising money for increasing the turnover and for increasing the financial strength of the closed cooperative society (ZRK) (share reserves, reserve funds, etc.).

(e) To establish social control over the selling prices of goods and over the issue of ration cards, thus helping the Administration to withdraw these documents from slackers and offenders against social discipline.

50. The Administration undertakes:

(a) To build dwelling-houses, out of the sum of 1,260,000 roubles allocated for building of dwellings and cultural and social buildings, as follows:

Repairs to house No. 2. To be completed by 1.vi.33	35,000	roubles
Repairs to house No. 3. To be completed by 1.vii.33	40,000	"
Completing the building of house No. 4, by 1.vii.33	2,000	"
Completing the building of house No. 5, by 1.x.33	23,500	"
Erection of new 8-apartment stone house, by 1.i.34	150,000	"
Erection of four new barracks, by 15.ix.	260,000	"
Repairs to barracks and lathe houses (list given)	30,000	"
Road and street planning and construction (list given)	40,000	"
Outhouses and usual offices (details given)	20,000	"

Piggery, vegetable bair and rabbit hutches for suburban farm	50,000 roubles
Water supply and canalisation (details given)	100,000 „
Social and Cultural Construction :	
Adaptation of premises for crèche, to be completed by I.vi.	10,000 „

The allocation of apartments in houses belonging to the works management will be carried out by the Administration in agreement with the Factory Committee (ZK).

Shock-workers, and members of the engineering and technical personnel who are shock-workers, workers in cost-accounting brigades, inventors, and workers of long service in the undertaking, will be given priority in the allocation of dwellings.

Apartments in houses which are being built will be allocated to the workers in good time, so that the future tenants may share in the social control over the completion of the building at the appointed date.

The Factory Committee (ZK) undertakes to organise systematic control and ample help to the working masses in carrying out measures which would ensure in full the execution of the plan of construction.

51. The Administration undertakes to bear the full cost of the organisation and maintenance of the crèche—as regards heating, lighting, supply of equipment, cleaning, medical consultations concerning the children of workers, within the limits of the allocation made for this purpose.

52. To disinfect periodically the residences attached to the works.

The Factory Committee (ZK) undertakes to give active help in ensuring the smooth running of institutions for the children of workers, and to enlist the cooperation of the paying-out centres of the social insurance in the undertaking for this purpose.

53. The families of workers, of members of the engineering and technical personnel, and of employees who have died as a result of an accident at work, will be given assistance by the Administration in one lump sum, equal to the monthly earnings of the deceased.

VII. *Improvements in Conditions of Labour as regards Health*

54. The Administration undertakes :

(a) To observe strictly all requirements of preventive care as regards safety technique and industrial hygiene in the erection of new premises and in the reconstruction of existing workshops.

(b) To carry out all the measures necessary for the improvement of the conditions of labour as regards health (safety technique, industrial hygiene) in accordance with the agreement made with the inspectorate of labour, and at the times stated in the agreement.

(c) To provide all workshops with tanks of cooled, boiled drinking water, with mugs to them.

(d) To provide washstands for workers in workshops.

The Factory Committee (ZK) undertakes to establish daily supervision over the use of means allotted for the improvement of the health conditions of work, and over the proper utilisation of the materials issued for this purpose.

55. Working clothes will be issued, as laid down by the Commissariat of Labour (NKT) of the USSR. Washing, mending and disinfection of working clothes, and repairs to working boots, will be done at the expense of the establishment. Workers who are engaged in injurious occupations will have milk issued to them in the quantities fixed by the NKT of the USSR. Working clothes and all neutralising preparations are issued to pupils in the same measure as they are issued to adults.

56. The Administration undertakes to provide special accommodation with separate compartments for clothes, so that each of the workers may keep both his own clothes and his working clothes in his own compartment. The establishment will replace, either in cash or in kind, all clothes lost, if they have been handed over for safe-keeping.

57. The workers undertake to take care of the working clothes and boots issued to them, and also to hand over for safe-keeping their own clothes, as well as their working clothes and boots, according to established order. When working clothes and boots are done with, or when a worker leaves the establishment, they must be returned. No new working clothes or boots will be issued until the old ones are returned.

58. The Administration and the Factory Committee (ZK) undertake to submit to a preliminary professional test all pupils to be admitted, and to have them medically examined regularly during their period of instruction.

59. The Administration undertakes to organise special short-term courses of instruction in safety technique, as applied to the peculiarities of the given processes, for new workers taken on. The workers undertake to carry out the rules relating to safety technique, and to observe the necessary requirements as to hygiene in working places and places of common use; also to notify the Administration in good time of unprotected machinery, or of faulty protection of moving parts.

60. The Administration undertakes to apply measures for the reduction of accident and sickness.

The Factory Committee (ZK) undertakes to mobilise the workers for a struggle against accidents and sickness, and to keep watch—through specially selected individuals and the social inspector of labour—that the Administration carries out the measures necessary for improving the health conditions of work and safety technique.

61. The Administration and the Factory Committee undertake to adopt within a month all measures necessary to improve the working conditions of the evening and night shifts, in order to ensure :

(a) That the evening and night shifts have adequate administrative and technical guidance.

(b) That they are supplied, without any break, with materials, tools and lighting.

(c) That the ventilating installations, cloakrooms and safety devices function properly.

(d) That the medical centre, the dining-rooms and cafeterias function properly.

62. The Factory Committee and the Administration undertake to organise the distribution of admissions to sanatoria, health resorts and houses of rest

—both those allotted to them and those bought out of the premium fund—so as to satisfy the workers, the engineering and technical personnel (ITR), the shock-workers and the inventors, in the factory, who carry out the requirements of the plan and who stand in need of medical attention or rest.

VIII. *Duties as regards Cultural Work and Trade Union Organisations*

63. The Administration undertakes :

(a) To provide premises suitable for office work, properly equipped and furnished, for the Factory Committee (ZK), the various workshop committees and the office of the engineering and technical section (ITS), and to pay the cost of heating, telephone service, cleaning, repairing and guarding, out of the moneys of the establishment ; and also to bear the cost of lighting, heating and cleaning the Red Corners in the workshops and in the dormitories.

(b) The Administration undertakes to bear the cost of repairing, lighting, heating and protection against fire, of the club of the works, within the limits laid down for this purpose by legislation.

(c) The works management undertakes to organise Red Corners in No. 1 workshop, in the SGM and the factory school (FZU), in addition to those already existing.

64. The Administration undertakes to provide, within the limits sanctioned in the industrial and financial plan, the means for health work among the workers' children, and to take part in this work ; it also undertakes to provide accommodation for work among the Pioneers.

The Administration undertakes to make monthly payments, simultaneously with the payment of wages, to the funds of the Factory Committee (ZK), amounting for the first thousand workers to 1.5 per cent of the total wages paid, and for the rest of the workers to 1 per cent of the total wages paid, towards the upkeep of the factory school (FZU), and 1 per cent of the total wages paid towards cultural work.

IX. *The Conditions of Work of the Engineering and Technical Personnel*

65. In order to ensure the active influence of the entire body of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) upon the practical solution of the problems of production, connected with the struggle for the new technique and for improving production, the engineering and technical section undertakes to achieve in 1933 the utilisation to capacity of all lathes, machines and aggregates thereof ; to mechanise all labour-absorbing processes ; to see that workers and members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) are placed in the workshops to the best advantage : for this purpose the assistance of the appropriate highly trained specialists of the NITS, of the scientific research institutes and of the higher technical educational institutions must be enlisted.

66. The Administration undertakes :

(a) To issue by l.vi. an instruction which would determine the rights and duties of every member of the engineering and technical personnel according to the post occupied by him, so that the engineering and technical personnel R) should be doing only technical and production work. The instruction

as to the rights and duties of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) in workshops must be worked out not later than May 1 of this year; the responsibility for this rests with the Department of Rationalisation in the works, and with the chiefs of workshops.

(b) To enlist the participation of the engineering and technical personnel (ITS) in the solution of problems of planned recruiting and of rational utilisation of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR).

67. In cases of dismissal according to paras. (a) and (b) of article 47 of the KZOT, the members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) must have a month's notice in writing given to them. When members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) are dismissed for causing material loss in production, the Administration undertakes to appoint an expert commission consisting of the representatives of the Administration, of the Factory Committee, of the local body of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) and of specialist experts, according to the recommendation of the higher organisations of the ITS.

68. Members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) who work in workshops injurious to health have a right to additional holidays, and to the issue of working clothes and neutralising preparations as laid down by the Commissariat of Labour (NKT).

69. The Administration will provide the necessary sums, within the limits allocated for the purpose, for improving the qualifications of the engineering workers as follows: journeys and excursions within the USSR and abroad; refresher courses and attendance at scientific and technical conferences and congresses; to aid the work of the NITS; for study of foreign languages; for organisation and provision of technical libraries and technical literature, including foreign publications (in agreement with the engineering and technical section (ITS and NITS)); for the publishing work of the engineering and technical section (ITS and NITS), etc.

When it is contemplated to send members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) abroad or elsewhere for the purpose of improving their qualifications, their candidatures will be agreed by the Administration and the Factory Committee (engineering and technical section) in consultation.

The Administration undertakes to put at the disposal of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) archives, research studies, etc.

The moneys allocated for the work of the NITS will be handed over to the NITS within a month of their allocation.

70. The Administration undertakes:

(a) To provide the necessary residential accommodation, for those members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) who have either not got any at all or are badly in need of it, in houses which have been newly built or purchased, in addition to those houses which have already been specially set aside for the engineering and technical personnel (ITR).

(b) To make a plan not later than 5.v. in agreement with the Factory Committee (engineering and technical section) ZK(ITS), setting aside residential accommodation for the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) month by month, together with a list of members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) to whom such residential accommodation must be allotted.

(c) To make sure beforehand that the necessary residential accommodation is available for those members of the engineering and technical personnel (ITR) who are to be taken on, or transferred from other places.

(d) The Administration undertakes to provide six vacations in health resorts, with pay for railway expenses, out of the premium reserve fund, and to allocate them in accordance with achievements in production, according to the premium system, in consultation with the engineering and technical section (ITS).

(e) The Administration undertakes to increase the funds for food supplies in cases where persons who are not members of the ITR are attached to the ITR dining-rooms, so as to make sure that the increase in numbers fed does not lead to a deterioration in the feeding of the ITR.

71. The Administration and the ZK(ITS) undertake to see that the best possible use is made of the capacities of foreign specialists in their own fields, by providing them with suitable conditions for their work, by developing cultural and political activities among them, and by giving them appropriate cultural services.

72. In the summer time the Administration undertakes to provide boat transport for the workers and members of the engineering and technical personnel across the river Oka to the Mysa.

73. The Administration undertakes to provide by May 1 accommodation for cultural services to the ITR in dwelling-house No. 1 ; to equip and organise a cafeteria on a cost-accounting basis ; and to arrange for supplies out of the self-supply of the closed cooperative society.

74. The works management undertakes to provide regularly, not less than once in six days, hot water for baths, and to arrange for the cleaning of apartments of the unmarried members of the ITR.

X. *The Duties of the ITR*

75. To fulfil the industrial and financial plan as regards its quantitative indices, *i.e.* to ensure that the planned increase of productivity reaches 138 per cent ; to lower the cost of production ; and to make sure that the output is of the requisite quality.

76. To bring about an economy of not less than 500,000 roubles during 1933, by using rationalisation methods and inventions of the ITR.

77. To assist in lowering the percentage of spoil goods in basic production.

78. To lower stoppages due to breakdowns of machinery to 3-3.5 per cent of that set aside for repairs, by making compulsory the introduction of planned preventive repairs.

79. To appoint 50 ITR as social technical leaders to all production brigades in the works, with an undertaking that they will give constant guidance and instruction and that they will ensure the use of cost-accounting in the brigades.

80. To make sure that all basic production workshops have completely mastered in all details the established technological process of lathe 682, with use of all appliances and special tools as planned.

81. To give guidance in raising the qualifications of the workers (technical

minimum), and to select from the members of the ITR forty trained leaders, having organised a seminar for them; to make sure that the teaching is given systematically, according to programme.

82. To take the greatest possible part in preparing technological instructions as to care of equipment and in the continuous elaboration of these instructions.

*XI. Work of the RKK and Checking of the Carrying-out of the
Collective Agreement*

83. The Factory Committee (ZK) and the Administration undertake to create all the conditions necessary for the normal working of the Workers' Control Commission (RKK), and for the immediate consideration (within three days) of all communications received.

In order to improve the work of the RKK, the ZK undertake to improve the qualifications of the workers' part of the RKK, by giving them short-term courses of instruction in labour legislation and calculation of production quotas, so that by giving systematic instructions the workers and employees will be rallied round the RKK.

The Administration undertakes to provide technical services to the RKK by its own staff, and to let the RKK have all the materials necessary for settling particular problems; further, to provide expert advice when required.

84. The Administration and the ZK undertake to organise a systematic check upon the carrying out of their mutual obligations. When the collective agreement is infringed, the Administration and the ZK must take immediate steps to stop the infringement.

85. Every three months a mass checking of the carrying out of the collective agreement is undertaken.

Individual members of the works management who are actually guilty of offences against this collective agreement are liable to criminal proceedings under article 134 of the UK. Each worker, ITR or employee will be punishable according to the table of fines and penalties, and will also be responsible to the Comrades' Court and, as members of the trade union, to their trade union organisation.

86. The Administration undertakes to print this collective agreement with all its appendices, and to distribute it to the workers by May 1.

87. New legislation passed during the period of the operation of this collective agreement will be binding upon both the contracting parties.

Chairman of the Factory Committee (Zavkom):	KAZAKOV
Director of the Works:	TARANKOV
Chairman of the Workers' Control (RK):	SEVRIDOV
Chief of the STP and ST:	MINERVIN

XII

APPENDIX TO CHAPTERS II AND VI (see pp. 63-67, 324-348)

The New Constitution of 1936 (complete text, with a summary setting forth the Rights of Man)

WE are indebted for this admirable translation of the Russian text to Mrs. Anna Louise Strong, who has given a dozen years to the USSR. It is curious that there is no official version in English of the Soviet Constitution, but English is not one of the eleven official languages in the USSR. Mrs. Strong has examined seven translations, all made by staffs of experts: The *Moscow News* translation (MN), the Cooperative Publishers (CO), the International Publishers (IP), the Lawrence and Wishart (LW), the Inprecor (INP), a translation made by the Soviet Embassy in Washington (SE) and a translation made by an English-speaking embassy in Moscow for official use (LEG). The first five vary considerably among themselves but tend towards a sovietized English not always clear to the average reader; the SE translation has improved on much of their phrasing, but not on all. (Note the ungrammatical use of "Union Republic" for constituent republic.) The LEG makes important improvements from the standpoint of legal English, but tends occasionally towards a too-legal phrasing which violates the clear simplicity of the Russian text. Mrs. Strong has earned our thanks by preserving the feeling of the original in a simple, direct and readable translation, meantime giving footnotes to show the chief differences. The layman should thus be able to read it without confusion, while the student may trace possible shades of interpretation as shown by different texts.

Amendments made by the Constitutional Congress after popular discussion have been indicated in the indented portions of the text.

The footnotes are those of Mrs. Strong. Her book, *The New Soviet Constitution* [New York, 1937, 164 pp.], affords the best account of the coming of the constitution.

CHAPTER I

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY¹

ARTICLE I: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers² and peasants.³

¹ In other translations "Social Organization", "The Organization of Society".

² "Workers" means industrial workers, contrasted both with peasants and with white-collar employees. Proposals made during the nation-wide discussion to recognize "intellectuals" in this article—there were various suggested phrasings—were rejected on the ground that this article gives the class basis of Soviet society and that intellectuals are not a separate class. Intellectuals are, however, included in all powers and privileges of the Soviet state, under the word "trudyashchikhsya", here translated "working people".

³ I should like to use "farmer" as that is the generic term in America, as "krestyainin" is in Russian, for all persons working in agriculture, but I don't venture to oppose all seven translators.

ARTICLE 2 : The political foundation of the USSR consists of soviets ⁴ of working people's ⁵ deputies, which grew up and became strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of landlords and capitalists and the winning of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

ARTICLE 3 : All power in the USSR belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by soviets of working people's deputies.

ARTICLE 4 : The economic foundation of the USSR consists of the socialist economic system and the socialist ownership ⁶ of the tools and means of production, firmly established as a result of the liquidation of the capitalist economic system, the abolition of private ownership ⁶ of the tools and means of production, and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man.

ARTICLE 5 : Socialist property ⁶ in the USSR has either the form of state property (the wealth ⁷ of the whole people) or the form of cooperative-collective property (property of separate collective farms, property of cooperative associations).

ARTICLE 6 : The land, its deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, railways, water and air transport, banks, means of communication, large state-organized farm enterprises (state farms, machine-tractor stations, etc.) and also the basic housing facilities in cities and industrial localities are ⁸ state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people.

ARTICLE 7 : Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organizations, with their livestock and equipment, products raised or manufactured by the collective farms and cooperative organizations, as well as their public structures, constitute ⁸ the public, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations.

Aside from the basic income from socialized collective farm husbandry, every collective farm household shall have for personal ⁹ use a plot of land attached to the house and, as personal ⁹ property, the subsidiary husbandry ¹⁰ on the plot, the house, productive livestock, poultry, and small farm tools—according to the statutes of the farming artel.

Words "aside from the basic income from socialized collective farm husbandry" were added by the Constitutional Congress.

ARTICLE 8 : The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them ¹ without payment and without time limit, that is, for ever.

The words "without payment and" were added.

⁴ "Soviet" means "council".

⁵ All other translations say "toilers" which in English implies heavy, exhausting labour; the Russian word means all persons, including artists and scientists, who do useful work of hand or brain. There is no good English equivalent.

⁶ "Sobstvennost", i.e. "ownership" or "property". I have chosen now one, now the other, according to the English sense.

⁷ "Dostoyaniye"—not the same word as "sobstvennost"—implies wealth rather than ownership.

⁸ LEG gives "shall be", to conform to English legal use; I retain the present tense to conform with Stalin's emphasis that the constitution represents attainments to date. In later paragraphs referring to government procedure I follow LEG and also use "shall".

⁹ "Its own", "individual", "private" in various translations.

¹⁰ "Auxiliary establishment, or enterprise" in other translations is too pretentious.

ARTICLE 9 : Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the dominant form of economy in the USSR, the law allows small-scale private enterprise of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labour, provided there is no exploitation of the labour of others.

ARTICLE 10 : The right of personal property of citizens in their income from work and in their savings, in their dwelling house and auxiliary husbandry, in household articles and utensils and in articles for personal use and comfort, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

“ As well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens ” was added in amendment.

ARTICLE 11 : The economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by a state plan of national economy in the interests of increasing the public wealth, of steadily raising the material and cultural standard of the working people, and of strengthening the independence of the USSR and its capacity for defence.

ARTICLE 12 : Work in the USSR is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, on the principle : “ He who does not work shall not eat ”.

In the USSR the principle of socialism is realized : “ From each according to his ability, to each according to his work ”.

“ And a matter of honour ” was added.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURE ¹¹ OF THE STATE

ARTICLE 13 : The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary union ¹² of the following Soviet Socialist Republics equal in rights :

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic ;
 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Turkoman Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic ;
 The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 14 : Within the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of power and organs of state administration, shall lie : ¹³

¹¹ Other translations “ State Organization ”, “ The Organization of the State ”.

¹² IP translation ; others give “ association ”.

¹³ “ Shall ” from LEG translation, correct legal form implying compulsion. Other translations use present tense. See note 8.

- (a) Representation of the Union in international relations ; conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states ;
- (b) Questions of war and peace ;
- (c) Admission of new republics into the USSR ;
- (d) Supervision of the observance of the constitution of the USSR and ensurance of the conformity of the constitutions of the constituent republics ¹⁴ with the constitution of the USSR ;
- (e) Confirmation of changes of boundaries between constituent republics ;
- (f) Confirmation of the formation of new territories and provinces ¹⁵ as well as new autonomous republics within the constituent republics ;

This paragraph (f) was added.

- (g) Organization of the defense of the USSR and the direction of all the armed forces of the USSR ;
- (h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly ;
- (i) Protection of the security of the state ;
- (j) Establishment of national economic plans of the USSR ;
- (k) Confirmation of the unified state budget of the USSR as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to form the All-Union, ¹⁶ the republic and the local budgets ;
- (l) Administration of banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and also of trading enterprises of All-Union importance ;
- (m) Administration of transport and communications ;
- (n) Direction of the monetary and credit system ;
- (o) Organization of state insurance ;

The original draft had " of property " added ; these words were struck out.

- (p) Contracting and granting of loans ;
- (q) Establishment of the fundamental principles for the use of land as well as for the exploitation of its deposits, forests and waters ;
- (r) Establishment of the fundamental principles in the domain of education and public health ;
- (s) Organization of a single ¹⁷ system of national economic accounting ;
- (t) Establishment of the principles of labour legislation ;
- (u) Legislation governing the organization of courts and judicial procedure ; criminal and civil codes ;
- (v) Laws regarding citizenship of the Union ; laws concerning the rights of foreigners ;
- (w) Passing All-Union acts of amnesty.

ARTICLE 15: The sovereignty of the constituent republics shall be ¹⁸

¹⁴ LEG translation. All others use " union republic ", which is not only confusing but inaccurate, as " soyuznaya " is an adjective, the same incidentally, as is translated " federal " in Article 13. " Federated republic " is a possible translation, but " constituent " is the English word for " belonging to and making up the Union ", the exact meaning of " soyuznaya ".

¹⁵ " Krai " given as " territory ", " oblast " as " province ", following majority of translations.

¹⁶ All-Union, the equivalent of " Federal " in America.

¹⁷ " Unified " in most translations.

¹⁸ " Shall " from LEG translation. See notes 8 and 13. Henceforth this legal form will be used without comment. The other translations use present tense throughout.

restricted only within the limits set forth in Article 14 of the constitution of the USSR. Outside of these limits, each constituent republic shall exercise state power independently. The USSR shall protect the sovereign rights of the constituent republics.

ARTICLE 16: Each constituent republic shall have its own constitution, which shall take into account the peculiarities of the republic and be drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR.

ARTICLE 17: The right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved to each constituent republic.

ARTICLE 18: The territory of the constituent republics may not be altered without their consent.

ARTICLE 19: The laws of the USSR shall have like force in the territories of all constituent republics.

ARTICLE 20: In case of conflict between a law of a constituent republic and a law of the Union, the All-Union law shall prevail.

ARTICLE 21: A single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the USSR. Every citizen of a constituent republic is a citizen of the USSR.

ARTICLE 22: The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic shall consist of the following territories: Azov-Black-Sea, Far-Eastern, West Siberian, Krasnoyarsk and North Caucasus; of the provinces: Voronezh, East Siberia, Gorky, Western, Ivanovo, Kalinin, Kirov, Kuibyshev, Kursk, Leningrad, Moscow, Omsk, Orenburg, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Northern, Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk and Yaroslavl; of the autonomous soviet socialist republics: Tatar, Bashkir, Daghestan, Buryat-Mongolian, Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Karelian, Komi, Crimean, Mari, Moldovian, Volga German, North Ossetian, Udmurtsk, Chechen-Ingush, Chuvash and Yakut; and of the autonomous provinces: Adygei, Jewish, Karachai, Oirat, Khakass and Cherkess.

ARTICLE 23: The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shall consist of the following provinces: Vinnitsa, Dniepropetrovsk, Donetz, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov and Chernigov and the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 24: The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic shall include the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province.

ARTICLE 25: The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic shall include the Abkhazian ASSR, the Ajar ASSR and the South Ossetian Autonomous Province.

ARTICLE 26: The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic shall include the Karakalpak ASSR.

ARTICLE 27: The Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic shall include the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province.

ARTICLE 28: The Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic shall consist of the

following provinces : Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata, East Kazakhstan, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kustanai, North Kazakhstan, South Kazakhstan.

ARTICLE 29 : The Armenian SSR, the White Russian SSR, the Turkoman SSR, and the Kirghiz SSR shall contain no autonomous republics or territories or provinces.

CHAPTER III

THE HIGHEST¹⁹ ORGANS OF STATE POWER OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 30 : The highest organ of state power of the USSR is the Supreme Soviet²⁰ of the USSR.

ARTICLE 31 : The Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall exercise all the rights vested in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, insofar as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, fall within the competence of organs of the USSR accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, i.e. the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council²¹ of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR and the Peoples' Commissariats of the USSR.

ARTICLE 32 : The legislative power of the USSR shall be exercised exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 33 : The Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall consist of two chambers : the Soviet²² of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 34 : The Soviet of the Union shall be elected by the citizens of the USSR by electoral districts on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population.

ARTICLE 35 : The Soviet of Nationalities shall be elected by the citizens of the USSR by constituent and autonomous republics, autonomous provinces and national regions²³ on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each constituent republic, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five deputies from each autonomous province and one deputy from each national region.

In the original draft this read : " The Soviet of Nationalities

¹⁹ SE translation ; others have " Supreme ". The Russian word is " Vysshy ", not the same as in " Supreme Soviet ".

²⁰ " Verkhovny Soviet. " Translated " Supreme Council " except in LEG translation. Since all translations use " Soviet " everywhere else the same Russian word occurs, as " village soviet ", " Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ", " soviets of working people's deputies ", " the political foundation of the USSR consists of soviets ", it is politically confusing to change suddenly to " Council " for the supreme body of the land, consisting of more than a thousand elected representatives. " Council " implies a small appointed body, accentuates the contrast with the previous " Congress of Soviets ", and gives the impression of a group of dictators or a return to capitalist democracy. I therefore follow LEG in retaining the word " Soviet ", the form universal throughout the entire structure of Soviet power.

²¹ " Soviet Narodnykh Kommissarov. " I retain " Council " here since it is a small appointed body.

²² See note 20. Same word here.

²³ " Okrugs ", also " districts ". Cf. note to Article 94.

shall consist of deputies appointed by the Supreme Soviets of the constituent and autonomous republics and the soviets of working people's deputies in the autonomous provinces : on the basis of ten deputies from each constituent republic, five deputies from each autonomous republic and two deputies from each autonomous province ”.

ARTICLE 36 : The Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall be elected for a term of four years.

ARTICLE 37 : The two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, shall have equal rights.

ARTICLE 38 : The legislative initiative shall belong in equal degree to the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 39 : A law shall be considered adopted if passed by both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by a simple majority in each.

ARTICLE 40 : Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall be published in the languages of the constituent republics over the signatures of the Chairman ²⁴ and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

“ In the languages of the constituent republics ” was added.

ARTICLE 41 : The sessions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities shall begin and terminate simultaneously.

ARTICLE 42 : The Soviet of the Union shall elect a Chairman ²⁴ of the Soviet of the Union and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 43 : The Soviet of Nationalities shall elect a Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 44 : The Chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and of the Soviet of Nationalities shall preside over the meetings of the respective chambers and regulate their internal procedure.

ARTICLE 45 : Joint sessions of both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall be presided over alternately by the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.

ARTICLE 46 : Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall be convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR twice a year.

Special sessions shall be convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its discretion or on the demand of one of the constituent republics.

ARTICLE 47 : In case of disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities the question shall be referred for settlement to a conciliation commission formed on a parity basis. If the conciliation commission does not come to an agreement, or if its decision does not satisfy one of the chambers, the question shall be considered a second time in the chambers. Failing an agreed decision of the two chambers, the Presidium of the Supreme

²⁴ LEG uses “ President ”.

Soviet of the USSR shall dissolve the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and shall fix [up] new elections.

ARTICLE 48 : The Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall elect at a joint sitting of both chambers the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, eleven Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary of the Presidium and twenty-four members of the Presidium.

Original draft had four Vice-Chairmen and thirty-one members.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall be accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in all its activities.

ARTICLE 49 : The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall :

- (a) Convene the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ;
- (b) Interpret existing laws of the USSR and issue decrees ;
- (c) Dissolve the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in conformity with Article 47 of the Constitution of the USSR and fix [up] new elections ;
- (d) Hold consultations of the entire people (referendums) on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the constituent republics ;
- (e) Rescind decisions and orders of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR and the Councils of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republics in case they do not conform to the law ;
- (f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, remove from office and appoint Peoples' Commissars of the USSR at the instance of the Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ;
- (g) Award decorations of the USSR and bestow honorary titles of the USSR ;

“ Bestow honorary titles ” was added.

- (h) Exercise the right of pardon ;
- (i) Appoint and replace the high command of the armed forces of the USSR ;
- (j) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, declare a state of war in case of an armed attack upon the USSR, or in case of the need of fulfilling international treaty obligations of mutual defence against aggression ;

The phrase “ or in case of the need of fulfilling international treaty obligations of mutual defence against aggression ” was added amid applause, the only applause greeting the reading of any amendment.

- (k) Declare general or partial mobilization ;
- (l) Ratify international treaties ;
- (m) Appoint and recall plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR to foreign states ;
- (n) Receive the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited to it.

The original draft read, “ Accepts the credentials of diplomatic representatives of foreign states ”.

ARTICLE 50 : The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities shall elect credentials committees ²⁵ which shall verify the credentials of the members of the respective chambers.

On representation of the credentials committee the chamber shall decide either to recognize the credentials or to declare invalid the elections of individual deputies.

ARTICLE 51 : The Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall appoint, whenever it deems necessary, investigating and auditing commissions on any matter.

All institutions and officials are bound to comply with the demands of these commissions and to submit to them the necessary materials and documents.

ARTICLE 52 : A deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and during the period when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 53 : On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, or on its dissolution before the expiration of its term, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall retain its powers until the formation of a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 54 : On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, or on its dissolution before the expiration of its term, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall fix new elections to be held within a period of not more than two months from the date of expiration of the term of office or the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ARTICLE 55 : The newly elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR shall be convened by the Presidium of the former Supreme Soviet of the USSR not later than one month after the elections.

ARTICLE 56 : The Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a joint session of both chambers shall set up the executive ²⁶ of the USSR—the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR.

CHAPTER IV

THE HIGHEST ²⁷ ORGANS OF STATE POWER OF THE CONSTITUENT REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 57 : The highest organ of state power of a constituent republic shall be the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 58 : The Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall be elected by the citizens of the republic for a term of four years.

The rates of representation shall be fixed by the constitutions of the constituent republics.

²⁵ Following LEG; others use "commissions".

²⁶ All other translations "government", in the European sense, i.e. executive branch.

²⁷ From SE translation; others have "Supreme".

ARTICLE 59 : The Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall be the only legislative organ of the republic.

ARTICLE 60 : The Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall :

(a) Adopt the constitution of the republic and amend it in accordance with Article 16 of the Constitution of the USSR;

(b) Approve the constitutions of the autonomous republics included in it and define the boundaries of their territories ;

(c) Approve the economic plan and budget of the republic ;

(d) Exercise the right of amnesty and pardon of citizens sentenced by the judicial organs of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 61 : The Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall elect the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic consisting of : the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary of the Presidium and members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic.

“ Secretary of the Presidium ” was added.

The powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall be defined by the constitution of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 62 : To conduct its sessions, the Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall elect its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 63 : The Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic shall set up the executive ²⁶ of the constituent republic—the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republic.

CHAPTER V

ORGANS OF STATE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 64 : The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR.

ARTICLE 6 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall be responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and accountable to it ; and between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

“ And between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ” was added.

ARTICLE 66 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall issue resolutions ²⁸ and orders on the basis of, and in execution of, the existing laws and shall verify their execution.

ARTICLE 67 : Resolutions and orders of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall be binding throughout the entire territory of the USSR.

²⁸ LEG wording ; others give “ decisions ”.

ARTICLE 68 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall :

(a) Co-ordinate and direct the work of the All-Union and Union-Republic Peoples' Commissariats of the USSR and of the other economic and cultural institutions subordinate to it ;

(b) Take measures to carry out the national economic plan and state budget and to strengthen the credit-mouetary system ;

(c) Take measures to secure public order, to defend the interests of the state, and to safeguard the rights of citizens ;

(d) Exercise general supervision in the sphere of relations with foreign states ;

(e) Fix the annual contingent of citizens to be called for active military service and direct the general organization of the armed forces of the country ;

(f) Set up, when necessary, special committees and central administrations attached to the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR for economic, cultural and defence construction.

This paragraph (f) was added.

ARTICLE 69 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall have the right, in respect to those branches of administration and economy which come within the competence of the USSR, to suspend resolutions and orders of the Councils of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republics and to annul orders and instructions of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR.

ARTICLE 70 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall be formed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and shall consist of :

The Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR ;

The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR ;

The Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the USSR ;

The Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission ;

The Peoples' Commissars of the USSR ;

The Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Products ; ²⁹

The Chairman of the Committee on [the] Arts ;

The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education.

ARTICLE 71 : The Executive of the USSR or a Peoples' Commissar of the USSR to whom any question by a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is addressed shall be obliged to give a verbal or written reply in the respective chamber within a period of not more than three days.

ARTICLE 72 : The Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall direct the branches of state administration which come within the competence of the USSR.

The word "vedayut", "has charge of", in original draft was changed to "rukovodyat", "directs". The same change was also made in Articles 75, 76, 84, 87.

²⁹ LEG has "procurements" ; SE has "stocks" ; others have "for purchasing agricultural products" [in the Russian text, zasotovok].

ARTICLE 73 : The Peoples' Commissars of the USSR shall issue, within the limits of the competence of the respective Peoples' Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis of, and in execution of, existing laws as well as of resolutions and orders of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR, and shall verify their execution.

ARTICLE 74 : The Peoples' Commissariats of the USSR shall be either All-Union or Union-Republic.

ARTICLE 75 : The All-Union Peoples' Commissariats shall direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the USSR either directly or through organs appointed by them.

ARTICLE 76 : The Union-Republic Peoples' Commissariats shall direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them, as a rule, through like-named Peoples' Commissariats of the constituent republics, and shall directly administer only a definite limited number of enterprises according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

“ As a rule ” and “ and shall directly administer only a definite limited number of enterprises according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ” were added.

ARTICLE 77 : The following Peoples' Commissariats shall be All-Union Peoples' Commissariats :

Defence ;
Foreign Affairs ;
Foreign Trade ;
Railways ;³⁰
Communications ;
Water Transport ;
Heavy Industry ;
Defence Industry.

“ Defence Industry ” was added.

ARTICLE 78 : The following Peoples' Commissariats shall be Union-Republic Peoples' Commissariats :

Food Industry ;
Light Industry ;
Timber Industry ;
Agriculture ;
State Grain and Livestock Farms ;
Finance ;
Internal Trade ;
Internal Affairs ;
Justice ;
Health.

³⁰ Literally “ Ways of Communication ” but refers [mainly] to railways.

CHAPTER VI

ORGANS OF STATE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
CONSTITUENT REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 79 : The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of a constituent republic shall be the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 80 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of a constituent republic shall be responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic and accountable to it, and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic.

“ And in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic ” was added.

ARTICLE 81 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of a constituent republic shall issue resolutions ²⁸ and orders on the basis of, and in execution of, the existing laws of the USSR and of the constituent republic, and of the resolutions and orders of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR, and shall verify their execution.

ARTICLE 82 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of a constituent republic shall have the right to suspend the resolutions and orders of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the autonomous republics and to rescind the decisions and orders of the executive committees of the soviets of working people's deputies of territories, provinces and autonomous provinces.

ARTICLE 83 : The Council of Peoples' Commissars of a constituent republic shall be formed by the Supreme Soviet of the constituent republic and shall consist of :

The Chairmen of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republic ;

The Vice-Chairmen ;

The Chairman of the State Planning Commission ;

The Peoples' Commissars for :

Food Industry ;

Light Industry ;

Timber Industry ;

Agriculture ;

State Grain and Livestock Farms ;

Finance ;

Internal Trade ;

Internal Affairs ;

Justice ;

Health ;

Education ;

Local Industry ;

Municipal Economy ;
 Social Welfare ;
 A representative of the Committee on Agricultural Products ;
 Chief of the Administration for [the] Arts ;
 Representatives of the All-[Union] Peoples' Commissariats.

ARTICLE 84 : The Peoples' Commissars of a constituent republic shall direct those branches of state administration which come within the competence of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 85 : The Peoples' Commissars of a constituent republic shall issue, within the limits of the competence of the respective Peoples' Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis of, and in execution of, the laws of the USSR and the constituent republic, of resolutions and orders of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR and of the constituent republic, and of orders and instructions of the Union-Republic Peoples' Commissariats of the USSR.

ARTICLE 86 : The Peoples' Commissariats of a constituent republic shall be either Union-Republic or Republic.

ARTICLE 87 : Union-Republic Peoples' Commissariats shall direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them and shall be subordinate both to the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republic and to the corresponding Union-Republic Peoples' Commissariat of the USSR.

ARTICLE 88 : Republic Peoples' Commissariats shall direct the branch of state administration entrusted to them and shall be subordinate directly to the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the constituent republic.

CHAPTER VII

THE HIGHEST²⁷ ORGANS OF STATE POWER OF THE AUTONOMOUS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 89 : The highest organ of state power of an autonomous republic is the Supreme Soviet of the ASSR.

ARTICLE 90 : The Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic shall be elected by the citizens of the republic for a term of four years, according to rates of representation fixed by the constitution of the autonomous republic.

ARTICLE 91 : The Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic shall be the only legislative organ of the ASSR.

ARTICLE 92 : Each autonomous republic shall have its own constitution, which shall take into account the peculiarities of the autonomous republic and which shall be drawn up in full conformity with the constitution of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 93 : The Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic shall elect the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic and shall form the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the autonomous republic in accordance with its constitution.

CHAPTER VIII

LOCAL ORGANS OF STATE POWER

ARTICLE 94 : Soviets of working people's deputies shall be the organs of state power in territories,³¹ provinces, autonomous provinces, regions, districts, cities and rural localities³² (stanitsa, village, khutor, kishlak, aul).

ARTICLE 95 : The soviets of working people's deputies of territories, provinces, autonomous provinces, regions, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsa, village, khutor, kishlak, aul) shall be elected by the working people in the respective territories, provinces, autonomous provinces, regions, districts, cities and rural localities for a term of two years.

ARTICLE 96 : The rates of representation for the soviets of working people's deputies shall be fixed by the constitution of the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 97 : The soviets of working people's deputies shall direct the activity of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens, direct the local economic and cultural construction and draw up the local budget.

"Carry out local economic and cultural construction" in the original draft was changed to "direct the local economic and cultural construction".

ARTICLE 98 : The soviets of working people's deputies shall make decisions and issue orders within the limits of the powers conferred on them by the laws of the USSR and the constituent republic.

ARTICLE 99 : The executive and administrative organs of the soviets of working people's deputies of territories, provinces, autonomous provinces, regions, districts, cities and rural localities shall be the executive committees elected by them, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary and members.

"And rural localities" and "Secretary" were added.

ARTICLE 100 : The executive and administrative organs of rural soviets of working people's deputies in small settlements, in accordance with the constitutions of the constituent republics, shall be the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary elected by them.

"Secretary" was added.

³¹ "Krai", territory ;

"oblast", province ;

"okrug", region ;

"rayon", district ;

"stanitsa", Cossack village ;

"khutor", hamlets of a few farms [in Ukraina] ;

"kishlak", village in Central Asia ;

"aul", mountain or desert village, especially in the Caucasus.

³² "Villages" in all translations except SE ; a rural administrative unit including several villages or hamlets.

ARTICLE 101: The executive organs of the soviets of working people's deputies shall be directly accountable both to the soviet of working people's deputies which elected them and to the executive organ of the higher soviet of working people's deputies.

CHAPTER IX

THE COURT AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S
OFFICE

ARTICLE 102: Justice in the USSR shall be administered by the Supreme Court of the USSR, the Supreme Courts of the constituent republics, territorial and provincial courts, courts of autonomous republics and autonomous provinces, regional courts, special courts of the USSR created by resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and peoples' courts.

"Regional [okrug] courts" was added to original draft.
Russian text uses different word for "resolution" in the original and final drafts.

ARTICLE 103: Cases in all courts shall be tried with the participation of peoples' associate judges ³⁴ except in cases specially provided for by law.

ARTICLE 104: The Supreme Court of the USSR shall be the highest judicial organ. It shall be charged with supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the USSR and of the constituent republics.

The word "judicial" was inserted before the word "activities".

ARTICLE 105: The Supreme Court of the USSR and the special courts of the USSR shall be elected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 106: The Supreme Courts of the constituent republics shall be elected by the Supreme Soviets of the constituent republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 107: The Supreme Courts of the autonomous republics shall be elected by the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 108: Territorial and provincial courts, courts of autonomous provinces and regional courts shall be elected by the soviets of working people's deputies of the territories, provinces, regions and autonomous provinces for a term of five years.

"Regional" [okrug] was added.

ARTICLE 109: The peoples' courts shall be elected for a term of three years by the citizens of the district, by secret vote, on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage.

ARTICLE 110: Court proceedings shall be conducted in the language of

³³ Also given "State Prosecutor", "State Attorney". I have used Attorney-General for American readers, with state and district attorneys for the subordinate divisions.

³⁴ Literally "co-sitters"; several versions use "assessors".

the constituent or autonomous republic or autonomous province with the guarantee to persons not knowing the language of full acquaintance with the material of the case through an interpreter, and also of the right to speak in court in their native language.

ARTICLE 111: In all courts of the USSR cases shall be heard in public unless otherwise provided by law, and the accused shall be guaranteed the right to defence.

ARTICLE 112: The judges are independent and shall be subordinate only to the law.

ARTICLE 113: The highest supervision over the strict observance of laws by all the Peoples' Commissariats and institutions subordinate to them, as well as by individual officials and also by citizens of the USSR, is vested in the Attorney-General of the USSR.

ARTICLE 114: The Attorney-General of the USSR shall be appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a term of seven years.

ARTICLE 115: State attorneys of republics, territories and provinces, as well as state attorneys of autonomous republics and autonomous provinces shall be appointed by the Attorney-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 116: District attorneys of regions, districts and cities shall be appointed for a term of five years by the state attorneys of the constituent republics and confirmed by the Attorney-General of the USSR.

"Regions, districts and cities" in final draft replaced
"district" in original draft.

ARTICLE 117: The state and district attorneys' offices shall perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever and be subordinate solely to the Attorney-General of the USSR.

CHAPTER X

BASIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES ³⁵ OF CITIZENS

ARTICLE 118: Citizens of the USSR have ³⁶ the right to work, that is, the right to guaranteed employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.

"That is" in the final draft replaced a dash in the original

³⁵ Some translations use "Fundamental" for "Basic"; and "Obligations" for "Duties".

³⁶ LEG "shall have", but I here revert to present tense for Articles 118-122 in common with all the other translations, having employed the LEG form throughout all discussions of government structure.

draft. "Elimination of the possibility of economic crises" replaced "the absence of economic crises".

ARTICLE 119 : Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest.³⁷

The right to rest is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with pay for workers and other employees, and the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest homes and clubs serving the needs of the working people.

ARTICLE 120 : Citizens of the USSR have the right to material security³⁸ in old age and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work.

This right is ensured by the wide development of social insurance of workers and other employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts at the disposal of the working people.

"For the working people" was inserted after "free medical service".

ARTICLE 121 : Citizens of the USSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education, by education free of charge including higher education, by a system of state stipends³⁹ for the overwhelming majority of students in higher schools, by instruction in schools in the native language, and by the organization in factories, state farms, machine-tractor stations and collective farms of free industrial, technical and agricultural education for the working people.

ARTICLE 122 : Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political⁴⁰ life.

The realization of these rights of women is ensured by affording women equally with men the right to work, payment for work, rest, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pregnancy leave with pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

ARTICLE 123 : Equal rights for citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, shall be an irrevocable law.

Any direct or indirect limitation of these rights, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness⁴¹ or hatred and contempt, shall be punished by law.

ARTICLE 124 : In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR shall be separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship⁴² and freedom of anti-religious propaganda shall be recognized for all citizens.

³⁷ SE adds "and leisure".

³⁸ SE gives "maintenance".

³⁹ SE gives "scholarships".

⁴⁰ Strictly, "social-political".

⁴¹ "Exceptionalism" in many translations.

⁴² SE translation; others give "to perform religious rites". Literally, "to perform the activities of the religious cult".

ARTICLE 125: In accordance with the interests of the working people, and in order to⁴³ strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law:

- (a) Freedom of speech;
- (b) Freedom of the press;
- (c) Freedom of assembly and meetings;
- (d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These rights of citizens are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing shops, supplies of paper, public buildings, the streets, means of communication and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

“By law” was inserted.

ARTICLE 126: In accordance with the interests of the working people, and for the purpose of developing the organized self-expression and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the USSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations—trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical, and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens from the ranks of the working-class and other strata of the working people unite in the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and which represents the leading nucleus of all organizations of the working people, both social⁴⁴ and state.

“The All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks),” *i.e.*, the official name, in the final draft replaced “the Communist Party of the USSR” of the original draft.

ARTICLE 127: Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No one may be subject to arrest except by an order of the court or with the sanction of a state attorney.⁴⁵

ARTICLE 128: The inviolability of the homes of citizens and secrecy of correspondence are protected by law.

ARTICLE 129: The USSR grants the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people or for scientific activity or for their struggle for national liberation.

ARTICLE 130: It is the duty⁴⁶ of every citizen of the USSR to observe the constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to carry out the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform his public duties⁴⁷ and to respect the rules of the socialist community.

ARTICLE 131: It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the fatherland,

⁴³ All except SE give “for the purpose of”.

⁴⁴ SE; others give “public”.

⁴⁵ Includes district attorneys and Attorney-General.

⁴⁶ SE; others give “Every citizen—is obliged. . .”

⁴⁷ “Honestly to regard his social duties”, or “to take an honest attitude towards”

as the source of the prosperous and cultural life of all the working people.

Persons making attacks⁴⁸ upon public socialist property shall be⁴⁹ regarded as enemies of the people.

ARTICLE 132 : Universal military duty shall be the law.

Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army represents an honourable duty of the citizens of the USSR.

ARTICLE 133 : The defence of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason to the homeland⁵⁰; violation of the oath, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military might of the state, espionage : shall be punished with the full severity of the law as the gravest crime.

The original draft contained " on behalf of a foreign state " after " espionage ".

CHAPTER XI

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

ARTICLE 134 : Elections of deputies to all the soviets of working people's deputies ; to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ; to the Supreme Soviets of the constituent republics ; to the territorial and provincial soviets of working people's deputies ; to the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics ; to the soviets of working people's deputies of autonomous provinces ; to the soviets of working people's deputies of the regions, towns and rural districts (stanitsas, villages, khutors, kishlaks, auls)⁵¹ shall be effected by the voters on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot.

ARTICLE 135 : The elections of deputies shall be universal : all citizens of the USSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race and nationality, religion, educational qualifications, residence, social origin, property status or past activity, shall have the right to take part in the elections of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons condemned by court with deprivation of electoral rights.

Article 135 in the original draft read as follows :

" Elections of deputies are universal : all citizens in the USSR who in the year of the elections reach the age of 18 have the right to participate in elections of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of the mentally deficient and persons deprived of electoral rights by the courts."

ARTICLE 136 : The elections of deputies shall be equal : every citizen shall have one vote ; all citizens shall take part in the elections on an equal basis.

Article 136 in the original draft read :

" Elections of deputies are equal : every citizen has the right to elect and be elected irrespective of race or nationality, religion,

⁴⁸ " Attempting to violate ", " to infringe " are other versions.

⁴⁹ LEG ; all others say " are ".

⁵⁰ All other translations give " fatherland ", but " rodina " is a more intimate term than " otechestvo ", translated " fatherland " just above.

educational qualifications, residence, social origin, property status or past activity."

ARTICLE 137: Women shall have the right to elect and to be elected on equal terms with men.

ARTICLE 138: Citizens who are in the ranks of the Red Army shall have the right to elect and to be elected on equal terms with all citizens.

ARTICLE 139: The elections of deputies shall be direct: the elections to all the soviets of working people's deputies, beginning with the rural and city soviets of working people's deputies and up to and including the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, shall be directly effected by citizens through direct elections.

ARTICLE 140: The voting at elections of deputies shall be secret.

ARTICLE 141: Candidates for elections shall be nominated by electoral districts.

The right to nominate candidates shall be ensured to public ⁵¹ organizations and societies of working people; Communist Party organizations; trade unions; cooperatives; organizations of youth; cultural societies.

ARTICLE 142: Every deputy shall be obliged to report to the electors on his work and on the work of the soviet of working people's deputies and may at any time be recalled by decision of a majority of the electors in the manner prescribed by law.

CHAPTER XII

EMBLEM, FLAG, CAPITAL

ARTICLE 143: The state emblem of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall consist of a sickle and hammer on the globe of the earth depicted in rays of the sun and surrounded by ears of grain, with the inscription: "Workers ⁵² of all lands unite", in the languages of the constituent republics. Above the emblem shall be a five-pointed star.

ARTICLE 144: The state flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be of red cloth with a sickle and hammer depicted in gold in the upper corner near the staff and above them a red five-pointed star bordered in gold. The ratio of the width to the length shall be one to two.

ARTICLE 145: The capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be the city of Moscow.

CHAPTER XIII

PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 146: Amendments to the Constitution of the USSR shall be effected only by decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes in each of its chambers.

⁵¹ "Social" in several versions.

⁵² Strictly, "proletarians". I follow the English slogan.

The first meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place in January 1938 (see page 332 of Ambassador Joseph E. Davies' My Mission to Moscow). This meeting under the New Constitution of 1936 is described in A. P. and Zelda K. Coates' From Tsardom to the Stalin Constitution, on pages 270-272.

This session arranged for the establishment of 21 People's Commissariats. "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is formed by the heads of these People's Commissariats, together with the chairman of the Gosplan and the Commission for Soviet Control, the chairman of the State Bank, the presidents of the Committees for Higher Education and for Art—all these, as also the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and three vice-chairmen, are elected by the Supreme Soviet" (see Coates, page 270).

December 5, 1936. New Constitution adopted by the All-Union Soviet Congress.

November 21, 1937. Lists of candidates published.

December 12, 1937. Elections held.

The following are the dates on which Sessions of the Supreme Council (opening dates) were held since the first elections :

January 12, 1938, May 25 and August 28, 1939, October 31, 1939, March 29 and August 1, 1940, and February 25, 1941.

CHIEF CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER I

ARTICLES 1 TO 4 :

The RSFSR Constitution of 1918 declared "the establishment (in the form of a strong Soviet government) of the dictatorship of the urban and rural workers, combined with the poorer peasantry, to secure the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the establishment of socialism".

The present Constitution assumes that these objectives have been obtained and declares that the USSR "is a socialist state of workers and peasants". Its political foundation is given as "soviets of working people's deputies", a much more conclusive term than earlier.

ARTICLES 5 AND 6 :

The RSFSR Constitution of 1918 declared the abolition of private ownership of land "in order to establish the socialization of the land". It ratified the law on workers' control in industry and that on the Supreme Economic Council . . . "as a first step towards the complete transfer to the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic of all factories, workshops, mines, railways and other means of production and transport". It "ratified the transfer of all banks" to the government.

The present Constitution expresses the completion of those processes of which the 1918 Constitution was a first step.

ARTICLES 7 TO 12 :

All this detail regarding collective farm property and private property is absent from the first two Constitutions.

CHAPTER II

ARTICLE 13 :

The present Constitution contains eleven constituent republics of which only one—the RSFSR—existed in 1918, and four—the RSFSR, the Ukraine, White Russia and Transcaucasia—in the 1924 Constitution. The Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR were added at the end of 1924 : the Tajik SSR in 1929, making seven.

The present Constitution dissolves Transcaucasia into three separate constituent republics—the Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijan—and forms two new republics—the Kazakh and Kirghiz. This means a considerable raising of status for many minor nationalities.

ARTICLE 14 :

The Constitution of 1924, passed at the beginning of the “ new economic policy ”, which permitted private trade and concessions to foreign capital, spoke of “ laying the foundations of, and establishing a general plan for, the entire national economy of the Union, the definition of branches of industry . . . the conclusion of concessionary agreements ”. It included also “ the direction ” of foreign trade and “ the establishment ” of a single monetary and credit system.

The present Constitution gives to the Union Government “ administration of banks, industrial and agricultural establishments, as well as trading establishments ” and also “ foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly ”.

CHAPTER III

The 1924 Constitution gave supreme power to the “ All-Union Congress of Soviets ” of some two thousand members indirectly elected and convening once a year. Between sessions power was vested in the Central Executive Committee of somewhat more than four hundred members in two chambers which convened three times a year. This, in turn, elected a Presidium which had “ supreme legislative, executive and administrative ” power in the interim.

The present Constitution vests the supreme power more simply and directly in the Supreme Soviet of slightly more than a thousand members, meeting twice a year, and consisting of two chambers roughly equal in number. Between sessions a Presidium of thirty-six members continues with strictly prescribed functions but without legislative power.

CHAPTER V

ARTICLES 70, 77, 78 :

Contrast these eight All-Union Commissariats, ten Union-Republic Commissariats, and five Chairmen of Commissions—total twenty-three main departments—with the five All-Union Commissariats and six “ Unified Peoples’ Commissariats ” of 1924.

Of the former All-Union Commissariats—Foreign Affairs, War and Marine, Home and Foreign Trade, Transport, Posts and Telegraphs—Transport has

been divided into Railways and Water Transport ; Home and Foreign Trade have become two separate Commissariats.

The former " Unified Peoples' Commissariats " were : Supreme Economic Council, which has given birth to Heavy Industry, Defence Industry, Food Industry, Light Industry, Timber Industry ; Agriculture, which is now supplemented by State Grain and Livestock Farms ; Labour, which is now abolished, its functions having been transferred to the trade unions ; Finance, which remains ; Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, now replaced by the Soviet Control Commission ; Central Statistical Department, now replaced by the State Planning Commission. The present Commissariats of Justice and Health are a centralization of functions formerly performed locally. The functions of the OGPU, formerly an independent department to which a special chapter of the 1924 Constitution was devoted, are now included in the Commissariat of Home Affairs. The Committees on Agricultural Products, Art and Higher Education are completely new additions.

CHAPTER IX

The present Constitution gives greater independence to the courts than formerly. Under the 1924 Constitution, the Supreme Court, if faced with a conflict between the laws of a constituent republic and the Union, could only " appeal " to the Central Executive Committee to set this right. Now it has " supervision of the judicial activities of all judicial organs of the USSR and of the constituent republics ".

Formerly the judges were appointed and removable by the Central Executive Committee ; now they are appointed for a fixed term of five years, *i.e.* longer than the life of the appointing body.

The Attorney-General is appointed for seven years and appoints all state and district attorneys, who are thus independent of local governments. Formerly similar independence was enjoyed by the OGPU but its functions went beyond those of investigation and prosecution to which the Attorney-General's office is limited.

CHAPTER X

The earlier constitutions had no list of " basis rights and duties ". The right to work did not appear since unemployment was not abolished until 1931. The right to rest and to material security were not included in earlier constitutions although the eight-hour day, paid holidays and sickness insurance were introduced by law at an early stage. The Constitution of 1918 did not guarantee the right to education but " set before itself the task of providing for the workers and poorer peasants a complete, universal and free education."

Equal rights for women and for all nationalities were part of the earlier constitutions.

" Freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda " was recognized in the text of 1918 but was changed to the present formulation in the revised constitution of the RSFSR of 1927.

Freedom of the press and of assembly were recognized in the Constitution of 1918 ; their material guarantees—printing shops, meeting halls and other technical resources—were transferred " to the working class and to the

peasants". The present Constitution widens this to include all "the working people and their organizations".

"Full liberty of association for the workers" was ensured in the Constitution of 1918, the government pledging itself to "lend to the workers and peasants all its material and moral assistance to help them to unite and organize themselves". The present Constitution defines the types of organizations which have arisen and specifically mentions the Communist Party.

"Inviolability of homes and secrecy of correspondence" were not guaranteed in previous constitutions.

The right of asylum was granted in 1918 to "all foreigners persecuted for political and religious offences". The present Constitution reads "for defending the interests of the working people or for scientific activity or for their struggle for national liberation", a clear indication of the historical changes which have taken place in world pressures.

In 1918 the "honour of bearing arms" was "granted only to the workers; the leisured sections of the population will fulfil other military duties". In the present Constitution all citizens are equal.

CHAPTER XI

ARTICLE 134 :

According to previous constitutions, deputies to the town and rural soviets were elected by the voters by a show of hands at meetings. Larger areas were governed by Congresses of Soviets elected by the lower soviets. In the All-Union Congress the cities were represented by one delegate for every 25,000 electors, and the provinces by one delegate for every 15,000 inhabitants.

The present elections are direct to both local and central governing bodies on an equal basis of representation and by secret ballot.

ARTICLE 135 :

Previous constitutions gave lists of disfranchised persons including those who employed others for the sake of profit—a category that no longer exists—clergy and former tsarist officials.

The present Constitution grants the suffrage to all citizens except the mentally deficient and persons condemned by law with deprivation of electoral rights.

CHAPTER XIII

The All-Union Congress of Soviets could change the constitution by a majority vote.

Now a change requires two-thirds of the votes in each of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet.

ELECTION REGULATIONS

The necessary regulations for the elections, which are to take place in the autumn of 1937, are not completely formulated in the code published in July 1937. The constituencies were then not defined. So far only certain points have been decided. Among these are (a) that the elections will take place everywhere on the same day; (b) that the poll will be open from 6 A.M.

to midnight ; (e) that polling districts will be provided for each one or two thousand electors in the cities, and for each five hundred in the country, or even for each hundred in sparsely inhabited districts ; (d) that no candidate may stand for more than one constituency ; (e) that if no candidate polls an actual majority of the votes cast, there will be a Second Ballot confined to the two candidates heading the list ; (f) that lists of electors in alphabetical order will be posted up in each polling district ; (g) that the ballot papers will be officially provided with envelopes in which the elector will place his ballot paper, after crossing out all but one name.

THE RIGHTS AND BASIC DUTIES OF MAN AS LAID DOWN BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR, 1936

We now add our own summary of the Constitution, not in the Russian phraseology, but in terms enabling the British or American reader more easily to comprehend its purport ; and not following the order of the legal text but rearranged so as to bring out its character as a new Declaration of the Rights of Man.

The Twelve Tables of the Law

- I. The Right to work, and to be enabled to live by the work that must be found for all able-bodied adults, with their own option, alternatively, to join in independent cooperative productive societies, either in industry, agriculture or fishing, or to work individually on their own account, without the employment of hired labour.
- II. The Right to leisure, by statutory limitation of the hours of employment in office, factory, mill or mine ; together with the provision of paid holidays and of all approved means of happily using the leisure so ensured.
- III. The Right of those who work at wages or salary by hand or by brain, and of their incapacitated dependants, collectively, to the entire net product of the labour so employed throughout the whole USSR, as annually ascertained.
- IV. The Right to positive health of body and mind, so far as this can be secured by the widest possible use of preventive and curative medicine and surgery, and of public sanitation, with wages in sickness and incapacity without waiting interval or time limit ; and the ensuring of adequate nutrition and physical as well as mental training of all infants, children and adolescents.
- V. The Right of Women to fulfil the function of motherhood with all possible alleviation of the physical suffering involved ; without pecuniary sacrifice or burden, and further aided by universally organised provision for the care of infants and children.
- VI. The Right to education equally for all races, without limit or fee, for persons of any age and either sex, with maintenance in suitable cases.

- VII. The Right to prompt and adequate provision for the family on the death of any breadwinner or pensioner ; with universally gratuitous funeral, and instant succour of the home.
- VIII. The Right to superannuation at a definite age before senility or upon previous breakdown, with adequate non-contributory pension.
- IX. The Right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and of holding mass meetings, freedom of street processions and demonstrations and freedom of the press [from domination by capitalist, financial or counter-revolutionary ownership or control]. These "rights of the citizens" by Article 125 "are ensured by placing at the disposal of the toilers and their organisations" [including trade unions, cooperative societies, sport and other voluntary societies] printing presses, supplies of paper, public buildings, and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights ; as well as by the prohibition of private profit-making and exploitation.
- X. The Right to criticise every branch of the public administration, and to agitate for its improvement, by groups and associations of divers kinds, such as trade unions, cooperative societies and cultural associations, by speeches at public meetings and by printed matter—yet without any organisation of merely political groups having no other common interest than public criticism or opposition, and without permission to individuals or factions to obstruct the *execution* of what has been finally decided on by the supreme elected legislature.
- XI. The Right to elect, irrespective of nationality, race, sex or colour ; freely, directly, secretly, equally and universally ; from 18 years of age ; to all governing assemblies from the lowest to the highest, without pecuniary, residential or other limiting qualifications ; candidates being put forward by non-party groups of every description, as well as by the Vocation of Leadership known as the Communist Party. This will produce an electorate numbering actually 55 per cent of the census population, as compared with one of less than 40 per cent in the United States and Great Britain, reduced as those are by requirements of residence and specific registration.
- XII. The Right to inviolability of the person, and of his correspondence. The right to be free from arbitrary arrest, as in other continental administrations, will not have what is so much cherished in England, the special protection of that unique British peculiarity, the Habeas Corpus Act. But (Article 127) "the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed inviolability of person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of the judicial department of the State Attorney", which is now made independent of the executive.

THE BASIC DUTIES OF MAN

Unlike all other Declarations of the Rights of Man, notably the historic American Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1776, and the French Revolutionary Declaration of 1793, the Soviet Constitution of 1936 supplements the

Rights of Man by the Basic Duties of Man to the community in which he lives and has his being.

First and most outstanding is Article 12: "Work in the USSR is a duty, a matter of honour, for every able-bodied citizen. He who does not work shall not eat." This duty *not to be a parasite*, living on the work of other men, is strikingly absent in Capitalist and Landlord Countries, whether democracies or oligarchies, conservative or liberal. In normal times, the so-called "leisured classes" are envied and honoured by their fellow men, they are never penalised.

But this is not all. In Articles 131, 132, 133 and 134, all citizens, male and female, young and old, are instructed to "strengthen public-socialist property, to regard it as the source of the wealth and power of the fatherland, of the health and happiness, the prosperity and culture of a working people. It is unnecessary to add that military service is the duty of all citizens."

"Treason to the Homeland, violation of the oath, desertion to the enemy, espionage, are to be punished with the full severity of the law." Thus there were no Quislings in the USSR, no Fifth Column, as there were in Denmark, Norway and Holland, and, above all, in the much honoured Republic of France. These undesirable citizens had been dealt with in the much abused Moscow Trials of the thirties.

Perhaps it is this unique emphasis on the *Duties of Man* as a necessary complement to the Rights of Man which is the peculiar characteristic of the Soviet Constitution of 1936. It explains why the defeated, starving, illiterate inhabitants of Tsarist Russia became in the course of twenty years the relatively comfortable and cultured, healthy and skilled, courageous and adventurous Soviet people of 1941-42; who alone among the inhabitants of the European Continent have been able to resist and beat back the mighty military machine of Hitler Germany, intent on the conquest and enslavement of the world.

SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, 1937-42

PART II

SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOVIET COMMUNISM

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world: our business is to change it."

KARL MARX

"In order to manage successfully, in addition to being able to convince and in addition to being able to conquer in Civil War, it is necessary to be able to organise. This is the most difficult task, because it is a matter of organising in a new way the most profound economic foundations of life of tens and tens of millions of people. And it is the most grateful task, because only after it is fulfilled, in its main and fundamental outline, will it be possible to say that Russia has become not only a soviet but also a socialist republic."

LENIN

CHAPTER VII

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE LANDLORD AND THE CAPITALIST

THE revolution of February 1917, which swept away the tsarist régime, was not the work of the Bolsheviks. Lenin, in fact, did not arrive in Petrograd until over a month, and Trotsky until nearly three months, after the edifice had collapsed through its own rottenness. This had almost happened twelve years before. Already in 1905, when the universal disgust at what the Japanese war had revealed made the throne totter, it could be said that, in every class and section of the nation, there were demands for revolution.¹ But "to think of these people as forming one united army, or of the revolution itself as a unitary movement upon a single front and towards a single goal, is to misunderstand the situation so completely that certain subsequent developments must seem a miracle. Actually there was and there could be no full agreement as to either the direction or degree of the desired change; and in a concrete and positive sense there was now in progress, not one revolution, but a whole series of revolutions in parallel."² As a whole the peasantry were passive and the urban workers divided. This lack of unity among the upheaving forces was not remedied by any persistent will and purpose. The Tsar was then

¹ In 1905, as has been pointed out by a careful student, "a greater or smaller proportion of the members of every major social class in Russia—the peasants and the nobles, the urban workers and the bourgeoisie—were involved in attempts to change, in one way or another, the established order of life" (*Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by G. T. Robinson, 1932, p. 164).

² *Ibid.* p. 164; see also *Memoirs of Count Witte*, by his widow (1920, pp. 266-267). Witte records that the minister Plehve had told General Kuropatkin that "we need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution".

able to save himself and the whole governmental machine by what seemed the great concession of a Duma. But it soon appeared that nothing had been changed. The autocratic administration remained intact. Within a couple of years the Duma had been reduced to a nonentity and the repressions became even more tyrannous than before. The peasantry, which had broken out in scattered refusals to pay the oppressive taxes, and even in lootings of estates and mansions, was ruthlessly flogged into submission. The steadily increasing class of factory operatives and miners, largely working under foreign managers and foremen, for companies of foreign shareholders, were denied all rights of collective bargaining.¹ In 1907 all trade unions were suppressed. Every activity of the zemstvos was stopped by the bureaucracy. Even among the nobles the expression of the mildest aspiration for constitutional reform was visited with the Tsar's displeasure, and sometimes by arbitrary relegation to distant estates. The oppressive "russification" of the various subject nationalities, numbering together very nearly one-half of the whole population, was continued even more sternly than before. The vernacular tongues were suppressed; and newspapers, books and schools which used these languages were shut down. The Jews, in particular, continued to be confined to their ghettos in the Jewish Pale, to be harassed by the caprices and extortions of the officials, and even to be scourged by deliberately promoted pogroms. The Greek Orthodox Church, with its superstitious and illiterate clergy, itself continued to be an instrument of oppression of the numerous sectaries; and it succeeded, in the proceedings of the notorious Rasputin, in creating an almost universal disgust and abhorrence, with which the Tsar, his court and the whole régime were besmirched. History records no clearer case of an incapable autocratic ruler, with a degenerate aristocracy and a hidebound and corrupt bureaucratic administration, blindly staggering towards its doom.

It is ironical to learn that the Great War, with its appalling holocaust of Russian soldiery, was (as in 1904) entered upon, at least by some of the Russian statesmen, as a means of preventing the renewed popular uprising that they feared. Lenin, with clearer vision, realised at once that the war made the revolution inevitable. Nor did the outbreak of February 1917 require either his inspiration or his presence. All that was needed to stir to action the accumulating forces of upheaval was the crushing defeat of the ill-equipped, badly provided and ignorantly led millions of Russian soldiery, and their persistent streaming back, from 1915 onwards, as deserters from the front. When Lenin arrived at Petrograd in April 1917 he found the "bourgeois revolution" accomplished, and a mildly liberal republican government in power, avowedly wedded to parliamentary democracy and the maintenance of the rights of private property.

¹ "Between the first revolution and the war industrial production in Russia approximately doubled" (*History of the Russian Revolution*, by L. Trotsky, vol. i. p. 29). This happened largely under the fostering care of Witte (*Memoirs of Count Witte*, by his widow, 1920).

The task of Lenin, to which he at once rallied the small Bolshevik Party, was to convert the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution, involving the expropriation of the landlord and the capitalist.

The Liquidation of the Agrarian Landlords by the Peasantry

In the rural districts, for the most part, the peasants themselves saw to the "liquidation of the landlord", quite apart from government action or Marxian theory. The Russian peasant, whether poor or well-to-do, had never relinquished the conviction that the land which he cultivated, or from which he had been evicted, was rightfully his own property, subject only to the right and duty of the Mir periodically to rearrange its distribution among all the village households. For twenty years prior to the revolution of 1917 the peasants in various parts of Russia had been spasmodically liquidating the landlord in their own rough way.¹ The floggings, imprisonments and hangings, by which these outrages were punished, failed to prevent their recurrence, now at one place and then in another. The dislocation caused by the war was marked by a widespread renewal of these popular holocausts. The news of the February revolution, with the Tsar's abdication, and the general weakening of authority throughout the provinces, soon made the "liquidation of the landlord" almost universal, even whilst Lenin was a hunted fugitive, hiding from Kerensky's police. One specimen will give the reader a vivid sense of what was everywhere happening. "One September day in the fateful year 1917, by a roadside in the South Central Steppe, a man climbed a telephone pole and cut the minute thread of communication which joined a manor-house on the northern horizon with the towns, the police stations and the barracks along the railway line to the southward. In one sense the manor-house now stood quite alone, but not really so, for within sight of its groves there were several peasant villages. Thus, the two elements—peasant and proprietorial—were left momentarily to react

¹ "During the five-year period ending with 1904, there were in European Russia some hundreds of instances of agrarian disturbance, including certain cases of the burning of buildings and even a number of fatal assaults upon the landlords or their deputies; but these disturbances were for the most part widely separated in both time and space. By way of exception, the disorders of 1902 in the *gubernias* of Kharkov and Poltava were so highly concentrated that the movement might perhaps be called a miniature revolution. . . . More than 160 villages were involved in the movement; some 80 estates were attacked within the space of five days; and in the *gubernia* of Poltava alone 75 landlords subsequently brought in claims for losses amounting to a quarter of a million roubles" (*Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by G. T. Robinson, 1932, p. 138).

A report of the military commander stated that "in Saratov *gubernia* more than 300 estates have suffered losses from the disorders. In Balashov *uezd* there are places where all the manor houses have been destroyed. A terrible impression is produced by an examination of the ravaged estates. With an astounding violence the peasants burned and destroyed everything; not one stone is left upon another. Everything has been plundered—grain, stores, furniture, household utensils, animals, the sheet iron from the roof—in a word everything that could be carried or hauled away; and what remained was given to the flames." (See the report in *ibid.* p. 175.)

upon each other in isolation. And within a few hours the estate had been looted, the mansion was in flames, and somewhere within the fiery circle the master of the house lay dead.”¹

Thus, before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, the “liquidation” of the landlords up and down rural Russia had been, to a considerable extent, roughly but effectively carried out by the peasants themselves. The process was substantially completed during the ensuing year. This was far from being in accordance with any programme of Lenin or his associates. The expropriation of the owners of manor-houses, and of the estates appertaining to them, may have seemed all to the good, though in method deplorable. But the destruction of property meant an incalculable loss to the community as a whole, whilst the division of the relatively large holdings among the eighteen million peasant householders and their landless relatives and associates rapidly resulted in a reduction of the aggregate yield of foodstuffs, and still more of the quantity marketed, on which the urban population depended. Yet what was to be done? It is doubtful whether any government at Petrograd or Moscow in the circumstances of 1917-1918, when millions of soldiers were hastening from the front to take part in the division of the landlords’ estates, could have had sufficient power to have stopped this popular expropriation. Certainly the newly installed Bolshevik administration was helpless in the matter. Mere denunciation of the peasants’ precipitous action would have been not only futile but dangerous. What Lenin did, with prudent promptitude, was to get the Congress and the new Sovnarkom to issue a decree declaring all the land the property of the people as a whole; throwing open for re-allotment among the peasant cultivators the vast estates owned by the Tsar and his relatives, or by the Church and the monasteries; placing this redistribution in the hands of local committees to be elected by the peasants; and reserving for national administration, as model agricultural establishments, the home farms which a relatively small number of improving landowners had developed for stock-breeding and grain-growing on a large scale. Unfortunately, even many of these home farms were seized and divided by the peasants. Not for a whole decade did the Soviet Government find it possible to deal with the bulk of the land, nominally nationalised, but perforce left, in usufruct, in

¹ *Rural Russia under the Old Régime*, by G. T. Robinson, 1932, p. 64. A detailed description of similar happenings in the Ukraine will be found in *Seed and Harvest*, by Vladimir Korostovetz, 1930. *The Russian Land*, by A. R. Williams (New York, 1928), gives other examples. The articles entitled “The Russian Agrarian Revolution of 1917”, by Lancelot A. Owen, in *Slavonic Review* for July 1933 and January 1934, give a summary of this widespread jacquerie. See also *Die Bauerbewegung in der russischen Revolution, 1917*, by S. Dubrovsky, Moscow, 1932.

It should be said that, although a considerable number of landlords and stewards were killed in the course of the jacquerie of 1917-1918, sometimes under the circumstances of revolting brutality, these were principally those who had made themselves personally hateful to the peasants, or who actively resisted expropriation. The great majority of the landlords and their families escaped with their lives; either because they were non-resident, or accidentally absent from their estates, or because they were able precipitately to flee to the towns or to the White Armies, and eventually overseas.

minute and often dispersed holdings, in the hands of what had grown to be as many as twenty-five million peasant families.

The Expropriation of the Capitalist

For the liquidation of the capitalist, the new Bolshevik Government was wholly responsible. To the followers of Karl Marx, as we shall show in our chapter entitled "Science the Salvation of Mankind",¹ the very existence of the profit-making or rent-receiving capitalist, whether financier or trader, manufacturer or shipowner, speculator in land values or investor on the stock exchange, seemed the root of all that was evil in modern civilisation. It was this class, as it appeared, that was directly responsible for the division of the population, in every capitalist state, into what Disraeli, nearly contemporaneously with Marx, had described as "two nations"—the rich and the poor. The nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange, without any compensation to their owners, had, in fact, been a plank in the programme of every section of the Russian social democrats. Nor could this systematic liquidation of a whole class be accomplished otherwise than by a revolution having for its object the replacement of the manifest "dictatorship" of the few, who owned the means of production, by that of the many who earned their sparse and insecure livelihood by wage-labour. Such a revolution throughout the capitalist world, it was confidently assumed, would inevitably be brought about by the continuous growth, in numbers and in organisation, of the increasing hordes of wage-earners, already in some countries constituting two-thirds of the whole population, who "had nothing to lose but their chains". To the old Marxist it was anomalous that the first successful rising of the proletariat against their masters should be accomplished in Russia, the least industrialised of all the Great Powers. What Lenin's predecessors did not realise was that they had in Russia one revolutionary condition which was absent in Great Britain, France, Scandinavia and other western political democracies, and which was not even present in Imperial Germany, with its honest and efficient bureaucracy, its developed social services, its freely elected and powerful social democratic party, its legalised and highly organised trade union and cooperative movements. This asset was the well of hatred, animated by heroic courage, in the minds of countless men and women of all classes and successive generations—leaders of peasant revolts, organisers of revolutionary strikes, conspirators among freedom-loving intellectuals—all of whom had suffered imprisonment and exile, with prolonged fear of imminent death, in poverty and privation. Not a few of them had watched their loved ones or their comrades suffer martyrdom in the cause of freedom. Thus Lenin and his followers, ignoring the absence in other countries of this embittered class- (or creed-) consciousness, fervently

¹ Chapter XI, in Part II.

believed in the possibility of an early uprising of the wage-earners of the world, especially in the highly industrialised countries. Their faith in the righteousness and practicability of communism was accompanied by an equally fixed belief that a communistic régime could neither be completely established nor continuously maintained in Russia alone. They were so fanatically convinced, not only of the validity of their policy of abolishing private property in the means of production, and of replacing the motive of profit-making by that of social service, but also of its intrinsic morality, that they steeled their hearts to all the individual suffering that a social revolution inevitably causes. To overthrow the "dictatorship of the capitalist", which an essentially liberal new Provisional Government was seeking to maintain, Lenin would have waded through seas of blood. In fact, although there were several days of fierce fighting at Moscow, and many individual murders in Leningrad and elsewhere, the October revolution itself was substantially an expression of the popular will. It was afterwards, in maintaining the Soviet Government in power, and in repressing the counter-revolutionary rebellions which marked the inevitable reaction, that Lenin and his colleagues found themselves using the weapons of tyranny: the autocratic imprisonment and summary execution of political opponents equally with robbers and bandits, the terrorism of an irresponsible secret police, and all the horrors of civil war on the largest scale. Hatred of the capitalist soon extended to all governments, whether republics, kingdoms or empires; for did not these, one and all, support the capitalist system? Was not their reliance on the profit-making motive as the "invisible hand of God" the principal feature which they all had in common? Such denunciation of all the governments of the world naturally aroused the hostility of the victorious allies of the Tsar. It was, very largely, the armed intervention of half a dozen capitalist governments against the Soviet Government which drove that government to the wall, and compelled it to fight desperately for its life. And this intervention, undertaken in 1918 partly for strategic reasons, in order to restore the military front against the triumphant German forces, was continued and extended in 1919-1920, not merely from sympathy with the Russian landlords and capitalists, but in no small degree out of fear that the Bolsheviks would succeed in their avowed purpose of stirring up revolutionary upheavals in other countries. Thus the beliefs of some of the Bolsheviks about the imminence of world revolution were not merely logical errors. In 1919-1920 these very beliefs came nearly to overwhelming the revolution in Russia itself which the Bolsheviks were struggling so valiantly to maintain.

It is hard to disentangle, and still harder to visualise, what happened in these first hectic days of the Bolshevik revolution. "The Russian smash at the end of 1917", wrote Mr. H. G. Wells from what he saw and learned in 1920, "was certainly the completest that has ever happened to any modern social organisation. After the failure of the Kerensky government to make peace, and of the British naval authorities to relieve the

situation upon the Baltic flank, the shattered Russian armies, weapons in hand, broke up and rolled back upon Russia, a flood of peasant soldiers making for home, without hope, without supplies, without discipline. That time of débâcle was a time of complete social disorder. It was a social dissolution."¹

The Civil War and Foreign Invasion

In 1918 the authority of the Soviet Government was far from being firmly established. Even in Petrograd and Moscow there was the very smallest security of life and property. Robbery with violence in the streets, and the incursion of armed bandits into the houses—often under pretence of authorised searches or requisitions—were of daily occurrence. Outside the cities there was no organised protection. The deliberate and long-continued blockade maintained by the British fleet, and supported by the other hostile governments, kept out alike food and clothing, and the sorely needed medicines and anaesthetics. The whole country swarmed with counter-revolutionaries, who passed easily from individual *saboteurs* into wandering groups combining in varying degrees rebellion with banditry. Presently came the armies of the governments of Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy and the United States, without any declaration of war, actually invading, at half a dozen points from Vladivostock and Batoum to Murmansk and Archangel, the territory of what had never ceased to be technically "a friendly power". The same governments, moreover, freely supplied officers, equipment and munitions to the mixed forces raised by Denikin, Kolchak, Yudenich and Wrangel, who took up arms against the Soviet Government. Incidentally, the Germans and Poles ravaged the western provinces, whilst the army formed out of the Czechoslovakian prisoners of war held an equivocal position in its protracted passage through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean. Professedly independent governments were set up, with more or less open foreign support, in Georgia and the Ukraine, where fierce partisan warfare led to dreadful outrages and reprisals, in which the representatives of the foreign powers did not always refrain from participating.² These horrors, in the

¹ *Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 34. The best documentary survey of these proceedings appears to be *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (documents and material), by James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, 1933, 735 pp. (No. 3 of Hoover War Library Publications, Stanford University, California).

Something may be gathered from the adverse, if not spiteful, account of one who was for a short time associated with Lenin's government, published in German and subsequently in French (see *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, by J. Steinberg, especially chapters i. and ii.). And see *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, by W. H. Chamberlin, New York, 1935.

² One incident is frequently recalled as "the murder of the 26 commissars". "The Fifteenth Anniversary of one of the blackest days in the history of the Civil War was commemorated yesterday in Baku and all over the Soviet Union. It was on September 20, 1918, that the 26 Commissars of Baku were murdered in the night by the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary government at the behest of the British expeditionary forces. . . . From Persia, British armies were marching on Turkestan, to deprive the revolution of

perpetration of which mere banditry and racial and religious persecution joined hands with war and rebellion, lasted at one place or another for more than two years; and extended, at one time or another, to nearly the whole of what is now the USSR. We quote only one description of the effect upon the civil population, written by one who was himself an extreme revolutionary, but who was, at the same time, in profound and convinced opposition to the Bolsheviks—the anarchist Alexander Berkman, who traversed European Russia from end to end.

“In the South of Russia”, he wrote in his diary in July 1920, “all is unformed, grotesque, chaotic. Frequent changes of government, with their accompaniment of civil war and destruction, have produced a mental and physical condition unknown in other parts of the country. They have created an atmosphere of uncertainty, of life lacking roots, of constant anxiety. Some parts of the Ukraine have experienced fourteen different régimes within the period of 1917–1920; each involving violent disturbance of normal existence, disorganising and tearing life from its roots. The whole gamut of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary passions has been played on this territory. Here the nationalistic Rada had fought the local organs of the Kerensky government till the Brest treaty opened southern Russia to German occupation. Prussian bayonets dissolved the Rada, and Hetman Skoropadsky, by grace of the Kaiser, lorded it over the country in the name of an ‘independent and self-determining’ people. Disaster on the Western Front and revolution in their own country compelled the Germans to withdraw, the new state of affairs giving Petlura victory over the Hetman, [which] kaleidoscopically changed the governments. Dictator Petlura and his ‘directorium’ were driven out by the rebel peasantry and the Red Army, the latter in turn giving way to Denikin. Subsequently the Bolsheviks became the masters of the Ukraine, soon to be driven back by the Poles, and then again the communists took possession. The long-continued military and civil struggles have deranged the whole life of the South. Social classes have been destroyed; old customs and traditions abolished; cultural barriers broken down, without the people having been able to adjust themselves to the new conditions which are in constant flux. There has been neither time nor opportunity to reconstruct one’s mental and physical mode of life; to orient oneself within the constantly changing environment. The instincts of hunger and fear have become the sole *leitmotif* of thought, feeling and action; uncertainty is all-pervading and persistent; it is the only definite, actual reality. The question of bread, the danger of attack, are the exclusive topics of interest. You hear stories of armed forces sacking the environs of the city, and fanciful speculations about the character of the marauders whom some claim as Whites and others as

cotton, and create a basis for imperialism in Central Asia. Baku fell on the night of September 20, 1918, to the British, who were aided by their agents, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries. The 26 Commissars, who had been under arrest, were taken out of jail, railroaded out of the city, and shot” (*Moscow Daily News*, September 20, 1933).

Greens [peasant bands], or pogrom bandits. The legendary figures of Makhno, Marusya and Stechooss loom large in the atmosphere of panic created by the horrors lived through and the still more fearful apprehension of the unknown. Alarm and dread punctuate the life and thought of the people. They permeate the entire consciousness of being. . . . The whole country resembles a military camp living in constant expectation of invasion, civil war and sudden change of government, bringing with it renewed slaughter and oppression, confiscation and famine. Industrial activity is paralysed, the financial situation hopeless. Every régime has issued its own money, interdicting all previous forms of exchange. But among the people the various 'papers' are circulating, including Kerensky, Tsarist, Ukrainian and Soviet money. Every rouble has its own varying value. . . . Beneath the surface of the daily life man's primitive passions, unleashed, hold almost free play. Ethical values are dissolved; the gloss of civilisation is rubbed off. There remains only the unadorned instinct of self-preservation and the ever-present dread of to-morrow. The victory of the Whites, or the investing of a city by them, involves savage reprisals, pogroms against Jews, death for communists, prison and torture for those suspected of sympathising with the latter. The advent of the Bolsheviki signifies indiscriminate Red Terror. Either is disastrous; it has happened many times, and the people live in perpetual fear of its repetition. Internecine strife has marched through the Ukraine like a veritable man-eater, devouring, devastating, and leaving ruin, despair and horror in its wake. Stories of White and Red atrocities are on everybody's lips, accounts of personal experiences harrowing in their recital of fiendish murder and rapine, of inhuman cruelty and unspeakable outrages."¹

Amid such horrors it was inevitable that both agricultural and in-

¹ *The Bolshevik Myth* (Diary 1920-1922), by Alexander Berkman, 1923, pp. 100-102. An experienced German observer, visiting the USSR in 1929, gives the following account: "Men who spent seven years at the front and then at home, the ruthless storm troops of the régime who quailed at nothing, will to-day cover their eyes when the scenes of the civil war are conjured up before them by questions. They must have been appalling beyond all measure, incomparably worse than the scenes of the external war. The infernal cruelty of man's hate of man, compatriot of compatriot, neighbour of neighbour, the bestiality on both sides induced by familiarity with murder, which must eventually have become for many an indifferent habit, a mechanical exercise of eyes and hands; and all this piled upon misery intensified to the utmost degree. Villages and industrial works converted into fortresses, defended by men and even women, pausing in the intervals of fighting to manufacture the articles of peace; and these manufactures always being claimed first of all, and often simply commandeered, for the fighting troops of the side which, in the changing fortunes of the civil war, was uppermost for the time being—this is what the economic system must have looked like over a great portion of the country" (*The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling, English edition, 1930, pp. 43-44).

No part of the country suffered more than the once-prosperous Ukraine, where "the war brought about an almost complete collapse of the economic position. . . . The occupation of that country by the Germans was followed by a line of brigand bands, who alternated with great rapidity and severe destructiveness. In addition to minor bands which carried on destruction in the various parts of the country, Makhno, Grigoriev, Skoropadsky, Denikin, Petlura and many others were plundering on a large scale. Under the pretence of fighting against Bolshevism, brigands of every description despoiled the country, until they brought it to almost complete ruin" (*Moscow Narodny Bank Monthly Review*, December 1934, p. 9).

dustrial production should go to pieces. It seems, on the best estimates obtainable, that the aggregate production of the territory which became the USSR did not in 1920 amount to as much as one-third of what it had been in 1913. More than once during the years 1918-1920, when the supplies of food and fuel failed, the whole population left in Petrograd came near actual death from hunger and cold. The entire country suffered terribly from a privation that was chronic and unescapable. Even to maintain the troops in the field taxed to the uttermost the government's powers.

It was one of Lenin's firmly held principles that, whilst it was mere foolish sentimentalism to be, like Blanqui and the anarchists, always rebelling against a government, it was indispensable, once a revolution was started, to carry it through at all hazards to the bitter end. And he held equally firmly to the maxim, which the revolutionists of 1818 had ignored, that when a revolution had once been effected, it was an imperative duty—and one which will involve even greater peril than the making of the revolution had done—at all costs to maintain it against the inevitable assaults of the counter-revolutionaries. If it is asked what the Soviet Government accomplished during the first three years of its existence, the answer must be that it "maintained the revolution". But so dire was the condition of the people, so implacable was the enmity of practically all the governments of the world, and so fierce and persistent were the attacks which the most powerful of them promoted and supported, that the Soviet Government only just managed to survive.

War Communism

This was the period (1918-1920) subsequently designated as that of "War Communism". What was universally shared was not wealth but privation and hunger. Every other consideration was sacrificed to the urgent necessity of defeating both the hostile armies in the field and the insurgent counter-revolutionaries behind the military fronts. All the factories were made to concentrate their production upon what was needed by the sixteen Red Armies of five million men that Lenin was able to put in the field under Trotsky, Stalin and Frunze; and that Trotsky so dramatically directed from his perpetually moving armoured train. The trade unions became recruiting agencies to keep up the necessary stream of men to the various fronts. The peasants, within the area for the time being free from hostile domination, were harried with arbitrary requisitions for all the foodstuffs that could be extorted from them. The entire population of the cities was put on exiguous rations, in order that regular supplies might be sent to the soldiers. Every decision of Lenin and his colleagues took the form of a peremptory order, to be complied with under penalty of instant arrest, and, frequently, of summary execution. The least inclination towards counter-revolutionary activity of any kind was, in the same way, ruthlessly stopped and extinguished. And the

people did not revolt. The peasants everywhere hated the Whites more than they did the Reds. The workmen swarmed into the Red Army. Those who remained in production, far from resenting the pressure upon them, intensified their efforts to increase output. Everybody grumbled about the continued shortage of food, fuel and clothing; about the lack of light, of sugar, of drugs, of all the comforts of life. But the people as a whole did not rebel; there was not even any pressure on the government to discontinue its efforts against the successive waves of the White armies that British, French, Italian, Japanese and American governments sometimes officered, usually equipped and occasionally subsidised. It may, indeed, be said that it was just the feeling aroused by these foreign invasions that enabled the Bolshevik Government to survive. It was during these two or three years of Allied intervention and civil war; of assassinations and attempted assassinations of Soviet Government officials, and innumerable instances of counter-revolutionary sabotage and plotting; of outrages and reprisals by the soldiery and the partisans on both sides; and of a civilian death-rate increased much more by the long-continued privation and chronic disease than by wilful homicide in all its degrees, that were piled up the oft-quoted statistics of Russian lives lost "through the revolution"—a loss of life which, with an incredible naïveté, is sometimes debited, not at all to the rebels who took up arms against the *de facto* government, or to the foreign governments that, without lawful excuse, incited and supported them, but wholly to the Bolshevik influences in the government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic! ¹

This three years' episode of War Communism has been looked at in two ways. It has been described as if it had all been part of a deliberate plan to establish a communist state. Possibly there were, among the Bolsheviks, some who had at first believed that, as it has since been said, they "could carry out the evolution to communism at one great bound. Nationalisation of banks; sequestration of the private property remaining in their custody; expropriation of the bourgeoisie, including their houses, and even their silver, jewels and works of art; all land declared to be state property; the whole of large-scale industry taken over by the state; the rationing of all articles of prime necessity; the destruction of the market by the prohibition of trade; the militarisation of labour by universal obligation to work; and finally the abolition of money by the state, which, instead of paying its workers and employees in cash (amounting to only 7 per cent in 1920), aimed at supplying an ever-growing proportion of their requirements in kind (maintaining them by the distribution of rations or free meals in public eating-houses; housing to include fuel, gas, water and electricity; use of the railway and the trams; clothing and domestic articles to be supplied from the public stores;

¹ "It is reckoned that two and a half years of the civil war alone were responsible for the premature death of about seven millions of people" (*The Economic Policy of Soviet Russia*, by Paul Haensel, 1930, p. 2).

schools, newspapers and the theatre); likewise supplying the peasants with the industrial products they needed in exchange for the foodstuffs they were bound to deliver—such, in broad outline, were to be the features of this transition to communism.”¹ Lenin, on the other hand, as plainly appears from his numerous publications during 1917, had contemplated a lengthy period of transition, the various stages of which he could not foresee, and which he imagined would have to take the form of a whole series of economic experiments. In 1921, he explained—to use the words of an able German investigator—that “it was only dire necessity, war and wholesale destruction that had imposed this war-time communism upon the Bolsheviks. It had consisted in the fact that all the surplus, and sometimes a portion of the necessary, foodstuffs were taken from the peasants in order to supply the army and the workers. . . . This military communism was a provisional measure, because in their then desperate plight the Bolsheviks could shrink from no measures, however extreme; half starved and worse than half-starved, they had to hold their ground at all costs and keep alive the workers and peasants.”²

Fortunately for the Bolsheviks, just when the people, as it now seems, were at their last gasp, the foreign intervention came to an end. The year 1920 was the year in which War Communism reached its culmination. “That year”, it has been said, “will live long in the memory of all Russians who lived through it as the coldest, hungriest and most dreadful year of the revolution.”³ But at the end of it “the power of the Central Committee of the ruling Party was absolute and complete”.⁴ The foreign governments had failed to coordinate the successive invasions that they promoted. Their own countries were mostly too much exhausted by the years of war, and their statesmen too much afraid of their own wage-earning class, to continue their efforts. The White Armies were too incompetently led, and the conduct of both officers and rank and file was too scandalously bad, to obtain any support from the peasantry whom they oppressed, or to withstand the patriotic fervour of the Red Armies. The British troops were soon withdrawn from Murmansk and Archangel, and eventually the Japanese from Vladivostock. British and French steamers evacuated both foreigners and Russians hostile to the Bolsheviks from the coasts of the Black Sea. “The peace treaties with Latvia and Lithuania were signed in July 1920; and the treaty with Finland in October of the same year. The civil war in Siberia was finished by October 1920; the fight against Wrangel, Petlura, Bulak-Nalakhovich and Makhno, in Southern Russia, likewise came to an end in November 1920. In fact, by the end of November 1920 there was peace throughout the country.”⁵

¹ *The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling (English edition, 1930), pp. 52-53.

² *Ibid.* pp. 53-54.

³ *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 27.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 27.

⁵ *Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov (English edition, 1920), p. 41. It was, however, not until the end of 1922 that the last of the Japanese forces evacuated the port of Vladivostock, and not until 1924 that they left North Sakhalin.

Nevertheless, so uncertain was the position, and so high was the determination of the Bolshevik Government, that the policy of War Communism was maintained for some months longer. "The decree for the complete nationalisation of all industries, including small scale enterprise" (that is to say, all undertakings employing more than ten workers, and also all those employing more than five workers if with mechanical power) was issued "under date November 30, 1920; the decree that the levying of taxes was to cease, because money no longer functioned as a means of payment, under date February 3, 1921. In December 1920 . . . the Eighth Soviet Congress passed the most Utopian of all the resolutions of the days of War Communism, the resolution concerning the socialisation of peasant agriculture. Special committees were [to be] appointed to prescribe the scope and the kinds of cultivation to be practised on every one of the twenty [five] millions of peasant farms." Peasant farming, said this resolution, "must be conducted in accordance with a unified plan, and under a unified management".¹

The Famine of 1921

Then, in the spring of 1921, the year in which all the horrors culminated in the direst famine within Russian memory, the régime of War Communism suddenly broke. Whole provinces were reduced to absolute starvation, in which the worst horrors occurred. Famine in Russia was, of course, no new thing. It was, in fact, expected every few years in one part or another of that vast area. But the failure of crops in 1921, coming on the top of a diminution of the area sown, and the slaughter of livestock, proved to be both more complete and more widespread than had been known within living memory. "The famine of 1891 had affected seventeen million persons; that of 1906 twenty-one millions; that of 1911 twenty-seven millions; but that of 1921 involved no less than forty-three millions. In the worst of the previous Russian famines the number of peasants who could not get even enough grain for seed never exceeded three millions; but in 1921 such peasants numbered thirteen millions. That is to say, thirteen million peasants were practically destitute. Twenty-seven provinces, that is nearly half Russia, were in the grip of the famine. In these provinces the food consumption of the people sank to a terribly low level, and the death-rate among both human beings and cattle was terribly high."²

¹ *After Lenin*, by Michael Farbman, 1924, p. 41.

² *Ibid.* p. 41. To what depths every form of activity had been reduced in 1921 may be seen in the terrible description by a Petrograd university professor and prominent cooperator, entitled *Russia after Four Years of Revolution*, by S. S. Maslov, 1923.

The inevitable consequences on women, children and the family, and the general relaxation of morals were at least as serious as the swollen death-rate. "Then there were the terrible famine years of 1921-1922, which produced a positive migration of the peoples amongst the utterly destitute population; whole families, all the inhabitants of a settlement, were forced to leave their homes and go elsewhere in search of a crust of bread. . . . What followed—the period of the NEP, the New Economic Policy—confused people's

The New Economic Policy

The people, who had borne so much, could stand it no longer. There were peasant risings at Tambov and along the Volga. Gravest of all, the sailors in the Red Fleet centred at Cronstadt, together with the Cronstadt garrison, broke out in armed revolt against the Soviet Government itself, not on account of any service grievances, but in protest against the starvation of the families to which the soldiers and sailors belonged, in the rural villages of the stricken areas. "The Soviets without the Communist Party" was the sailors' slogan. It was one of the features of Lenin's genius that he knew when to yield to unmistakeable popular discontent; and not less so that he knew how to yield dramatically and completely, whilst never abandoning his fundamental aim.¹ The revolt at Cronstadt had plainly to be forcibly suppressed, by bombardment and assault across the ice, yet without undue punishment for the gravest of all military offences. But in March 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party, Lenin startled his followers by proposing and carrying a complete abandonment of the measures of War Communism.² First, the unlimited requisitioning of grain was done away with, and replaced by a fixed graduated tax on each peasant proportionate to his holding of land, leaving to him the right freely to dispose of his produce, over and above the tax, in the open market, at the highest prices he could obtain. Next the use of money was reverted to, and the currency was stabilised, and all limitations on the possession and handling of money were repealed. "The decree of July 9, 1921, re-established railway fares. That of August 1 restored post and telegraph charges. That of September 15 reintroduced water-rates (and) electricity rates, along with charges for the use of tramways, public baths and laundries."³ A decree of August 12, 1921, gave a virtual autonomy to nationalised undertakings on the startling new basis of paying their way! "Such factories or undertakings were

ideas still more. For whereas the preceding years had let loose the brutish instincts of the starving people, now the instincts of those were roused who scraped together the money which but yesterday had been utterly worthless and so enjoyed a degree of prosperity hitherto unknown in Soviet Russia. The demand for women who had fallen on evil days increased from day to day. Restaurants, cafés, and taverns flaunted themselves again, and wine was sold once more. There was nothing to bridle the human instincts which had at least been repressed in the days of war communism by a stern military régime. The number of divorces and abuses of the law increased vastly even in the country. And so that 'free love' which has so often been misunderstood, as well as the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of revolutionary forms, began to degenerate into excesses" (*Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle, 1933, p. 107).

¹ "Lenin is an opportunist genius. He has a wonderful knack of recognising when it is necessary to change his tactics. And then he changes them with lightning rapidity. But whether he is advancing or retreating, attacking or retracting, he is always firm and determined. He never wavers. He is never afraid" (*Bolshevism in Retreat*, by Michael Farhman, 1921, p. 59).

² The fullest account accessible to the English reader of the New Economic Policy will be found in *After Lenin*, by Michael Farhman, 1924, pp. 85-170. This admirable volume is all the more interesting from being written at a time when the New Economic Policy and the dominance of an individualist peasantry seemed destined to permanence.

³ *After Lenin*, by Michael Farhman, 1924, p. 109.

to retain all their equipment, stocks of fuel, raw materials and semi-manufactured products ; but they were to lose any claim to being supplied by the state with money or food for paying wages : they had to run their business on commercial lines, and they were under no obligation to supply any government department with their produce without payment. Very soon most of the former state industries became autonomous in this sense. Later in the same month the state factories acquired the right to buy on the market the raw material they needed and the food they required to pay the workmen's wages, while in October 1921 they secured the additional privilege of selling their produce in the open market. In this rapid and summary fashion were the necessary steps taken for building up the new economic system."

The revival of productive enterprise, the establishment of innumerable small businesses of every kind, and the development of free exchanges between town and country producers naturally took some time. It was, we suggest, mere "wish-fulfilment" that the whole world outside the USSR, together with nearly all the opponents of the Bolsheviks inside the USSR, acclaimed the New Economic Policy as both confession and proof of the failure of collectivism. Nearly everyone assumed that any further pursuit of the policy of liquidating the landlord and the capitalist had been abandoned. Yet Lenin made it abundantly clear that it was, as he said, only a case of taking one step backward in order to be able to take two steps forward. So long as the government continued to own and to operate the entire banking system ; the whole of international commerce ; the various means of communication and transport ; practically all the urban land and buildings ; the mineral resources, the supplies of every kind of fuel and all the sources of electric power ; the heavy industries, and even all the enterprises of any magnitude in the light industries—to say nothing of directing the trade unions and the consumers' cooperative societies—what did it matter to the future of collectivism if the millions of individual peasants were set free to sell their baskets of produce in the street markets ; or if everyone was allowed to open in the cities multitudes of little restaurants and cafés, confectioners' shops and tea-houses, grocery and drapery stores, and even petty workshops and factories making the hundred and one articles of household use ? Whilst the "commanding heights of socialism" continued to be occupied by the government, so Lenin argued, the thousands of minor outposts might safely be abandoned to the profit-maker for just as long as the government found it convenient to forgo these channels of supply of the consumers' demands. Even the most fanatical communist might safely invite the foreign capitalist to apply for concessions, allowing him, for a strictly limited period, within the limits of legal and trade union control, to develop such of the natural resources as the government found itself, for the moment, unable to attend to. The trouble was that the Bolshevik administrators underrated or ignored the potency, for good or for evil, of the profit-making motive. It might increase production and facilitate the exchange of commodities

between industrialists and agriculturists. But, once liberated, the motive of pecuniary self-interest took devious ways, and rapidly undermined the new morality upon which the success of Soviet Communism depended. Every day the New Economic Policy widened the range of its intellectual influence. At the start only the peasant market was abandoned to the private greed for gain. All other spheres of enterprise were supposed to be governed by the pursuit of the commonweal. But more and more NEP extended towards the complete liberation of private enterprise from all attempts at public regulation, whilst even state enterprises became insidiously permeated with the spirit of individual self-interest. "There is a Russian saying," we are told, "always very popular with the disciples of Marx, that whoever says A says B. The cogency of this maxim was never better illustrated than by the rapid evolution of measures" that were found to be involved in the New Economic Policy. The abolition of the state's arbitrary requisitions of the peasant's harvest, and the substitution of a fixed tax on grain, was designed to give a stimulus to production to the peasants. "This was the innocent A in the alphabet of the Bolshevik retreat. Within a month it seemed necessary to give the urban producers a similar stimulus. Soon it became unavoidable to suffer the reappearance, not clandestinely but legally, of the hated bourgeois, first as middleman and trader, and then even as employer of labour. And subsequently a whole series of concessions, large and small, was made, all of them modifying in the direction of individualism, the economic relations, not only between the urban and the rural populations, but also between both of them as producers and the central and municipal governments."¹

The evil effects of these developments of the New Economic Policy became quickly manifest to the leaders of the Communist Party. This led to a general desire for something in the nature of a general plan to which both state and private enterprise would be subordinated.² Thus, when, towards the end of 1920, the Commission for the Electrification of Russia presented its report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Lenin congratulated the Congress on having at least secured not merely a plan for electrification but also, in effect, the basis of one for a general control of all economic life. It was not regarded as possible immediately to regulate all production and distribution by such a plan. But it was felt that, in so far as it was necessary to appeal to the motive of the pecuniary

¹ *After Lenin*, by Michael Farberman, 1924, p. 134. In 1924 "the number of all licensed trade establishments—that is of all traders, from wholesale dealers to the smallest village retail shops, with the exclusion of pedlars"—in the USSR was 460,803 as compared with 935,000 pre-war. Thus in three years' time 50 per cent of all trade establishments had been restored. If we "divide these 460,000 shops according to proprietorship, we find that the state possesses altogether, in the cities and in the villages, 11,915. The cooperative societies possess 26,678. The privately owned shops number 420,366. If we divide all the shops according to their four categories—wholesale, wholesale and retail, retail, and market (stalls), we find that only in the wholesale trade, of which they possess 55 per cent, are the state-owned shops predominant" (*ibid.* pp. 106-107).

² This will be explained in the following chapter, "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

self-interest of the individual producer or trader, this could be kept in check only by the formulation and enforcement of a comprehensive plan for the whole economy of the state.

We have neither the space nor the data that would enable us to discuss the question whether the New Economic Policy, if it had been allowed to develop for as long as a decade, and even if it had been controlled and guided by a general plan, either would or could have proved successful in building up a socialist state. In the cities the rapidly extending enterprises of the Nepmen were not long allowed to continue. It quickly became manifest that the assumption of any intentional reversion to capitalism was without foundation. Within twelve months, the policy of liquidating the profit-maker began to be resumed. This was not effected wholly by repression. The mere expansion of production and trade by the state trusts and municipal departments, and the preferential treatment that they received, was, in itself, sufficient to bring down the edifice of profit-making trade. But the weapon of repression was also used in the harrying of the Nepman by such methods as exceptional taxation and enforced contributions; obstructing his supplies; arresting and expelling his foreign assistants; harassing his operations by labour disputes and demands for higher wages, and finally police suppression of this or that manifestation of NEP activity in attracting customers.

It will be realised that the reversal of the New Economic Policy, and the liquidation of the Nepman in all his various activities, was a gradual process not effected by any one decree, or even by any one governmental device, but was extended over several years. We may perhaps take the year 1928, when the first Five-Year Plan was promulgated, as marking the date when in the cities this process had been practically completed. In all the urban centres of the USSR the liquidation of the capitalist, in anything more substantial than street-selling, had by then been substantially accomplished. The swarm of "speculators" who had between 1921 and 1927 started hundreds of thousands of little businesses in wholesale and retail trading, the running of eating-houses, and petty manufacturing, had been finally suppressed; some to die, many to linger out terms of imprisonment or administrative exile, others to escape to foreign lands, whilst probably a majority found themselves not actually excluded from wage-earning employment, but sunken to obscurity among the "deprived classes". Practically the whole of the activities of these Nepmen in wholesale and retail trade, as well as in manufacturing, had been, by 1929, replaced by the continuous extension of collective enterprises, by which an ever-increasing proportion of the needs of the urban population were being supplied. In this growing supersession of the private profit-maker, the thousands of factories of the state trusts directly under the orders of the Supreme Economic Council, in conjunction with the efforts of the trade unions to increase production, were aided by the ever-increasing manufacturing and distributing enterprises of the constituent republics (principally the RSFSR and the Ukraine); and by those of the

municipal soviets in such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, Kharkov and Rostov. But a large part was played also, and not in distribution alone, by the rapidly growing consumers' cooperative societies; whilst the reviving artels, as manufacturing associations of owner-producers (incops), likewise contributed substantially to the output. There were in 1929, as the government spokesmen admitted, still many gaps, which the private profit-makers, if they had been allowed, would have filled to the greater comfort of the citizens. Such minor deprivations suffered by the consumers did not much disturb the Soviet Government. What was serious, and what caused the greatest concern to the leaders of the Communist Party, was the persistent shortage of foodstuffs. But before dealing with the successive liquidations to which this problem led "on the agricultural front", we must first notice certain consequences of the summary supersession of the New Economic Policy itself.

The Persecution of the Intelligentsia

The spasmodic and abrupt changes of front, between 1920 and 1929, on the vital question of whether or not profit-making was an ethical offence to be condemned as a crime, and ruthlessly suppressed, had, we believe, an injurious effect on public morality. Nor was this shock to public morals lessened by the measures of suppression that were spasmodically and, as it seemed, arbitrarily applied. Individual producers who had done their best to become well-to-do; traders who had merely followed their avocation of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market; officials of state banks and public trusts who had freely given credit to the new class of manufacturing employers, found themselves suddenly subject to obloquy, dismissed from office or harried by the police and the taxing authorities; often condemned to imprisonment, and occasionally shot.

There was a more insidious effect of the successive changes of policy in the minds and upon the conduct of the intelligentsia, who had, in large part, stood aloof from the October revolution, and from the administration which emerged from it. Many of the scientists, engineers and expert managers of the old régime, who had not taken to flight, had, during the years of War Communism, remained quietly in obscure poverty rather than take service under a government of which they disapproved, so long as it was pursuing a policy in which they could put no faith. When the New Economic Policy was adopted in 1921, many of these intellectual workers, believing that the Soviet Government intended henceforth to revert gradually to free private enterprise, with the motive of "profit on price" on which alone they thought it possible successfully to organise industry, voluntarily accepted the specialist posts for which they were qualified. Many of them, it may be the majority of them, honourably fulfilled the duties with which they were entrusted. It was, however, inevitable that persons holding their opinions should, in the atmosphere of mingled hatred and fear that prevailed, become objects of suspicion.

This suspicion was in many cases increased by their intellectual attitude, their unguarded utterances and their habitual conduct. When it became manifest that there was no abandonment of the policy of liquidating the capitalist, and when the harrying of the Nepmen was resumed and even intensified, a certain disapproval, by these intellectual recruits, of the communist administration could not be concealed. They were, it is clear, whether or not intentionally or even knowingly, sources of criticism of the government. In some cases they were apparently unable to maintain the loyalty required from executive officers. They became centres of accusations and recriminations, if not actually of counter-revolutionary activities in the nature of sabotage. There were anyhow innumerable hitches and breakdowns in the newly restored or newly erected machinery of power stations, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and automobile and machine-making establishments that were rising up all over the USSR; and, naturally, always failing to come up to their designers' optimistic expectations of their accomplishments. Whether or not there was often sabotage, it was inevitable that this should be popularly suspected. In 1927-1928 the widely advertised Shakhty prosecution of Russian technicians in the Donets coal-mines, in conspiracy with certain Germans, further inflamed popular feeling. There ensued a steady dispensing with the services of all whose loyalty was not completely beyond question. A foreign journalistic critic of the Soviet Government declared, in 1931—probably with some exaggeration—that “hundreds of so-called ‘spetsies’ [specialists] of all kinds have disappeared during this last year from places in which they had long been working for the Soviet Government. Either they have been simply dismissed because a Red professor, a Red engineer, a Red librarian had meantime grown up out of the ranks of proletarian youth to take their positions; or else they have been arrested on some flimsy charge.”¹

It was a time when living conditions worsened for all sections of the population, and not least for the brain workers. “Yet at the same time the population was asked to work more intensely for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan. ‘Why should we?’ many engineers and intellectuals asked themselves. ‘It is not our government. Sacrifices are demanded, and simultaneously harsh treatment is meted out to us.’ The cumulative effect of all these circumstances was to make the intelligentsia bitterly and actively anti-soviet, so that in 1929, when agrarian collectivisation disaffected millions of peasants, the intelligentsia believed, indeed many of them hoped, that the Soviet Government was about to collapse. During the first three months of 1930, Stalin expected foreign military intervention. The atmosphere grew tense. Intellectuals and Bolsheviks acted nervously.”²

¹ *Seven Years in Soviet Russia*, by Paul Scheffer, 1932, p. 343.

² *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, p. 221.

In the same year we read: “Simultaneously with the announcement of the Five-Year Plan, preparation was made for a monster trial at Kharkov, specially directed against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. With this aim in view, mass arrests were made and

The Trial of the Industrial Party

In December 1930 came the famous "Promparti" trial of eight soviet engineers whom the state charged with economic sabotage, the organisation of a secret political party, and conspiracy with France to invade Russia with a view to the overthrow of the soviet régime. Six of the defendants were sentenced to death, two to ten years' incarceration.¹

This much-discussed prosecution of Professor Ramzin and his colleagues inaugurated a veritable reign of terror against the intelligentsia. Nobody regarded himself as beyond suspicion. Men and women lived in daily dread of arrest. Thousands were sent on administrative exile to distant parts of the country. Evidence was not necessary. The title of engineer served as sufficient condemnation. The jails were filled. Factories languished from lack of technical leadership, and the chiefs of the Supreme Economic Council commenced to complain "that by its wholesale arrests of engineers, the GPU . . . was interfering with industrial progress". In the end none of the condemned engineers were actually executed, and even the terms of imprisonment were greatly reduced.

"That Russian engineers have engaged and are engaging in sabotage is never disputed. American specialists working in Russia have said so repeatedly in private and in print. Circumstantial evidence supports their contention. But this fact constitutes no warrant to arrest and condemn an entire class, many of whose members are loyal, devoted citizens."²

people shot without trial as early as the autumn of 1929; while between March and April 1930 a 'trial' of 45 persons, lasting 40 days, was conducted in one of the largest Kharkov theatres, which was crowded with spectators from all parts of Soviet Ukraina. The most important of the prisoners was Efremov, a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and those who stood their trial with him were professors, writers, doctors, schoolmasters, priests and so on. The prisoners were charged with having formed a 'Society for the Liberation of Ukraina', which aimed at the forcible separation of the country from the Soviet Union. They were all condemned to exile and imprisonment, and the trial itself was used as a pretext for the complete suppression of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Science, to which soviet commissaries such as Schlichter, Zatonsky and the like were elected members in place of genuine Ukrainian scholars. The autocephalous Ukrainian Church was also liquidated, for it was supposed to be connected with 'The Society for the Liberation of Ukraina'. Ukrainian literary periodicals, such as *The Red Road*, *Life and Revolution*, *The Literary News*, *The Literary Fair* and others, were suppressed. The State Publishing Department of Ukraina was abolished, and in its place a 'United Publishing Department of Ukraina' was created, which was completely under Moscow's thumb" ("Ukrainia under Bolshevik Rule", by Isaac Mazepa, in *Slavonic Review*, January 1934, p. 337).

¹ *Le Procès du parti industriel de Moscou*, compte-rendu abrégé, avec une préface de Georges Valois (Pierre Dominique), Paris, 1931, 744 pp.; *Seven Years in Soviet Russia*, by Paul Scheffer (1932), pp. 342-344; *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer (1932), p. 222; *Acte d'accusation présenté au procès du parti industriel*, par N. Krylenko, avec préface de Marcel Cachin (Paris, 1930, 100 pp.); *Lettre aux ouvriers et paysans des pays capitalistes*, par Maxime Gorki, avec préface de Marcel Cachin (Paris, 1930, 14 pp.); *Capitalisme contre socialisme : le sens politique du procès de Moscou*, par L. Madyar (Paris, 1931, 65 pp.); *Portraits and Pamphlets*, by Karl Radek, 1935.

² *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, chap. xv., "Russian Intelligentsia comes into its Own", pp. 210-231; see also *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 162-164.

The Trial of the Menshenik Professors

There was yet another elaborately staged and widely published trial in March 1931, when fourteen professors and state officials (including Groman of Gosplan, who had insisted on much lower estimates of production in the First Five-Year Plan) were accused of "counter-revolutionary" activities in conspiracy with Mensheviks in the USSR, and their colleagues in foreign countries. Here, it may be suggested, the defendants really aimed at were the members of the Russian Social Democratic Party residing abroad, who continued to constitute the Russian Section of the Second International, and who, it was asserted by the prosecution, had taken part in inciting and subsidising various measures of "sabotage" at the behest of committees, in Paris and London, representing the former proprietors of great industrial enterprises in Russia.¹

Stalin's Pronouncement

At this point we come to one of those sudden and dramatic changes of policy that make the story of the Soviet Government so bewildering to those who are unable closely to follow the details. The period that we have described (1929-1931) was, writes a trustworthy American resident at Moscow, "the blackest in the history of the intelligentsia under the soviet régime. But 1931 marked a sharp change for the better. . . . To-day [1932] Russia's intelligentsia is coming into its own. It breathes more freely. New rights and privileges are being accorded to it. The soviets are making its life more comfortable."²

Within a few months of the verdict and sentences of the great trial of Groman and his associates, "the new policy was announced by Stalin in an historic speech on June 23, 1931. It was the Magna Charta, so to speak, of the soviet intelligentsia. Previously the orthodox Bolshevik,

¹ See, for the official accounts of this trial, *Acte d'accusation relatif au procès de l'organisation mencheviste contra-révolutionnaire de Groman, Cher, Ikon, Soukhanov et autres*, par N. Krylenko (Paris, 1931, 98 pp.); also the issues of *Izvestia* and of *International Press Correspondence*, between February and April 1931, and the replies of the Second International in *The Moscow Trial and the Labour and Socialist International* (The Labour Party, London, 1931, 48 pp.); also the pamphlet entitled *Révélation sur un complot contre le pouvoir soviétique*, by G. Krizhanovsky, president of Gosplan (Paris, 1931, 72 pp.).

An earlier prosecution of Social Revolutionaries, in 1922, had, it is believed, a similar motive. The accusation was, in effect, against the "Second International", which was supposed to be plotting an armed uprising, to be preceded or accompanied by assassinations of leading Bolsheviks. Among the accused persons were Social Revolutionary members of the Russian Section of the Second International; and eminent members of that body, including the Belgian ex-Minister, Emile Vandervelde, with Liebknecht and Rosenfeldt, travelled to Moscow, in an endeavour to secure a fair trial. Their reception was not such as to impress the Second International with confidence in the judicial impartiality of the proceedings; nor were these, it has been asserted, calculated to allay the fears of the intelligentsia in the RSFSR itself. The twelve defendants were all sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted to long terms of imprisonment (see *The Twelve Condemned to Death*, Berlin, 1922).

² *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, p. 22.

or at least the ordinary worker, might have ingained that the intelligentsia was a disease of which he would sooner or later be cured." But Stalin declared that "no ruling class has yet managed to get along without its own intellectuals", and the Soviet Union was no exception. The intelligentsia, Stalin submitted, must be helped. "The problem is", he said, "not to discourage these comrades." The fact that many of the intellectuals were not Bolsheviks, Stalin declared, "should not serve as a barrier to quick promotion to leading positions". Even the old bourgeois specialists, inherited by Bolshevism from the tsarist régime, must receive better treatment. Therefore, Stalin urged, "the Bolsheviks must pursue a policy of attracting it [the intelligentsia] to us, and of concerning ourselves with its welfare". There was to be "no more persecution of engineers". "Specialist baiting", Stalin asserted emphatically, "has always been considered and continues to be a harmful and shameful manifestation." Presently a government decree gave engineers and other technicians the same high status as manual workers in industry, in the way of rations of food and clothing, the allocation of apartments and the privilege of admission to sanatoria and rest-houses. They were each to be entitled to an extra room for study at home. They were placed in a more favourable class of income-tax payers by which their tax percentages were reduced. Their children were to be admitted to schools and colleges on the same terms as those of manual workers.

"A marked improvement", we are authoritatively told, "in the lot of Russia's intelligentsia followed immediately. . . . A large number of engineers were released from jail or recalled from exile, and few, if any, are [1932] being arrested. . . . Non-Communist physicians and technical men have been promoted to high positions of trust. Many engineers are being awarded the Order of Lenin, and other soviet distinctions. . . . Where previously the intellectual hesitated a hundred times before lifting his voice in complaint, he has now been endowed with new courage, and every government office lends him an attentive ear. Punishment for 'production risks' is now frowned upon. This practice was the bane of the engineer's life. Suppose a specialist believed that a certain district was petroliferous, and decided to sink a well in the hope of striking oil. If he failed to find it, he might easily have been accused of deliberate anti-government sabotage. The consequences, at times, were unpleasant. Now [1932] every state spokesman declares loudly that production risks are desirable and useful, and indispensable to industrial progress. The natural right of unfettered initiative has been returned to the engineer. In a recent speech, Nicolai Krylenko, Commissar of Justice, endorsed the principle of equality between factory workers and engineers; and told of a case in which he had dismissed, and then arrested a provincial prosecuting attorney for taking legal action against several engineers without sufficient incriminating evidence. . . . Even more noteworthy as an indication of fair weather for the intelligentsia is an article in the official Moscow *Izvestia* by Arnold Soltz, a member of the pivotal central Control Com-

mittee, and one of the leading legal minds of the USSR. 'We are not accustomed to value the human being sufficiently', Soltz declared. 'To withdraw men from important posts in industry and civil service by arresting and sentencing them without adequate justification has caused the state tremendous loss', Soltz complained. He condemned the practice, and thereby implied a criticism of the authorities, who have deprived soviet institutions of thousands of indispensable employees by thrusting them into prisons on the slightest provocation, and keeping them there, in true Eastern fashion, until they could prove their innocence—not until the state could prove them guilty."¹

Trial of the Metro-Vickers Engineers

It adds to the bewilderment of the student of soviet policy to find that, notwithstanding Stalin's pronouncement of June 1931, and the manifest change of attitude that it produced, renewed outbursts of persecution of the intelligentsia almost immediately recurred.

We need do no more than record the dramatically staged criminal prosecution, in January 1933, of six British and ten Russian engineers, together with a Russian woman secretary, for alleged wrecking activities at power stations, accompanied by conspiracy, espionage and bribery. This case became of world importance owing to its immediate consequences. The British Ambassador manifested at the outset a resentment, for which there was no diplomatic justification, at British engineers being even suspected of any criminal offence, let alone being prosecuted! He peremptorily demanded their immediate discharge without trial. What made matters more difficult was the very undiplomatic action of the British Government in publicly threatening to impose an embargo on all imports from the USSR, should any one or more of the British defendants be found guilty and sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR. After this public threat, as might have been foreseen, the Supreme Court found the evidence of guilt, supported as it was by manifold confessions, convincing in sixteen out of the seventeen cases. One of the British defendants was acquitted. Three others, though found guilty, were sentenced only to immediate expulsion from the USSR for a period of five years, whilst the other two, who had elaborately confessed their own and their comrades' guilt, were condemned respectively to two and three years of imprisonment. The British Government, without even waiting to consider the verbatim stenographic reports of the evidence that were promptly published, imposed the embargo which had been so precipitously threatened, and by which—followed as it was by a counter-embargo on the other side—practically all trade between the two countries was stopped. The pecuniary loss thus caused to individual British manufacturers and ship-owners was at least comparable with the inconvenience inflicted on the

¹ *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, pp. 228-229; see on this *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter, 1933, p. 76.

Soviet Government. This irrational outcome of regular judicial proceedings, taken in proper form before the highest tribunal of an independent sovereign state, was endured for over two months. At last, when the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs (Litvinov) visited London to attend the World Economic Conference, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sir John Simon) deigned to approach him verbally with a view to a settlement. The blessed word was immediately found in "simultaneity". It was agreed that the withdrawal of the two embargoes, and the release of the two prisoners, should take place at the same moment of time. Thus honour was saved, and an unfortunate international incident was, after substantial economic loss to both sides, at length closed.¹

Murder of Kirov

Unfortunately the prosecution of the British and Russian engineers in 1933 did not stand alone. The very next year witnessed the assassination at Leningrad, by a dismissed employee (Nikolavev), of one of the principal members of the Soviet Government (Kirov, an old revolutionary, a member of the Politbureau, and secretary of the Leningrad Committee of the Party). This vindictive murder was immediately made the occasion of drastic reprisals. In Moscow and Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk, some two hundred Russians, including intellectuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities, with which the murder of Kirov was alleged to be connected, were promptly and privately tried by "Military Commissions" of the Supreme Court of the USSR. These summary trials were held in secret, exactly as they would have been by the OGPU, without the defendants being allowed either legal assistance or opportunity of collecting witnesses in their defence. The trials ended in more than a hundred of the prisoners being sentenced to death; and, as the usual privilege of making an appeal for clemency had been expressly abrogated in advance, the condemned men were, it was announced, instantly shot. The proceedings were taken, by order of the Soviet Government itself, by the newly formed Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), in which, as we shall presently relate,² the OGPU had been merged. The same authority seems to have been responsible for the secrecy maintained as to the evidence; for the reason, it is alleged, that it implicated one or

¹ These proceedings were, for weeks, the talk of every legation and every Foreign Office, and received an immense press publicity all over the world. The Soviet Government immediately issued in English as well as in Russian a verbatim report of the eight days' trial, exceeding a thousand pages, in three volumes (*The Case of [eighteen defendants] charged with Wrecking Activities in the Soviet Union, etc.* Moscow State Law Publishing House, 1933). The British Government published despatches, etc., as Cmd. 4286 and 4290 of 1933.

The principal defendant published a book entitled *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse (1933, 348 pp.). Other books are *The Moscow Trial*, by A. J. Cummings, 1933, 387 pp., and *The Problem of the Moscow Trial*, by G. W. Keeton, 1933, 143 pp. See also *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky, 1933, pp. 248-250, 253-254; and "The Trial of the Engineers at Moscow", by W. R. Riddell, in *American Bar Association Journal* for December 1933.

² Pp. 487-488.

other foreign government, with whom it was not desired to break off friendly relations. For half a dozen other persons, being old Bolsheviks, who were arrested for supposed complicity in what was alleged to have been a widespread conspiracy of the adherents of the Trotsky faction, including Zinoviev and Kamenev, with Salutzki, Yevdokimov, Savarov and Vardin, a different fate was reserved. At first it was admitted that the evidence against them was insufficient, and they were not brought to trial, but remained in charge of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, for administrative exile to distant parts of the USSR. Presently, however, it was announced that further incriminating evidence had been found in the papers and confessions of the other defendants; and these prominent members of the Communist Party were brought to trial. They were all found guilty, but in view of their services immediately after the Revolution, and their personal acquaintance with Lenin, they were sentenced only to long terms of imprisonment.

We are unable to interpret the proceedings of the Soviet Government in this case. The proceedings against the British engineers and their Russian colleagues in 1933 seems to have been initiated by the OGPU without prior consultation either of the Sovnarkom or of the Politbureau. They may be plausibly ascribed to the OGPU being "out of step" with the Soviet Government, and possibly to a self-willed attempt of an organ threatened with new forms of control, to assert its independence. But the proceedings so precipitately instituted in December 1934, after the murder of Kirov, were initiated by the Soviet Government itself. The indictments against the several batches of defendants appear to have contained, under the common designation of counter-revolutionary activities, various different charges. A considerable proportion of the defendants, who had been arrested before the murder of Kirov, and had been under examination for several months, seem to have been guilty of entering the USSR illegally, and in possession of arms intended for no lawful use. Others, ordinarily resident in the USSR, were accused of conspiracy, in which the Latvian consul at Leningrad was said to have been implicated, to commit terrorist assassinations, of which that of Kirov was to be only the first. The inclusion in the list of such impenitent opponents of Stalin's policy as Zinoviev and Kamenev, and the combination of persons guilty of illegal entry with those charged with conspiracy to murder Kirov, were open to misconstruction.¹

It is one of the penalties of the secrecy to which the Soviet Government

¹ The indictment of the defendants arrested at Leningrad, where the murder of Kirov is alleged to have been concerted, will be found in full in *International Press Correspondence* for January 5, 1935. The same paper contains the statement that "the November issue" of *Za Rossiyu*, "the White Guard newspaper of Belgrade [which styles itself The Organ of the Central Administration of the Russian Nationalist Organisation] . . . deliberately called for the 'removal' of Kirov in Leningrad", as well as of Kaganovich in Moscow, observing of Stalin that he was too well guarded; a specific incitement to murder which is said to have been repeated in other journals of the *émigrés*. Louis Fischer, whose able articles in *The Nation* (New York) of May 8 and 15, 1935, afford the best analysis we have seen, declared that he had himself read this specific incitement to the assassination.

is addicted in such matters, that the world at large inevitably puts a bad construction on everything. The arrest and summary execution, after a single murder, of a whole multitude of persons of diverse antecedents and conditions, spread over a wide area, and explained on different grounds, could not but excite adverse comment.¹ Even if it was justified by evidences of criminal conspiracy of which the public had no opportunity of judging, it had the appearance both of revenge and of a determination to take the opportunity of removing from the scene all the surviving opponents of the government's present policy. It was widely interpreted as a deliberate manifestation of terrorism. We are concerned with it here only in its effect upon the intelligentsia as a class. To them it seemed making an excuse for a revival of the persecution which Stalin had sought to bring to an end by his pronouncement of June 1931. This, however, proved not to be the case. In July 1934, Vyshinsky, as Deputy State Prosecutor, even issued an order to local prosecutors to cease making engineers and directors scapegoats for administrative failures. He strongly deprecated indiscriminate prosecutions. He stated that he had lately had to quash a large number of sentences wrongly pronounced by Siberian courts. He definitely forbade any further arrests of this kind.

The Liquidation of the Kulaks

The persecution of the intelligentsia between 1928 and 1934 was contemporaneous with an entirely separate and no less ruthless decision of

¹ One manifestation of the popular condemnation of these proceedings (as reported in the press) was a deputation of protest to the Soviet Ambassador in London by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Executive Committee of the Labour Party. (It is not easy to imagine what the British Ambassador at Moscow would have said to a deputation from the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, coming to protest against the trial and sentence by a British Court of Justice, of Englishmen convicted of high treason and conspiracy to murder!) The Soviet Ambassador (Ivan Maisky), whilst expressing his surprise at the unusual step, received the deputation with scrupulous politeness, and even supplied an explanation of the judgments of the Supreme Court. He said that the condemned men "had been found guilty of preparing and carrying out terrorist acts. The majority of them came from abroad and on them were found bombs, grenades, revolvers and other weapons. In Court they openly declared themselves enemies of the Soviet Union, and also admitted the crimes which they were charged with. In ordinary circumstances", Mr. Maisky went on, "the persons arrested previous to the murder of Kirov would probably be tried at different times, and be subjected to appropriate punishments. The assassination of Kirov, however, has called forth the necessity of strengthening the means of combating terrorism, and in connection with these circumstances the Soviet authorities found it imperative to expedite the investigation of all pending terrorist cases, as well as the trials in Court." After a reference to the assassinations of the King of Yugoslavia and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the action taken by the League of Nations, Mr. Maisky pointed out that "it is universally known that the White Guard terrorists enjoy generous hospitality in certain European countries, where they openly incite the committing of terroristic acts against the representatives of the Soviet Government, and are engaged in preparing such acts. Notwithstanding the fact that in the countries adjacent to the USSR the strictest régime of passport and police control exists, the White Guard terrorists cross unhindered from those countries into the USSR, with the object of fulfilling their terrorist designs. Such a situation ought to have aroused the indignation of all honest people" (Reports in *The Times*, *Manchester Guardian* and other British newspapers of January 3, 1935).

policy in the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class". We have already described¹ how the Communist Party wrestled with the problem of the shortage of foodstuffs, and we shall refer to it again in the chapter entitled "Planned Production for Community Consumption".² Here we need only recall how, unlike the procedure of a dictatorship, the intellectual wrestling with the problem lasted for a couple of years; how it took the form of a long-drawn struggle in endless meetings and debates, rival pamphleteering and newspaper controversy; how it produced the most acute cleavage in the ranks of the Communist Party that had occurred in all its decade of governmental experience; and how, at last, after interminable parleyings in committee among the warring factions, a decision was arrived at, against which a minority intrigued and rebelled in such a way and to such an extent as to lead at last to the expulsion and exile of some of the most prominent personalities among the "Old Revolutionaries". The new policy thus adopted amounted to nothing less than a second agrarian revolution, even greater in magnitude than that of 1917-1918. The innumerable scattered strips and tiny holdings throughout the USSR were to be summarily amalgamated into several hundred thousand large farms, on which agriculture could be effectively mechanised. Only in this way, it was finally concluded, could the aggregate production of foodstuffs be sufficiently increased, within the ensuing decade, to meet the requirements of the growing population; to rescue from inevitable poverty the mass of the peasants unable to produce even enough for their own families; and to build up a grain reserve adequate to provide against the periodical failure of crops, whilst meeting the needs of defence against the ever-possible foreign invasion.

This momentous Party decision—perhaps the most important since that of 1918 in favour of accepting the terms of peace dictated by the German Army—committed the Soviet Government, in addition to all its other work, to a task of colossal magnitude and difficulty. Here we are concerned only with the fact that it incidentally involved the "liquidation" of the last remaining sector of individual capitalists. Among the twenty-five million peasant families there were, as we have elsewhere described, three recognised grades, the poor (*bedniaki*), the middle (*seredniaki*) and the relatively well-to-do (*kulaki*). Of these it was assumed that the first could easily be persuaded to unite in the *kolkhosi* that would offer them prospects of larger shares than their tiny holdings had ever yielded. The second grade could, it was supposed, for the most part, be won over by demonstration of the success of the *kolkhosi*. But it was foreseen that an uncertain proportion of these middle peasants, including both the more energetic and ambitious, and the more obstinate and prejudiced, would prove entirely recalcitrant. Finally, the relatively well-to-do peasant, who had managed to enlarge his holding by renting land, often joining with his farming a little trading and a persistent money-lending; and

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., Section II., "The Collective Farm".

² Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

who had developed his cultivation with the aid of the agricultural co-operative societies, by himself acquiring a greater knowledge and through the employment of low-paid wage labour-- in short, the much-hated kulak-- would have to be "liquidated as a class". It can be inferred that it was actually expected that to carry to completion this new agrarian revolution would involve the summary ejection from their relatively successful holdings, of something like a million families.¹ Strong must have been the faith and resolute the will of the men who, in the interest of what seemed to them the public good, could take so momentous a decision.

It must be recognised that this liquidation of the individual capitalist in agriculture had necessarily to be faced if the required increase of output was to be obtained. To allow of a mechanisation of all the agricultural processes, it was indispensable, not only that the scattered strips and tiny holdings should be merged, but also that no separate holdings should be allowed to obstruct the wide area of each collective farm. It was, it is true, not necessary in Russia; as it had been in the analogous tatory enclosure of commons in the England of 1760-1820, to deal always with whole parishes or manors. But at least each collective farm needed a clear run of hundreds of acres, an area which might be irrespective of village or district boundaries, but which inevitably involved the forcible removal of any holder who refused (or was not allowed to) merge his little farm in the new kolkhos. It was, we may say, not on this point that the serious cleavage of opinion in the Communist Party had arisen. None of the factions wished to show any mercy to the universally hated kulak.

It is hard for the Englishman of the present day to appreciate the abhorrence and hatred felt by the Russian for the kulak. To-day, in his "liquidation", he may seem only the exceptionally thrifty and energetic peasant, who had raised himself by his virtues out of the destitution of the thriftless and incapable mass. But all students of Russian rural life have, for the past half-century or more, stigmatised the kulak as a terrible oppressor of his poorer neighbours. Stepniak, in 1895, gave an appalling description of the effects upon his neighbours of the kulak's inveterate usury, and his virtual enslavement of the landless peasant. "The distinctive characteristic of this class", Stepniak declared, "is the hard, unflinching cruelty of a thoroughly uneducated man who has made his

¹ The numerical strength of the kulaks was considerable. Stepniak, in 1893, observed that "Every village commune has always three or four regular kulaks, as also some half-dozen smaller fry of the same kidney. . . . They want neither skill nor industry; only promptitude to turn to their own profit the needs, the sorrows, the sufferings and the misfortunes of others" (*The Russian Peasantry*, by Stepniak, 1895; English edition, 1905, p. 54).

This proportion, in some seventy thousand villages, corresponds approximately with Stalin's estimate in November 1928 that "It has been proved that the kulaks amount to about 5 per cent" (*Leninism*, by Josef Stalin, 1933, vol. ii. p. 164). It was this whole class, possibly numbering a million households, that the Soviet Government in 1928 was instructed to "liquidate" within five years.

way from poverty to wealth, and has come to consider money-making, by whatever means, as the only pursuit to which a rational being should devote himself.”¹ “The kulak”, wrote an able German observer in 1904² “is a very interesting figure in rural Russia. . . . There is no doubt that the methods used by this usurer and oppressor in the peasant’s blouse have not been of the cleanest. . . . The conspicuous position he now occupies came about during the last twenty or thirty years. . . . The ‘village eater’ . . . is the natural product of a vicious system. . . . Utilising the unpropitious condition of their fellow members of the commune [they] made one after another their debtors, next their hired labourers, and appropriated for their own individual use the land shares of these economical weaklings.” Dr. Dillon, whose testimony is of unimpeachable authority, declared in 1918 that “this type of man was commonly termed a kulak, or fist, to symbolise his utter callousness to pity or ruth. *And of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels, I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak.* In the revolutionary horrors of 1905 and 1917 he was the ruling spirit—a fiend incarnate.”³ Many illustrative examples of relentless economic oppression by kulaks may be gathered from Russian sources.⁴ Yet the kulaks as a class may be said to have done no more than would have been considered “sound business” by the individualist economists of Victorian England; namely, habitually to take advantage of the economic weakness of those with whom they made their bargains; always to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market; paying the lowest wage at which they could hire the services of those who begged for employment; and extracting the utmost usury from those who voluntarily accepted their loans.

But whether the successful peasant was a good or a bad member of rural society, the Communist Party was determined that the USSR should not follow the example of France in permanently establishing a class of peasant proprietors. The experience of the preceding seven years, during which only one or two per cent of the peasants in the whole USSR had voluntarily joined the various kolkhosi, in spite of these having been expressly favoured in grants of credit and remissions of taxation, showed that a much more determined effort was required. Within the first year after Stalin’s enunciation of the new policy, the second agrarian revolution was already in full swing, with summary expulsion from house and home of those objectors whose holdings stood in the way; coupled with confiscation of their property, and forcible removal of themselves and families to new localities. At the same time, taxation was differentiated in such a way as severely to penalise the individual peasant holding, even when it

¹ *The Russian Peasantry*, by Stepniak, 1895 (English edition, 1905, p. 35).

² *Russia, her Strength and her Weakness*, by Wolf von Schierband, 1904, p. 120.

³ *The Eclipse of Russia*, by E. J. Dillon, 1918, p. 67.

⁴ See for instance the convincing story of a woman peasant in the pamphlet *Collective Farm Trud*, by Eudoxia Pazukhina (Moscow, 1930).

did not stand in the way of a kolkhos, merely in order to convince its owner that his position would soon become unendurable.

At first the new agrarian revolution went ahead at a rate surpassing all expectation. The First Five-Year Plan had provided for the amalgamation, each year, of 20 per cent of the peasant holdings. But within a year no less than 55 per cent of them had merged their holdings in collective farms. There were nothing like enough tractors and other agricultural machines ready for such a rapid development, and great discontent arose. The Central Executive Committee (TSIK) reported that something must be done to allay the unrest; and the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructed Stalin to deliver the speech which was circulated over all the USSR under the title "Dizzy with Success". In this he sharply rebuked the local committees and officials for their excess of zeal. He insisted that joining a collective farm was to be an entirely voluntary decision of each individual peasant; and that, far from depriving such voluntary recruits of the advantage of the property that they brought in, the kolkhos authorities ought to allow a reasonable equivalent for this addition to the common stock. He declared that any member who wished to withdraw must be allowed to do so upon reasonable terms. The result was that the aggregate membership of the kolkhosi at once fell off by nearly one-half. Collectivisation thereafter proceeded with less precipitancy and more discretion. But it continued without a break until, by the end of 1933, about 65 per cent of the peasant holdings had become merged in over two hundred thousand collective farms, which yielded more than three-quarters of the aggregate harvest of the whole USSR for the year. In those provinces in which the formation of kolkhosi had been specially pushed forward, comprising nearly the whole of the area on which more wheat is normally produced than is required for local consumption, it could be reported, at the end of 1933, that the liquidation of the kulak had been substantially completed.

It is, we think, to be regretted that no statistics are accessible, and not even a descriptive report has been published, as to the manner in which this enforced *diaspora* of probably some hundreds of thousands of persons was effected. We can form no estimate of the number of cases in which practically the whole property of these families was confiscated, or was simply taken over by the kolkhosi, which, as kulaks, they were not allowed to join, or membership in which they stubbornly refused. We can form no idea as to how many of them could accurately be described as kulaks, or persons guilty of economic oppression of their less successful neighbours; and how many were merely obstinate individualists who, whether or not their separate cultivation of their little holdings had been successful, resolutely declined to merge these in the collective farms. We do not know to what extent or by what means their cases were investigated, before they were forcibly ejected from their homes. We have been unable to learn how many of these peasants were removed to prison, or (as is specifically alleged) deported to the lumber camps in the northern

forest areas, or employed on public works of railway or canal construction, or taken on as labourers at such gigantic industrial enterprises perpetually hungry for men as Magnitogorsk or Chelyabinsk, or sent to the Donets Basin to work in the coal-mines, which have been equally suffering from shortage of labour force. Nor is there any account known to us of the conditions under which these hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have had to live in this process of arbitrary removal and resettlement, nor any estimate of the mortality involved in their displacement. So far as we are aware the Soviet Government has not deigned to reply to the numerous denunciations of the cruelty on a gigantic scale alleged to have been perpetrated by its agents; nor published any explanatory account of its proceedings in this summary "liquidation" of so large a proportion of its citizens. In fact, almost the only thing publicly known is that travellers throughout the southern parts of the USSR have, during the past few years, repeatedly witnessed in the railway stations groups of weary and disconsolate men, women and children, with no more belongings than they could carry, being shepherded by armed guards into trains carrying them to unknown destinations. The sum of human suffering involved is beyond all computation.¹

The procedure on which the kulaks were got rid of was peculiar. Decrees of the USSR Sovnarkom declared that the kulaks as a class were to be liquidated. Up and down the country the batraks and bedniaks, the landless and the poor peasants, with such of the seredniaks (the middle peasants) as chose to attend, held village meetings, and voted that such and such peasants of their village were kulaks, and were to be dispossessed. We have already quoted the testimony of the American journalist long resident in the USSR as to the seriousness and sense of responsibility with which the meetings that she attended came to their decisions, and as to the belated attempts made by higher authorities to moderate the

¹ A competent observer writes in 1933: "Two successful hardworking peasants who were certainly not kulaks, and both of whom I knew, had been taken from their houses at two o'clock in the morning and deported to an unknown compulsory labour district without any charge being made against them. Their land had been confiscated and their families had been left destitute. . . . The majority of his village was collectivised, but the collective-farm organisation had refused to include him. He had been a more prosperous peasant and had employed agricultural labour, therefore he was disfranchised and not allowed to take part in the collective farm. 'So you see, I am a deportee like you are' (this was the day after the Moscow Trial concluded), 'but', he continued, 'there is a difference—you go home to order and plenty: for us our only way out is closing the window and opening the stove; in that way one goes out without the pains of death by starvation'" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, pp. 219-220).

The same observer describes the kulaks at Chelyabinsk in January 1932: "I paid a visit to the special station where agents were taking on workers for Magnitostroi. . . . The majority of these unfortunate work-seekers were kulaks who had been deprived of their land and their property, and had been expelled from their villages. In many cases their families accompanied them. Their plight reminded me of the Polish refugees in Moscow in 1915. The older ones were obviously too terrified to talk, and would say very little of their feelings and their experiences. Two children came to ask for assistance . . . and I heard a pitiful tale of destroyed village life, broken homes and the search for employment, which had become the lot of these peasants" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, p. 190).

harsh judgments that were come to.¹ As to how the decisions were put in operation we have no record and no direct testimony. But we venture to transcribe a passage from a recently published work of fiction by a writer who was an eye-witness of much that he describes. We do not give this as evidence. But, even if not to be relied on for details, the novel certainly expresses the spirit with which the expropriation was carried out :

" Timothy, stately and handsome like his mother, rose from his place. He wiped his red lips beneath the downy youthful moustache on a cloth, screwed up his insolent, bulging eyes, and, with the ease and assurance of the best concertina-player in the village and the favourite of the girls, said with a wave of his hand : ' Come in, take a seat, respected authorities.'

" ' We have no time to sit down,' said Andrei, drawing a sheet of paper out of the bundle he held. ' Citizen Frol Damaskov, the meeting of poor peasantry has decided to eject you from your house and confiscate all your property and stock. So finish your dinner and vacate the house. We'll draw up a list of the property at once.'

" ' Why so ? '

" Frol put down his spoon and rose.

" ' We are destroying you as a class,' Demka Ushakov explained to him.

" Frol went out of the room, his leather-soled felt boots creaking, and came back with a paper.

" ' Here's my certificate. You signed it yourself, Razmetnov.'

" ' What certificate ? '

" ' To show that I gave up all the grain consignment.'

" ' This has nothing to do with grain.'

" ' What do you want to send me out of my house for and confiscate my goods ? '

" ' The poor peasants have passed a decision, I told you.'

" ' There's no such law ! ' screamed out Timothy. ' It's robbery ! I shall go straight to the District Executive Committee, papa. Where's the saddle ? '

" ' If you want to go to the Executive Committee, you can walk there ! I won't give you a horse,' said Andrei, sitting on the edge of the table and taking out pencil and paper.

" Frol's torn nostril went blue and his head began to shake. Suddenly he collapsed where he stood, moving with difficulty his swollen, blackened tongue.

" ' Sons of bitches, sons of bitches, robbers, cut-throats ! '

" ' Papa, get up for Christ's sake,' wept the girl, tugging at her father's arm-pits.

" Frol recovered, rose, lay down on the bench and simply listened while Demka Ushakov and tall, shy Mikhail Ignatenok dictated to Razmetnov :

¹ *Dictatorship and Democracy*, by A. L. Strong, 1934, p. 267.

“ ‘ One iron bedstead with white knobs, one eiderdown, three pillows.’
 “ ‘ Two wooden beds.’
 “ ‘ A cupboard full of crockery. Am I to tell you all the crockery?
 To hell with it.’
 “ ‘ Twelve chairs, one long seat with a back to it.’
 “ ‘ A triple concertina.’
 “ ‘ I’m not going to give away my concertina!’
 “ Timothy tore it away from Demka. ‘ Leave it alone, squint-eye,
 or I’ll break your nose for you.’
 “ ‘ I’ll punch you so your mother won’t be able to wash it off. . . .’

“ ‘ Comrade Zakharenko, District Representative of the GPU, I herewith hand over to you the kulak, Borodin, Tit Konstantinovich, as a counter-revolutionary and treacherous element. While making an inventory of his property, he officially made an attack on Comrade Davidov, one of the 25,000 mobilised workers, and managed to hit him on the head twice with an iron bar.

“ ‘ In addition to this I certify that I saw in Borodin’s possession a rifle, Russian type, which, owing to circumstances not under my control, I was unable to obtain, being on a hillock and fearing bloodshed, and which he managed to throw away without us seeing. When found, it will be handed to you as material evidence.

“ ‘ M. Nagulnov, Secretary of the Gremyachy Nucleus of the All-Russian Communist Party (B), Holder of the Order of the Red Banner.’

“ They placed Tit in the shed. He asked for a drink and called Nagulnov to him. The latter only shouted from the porch:

“ ‘ What do you want?’

“ ‘ Makar! Remember!’ cried Tit, waving his bound hands like a drunkard. ‘ Remember! Our paths will cross again! You have trampled me under, but afterwards it will be I who will do the trampling. I shall kill you! This is the grave of our friendship.’

“ ‘ Off with you, counter-revolutionary swine!’ shouted Nagulnov.”

How many kulaks were summarily expropriated in this way, stripped of all their possessions, and turned out of the villages, we cannot say. But this was not the only cause of their “liquidation”. In 1931 and 1932, concurrently with the widespread partial failure of the harvest that we have described, many peasants, both members of the new kolkhosi and non-members, obstinately refused to cultivate their holdings; limited their sowing to a small proportion of their land which they thought would yield a crop large enough for their own maintenance; wholly neglected the weeding, and when the grain ripened limited their reaping to the minimum that they required, and left the rest of the harvest to rot on the ground. The result was that, when the drought interfered with their

¹ *The Soil Upturned*, by M. Sholokhov (Moscow, 1934), chap. vii. pp. 71-73, 80-81; also published in London, 1935.

estimates of yield, many peasants in the Ukraine and in the North Caucasus found that they had nothing to live on during the winter and spring. The Soviet Government, after remitting taxes, and in some cases bringing grain to the starving, decided that it was inpolitic to feed these recalcitrants in the holdings which they had refused to cultivate. They were deported, either as individual families or, in some cases in the North Caucasus, as whole villages, to places in which they could be saved from starvation by being employed, as on "relief works", at bare subsistence wages. Tens of thousands of the men were put to work on the construction of the White Sea canal. Others were sent to swell the labour force building the new cities of Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk. How many hundreds of thousands of families were thus, between 1930 and 1934, forcibly torn from their holdings, losing all that they possessed, we are unable even to estimate.

We have no wish to minimise, still less to seek to justify, this ruthless expropriation and removal of the occupiers and cultivators who were stigmatised as kulaks, any more than we do the equally ruthless expulsion, little over a century ago, of the crofters from so much of the Scottish Highlands, or the economic ruin of so many small-holders that accompanied the statutory enclosure of the English commons. The policy of compulsorily substituting sheep-runs and large farms for tiny holdings may have been economically sound in the one case as in the other. The Soviet Government may well have been right in concluding that only by a widespread amalgamation of the independent peasant holdings could any general mechanisation of agriculture be made practicable; and that only by such mechanisation could the aggregate production of foodstuffs be made equal to the nation's requirements. In fact, the partial failure of crops in 1931 and 1932 (though, as we have already explained,¹ far removed from anything to be properly called a famine) brought many thousands of small peasants within reach of actual starvation; and it may well have seemed that, in these cases at any rate, nothing but removal could save them from death at the next failure of crops, or even before the next harvest. It is, indeed, not so much the policy of removal that is open to criticism, as the manner in which it appears to have been carried out, and the unsatisfactory conditions of life into which the victims seem to have been, without judicial trial or any effective investigation, arbitrarily deported.²

¹ Chapter III. Section II. in Part I., "The Collective Farm".

² We have been told of a group of deported kulaks having been, under very comfortable conditions, employed as labourers on the Turksib railway construction works. On the completion of their particular task, the engineer in charge is reported to have suggested that the whole group should be assigned an adequate amount of vacant land, and set up as a kolkhos by themselves, where they could utilise their agricultural skill in doing all the work of cultivation, without employing any wage labour. We do not know whether such a suggestion has anywhere been acted upon. Something of the sort may have been effected by a "colonisation and settlement plan", under a special All-Union Settlement Commission, promulgated in August 1933. It had been experimentally put in operation in 1932, in connection with the deportation of whole villages of Cossacks from the North

The Activities of the Tcheka and the Ogpu

Notwithstanding the immense and long-continued sufferings which were the incidents of War Communism, the civil wars, the famine of 1921, and the liquidation first of the Nepmen and then of the kulaks, it is, we suggest, impossible to avoid the conclusion that, during the whole period from 1917 to 1935, the Soviet Government has received the support, not only of the couple of millions of members of the Communist Party, but also of the bulk of the workmen of the towns and the mining districts ; of those employed in the transport services ; of the hundreds of thousands enrolled in the Red Army, and, although with many exceptions, even of the hosts of peasants throughout the greater part of the vast area of the USSR.¹ We have already described the ubiquitous political education and propaganda by which the Communist Party has won and maintained its unquestioned leadership.² Here we have to notice the effective use made, during the whole period of the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, and of so many of their intellectual supporters, of widespread repression, and drastic punishment of every "counter-revolutionary" activity. The main instrument of this "terrorism" has been an extensive organisation of the nature of a secret police, known successively as the Tcheka and the Ogpu, and in 1934, as we have mentioned, merged in the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs (*Narkomnutdel*).

Terrorism by a secret police force is, of course, in Russia, no new thing. Like so much else, it may be traced to Peter the Great, if not to Ivan the Terrible. But its effective organisation may be said to date from the formation of the corps of *gendarmérie*, soon after the revolt of the Dekabrist in 1825, subject to the notorious "Third Section" of the court "chancery", under Nicholas the First. Notwithstanding various so-called reforms, the organisation continued substantially unchanged in scope and method, under the name of the Okhrana, down to the revolution of February 1917, when for a few months it disappeared in the loosening of all governmental authority. Kerensky, however, soon found the need for some such national force of political police, and was taking steps to resuscitate the Okhrana, when the October revolution swept him and his

Caucasus. The new colonies are in suitable agricultural districts in the southern part of Siberia (see *The Times*, August 31, 1933).

¹ The Bolshevik majority was not only most conspicuous, but also has been most continuously effective, in and about Leningrad and Moscow. But even in 1917, the Bolsheviks commanded a majority of votes throughout Russia proper. A competent observer reports that "there is no doubt that, in Central Russia, the majority of the population welcomed the Revolution. I was amazed to discover, from a study of the statistics of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, taken on an orthodox democratic basis, that the Bolsheviks had polled a clear 55 per cent of all the votes cast in Northern and Central Russia, including Moscow, Petrograd and the North-Western and West-Central areas. They were outvoted in the richer outlying parts of Russia, the Ukraine, the South, the Caucasus and Siberia, where the Social Revolutionaries predominated. These regions they have slowly conquered, thanks mainly to the folly and brutality of the 'White' Generals" (*The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford, 1921, p. 110).

² Chapter V. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership".

projects away. Lenin and his Sovnarkom were promptly driven to the conclusion that, without a similar organisation, the new government could not cope successfully with the counter-revolutionaries rising up all around, often in communication with the invading armies.¹ In June 1918 the Sovnarkom willingly accepted the recommendation of Felix Djerjinsky, one of their most trusted colleagues, that the spasmodic and irregular activities of the inchoate force of secret police, which had begun almost immediately after the seizure of power, should be definitely organised under an "Extraordinary Commission to deal with Counter Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage"—a title immediately shortened to Tcheka. By a decree of November 7, 1918, Djerjinsky was made president of this board of fifteen tried and trusted Bolsheviks, upon which much the same exceptional powers were conferred as those formerly wielded by the Okhrana. The new body, although not re-engaging any of the personnel of the old Okhrana, adopted the same methods of spying and delation, oral examinations and secret trial. It was, at first, even less controlled than its predecessor, which had been directly subject to the Tsar's Ministry of the Interior, whereas the Tcheka was responsible only to the Sovnarkom as a whole, which had not the assistance of an organised department. Moreover, the Tcheka took upon itself, from the first, the power to punish even by death those counter-revolutionaries whom it discovered *in flagrante delicto*; whereas the Okhrana had professedly no power itself to inflict any punishment whatever—a fact which, if we may believe even a hundredth part of the allegations made against it, did not prevent it from detaining persons indefinitely in prison, subjecting them to flogging and other physical violence, and summarily deporting them to Siberia.

It is unfortunately impossible for anyone to tell the story of the years, 1918–1922, during which the Tcheka wielded uncontrolled its tremendous powers, under which no man's life was safe. Like everything else in that grim time, the Tcheka was drastic, uncontrolled and ruthless. Its arbitrary arrests and summary executions; the horrors of its nerve-racking investigations and secret tribunals; the widespread anxiety and gloom caused by its network of spies and their almost continuous delations

¹ "Lenin issued a decree on December 11, 1917, declaring the Kadets 'a party of enemies of the people'. The directing members of the party became liable under this decree to trial by the revolutionary tribunals. Lenin then wrote a memorandum, on December 19 or 20, to F. E. Djerjinsky, containing the draft of a general decree for combating counter-revolution and sabotage. He suggested that the Commissariat of the Interior should, with the aid of house committees, assume supervision of all the bourgeoisie, the landowners and the wealthier classes. In the category of persons belonging to the wealthier classes was included everyone with an income of five hundred roubles a month, or more, or who possessed town property, securities, or money to the amount of more than a thousand roubles. Such persons, and also all employees in banks, investment firms and other institutions, were required to submit to the house committees information concerning their incomes and occupations" (*Lenin, Red Director*, by G. Vernadsky (1931), p. 190). See also *Economic Policy of Soviet Russia*, by Paul Haensel, p. 27; *La Révolution Russe*, de Fernand Grenard (Paris, 1933); *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917–1918*, translated from the German edition, by J. Steinberg (Paris, 1930), especially chap. iii. pp. 86–97; and *Mon Ambassade en Russie Soviétique, 1917–1919*, par J. Noulens (Paris, 1933), vols. i. and ii.

—all this has been described sensationally in dozens of books in several of the languages of western Europe. There is, we fear, no reason to doubt the reality of the "Red Terror" any more than that of the "White Terror", with which, wherever the White Armies held sway, the Red Terror alternated. But with regard to any particular incident, the evidential value of the greater part of the mass of lurid literature on the subject is of the slightest. Very naturally these volumes betray intense bias. They are full of "hearsay evidence", and of unsupported allegations and unsigned letters, wholly unverifiable. No archives have been published, and no such publication is ever likely. Accordingly, the world will never be able to explore, and still less to judge with any accuracy, even a fraction of the cruelties that marked the first few years after the October revolution, any more than it can properly estimate those inflicted by the White Armies in 1918-1920, or those of the tsarist repression from 1907 to 1912.¹

In 1922, when all the successive wars had come to an end, and civil order was substantially restored, the Tcheka itself was, in an attempt to dispel the anxiety and fear of the public, ostensibly abolished. But it had, with all its brutalities, proved too useful an instrument for any government willingly to dispense with its protection. It is one of the worst features of a desperately fought civil war that it hardly ever ends in any genuine peace within at least one generation. Governments can terminate hostilities against other governments, and make peace with

¹ The same warning to the reader is given in Mr. W. H. Chamberlin's latest volume, *Russia's Iron Age*, 1935. "Many of the books which profess to expose the G.P.U. are so grossly exaggerated and uninformed that they are worse than worthless from the factual standpoint" (p. 160).

Those liking sensational literature may find useful the following sample list: *Siberia and the Exile System*, by George Kennan, with extensive bibliography and appendices (2 vols., 1891); *The Ochrana: the Russian Secret Police*, by M. I. Vassilyev, the last chief of the police under the Tsar (1930, 320 pp.); *The Terror in Russia: an Appeal to the British Nation*, by Prince P. A. Kropotkin (1909, iv and 74 pp.); *Tcheka, the story of the Bolshevik Extraordinary Commission*, by J. Alinin (1919); *Tscheka: der Staat im Staat*, by G. Popoff (1925, 306 pp.), translated as *The Tcheka, the Red Inquisition* (1925, 308 pp.); *En prison sous la terreur russe*, par L. Nadcau (1920, 247 pp.); *Tcheka, matériaux et documents*, par V. M. Chernov et E. Pierremont (1922, 305 pp.); *The Red Terror in Russia*, by Sergey Petrovich Melgounov (1925), with lengthy bibliography, translated as *La Terreur Rouge en Russie, 1918-24* (1927); *Moscow sans voiles; neuf ans de travail au pays des Soviets*, par J. Douillet (1928, 249 pp.), translated as *Moscow Unmasked: A Record of Nine Years' Work and Observation in Soviet Russia* (1930, 223 pp.); *An Epopt in the Service of the Soviet*, by M. I. Larsons (1929); *In the Clutches of the Tcheka*, by B. Cederholm (1929, 349 pp.); *In the Toils of the Ogpu*, by Dr. Karl Kindermann (1933, 288 pp.); *The Methods of the Ogpu*, by Vladimir Brunovsky (1931, 235 pp.); *Das Sowjetparadies*, von W. W. Antonois (1931, 175 pp.); *Ogpu: in der Halle der Tscheka* (1932, 222 pp.); *Die Verschwörung gegen die Welt*, von Essad Bey (1932, 259 pp.), translated as *Secrets of the Ogpu* (1933); *Die Tscheka bei der Arbeit*, von Gregor A. Agabekow (1932, 207 pp.); *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, par J. Steinberg (1930, 250 pp.); *Escape from the Soviets*, by Tatiana Tchernavina (1933); "Life in Concentration Camps in the USSR", by Vladimir Chernavin, in *Slavonic Review* (January 1934, pp. 387-408), amplified in *I Speak for the Silent*, by the same, 1935; "Government by Terror", by W. H. Chamberlin, in *Atlantic Monthly* for October 1934, and "The Evolution of Soviet Terrorism", by the same, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1934, resumed in *Russia's Iron Age*, by the same, 1935, and in his *Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, New York, 1935.

each other, because, of the citizens themselves, neither victor nor vanquished has to go on living in close intermingling in daily life. When, as in the USSR, millions of men and women had spent years in more or less overt hostility, ranging from the ordinary quarrels of town life to actual guerilla warfare, arising out of embittered class hatred which the issue of the fighting did nothing to dispel, it was inevitable that monarchist and communist, bourgeois and proletarian, Menshevik and Bolshevik—in short, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary—should continue not only estranged but also mutually resentful. The conquerors, in particular, were without belief in the loyalty of the conquered to the social order that had emerged from the ruin. There existed, moreover, a swarm of common criminals who, under cover of one flag or another, practised theft and embezzlement, rape and murder. It must be remembered that there was at that time, in the vast area of the USSR, no organised force of “preventive police”, such as most western nations had, during the nineteenth century, equipped themselves with. Even the cities possessed no local constabulary equal to maintaining order or preventing burglary and street robbery, let alone suppressing any treasonable conspiracy. Thus, it was not altogether without reason that, in 1922, coincidentally with the institution of the New Economic Policy and with the establishment of the USSR itself, a new organisation was created having much the same functions as the Tcheka, under the new name of the “Union State Political Administration”, a title immediately abbreviated to Ogpu, or GPU (Gay Pay Oo). The Ogpu had the same head (Djerjinsky) as the Tcheka; and much the same personnel. The change amounted, in fact, to no more than the continuation under a new name, on slightly improved lines, of an organisation which, however hated and feared, had proved its effectiveness.¹

The Organisation of the Ogpu

The Ogpu is to-day, under a second new name, an organisation of great magnitude, extending to every corner of the USSR. “Its nature”, we are informed, “is twofold: first, a division of secret agents circulating unknown even to one another: second an open, uniformed personnel of officers and men, who have distinctive uniforms, special barracks, the best

¹ For the GPU, amid a wild and luxuriant crop of denigrating references without authority, there are few sources of trustworthy information to which the student can be referred. Zelitch (*Soviet Administration of Criminal Law*, 1931, pp. 34, 40, 129, 135 and 193) gives precisely its origin and summarises its legal powers. We have found the most illuminating description of its activities in the volume, *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukoyser (1932). This Canadian expert, working in soviet industry, saw a great deal of the GPU organisation and its criminal prosecutions. Equally trustworthy testimony, not dissimilar in effect, is given in *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse (1933), pp. 274-275. *Soviet Russia* (by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, chap. xviii, pp. 387-403, “Liberty in the Soviet State”) gives a carefully phrased and seemingly trustworthy account of the institution. On leaving the USSR permanently the same author has written more adversely to the Ogpu; see his subsequent publications cited in the footnote on p. 474.

quarters in Russia, whose annunciatory signs, with the letters OGPU above, cause an involuntary shudder even in the passing foreigner.”¹ The whole department was, down to 1934, directed by the board of fifteen commissioners, who shared the administration among themselves, either individually or in collegia, subject to the decisions on matters of principle taken by the plenum. Great authority was given to the president, who was habitually in communication with the Sovnarkom. Djerjinsky is stated to have personally controlled everything down to his death in 1926, even after he had added to his work the presidency of the special commission for dealing with the homeless waifs, and that of the Supreme Economic Council. He was succeeded as president of the OGPU by another Polish nobleman, Menzhinsky, whose grasp of the office is reported to have weakened with advancing years, and on whose death in 1934 a thorough reorganisation was effected, and Yagoda, Djerjinsky’s closest collaborator, became president of the Narkomvnutdel.

On the executive side the work is done by half a dozen distinct departments, namely : (1) the operative or general (OO), which supervises the whole, and directs the movements of the staff, including the brigades of special troops ; (2) the foreign (INO), which watches the machinations of the *émigrés* and others abroad ; (3) the economic (EKG), dealing with industrial offences, especially sabotage, bribery, counterfeiting and smuggling ; (4) the transport, inspecting passports, and maintaining order on railways and steamboats ; (5) the Red Army, keeping a vigilant eye on symptoms of disaffection or attempts at seduction in the armed forces ; and (6) the secret service (SO), for detecting counter-revolutionary tendencies in the USSR itself. There are public offices of the GPU (now of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in all cities and other considerable urban centres in the USSR, often at the railway station, to which any traveller is recommended to apply in difficulty ; where information, advice and assistance are courteously supplied on any subject whatever.² These offices keep a constant watch upon their several localities ; ready at a moment’s notice to intervene in the suppression of riot or disorder, or in case of need to support the local constabulary (called militia). In any

¹ *Working for the Soviets*, by the Canadian asbestos expert, W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, p. 44.

² “The American working in Russia will probably find the GPU to be at all times to him a friend in need. When transportation is difficult (which means practically always) the GPU will give him space reserved especially for that organisation. Should trouble arise concerning his passports the GPU will always be found willing to help. Should he feel himself persecuted or hindered by his trust officials, Communists or non-Communists, the all-dreaded GPU can be relied upon to alleviate the difficulty. The GPU forms a sort of liaison organisation between foreign technicians and Russian co-workers . . . among the Russian people of to-day only the members of the GPU have nothing to fear from contact with foreigners” (*Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, p. 44).

In the USSR, alone among civilised countries, the word “police”, now common to nearly all languages, is never used. We are told that this results from the universal fear, hatred and contempt inspired by the tsarist police. What would be in England the local constabulary force is, in the USSR, termed the militia. The word police is never applied either to the uniformed force or to the secret service agents of the OGPU.

local calamity, such as a railway accident or shipwreck, flood or fire, they supply whatever protection or assistance is required. Within reach there is everywhere a detachment of the organised military force of the OGPU, parallel with but, down to 1934, not included in the Red Army; at hand at every place of entry into the USSR to give force to the Customs administration and, in fact, stationed largely on the frontiers; but ready to start at a moment's notice to cope with any armed revolt or serious riot.

The less public side of the GPU organisation is still maintained in all its ubiquity, including its very extensive secret service of spies and investigators, who are, in the main, unknown even to each other, and who ostensibly pursue, by way of camouflage, all sorts of occupations enabling them to keep other people under constant observation. How far this secret service of the GPU differs either in magnitude or in the minuteness of its espionage from that maintained by most other governments, about which little is said, we have no means of estimating. The GPU perhaps differed from analogous organisations elsewhere chiefly in its combination, in one and the same body, at any rate down to its reorganisation in 1934, of detective functions with those of trial and sentence. The extensive staff came to include a strong and professionally qualified legal department which provided its own procurators, investigators and courts of judges which, as it was claimed, and not effectively denied, dealt with offenders, though always *in camera*, and without the assistance of advocacy, with just as much regard—however this may be estimated—for law, evidence and extenuating circumstances as the ordinary soviet tribunals.¹

The primary function of the GPU is to “maintain the revolution” by suppressing all “counter-revolutionary activities”, including not only what we should call treason and sedition, but also espionage and any sort of conspiracy with the enemies of the soviets; any form of banditry; any riot or serious public disorder; and the destruction or misappropriation of any form of public property by sabotage or otherwise. An invidious feature is the looseness of the definition, which enables anything to be thought “counter-revolutionary” that is of the nature of resistance to the policy of the government for the time being. At different dates

¹ All proceedings of the GPU in its reorganised form are still secret—a practice abhorrent to modern students of judicial proceedings—imperfectly justified by the analogous sessions *in camera* of other courts, or by the plea that it is as much against public policy to publish the details of counter-revolutionary activities as it is those of spies in war-time, and at any time those of smugglers of prohibited drugs or of dealers in pornography, all of whom are, even in Great Britain, France and the United States, frequently tried without the presence of the press and the public. It is, we believe, incorrect to assert that the GPU condemns and executes without trial. Latterly, at least, whenever the accusation is such as to warrant a sentence, there has always been a formal trial, and a quite serious weighing of evidence, though not necessarily with any actual confrontation of the defendant by the witnesses, and never with the assistance of advocacy. There are (at least usually—we cannot speak of cases of urgency) opportunities for appeal to higher authorities of the province, or even to Moscow; but such appeal is only to higher collegia of the GPU itself; never to the USSR Supreme Court, although there may be eventually a petition for clemency to the highest soviet authorities.

mere passive membership of the defeated factions of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries has been accounted a serious crime. At all times it has been extremely dangerous for anyone to be even supposed to be in correspondence, however innocently, with Russian *émigrés* in other countries, many of whom never cease intriguing for the "independence" of the Ukraine or of Georgia, and who still claim to maintain staffs in France and organisations of thousands of officers and men in Manchuria and the Balkans, ready, on any signal, to invade the USSR. Latterly the greatest danger has seemed to be the ubiquitous kulak, and his machinations against the collective farms. "The anti-soviet elements of the village", reported Kaganovich to the Communist Party in January 1933, "are offering fierce opposition. Economically ruined, but not yet having lost their influence entirely, the kulaks, former white officers, former priests, their sons, former ruling landlords and sugar-mill owners, former Cossacks and other anti-soviet elements of the bourgeois-nationalist, and also the Social-Revolutionary and Petlura-supporting intelligentsia settled in the village, are trying in every way to corrupt the collective farms, are trying to foil the measures of the Party and the Government in the realm of farming."¹

It is, indeed, plain that any action whatsoever of which the Soviet Government thought fit to disapprove could be brought within the jurisdiction of the Ogpu, and can now be brought under that of Narkomvnutdel, merely by ascription of "counter-revolutionary" motives or intentions. Unfortunately, as little is authentically known of the procedure and severity of the thirteen years of the Ogpu as of the three years of its predecessor, the Tcheka, or the half-century of their common ancestor, the

¹ Report of Kaganovich on Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), January 20, 1933. To the same audience Stalin observed that "our comrades of the locals have not been able to readjust the front of the struggle against the kulaks and have failed to realise that the physiognomy of the class enemy in the villages has changed, and that our tactics must change accordingly in order to be successful. . . . They seek the class enemy outside the collective farms; they expect to find him with the face of a brute, with big teeth, a thick neck, and gun in his hand. They seek the kulak such as we know him from our posters. But such kulaks have long since disappeared. Present-day kulaks and their agents, present-day anti-soviet elements in the countryside, are to a large extent 'quiet, sweet', almost 'saintly' people. One does not have to look far from the collective farm for kulaks; they are right inside the collective farm, and hold positions there as warehouse managers, business managers, bookkeepers, secretaries, and so on. . . . [The kulak] will never say 'down with the collective farms'. They are 'for' collective farms. But they carry on sabotage and wrecking in the collective farms, which will not do them any good. They will never say 'down with the grain collections!' They are 'for' grain collections. They 'merely' resort to demagoguery, demanding that the collective farms should form reserves for live-stock, three times as much as is necessary, that the collective farm should organise insurance reserves, three times as big as is necessary, that the collective farm should distribute for public feeding from six to ten pounds of grain per day for each worker, and so on. It is obvious that after such 'reserves' and distribution for public feeding, after such roguish demagoguery, the economic strength of the collective farm would be undermined, there would be nothing left for grain collections" (*Moscow Daily News*, January 18, 1933).

Okhrana. There can, however, be little doubt of the terror that was caused by all three institutions among innocent and guilty alike. It is, we think, an objectionable feature that this very terror has been and apparently still is a deliberately chosen means of deterrence. An exceptionally qualified witness¹ has recently put on record his opinion that "the Ogpu themselves circulate fantastic tales of the tortures and punishments which it is alleged are employed in their prisons and places of detention. When the new headquarters of the Leningrad Ogpu were recently completed, a terrible rumour was circulated throughout the city regarding an elaborate mincing-machine in which it was alleged that the GPU destroyed their victims before washing their remains out into the Neva. Although I am convinced that there does not exist the slightest pretext for this rumour, it was nevertheless firmly believed by thousands of Leningrad's inhabitants. In Moscow one frequently hears fantastic tales of physical tortures to which the Ogpu are reputed to subject their victims. Many of these alleged tortures completely eclipse the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition, but it is my own conviction that such methods are not used by the Ogpu. . . . The Ogpu have a definite purpose in circulating such wild stories of their methods, and there is little doubt that, when they detain their own nationals for questioning and examination, the mere existence of these rumours is in itself sufficient to so terrify their victims as to make them comply readily with the examiner's demands, without the Ogpu officers themselves resorting to anything other than a little exaggerated politeness and firmness."

It is, we believe, very largely the manner in which the GPU carries on its work, even more than the ruthlessness of its sentences, or any actual injustice in its operations, that creates such an impression on the public. There is something ghastly in its inveterate secretiveness, even down to the detail of making nearly all its arrests in the dead of night. The public hears nothing until a brief notice in the newspapers informs it that a death sentence has been carried out. Thus, in a case in which a mill had been burnt down, and three important engineers were accused of undefined "counter-revolutionary activities", three judges elaborately tried the case in secret for several days on end. "The sentence was death by shooting. Later the case was appealed . . . the verdict was sustained. Still later, with the condemned men's wives fighting for them like Trojans, the case went to Moscow. The sentence was again upheld. The GPU swallowed them up. A German in Sverdlovsk told me that, as is usual in all such cases, the newspaper had merely a little item: 'December 31 at midnight, the death sentence by shooting was carried out on engineers So-and-so by the Ogpu'.

"There are two peculiarities of these GPU sentences. First, it is said that the convicting prosecutor must execute the sentence himself. Second, the condemned are not lined up against the wall to be shot. They are led from their cells ostensibly for another interview. . . . As the doomed

¹ *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, pp. 271-275.

man, all unknowingly, walks between his guards, he is shot as mercifully as possible: the bullet usually goes into the back of his neck at the base of the brain.¹ A third peculiarity about these sentences is significant. Notices in the newspapers notwithstanding, oftentimes the sentence has never been executed at all! (I do not refer to open commutation or pardon.) Officially dead, the prisoner still lives to continue his work for the soviets, abiding night or day in the GPU dungeon, and working the rest of his time. Good experienced engineers are now too scarce in Russia for many still to be shot promiscuously. They must be kept working for the Plan."² Similar testimony is borne by one who has had excep-

¹ This detail, confirmed by other testimony, appears to have been derived from the practice of the Okhrana. "The execution was regularly carried out by shooting in the Teheka building: a revolver shot was fired into the back of the neck" (*The Okhrana*, by M. I. Vassilyev, 1930, p. 293).

If the death penalty is to be retained for any offences, there is much to be said, if not for permitting the criminal at any time voluntarily to enter a lethal chamber, at least for causing death suddenly, instantaneously and unexpectedly.

² See the volume *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukyeser, 1932, p. 182. We ourselves happened in 1932 upon a confirmatory incident. In an important city we found, occupying the best room in the best hotel which we thought had been reserved for us, a Russian specialist who had been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for counter-revolutionary activities. He had served only a small part of his term when the president of the trust for which he had worked, feeling severely the loss of this expert service, obtained the favour of his release, and his re-assignment to the factory, with permission to live with his wife at the hotel.

An American observer records several instances of similar treatment: "A grafting contractor, whom I met in prison in 1924, was in 1931 in an important executive post. He had been sent to Central Asia to take part in a big development of flax cultivation, and had made good. The famous engineer-professor Ramzin, sentenced in the famous Prom Party trial, was not kept in gaol, but sent back to his lecture-room every day, at first under guard, and then unattended. He lost his house, his automobile and his prestige, but not his job. If he continues to do that well his prestige will return" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 91-92). As already mentioned, none of the persons found guilty in this trial was actually executed. One of them, a medical practitioner who was condemned to death, was acting as prison doctor, living with his wife in a comfortable flat at the Saporoshe prison colony when this was visited in 1933 (*Soviet Russia Fights Crime*, by Lenka von Koorber, 1934, pp. 23-34).

"Recently eleven thousand roubles were awarded for good work to one of the engineers who, about eighteen months before, had been convicted and sentenced for sabotage. He had been sent back to work under surveillance, and made good" (*ibid.* p. 46). "Four men in a civil aviation factory were arrested for wrecking. They were given ten-year sentences. A year later they were all amnestied, given 10,000-rouble bonuses for good work done, and sent back to work without a stigma" (*Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter, 1933, p. 76).

Other cases have been publicly referred to: "In the Menzhinsky Factory No. 39 [Moscow], which has received several high rewards from the Soviet Government for outstanding achievements, former wreckers, who had been convicted in court in their day, have taken an active part in the struggle of the workers for a high tempo and a high quality of production. . . . Some of the 'heroes' of the Shakhly wreckers' trial are now successfully participating in the development of the eastern coal and metal base, and displaying great creative initiative" (*New Methods of Work, New Methods of Leadership*, by J. Grabe, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1933, p. 57).

A specially remarkable instance was given on the opening of the first blooming-mill constructed in the Izhorsky Plant. "The presence of two members of the convicted group of engineers who are responsible for the design and construction lent a touch of the dramatic to the ceremony. It climaxed two distinct features of soviet life, the high achievements of the machine-building industry, and the changing viewpoint of the engineers

tional opportunities for studying the operation of the GPU—Mr. Allan Monkhouse—who goes so far as to state, “I very much doubt whether many of their reputed victims are ever shot”.¹

It is, of course, only the worst cases in which the death penalty is even pronounced. The great majority of the persons arrested by the GPU are now either promptly transferred as criminals for trial by the regular courts, or, if their action is regarded as only mildly counter-revolutionary, they are discharged, after brief detention, with a warning. Others may be directed to reside somewhere outside the six principal cities. More dangerous political offenders may be simply exiled to uncomfortable localities beyond the Urals or near the Arctic Circle. Long terms of actual imprisonment appear to be uncommon; and when the victim gives evidence of repentance and willingness to abandon his past errors he is often released and given opportunities of service to the state.

More invidious was the practice, which seems to have been extensively resorted to after 1927, of relegating “counter-revolutionaries”, and of forcibly deporting kulaks and other recalcitrant peasants, as we have elsewhere described, to concentration camps or special industrial depots, where they could be set to hard labour in return for a bare subsistence. It is with regard to the conditions in these exceptional places of confinement, as distinguished from the regular prisons, that the gravest accusations have been made against the OGPU. The worst of these places was from 1923 (and perhaps still is) the vast aggregation of prisoners, alleged to number many tens of thousands, upon the shores and islands of the White Sea, between Kem and the ancient monastery of Solovetsk. Here the miseries of a rigorous climate were aggravated by a cruel administration by brutal jailers, in which every kind of torment seems to have been employed. The terrible reports that reached the western world at last led to an official enquiry early in 1930, of which no report was ever published. How serious had been the maladministration, under which innumerable prisoners had died, may be judged from the fact that the outcome of the enquiry was the summary shooting of many of the overseers and warders, whilst many more were dismissed or removed elsewhere. By order of the OGPU itself, in May 1930, the whole administration was reorganised, and largely reformed. The entire establishment became an enterprise of economic exploitation, the prisoners being set to work in a whole series of lumber camps, fishing brigades and industrial factories.

formerly hostile to the soviet régime. . . . Its history goes back to May 1930, when representatives of the OGPU entrusted its design and construction to several specialists held in confinement for their participation in the Ramzin-engineered counter-revolutionary activities of the Industrial Party. . . . In the early conferences held between representatives of the OGPU and the engineers it was ascertained that the latter were anxious to prove their loyalty to the Soviet Union by carrying out any task assigned to them which fell within the scope of their qualifications. They felt that they could cope with the designing of a blooming-mill even though they had little to guide themselves by, either in materials or in experience in this specific field” (*Moscow Daily News*, February 4, 1933).

¹ *Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1933, p. 274.

The conditions, we fear, continued to be inhuman ; but, if only in order to make the labour productive, the diet has been improved, and there is authority for saying that the prisoners were, after 1930, no longer beaten, tortured or killed. How many others of these special places of detention have been maintained by the Ogpu, with what number of inmates and under what conditions, is a carefully guarded secret ; and no one can hazard even a plausible guess at the present position.¹

More fortunate may be the fate of the highly skilled engineers, of whom so many suffered in the various proceedings of the Ogpu. Many, if not most, of these were, as we have shown, neither shot nor kept in prison, but were directed to continue in the exercise of their profession, either under guard or under surveillance. It is even reported, we know not with what accuracy, that the Narkomvnutdel, in succession to the Ogpu, maintains an extensive engineering office of its own, where a whole bevy of skilled professionals, under sentence for various counter-revolutionary acts, are employed in working out plans for public works or special machinery for which premature publicity is to be avoided, especially for the service of the Red Army.

It is to be noted that, with all the public fear of the GPU, there is now, we think, little or no sign of general disapproval among the four-fifths of the people who are manual workers in industry or agriculture, either of its continued existence or of its vigorous activities. It is the intellectuals, especially those who held positions under the tsarist régime, who mainly suffer from distrust leading to trumped-up accusations. If, as may well be the case, injustice and unmerited hardship still occur, it arises from the suspicion in which these survivors of the Imperial service continue to be held. The average workman, in the cities at any rate, thoroughly believes that it is to the vigilance of the GPU that is due the continued existence of the Soviet State, which would otherwise have been overthrown by the innumerable enemies, within and without, against whom, as he believes, the struggle has been so great, and is still incompletely successful. And this view, as we have found, is taken also by

¹ An elaborate description of the ancient monastery and place of pilgrimage of Solovetsk, as it was in 1863, may be found in *Free Russia*, by W. Hepworth Dixon, 1865. A terrible account of the same place as a penal settlement in 1931-1932 is given by an escaped prisoner, in the article "Life in Concentration Camps in the USSR", by Vladimir Chernavin, in *Slavonic Review* for January 1934, pp. 387-408; repeated in his book, *I Speak for the Silent* (1935). It is to be regretted that this testimony—very naturally strongly biased—mixes up personal observation and experience of conditions that are, in all conscience, bad enough, with hearsay gossip unsupported by evidence, and with manifestly exaggerated statistical guesses incapable of verification. The account would have carried greater weight if it had been confined to the very serious conditions of which the author had personal knowledge. His naïve belief that this and other penal settlements are now maintained and continuously supplied with thousands of deported manual workers and technicians, deliberately for the purpose of making, out of this forced labour, a net pecuniary profit to add to the state revenue, will be incredible by anyone acquainted with the economic results of the chain-gang, or of prison labour, in any country in the world.

Another description of the horrors of Solovetsk (on which, unfortunately, no reliance can be placed) will be found in chap. xx. pp. 200-216 of *Secrets of the Ogpu*, by Essad Bey, 1933.

foreign residents of candour and experience. "In all fairness", writes the one who has put into a book the most personal knowledge of the GPU, "I must add that, wherever the GPU strikes, it is usually with reason. Perhaps the accusation is trumped up or exaggerated; perhaps the particular incident leading to the arrest is but a pretext. Yet behind these possibly flimsy excuses, the GPU is practically dead certain that the accused was engaged in activities against the state. When they do strike they strike sure and hard. Their case is practically watertight. If the charge is a minor one, and the man repents, he is released. However, many of the condemned men have admitted, fully and unrepentantly, their counter-revolutionary activities and flagrant sabotage. Without the GPU there would be no Communist Party in Russia to-day, no Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Spies are shot in time of war, and Russia is admittedly at war. In Russia the greatest crime is justly that against the state."¹

The Constructive Work of the Ogpu

During the past few years increasing attention has been paid to what may be called the constructive work of the Ogpu. Its preventive service has greatly improved. On the railways, as in the streets of the great cities of the USSR, there is now at least as much security against robbery with violence as in other countries. What is even more to be praised is the reform in prison administration that was started by Djerjinsky, and has been maintained by his successors.

The ordinary prisons of the USSR are maintained not by the GPU but by the sovmarkoms of the several constituent republics. The buildings are, in most cases, those inherited from the tsarist régime, and often still inadequately improved in sanitation and amenity. But the administration is well spoken of, and is now apparently as free from physical cruelty as any prisons in any country are ever likely to be.² But in addition to these

¹ See the interesting account in *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukkeyser, 1932, p. 182.

² The present writers have had no opportunity of investigating the prison system of any of the constituent republics of the USSR; and they have found no adequate sources of information as to present prison conditions. But it may be recorded that a French *avocat*, P. Guiboud-Ribaud (who was known to be friendly to the USSR), wished, in 1927, to inspect the prisons. He saw the People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR (Kursky), who at once acceded to his request, and obtained for him, by telephone to the Commissariat of the Interior, the complete list of some hundreds of prisons. M. Guiboud-Ribaud was able to choose whichever he pleased, and was given written orders admitting him without notice to any of them, either alone or with an interpreter of his own selection. He thereupon visited many prisons, and found there, mixing with the other convicts, numerous political prisoners (some whose death sentences had been commuted to long terms of imprisonment). He was able to have long conversations with them alone, as they were free to circulate about the corridors, and many of them spoke one or other of the languages at his command. He found the prisons, and the treatment of the prisoners, humane and rational, and far superior, in his estimation, to those of France. His long and interesting account ends with the conclusion, "le régime pénitentiaire en Russie soviétique est humain et acceptable" (*Où va la Russie?* par P. Guiboud-Ribaud, Paris, 1928, chap. vii., "la régie pénitentiaire et les prisons", pp. 115-134).

Even more informative, and equally laudatory, is the book, *Soviet Russia Fights*

government prisons, the GPU itself maintains at Bolshevo, in the Moscow oblast, a remarkable reformatory settlement, which seems to go further, alike in promise and achievement, towards an ideal treatment of offenders against society than anything else in the world. This is an extensive establishment, accommodating nearly a thousand inmates. It is situated on the pleasant country estate of an expropriated millionaire industrialist, where it combines manufacturing production with agriculture. It has no walls or locked gates interfering with the inmates' freedom to leave. These, who are specially selected as likely to be reformable out of the mass of persons who have been at least twice convicted by the ordinary tribunals of the several constituent republics of petty larceny, or burglary or robbery with violence, are simply set to work at piece-work wages, to be spent freely at the various departments of the prison shop; allowed to smoke and to talk, to enjoy music and the theatre, and to spend their leisure, within reasonable limits, as they choose. They are, in fact, shown that a life of regulated industry and recreation, with the utmost practicable freedom, is more pleasant than a life of crime and beggary. After a certain period they may invite their wives to reside with them, and each family is set up on its own homestead. Many refuse to leave on the expiration of their sentences, some find wives there; and the colony steadily grows as a self-supporting mixed population, now nearing 3000, of convicts and freemen.¹ Nor does Bolshevo stand alone. There are in the USSR ten other reformatory colonies on the same plan.

The GPU appears to be made use of whenever the Soviet Government has a difficult task to accomplish which transcends the sphere of any of the constituent republics. When, in 1925, the task was undertaken of capturing and reforming the hundreds of thousands of "homeless waifs"—the sad product of the civil war and the famine—it was to the head

Crime, by Lenka von Koerber (1934, 240 pp.), who, in 1932, wandered during many months over innumerable prisons (other than those for political offenders) all over the USSR, freely conversing with the prisoners without let or hindrance. See also *Russian Justice*, by M. S. Calcott, New York, 1935.

Official reports published by the Prisons Department of the Commissariat of the Interior of the RSFSR in 1932 record steady progress in the industrial training of convicted prisoners, and their employment in productive work, particularly in timber-working, metal, leather, quarrying, textiles and food industries, at which they earn wages according to the trade union standard rates, with the hours of labour usual in those industries. The overhead charges prevent any claim to make economic profit, but the moral effect of regular and especially of purposeful occupation is reported to be remarkably good.

¹ This prisoners' colony of Bolshevo, some twenty miles from Moscow, has been visited by many persons, including one of the present writers, with others better qualified to appraise reformatory prisons. See for instance the description by D. N. Pritt, K.C., in *Forward*, January 7, 1933; that in *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., and John A. Kingsbury, 1933; that in *Soviet Russia Fights Crime*, by Lenka von Koerber, 1934, pp. 98-120; and that in *The Russian Judicial System*, by Harold J. Laski, 1935.

The theory on which it was established is now frequently described in the soviet newspapers: "Crime—thrift, robbery, murder—is the result of social and economic conditions. That was the principle which prompted the organisation of the Labour Commune. Remove the people from corrupting influences; give them the type of work which will make an appeal to them; offer them a means of subsistence—and they will not desire to lead a life of vagrancy on the streets" (*Moscow Daily News*, August 2, 1933).

of the Ogpu—the idealist fanatic Djerjinsky—that the difficult job was entrusted. He was appointed president of a special commission to “liquidate” this formidable problem; and he mainly employed for this purpose the only ubiquitous civil staff that the USSR possessed, namely, the officials of the Ogpu itself. It was under this commission that Djerjinsky and the Ogpu established and maintained the institutions (now converted into reformatories for youthful offenders or orphan asylums) in which these hundreds of thousands of boys and girls were, in the course of the ensuing seven years, with a considerable degree of success, “reconditioned”, and placed out in the industrial world, where a remarkably large proportion have already made good as self-supporting and law-abiding citizens.

In another direction, the Ogpu during the past few years has been engaged in many constructional works, partly as a means of employing the engineers, technicians and manual workers whom its tribunals have condemned for counter-revolutionary activities, and whose sentences have been commuted into terms of enforced labour. The total number so employed is quite unknown. In many cases special housing facilities have been arranged, for people working in this manner under guard, actually in the works which they were employed. It has been stated that Professor Ramzin, the central figure in the Industrial Party Trial in 1931, who has spent practically the whole period of his sentence employed in useful consulting-engineering work, was during the greater part of the first year housed under guard at the Electrosilva works in Leningrad, in the house that in pre-war days was occupied by Krassin, then one of the directors of these works. The Ogpu receives payment from industrial trusts for the services of technical men working in this manner, and pays a portion of the sums thus earned to the men serving under sentences.

The latest example of the constructive work of the Ogpu will strike the British or American student of public institutions as even more remarkable than its prison reforms or child-rescue work. When, in 1929, it was decided by the Soviet Government to construct an artificial waterway from Leningrad to the White Sea, this huge operation was entrusted, not to a contractor, and not even to one of the state departments or trusts dealing with “heavy industry”, or performing other feats of civil engineering, but to the Ogpu. To the Ogpu itself was given the task of engaging, organising and directing the whole staff required, which seems to have amounted, at times, to over two hundred thousand. A large proportion of the manual labour was performed by men who had been sentenced to imprisonment by the ordinary courts for such offences as robbery, embezzlement, assault and homicide. To these there appear to have been added a considerable number of persons, some of them technical specialists, who had been sentenced by the Ogpu’s own tribunals for counter-revolutionary activities; and also a number of men deported from their villages as kulaks or recalcitrants whose holdings stood in the way of the formation of collective farms. This heterogeneous host was organised into

companies and brigades under foremen and engineers, some of whom were, in the course of the work, promoted from the ranks. This industrial army was housed and fed and medically attended to, and moved from place to place, just as if it had been a military force. Yet it did not behave as a military force. These convicts serving their sentences rose to the height of the occasion. Realising that they were engaged on a work of great public utility, they were induced to enter into "socialist competition", gang against gang, locality against locality, as to which could shift the greatest amount of earth, erect the greatest length of concrete wall, or lay the longest line of rails, within a given number of hours or days. It is, we think, not surprising that Maxim Gorky should describe this almost incredible experiment in glowing terms. In the *Moscow Daily News* of August 14, 1933, he writes: "Out of the ranks of law-breakers of 15 years there was salvaged, in the colonies and communes of the OGPU, thousands of highly qualified workers and more than 100 agronomists, engineers, physicians and technicians. In the bourgeois countries such a thing is impossible. . . . How does the process of reconstructing the now socially dangerous, but potentially socially useful, people on the Baltic-White Sea Canal show itself, and what are the measures employed? The nondescript army of law-breakers, vandals and enemies are told: 'It is necessary to connect via canal the Baltic and the White Seas. You must construct a waterway 227 km. long, and you will have to work in the woods, in the swamps, tear down granite cliffs, change the course of turbulent rivers, and lift their waters up by means of sluices to a height of 103 metres. It will be necessary for you to dig up more than 30 million cubic metres of earth. All this work will have to be done in the shortest possible time. You will receive good food, good raiment, good barracks, and you will have club-quarters and cinemas. The Government does not promise you anything beyond that. Your own work will prove your worth. . . .'

"The army of prospective wrestlers with nature, not being of a homogeneous social origin, could not all be of one mood. But it so happens that in the OGPU's correctional camps they teach not only reading and writing, but also political wisdom. Man is by nature quick-witted and it is very seldom that stupidity is conditioned by one's physical make-up. More often than not, it is the result of bourgeois class violence. Among the tens of thousands there were many who at once grasped the importance of such a work for the state, and the physically healthy were eager to exert themselves. The wildly flowing rivers and the swamps of Karelia, her fields and woods covered with huge boulders—here was something to struggle against."¹

In the end, this huge work, which comprised every kind of engineering operation, was accurately measured up and rigorously tested, when it was found that the waterway, carrying sea-going vessels of considerable tonnage, had been completed well within the contract time, at a total cost for labour and materials below the estimate. The Soviet Government,

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 14, 1933.

quick to recognise how to make this success of value in the education of the public, celebrated the opening of the White Sea Ship Canal by giving decorations, not merely to the directing superintendent and his principal engineers, but also (the same decorations) to several dozens of the convict labourers who had excelled in zeal and good conduct. In addition money awards were made to a considerable number of the best workers; and the remainder of the sentences of 12,484 of them were remitted, provision being made for their immediate admission to normal employment, jobs being quickly found in one or other of the numerous industrial establishments needing workmen in the various parts of the USSR. In addition, remissions of part of the remaining term of their sentences were made to 59,516 others. It is pleasant to think that the warmest appreciation was officially expressed of the success of the GPU, not merely in performing a great engineering feat, but in achieving a triumph in human regeneration.¹

Amid the flood of unverifiable denigration, and in the absence of authentic information, it is hard to come to any confident conclusion about the Ogpu of 1934, or of the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel) into which it was in that year converted. We venture to infer, during recent years, a steady improvement in more than one respect. With the growing feeling of security the governing authorities of the USSR have been, on the whole, although not without nervous backslidings, relaxing the sternness of repression of those who, without intrigue and without active resistance, nevertheless by opinion and sympathy, still remain hostile to the present régime. Concurrently, those very persons, without conversion to communism, have become increasingly convinced of the stability and, indeed, the permanence of the Soviet Government, whilst becoming reconciled to the better conditions of life and increased opportunities for responsible work that are now afforded to them. There is, accordingly, no longer the same justification for the difference that the Ogpu seems to have made in the treatment of Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists and monarchists on the one hand, and of common thieves and bandits on the other. It appears to have been held, in practice, that mere criminals could safely be dealt with exclusively with a view to their reform, but that political hostility was irremediable, so that enemies of the régime had to be either exterminated or else put away in prison or relegated to distant exile. In the period of prolonged civil war this view certainly led to a great many summary executions, of Whites by Reds as of Reds by Whites. It survived, through the ensuing decade, in the permanent suspicion of disloyalty with which, by the communist activists, and perhaps by the Ogpu itself, the intelligentsia were regarded. With a real increase in loyalty on the one side, we seem to notice a substantial decrease in the miasma of suspicion on the other. It is at least interesting

¹ The soviet newspapers during August 1933 contained long reports of these public celebrations; see for summaries in English, *Moscow Daily News* for that month, notably August 6 and 17, 1933. The decree, signed by M. Kalinin as President of the Central Executive Committee, is dated August 4, 1933.

to find it definitely reported by a soviet writer that the Ogpu has lately begun to treat rebels and counter-revolutionaries on the same lines as common criminals, on the theory that, 'as man has been made by his environment, he ought to be reformed by change of environment, rather than punished. "In the Karelian woods," wrote, in the spring of 1933, a man serving a ten-years sentence as a counter-revolutionary, "in the barracks of the technical workers, I first learned the meaning of real work, and what it means to be an engineer who has behind him the persistent energy of a mass of workers who know what they are working for. At my age I cannot philosophise much, but the idea of rehabilitating wayward people by means of constructive labour is a wonderfully healthy and beautiful one. As for the practical application of the idea, let the two thousand shock-workers who were released in our district long before the expiration of their terms testify. As might have been expected, all such heroic toilers were set free long before the expiration of their terms. But until then, for a period of some five hundred days, these engineers were moving in the thick of a 'socially dangerous mass', which knew that they were counter-revolutionaries, yet, though counter-revolutionaries, they worked unselfishly. . . . How did the kulaks work? There was, for example, the 'Podlinsky' brigade of District One numbering 32 kulaks. The last 10 days of the month of May the brigade attained the record figure of 256 per cent above the required norm of labour on soft soil. It refused to leave the work even when another brigade appeared to replace it, and it became necessary to remove it by special order from the superintendent." ¹

It is not inconsistent with such a change of practice that the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs, into which the Ogpu was in 1934 transformed, should retain all its old machinery of close inspection of the whole population, or that this should be kept sharpened by perpetual reports and delations. This general supervision of the whole population may even be perfected as a consequence of recent measures. In order to clear the large cities, and Moscow in particular, from the accumulation within them of nondescripts without legitimate occupation or means of livelihood, the old system of internal passports is being revived, involving some form of registration of domicile and of *permis de séjour*. "A universal passport system for the USSR has been adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR . . . every citizen of the USSR from the age of 16 upwards will have to obtain a passport if he permanently resides in town or workers' settlement or is employed on a railroad, state farm or new construction job. . . . To effect this registration and handling of passports the Government sets up an administrative department of the militia [the local police], under the auspices of the Ogpu with G. E. Prokofiev at the head. This department will have general control of the Workers' and Peasants' militia in the constituent republics. It will also train militia-men for these republics and to introduce legislative acts before the Council

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 14, 1933.

of People's Commissars pertaining to the militia. The militia remains otherwise an autonomous body in accordance with the statute of May 25, 1931, passed by the Council of People's Commissars, concerning the rights and powers of the militia. . . . *Isvestia* stresses the new regulation as an important act from the point of view of statistics which, it declares, is one of the major requisites of socialist planning. This truth was realised long ago and many statistics are already available on production, output, fixed and circulating capital, money resources and so on. Very little is known, however, about the major factor in production—man himself. On this subject statistics are meagre. We know little about composition, position and movement of population. The government consequently has no means of influencing movement of population. Passport regulations will alter the situation, and this alone renders the new regulation of extraordinary practical and political importance. On the verge of the Second Five-Year Plan the country must know what changes were wrought by the First Five-Year Plan in the masses of the people, and incidentally in the geographical distribution of population.”¹

Thus, we may conclude that the other functions of this extensive government department, in the considerable social services rendered by its uniformed staff, and its positive achievements of a reformatory character, now constitute a larger proportion of its work than its criminal prosecutions or the imposition of death sentences.²

The Procurator of the USSR

What will now be the trend of development cannot easily be foreseen. In 1933 there was created an important new office which may possibly have some significance. Akulov, an old revolutionary and associate of Lenin, who had been a vice-president of the Ogpu commission, a place from which he was removed in 1931, and relegated to an inferior post in the Donets Basin, was appointed, in July 1933, Procurator of the USSR, a new office with all the wide powers and functions of the Procurators of the constituent republics. An additional duty explicitly imposed upon him is “the supervision . . . of the legality and regularity of the actions of the Ogpu”. This may perhaps mean that there is a feeling in the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) that the time has come when there can safely be established a systematic check on the methods and procedure of the Ogpu, possibly with a view to a change in its psychology.³

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 29, 1932.

² This was noted in 1930 by an American observer long resident in the USSR: “Whereas the executions by the Tsheka during the years of desperate civil war ran well into thousands, the annual lists of persons shot by order of the Gay Pay Oo could probably be reckoned in scores, or at most in hundreds” (*Soviet Russia*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1930, p. 390). For a population exceeding 160 millions such a number of executions does not compare badly with the statistics of various other countries deeming themselves civilised.

³ *L'Europe nouvelle*, July 29, 1933; also article by Louis Fischer in *The New Republic*, July 1933.

We have been told that Akulov, the USSR Procurator, now has an assistant per-

In the following year the reform was completed, as we have already described, by the transformation of the OGPU into the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narkomvnutdel), under a People's Commissar of its own (Yagoda), with a seat in the USSR Sovnarkom.

Three Revolutions in One

Let us, before leaving this darkest chapter dealing with the most destructive trend of Soviet Communism, which shows no sign of weakening—the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist—attempt some comparison between it and the corresponding revolutionary period that England has, in its own way, traversed.

The Russian revolution of 1917–1935 has combined in one what are essentially three distinct struggles, which in western Europe came separately to a crisis in a period stretching from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. There was first the conflict, between rival interpretations of man's relation to the universe, for supremacy over the mind and conduct of men. There was next the violent transformation, standing between the Middle Ages and modern times, of the way in which the mass of the population gained its subsistence. And there was finally the struggle for the control of the government between the narrow oligarchy of a superior class and the mass of common citizens. It was the fate of Russia to have its religious, its industrial and its political revolutions, not separately, but almost simultaneously: and, perhaps consequently, to make each of them more drastically complete than has happened elsewhere. Within the short space of eighteen years, the dominant faith by which men's lives are governed has undergone, in the USSR, the most fundamental change, to which we devote a subsequent chapter.¹ Two successive agrarian revolutions have coincided with a gigantic mechanisation of every kind of production both agricultural and industrial, working under an entirely novel theory of wealth production.² We have described in the six chapters of Part I. how the entire governmental structure of one-sixth of the total land-surface of the globe has been drastically reversed, replacing the "dictatorship" of the capitalist by that of the proletariat. If we find the fight in the USSR fiercer, the destruction of social tissue more ruthless, the cruelty and suffering greater, than in the Reformation in Elizabethan England, or in the Industrial Revolution in the England of George the Third, or in the constitutional changes in the England between 1640 and 1918, we should remember the intensity given by the concentration, in the USSR, of all three revolutions within one-twentieth part of four centuries, and a simultaneous coalescence of the differences and insurgencies of a population more than twenty times as great as that of manently inside the new Commissariat of Internal Affairs, who makes regular reports on all cases dealt with, so as to enable the Procurator promptly to intervene whenever he considers that injustice has occurred.

¹ See Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

² See Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

England in the middle of those centuries. Surely so large a proportion of the whole world has never before undergone, suddenly and simultaneously, a transformation alike so penetrating and so volcanic!

No one can compute the sum of human suffering caused by this triple revolution over so vast an area, in so brief a time, amid the most embittered civil war, supported by half a dozen foreign armies actually invading soviet territory. But equally no one can compute the sum of human suffering, even unto death, caused in England by the Protestant Reformation, the Industrial Revolution and the triumph of democratic parliamentarianism, the whole drawn out over four centuries, with only the mildest of civil wars, and with next to no foreign invasion. If, eighteen years after the Bolshevik seizure of power, all ministers of religion, together with the impenitent landlords, capitalists and speculators, are disfranchised, and are excluded alike from membership of the soviets, the trade unions and the consumers' cooperative societies, we ought in all fairness to remember that, for nearly three centuries after the Anglican Church had abjured the primacy of Rome (in fact, down to 1828), not only every Roman Catholic priest, or member of a religious order, but also every person adhering to the Roman Catholic faith, was denied a vote. For at least as long, members of the Jewish, the Baptist, the Quaker or the Unitarian religion were excluded alike from Parliament, the municipal councils, the ancient trade guilds, the Royal College of Physicians, and the Commission of the Peace. Their sons were denied admission to practically all the then-existing secondary schools, as well as to all the universities in the land. These disqualifications on account of religion, not confined to the priesthood, were in England not entirely got rid of until the twentieth century.¹ Eighteen years' mechanisation of Russian industry and agriculture have ruthlessly upset the "established expectations" of millions of Russian handicraftsmen and peasants, and involved the deportation and confiscation of property of possibly hundreds of thousands of supposed kulaks and other recalcitrants, many of whom must have died under their hardships. In Great Britain the statutory "enclosure of commons"; the eviction of the Scottish crofters in favour of sheep and grouse and deer, and the triumph of the machine industry between 1700 and 1850, were accompanied by the practical ruin and destruction of nearly the whole surviving peasantry, and the reduction of the independent handicraftsmen to the hideous conditions of the unregulated mines and factories. We are apt to forget the terrible record of the virtual enslavement, by the thousand, of little children in the new textile factories; the actual

¹ See the Act 16 & 17 George V. c. 55 (1926). Priests and deacons of the Roman Catholic Church, together with those of the Church of England, are still disqualified for sitting in the House of Commons (though not in the House of Lords). The King and Queen, together with the Lord Chancellor, have still to profess the Protestant religion. Under the Tudor and Stuart statutes the mere profession of Roman Catholicism, or the possession of Romish books, incurred all the penalties of *praemunire*. These laws were virtually abrogated in 1792 and 1829, but they were not wholly repealed until 1871 (*Guide to the Laws of England affecting Roman Catholics*, by T. C. Austey, 1842, 193 pp.; *Manual of the Law specially affecting Catholics*, by W. S. Lilly and J. E. P. Wallis, 1893, 266 pp.).

purchase of orphans (with "one idiot among every twenty") by the mill-owners from the parish vestries and Poor Law Guardians; the young boys and girls working naked in the coal-mines; the indescribable state of the prisons and the general mixed workhouses; the paupers arbitrarily deported to their places of settlement; the daily slaughter and maiming of the workers of all ages, by wholly preventible "accidents" from the machinery that it was too expensive to fence; and the incredible insanitation, generation after generation, of the new industrial centres, all of which, as we can now recognise, formed, in the nineteenth century, a frightful background to the brilliant coronation of the young Queen Victoria.¹ Even the constitutional reform of 1832, which brought political power to the British bourgeoisie, not only left nine-tenths of the adult men (and all the women) without a vote, but even arbitrarily took away the vote that many handicraftsmen of Westminster and a few other constituencies had long exercised under an exceptional popular franchise. In Great Britain, it is true, there has been no Okhrana, Tcheka or OGPU, of which the irresistibly dominant aristocracy and bourgeoisie never felt the need. But even without such a force the eighteenth and even the nineteenth century witnessed a persistent oppression, by High Court Judges as well as by magistrates belonging to the governing class, of trade unionists, strikers, poachers, vagrants, sellers of popular newspapers, "seditionists" and blasphemers—all professedly in accordance with a criminal law so vague and ambiguous that it could always be stretched to cover every activity displeasing to the governing oligarchy. It is only a callous ignorance that prevents our recognising that, even in the twentieth century, this oppression has not wholly disappeared.²

The English reader may impatiently declare that we have overstated the indictment that the Russian communist may bring against us. Quite the contrary. On discussing the matter with a member of the Marx-Lenin Institute at Moscow, he indignantly objected that such a comparison as we have made understated the case of the Bolshevik Government, and

¹ When Engels, in 1845, drew attention to some of these evil conditions in his *Lage der englischen Arbeiterklasse*, his work seems never to have penetrated either to the Poor Law Board or to the Home Office or the House of Commons (it is not in their libraries). It was ignored by the London publishers and did not appear in English until 1887, when it was published as *The Condition of the English Working Class in 1844*.

² Even down to the present day the law relating to criminal conspiracy, sedition and seditious libel, strikes and picketing, blasphemy and vagrancy has not been thoroughly reformed, and is still from time to time the cause of "legal" oppression of the poor for action which among the well-to-do usually goes unpunished. We may yet see it used much more frequently than at present for the oppression of those who are still widely regarded as the "lower orders". Nor should we ignore the very frequent hardship to wage-earning families caused by certain features of the English legal system itself, such as the prohibitive expense and difficulties of an appeal to Quarter Sessions against the judgments of Petty Sessions (the often prejudiced decisions of a couple of lauded proprietors); or the whole practice of "imprisonment for debt"; or the quite insufficient provision yet made for ensuring that every person sued for debt, or endangered by proceedings for eviction, or even accused of crime, is able to secure, without question, the services of an advocate, and defray the necessary expenses of defence against what may well prove to be absolute ruin to himself and his family.

gravely overstated that of the British Government, by a most important omission. He pointed out that we had taken, on the one side, the whole of the immense territory of the USSR, with its 170 millions of people of the most diverse races, creeds, languages and customs, the vast majority being illiterate and uncivilised. On the other side, he objected, we had taken, not the British Empire, but only the small section of it, perhaps one-tenth of the whole, which belonged to the dominant race and dwelt in the most civilised area. Even leaving out of account the short time that the Soviet Government had been at work, the comparison between the judicial systems of the two countries could only be fairly made between the USSR as a whole and the British Empire as a whole. "You tell us", this outspoken critic declared, "that in the sight of your God all men are equal; that one soul is as precious as another. We prefer to express the same thing in the American statement that all men have equal rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. In the USSR, from one end of the vast territory to the other, we have absolute identity of franchise; equality of rights under the law; universal education without the slightest colour-bar or racial prejudice; complete freedom for all without exception from exploitation by landlord or capitalist, and a genuine and persistent attempt to level up the backward races as quickly as possible to an equality of civilisation with the highest. If you reproach us", he continued, "with defects and shortcomings in our eighteen years of social construction, what about the record of the British Empire during its hundred and fifty years of social organisation since the conquest of Canada and the discoveries of Captain Cook? What justice did the British Government accord to the Irish Catholics under the Penal Laws, and to the Scottish Jacobites at Glencoe and Culloden? What about the slave trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? What has happened to the aborigines of Australia? Up to what level of civilisation has your Government, in a whole century, brought the descendants of the negro slaves that your ships carried to the West Indies? What is to-day the status, politically and legally, of the Africans in the Cape Colony and in Kenya? Was the judicial procedure always perfect in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny? What happened fifty years afterwards at Amritsar? Even to-day, how many thousands of Indians are in prison *without having been convicted of any crime whatsoever*, merely because the magistrate suspects that they are 'bad characters', and they are unable to find the two sureties for their future good behaviour, which he summarily orders them to find? And what about the rights of property of the inhabitants of the lands that you have conquered? Above all, what about the denial of political rights and economic freedom to the hundreds of millions of British subjects in Africa and India? Compare the Soviet Government's treatment of the backward races in the wilds of Siberia and on the borders of Afghanistan and Mongolia with your own dealings with similar people. The verdict of history will, we think, be on our side."

Two wrongs do not make a right. Moreover, the mutual reproaches

of those who have sinned in common make rather for exasperation than for enlightenment. We had better leave the future historian to come to his own verdict ! Meanwhile comparisons between different nations may more profitably lead to each learning, from the other's aspirations, how to improve and refine his own : and to each discovering, from the other's shortcomings and mistakes, as if in a mirror, the very defects and blunders that he has made but of which he had been scarcely conscious. We may safely conclude, from the common experience of mankind, that whenever, in any country, there takes place a great redistribution of power among groups or classes, a new destination will be given to existing wealth, especially that in the form of ownership of the means of production. If that new destination is forcibly resisted by the old possessors, there has always been fighting ; and both during and after the fighting, more or less " terrorism " by those who prove to be the stronger, and who regard this as the only means of destroying or maintaining the social revolution that is occurring. This fighting and " terrorism ", and the misery to which it leads, are, as it seems to the present writers, strong reasons in favour of proceeding as far as possible by general goodwill.

There is one other consideration with which we shall conclude. Future generations will estimate the worthwhileness of national conquest or internal revolutions, not so much by the temporary misery that they inevitably create, but largely according to the relative social value, in each case, of the new order in comparison with the old. In the USSR the substantial completion of the liquidation of the landlord and capitalist, together with the coincident abandonment by the western powers of their original project of armed intervention to suppress Soviet Communism, have not only made humanity to individuals at last socially safe, but have also witnessed a considerable building up of new social tissue, and the purposeful reorganisation of community life on a deliberate plan for the Remaking of Man, the various trends of which we have now in successive chapters to examine.

CHAPTER VIII

PLANNED PRODUCTION FOR COMMUNITY CONSUMPTION

IN this chapter we seek to describe what seems to us the most significant socially of all the trends in Soviet Communism, namely, the deliberate planning of all the nation's production, distribution and exchange, not for swelling the profit of the few but for increasing the consumption of the whole community. And if we may be forgiven an autobiographical note, it is this outstanding discovery in economics, and its application, in unpromising circumstances, to the relations between nearly 170 millions of persons on one-sixth of the earth's land-surface, that induced us, despite the disqualifications of old age, to try to understand what is happening in the USSR. Will this new system of economic relationships, and this new motivation of wealth production, prove permanently successful? For if it does, it will not only show the rest of the world how to abolish technological, and indeed all other mass unemployment, together with the devastating alternation of commercial booms and slumps; but further, by opening the way to the maximum utilisation of human enterprise and scientific discovery in the service of humanity, it will afford the prospect of increase beyond all computation, alike of national wealth and of individual well-being.¹

¹ The First Five-Year Plan led to an ocean of literature in many languages. The publications (mostly in Russian) of Gosplan itself are numerous and extensive, the Plan alone occupying half a dozen volumes. The official summary of the Plan, without comment, was published in English in 1929, under the title of *The Soviet Union Looks Ahead* (New York, 1929, 295 pp.). Gosplan itself published in English; in 1933, a *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR* (296 pp.). The best exposition in English is perhaps the set of four lengthy papers contributed by Gosplan in 1931 to the World Social Economic Congress at Amsterdam, the responsible authors being V. V. Obolensky-Ossinsky, L. Solomon Rouin, A. Gayster and L. A. Fraval (published in the bulky report entitled *World Social Economic Planning*, 2 vols., 1931, by the International Industrial Relations Institute [I.R.A.], the Hague and New York); and partly republished in the volume entitled *Socialist Planned Economy in the USSR*, by V. V. Obolensky-Ossinsky. A clear analysis (in German) is *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion*, by T. Pollock (Leipzig, 1929). Another description, by a former chief of Gosplan, is published in German as *Die Planwirtschaftarbeit in der Sowjetunion*, von M. Krischanowski (1928, 124 pp.). A good popular explanation will be found in *Piatiletka: Russia's Five-Year Plan*, by Michael Farbman (New York, 1931, 220 pp.), first published as a special supplement to *The Economist* (London, November 1930). More elementary is *Modern Russia, the Land of Planning*, by Louis Segal (1933, 169 pp.). *The Soviet Five-Year Plan and its Effect on World Trade*, by H. R. Knickerbocker (London, 1931, 246 pp.), affords a series of vivid impressions. *Le Plan quinquennal*, par A. Jagow (L'Eglantine, Brussels, 1932, 266 pp.), is an entirely adverse but merely theoretical criticism. A more balanced view, based on observation of the facts, is given in *Les Leçons du Plan quinquennal*, par Gustave Maquet (Paris, 1932, 252 pp.); and the article by Margaret Miller, "Planning System in Soviet Russia", in *Slavonic Review* for December 1930. *Der russische Fünfjahres Plan*, by Nils Oleinoff (Brunswick, 1932, 86 pp.), has a good bibliography of works in the languages of western Europe. Other German studies are *Die russische kommunistische Theorie und ihre Auswirkung in den Planwirtschaftversuchen der Sowjetunion*, von Mary Bauermeister (1930, 154 pp.); *Der Fünfjahr-*

How Planning Arose

The theory and practice of planned production for community consumption did not exist ready-made in the minds of Lenin and his followers when they found themselves in office as the Government of Russia. Year by year it was slowly and painfully evolved; at first by the primitive process of "trial and error"; presently to be superseded by "the scientific method" of perpetually testing the "order of thought" by comparison with the "order of things"; that is to say, by observation and experiment, ratiocination and verification, all the results being recorded in detail for comparison and future action. The Bolsheviks had what most governments lack—a fixed purpose of social change, to be persistently pursued and relentlessly fulfilled, at whatever cost and sacrifice. This purpose they themselves described as the creation of a new social order, "the classless state"; by which they meant a society in which no one would be able to use the labour of others in order to enrich himself, or even in order to live without producing. Hence the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist. But the term contained also a constructive meaning, briefly summed up as social equality. It implied, that is to say, the establishment of a community in which every able-bodied person, without exception, would be expected to repay to the community the cost of his upbringing, as well as to contribute to the common well-being, in whatever way his faculties permitted; whilst being secured his own share in the common product, in a form and to an amount appropriate to his particular needs. It is this far-reaching purpose, which the government of the USSR has never lost sight of, and in pursuit of which it has never weakened, that runs like a red thread through all the warp and weft of its administration, and that inspires and elucidates, as we shall attempt to show, the whole trend of its history.

The Episode of Workers' Control

With all its purposefulness, the Bolshevik Party, in common with other Marxists, had no idea of how this social ideal could be realised.¹ Lenin

plan und seine Erfüllung (1932, 106 pp.), by Boris Brutzkus; *Russland vor dem zweiten Fünfjahrplan*, von Georg Kaiser (1932, 143 pp.). Almost the only British economic examinations of the Plan known to us are the able volume entitled *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Woodton (1933); the article by Paul Winterton in *The Economic Journal*, September 1933; the chapter "An Economist looks at Planning", in *Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by Professor T. E. Gregory (1933); and three paragraphs in *The Great Depression*, by Lionel Robbins (1934). A useful account will be found in Hugh Dalton's chapter in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by Margaret Cole (1933). To the above must be added two substantial works of criticism, avowedly mainly theoretical and historical, and largely written in 1900-1922, both with introductions and recently written chapters by Professor F. A. Hayek, namely, *Collectivist Economic Planning*, by various economists, with useful bibliography, 1935, 293 pp.; and *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, 234 pp.

¹ "In the days before 1918, all the Marxist world thought of the social revolution as an end. The workers of the world were to unite, overthrow capitalism and be happy ever

himself was distinguished for his firm grasp of the conception that the revolution was not itself communism, nor even the first stage of a socialist state, but only the opportunity for its construction. But so long as he was in exile, even he had thought out no plan of how to build up a classless society. During his six months' residence in or near Petrograd in 1917, when he was maintaining a continuous bombardment of the public with articles, pamphlets, letters and speeches, we can see him, in successive publications, bit by bit recognising and accepting the materials out of which the socialist state was to be built. In his writings he adumbrated, successively, the pyramid of soviets by which the citizens would create the instruments of local and central administration; then the trade unions, comprising all the wage-paid workers by hand or by brain, who would by this means jointly control the conditions of their working lives; then the consumers' cooperative movement, through which the whole adult population, as consumers, would manage the distribution among themselves of the commodities which they, as producers, had created. In Russia all the waterways and nearly all the railways were already state enterprises; and Lenin contemplated the immediate nationalisation of the banks and of all credit and currency operations. To these main social structures he added the notion, not of immediate nationalisation, but of a public control of the manufacturing, mining and trading enterprises still left in private hands. This control was to be exercised through universal publicity and a close supervision of the management by the whole working class, in all its various organisations, not excluding the salaried managers, technicians and clerical employees. But Lenin realised, quicker and more completely than his colleagues and supporters, that these proposals did not amount to a "blue-print" of reconstruction, and that what the new government had to do was to try a whole series of experiments in almost every department of social organisation. In one of his speeches he put this position with perfect candour. "We knew", he said, "when we took power into our hands, that there were no ready forms of concrete reorganisation of the capitalist system into a socialist one. . . . I do not know of any socialist who has dealt with these problems. . . . We must go by experiments. . . . We do not close our eyes to the fact that we are alone in one country only, and even if Russia were not so backward, we cannot achieve a socialist revolution. . . . But it does not mean that we have to cease to act. Once we have got a chance of experimenting, we must do it as it [the soviet state] accumulates more and more power."¹

afterwards. But in 1918 the communists, to their own surprise, found themselves in control of Russia, and challenged to produce their millennium. They have a colourable excuse for a delay in their production of a new and better social order in the continuance of war conditions, in the blockade and so forth; nevertheless, it is clear that they begin to realise the tremendous unpreparedness which the Marxian methods of thought involve. At a hundred points . . . they do not know what to do" (*Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 132).

¹ "The way to avert a catastrophe is to establish a real workers' control over the production and distribution of goods. To establish such control it is necessary (1) to make certain that in all the basic institutions there is a majority of workers, not less than

In the first few weeks after he and his friends had seized power, they could do no more than live from hand to mouth, without anything like a plan, issuing innumerable separate orders about particular industrial enterprises that had been left derelict. "Workers' delegations", he said afterwards, "used to come to me with complaints against the factory owners. I always said to them, 'You want your factory nationalised: well and good. We have the decree ready. But tell me. Can you take the organisation into your own hands? Have you gone into matters? Do you know how and what you produce? And do you know the relations between your production and the Russian and international market?' And inevitably it transpired that they knew nothing. There was nothing written about such matters in the Bolshevik textbooks, or even in those of the Mensheviks."¹ For the vast majority of manufacturing and trading enterprises, Lenin drafted with his own hands² a resolution on workers' control, which was published in *Pravda* of November 16, 1917, and converted into a decree in the most sweeping terms by the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars on the 28th of the same month. This decree provided that "in all industrial, labour, financial, agricultural, transportation, cooperative and similar enterprises, employing wage-workers or contracting for work to be done at home, there is introduced workers' control of production, of the purchase and sale of products and raw material, of their storage, and also of the financial management of enterprises. The workers in any given enterprise shall establish workers' control through their elected agencies, such as the mill and factory committees, shop foremen's councils and the like, with the condition that representatives of the [clerical] employees and the technical staff shall be included in the membership of these agencies. The workers' control bodies shall have the right to supervise production and to set a minimum output for each enterprise. The workers' control bodies have the right of controlling all the business correspondence of any enterprise, and for three-fourths of all the votes, and that all owners who have not deserted their business, as well as the scientifically and technically trained personnel, are compelled to participate; (2) that all the shop and factory committees, the central and local soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, as well as the trade unions, be granted the right to participate in such control, that all commercial and bank accounts be open to their inspection, and that the management be compelled to supply them with all the data; and (3) that the representatives of all the more important democratic and socialist parties be granted the same right. Workers' control, already recognised by the capitalists in a number of cases where conflicts arise, should be immediately developed, by way of a series of carefully considered and gradual, but immediately realisable, measures, into complete regulation of the production and distribution of goods by the workers" ("Measures to Overcome Economic Chaos", by N. Lenin, published in *The Social Democrat*, No. 64, June 7, 1917; included in Lenin's *Works*, vol. xx. Book II. pp. 136-137 of English edition).

¹ Speech of Lenin at the opening of the first Congress of the Supreme Economic Council (May 26-June 4, 1918). "Lenin . . . whose frankness must at times leave his disciples breathless, has recently stripped off the last pretence that the Russian revolution is anything more than the inauguration of an age of limitless experiment. 'Those who are engaged in the formidable task of overcoming capitalism', he has recently written, 'must be prepared to try method after method until they find the one which answers their purpose best'" (*Russia in the Shadows*, by H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 133).

² *After Lenin*, by Michael Farberman, p. 43.

withholding correspondence the proprietors shall be liable to trial. . . . Commercial secrecy is abolished."¹ Under this decree, practically all the important business enterprises in Petrograd passed, during the ensuing six months, under the control of variously constituted workmen's committees, beneath which such managers and foremen as had not fled, and sometimes even the proprietors themselves, struggled to keep their businesses going.

The Result of Workers' Control

It was a bad time to try the crucial experiment of workers' control as the pattern for the management of industry, even if, as it is now suggested, it was viewed by the wiser heads only as a temporary expedient. But it was important for the world to have it tried. Looking back on those hectic months in Petrograd, in the winter of 1917-1918, it seems clear that, after making all allowances, this particular idea, when put in operation, failed to commend itself to any of the persons concerned, including even its warmest advocates. It was not merely that the committees elected by the factory operatives, skilled craftsmen though these were, were found to be lacking in the various kinds of knowledge and skill required for the quite different task of direction and management. Nor was it conclusive that factory discipline was impaired by the continual interference of the members of the committee with the authority of the foremen. Such shortcomings and defects were neither universal nor inevitable, and would, moreover, be lessened by experience. What was fatal and irremediable in giving the management of each factory to the persons employed therein, whether to a majority or to the whole aggregate of them, and even in its best examples, was that each factory under such control—deprived of the automatic checks and warnings which the capitalist system supplies to the profit-maker in the relations of wages costs to selling prices, and of these to customers' demands—necessarily judged and decided its policy exclusively from the standpoint of its own wishes or interests. Each factory was without knowledge, alike of what the whole community of consumers needed or desired, and of how much all the other factories were simultaneously producing. If its product had been wooden chairs or copper cables, it went on turning out wooden chairs or copper cables, usually of the kinds, shapes and qualities that had been customary, irrespective of what was now required. It soon became evident that, on such a system, even if aggregate production could be kept up, there could not be the necessary continuous adjustment of supply to demand, on which, not only exchange value, but also the very maintenance of the citizens depended. What stood revealed to every intelligent person, when the experiment was tried, was that the function of each producing unit in the community was to produce, *not what that unit might prefer to produce, but what the community needed or desired.*

¹ *Pravda*, November 16, 1917; Decree of Sovnarkom, November 28, 1917; *Lenin: Red Dictator*, by G. Vernadsky, 1931, p. 105.

In any highly evolved industrial society, whatever its economic or political constitution, the citizen as a producer, whether by hand or by brain, in his hours of work, must do what he is, in one or other form, *told* to do; for the very purpose of being able to receive, along with all the other producers, in the rest of the day—the consuming hours—that which in order to live they all need and severally desire. And if the consumers' needs are to decide the producers' work, there must be—where the guidance of profit-making in a free market is abandoned—some organisation, outside the factory, outside the trade union, outside the industry itself, by which the spokesmen or representatives of the whole community of citizen consumers can instruct each factory, and even each group of handicraftsmen or peasants, from time to time, exactly what it is to produce.

The Supreme Economic Council

In Petrograd in 1918 a drastic remedy had to be applied. The idea of the "self-governing workshop"; the dream of the anarchist and the syndicalist, which had misled whole generations of socialists, had to be abandoned. Workers' control, though not eliminated for other functions, was definitely deposed from management. Within six months of starting the experiment, Lenin induced his colleagues in the Sovnarkom to insist, by a decree of June 28, 1918, that, whatever workmen's committees might be in the field, each industrial enterprise must be put under the control of a single manager, appointed by and responsible to the government itself. Lenin was, in fact, keenly conscious that, as he said, "One of the most important tasks is in labour discipline. . . . Labour discipline, the discipline of comradely intercourse, and soviet discipline, is actually being developed by millions of toilers. . . . It is the most important historical mission. . . . We do not claim or count on rapid success in this. We know that it will take up a whole epoch before it is achieved."¹ But this was not enough. An industrial programme for each manager had to be authoritatively formulated from time to time, if not actually week by week. A new government department was accordingly set up, under a committee specifically charged to direct manufacturing and mining industry throughout the whole country, with the dominant object of getting produced, not what the workmen in each factory thought fit, or even what the manager might decide, but what the community needed and desired in due order and proportion. It had, in fact, been discovered by painful experience that the "liquidation of the employer" necessarily

¹ *Verbatim Report of the First Congress of the Supreme Economic Council, May 26-June 1, 1918* (in Russian); *Lenin's Works*, vol. xxiii. p. 43 (in Russian); quoted in English in *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan, 1933*, p. 26.

This has been made a matter of reproach by an opponent: "After scrapping the traditional methods of managing enterprise, they [the Communists] have had to return to a régime of steady work, to an enforcement of the authority of foremen and managers, to a realisation of working discipline" (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov, 1930, 3. 63).

involved the governmental planning of production. "As one would naturally have expected," relates an English eye-witness of the proceedings, "the greatest danger in the transition period came from those workmen's councils, shop stewards' committees [factory committees] and professional alliances [trade unions and local trades councils] who ran their own provincial economic policies without considering the needs of the country as a whole. A guiding hand was necessary, and that was found in the Supreme Economic Council. I well remember being present at its first meeting. A few workmen from the Petrograd and Moscow professional alliances [trade unions and local trades councils] and shop stewards committees [factory committees], together with some trusted revolutionary leaders, and a few technical advisers who were not sabotaging [all these, we must explain, having been chosen and appointed by the Sovnarkom for this purpose], met together on the Tuchkof Naberezhkaya at Petrograd, with the object of organising the economic life of the republic in the interests of the toiling masses. All around them was chaos produced by the Imperialist war and the orgy of capitalist profiteering. Famine, dearth of raw materials, sabotage of technical staff, counter-revolutionary bands invading from the south, Prussian war-lords threatening from the west, made the outlook apparently hopeless. Yet, nothing daunted, these brave workmen, with no experience, except that derived from the hard school of wage-slavery and political oppression, set to work to reconstitute the economic life of a territory covering a large part of two continents. I saw them, at that meeting, draw up plans for the creation of public departments which should take over the production and distribution of the 'key' industries and the transport. Their field of vision ran from the forests of Lithuania to the oases of Central Asia, from the fisheries of the White Sea to the oil-fields of the Caucasus. As they discussed these schemes, one was forcibly reminded that many of these very places, for which they were preparing their plans to fight famine and re-establish peaceful industry, were at that moment threatened by counter-revolutionary forces, and by the armed hosts of the European war-lords, whose so-called 'interests' demanded that famine, anarchy, and misery should teach the workers and peasants of Russia not to dare to lift their hands against the sacred 'rights of property'. And the wind howled round that cold stone building which looked over the frozen Neva, and the winter snows were driving down the dismal streets, but these men, fired with imagination and buoyed up by courage, did not waver. They were planting an acorn which they knew would one day grow into an oak.

"I saw them five months later at a big conference in Moscow. The Supreme Economic Council of Public Economy had now become a great state institution and was holding its first All-Russian Conference. In every province in Central Russia, and in many parts of the outer marches, local branches had been formed and had sent their representatives. The first organ in the world for carrying out in practice the theory that each citizen is part of a great human family and has rights in that family, in

so far as he performs duties to it, was being visibly created before my eyes in Russia. In the midst of the clash of arms, the roar of the imperialist slaughter on the battlefields of France, the savagery of the civil war, with Krasnoff on the Don, and with the Czecho-Slovaks on the Volga, the Supreme Council of Public Economy was silently becoming the centre of the new economic life of the republic. It had been created while the more prominent political body, the Soviet, was struggling to preserve the existence of the republic from enemies within and without. The Supreme Council of Public Economy was the tool designed to create the new order in Russia; the Soviet was only the temporary weapon to protect the hands that worked that tool."¹

The first decree of the Sovnarkom "as to the Supreme Economic Council", dated December 5, 1917, endowed the new body with extraordinarily wide powers and extensive rights. It was to organise "national economy", and also the finances of the state. For these purposes it was to produce general plans and estimates for the regulation of the whole economic life of the country, coordinating and unifying the activities of the central and local regulating institutions, including particularly all

¹ *Capitalist Europe and Bolshevik Russia*, by M. Philips Price, 1919, pp. 18-19. The membership of the Supreme Economic Council (OVWR) under the decree of August 8, 1918, was made up of 10 members of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), 30 members of the trade unions, 20 members of district economic councils, 2 members of consumers' cooperative societies, and 7 officials of as many people's commissariats. This plenum of 69 was directed to meet monthly, but also to elect a presidium of 8 persons for continuous activity, under a president to be appointed by the Central Executive Committee itself, who was to become *ex officio* a member of that body. (*Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion, 1917-1927*, von Friedrich Pollock, 1929, pp. 80-81.) Among its members were A. I. Rykov (president); L. B. Krassin, who brought to its deliberations great experience in industrial management as well as the highest technical ability; G. I. Oppokov, a highly educated man with the training of a lawyer; L. Karpov, a skilled engineer; and M. S. Lurie, also known as Yoric Larin, an eccentric economist of talent; together with leading representatives of the trade unions.

The Supreme Economic Council reported to, and its action was ratified by, an All-Union Congress of Councils of National Economy. This congress, whose proceedings were honoured during the first few years by the publication of a verbatim report (in Russian), began, in May 1918, with an attendance of 252 delegates, of whom 101 had a "decisive vote" and 148 only a "consultative vote". All parts of the RSFSR sent delegates, including Eastern and Western Siberia, and "Middle Asia" (Tashkent). Besides the local economic councils the trade unions and consumers' cooperative societies were represented, and also the great productive enterprises. 30 per cent of the delegates were workmen, 20 per cent technicians, 10 per cent engineers, 40 per cent statisticians, accountants and writers of books on economic subjects. 70 per cent were Communist Party members; 14 per cent were styled "non-Party"; 8 per cent Social Revolutionaries; whilst there were three Mensheviks and three Social Democratic Internationalists. By 1921 this Congress had grown to 693 delegates, of similar mixed character.

Another account of the formation of this body, under the titles of the "All-Russian Soviet of People's Economy" and the "High Soviet", will be found in the very critical volume entitled *The Russian Revolution*, by James Mavor (1928, 470 pp.), which is entirely drawn from sources hostile to the Bolsheviks (see pp. 263-264, 279-294, 298-302). His principal source for the council is the description, written long afterwards, by A. Yurovich, a member of the Cadet Party, who took service on the staff of the Supreme Economic Council for a short time, but could later remember nothing good about its members, its policy or its administration ("The Highest Soviet of People's Economy", by A. Yurovich, in *Archives of the Russian Revolution*, vol. vi. p. 305, an *émigré* production published in Berlin in Russian in 1921-1924).

the commissariats of the several People's Commissars. The new Council had rights of requisition, sequestration, confiscation, compulsory syndication and what not. All existing institutions regulating economic circumstances were made subordinate to it. All measures of importance, including all projected laws relating to the regulation of national economy as a whole, were to emanate from the Supreme Economic Council, and to be submitted for ratification to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom).¹

It was at this stage that, very largely by accident, the "liquidation of the capitalist" was formally completed, so far as large-scale industry was concerned, by a decree of general nationalisation dated June 28, 1918. Larin had been sent to Berlin to negotiate with the German Government the necessary protocol defining details of the execution of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On June 25, 1918, he telegraphed secretly to Lenin to the effect that the Germans were insisting that no measures should be taken impairing the value of any industrial undertaking belonging to a German national. He pointed out that any such restriction could easily be indefinitely extended by the transfer to Germans of the industrial shares belonging to Belgian or English nationals. The only way by which the Soviet Government could retain its industrial freedom of action was immediately to make all industries the property of the state, as the treaty contained no restriction on the government's liberty to deal as it chose with government property. Three days after this telegram, a decree was issued declaring all enterprises having a capital exceeding 200,000 roubles to be the property of the RSFSR.²

Despite all the powers entrusted to it, and the enthusiasm and zeal of its members, the Supreme Economic Council had, for a long time, little opportunity of planning for social reconstruction. The council got promptly to work, and called into existence a whole network of local "councils of national economy" all over the huge area of the RSFSR, from Poland to the Pacific. From the first the situation was critical owing to the chaos and ruin into which the country had fallen.³ In a very few months came the outbreak of local rebellions and the successive advances of composite armies, largely subsidised and officered by half a dozen capitalist governments. Presently the military situation became desperate, with sabotage and rebellion everywhere, and hostile armies

¹ Decree No. 5 of December 5, 1917, in *Collection of Decrees of the RSFSR* (in Russian), 1917, p. 83; see *Fifteen Years of Soviet Building* (in Russian), by G. Amfiteatrov and L. Ginsburg, 1932, p. 306.

² This curious incident is described in *La Révolution russe*, par Henri Rollin, Part I, "Les Soviets", 1931, pp. 229-230. It is based on Larin's own statement, published after he had left Lenin's administration, and was living outside the USSR. See also *Souvenirs d'un Commissaire du Peuple, 1917-1918*, by J. Steinberg, translated from the original German (Paris, 1930); and *La Révolution russe*, by Fernand Grenard (Paris, 1933).

³ Lenin said that "Russia has emerged from the war in such a condition that it resembles a man who has been beaten until he is almost dead" (reprinted in his *Works*, vol. xxvi. of Russian edition, p. 345; as quoted in *Fifteen Years of Soviet Building* (in Russian), by G. Amfiteatrov and L. Ginsburg, 1932, p. 348.

converging from all sides on Leningrad and Moscow. Every other consideration had to be subordinated to provisioning the Red Army and these two cities. Every factory found itself concentrating on military equipment and munitions. There was planning, sharp, direct and continuous, but it was planning exclusively for the daily needs of war.¹

The Emergence of the General Plan

But Lenin never lost sight of the necessity of a General Plan of reconstruction. When the delegates to the First All-Union Congress of Councils of National Economy met in Moscow at the end of May 1918, the resolution put before them, and duly adopted, made it quite clear that their task was that of systematic planning of economic relations throughout the whole country. The congress resolved as under :

"The primary task in the sphere of production is : to proceed from the separate nationalisation of individual enterprises to the nationalisation of industry ; beginning with the metal industry, the machine industry, the chemical, oil and textile industries.

"The development of productive forces of the country requires the introduction of compulsory quotas of output ; the coordination of the rates of wages with the output ; a strict labour discipline, introduced by the labour organisations themselves ; a gradual introduction of the obligation to labour, especially for persons who are not employed ; the mobilisation of all specialists and technicians, and the redistribution of the labour force in accordance with the redistribution of industry.

"In the sphere of exchange and distribution, the centralisation of trade in the hands of the state and of cooperative organisations, with the gradual liquidation of private trade. The system of state monopoly of goods for mass consumption makes necessary the introduction of exchange between different oblasts, and the fixing of prices, with the gradual reduction of them.

"The supply of villages with livestock and machines, and with manu-

¹ N. Popov, an historian of the Bolshevik Party, states that the years of the civil war were essentially "an era of planned economy in a land of impoverished resources, in a state of isolation from the rest of the world externally and from the producing elements internally". He points out that the planning extended to agriculture : "The crying need for bread was the first dictator of the planning, compelling the creation of a network of state-controlled agriculture. A relentless drive was instituted to organise large government farms, which socialism always regarded as superior economically [to peasant agriculture]. A campaign against the Kulaks was conducted without mercy. By the end of 1921 there were 4316 soviet farms (sovkhosi) and 15,121 collective farms (kolkhosi) covering a total area of over 10,000,000 acres. . . . In the conditions of civil war, lacking capital and technical personnel, this was no mean political achievement on the part of the dictatorship" (*An Outline History of the All-Russian Communist Party* (in Russian), by N. Popov, 1930 ; see the comments in *Stalin*, by Isaac Don Levine, p. 357).

"At the close of the year 1920 there were under the management of the central and local authorities [the Supreme Economic Council, etc.] 37,000 enterprises. Each branch of industry was managed by a special board" (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov, 1930, p. 53).

factured goods; the introduction of improvements; and a regular exchange of goods between town and countryside.

"In the sphere of finance: the nationalisation of all banks and the introduction of a system of cheques, current accounts, etc."¹

This systematic planning had been prepared as part of the new programme of the Communist Party, which Lenin himself drafted, and which, as adopted in March 1919, expressly provided for a planned development of the entire national economy, including the continuous utilisation of the whole of the labour force, without any recurrence of unemployment; places being found for all able-bodied workers, whilst the distribution of all the commodities that they produced would be systematically co-ordinated. It was to carry out this Party decision that the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was formally appointed by the Sovnarkom's decrees of February 24, 1921.²

In 1920 it was this idea of a General Plan that inspired Lenin's letter to Krzhizhanovsky, out of which arose the scheme of national electrification. Lenin, as he said, wanted this in order to "centralise the energy of the whole country. . . . I repeat", he said, "it is necessary to rouse the workers by a grand programme for the next ten or twenty years."³ The adoption of this programme by the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920 led to the appointment of a commission in April 1921 to work out a plan of electrification of the whole country (the GOELRO). There followed, by decrees of the Sovnarkom of February 22, 1921, December 22, 1922, and August 21, 1923, the establishment of a separate body, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), for the express purpose of working

¹ Resolution on the Economic Situation and Economic Policy: in *Verbatim Report of the First Congress of the Supreme Economic Council, May 26-June 4, 1918* (in Russian).

² Programme of Communist Party, March 1919; RSFSR Sovnarkom decree of February 24, 1921. Lenin doubtless learned something as to what would be involved in a General Plan for the whole economic life of the nation from a German book entitled *Der Zukunft-Staat: Production und Consum im sozialistischen Staat*, by Professor Karl Ballod of the University of Berlin, the first edition having an introduction by Dr. Karl Kautsky; published in Germany in 1898 and 1919, translated into Russian in 1906; and reissued in Moscow at Lenin's instance in 1919. This work calculated in detail, for each main industry, the statistics that must underlie any systematic planning of mass production directed to supplying the needs of the whole population, on the basis of the state ownership of all industries, and (a Prussian touch!) the application of universal industrial service for the whole male adult population, not exceeding five or six years in each man's life. (See *Stalin*, by Isaac Don Levine, p. 355.)

³ Lenin's letter, which Krzhizhanovsky produced in 1920, when he expounded the First Five-Year Plan into which the seed thus sown had grown, is worth reproduction: Lenin wrote, "Couldn't you produce a plan (not a technical but a political scheme) which would be understood by the proletariat? For instance, in 10 years (or 5?) we shall build 20 (or 30 or 50?) power stations covering the country with a network of such stations, each with a radius of operation of say 400 versts (or 200 if we are unable to achieve more). . . . We need such a plan at once to give the masses a shining unimpeded prospect to work for: and in 10 (or 20?) years we shall electrify Russia, the whole of it, both industrial and agricultural. We shall work up to God knows how many kilowatts or units of horse power" (given in article by Michael Farbman in the *Daily Herald*, in 1929).

G. W. Krzhizhanovsky, to whom was entrusted in the first instance the organisation of Gosplan and in 1927-1928 the preparation of the First Five-Year Plan, was eminent as a scientist, long a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, of which he became vice-president (*Modern Russia, the Land of Planning*, by Louis Segal, 1933, p. 8).

out a General Plan of all economic relationships.¹ This took at first the modest form of annual "Control Figures", being tables of statistics showing the amount of every kind of production to be expected during the ensuing year. These statistics, which each year became more exact and more complete, enabled the Supreme Economic Council, in the light of the aggregate output to be expected, to formulate with greater precision its instructions to the government trusts and enterprises, including the various transport undertakings.

Krassin's Exposition of Planning in 1920

It happens that the present writers are able to supply some contemporary evidence as to the soviet intentions and designs about a General Plan in 1920. In August 1920 the usual "summer school" of the Fabian Society was occupied principally with problems of foreign relations. Two envoys from the RSFSR, L. B. Krassin and Kamenev, happened to be in London, endeavouring to arrange with the British Government for a resumption of trade relations. It was suggested that they should be invited to visit the school. The following extract from a contemporary diary enables us to see how far Krassin's speech foreshadowed the action of the Soviet Government during the ensuing decade. "Krassin, with his lithe figure, his head perfectly set on his shoulders, with his finely chiselled features, simple manner and keen direct glance, looks, every inch of him, the highly bred and highly trained human being, a veritable aristocrat of intellect and bearing. So far as one can gather from listening to him, he is a curious combination of the practical expert and the convinced adherent of a dogmatic creed. But one is tempted to wonder whether this creed does not consist almost entirely in an insistent demand for the subordination of each individual to the 'working plan' of the scientifically trained mind; though, of course, the plan is assumed to be devised in the interests of the community as a whole. . . . He spoke in German, with the clear enunciation and the limited vocabulary of an accomplished linguist speaking in a foreign language; so that even I could understand every word of it. It was a remarkable address; admirably conceived, and delivered with a cold intensity of conviction which made it extraordinarily impressive. Especially skilful was his statement of general principles, combined with a wealth and variety of illustrative fact and picturesque anecdote. The greater part of the speech was a detailed account of the industrial administration he had actually set up, or hoped to introduce into Russia. Working to a plan, elaborated by

¹ Decrees of February 22, 1921, December 22, 1922, and August 21, 1923. An informative article (in Russian) by S. Strumiin, entitled "The First Experiments in Planning", included in (Russian) *Planned Economy*, No. 12 of 1930, makes it clear that the first decree contemplated only a plan for one year ("current planning"). It was P. A. Bogdanoff who, in the autumn of 1921, first suggested the necessity, at any rate in the metal industries, of a plan for as long as five years ("prospective planning"), which Gosplan recognised in its revised regulations of March 8, 1922.

scientific experts, under the instructions of the Communist Party, was the central idea of this industrial organisation. Russia's needs, external and internal, were to be discovered and measured up; and everything was to be sacrificed to fulfilling them. All the workers by hand and by brain were to accept this plan, and their one obligation, as members of the Soviet Republic, was to carry it out with zeal and exactitude. There were, he implied, two great sources of power in Soviet Russia, which would lead to its redemption, and its complete independence of the hostile world by which it was surrounded; the fervour of the faithful, organised in the Communist Party, and the scientific knowledge of the experts specially trained to serve that Party in all departments of social and industrial life. Every expedient of modern industrialism designed to increase the output of the individual worker, whether new mechanical inventions, new forms of power, new methods of remuneration, piece-work, premium bonus, the concentration of business in the best equipped factories, were to be introduced in order to achieve the working out of this plan. Even consumption was to be organised. Payment in kind, with a small balance of money for 'supplementary needs', was to supersede the ordinary wage system, so that the consumption of commodities by individuals might lead to the maximum mental and physical development of the race. The peasants, comprising as they did the vast majority of the population, were, he admitted, a difficulty. . . . The Bolsheviki Government had been compelled to accept individual production on the land. But land could not be sold in the market; if the peasant who worked it threw it up the commune would allot it to someone else. Krassin, however, affirmed his faith that eventually the peasants would be converted to communism; and he gave us a glowing description of what might be done by introducing scientific agriculture on a great scale, and sweeping away individual production in favour of communal production according to a plan worked out by scientific agriculturalists. Finally, in a splendid peroration, which excited the most enthusiastic applause from all those assembled Fabians who understood German, he asserted that Soviet Russia, alone among nations, had discovered the 'philosopher's stone' of increased productivity in the consciousness, on the part of each individual operative, that he was serving the whole community of the Russian people—a consciousness which would transform toil into the only true religion, the service of mankind."¹

Experimental Development of Planning

Probably no one in 1920 realised how long and arduous would be the putting in operation of any General Plan. Indeed, so long as the New Economic Policy was adhered to, and so long as the private businesses of half a million profit-makers were, if only in the smaller enterprises, producing and distributing whatever commodities they chose—so long, moreover, as most of the agricultural production was abandoned to the uncon-

¹ MS. diary by Beatrice Webb, September 4, 1920.

trolled action of twenty-five million peasant households—no successful planning for the allocation of the labour force of the community was practicable. But in 1927, coincidentally with the substantial liquidation of the New Economic Policy, and with the determination to take seriously in hand the collectivisation of peasant agriculture, Gosplan was able to venture to submit to the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), a General Plan on the lines that Krassin had adumbrated, and notably of the kind that Lenin had called for, namely, a scheme to “centralise the energy of the whole country”, with which to “rouse the workers by a grand programme for the next ten or twenty years”. We come thus to the adoption, by the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party in 1928, of the First Five-Year Plan of production and distribution for the USSR, with which a less definite Fifteen-Year Plan of electrification was associated.

This momentous and even audacious piece of planning was undertaken at a critical time. The policy upon which the Plan had to be constructed had been, from 1925 to 1927—odd though this must seem to those who regard the government of the USSR as a dictatorship of Stalin or any other individual—the subject of the longest and widest controversy since 1917. Its adoption took place, as a competent observer writes, at a time of “trouble and torments. Russia’s international affairs were in a dismal plight. England had broken off relations, America persisted in her policy of non-recognition, France continually sulked, Poland never ceased to make wry faces, China forcibly broke into the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the consulates in other cities, raided them and ousted the soviet representatives. No nation, save possibly Germany, then a republic, and Turkey, evinced any sympathy, and neither was too openly nor too abundantly friendly; no credits were in sight, save in limited amounts from Germany and Italy. No help was forthcoming from anybody, anywhere.”¹

“Internally the picture in 1928 was no more cheering. The Communist Party was riven with dissension. Trotsky was ousted; his followers in their hundreds, among them [some of] the ablest men in the country—orators, executives, writers, engineers, economists—were exiled to remote parts of the land, and the ‘Right Opposition’ was continually threatening a fresh disruption. The peasants were growling with dissatisfaction, the nepmen [private capitalist entrepreneurs and dealers] and the intellectuals were recalcitrant; and some of the latter, though a much smaller number than the hysterical soviet press would have the world believe, were actually effecting sabotage. There was little skilled labour in the country, and very few engineers experienced in building modern industrial plants; and few leaders to manage such plants once they were built. The country itself was backward, and had barely recovered from

¹ It should, however, not be forgotten that the English Cooperative Wholesale Society and various considerable British firms made it known that the official breaking off of relations would not interfere with their continuing to fulfil soviet orders, upon the customary credit terms.

the cumulative ravages of the world and civil wars, which had reduced industrial output to one-fifth and agricultural to three-fifths of normal. In brief, Russia was alone, disunited and impoverished."¹

The controversy in which the First Five-Year Plan was involved may be summarily described in the words of a subsequent official report, in which the reader must kindly accept the characteristic phraseology and discount the inevitable bias. "The Right Opportunists," declared Gosplan in 1933, "while in words admitting the planned character of economy in the USSR, actually denied it, in so far as they refused to admit that industrialisation was the decisive lever for the reconstruction of national economy; they fought against high rates of industrialisation; they denied the decisive significance of the link between the working class and the peasantry on the basis of production; to the class struggle for the realisation of the socialist reorganisation of the whole of national economy, they counterpoised the theory that the kulaks would peacefully grow into socialism; the theory that things should be allowed to go automatically their own way. Taking this as their starting-point, the Right Opportunists, in opposition to the Five-Year Plan . . . proposed a Two-Year Plan, in which the central link was not industry but agriculture; not the socialist transformation of the countryside but the consolidation of private peasant economy. This, in fact, implied the denial of the possibility of building socialism in a single country; the denial of the possibility of drawing the main masses of the peasantry into socialist construction. The realisation of the Two-Year Plan would have led to the perpetuation of the technical backwardness and agrarian character of the country, to bourgeois restoration, and to the colonial subjugation of the USSR to the capitalist world. . . . The Trotskyists, in their turn, denied the possibility of the planned development of the economy of the USSR, in that they denied the law of the uneven development of capitalism, and asserted that the international division of labour stands higher than the dictatorship of the proletariat in a single country, and imperatively dictates to it its further development. They denied that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a special form of the link between the working class and the peasantry, and prophesied the inevitable rupture between [them]. . . . The Trotskyists advanced the bourgeois theory that the building up of socialism in a single country, and the reconstruction of the national economy of the USSR by its own efforts, were impossible. . . . The Five-Year Plan was born in the midst of a fierce class struggle around the question of the main roads [or] means of socialist construction. Notwithstanding the counter-revolutionary resistance of the Rights and the Trotskyists, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government adopted the Five-Year Plan for the socialist reconstruction of national economy. More than that, of the two variants of the plan—the initial plan and the optimal plan that were submitted by the State Planning Commission—the Sixteenth Party Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

¹ *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 24-25.

and the Fifth Congress of Soviets, adopted the optimal variant of the plan, which, in the subsequent course of its fulfilment, became a minimum plan, for the scope of its main tasks was considerably widened.”¹

We may add that the First Five-Year Plan, in its “optimal variant”, which was presently greatly enlarged in scope and content, was held to be substantially fulfilled by the end of 1932, within four and a quarter years. A Second Five-Year Plan was accordingly formulated for the years 1933–1937, which is now (1935) in course of execution.

Gosplan as Planning Authority

The USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan), to which this important work was entrusted, is now appointed by and is directly responsible to the Sovnarkom, of which its president is always a member. The Commission, unlike some other bodies, has never taken the form of a committee wholly or mainly composed of People’s Commissars already busied with their own work; and consisted, down to 1935, of a president who is now one of the two vice-presidents of the Sovnarkom; two vice-presidents, none of whom held any other public office, and no fewer than 158 members. The supreme planning authority—Gosplan USSR—is supported by similar planning commissions in all the constituent and autonomous republics. These republic planning commissions (which are also referred to as Gosplan, but followed by the name of the republic) are each subject to its own Sovnarkom, but bound to adopt the lines decided on by the USSR Gosplan.²

All governmental or public institutions or establishments of every kind, including not only those engaged in industry or agriculture, but also those concerned with such services as education; medicine and public health; the arts; music and the drama; social insurance; defence; justice; and transport and communications, are statutorily required to supply Gosplan with all necessary data as to their present and prospective operations. To deal with the enormous mass of information that pours in continually from all over the USSR, Gosplan has gradually developed an extensive staff of trained statisticians and technical experts in all branches of industry, exceeding a thousand in number, which is elaborately organised, with all its thousands of clerical workers, in a large number of departments. The special department of statistics, working independently,

¹ *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan), 1933, pp. 4-5.

² “Each of the various republics that combine to form the Union has its own State Planning Commission, which drafts a scheme for the economic development of its own area. The general plan for the USSR is drafted by the State Planning Commission of the Soviet Union. The last-named authority is not subordinated to any of the People’s Commissariats; and should any difference of opinion arise between the State Planning Commission and economic commissariats, the matter has to be submitted to . . . the Council of Labour and Defence, whose decisions are binding on all the state authorities” (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, by A. Yugov, 1930, p. 298).

This work, by an opponent of the Soviet Government, is untrustworthy in its details, but is not without use as suggesting possible criticisms.

has now become a Central Board of National Economics Accounting, subordinate to the USSR Gosplan, and paying particular attention to cost accounting.

The internal organisation of an office charged with a task of such magnitude and complexity seems worth describing in some detail. We may therefore be pardoned for placing on record an unpublished departmental order—No. 103 of April 12, 1932—signed by V. Mezhlauk, then deputy president of the Commission, directing a complete reorganisation of Gosplan into 10 departments, most of which have from 3 to 7 sub-departments (sectors), making in all 33 divisions, among which the whole work was, at that date, carefully divided. This Order ran as follows :

“The gigantic sweep of socialist construction on the completed basis of soviet economics, the building up of the Second Five-Year Plan with a view to achieving a classless socialist society within five years, and accomplishing the reconstruction of national economy on the basis of modern technique and inventions, and the corresponding reconstruction of Narkomats [ministerial departments] in the direction of their specialisation, which would enable them to exercise more direct control and planning—all this makes it imperative for Gosplan to create more coordination (*uviazka*) in the planning and correlation and control of different branches of the Plan and to work out a synthetic plan of socialist construction of the USSR.

“The preparation of such a plan and its execution cannot be carried out by one sector or group of sectors of Gosplan. Its success depends on the active participation in it of all workers in the constructional and functional sectors of the Plan in constant coordination with each other. Only on these conditions is it possible to utilise the tremendous experience of all republican, oblast and scientific planning institutions, and to build up a scientific technical and economic synthetic plan comprehending the oblasts, their groups, and the republics of the USSR.

“In accordance with these considerations the apparatus of the Gosplan must be reconstructed by creating in the midst of its organisation combined kindred sectors, and by regrouping the functions of different sectors and their groups. The administration of the department must be placed in the hands of their chiefs and of the deputies, without creating special organs attached to them for this purpose.”¹

Gosplan worked under this scheme of 1932 for three more years with steadily increasing efficiency. In April 1935 the whole department was again reorganised by a decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and Sovnarkom, which testified appreciation of the brilliant success of the planned economy.² But these very achievements, and the

¹ Gosplan, Order No. 103 of April 12, 1932.

² Sovnarkom Decree of April 1935; *Pravda*, April 6, 1935; *Moscow Daily News*, April 6, 1935; *Izvestia*, April 8, 1935; *Russian Economic Notes* (of U.S.A. Department of Commerce), June 15, 1935.

ever-increasing scale of their application, were held to call for a yet higher level of planning, to be directed towards completing the reconstruction of the entire national economy. Planning must henceforth penetrate even the smallest section of the economy of the Union. Now that 96 per cent of the national income and of the means of production are in the hands of the collectivity, there must be, in the whole organisation, the most exact accounting, a high degree of knowledge of economics, complete familiarity with the technique of all forms of production, and ability to find a solution for any problem, however complicated, that may arise in practice. This is deemed particularly important in the case of agriculture, where there are still thousands of farms which can reach their objectives only by planned direction. Distribution, transport and stabilisation of prices all demand increased attention from the planning authorities. One of the chief tasks of the reorganised Gosplan must be what is called synthetised planning, or the more rational amalgamation into a single whole of the separate plans for the various geographical and economic divisions of the Union.

The reorganisation called for by these considerations took the form of the supersession of the presidium and the vice-presidents by a new commission of the fixed number of 70 persons, who were chosen for appointment by the Savnarkom by the president of Gosplan himself. Among these carefully selected members the principal workers under the former scheme have found places, but the list also includes the most effective members of the local planning commissions, and also a number of scientists and technicians specially chosen regardless of their connection with other organisations and agencies. A new scheme of internal organisation has been worked out under this commission, adopting the most successful parts of the previous one, with an improved distribution of work according to subjects and localities, accompanied by increased provision for the continual inter-regional and inter-industrial "synthesisation" of the plan. Independent sections are being built up to overhaul, from the standpoint of planning, the scheme of national defence; to deal, from the same angle, with the problem of the training of "cadres" (adequately differentiated grades of technical efficiency); to devise a fuller utilisation of alternative building materials; to plan a systematic coordination of automobile highways and aeroplane routes; to effect a general planning of all the means of communication; to survey the mutual relations of the lines now opening out for a further improvement of the national health; and to concert measures for the special training of planners! There are now, in close connection with Gosplan, a central administration of national accounting; an institute of economic research; and an All-Union Academy of Planning, with subordinate institutes of research on the aims and processes of planning, at Moscow and Leningrad respectively. The whole staff of the USSR Gosplan now amounts to something approaching to a couple of thousand expert statisticians and scientific technicians of various kinds, with as many more clerical subordinates—certainly the

best equipped as well as the most extensive permanent machine of statistical enquiry in the world.¹

How the Plan is Made

Upon all the information obtained by Gosplan the preparation of the Plan proceeds by successive stages. It starts—and this is an important point on which it differs from any analogous forecast in other countries—not from any consideration of the government's financial requirements or any statistics of the "balance of trade", but from the human beings of whom the nation is composed, the whole population of the USSR whose labour force is available for employment, and whose consumption of commodities and services has to be provided for. From the total population to be expected, in the whole of the USSR and in each of its principal areas, there have to be deducted the numbers under working age; the numbers too old for service; the numbers disabled by sickness or infirmity, and the numbers otherwise occupied, including the homekeeping wives and domestic workers; those engaged in study or research; those serving in the defence forces or in administration unconnected with production; the priests and other members of the deprived categories, and finally, along with the nomadic tribes, the still surviving independent peasants and handicraftsmen. The remainder constitutes the labour force available for the more or less collectivised production of commodities and services, to be distributed, to the best advantage of the community, over the whole field of collectivised industry and agriculture.

How is this distribution effected? Gosplan obtains annually, with regard to every enterprise in the USSR, whether state or municipal, central or local, factory or mine, sovkhos or kolkhos, university or hospital, cooperative society or theatre, health office or medical service, an elaborate statistical statement as to what it has produced or done during the last completed year; what is going on during the current year; and what is expected during the year next ensuing; including, in particular, how many workers of the various kinds and grades; and what amounts and kinds of materials and components have been or will be required; and what demands on the banking and transport services are involved. At the same time the consumers' cooperative movement, which has (1935) some seventy-four million members, reports how many persons each society has been supplying, and how many it expects to be supplying next year; with what kinds of commodities and to what aggregate amount; which of these commodities it can produce for itself, which it will need to obtain from other USSR producers, and which it proposes to import from abroad. The tens of thousands of industrial cooperative societies (incops or artels) equally report the proceedings of their several establishments.

¹ Students of political science will notice the extent and range, we think unparalleled in other countries, of the machinery for devising the means of coordinating the administrative work of separate government departments; and for "thinking out" the problems arising from their several uneven developments.

Corresponding data are obtained from the quarter of a million collective farms.¹ Analogous information is obtained from the railway, river, canal, air and maritime transport service, and from that dealing with the service of communications by post, telegraph, telephone and radio. All the "cultural" institutions supply similar information as to what they are doing or requiring, whether they are educational or medical, artistic or recreational, publishing books or newspapers, or running theatres, concerts or cinemas. This nation-wide reporting of economic data, elaborately organised, through the several ministerial commissariats, in the various central offices, is, we are informed, made with extraordinary willingness and punctuality, if only because the failure of any one of the hundreds of thousands of separate establishments to reply fully and punctually might result in its exclusion from any provision of materials and financial credits. But Gosplan gets in the laggards by sending special inspectors to visit them, even in the most distant and obscure corners of the USSR; and may even supply instructors to help in the preparation of the voluminous returns.

The Provisional Plan

With all this enormous mass of information, which is daily being examined and verified, classified and digested in the appropriate departments, Gosplan, with a whole decade of acquaintance with the facts and with the personnel of each enterprise, is able to form a preliminary and hypothetical picture of what next year's output would be if each enterprise proved to be able, and was also left free, to accomplish exactly what it individually proposed. Simultaneously, the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in consultation with the People's Commissars of the principal departments of the government, will have been coming to general conclusions as to the particular expansions and new developments to be pressed forward. These provisional decisions "from above" have to be worked into the multifarious proposals "from below". But to make consistent with itself even the first draft of the provisional Plan thus made up, partly of proposals from below and provisional decisions from above, the whole aggregate of existing and projected enterprises in the USSR must be brought to a very complicated balance. One fundamental question is in what industries, and what parts of the USSR, the whole of the available labour force will find employment. For the last few years, indeed, the question has had to be put the other way about. The problem has been how to distribute the available labour force

¹ Even the millions of individual peasant families, and the vaguely known nomadic tribes producing mainly for subsistence, are not wholly ignored by the General Plan. Estimates have to be included in the Plan for (a) the aggregate produce that these peoples may be expected, from past experience, to bring to market; and (b) for the aggregate amount and the principal kinds of commodities that they may be expected to purchase. As these two estimates approximately balance each other in aggregate value, the totals are not affected; but the calculation is made in order that note may be taken of the additional produce likely to be available on the one hand, and, on the other, of the additional demand to be expected for certain commodities.

so as to make it, as far as possible, suffice for the demands of all the establishments, industrial and cultural, great and small. Whichever way the question is put, the total increase of population may be sufficiently accurately estimated, and changes in its location may be statistically allowed for, without in any way prescribing, to any individual person, where he shall reside or in what vocation he shall engage. The notion that the Plan includes or requires any such regimentation is simply a delusion. In the following chapter we shall describe in detail by what devices all the persons seeking employment are led voluntarily to choose among the several occupations and locations in the proportions that the interests of the community require. Here we need only mention that this optimum distribution of new recruits among the various branches of the army of labour is secured largely by the provision of the appropriate number and kinds of opportunities for training in the skilled crafts and learned professions that are most in demand; and by the trade unions agreeing to fix the several rates of remuneration for different occupations with due regard to the "social value" of any particular kind of labour that is temporarily in short supply.¹

Meanwhile all the various enterprises, industrial or cultural, will be, in their several programmes, requiring a particular amount of labour power without which they cannot achieve the output that they propose or that which will be demanded from them. A certain proportion of this labour power has to possess this or that kind of experience or skill. Whence is this labour power, skilled or unskilled, to be drawn; how many trained youths will be turned out by the various educational establishments; and what will probably be the outflow of surplus labour from the agricultural districts in course of mechanisation? But apart from the allocation of labour power, the other requirements of each of the various establishments, made without knowledge of what the rest of them are requiring, involve a whole series of complicated adjustments. All the establishments, industrial or cultural, will be dependent, to take the simplest example, on the supply, throughout the year, of fuel for heating purposes, whilst all the important ones require also artificial power. What is the aggregate demand of all the enterprises for heating, lighting and power; and how does this compare with the expected output of timber, coal, oil, peat and hydro-electricity? Most manufacturing industries require for their production either iron or steel, or one or other of the non-ferrous metals. The aggregate supply of each of these necessities from the mines and furnaces has to be made to fit the aggregate demand. Each enterprise, in short, has its own requirements in materials, components and accessories, without an exactly proportionate supply of which throughout the year it cannot maintain its planned output. Moreover, in most cases it is not enough to provide, of each component, a sufficient aggregate in the USSR to supply all the establishments throughout the land. It is often necessary,

¹ See Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer: Soviet Trade Unionism", and Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

and for various reasons always desirable, that each economic region of the USSR should be able to satisfy its own requirements, and thus avoid increasing the strain of long haulage on the overworked transport system. Then there is the immense problem of the food, the clothing, the housing, the educational and health services, the holidays and the amusements of the entire population to be provided for, as and when and where it is demanded. Gosplan has to compare the aggregate expected demand for each commodity or service (in the light of past experience, and as reported by the network of consumers' cooperative societies to which nearly every adult belongs, and also by the other agencies receiving the current expenditure of the population) with the amounts that the productive enterprises are severally proposing to turn out during the year, and with the manner in which these several outputs are distributed in relation to the homes and to the expected desires of the people. And when all this has been done, there has still to be considered the carrying capacity that the transport system must have in order to move everything without delay from where it is made to where it will be consumed or used. Even more difficult and complicated is the adjustment to be made between home and foreign supply. In the circumstances of the USSR a profound economic truth is revealed, namely that the fundamental interest of every country in foreign trade is not in its exports but in its imports. The USSR, like every other country, is compelled to seek some commodities in foreign lands; and it suits its present policy of rapid industrialisation to obtain from abroad much else in the way of machinery of all kinds that it cannot for the moment conveniently find sufficient labour force or plant to produce for itself. All such things the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade will be prepared to order from abroad, on the best terms he can obtain. But these imports have, in the absence of loans from foreign investors, necessarily to be paid for out of the proceeds of sales of exports. It becomes, accordingly, an anxious problem to decide which commodities—not excluding gold itself—it will be most profitable, or least costly to the USSR, to produce in order to ship to foreign countries, and in what quantities; whether, for instance, it will be more profitable, at the prices that the foreigner will pay, to ship more timber, oil and furs, or more wheat, butter and eggs.¹

We pause at this point to note that, so far, the preparation of the draft

¹ It is not easy to explain with brevity how far the planning descends to the innumerable details of size and shape, material and style, size and colour of the myriads of commodities that have to be produced. The decree embodying the Plan, which is eventually passed by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), contains statistical totals for only about a dozen of the main divisions of production, with merely general reference to the Plan with regard to the quantities of other commodities. The widely published "control figures" usually give statistical totals for sixty or seventy kinds of commodities, including for instance 25 specified classes of "producers" goods (such as coal, mineral oil, iron ore, rolled iron, agricultural machinery, etc.), 14 specified classes of "consumers" goods (such as cotton yarn, boots and shoes, matches, sugar, etc.); and 23 specified classes of marketable agricultural products. But the Plan itself involves a quantitative regulation of the production or service of every kind of establishment, each of which can deviate from the specification only by express permission of the People's Commissar under whom it works; permission which is given only after consultation with Gosplan.

provisional Plan, complicated and difficult though it is, is merely a matter of statistical calculation and estimate, on the basis of the figures drawn from all parts of the USSR, combined with the best possible forecast of such indeterminate factors as the local harvests and next year's world prices of the commodities to be exported in order to pay for the imports. Such a calculation and estimate is required before any sensible orders can be given to the hundreds of trusts and services, controlling the tens of thousands of separate factories, mines, oil-fields, state farms, transport systems, and social service agencies of all kinds. Once private ownership, with its profit-seeking motive of production for the competitive market, is abandoned, specific directions must be given as to what each establishment has to produce. It is this necessity, and not any question of policy, that makes indispensable, in a collectivist state, some sort of General Plan. And once private ownership and the profit-seeking motive of production for the competitive market have been abandoned, it becomes plain that these necessary directions cannot be given without producing unutterable chaos and ruinous waste, unless the collection of facts is adequate and extensive and (though here accuracy and precision cannot be completely attained) unless the forecast of harvests and world prices is either fairly sound, or else safeguarded by adequate reserves. If these difficulties can be overcome, the planning becomes a mere scientific process, applicable to any purpose whatsoever. Planning is, in fact, undertaken—it is true with a purpose quite different from that of the USSR—by every important capitalist trust or combination, so far as concerns the whole sphere of its own enterprise. Such capitalist planning is, however, everywhere limited to the range of the particular trust or combination; and takes no account either of the labourers, or of the production, outside this range. What is more important is that such capitalist planning is governed by entirely different motives from those prevailing in the USSR.

It is rightly pointed out that planning makes, in itself, no promises to the people. In itself, it is merely a statistical process without a purpose. Logically, however, planning implies a purpose outside itself, a purpose to be decided and determined on by human will. In a capitalist society, the purpose of even the largest private enterprise is the pecuniary profit to be gained by its owners or shareholders. It may or may not be recognised that, in order to obtain, in the long run, the greatest pecuniary profit, various conditions have to be observed, such as the need for attracting and keeping in decent efficiency the workers concerned. But these conditions are all subordinate to the object of profit. In the USSR, with what is called the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the end to be planned for is quite different. There are no owners or shareholders to be benefited, and there is no consideration of pecuniary profit. The sole object aimed at is the maximum safety and well-being, in the long run, of the entire community, on an equalitarian basis, so that everybody's faculties can be afforded the utmost scope in the common service, and everybody's needs as far as practicable satisfied. But the decision as to how exactly

this object should be aimed at by each year's plan is not for Gosplan to make. The determination of the particular ends to be attained, and the manner and degree in which each of them shall be served during the period that is planned for, and the will to enforce this policy, is the business of the USSR Government itself.

Accordingly it is the duty of the USSR Gosplan, at some stage, to take the instructions of the Soviet Government—in practice, to communicate the substance of the earliest draft of the provisional Plan to the Sovnarkom and the Council of Labour and Defence on the one hand, and the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the other—in order to obtain decisions upon a series of points, before even the Provisional Plan is completed. In practice, this takes the form of an almost continuous consultation throughout the year among the leading personalities in the Kremlin on a succession of problems of policy. These consultations, in which the experts of the USSR Gosplan necessarily play a great part, by the facts that they adduce, are summed up in a series of committee decisions. We can only give a general description of the social purposes by which are influenced all the innumerable adjustments that have always to be made in the formulation of even the provisional Plan. It will be seen that every one of these social purposes, by which the Plan is finally governed, imports considerations of social well-being which no profit-seeking capitalist—and, we may add, no deductive economist working out theoretically what will be the operation of an entirely unhampered competitive capitalism—admits into his problem.¹ That is to say, each of these decisions of paramount importance takes into account other ends than the making of pecuniary profit by production for a competitive free market; other ends even than the maximum satisfaction of the desires for consumption by the jostling crowd of consumers whose frictionless succession of momentary demands, all deemed in the argument to be equally “effective”, both create and govern such a market.

The General Object of Soviet Planning

The fundamental purpose that the Soviet General Plan has to promote has been, from the outset, definitely and, so to speak arbitrarily, fixed. The USSR, in which agriculture has always been the dominant occupation of the mass of the people, has got to be as far as possible industrialised and mechanised. Moreover, the industrialisation must not be monopolised by any favoured district or districts, but has to extend, in due proportion, to every part of the country. The primary object of this industrialisation is to increase wealth production. It has always been held by the Soviet Government that an exclusively agricultural community is a community

¹ Such a decision between industries, “not strictly related to considerations of prices and costs”, seems to Mr. Lionel Robbins (*The Great Depression*, 1934, p. 130) to belong “only to the sphere of aesthetics or military strategy”. He apparently does not allow for Public Health or education, or even for the economic interests of future generations, in opposition to those of the present population.

in which there is, for the masses, beyond a bare subsistence, very little surplus available, even for the means of civilised life, let alone for cultural developments. Without extensive industrialisation, and an equally extensive mechanisation of agriculture, so Lenin taught, there could be no great or continuous rise in civilisation for the whole mass of the people of the USSR. And to the advantages of this rise in civilisation every part of the USSR is considered to have an equal claim. Thus, it is not merely in order to lessen the cost of transport, and not only to put the most important new works out of reach of potential hostile invaders, that the additional mines, factories, oil-fields and electric plants of which the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry always has a long list waiting to be put in operation to the extent that the Plan may allow, are, as a matter of policy, geographically widely dispersed. The Soviet Government makes it a cardinal point of policy, largely irrespective of cost, or even of immediate maximum production, to see to it that the Plan leaves no part of the USSR, and no important national minority, dependent on agriculture alone, or on stock-breeding alone, or on hunting or fishing alone. This supreme decision of policy, it will be noted, has so far been made by no other government. Nowhere else has a government deliberately set itself to maximise industrialism and mechanisation; or to make all its citizens, to use Stalin's own phrase, "well-to-do". Least of all has any previous government ever set itself to cause all parts of its area, and all its various races, to enjoy equal shares in the common productivity.

Collectivisation and Mechanisation of Agriculture

It has, since 1927, also become a cardinal point in the policy of the Communist Party, and of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, to press forward, with all possible speed, the collectivisation of agriculture in state or collective farms. Only by such a transformation of rural life, as it seemed to the far-sighted, could there be any possibility of raising the whole peasantry, especially the children, into an educated community, capable of understanding communism and familiar with its scientific methods. Compared with the peasant's izba, the sovkhos, and still more the kolkhos, would become the peasant's university. But the urgent reason for an immediate transformation was the need for introducing the mechanisation which alone would put the country beyond reach of local distress, or even of actual famine, brought about either through the periodical failure of crops or by the apathy or recalcitrance of an independent peasantry.¹ This involved a provision in the Plan for exception-

¹ It must be remembered that, as we have already described, owing to the "extensive" character of Russian peasant agriculture, to its backwardness, and to its lack of proper technical equipment, failures of the harvest in the USSR have always been frequent, rising from time to time to the proportions of veritable famine. During the first half of the nineteenth century, from 1800 to 1854, there are said to have been 35 years in which there was a more or less serious failure of the crops. In the 20-years period from 1891 to 1911, there were 13 poor harvests, 4 good harvests and 3 famine years. During the 10 years

ally rapid development of the production of tractors and other agricultural machinery, as well as such an expansion of transport facilities as would bring every village in the USSR into easy connection with the cities and the manufacturing centres. This insistence on the greatest practicable mechanisation of agriculture, for the sake of maximising quantitative output, and, at the same time, of educating the peasant population for a fuller citizenship, may well be inconsistent with maximising the pecuniary profits of agriculture, which is what the landlord, the capitalist profit-maker and even the kulak would look at.

The Coefficient of Increase

Another preliminary that it is necessary to decide for each year is what shall be the coefficient of increase to be applied to the total output of the last completed year. Besides the growth of population and the coming into operation of new plants and additional machines which this increase of labour force makes it possible to set going, there is the factor of human effort. Shall the people be called upon to increase their own exertions by 1 per cent or 5 per cent, or any other amount? ¹ For the Plan, even in its provisional form, is more than a statistical exercise. It is, in itself, a potent instrument, having dynamic effect upon the General Will of the community. Whether the average amount of energy displayed, of persistence manifested, and of work done by each employed person in the USSR will increase, and by how much it will increase, is partly dependent on what the Plan demands. But this is not all. The Plan is not intended as a scientific prediction of what will actually happen. Without having read Browning, the soviet authorities act on the maxim that "Life's reach should exceed its grasp". The practice in the USSR is for the Government, each year, to ask of the community rather more than can objectively be expected from it, and to do this deliberately as a means of inducing the people to stretch themselves to the utmost. It

of soviet rule (1918-1927) there have been 2 famine years, 5 years with poor harvests, and only 3 years with good harvests. Unlike the Tsar's Government, that of the soviets feels bound to take steps to prevent such calamitous shortages.

¹ This coefficient of increase was, at the very outset of the First Five-Year Plan, the subject of heated controversy within the State Planning Commission. There were some, such as Groman, who were dominated by the past experience of capitalist countries, and who accordingly doubted, not only whether anything more than an annual increase of 3 per cent should be calculated on, but also whether allowance should not be made for a steadily diminishing rate of increase of production, on the basis of a "law of diminishing return". The outcome was that, as already mentioned, Gosplan submitted the Plan in two variants, the "initial Plan" and the "optimal Plan", of which the Government adopted the latter (*Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan, 1933, p. 4*).

The two variants differed in their totals by approximately 20 per cent. The initial draft made allowance for (a) the possibility of widespread failure of crops, amounting to a famine; (b) the inability to increase imports in the absence of foreign loans or long credits, and (c) the need for greatly increasing the defence forces. The maximum draft held it sufficient (x) to estimate for local shortages of crop, far short of famine; (y) to meet the increase of imports by increasing exports, to be made possible by lowering costs of production, owing to increasing output; and (z) to slow down increases in the defence forces.

is one of the results of the system of Participation, to which we have so often had to allude, that this deliberate public appeal for greater strenuousness, though repeated at frequent intervals, has a considerable effect.

The Division of the Nation's Income between Current Consumption and Capital Investment

But all this leaves the quantitative decisions still open. How much of the additional industrialisation for which the Commissariats of Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Railways and so on have worked out plans shall be undertaken in the ensuing year? This question involves a division of the total expenditure between individual consumption and new capital investment. It necessitates a corresponding allocation, in the Plan itself, of labour force and plant, either to the production of commodities and services for immediate consumption or use, on the one hand; or, on the other, to the erection and equipment of new industrial establishments, or to the making of additional machines, or to the extension and improvement of such common services as transport and communications, or to the provision of additional dwelling-houses, and educational buildings, and other works of durable utility. Here we have an issue of high policy, on which Gosplan requires an authoritative ruling before even the provisional Plan can be completed and duly balanced. There is not only the depreciation, by wearing out, of all the existing equipment to be made good. The requirements of national defence in works and stores and equipment, possibly even of strategic railways, or a doubling of track not called for immediately on economic grounds, must be favourably considered. But what is no less important in deciding on the amount of additional industrialisation to be undertaken in the ensuing year is the limiting condition of the number of new workers who will be available; and the allocation, among the various works and services, of these additional workers who will be seeking employment. When there is so much to be done, the state cannot afford to let any part of this labour force remain unadapted to the service of the community. How to ensure this adaptation is one of the problems to be taken into account in the protracted annual collective bargaining as to the standard rates of wages and conditions of employment, that we have already described, between the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, AUCCTU, representing all the 47 (in 1934 redivided into 154) trade unions of the USSR, and the USSR Sovnarkom, representing the management of all the enterprises in which the workers are employed. These expert negotiators have, perforce, both had to recognise that there are three main parts into which the total expenditure of the nation must be arranged to fall. There is, first of all, the amount to be withheld from current consumption and invested in ways of lasting utility. This, in capitalist nations, is called the savings or the internal investments of the nation. In the USSR this share has, during the past few years, been as much as 30 or 40 per cent of the total

national income, being many times as large a proportion as in any other country at any time whatsoever. What remains has then to be allocated, partly to the maintenance of the common services of the nation, necessarily conducted on a collectivised basis, such as the various government departments, local and central; the defence forces and the administration of justice; and all the numerous branches of social welfare, such as public health, insurances, the whole educational system, scientific exploration and invention, literature and the arts, holidays and recreation. The whole of the remainder constitutes a wage fund more concrete than any imagined by Ricardo and McCulloch. This will constitute the income paid in wages and salaries to the whole of the workers, by hand or by brain, employed in the production of commodities and services. It is this three-fold allocation of national income and expenditure—made, it will be seen, according to other considerations than the pecuniary net profit of any enterprise—that enables the parties to the collective bargaining to arrive at a coefficient of wage-increase for the ensuing year. It is this determination of a coefficient of increase of the aggregate wages and salaries of the whole people that will permit Gosplan to complete its allocation of labour force and materials to the production of the various commodities and services on which, as it can be foreseen, the wages and salaries will, in the aggregate, be expended. And here emerges what the western economist, like the capitalist statesman, may well consider the supreme novelty and advantage of such a Plan. For the Plan, as worked out through the above stages, not only provides the necessary number of remunerative situations (or jobs in wealth production) for the whole of the anticipated able-bodied adults, but also ensures automatically that every one of these workers, together with all the non-able-bodied, are provided continuously with purchasing power, on the spending of which the producers of commodities and services can with absolute confidence count. Thus, within the ultimate limits of the Plan, there can be no failure of “effective demand” for whatever the people desire.

National Defence

Every government has to plan for national defence. But, to the Soviet Government the danger of war has hitherto been a constant pre-occupation. Rightly or wrongly, the USSR lives in constant apprehension of attack, not by one foreign power alone, but by a combination of capitalist governments. It is never forgotten that only fifteen years ago, the armies of no fewer than half a dozen governments were ravaging soviet territory, without any excuse that any of them can put up before an international tribunal, without even a declaration of war, doing immense damage to what had never ceased to be, technically, a “friendly power”. And for this aggravated assault and colossal destruction no compensation has yet been paid. If combined invasion has lately become less likely, there is still fear of a particular invasion, as well as of a commercial

embargo, or an economic boycott, or even a *cordon sanitaire* to prevent the spread of the bacillus of communism! This apprehension has, from the first, lent a strategic object to the planning. It has seemed of vital importance that, whilst the capitalist governments were divided among themselves, and whilst they had still not recovered from the losses of the Great War, the USSR should make itself substantially independent of the outer world, not only in all the means of waging modern warfare, but also in all indispensable commodities. Hence the exceptional concentration of the First Five-Year Plan on the opening of new mines, oil-fields, hydro-electric plants, iron and steel works, the construction of strategic railways, or the doubling of track through economically undeveloped districts, and generally on a rapid expansion of the "heavy industries", by means of which things can be made, or troops can be transported, instead of seeking directly to increase the making of the household commodities desired by the people.¹

The Development of Technical Education

Moreover, the whole development of industrialisation, and the mechanisation of agriculture, together with the increasing demands of an immense population ever more awakening to cultural needs, necessitate the devotion of a constantly increasing portion of the nation's means to technical education, and, indeed, to education of every kind. The Plan is accordingly called upon, if only as an economic necessity, to provide each year for more schools and colleges, more teachers and professors, more scientific researchers and inventors. Industry itself constantly calls for more assistance from the scientists; and the USSR scientists are not backward in demanding more and more costly opportunities for exploration and investigation of every part of the universe. In fact, the very large sums included in the Plan for scientific research excite the envy of scientists all the world over. Nor is it merely for the service of industry, or as a means of greater wealth production, that Soviet Communism insists on educational progress. One of its fundamental purposes, as we indicate in a subsequent chapter,² is the raising, to a higher level of civilisation, by the instrument of science, of all the races of the USSR. It is not without significance that the USSR is the only country in the world in which the public expenditure on education on the one hand, and on scientific research on the other, has been, throughout all the economic depressions of the past decade, continuously increasing.

¹ In 1932, as elsewhere referred to, considerations of high policy connected with national defence led the Government of the USSR to make an important deviation from the First Five-Year Plan, in order to avert the danger of invasion by Japan. Even at the cost of creating a serious shortage of foodstuffs, the Government established stores of grain and army equipment along the line to the Far East, and diverted much labour force to the building of additional aeroplanes, to all of which a calculated publicity was given. This action is believed to have averted, or at least indefinitely postponed, an invasion from Manchuria.

² Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind."

Public Health and Housing

Nor can the Soviet Government afford to starve the social services on which the health and productive power of the people depend. Thus, the authorities have to scrutinise the draft Plan to see that enough is provided for additional dwellings for the steadily increasing population; for more and more hospitals and maternity centres and for an illimitable supply of trained doctors and nurses; for a constantly increasing care of the children; and for the development of every kind of social insurance. As with Public Education, the sums allocated to all these services have been increasing year by year, by leaps and bounds, calculated to reduce to despair the Finance Minister of any capitalist community.

The Provision of Adequate Reserves

Nor is this all that has to be looked for in the provisional Plan. The Plan can never be of the nature of an astronomical prediction, assured of a full and exact fulfilment. Quite the contrary. It can be foreseen that no part of the Plan will be precisely fulfilled; at any rate, not to the extent, at the time, and with exactly the consequences that the optimistic proposals of particular enterprises, or of the experts of Gosplan itself, may have led the Government to believe. And every failure to realise, with precision, any one of the projects of the Plan, whether the failure is by excess or by deficiency, will entail consequences on other parts of the Plan.

The most obvious of these failures to realise the results projected in the Plan may be the "under-production" of particular factories or other industrial enterprises. Nothing is done, as an ingenious Frenchman has observed, without "deficiency, damage and delay".¹ There will certainly be accidents, great or small, which, in particular mines or electric plants, factories or oil-fields, will stop the work, wholly or in part, for hours or days, whilst the greater part of the costs run on. One or other section of the machinery breaks down, and cannot be instantly repaired. There are frequent shortages of supplies, either of materials or of components, which lessen the year's output. The staff actually at work, whether of skilled workmen or of unskilled, or of this or that kind of technician, is seldom continuously up to the full establishment. There may be exceptional absences from sickness, or from workers "leaving the job" to wander off elsewhere. More frequently than not, there is a positive inability to obtain the desired workers, either because men of this or that particular kind of skill are not to be found, or because the available supply of unskilled labour runs short. There may even be occasional stoppages from spasmodic short strikes, which the "triangle"—the internal arbitra-

¹ *URSS : Une Nouvelle Humanité*, par Joseph Dubois (Paris, 1932) ("perte, atavie, retard").

tion tribunal—fails to avert or immediately to terminate.¹ Finally there are the ordinary shortcomings of "the human factor". The director or manager makes an "error of judgment". The specialist or the foreman perpetrates mistakes. The manual workers, male or female, are not fully trained and never perfectly competent. We can see that the seven or eight People's Commissars, to whom severally the supreme control of all the industries of the USSR is committed, do not have an easy task in straightening out the difficulties that are perpetually being reported to them. If a factory, or even a whole trust or combine, continually fails to produce the required output, or persistently exceeds its permitted costs, its administration will presently be ruthlessly overhauled, its managerial staff may find itself dismissed or demoted: and if no adequate improvement occurs, the worst plants may be summarily closed down, the necessary production being sought in enlargements of more successful enterprises, or in the establishment of new ones.² So far as the General Plan is concerned, it is clear that allowance must be made, by means of an adequate discount off all estimated output totals, for an inevitable average of shortcomings.

But there will certainly be, from time to time, other and more serious contingencies, which would fatally dislocate the Plan, if provision were not made by way of reserves. Famine or pestilence; war, or (as in 1932) urgent defensive measures calculated to ward off a threatened invasion, may play havoc with the vaticinations of the ablest and best informed of planners. Much smaller calamities will cause deficiencies, each of which will upset many other calculations. An indispensable feature of wise and prudent forecasting is, accordingly, a deliberate planning for shortages caused by losses, failures and calamities of all kinds, as well as for surpluses caused by "over-fulfilment". The ideal would be to make provision at every point for a surplus over the actual requirements of the year equal to the greatest recorded deviation from the normal during a series of years past, and for an appropriate disposal (including provision for a continually renewed storage) of that contingent surplus. The most certain of such deviations is the periodical failure of the harvest, or the "bumper crop", in one or other part of the country. Here the planners are helped by the existence of statistics of the yield per hectare in previous years, which afford a reasonable indication of how great the local reserve of each kind of foodstuff ought to be. But, whether by way of substitution or by that

¹ In every establishment an *ad hoc* arbitration tribunal is instantly called together, consisting of one representative of the management, one of the workers (the local trade union secretary), and the local secretary of the Communist Party. This almost always settles the dispute, but either party had a right of appeal to the People's Commissar of Labour, and now has to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCUTU).

² When incompetent operation of a factory becomes too glaringly obvious, the soviet authorities swoop down with draconic penalties, not only dismissing the luckless director, but sometimes putting him in prison. The factory then goes on as before under new direction (*Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, p. 58). A striking instance of the elaborate investigation made in such cases is given in *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser, 1932, pp. 166-188.

of a specific reserve, the perfect plan must include provisions for every kind of deviation from prophecy.¹

Moreover, changes in the Plan may be made in subsequent years merely because it becomes apparent that more can be accomplished in the aggregate than had been contemplated; or, on the other hand, because the popular demand for particular commodities unexpectedly declines. Thus, in the second and third years of the First Five-Year Plan, there was added to it, not only the creation of a new combined coal and metallurgical base in the Urals, but also the construction of a score or more of gigantic new factories that had hardly been thought of in 1928.² What is always involved in such changes is the establishment of a new balance between the production of materials and components, the available labour force duly provided with purchasing power, and the utilisation of both of these factors in additional production of commodities or services, of which, by the presence of the additional purchasing power in the hands of the people, the sale is well assured.³

Finance

The trouble is that no government, and no planning commission, ever has in view sufficient means to provide completely for all that is desirable—just as the world's aggregate of capitalist entrepreneurs has not. This is not, as it should be needless to say, a difficulty of money or currency, coinage or credit. The most expert planners, instructed by the most far-seeing government, if it is unable or unwilling to obtain a foreign loan, cannot honestly plan the allocation during the year, to specific projects, of an amount in the aggregate exceeding the output of commodities and services that the community can produce within the year. What the government can do, with sufficient notice, is to transfer any portion of the available labour force, plant and materials from the margin of one kind of production to the margin of another; and so, within the aggregate,

¹ The authors of the First Five-Year Plan expressly stated that "in our projects there are sufficient reserves, and in the plan system sufficient 'give', to enable us to make any unavoidable corrections of the parts without, at the same time, altering the whole; thus we shall finally secure the market equivalent which we need" (*The Five-Year Plan* (in Russian), vol. ii. p. 47, quoted in *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, p. 131).

² *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933, p. 5).

³ It reveals a curious ignorance of how, in capitalist industry, planning is actually conducted to find some theoretical critics insisting that there can be no planning for changes. What would Mr. Henry Ford or Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited, say to the following? :

"To begin with, a planned economy involves the rejection of all alternatives save the one which is actually adopted. A planned society which 'plans for change' is, in fact, a contradiction in terms. Either the plan is sound or it is unsound: either it admits of alteration, or it does not. If it does not allow for the improvements of technique, changes in demand, variations in the volume and composition of the population, it suffers some inherent weakness from the very beginning. If it does allow for such changes it is not a plan at all, but an aspiration" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 289).

and often even within the current year, vary the several kinds of products to a considerable extent. But unless the government can somehow increase the aggregate output, the amount of this is the limit beyond which its planning will be nugatory. There is accordingly, during the preparation of the Plan, always a struggle between the planners on the one hand, and the whole group of advocates for specific commodities or services on the other; and, finally, a struggle among themselves of partisans of the various products, as to which of them shall be increased, whilst others have thereby to be decreased in amount.

But, after the Plan has been adopted and put in operation, a clever government can get a little "play", by means of which the unforeseen deviations from the Plan may be prevented from causing a breakdown, or even from requiring any immediate alteration in the Plan which might, for the moment, be inconvenient. Besides using, as a temporary cushion against the jolts of these deviations, the people's current deposits in the state savings bank, the Finance Minister can regulate at his will the issue of paper roubles in payment of wages. This way, however, lies inflation, with its inevitable rise in the prices of all the commodities and services not rigidly controlled. And inflation, as the Soviet Government is fully aware, amounts to a disguised cut in everybody's wages, which has hitherto been regarded as an objectionable form of taxation, though one found to be less injurious in an equalitarian community, in which there is no great difference in individual incomes, and an absence of incomes that are unearned. A preferential expedient to which the Soviet Government usually resorts is an internal loan. This has the incidental advantage of attracting back some of the paper currency already issued as wages and salaries, and thereby lessening the currency inflation, whilst it permits the Government, without inflicting actual hardship, to lessen the production of those commodities and services on which the wages and salaries invested in the loan would otherwise have been expended. Apart from the expedient of an internal loan, the government is driven simply to make, in the course of the year, the consequential adjustments in the plan that every unforeseen deviation inevitably necessitates in one direction or another. If at any point production falls short of anticipation the government must receive the earliest possible information, so that it may postpone or diminish the expenditure of labour and the use of plant on something that may be, for the moment, most easily dispensed with. In this way additional productive forces can be diverted to increase the output of a substitute for the commodity or service in which there is developing a deficit. Similarly if by some happy conjunction production of a particular commodity or service is developing towards a surplus—or if there are signs that the public demand is changing, so that less than was expected will be asked for by the consumers or users—a timely diversion of productive forces to another point can be made in reinforcement of some threatened short supply. This, in fact, is what goes on in the USSR continuously throughout the year, very much as it does in the vast aggre-

gate of varied enterprises of Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited. Possibly the USSR has an advantage in its more complete supply of relevant information. The monthly, weekly and even daily reports that pour in upon Gosplan from every one of the enterprises in the USSR, have to be systematically digested, and all possible inferences promptly drawn from them as to eventual surpluses and shortages in particular commodities and services. The perpetual changes in the factors that make up the weather, for which nearly all governments now maintain extensive meteorological offices, are nowhere observed and recorded in the minuteness, variety and extent with which the Soviet Government detects and counteracts the changes in the economic sky, covering one-sixth of the habitable globe, of which it has to take cognisance. The industrial activities in every branch of production wax and wane according to the current fluctuations in supply and demand.

The Final Plan

We now ask the reader to assume that all the decisions on policy have been made, and that the provisional Plan has been properly balanced and completed. Gosplan now submits it for consideration, through the several commissariats and other centres, to all the enterprises and organisations whose proceedings for the ensuing year it will govern. Each centre transmits it through the provincial and district bodies, down to every one of the establishments affected. In each factory or office the part of the Plan relating to that establishment is not only exhaustively examined by the directors and managers and heads of departments, but also submitted to the whole of the workers concerned, through their various factory or office committees, production conferences and trade union meetings, at which the quotas assigned to the particular establishment become the subject of protracted discussions and debates. All sorts of suggestions and criticisms are made, which are considered by the foremen and managers, and finally transmitted to Gosplan with the director's own reports thereon. Very often, during the last few years, the workmen's meetings have submitted a counter-plan, by which the establishment would be committed to a greater production than the Provisional Plan had proposed,¹ to be attained either by more strenuous or more regular efforts on the part of the workers, or by means of economies in the use of material or components, or by a lessened breakage or creation of scrap, or by some saving of time permitting the working up of a greater amount of material than had been contemplated.² The counterplans thus submitted, together with

¹ These "counter-plans", produced by enthusiastic bodies of workers, have, like the achievements of "socialist competition", to be scrutinised with cool realism. It is sometimes overlooked that machinery may be driven too hard, so that the increased output presently results in calamitous breakdown, which not only stops production but also involves considerable outlay on repairs.

² So enormous is the volume of work, and so protracted the discussion, that the actual decree making the Plan obligatory has seldom or never been issued prior to the date of

all the other criticisms and suggestions, are duly considered by the appropriate departments of Gosplan in consultation with technicians and experts of all kinds. The Provisional Plan has then to be readjusted as a whole according to the decisions taken, and every part of it again brought to the necessary balance. It thus becomes, at long last, the definitive or final Plan. This is formally submitted, on the one hand, confidentially to the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and, on the other, more publicly to the Sovnarkom and to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Congress of Soviets, when it is made law by decree. Such a decree, apart from special authority for particular deviations, governs every people's commissariat, every trust and service department and ultimately every establishment in the USSR, for the period to which the Plan extends.¹

We have spoken of this period as one year. This is the minimum period for which any Plan must provide that is largely dependent on agricultural production, and on the effect, upon industry and transport, of the succession of summer heat and winter ice. But as constructional works take several years to come into working operation, it was decided in 1927 to extend the Plan, as completely as possible, to a period of five, and for purposes such as electrical development, even of fifteen years. This extension of the planning has more than a statistical utility. It has fulfilled Lenin's desire for something on which an appeal to the people might be made, a slogan which should arouse their energy, and concentrate it on a single object. The First Five-Year Plan, and its substantial fulfilment within four and a quarter years; and the Second Five-Year Plan, with its promise of increased provision of commodities for household consumption and use, have certainly gone far not only to

its beginning; sometimes it is many months late. We may assume that provisional instructions are issued to each enterprise, informing its management what will be the minimum required of it, or what reduction or change of its accustomed work will be ordered. The exact months of all the various stages of the preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan, from February to December, are given in Dr. Hugh Dalton's chapter, entitled "A General View of the Soviet Economy", in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by Margaret Cole, 1933, p. 20.

¹ Thus, it may not unfairly be said that "The social economic Plan . . . was not thought out and superimposed by a few people at the top. It grew up gradually in the course of years—after the first electrification plan so strongly advocated by Lenin—as the natural result of the union of two forces, the inherent nature of the socialist economy and the practical necessities of the situation. The first draft Plan is merely tentative and provisional, say the Gosplan authorities. It is subject to thorough discussion, critical examination, revision and amendment in accordance with the proposals made by the central and local bodies, public and business organisations, and the millions of workers in each respective district and factory. They report that the importance of this local planning work, and the number of people participating in it, increases yearly. The Plan of national economy in the USSR is a plan of the millions. The millions draw it up, carry it out, and closely watch the course of its fulfilment. This is the basis of success of planned economy; this is the fundamental advantage of the soviet system of economy. Thus the Plan provides the masses with more than a concrete aim and a unifying slogan. It gives them opportunities for developing their initiative" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 163-164). The importance of this feeling that the workers themselves share in the planning is emphasised in *Principles of Economic Planning*, by G. D. H. Cole, 1935, chap. xii, "Planned Economy and Workers' Control".

create a popular understanding of the problems and projects of the Soviet Government, but also to secure for them public acquiescence and support.

Substantially, however, Gosplan plans for one year, with a preliminary survey over the four following years. The Plan is hypothetically completed for each of the five years; but the statistical forecasts, and particularly the assumptions as to policy, for the years after the first are made with progressively smaller confidence. In fact, the Plan is perpetually being revised at particular points, almost from the start, according to the contingencies that occur, the new information that is received and the changes that are thereby necessitated. Once a year the revision is so extensive and complete as to amount almost to a remaking of the Plan. The formulation, at the end of each quinquennium, of an entirely new Plan, serves principally as the opportunity for a new appeal; that is to say, as a fresh stimulus or incentive to the whole people.

The Efficiency of a Planned Economy

We do not, of course, suggest that a planned economy will necessarily accomplish, without error or loss, the task that it seeks to perform. It is, however, worth notice that—to adopt the conclusions of a recent observer¹—“A planned economy develops of necessity its own type of efficiency movement and its own brand of rationalisation. It requires cost-accounting and better management and the greatest possible co-ordination of processes to produce the greatest productivity at the lowest cost. The purpose of the Gosplan is to combine the maximum of production with the minimum of expenditure in the shortest possible time. The First Five-Year Plan was characterised by speed and quantity, the second will [in addition] be marked by quality. . . . Already results of the drive for efficiency and quality can be noticed. One runs into them everywhere. . . . When it comes to the wider aspects of efficiency to securing a rationalisation of industry, agriculture, transportation and distribution in the interests of the widest social well-being, the socialist economy has certain natural advantages. It is not limited by the demands of profit, nor hampered by private property rights. It has not to support any idle class, either at the bottom nor at the top. It suffers now but little from sabotage and has no bill of costs for long strikes. Against this must be set the waste from inefficiency and bureaucratism. But this will have to be enormous to offset the other savings. In addition, a planned economy can secure the most productive distribution of credit. It can build the biggest and best equipped enterprises. It can use its machinery

¹ The same American observer remarks that “the significance of the Plan is that it gives the masses . . . that which life has not had since the break-up of the Middle Ages—a central purpose. . . . Heretofore the social organisation has always betrayed the creative capacities of the workers, turned them towards greed and war and death. . . . Now a form of society appears which asks man to the greatest creative task of history” (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 96).

up to the operating point of the law of diminishing returns. Allowing for that, the Soviet Union can use its agricultural machinery 100 per cent, the United States only 40 per cent. Also a planned economy permits, for the first time, a scientific development of natural resources. In the oil-fields, for example, the spacing of the wells at proper intervals, according to the stratum being followed, is in striking contrast to that of the older wells, which are sometimes close together on either side of a boundary line in order to tap a competitor's flow. Similarly, a national plan for agriculture enables distribution of crops on a scientific basis according to soil and climate. Underneath all this, as the enabling fact, and therefore a steady stimulus to the greatest economic efficiency, is the new form of property, social ownership."¹

The Results of Planning

We have so far not troubled the reader with statistical or other details as to the results of the planned economy of the USSR. We have preferred to describe how the planning is actually conducted, and to discuss the lines on which each successive Plan is framed. We ourselves attach the very smallest importance to any merely theoretical demonstration of the admirable results which it is assumed that the deliberate planning of all the economic relationships of a great nation must necessarily produce. And we give no greater weight to the merely theoretical demonstration, by adverse critics, that any abandonment of private ownership and the profit-seeking motive in the organisation of industry, and in particular their supersession by any form of deliberately planned economy, must inevitably be calamitous. We decline to be intimidated by the confident assumption that there can be no useful substitute, in deciding what shall be produced by any community, for the passionless arbitrament of a "free market". This arbitrament is one that no economist and no capitalist accept, any more than the statesman, when the supreme ends of national defence, public health and universal education are concerned, to which every civilised country now forcibly devotes no trifling proportion of the nation's income.²

In our opinion the only way of testing the validity of any economic or political hypothesis, whether it be called an assumption, a demonstration, a theory or a law, is by comparison of such an "order of thought" with the ascertained "order of things". With regard to the planned economy of the Soviet Union, we have, as yet, found no serious attempt by any

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 64-66.

² How curious are the economists' denunciations of planning! "A planned society, as Professor Mises has abundantly shown, deprives itself of all those guides to rational conduct upon which the progress of economic life, in the last two centuries, has depended" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 291). This is to assume that the "rational conduct" of a nation is to leave everything to the arbitrament of the profit-seeking capitalists in competition with each other, turning exclusively on what will yield them, in their own lifetimes, the maximum of pecuniary profit!

western economist or statesman to put his opinion to the test of comparison with the facts. It is hard to believe that the outcome of a whole decade of preparatory "control figures" (1918-1927), the completion of the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), and the first two years (1933 and 1934) of the Second Five-Year Plan do not enable some conclusions to be confidently arrived at.¹

Let it be noted, in the first place, that the oft-predicted bankruptcy and economic ruin of the USSR under the system of a planned economy has not taken place. On the contrary, we do not think that any candid student of the picture that the Soviet Union presented in 1921, when planning may be said to have begun, and that which it presents in 1935, can have any doubt of its very considerable advance in aggregate capital wealth. This judgment finds ample support in statistics so numerous and detailed as to be bewildering, whether they relate to the increase of such constructional enterprises as railways and canals, hydro-electric works and oil-wells; or to dwellings and offices, factories, and shops, with their equipment, furnishings, and current stocks of all sorts of commodities in the cities, on the one hand, and the household possessions, poultry and pigs, and stores of grain, etc., of the agriculturists on the other; or to the individual investments of the masses in the savings banks. There are to be included, in all parts of the country, the gigantic iron and steel, chemical and machine-making works—which, it was alleged, could not be even set going, and which were jeered at as monuments of folly, destined to stand for ages, falling slowly in ruins on the steppe, as useless as the Egyptian pyramids! These "pyramids" are, to-day, as seen by countless witnesses, actually turning out yearly many tens of thousands of tractors and motor-cars, and making, literally by the hundred thousand, every kind of machine and every sort of commodity that formerly had to be imported. The railways, vastly increased in length between 1913 and 1935 are, in this decade, the only ones in the world to show, year after year, increased passenger and goods traffic habitually exceeding the transporting capacity. The production and distribution of electric current goes up annually by leaps and bounds, not only the cities and factories, but now actually many of the rural villages and collective farms, being supplied for power and heat, as well as for light. If the reader can stand any statistics at all, let him consider the following summary. "The gross output of industrial production increased from 15.7 billion roubles

¹ The student will find nearly 300 pages of detailed statistics as to every branch of production in the *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR* (published in Gosplan, in English, 1933, and presented to the World Economic Conference). He may also care to read the worst that can be said in criticism of this detailed statistical report in the *Revue de Deux Mondes*, October 15, 1933, pp. 847-893, entitled "En URSS: l'Atlas de statistiques imaginées; les silences d'un document officiel", par le Comte V. Kokovtzeff. This writer suffers from the disadvantage of not having been able to visit the USSR during the past seventeen years, and thus see with his own eyes the transformation of which he denies the existence! Much more valuable is the careful analysis of the statistics in *Das Experiment der Industriepfannung in der Sowjetunion*, by Dr. Robert Schweitzer, Berlin, 1934, 144 pp.

in 1928 to 34.3 billion roubles in 1932 (calculated at prices prevailing in 1926-1927), which represents 218.5 per cent of 1928. The volume of industrial production in 1932 exceeded the pre-war level more than threefold, and exceeded the level of 1928 more than twofold. The First Five-Year Plan as a whole was fulfilled (in four and a quarter years) to the extent of 93.7 per cent as far as the gross output of industry is concerned."¹ Viewed in comparison with other nations that suffered from the Great War, and measured either by capacity to produce or by the aggregate of commodities and services distributed, there seems no doubt that the material progress of the USSR, *from the exceptionally low level to which it had been reduced in 1921*, has not only been enormous, but has even been proportionately greater than that of any other country. In fact, the Soviet Union has quite obviously grown richer in the very years in which most, if not all, other countries have grown poorer.

Out of the mass of testimony as to the great advances made under the First Five-Year Plan, we take no Bolshevik statement but the brief summary by the able Russian economist who is the most persistent and most energetic opponent of all the economic experiments of Soviet Communism. Dr. Boris Brutzkus records in 1935 that "the superficial successes achieved in the construction of the heavy industry are remarkable. The basic supply of energy to the economic system was expanded by the construction of a series of power stations. New coalfields were developed outside the Donets Basin, in particular the enormous coalfield of Kuznetsk (Western Siberia); deposits of coal in the Urals, of brown coal near Moscow, and of peat, were exploited. This made it possible to decentralise industry without, at least proportionately, increasing the dependence of industry on coal supplies from the Donets Basin. The iron industry showed a notable expansion; here most emphasis was laid upon the development, on a great scale, of the Magnitogorsk-Kuznetsk expansion. According to the Five-Year Plan the capacity of blast furnaces in operation was to

¹ *Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan* (Gosplan, 1933). It is, we suggest, sheer prejudice to pretend that the statistics of the USSR are to be disbelieved, because, like all other public statistics in the world, they are compiled and published by the government concerned. In fact, they command greater credence than the published statistics of any other government, because, in the USSR, they form the basis of all economic and financial action, which, if it were taken upon "cooked figures" must inevitably result in patent failure. They may be compared in this respect with the Budget forecasts of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, which, although never perfect, have, in the government's own interest, to be as accurate as can be contrived, as any mistake or falsification would be inevitably revealed at the end of the year. Soviet statistics have their peculiar defects, as have those of other countries. In an area so vast and so diverse as the USSR—as in the U.S.A.—there cannot be perfect accuracy in the vital statistics of the whole population. We cannot believe that every birth and every death throughout all Siberia can possibly be registered, any more than every birth and every death throughout the whole of the United States. In the USSR publications there is often an inadequate discrimination between the actual statistics of completed years and mere estimates for the current year, which is apt to mislead the unwary reader. There is also a frequent unscientific use of percentages of increase, irrespective of the magnitude of the amounts. In propagandist statements there is an optimistic selection of the most favourable statistics. But none of these minor defects impairs the accuracy of the statistics themselves.

increase from 20,000 cubic metres to 36,800 cubic metres, or 84 per cent; and the areas covered by Martin furnaces from 4630 square metres to 6421 square metres, or 39 per cent. The engineering industry was developed on an especially imposing scale; there hardly remain machines so complex that they cannot be built in Russia. After the U.S.A. Russia has the greatest tractor industry in the world, whereas before the Five-Year Plan the Russian production of tractors was quite insignificant. A great chemical industry was hardly existent before the war. According to the calculations of Professor Prokopovich, the value of the original capital of Russian industry amounted in 1928 to 3700 million roubles in pre-war prices, while at the end of the Five-Year Plan it amounted to 8134 million roubles; thus capital increased by 120 per cent. In spite of all the reservations which have to be made in connection with such computations, these figures do give an idea of the magnitude of the capital investments into industry.”¹

At the same time, whilst the volume of production of nearly every commodity was vastly greater in 1932 than it was in 1927-1928—sometimes fourfold—it has to be recorded that it was, in many important products, considerably below what had been anticipated in the Plan. The planned production was realised eventually, but not in 1932. In the generation of electric power; in the output of pig-iron and steel and copper; in the production of bricks, cement and sawn timber; and above all in superphosphate and nitric acid, it proved to take two or three years longer to raise the output to what had been required for 1932. If, as is claimed, the Plan was, as a whole, fulfilled in 1932 to the extent of 93·7 per cent within 4½ years, this was due to the much more rapid development of production in other fields.

This demonstrable advance in material wealth does not imply that the average income enjoyed by each inhabitant of the USSR, and perhaps not even the total national income of the country as a whole, has yet reached the amount of that of Great Britain or the United States. Still less does it prove that the remarkable progress in capital wealth of the USSR since 1921 has been due to the adoption of a planned economy. It might, indeed, be cited as one more instance of the rapidity with which a virile people can, whatever the system of society, make good the material devastations of war. But communists are quick to point out, with complete accuracy, that the increase in capital wealth, and that of the commodities and services actually provided, afford conclusive proof of the contention that the adoption of a planned economy upon an “equalitarian basis” is, at any rate, not incompatible with such an increase.

The candid student may, indeed, consider that the statistics are less conclusive, with regard to the income (measured in commodities and services) actually enjoyed by the average household in the USSR, than

¹ *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, pp. 198-199; quoting *The Planning Scheme and the Results of the Five-Year Plan*, by Professor Prokopovich, Paris, 1934, p. 95.

with regard to the aggregate capital wealth. People in the USSR were, at any rate until recently, still conscious of scarcity; queues, although rare in 1934, have not yet completely ceased;¹ and there are always witnesses who assert that the experience of scarcity is actually more acute than it was at some previous period. Further scrutiny shows, however, that in the villages, the popularly remembered time of greater abundance always relates to the year of some particularly good harvest, which those of 1930 and 1933 have at least equalled in the aggregate. Similar memories in Moscow and other cities relate to the short period when the *nepmen* contrived temporarily to get hold of exceptional stocks, not simultaneously of everything, but alternately, of this and that commodity. Contemporary descriptions of home conditions among the peasants of tsarist times, right down to 1914, do not indicate that any large proportion of them habitually ate meat, or knew the luxuries of butter and sugar; or had anything left to spend on clothing or amusements. With regard to housing accommodation, it is clear that a large proportion of the workmen in Moscow, and in such a factory centre as Ivanovo, in 1914 dwelt in cellars or in primitive barrack dormitories and were far from the luxury of having on an average, even one room per family; so that it is hard to believe that the overcrowding has actually increased! Making all allowances, however, we might easily imagine that little increase could be shown over 1913 in the average quantity of foodstuffs actually consumed by many an adult workman in the USSR. But any such depressing supposition would be subject to very large exceptions. The great mass of poor peasants (*bedniaki*) are certainly, in all the years of average or over-average harvests, getting much more to eat than they did before the war, when they were harried by the landlord, the tax collector and the usurer.² The children and the sick are everywhere very much better provided for in all respects than at any previous period. The whole twenty million adult workers in the factories are ensured a relatively good dinner daily at an exceptionally low price. These three classes alone comprise at least one-half of the whole population. We may quote on the subject the very restrained conclusions of a competent observer. Mr. Maurice Hindus, in his sum-

¹ We must, however, repeat that queues do not necessarily imply short supply. There are, in the USSR, constant queues at the post offices where the supply is unlimited. A queue will arise, whatever the supply, whenever purchasers arrive at a greater rate than they can be dealt with. Even if supply is unlimited, a queue of as many as 48 persons will form in an hour, wherever each purchaser takes five minutes to be served (which is expeditious for Moscow), whilst others arrive at the rate of one per minute.

² "One of the reasons why a comparatively small amount of agricultural produce finds its way to the market is that the peasants' own consumption of their produce has increased. In pre-war days, although Russia was accounted one of the principal granaries of Europe, the actual producers of Russian grain, the peasants who form the majority of the Russian population, used to go hungry. . . . After the revolution . . . there was an improvement in the nutritive conditions of the peasant population. . . . The Russian peasants have . . . abandoned their compulsory vegetarianism": this writer testifies that they now eat very much more meat and butter than before (*Economic Trends in Soviet Russia*, A. Yugov, 1930, pp. 123-127). This testimony is all the more impressive in that it is given by an adversary of the Soviet Government, and a severe critic of planning.

mary of the results in 1933 of the First Five-Year Plan, writes as follows: "For purposes of correctness and without presuming to be mathematically precise, I would divide Russian life at the present moment into the following sections: consumption, or the standard of living in terms of material satisfaction; construction, or the process of developing industry; culture, or education, hygiene, refinement of manners, and civilised diversions; psychology, or the reconstruction of the human personality. If one were to express the condition of each of these in terms of curves, one would note that the consumption curve has been steadily declining [he means, in comparison with the brief halcyon days of the supplies of the *nepmen* in the cities during 1922-1924] but that the construction, culture and psychology curves have been steadily ascending." We must not assume that Mr. Hindus regards the deliberate allocation made by the First Five-Year Plan as having erred in not allowing a larger share to "the standard of living in terms of material satisfaction," at the cost of allotting less to the four other curves. We think, moreover, that he would be far better satisfied with the results of the past two years (1934-1935).

We do not ourselves presume either to agree with or to differ from this summary. We do not feel that we have the materials for judgment. But it is evident that the enormous over-capitalisation, as the financier would call it, in agricultural machinery involved by the liquidation of peasant ignorance by collective farming, and in the direct education of the children, must have made the First Five-Year Plan a Self-Denial Plan, to the extent of obliging Mr. Hindus to describe the citizens of the USSR as if they were the most richly cultured and the poorest fed people in the world! The Soviet Government, which had the responsibility of deciding annually on the allocation of resources by the State Planning Commission, may well have something to say in defence of its decision. There are ends more important than additional food supplies for immediate consumption. Even Adam Smith held that "defence was more than opulence". If, as some critics declare, the stringency was intensified in the last two years of the Plan (1931-1932), we may note that this was just when the government deemed it necessary, in the national interest, to accumulate stores of food along the line to the Far East, and to divert a large amount of labour force, with intentional publicity, to the building of aeroplanes and the making of munitions; avowedly with the intention of warding off an expected declaration of war by Japan. What economist will venture to say that this decision was unjustified? Whether the allocation in the Plan was so far defective as to be injurious to health may, from the standpoint of the community, perhaps be tested by its effect on the death-rate. "Infant mortality rates", we are told by no less an authority than Sir Arthur Newsholme, "form a sensitive index of domestic sanitation, and of personal hygiene and care. . . . In European Russia the infant mortality per 1000 births in 1913 was 275; in 1927, 186; in 1930, 141 . . . which indicates a great improvement in personal

hygiene since the Revolution.”¹ There seems to be no doubt that, in spite of a local rise in mortality in a few areas during certain months of 1931-1932, amounting to a tiny percentage of the whole (as the result, as we have explained in our section on the Collective Farm,² less of any failure of crops than of the refusal of peasants to sow or to reap), the general death-rate and the infantile mortality rate for the USSR as a whole have continued to decline, year by year, *at the rate actually greater than in most other countries in the world*. This statistical fact, however, does not stop the complaints of the Moscow households about scarcity, which are eagerly picked up and repeated by uncritical tourists and the Riga newspaper correspondents. None of these critics seems to realise that the continuance of an experience of scarcity, of which many a household in the USSR complains, *does not imply in itself any diminution in the aggregate income of the community*, or even any lessening of the total supply of the various commodities that the consumers, furnished with steadily increasing purchasing power, are anxious to buy. In mercy to our readers, we confine ourselves to one outstanding example. There is, for instance, a constant scarcity of leather boots and shoes. Is this due to any shortage of supply? In 1913 (when, we may add, there were practically no boots or shoes imported, except the statistically negligible purchases of the wealthy aristocracy and the diplomatic circle, who ordered from Paris or London)³ we read, “Russia manufactured in factories 17 million pairs of boots, but in 1931 the figure rose to 76.8 million pairs. In 1913 Russia manufactured 27 million pairs of rubbers; in 1931 the number had grown

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme and J. A. Kingsbury, 1933, pp. 202-203.

² Chapter III. in Part I., “Man as a Producer” (“The Collective Farm”).

³ The Russian statistics of imports for 1913-1914 did not consider boots and shoes worthy of a separate record, but included them, with every other commodity made of leather, in “leather goods”. Of these there were imported in 1913, 118 million poods weight, and in 1914, 89 million poods (a pood being a little over one-third of a hundred-weight), the values being given as 63 and 52 million roubles (*Russian Year Book*, 1915). It may be added that the entire export from the United Kingdom to all the countries of the world of boots and shoes amounted in 1914 only to 226,184 dozen pairs valued at £839,133, which were mostly sent to the Dominions and Colonies (Statistical Abstract for the U.K.); so that the amount sent to the whole of Tsarist Russia must have been well under one million pairs, if indeed, any but the statistically insignificant high-priced, hand-made articles surmounted the prohibitive customs tariff at all!

If, as has been suggested, the individual handicraftsmen and kустар artels produced, in 1914, more leather boots than they did in 1932, of which there is no evidence, something may be added for this source of supply.

The same calculation is put in another way by a recent well-informed writer, taking other figures. “Prior to the war Russia produced . . . from one-fifteenth to one-twentieth pairs of boots per person per year. The great majority of the village population did not wear boots but plaited grass shoes. Only the well-to-do peasants possessed leather footwear. In 1932 the Soviet Union [a much smaller area than pre-war Russia] produced 74 million pairs—nine times as many as before the Revolution. Nevertheless the demand for boots was not met. Of the 74 million pairs of boots and shoes produced nearly 20 million went to children. Nearly all children of school age are supplied with boots through the schools. At the present time, production is at the rate of half a pair per inhabitant of the Soviet Union. This is ten times as much as before the war, but it is still insufficient. Not only the workers but even the peasants want to have (and many of them already have) several pairs of footwear for working, holidays, etc.” (*Supply and Trade in the USSR*, by W. Nodel, pp. 165-166).

to 65.9 millions." Yet leather boots and shoes and even goloshes are, it is said, as difficult to buy as ever! Another household requisite in constant scarcity is soap. "In 1913 Russia manufactured 94,000 tons of soap; in 1931 she manufactured 189,000 tons (all of which was issued to Russian housewives) and yet the demand far exceeds the supply."¹ We could quote similar statistics, which would only make the reader dizzy, with regard to article after article, of which it can be shown that, year by year, *a much larger quantity per head of population is actually being distributed to the inhabitants, without in any way lessening the apparent scarcity.*

Paradoxically enough, this continued experience of a scarcity of commodities and services in general consumption or use is actually a triumph for planned economy. The very purpose of the General Plan, as declared at the Fifteenth Party Congress, has always been, through industrialisation, to effect a "decisive raising of the cultural level of both city and village population",² including particularly the three-quarters of the population who are women and children, and especially the backward strata of the population, the backward districts and the backward races. The awakening of these backward elements, numerically vast, and all of them, by the very essence of the Plan, now for the first time continuously provided with purchasing power, necessarily involves a great increase in their material wants and daily purchases. Formerly, very few of the fifty or sixty million adult or adolescent peasants, and hardly any of their sons and daughters, ever thought of wearing leather boots. They wrapped their feet in coarse coverings of canvas, flax or straw (lapti). Now nearly every peasant man and woman, and all their elder children, want leather boots; and, what is more, the elders for comfort and the young people for smartness, they demand every year several different pairs of boots, appropriate to different seasons and occasions.³ The tsarist factory production of 17 million pairs per annum has, under the Bolshevik Government Plan, already been multiplied more than fourfold. Probably not until it has been further quadrupled will the average householder cease to consider boots scarce in the USSR. And the same is true with regard to sugar and soap, and in fact to nearly all other household commodities. Thus, notwithstanding a steadily increasing aggregate national income measured in commodities and services, and constantly

¹ *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 32-33. The visitor is struck by the spotless cleanliness of the white blouses, which certainly surpasses that of the common apparel of countries in which soap is reputed to be more plentiful than it is in the USSR.

² Report of Fifteenth All-Union Party Congress, 1927. See the comments in *The Great Offensive*, by Maurice Hindus, 1933, pp. 32-33.

³ We owe to Mr. Allan Monkhouse an illustrative anecdote of a Commissar of Forest Industries. He said: "We have given the peasant a tractor instead of his wooden plough. We have given him a booklet showing him how to work the tractor, and on the cover of the booklet we have allowed our printers to show an American land worker operating the tractor complete with his tie and his polished boots. Our peasant says, 'Thanks for the tractor, comrade, but where are the ties and the boots? Can you expect me to drive the tractor in lapti?'"

rising money wages, securing a steadily growing aggregate distribution of these commodities and services, the phenomenon of inadequately supplied government shops and cooperative stores, in face of an ever-increasing purchasing power, is likely to continue for a long time. This is because, whenever each increasing popular demand is being overtaken by increasing production, an indefinite number of new wants emerge, towards the satisfying of which an ever-rising portion of the increased productive power has to be allocated by the State Planning Commission. Who can compute the effect of the ever-widening desire for two or three rooms per family, instead of the one, or much less than one, with which nine-tenths of the city population of Tsarist Russia contented itself; of the never satisfied clamour for more clothing and better; of the ever-rising standards expected in public health and public education; of the demand for more hospitals and maternity centres, with an almost illimitable increase in the nurses and doctors serving all the villages between the Baltic and the Pacific; of the desire for more schools and libraries, with endlessly more teachers and professors and textbooks and scientific apparatus, over one-sixth of the entire land-surface of the globe? Adapt and contrive as it may, the State Planning Commission is perpetually finding itself at a loss how best to allocate, among the constantly widening range and increasing magnitude of the consumers' effective demand, the always insufficient labour force, buildings and raw material by means of which alone this demand can be satisfied. Meanwhile no one can fail to recognise that, in 1935, there is vastly greater plenty, in the cities and in the villages, than there has been at any previous time in Russian history. The shops and stores are (1935) now abundantly supplied, ration cards have been one after another abolished, and the total retail sales are going up by leaps and bounds.

The World's Argument about the Plan

The western world, and particularly the economists and statesmen, have, as it seems to us, been intellectually taken aback by the First Five-Year Plan being actually put in operation. They have been still more surprised by what they have heard of its substantial fulfilment in 1932, actually before the five years had expired, and by the confident launching of a Second Five-Year Plan for 1933-1937, on a much larger scale. We do not think that the stupendous experiment of a deliberate planning of the economic relationships of a population now approaching 170 millions has yet attracted as much serious attention from economic students as so considerable an enterprise deserves.¹

¹ We may cite, as the most serious of the economic examinations of the Plan, the able volume entitled *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Woolton (1934); the chapter "An Economist Looks at Planning", in *Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory (1933); *Die Sowjetwirtschaft, ihr Wesen und ihre neue Entwicklung*, by Boris Brutzkus (1929); *Der Fünfjahrplan und seine Erfüllung*, by the same (1932, 106 pp.). The two volumes edited and contributed to by Professor F. A. Hayek, entitled respectively *Collectivist Economic Planning* and *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia* (mainly by Boris Brutzkus), 1935,

The Alleged Impracticability

The first reaction of the economist, as of the British banker and manufacturer, when they realise the magnitude and complexity of the soviet General Plan, and the number and variety of the contingencies to be taken into account, is to declare that the task is beyond human capacity. But ten years' experience of the preparation of "control figures" by the State Planning Department, together with the actual execution of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928-1932, afford definite proof that such planning is not impossible. As we have already suggested, the process is not essentially different from that actually undertaken, for their own enterprises, in the United States and in Great Britain, by such industrial leviathans as the United States Steel Corporation and Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited, Mr. Henry Ford and the General Electric Corporation, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Measured by the value of the plant and equipment in use, or by the number of persons engaged, or by the aggregate volume of the commodities and services produced, the enterprises of the USSR are, of course, in the aggregate, vastly greater than those of any one British or American corporation. But they are of the same order of diversity and complexity as those for which the profit-making leviathans construct, for their own purposes, plans essentially similar to the formulations of Moscow. Whether the Five-Year Plan of the USSR is equal in magnitude to those of a hundred of the largest capitalist combinations; or, if preferred, to those of a thousand of them, all put together, the size has a bearing upon the scale on which the planning process has to be organised, but lends little support to its suggested impossibility.

The communists point out, indeed, that the task of planning the production of a whole nation is free from some of the difficulties encountered in planning for a single industrial corporation, whatever its magnitude. The Plan for the USSR need take no account of the hostile action of business rivals, whether they compete for raw material, for labourers, for specialist technicians, for bank credit or for customers. It has not to worry about possible changes in the price that the customers within the USSR will pay for their commodities and services, because these prices are, for the most part, fixed, as part of the Plan, by the government itself. Every producing unit in the USSR is free from anxiety—at any rate so far as the home customers are concerned—as to the market for its pro-

deserve attention as the most competent of the adverse statements. Perhaps we should mention also *Die Gemeinwirtschaft*, by Ludwig Mises (second revised edition, 1932; English translation, 1935), which confines itself, in all its 500 pages, exclusively to a theoretical demolition of any planned economy, without any reference to the fact of its existence in the USSR during the preceding five years! A book published in Russian (at Riga), and also in German, early in 1929, and in an English version in 1930, but evidently mostly written before the First Five-Year Plan had been actually put in operation, gives many economic and statistical details adverse to Soviet Communism, and has a chapter devoted to the projected planning, entitled "Purposeful Economics and State Regulation" (*Economic Trends in Soviet Communism*, by A. Yugov, 1930, 349 pp.).

ducts; if only because it is known that the whole population will be, throughout the whole year, in possession of a predetermined aggregate of purchasing power, and will therefore certainly have an "effective demand" for whatever it desires. No provision need be made for the extensive staff employed in other countries exclusively on advertising, in the unceasing attempt to attract customers away from the products of other producers. Similarly, nothing need be set aside for fire or marine insurance premiums, as there can be no wider spreading of risk than the funds of the community itself. There need be none of the failures of adjustment between the supply of particular kinds of materials, components or technical skill, and the capacity immediately to absorb any or all of these factors, because it is the same authority that determines how much or how many of each factor there shall be produced within the year, and at the same time determines how much and how many of each of them so turned out shall during the same period be taken into use, by each of the various establishments.

The Indispensability of a Plan

Communists, moreover, point out that those who shrink back alarmed from the very prospect of a planned production must realise that it affords the only alternative to the anarchy of individual profit-seeking. It is just this anarchy that has given the modern capitalist world its devastating alternation of booms and slumps, with its perpetual "reserve army" of unemployed workers, swelling periodically to millions. It may be thought less objectionable that this same anarchy produces also the vast incomes and prodigious accumulations of the industrial millionaires, the financiers, and the owners of minerals and urban ground-rents, alongside the continual existence of millions of families lacking the necessities of life. It is plain that if a nation decides, or is somehow driven no longer to depend, for the direction of its capital and for the organisation of its production, on the competitive struggle among the profit-seekers, and to cease to rely exclusively on the "price mechanism" of a free market, it is necessary that each factory or other enterprise should be told what it is to produce. And this involves the formulation of a Plan ensuring the production of exactly those commodities and services that the community needs or desires.

The Plan obviates both Booms and Slumps

As the aggregate amount of commodities and services required by the whole community varies only slightly from year to year—merely increasing steadily along with the increase in population and in production—there is no room, in a planned economy, for booms or slumps. In a planned economy there is no motive leading speculative individuals, hopeful of profit, to multiply factories, mines, oil-wells or sugar mills, automobile factories or wheat fields, beyond what the community needs; with the

result of presently overstocking the markets, slaughtering world prices, and making unprofitable during the slump all production whatsoever. So far as production and consumption within the USSR is concerned it has been demonstrated that the Plan can be carried out with an evenness unaffected by the financial storms and panics of the capitalist money markets.

It may seem that the least foreseeable contingency that has to be, in one or other way, deliberately planned for, is a change in popular demand, which leads to a temporary accumulation of "bad stock". But this is met in the USSR, as it is already in every department store in the world, by deliberately planning for selling off such surplus at reduced prices, a contingency which happens every year as a matter of course in one branch of trade or another. The Plan is promptly adjusted in the course of the year, to the alteration in demand, by slowing down the production in one branch, and increasing to a corresponding extent the production in another branch of what, under planning, is one and the same community enterprise.

As a matter of fact such popular changes of taste or fashion are, to some extent, themselves deliberately planned in western Europe by the principal producing firms and advertisers, and in the USSR, in a different way, by the public authorities. In the Soviet Union the various scientific institutes, together with other research organisations directly connected with producing trusts or government departments, or with the consumers' cooperative movement, are constantly at work upon discovering what is the most advantageous consumption. These agencies study such questions as the nutritive value of particular foodstuffs and the functions of the various vitamins; the hygienic effects of different textile materials for the clothing of infants, older children and adults respectively; the part played by different dyestuffs and even by particular colours; the suitability of different building materials; the effect, upon health, mental development and particular diseases, of different methods of working, different diets and different forms of recreation and amusement. These scientific enquiries, which are, in the USSR, carried on in an amazing variety, seldom issue in legal prescriptions or prohibitions. But one or other of them is from time to time made the subject of intense popular propaganda in all the forms in which public opinion in the USSR is habitually influenced to an extent that western Europe can scarcely imagine. Those in authority in the USSR are, like the American advertising magnates, very definitely of opinion that both fashion and taste can be largely influenced by propaganda. Hence changes in the volume of demand are by no means so completely unpredictable as is often supposed. If, for instance, a scientific committee in the USSR should condemn the use of "lipstick" as unhygienic; and if for any reason the Communist Party decided to throw all its energy into denouncing it as a "petty bourgeois" imitation of a manifestly decadent civilisation, we suggest that Gosplan, and the People's Commissar controlling the production of lipstick, would soon find statistical grounds for lessening the output of a

commodity that people were considering inconsistent with communist ethics. On the other hand, it is asserted that the popular demand for footballs, and consequently their manufacture, have, during the last five years, been greatly increased as a direct result of the deliberately undertaken propaganda in favour of outdoor games. Here, as elsewhere, the planned economy of the USSR differs widely from the unplanned economy of the western world. The whole science and art of commercial advertising depends on its ability to change the customers' demands. On this immense business there is spent annually in the United States and Great Britain several hundred million pounds. Communists are not slow to point out that for this considerable sum the community obtains no assurance that the best commodities are supplanting the worst, or even any increase in the total consumption, but only an increase of the business of certain capitalist undertakings, exactly balanced by the diminution of the business of others. It is claimed that in the USSR such influence as can be exerted on popular taste or fashion is deliberately guided by a social purpose, which itself figures in the prognostications of the State Planning Department.

Equally too, the planned economy of the USSR is unaffected by crises of currency or credit. It has to fear no bank failures and no panic withdrawal of foreign gold. Changes in price levels caused by ups and downs of currencies leave the USSR unmoved. The effective operation of the Plan, in short, is as little concerned with the rating of the rouble in the markets of the world as it is with the problems of internal currency or credit. The oscillations of the foreign exchanges, and the ups and downs of foreign prices, affect it only to the relatively small extent to which the world price level of the commodities which it wishes to import, taken as a whole, *varies at a different rate* from that of the commodities, taken as a whole, which it has to export in order to pay for its imports.¹

The Abolition of Involuntary Unemployment

The most important of all the achievements claimed for economic planning in the USSR is the abolition of involuntary unemployment. This took some time to effect. In the disorganisation of War Communism, there was, naturally, a great deal of distress in the cities, through wage-earners losing their jobs, and between 1917 and 1921 hundreds of thousands of workmen returned to their villages. Even the rapid revival of petty business enterprise in the cities under the New Economic Policy did not prevent the unemployment figures mounting up to more than two millions in 1925. One of the results of the adoption, in 1928, of the First Five-Year Plan was a steady and continuous reduction in the numbers of the

¹ Such a *differential* variation between the level of prices of primary products (which are those which the USSR has to export) and that of prices of manufactures (which it desires to import) has, in fact, characterised the past decade; and to that extent the Plan has to take cognisance of world prices; exactly as internationally operating capitalist undertakings do.

unemployed. By 1929 there was actually a scarcity of labour. By October 1930, the unsatisfied demand for workers was so general that the People's Commissar for Labour ordered the discontinuance of all benefit to the healthy able-bodied unemployed.¹ A large proportion of the thousands of enterprises in the USSR have been, for the past six years (1930-1935), continuously not able to get as many skilled operatives — and in many cases, for long periods, not even as many unskilled labourers — as they were able and anxious to take into employment at the trade union standard rates of wages.

So incredible is the spectacle of a land without unemployment that (outside the USSR) it is still denied that it can be true. It is, for instance, objected that it is incorrect to say that unemployment has been abolished in the USSR, when there are actually thousands of workmen wandering about, some even taking holidays between job and job. It has been pointed out that various government departments have, during the past three years, combed out thousands of superfluous clerical employees, who, it is assumed (without any warrant), must consequently be involuntarily unemployed, and unable to get another situation anywhere, at a moment when most of the two hundred and fifty thousand collective farms are badly in need of book-keepers! The steps being taken by the government to lessen the congestion of population in Moscow and some other cities by refusing permits for residing there to all persons without legitimate employment, are actually taken to mean that there must be serious unemployment in those cities, where, in fact, factories are seeking in vain for additional

¹ "There is no unemployment in the country of soviets" was the proud boast of *Trud*, the trade union journal, on October 11, 1930. The following was the minute of the People's Commissar for Labour of October 9, 1930:

(1) Owing to the great demand in labour force in all branches of national economy, all insurance offices will cease payment of unemployment benefits. No provision is made in the Budget for social insurance for payment of unemployed benefit during the additional quarter, October-December 1930.

(2) All Labour Offices must take the necessary steps for immediate despatch of the unemployed to places of work. This applies, in the first instance, to those in receipt of unemployment benefit.

(3) The unemployed must not only be assigned to such works as are indicated by their special qualifications, but when necessary, also to other occupations not requiring any specialised skill.

(4) No reasons for refusal to accept employment must be accepted, except that of illness, which must be supported by a medical certificate. Medical certificates are to be issued to the unemployed by the competent medical authorities. Persons holding such certificates are entitled to benefit, but the payments shall be made from the insurance funds for temporary incapacity to work.

(5) The heads of the departments dealing with labour and the chairmen of the insurance funds will be held personally responsible for the strict fulfilment of the above minute.

(6) This minute is to be put into operation immediately by telephone.

At the same time increased provision was made for converting selected unskilled labourers into skilled craftsmen. "Instead of the fifty million roubles that were paid out in unemployment benefits in 1930, twice that sum was provided in the 1931 budget for the training (along with maintenance allowances) of new industrial workers" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 5). The soviet authorities thought this kind of "unemployment pay for training for jobs which are crying out for competent workers . . . a constructive expense" (*ibid.*).

labour.¹ It is even suggested that the "deprived categories" (priests and monks, ex-landlords and ex-capitalists, speculators and members of the tsarist political police), who, if they have not taken to "socially useful" occupations, are not allowed to vote or to belong to trade unions or consumers' cooperative societies, and who, it is assumed (also without warrant), must be without work and subsistence, are economically the equivalent of a large proportion of the unemployed of London or Berlin.

All these expressions of incredulity are beside the mark. The phenomenon that is common to all capitalist countries, and absent from the scene in the USSR, has nothing to do with workers wandering from job to job; or with seasonal workers returning home when their season's work is completed; or with men and women taking their holiday in travel; or with the nondescripts of the population of a great city outside any industrial organisation, who pick up a living how they can in ways too obscure and often too discreditable to be even listed; or with the industrial malingersers, who exist in the USSR as elsewhere, and who desire nothing less than to be regularly employed. The Soviet Government does not compel people to work, any more than the British and American Governments do. If any person chooses to live without work, in order to take a holiday in the Crimea or to go down the Volga, no obstacle is placed in his way. He may, indeed, exist indefinitely in idleness by spending his savings or his inheritance, or living on gifts from relations and friends, without any legal proceedings being taken against him; although, as he is not a producer, he will not obtain a ration card, so that he must buy his meat and sugar with valuta at one of the 1300 Torgsin shops, or else, with roubles in the free market. And he may, presently, find himself deprived of a vote as a non-worker. What is asserted is, not that there is, in the length and breadth of the USSR, none of this flotsam and jetsam of the shores of the industrial sea, but merely that there has been, since 1930, no mass of able-bodied men or women wishing to obtain employment, and unable to find an employer willing to engage them at wages. Far from subsidising unemployment, as so many other governments have been driven to do, in poor relief or social insurance benefits, the Soviet Government was able, in 1930, to stop all such subsidies and to proclaim its readiness to discover a job at trade union wages for every able-bodied worker, though not necessarily in his own city or in his own craft. The only alternative is that the government may think it preferable to pay him or her a maintenance allowance whilst receiving technical training for this or that skilled work. This is certainly a notable result of planned economy.

It is often suggested that this absence of involuntary mass unemployment is merely an incident of an exceptional state of things, at a moment

¹ The Moscow Labour Placement Bureau "in June of this year (1933) received requests for 20,938 workers and could supply only 3222; in July, 21,293 requests and 1769 filled; in August, 14,111 requests and 1433 filled; in September, 9789 requests and 1176 filled" (article by John van Zant in *Moscow Daily News*, October 1933).

when a prodigious expansion of industry is taking place; that it will probably not be of long duration, and that it is certainly unlikely, whatever the Plan may say, to be a permanent feature of the Soviet Union.¹ Even if this should prove to be true, it must be accounted no mean achievement of planning to have avoided the creation of mass unemployment during several years of great industrial transformation. In England, in the absence of plan, we did not avoid periodical unemployment on a large scale, even in the generations when the Industrial Revolution or the early Victorian railway construction was at its height. In the United States there have been periods of acute mass unemployment over large areas at the time of greatest industrial expansion without plan. But more than the temporary cessation of involuntary unemployment is claimed for soviet planning. It is argued that so long as the existing system of planning production and distribution is adhered to, there is no reason to anticipate that there need ever be, in the USSR, any involuntary mass unemployment (other than for brief intervals, in individual cases), whether "technological" or "cyclical" or, with proper dovetailing arrangements, even "seasonal".

This remarkable claim is based on the fact—apparently unbelievable by the deductive economists—that the plan itself provides, at the outset, for the possession of purchasing power throughout the whole year by every person in the country who is within any part of the collectivist organisation. This organisation now extends to every branch of industry, and (with the notable exceptions of the still remaining minority of independent individual peasants, together with the nomadic tribes, who produce mainly for their own subsistence) also to every branch of agriculture. The aggregate number of places to be provided in industrial establishments, in the various governmental, cooperative, cultural and social services,

¹ "The difficulty is that no known system had been able to abolish unemployment—not even Communism—for it is now quite clear that in the last few years Russia has been passing through a "construction boom" analogous in every respect to that experienced in the capitalistic world; and that, with the gradual slackening of the intensity of that boom, the phenomenon of unemployment is appearing" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 287).

Professor Gregory omits altogether to allow for the *planned possession of purchasing power* throughout the whole year by every person within the collectivised production of the USSR. "If we lack purchasing power", writes an American economist, "we lack everything. Possessing it, we have everything we value. . . . The energy and ingenuity which have been expended on our financial institutions ought to be turned towards the repairing of a national damaged purchasing power . . . actual power to buy" (*American Economic Life and the Means of Improvement*, by R. G. Tugwell, 1933).

Professor Gregory's view is, we think, not supported by those economists who have examined the facts. The author of the most complete analysis yet made concludes that "If the authorities controlling a planned economy consider it more important than anything else that everybody should be found a job, and that all the stuff that is produced for sale to the public should be promptly consumed, then there is no reason why they should not get very near to achieving this aim. This does, I think, amount to saying that planning is itself a powerful lever for doing away with the particular form of unemployment crisis which besets the capitalist world of to-day: that is to say, prolonged unemployment which, though more severe in some trades than others, is yet so nearly universal as to raise the unemployment figure above the normal average in practically every single occupation, and which is accompanied by closing down of plants and congestion of markets with unsaleable goods" (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, pp. 203-204).

including the staffs of all the state farms, and the membership of all the collective farms, is, at the very outset of each year's planning, deliberately fixed so as to be equal to the estimated total, during that period, of men and women able to work. For the academic or technical students giving their whole time to study or research, as for the sick and infirm, including those either too young or too old to work, corresponding provision is made, wherever wages are not being earned, by stipend or pension or insurance benefits. It is accordingly known that all these millions will have at their disposal, continuously throughout the whole year, at least the amount of purchasing power constituting an "effective demand" for commodities or services which will keep fully employed the various establishments that produce what these purchasers require. These establishments will, accordingly, all be seeking, in accordance with the Plan, to engage the corresponding number of workers to produce these commodities and services up to the aggregate amount of the people's "effective demand". The necessary balance which the Plan has to attain—the correspondence in amount between the aggregate effective demand of the people and the aggregate amount of the commodities and services to be produced—is secured by the appropriate division of the total product, at the prices fixed in the Plan, into the three indispensable shares that we have already described in the collective bargaining of the trade unions.¹ Sufficient has first to be allocated to the required maintenance, extension and increase of the whole aggregate of plant and equipment with which the ascertained total amount of labour force will work. A second cut has to be made to cover the cost of all the governmental, cultural and social welfare services, which have to be paid for collectively. The rest—if we take into account also the salaries and wages provided for all those who work in the first two categories—forms the wage-fund, available for the individual remuneration of all the workers in any occupation whatsoever. We need not here repeat what has been said elsewhere as to the manner in which the wage-fund is shared among the several trade unions, and how the time rates for all the various grades of workers are translated into piece-work rates. Nor need we stay to describe how the receipts from sales by the collective farms and the manufacturing artels are divided as between joint and individual disposal. Assuming the prices of commodities and services to be fixed, and the wage-fund to be adjusted accurately to the total exchange value of the output as so defined, we see accurately determined a continuous orbit of circulation of (a) the energy of the entire labour force; (b) production of the commodities and services desired; (c) the remuneration, at the trade union rates agreed on, of all the workers; and (d) an effective demand for all the commodities and services produced. The Plan itself thus purports to provide for a perpetual correspondence between the moving aggregates of (a) working population, (b) output, (c) wages and salaries creating effective demand, and (d) sales to the happy possessors of that effective demand.

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", pp. 141-148.

This claim to a perpetual adjustment of what in other countries is left unadjusted has been met, among nearly all the economists of the western world, down to the end of 1934, with complete incredulity. Their rejection of the soviet claim appears to us to waver between two attitudes. On the one hand, it is still often assumed and implied, though with less explicit declaration than was formerly customary, not merely that such a planned adjustment is impracticable and undesirable, but also that it is unnecessary. If, it is said, governments would only leave business alone, such an adjustment must spontaneously emerge, without any planning, in every completely individualist society, in which there is no hampering interference, either by custom or law, trade union action or capitalist combination, with the free play of the "law of supply and demand". Whether or not such an assertion, relating to a society that has never existed anywhere in the world, can be logically upheld, it is to-day more commonly admitted, even by the most abstract economist, that this constant moving equilibrium is, in the world as we know it, never in fact achieved. Every capitalist country manifestly suffers acutely from alternate booms and slumps, accompanied by involuntary mass unemployment on a large scale. Nor can it candidly be maintained that there is any prospect in the future, under a régime of capitalist competition, of such an adjustment being attained as would prevent the continuance, the perpetual recurrence, and even the increase of what is now called technological unemployment. On the contrary, it may be predicted that technological unemployment will spread from country to country, and, assuming that inventions do not cease, even increase. Accordingly, most economists now admit the series of maladjustments attendant on freedom of competition, but they regard them as inevitable. Most of these economists are prepared to meet the situation by a certain amount of well-devised interference with freedom of competition by such instruments as factory legislation; the common rules and standard rates obtained by the collective bargaining of trade unions; the maintenance of the unemployed, preferably by some system of insurance; the public control of capitalist monopolies; and latterly even by the state assumption of the bankers' regulation, according to their pecuniary interest, of the credit currency. What is significant is that all schools of economists seem to feel that it is necessary to asseverate that, whether or not a perfect adjustment can be secured along the lines that they severally propose, one thing is certain, namely, that the adjustment actually secured, or likely in the near future to be secured, in Britain or the United States is, in fact, much more nearly perfect than that which can possibly be achieved under the planned economy of the USSR which they are so disinclined to examine.

The Abstract Economist's Criticism of a Planned Economy

There is one school of economists, which has adherents in all the western countries, who do not trouble to dispute the actual achievements of the

planned economy of the USSR, because they claim to possess a science according to which these achievements are logically impossible. It is only fair to set forth, even if succinctly, the argument which convinces such an economist that a planned economy must, by the very nature of its being, fail to produce the results that it claims.

Such an economist asserts, in the first place, that the absence in a planned economy from the great part of the field of distribution, of a completely free market among individual buyers and individual sellers, must necessarily prevent the maximum satisfaction of the aggregate of consumers taken as a whole. What he calls the "price mechanism", based on perfect freedom of competition among buyers and sellers in such a market, coupled with unhampered liberty to any entrepreneur to produce whatever he chooses, and complete freedom of movement from market to market, both of commodities seeking purchasers and of purchasers seeking commodities, *must* necessarily result, the deductive economist would say, in the whole aggregate of consumers getting, in return for the whole aggregate of their expenditure, the very maximum that is possible of what they themselves decide to be their heart's desire.¹ Or, with greater circumspection, he may declare that such a perfect freedom for buyers and sellers alike, must certainly result in a greater aggregate satisfaction of the consumers' conscious wants than the decisions, whether as to what shall be produced, or at what price each commodity shall be sold, made by even the wisest legislature or government department.

The deductive economist's second assertion about a planned economy, such as that of the Soviet Union, would be that its abolition or supersession of the motive of pecuniary profit in the entrepreneur or other proprietor of the productive enterprises of the community, and also in the merchants and traders who move the commodities to the markets in which they are most keenly in demand, must necessarily result in a less assiduous attention to the wants and desires of the whole community of consumers. It is, such an economist declares, the desire for profit, the determination to make profit, and the expectation of being able to make profit, that alone calls forth the greatest energy and persistence in the mine-owner, the manufacturer, the merchant, the wholesale trader and the shopkeeper, or anyone who acts in any of these capacities. It is this motive, selfish as it seems, that drives the capitalist to engage in business, to risk the loss of his capital, to make or adopt new inventions, and to strive to satisfy, to the utmost degree and at the lowest cost, the wants

¹ "The actual direction of industry, the decision whether more wheat shall be produced and less corn [maize], or more shoes shall be produced and less hats," writes an American economist, "is left to the choice of independent producers who make their decision with reference to the state of the markets." To him it seems clear that "prices in the market-places are in effect a continual referendum on what men wish to produce, what they wish to consume, where they wish to work, and where they wish to invest their savings" (article by Dr. Benjamin N. Anderson, junior, on "A Planned Economy and a National Price Level", in the *Chase Economic Bulletin*, July 9, 1933).

and desires of the consumers, on whose continued purchases any lasting success in profit-making ultimately depends. Such an economist will confidently assert that, at any rate over the greater part of the field of production and distribution, there is no known substitute for the incentive of pecuniary profit, without which, even under the wisest government, the methods of production must inevitably stagnate, and the nation's aggregate output decline in quality, and even in quantity per head of population, whilst the efficiency of distribution would very largely disappear, to the incalculable loss in satisfaction of the consumers.

Dealing in greater detail with the planned economy of Soviet Communism, the deductive economist of the western world would point out that, if the Soviet Government fails to debit each of its capital enterprises with annual interest, at an appropriate percentage upon the amount of capital invested in them, its failure to add this interest to the cost of production deprives that government, and the public, of the data necessary for a decision as to which of the proposed new works it is economically most advantageous to proceed with first; and indeed, also of the data which might lead to the judgment that some of them involve too large an expenditure of the nation's capital to be economically justified. The only system, it is asserted, on which a community can obtain the maximum return for its investments of capital, is one which takes for its guide such a continual allocation of capital as will result in the return yielded to the last increment of capital employed in each of the enterprises being always uniform.¹ This optimum distribution of the nation's aggregate capital, it is declared, is that to which, under perfect freedom of competition, unfettered private enterprise is always tending to approximate. Such an optimum allocation of capital, it is asserted, will never be reached, or even attempted, by any government. In particular, it is urged (quite forgetting the grounds of the decision in the USSR) that the whole policy of Soviet Communism is constructing gigantic productive works scattered all over the USSR, and therefore not always at the economically most advantageous place, and its haste in developing mass production by the use of the latest machinery, at a time when capital is relatively scarce, has resulted in the consumers getting positively less to eat and less to wear than if the handicraftsman and the kulak had been left free to enlarge their own more primitive enterprises. It is suggested that it would even have paid the USSR to have imported the cheap machine-made products of western Europe and America in return for more timber, grain and furs, putting its scanty capital into enlarging these industries, rather than sink that capital in the attempt to make the USSR self-sufficient in the supply

¹ Any government, of course, finds that it has to take into account needs and results incommensurable by the economists' arithmetic. The London County Council does not debit its parks with interest on their capital cost, as it is quite impossible to measure in money the returns that they make to the community; and quite futile to compare the relative cost and utility of an expensive open space in a densely crowded central area, with those of a less costly open space on the edge of the mass of houses, where the use by the public is largely prospective.

of every kind of machinery (as if there were no other consideration to be taken into account !).

Finally, the deductive economist of the western world denies that under the best planned economy there can be, in a community continuing to make inventions, to discover new sources of wealth, or even to change its fashions, any complete abolition of involuntary unemployment—even long-continued mass unemployment. Such ever-recurrent unemployment, it is declared, is the price that must inevitably be paid for the freedom to invent and explore, the freedom to substitute new methods for old, and even the freedom to alter tastes and habits, upon which the very progress of mankind depends. Such an economist may sometimes admit that the community as a whole may rightly relieve the sufferings of the involuntarily unemployed, as it might the victims of an earthquake. But the deductive economist is more apt to hint, if not openly to declare, that mass unemployment under the operation of the "price mechanism" is merely a result of the "rigidity" of the wage-scales of the wage-earners, even more than that of the rates of interest demanded by investors; a rigidity which obstructs the operation of the law of supply and demand. The amount of unemployment, it is sometimes asserted, is a function of the cost of labour. If the wage-earners would let the "price mechanism" apply freely to the remuneration of labour, and, in bad times, accept lower wages, there would be fewer unemployed. If wages were low enough, it seems to be held, in face of all the facts, that no person would be involuntarily unemployed, perhaps except, transiently, a few individuals, through temporary maladjustments of the market !

A Communist Reply to the Economist's Criticism

The economic thinkers in the USSR to-day would, we fear, deal very summarily with such criticisms of the economists of the western world as we have ventured to set forth.¹ The claim that the operation of the price mechanism in an absolutely free market necessarily secures the maximum satisfaction then and there possible of the wants and desires of the whole aggregate of consumers, would be simply laughed to scorn. In the first place, it would be objected that such perfect freedom is demonstrably incompatible with the actual organisation of any human society that has ever existed. It is, in fact, no better than an economic myth, and one which cannot be shown to be capable of application in any community whatsoever. Even as an economic myth, it must be rejected as logically indefensible, because by its very nature it is dependent on any number of unstated and arbitrary assumptions, such as the institution of individual

¹ It would be hard to convey, to the economists of the western world, the depth of the contempt felt for their reasoning by the economists of the USSR—unless by the estimate that it is at least equal to that felt by most of the economists of the western world for the reasoning of their Russian colleagues ! We venture to suggest that the reciprocal ignoring of each other's studies and the reciprocal contempt for each other's arguments is, on both sides, unworthy of what should be a matter of serious common investigation.

ownership in the means of production ; the universal application of laws against theft and fraud of the particular kind now in force in western Europe and the United States ; and the existence of a police force capable of rigidly enforcing such laws. But, even assuming that such a mythical argument could have any cogency, the communist absolutely denies that there is any ground for the inference that the price mechanism, under complete freedom of production for a free market, ensures the maximum satisfaction of the consumers' desires. The "price mechanism" does not even purport to have regard to the wants or desires of all the members of the community, but only to those of such of them as possess purchasing power. *It is only what he calls "effective demand" that the deductive economist claims to satisfy.* It is only those having "effective demand" who are allowed votes in what has been termed a "continual referendum on what shall be produced and consumed". Yet in every country of capitalist civilisation a considerable number of persons at any time, and in every recurring slump millions of persons, find themselves, through no fault of their own, for longer or shorter periods, without any purchasing power, and yet with imperative wants and desires which are "effective" enough to cause suffering and even death, but which do not constitute any "effective demand" that the economist will recognise.

Moreover, the economist's whole inference of "maximum satisfaction", even of "effective demand", is logically unsound, unless it can be shown that equal amounts of purchase price represent, to different purchasers, equal sacrifices of happiness. It is obvious that this cannot be demonstrated. On the contrary, the very inequality in individual wealth, which exists to a greater or lesser degree in every human society short of complete communism, necessarily involves the uncomfortable fact that purchase prices, of equal amount in money, represent, in different buyers, extreme differences in sacrifice. It follows that there is absolutely no ground for the inference that these equal prices purchase equal satisfactions. The London crowds returning home from city offices, overtaken by heavy rain, incur the cost of taking public vehicles very largely according to their degrees of opulence : the wealthy banker takes a cab in the least shower ; the salaried manager yields to the expense if the rain gets slightly worse ; the junior clerk turns up his collar and holds out until he can reach the underground railway ; whereas the girl typist, sharing her scanty wage with a sick mother, trudges homeward drenched, before she will part with the price of to-morrow's dinner. But it is not merely the maximum satisfaction of desires that the price mechanism fails to secure. It is plain that, with unequal incomes, there is not even a decent measure of justice secured in a community of persons having unequal needs.¹ The "price mechanism" in the free market does not even ensure a maximum

¹ The communist may safely admit that, *if it must be accepted that personal satisfaction is accurately measured by retail price*, the conclusions of Professor Mises and Professor Hayek are correct. But it is obvious that, in a population having unequal incomes, they are glaringly at variance with the facts. Other opponents of Soviet Communism admit

of social efficiency in wealth production, because this requires the exaction of less work from the sick and the weak than from the hale and strong, and the provision for the former of more care and sustenance than for the latter; whereas the prices for their labour, which provide their respective purchasing powers, tend, in a free market, to be more or less proportionate to their value to the profit-making employer, and this value is almost in inverse ratio to their needs!

But the communist has a far stronger reason for objecting to the economist's argument in favour of production for a free market. The economist apparently can never rid himself of the conception that the main object of society must be to enable and promote the maximum accumulation of individual riches. For the sake of this all-important end, he will put up with the existence, and even the increase, of inequality in opulence among individuals and social classes, and the existence of a destitute proletariat whose wages do not suffice to maintain their families in health. For this end he insists on buying labour in the cheapest market, actually preferring, in many cases, children to adults, women to men, and even weaklings to the strong, if only he can get them at a low enough wage. *For this end, he exploits the labour of backward races, incidentally destroying their indigenous social order, and recklessly introducing among them disease and demoralisation.* For this end, he will allow the unrestrained using up of the future resources of the community; the careless destruction of the forests; the reckless draining of the oil-fields; even the destructive exhaustion of the soil itself. The amenity, the beauty, even the healthiness of the country will be sacrificed to the supreme end of a maximum of production, not of wealth to the community but of riches to the entrepreneurs, to the very accumulation of which, it is claimed, society owes its material progress. It is interesting to contrast, with the criticism of the western economists, the ends that are sought in the planned economy of the USSR. Both the First and Second Five-Year Plans were avowedly governed, not by the question of how to secure the greatest profit or personal riches for a small minority of entrepreneurs and captains of industry—not even the greatest amount of wealth for the whole of the present generation—but *by considerations not taken into account at all by the individual profit-maker*, of whom the western economist habitually thinks. There was, first of all, the need for national defence, which is a terribly expensive service, not yielding pecuniary profit to the citizens as such. There was the requirement, deemed imperative for strategic reasons, of the quickest possible industrialisation of the country, irrespective of the economic cost that might be thereby incurred, in order that the USSR might become practically self-sufficient before the capitalist powers were able to combine to attack it, or to blockade it. There was the imperative that it “cannot be assailed in this position. If the problem consists of making the economic system serve extra-economic ends”—such, we suggest, as national defence, the improvement of Public Health and a universalisation of culture—“then the planned economy provides an excellent solution” (*Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, p. 230).

necessity, as it was, after prolonged consideration, deemed to be, of mechanising agriculture, as the only way of quickly increasing the gross output of foodstuffs to an extent that would ensure, even if not a maximum yield of profit each year, yet enough food in the famines which had heretofore desolated Russia every five or ten years. Then there was the conception that justice as well as humanity demanded that all the various peoples which together make up the USSR should be brought up to a common level of civilisation. This required that the new industrialisation should be extended to all parts of the Soviet Union, even if this involved some sacrifice of the greatest possible immediate wealth to the dominant race. The same conception demanded that positively more should be done for the women and the children than for the male adults, and more for the backward races and the backward districts than for those which had already made more progress. All this emphasised the importance, even for the sake of productive efficiency, of rapidly developing the education of an exceptionally backward population; and of equipping the whole area with hospitals, doctors and nurses, and generally the expensive apparatus of a Public Health service to fight disease and lessen the excessive infant mortality. The judgments and the decisions on all these matters may have been right or they may have been wrong. But no person of common sense can deny that they were of supreme importance to the well-being of the community and that they had to be made on other grounds than their effect on the personal riches of the minority of investors, or even than the amount of pecuniary profit or loss that they involved to the existing generation. Can we wonder, when the planned economy is found to be determined to an extent that is relatively great, by such ends as these rather than by considerations of what would yield the maximum profit—and this profit to be enjoyed by only a minority of the population—that the economist's criticisms fail to secure in the USSR even the amount of attention that they deserve? Whilst the western economists count as success solely the maximising of exchange values in relation to production costs, the soviet planners take account of every purpose of an enlightened community.

How the General Plan might be Upset

Probably nothing will convince the deductive economist that a planned economy can possibly work out to the common satisfaction, unless and until the actual results in the USSR during the ensuing decade are forced upon his attention. We think it more profitable to examine the doubts that are expressed, even occasionally in the USSR itself, whether the Plan may not be somewhat of the nature of a fair-weather excursion, almost certain to be upset by unforeseen contingencies. Even assuming that the Plan ensures, under ordinary circumstances, an approximation to complete adjustment between population and opportunities of employment, between output and sales, between wages and prices, and therefore between

supply and demand, will it not be completely upset by any serious war, any considerable famine or even any extensive pestilence? The answer appears to be twofold. As already explained, it is of the essence of the Plan that it should include a definite provision for unforeseen contingencies. We may assume that the State Planning Commission has been accumulating an ever-increasing knowledge of all the various kinds of contingencies that have, during the past decade, more or less interfered with the fulfilment of the Plan at this or that point. This statistical experience enables an estimate to be formed, each year, of the probable "limits of deviation" from the prognostications that are constructed from the data supplied by every establishment. The variations in the harvests of the past fifty years, taken district by district and crop by crop, ought to enable a prediction to be made, with practical certainty, that the harvest of the ensuing year will not be at worst much less than the lowest recorded minimum, nor yet at best much greater than the highest recorded maximum of the past generation. Similar calculations can be made for each branch of production, for the aggregate population, for the average amount lost annually by sickness and accident, by breakdowns of machinery, by fraud and embezzlement and so on. In a calculation extending over so large a mass of persons and of facts, of such extreme varieties of every kind, the effect of many of the contingencies may be expected, in a considerable degree, to balance each other. For perfect safety, there should be, in each year's Plan, as soon as it can be afforded, the provision of a reserve at every point, in order that even a serious deviation from the Plan may not involve so great a dislocation as to produce calamity. It would, of course, not be necessary to provide ten fully adequate reserves to meet ten different sorts of contingency. They will not all happen in a single year. Probably half the number would suffice. There is, however, one reserve that should certainly be fully provided in each year's Plan; that is, a store of wheat (and, possibly, of certain other foodstuffs), not only in one centre, but also in every oblast, sufficient to feed the whole population in case of a failure of the harvest as nearly complete and as widespread as that of 1891 or that of 1921. Possibly, in the climate of the USSR the same sort of reserve should be provided of timber, coal and oil, as the means of heating during the winter. Even with a Plan, such a perpetually maintained store of food, and perhaps also of heating material, by way of assurance in the event of a breakdown of transport, is as indispensable to the USSR as its gold reserve.¹

¹ It is as well that the USSR should be reminded also that the continued success of the General Plan will always depend on the continuance of the purpose of the governing authorities. "The mere fact that a plan has been made", it has been well said, "will not, of itself, in a changing world of fallible people, eliminate unemployment once and for all without more ado. A planning authority must be continually revising and adapting and extending its plans in order to make good its own mistakes and to meet the needs of new situations. If it sits still and does nothing, it will be faced with exactly the same situation as the government of an unplanned economy which sits still and does nothing, or next to nothing, to find employment for those to whom private industry offers no place."

"The true difference between the two types of organisation is that the capitalist

The contingency of war may perhaps be even more calamitous than a famine or a pestilence, especially as it may be accompanied or quickly followed by both of these scourges. Something should be done to meet the calamity of war, as of any other contingency, by providing stores of foodstuffs, equipment and munitions, together with a gold reserve, as a necessary part of the Plan. But what would happen in the case of a prolonged war on all the various fronts of the USSR, which would soon exhaust all possible reserves? The answer is that the abstraction of most of the able-bodied men from peace-time production, their maintenance in the field, and the universal concentration of practically all factories on war work instead of producing household necessities, would inevitably soon transcend the provisions of any Plan. It would certainly reduce the civil population of the towns to very short commons. On the outbreak of war, they would be none the worse off because there had been, throughout the years of peace, the most complete planning. Whilst the war lasted, its maintenance would have to be planned for, just as much as the winter's ice. Put simply, the Plan would have to provide for the illimitable wastage of war by suspending improvements and extensions of a capital nature; by cutting down all expenditure on cultural objects; by severely rationing the population; by reducing everybody's income and by increasing everybody's labour. All these measures would have to be taken even if there had been no Plan. What a Plan would accomplish for the whole people during war—as it does for a shipwrecked crew, in an open boat, inadequately supplied with food—is to enable the privation to be diffused equally among the whole company, with such preferences to the children, the aged, and the nursing mothers as the current humanitarianism might prescribe, instead of letting the whole weight of suffering fall on the weakest members. But, even in the worst crisis of the longest war, there need be no persons unemployed. There is, indeed, in those circumstances, almost a certainty not only of everybody's labour being demanded, but also of an increase in everyone's hours of work. No one need be allowed to starve to death, but everyone, with no exception for the rich, would have to forgo luxuries, including the luxury of leisure.

There is, however, quite another objection often made to the possibility of planning: the Plan, it is said, will be wrecked, not by war, with its diminution of production, but by the very success of the Plan in its steady increase of production. What will happen when the present outburst of industrialisation slackens its pace? It is admitted that, at present, the USSR can find employment for every able-bodied man and woman of its government, except so far as it can initiate a few schemes of public works the products of which are not offered on any commercial market, is *compelled* to sit still and do nothing, because, if it should go further than this, its efforts to restart industry that has stopped will have the effect of stopping such industry as is already going; whereas the controllers of a socialised system, if they set additional plans afloat in order to absorb unemployed labour, are merely extending the existing system of industry, instead of establishing a rival one which cannot work harmoniously with that already in operation" (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, pp. 203-204).

rapidly increasing population. But presently the factories will all be built, the railways will all be made, the cities will all be paved and lighted and drained; the sovkhosi and kolkhosi will have their barns bulging with excessive grain. It is already predicted by some economists in the western world that over-production is at hand, and that there will presently be as many unemployed in the USSR, in spite of its planned economy, as there is to-day in Great Britain and the United States. How can the Plan prevent future unemployment, it is said in Great Britain, with so many babies still being born, and with every demand already satisfied?

It seems to us a strange objection to make to a planned economy that it will inevitably result in such a plentiful supply of commodities and services that every shop will be heaped up with goods of which everybody has so much that nobody desires to purchase! In the USSR, even more obviously than in countries of a more mature civilisation, it is the very nature of human desire to be literally insatiable. There are, at present, in the Soviet Union nearly 170 millions of people wishing for more rooms, more meat and more sugar and butter, more clothes and more boots. And all of these millions are being provided throughout the whole year with purchasing power! What was formerly obtained only by the relatively well-to-do, from sugar and butter to felt hats and silk stockings; from several meat meals a day to wireless sets and daily concerts or theatrical performances, is now being more and more universally demanded by every peasant from the Polish border to the Pacific coast. We have already mentioned how the result of multiplying fourfold since 1913 the annual production of boots and shoes in the USSR has been to make boots and shoes seem scarcer than ever, because fifty or sixty million people are demanding leather boots instead of only a few millions. There is still a long way to go before every peasant and every workman between Murmansk and Vladivostock has as much food, as many delicacies, as spacious a home, clothes as comfortable for all the seasons, as good an education and as many books and newspapers to read, as frequent visits to the cinema, the theatre and the opera, as—to set no higher standard—the average professional man of western Europe! When that degree of satiety has been reached—indeed, long before it has been even approached—there will arise new and competing desires for greater leisure, for longer and more frequent vacations, and for new opportunities of travel. If every material want has been supplied and every desire satisfied in every member of the community, the ultimate remedy for over-production is always at hand in a reduction of the working day of the entire population—at last, by the then universal machine, freed from insistent toil—from eight hours a day to seven, to four or even to two.¹ The short answer

¹ This eventual reduction of the hours of labour is actually in the minds of those who prepare the Plan. "The Soviet Government", we are told, "foresees a time when over-production will necessitate a gradual reduction of working hours for the community. Many years may elapse before this point is reached in the USSR, on account of the enormous leeway in the production of commodities which has now to be made up" (*Moscow, 1911-1933*, by Allan Monkhouse, 1934, p. 262).

to this strange apprehension of over-production is that the Plan itself regulates, according to the community's need of commodities and services, the number of hours per day during which all the able-bodied adult members of the community will be asked to produce.

The Law of Diminishing Returns

There is a more plausible way of "proving" that an early recurrence of unemployment is inevitable in the USSR, even under a planned economy. The annual increase in population, together with the labour continually rendered surplus by increasing mechanisation and rationalisation, might conceivably be taken into employment by bringing more land under cultivation, or making cultivation more intensive, or by starting more and more manufacturing enterprises. But, it is argued, the Law of Diminishing Returns must come into play from the point at which the additional workers will find themselves, because of their resort to worse land and inferior sites, producing not enough profit to induce any entrepreneur to continue the business, and therefore, as the economist argues, not enough foodstuffs for their own subsistence; or in manufacture, producing commodities so faintly desired by a satiated community that they will not sell at a price that will even buy the producers bread!

The communist answer is to laugh at the delusion that there is any such thing as a Law of Diminishing Returns. All that is needed is the appropriate knowledge of the possible improvements of processes of production, whether agricultural or industrial, which will enable any number of persons to produce any amount of output of the commodities that the consumers desire. At any rate, if this is an exaggeration, even our existing knowledge would enable us to multiply many times the amount of foodstuffs that the agriculturists at present produce, and permit the industrialists to multiply equally their output of clothing and every other commodity. To the communist it seems that it requires only scientific planning to demonstrate to the most sceptical practical man that the Law of Diminishing Returns is, with the technical science of the twentieth century, no better than an economic myth. The world is living, in fact, under a Law of Increasing Returns, likely to endure until a date far too remote to be taken into account in twentieth-century planning.

"But Planning means Slavery"

There is, however, a final objection to economic planning with which nearly every argument on the subject concludes. Admitting that planning may be practicable, and that a cunningly devised Plan may deal successfully with all contingencies, the result can be achieved, it is triumphantly declared, only by reducing the community to the condition of slavery. It is the very essence of capitalism, it is said, to cause production to be automatically adjusted by competition in a free market, and by this

means to ensure the utmost attainable satisfaction of the desires of the consumers. This is taken to represent a state of perfect freedom. The very nature of planning, it is said, involves not only compelling everybody to work, but also, as there can be no free market, commanding them where they are to work, what particular work they shall do, and how many hours a day they shall devote to what will certainly be an uncongenial task, prescribed by a ubiquitous bureaucracy!¹

Let us analyse the modicum of validity that this objection contains. How far is it correct to say that the planning of the community's production and distribution involves, either in theory or in practice of the USSR, a compulsion to labour?

It is hard to see how it can honestly be suggested that, in the USSR, the General Plan itself imposes any legal obligation to labour upon any person whatsoever. What the Plan does is a very different thing, namely to ensure that *opportunity* to produce shall be provided for every able-bodied person. The obligation to labour remains, in the USSR, as in the United States, just as it is involved in man's very nature. He must eat in order to live. In every capitalist country to-day millions of persons find themselves without opportunity to "make a living", and at the same time forcibly prevented, by the police protection of private property, from satisfying even their most urgent needs. In the USSR, for every member of the collectivised organisation of industry and agriculture, the Plan provides a place in which he can earn trade union wages. But although the Five-Year Plan provides the necessary total number of situations waiting to be filled, neither the Plan nor any other law of the USSR dictates to Ivan or Nikolai which of the situations he is to fill. In a much more real sense than in Great Britain or the United States, he may, according to his faculties, make his own choice of work. Up and down the country many thousands of heads of establishments of the most diverse kind are seeking additional recruits, even recruits devoid of specific skill or training, in order to enable their works to produce up to capacity. The trade unionists, and also the recruiting departments of the factories, will tell Ivan and Nikolai where they can hopefully apply for jobs, and will even help them to go to the jobs. The establishments themselves have often sent out specially recruiting agents to remote villages who provide transport and subsistence on the journey (including the dependants) for any man or woman who will engage to serve at the standard wage. But no law compels any person (unconvicted of crime) to accept any one of these situations, even after he has exhausted all his savings or his inheritance, if he prefers either to live on his relations, or to incur the

¹ "The system would require the complete regimentation of producers. As consumers they could choose between the commodities available. But on the choice of commodities to be produced they could have relatively little influence. They would have to take what it was decided to produce. And what it was decided to produce would be the resultant, not of the conflicting pulls of price and costs, but of the conflicting advice of different technical experts and politicians with no objective measure to which to submit the multitudinous alternatives possible" (*The Great Depression*, by Lionel Robbins, 1934, p. 155).

penalties for detected theft, or simply to starve to death.

There are seeming exceptions to this sweeping statement, but they do not affect the argument. Thus every member of (or candidate for) the Communist Party, and every member of the Communist League of Youth (Comsomols), has voluntarily undertaken, as a condition of admission to these organisations, or of remaining therein, that he will undertake any task or duty that is assigned to him by his corporate superiors. This obligation leads sometimes to the most devoted self-sacrifice for the common good, and occasionally even to the most heroic martyrdom in the cause. But no one is required to join these organisations, and no such compulsion is involved in the Five-Year Plan. The Courts of Justice have constantly to sentence convicted criminals to imprisonment for specific crimes; and the sentence often takes the humane form of requiring the defendant to continue for a prescribed term (usually not exceeding six months) at his accustomed occupation in a particular establishment, suffering a deduction from his monthly wage. If the penalty is between six months and three years, he may be selected for reformatory treatment at Bolshovo or other reformatory settlement. In graver cases the defendant may be sentenced to a term of penal servitude, and be put to work on making a new canal or road. But all this has nothing to do with the General Plan. Equally remote from the Plan is the statutory privilege of all the rural inhabitants, in place of paying a road tax, to perform a certain number of days' labour on the local roads (as was the case in England down to 1835; and as is still the case in France, in some parts of the United States, and in various other countries). There may be other cases of *levée en masse* of all available inhabitants when, in some exceptional emergency, such as a fire or a flood, loss of life has to be prevented.¹ Even the forced removal from their homesteads to other districts, meaning normally to less pleasant opportunities of earning their living, of kulaks and other recalcitrants who in 1931-1932 obstructed the formation of collective farms or the timely sowing and reaping—harsh and arbitrary measure as this seems to the Englishman—was neither authorised nor contemplated by the Five-Year Plan. In short, unless we are to consider as slavery all work done for wages or salary, in pursuance of contracts voluntarily entered into, and upon conditions settled by the trade unions in collective bargaining, there does not seem to be any implication of slavery involved in a planned economy. The Government of the USSR has, indeed, no need to employ compulsion to fill its factories or state farms, or even its lumber camps. It finds it quite sufficient, as

¹ Thus, it is pointed out that "Russian law . . . provides a reserve power of complete industrial conscription, which requires that in case of public crises everyone between the ages of eighteen and forty-five in the case of men (or forty in the case of women) must take part in work required by the Government, except only women more than seven months advanced in pregnancy, nursing mothers and women with young children who have no one else to look after them" (*Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field, p. 225; *Labour Code of the Russian Federal Republic*, articles 11 to 13, quoted in *Select Documents Relative to Labour Legislation in the USSR*, Cmd. 3775; *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, p. 79).

we shall explain in the following chapter,¹ to use the device of making more attractive the particular occupations in which there is, at any time, or in any locality, a shortage of suitable applicants. The obvious remedy is to provide additional opportunities for training in such occupations, effectively open to the youth of either sex. An even simpler way is to pay more liberally for the kinds of labour that are temporarily in short supply. Thus, in 1932, in the exceptionally rapid development of electrical installation there was, nearly everywhere, a shortage of coppersmiths. It was accordingly provided that more youths who voluntarily applied should be selected for training as coppersmiths, and it was also arranged by the appropriate trade union that the coppersmith should be paid at a higher rate than other smiths. The result was that more youths were tempted to learn coppersmithing, whilst many adult mechanics voluntarily qualified as coppersmiths in the evening technical classes. Another instance of payment according to "social value" is the decision come to in 1933 to allow a special increase in wages, coupled with a special exemption from certain forms of taxation, to the workers resident in the extreme east of Siberia, a measure presently extended to the districts bordering on Mongolia, in order to retain in those areas a population (and even to promote the removal to them of other persons) whose presence would help to defend it against a possible Japanese invasion. In conclusion, it is perhaps not unfair to suspect that the real origin of this particular objection to planning is, not that the Plan condemns the proletariat to this or that form of wage labour, but that the Plan is rooted in the conception which Lenin borrowed from the Christian Fathers, namely, that "if a man do not work neither shall he eat"—even if he be in legal possession of property! This, however, is an objection not to economic planning but to the whole constitution of the USSR.

Consumers' Control instead of Producers' Control

There remains to be stated one principle of organisation that we believe to be fundamental to the successful operation of a planned economy. If the Plan is to be successful, it must be devised and executed for the benefit, and according to the desires, not of any section of the population—not even of so large a section as all the entrepreneurs in an industry, or as all the trade unionists in that industry, or as all the manual workers, or even as all the producers as such—but of the entire community. Just as planning by the employers of labour will fail, or planning by the financiers, or even by all the capitalist class, so planning by or for the persons working in particular occupations, or even in all the several occupations, will fail; even as the management of factories by the workers' committees failed, in the episode that we have described in Chapter VII., of workers' control in the Petrograd of 1917–1918. Planning by or in the interests of the producers always proceeds by such a restriction or other manipulation of

¹ Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

the output as will lead to a higher price. It was, we suggest, an instance of Lenin's genius that he led the Supreme Economic Council in 1918, and taught both the State Planning Commission and the Council of Labour and Defence that there was no way of ensuring that economic planning should be continuously directed to the benefit of the whole community, other than placing the control in the hands of the representatives, *not of any of the organisations of producers, but of organisations representing the consumers*. Only in this way can it be ensured that output should be continuously increased and that production shall really be "for use" and not "for profit", whether the profiteer be the capitalist employer or the proletarian craftsman.

Citizens' Control where that of the Consumer Fails

It was not difficult to see that the consumers' cooperative societies, with a membership becoming practically universal, were the appropriate organs for administering, under their committees of management elected by and responsible to all the members, both the wholesale and retail distribution of food and commodities for household use, and even, in many cases, the production of such commodities. But this form of consumers' organisation is not available for the whole of consumption or use. There is no possibility of organising the unknown millions of persons who will, ultimately and indirectly, use or consume the products of the giant factories producing turbines, or those manufacturing ball-bearings or motor lorries or tractors. Equally impossible is it to organise the users of the railway service, or of the Volga steamboats, or of the post and telegraph and telephone services. Nor can it be said that the workers in these services have interests in common with the users of them. The users and consumers in these cases are nothing less than the whole citizen community. In these, and a hundred other cases, the supreme direction and management can be undertaken only by the government itself, either central or local, with the assistance of advisory or consultative committees of the several categories of workers concerned in the production, and preferably also with the help, by way of criticism and suggestion, of specially qualified representatives of particular sets of users of the several products.

There is another reason why the planning of production, like its direction and management, cannot universally be entrusted either to the producers themselves, in their several occupations and trade unions, or to the consumers themselves, whether in the consumers' cooperative societies, or in committees of specially qualified users of particular services. All these organisations, and their members, are necessarily interested chiefly *in their own wants and desires*. Their minds are filled with a sense of present requirements. They are not to be trusted to plan, impartially and without bias, for the future. They are not qualified to weigh one against the other the importance of a fuller supply for the present, and a

proper provision for the next generation. The community alone has to live for ever. The faithful communist, looking in a distant future for a "classless society", asserts that the state will "wither away". But whatever happens to the state, regarded as the wielder of coercive power, the state, in the double aspect of a benign housekeeping mother, indissolubly united with a trained and experienced statistician, will evidently always be with us; and, as we suspect, with civilisation becoming ever more complex, continuously more and more!

Just as the central committee at the Kremlin alone is capable in estimating rightly both the needs of national defence against foreign aggression, and the appropriate means of warding off this danger to the very existence of the community, so a central planning authority alone is in a position adequately to survey the needs of the future, and to make the appropriate provision, even at the cost of the present generation, which will secure, alike to the producers and to the consumers who are to follow the conditions of an unbroken continuance of their common well-being. And thus, in our judgment, it was right to put the appointment of the USSR State Planning Commission in the hands of the USSR Sovnarkom, and to make it responsible to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) as representing the All-Union Congress of Soviets, rather than in the hands of either the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions or of Centrosoyus. It is emphatically for the community as a whole, as the trustee for the future generations as well as for the present, and not for any contemporary section of the community, to decide on the General Plan.

The Supposed "Coercion of the Consumer"

We are now able to deal with the common objection of nearly all schools of economists of the western world to the very idea of a planned economy. Nearly all of them object to it, not only because they think it impossible for a General Plan to be framed to deal wisely with all the complications and contingencies of production and distribution in a populous community—or rather to deal with it with at least as much wisdom as the present congeries of capitalist employers—but because they are convinced that even the best devised General Plan must necessarily involve a coercion of the consumer. With capitalist production for a free market, it is said, the consumer can get whatever he likes. The capitalists of the whole world, eager for profit, will, it is alleged, compete with each other in struggling to satisfy the customer's whim or fancy, and thus meet every demand of changing taste or fashion. In any deliberately planned economy, it is claimed, the consumer will be obliged to accept whatever the government thinks fit to produce; and no government, it is suggested, will ever put itself to the inconvenience and expense of satisfying such a riot of fancies!

We suggest that this optimistic vision of the profit-seeking capitalists as the far-sighted agents of the customer, fully satisfying, through the

apparatus of a free market, all the desires of the whole community of consumers, vanishes under the test of reality and must be dismissed as another economic myth. Even admitting that the capitalist entrepreneur acts, in effect, as an agent for the prospective purchasers of his wares, this does not mean that the desires of the consuming public will thereby be satisfied. The profit-seeking entrepreneur does not even aim at satisfying the desires of the whole community. *He is concerned only with the desires of that part of the community which will have purchasing power sufficient to permit of paying the price for the product. The desires of all the rest of the community are ignored.* In this so-called "continual referendum" those without purchasing power have no votes. Now, in every country of advanced capitalism to-day, at least one-half in exchange value—it might even be said three-fourths—of all the commodities and services brought to the market are designed for sale to a minority of the community, less than one-fourth of the whole, which takes for itself two-thirds or three-fourths of the national income.¹ This fortunate minority, it is true, is free to satisfy every whim and fancy up to the very edge of its wealth. These customers in the market may fairly be said to have in their service the profit-seeking entrepreneurs and organisers of industry of the whole civilised world. It is this aspect of the free market on which the economists are apt to fix their exclusive attention. It is *these* consumers of whom the economist thinks. This fortunate minority would undoubtedly find their freedom of choice limited under such a planned economy as that of the USSR, though limited by its purpose rather than by its process.

There is, unfortunately, in the free market of a capitalist society, another side of the picture. It is a constant and, as it seems, a necessary feature of a capitalist society that the small minority of the rich are accompanied by a large majority of the poor. Of these, at any moment, a considerable number are without any purchasing power whatever! Many more have no more purchasing power than suffices for a bare subsistence on the lowest scale compatible with life. This is not a matter only of the existence of unemployment in periods of depression. In the England of the beginning of the present century, it was possible for a statesman about to become Prime Minister to mention that one-third of the whole population of the country was *habitually* "on the verge of starvation".² This not inconsiderable proportion of every advanced capitalist community cannot be said to enjoy any effective freedom of choice in the much-vaunted free market! Not for them are produced all

¹ It is not usually remembered, even by economists, that in Great Britain, as in other countries of advanced industrial civilisation, the wage-earning manual workers with their families comprise two-thirds of the whole population; and that the aggregate income of these two-thirds of the population nowhere exceeds one-third of the whole national income. See the statistical sources given in Fabian Tract No. 5, *Facts for Socialists*.

² The admission made by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was based upon, and supported by, the exhaustive researches published as *Life and Labour of the People*, by Charles Booth (17 vols., 1892-1900). This survey was repeated in 1929-1933 under the direction of Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, by the London School of Economics, and published as *The New Survey of London Life and Labour* (9 vols., 1931-1934).

the wonderful variety of foodstuffs, of clothing, of comfortable homes, of household furniture, of the apparatus of games, of books, of works of art, of opportunities for travel. How limited is the range of choice of the labourer's wife, in expending the weekly income of one or two pounds (after setting aside the rent of the dwelling) which must provide over 100 meals per week (reckoning 5 persons and 3 meals daily), and clothe the whole family, and find the pence exacted for social insurance, if not also those demanded for tramway fares; and, perhaps, some modicum of amusement. The Russian visitor to England who visits the public markets during their busy hours cannot help remarking the amazing wealth, in quantity and variety, of the foodstuffs, sweetstuffs, clothing, toys, furniture, household utensils, and every conceivable temptation to the purchaser. Here, surely, is the amplest possible freedom of choice for the consumer! It takes a little reflection for even a trained economist to realise that the vast majority of the commodities displayed in the public markets, or in the shops of the London streets (which are estimated to offer for sale more than a couple of millions of different articles, including all the varieties of kinds, materials, shapes, colours and sizes),¹ are as *effectively forbidden to two-thirds of all the inhabitants of England as if this large majority were statutorily prohibited from purchasing them*. In the Soviet Union, under the Second Five-Year Plan, there are still far fewer commodities produced per head than in England, and in much less variety. But the Plan itself ensures that practically every family in the USSR has purchasing power throughout the year, in addition to a considerable addition in the way of socialised wages. Hence their effective command over commodities, alike in quantity and in variety, is in fact nothing like so much restricted as that of the couple of million unemployed in Great Britain, and perhaps not so much as that of the millions of English farm workers and general labourers earning no more than £2 per week for such part of the year as they are fortunate enough to be in constant employment. There is, as it seems to us, no reason why, as production in the Soviet Union increases, even the manual worker under the General Plan, which is constantly elaborating the variety of its commodities and the range of its services, should not enjoy at least as wide a liberty of choice as the average wage-earner in any equally productive capitalist country.

Greater Freedom of Choice

There are, indeed, some striking features about the structure of industry and agriculture in the USSR which incline us to predict that it may provide even greater opportunities for the freedom of choice in consumption than the modern capitalist anarchy. In these days of crowded city life and mass production, the individual of exceptional tastes, unless he has

¹ One of the largest of London's scores of huge "department stores" (Selfridge's) has estimated, on the basis of partial statistics, that it had at least one million different commodities on sale in 1934.

both time and exceptional means, does not find it easy to get the exceptional service he requires. We have already more than once commented on the peculiarly soviet acceptance of the principle of multiformity in the economic and political constitution. Alongside the gigantic enterprises and standardised production of the manufacturing trusts and combines, and of the agricultural sovkhosi and kolkhosi, under the direction of the People's Commissars and the Central Executive Council, there works the steadily growing array of kустar artels and industrial cooperative societies that we have described.¹ These independent groups of owner-producers, unlike the trade unions and consumers' cooperative societies, are not closed to the "deprived" categories, some of whom already find there a means of livelihood. They are subject to the very minimum of government direction or control. They are practically free to make, for household consumption, whatever commodities they like, or to render whatever services in the way of mending or repairing, painting or decorating that they choose. The design, the style, the shape, the colour, the materials, and even the workmanship are all within their discretion. These independent groups of hand-working producers, which are steadily increasing in number, are already supplementing, by specialised individual production, the mass output which seems indispensable, alike under capitalism or under socialism, for the commodities required in colossal magnitudes.²

A further extension of the range of the consumers' choice is being more and more afforded by the application of the "principle of self-supply". In order to relieve the burden upon the central organisations of coping with the demands of so large a population as 170 millions, all the factories and other industrial establishments and public services have lately been pressed, as we have described,³ to undertake their own production of foodstuffs and the commoner household commodities that they desire, through the factory department which has superseded the closed cooperative society to which their members belonged. In this way associations of producers are invited to assume the functions of management, but not the management of their own occupations. They are to organise in order to manage the production of what they themselves are to consume. Hence there are now in the USSR many thousands of "vegetable gardens", orchards, piggeries, poultry farms, and dairies, in which all these separate groups are encouraged, irrespective of any govern-

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", Section II., "The Association of Owner-Producers".

² Such an alternative seems to be inconceivable by the individualist economist. "Either there is freedom of choice or regimentation of the consumer: freedom to make use of the most economical method, as judged from the standpoint of profit or loss, or there is authoritative regulation of the methods of production. Each of these alternatives excludes the other. To have both planning and freedom, regulation and perfect elasticity of organisation and technique, is an impossibility" (*Gold, Unemployment and Capitalism*, by T. E. Gregory, 1933, p. 282). This "impossibility" may be witnessed in existence on a large scale in the USSR under the Second Five-Year Plan!

³ Pp. 259-260.

ment decision, to produce exactly what their own members desire to consume. What is more, in addition to this rapidly increasing collective production by groups of producers (factory workers) and of consumers (cooperative self-supply), there is now being added, on a gigantic scale, another form of "self-supply," namely, that by the workman himself in his abundant leisure. In the densely populated industrial district of the Donets Basin, and not there only, the miners and factory workers are being provided, free of rent or tax, with what in Great Britain are called allotments, that is to say, plots of agricultural land, on which, by the hundred thousand, they are already raising, with tools and seeds supplied on easy credit terms, whatever garden produce they prefer.

The application of this principle of self-supply to the purpose of enlarging the effective range of choice of the consumer may be noticed in some other of its ramifications. The member of a kolkhos is not only encouraged to take his own family product of eggs and chickens, piggery and dairy, to the free market anywhere he pleases, and at all seasons; but also, since 1933, to bring for free sale also his share of the collective harvest of the kolkhos, as soon as the amount due to the government for tax and for the use of tractors, etc., throughout each district has been paid. But still more useful in widening the range of the consumers' choice may be the now frequent arrangement by which an agricultural kolkhos or a fishery kolkhos freely contracts in advance, at a bargaining price arrived at in a market comprising other purchasers, to supply a proportion or the whole of its product—of wheat or flour, of dairy or piggery, or the daily catch of fish—to the canteen of some particular factory, or the dining-rooms of a municipal office or school. In all these ways the consumers of the USSR are finding that the mass production of a nationalised industry, whilst useful in meeting standard needs, is not the only source from which they may indulge their peculiar fantasies and satisfy their exceptional tastes.

It will be seen that, whilst the adoption of a policy of Planned Production for Community Consumption goes a long way in placing economic relations under collective control, yet it leaves open to personal choice and individual decision, not merely transiently, but in ways likely to become ever more effective, both the expenditure of the purchasing power with which every worker is provided, and the selection of an occupation in which he can earn his income. Whilst the "price mechanism" no longer determines the production of commodities, it is still retained as a useful instrument by which people, whether as producers or as consumers, can direct their own lives.¹ With production and distribution very largely

¹ "The final conclusion . . . is, then, that on the one hand the soviet planned economy has rendered the price mechanism entirely useless in certain spheres, and has partially dispensed with it in others. On the other hand, it has apparently retained that mechanism as the means of giving effect to a certain proportion of the decisions that all economic systems have to make: particularly as an instrument for regulating the actions of people, as distinct from the disposal of things (which can be nationalised and thus be disposed of by direct authoritative decree)—as in its relations with workers and with the

collectivised, and all family vicissitudes covered by social services, a specific allocation of income as salary or wage—the so-called “personal wage”—operates differently from similar economic relations under capitalism. How the difference affects personal motives and individual conduct on the one hand, and human initiative and mechanical output on the other, forms the theme of the following chapter, entitled “In Place of Profit”.

still unnationalised industry of agriculture. But this mechanism is always employed with a difference, so that even where the plan apparently follows its readings the result, obtained may be quite different from those which would be realised under an unplanned economy” (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, p. 101).

CHAPTER IX

IN PLACE OF PROFIT

THE liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, together with the substitution of collective for individual ownership, and of planned for unplanned production, necessitated, in industrial organisation, more than a structural change. It involved the loss of the powerful incentive of profit-making—that vision of “wealth beyond the dreams of avarice”, to be enjoyed by the minority who, under the capitalist system, controlled the use of capital and land and the hiring of labour. Some effective substitute for this incentive of private profit had to be found. Neither the Marxist theorists nor any other school of socialists had given any adequate attention to this need. We deal in this chapter with the way in which Soviet Communism has grappled with the problem.¹

The Magnitude of the Task

We must recall the conditions under which the Bolsheviks began their reconstruction. The nation with which they had to deal was exhausted by a prolonged war, which had cost it millions of lives, and stripped it of territory containing many of its factories, much of its railway mileage, and a large proportion of its few useful ports. A defeated and demoralised army had streamed back in disorder into the villages. Then came armed rebellion against the *de facto* government, coupled with the lawless invasion of Russian soil by half a dozen foreign powers, fomenting a civil war of the most devastating character, in which much of the remaining railway mileage was ruined; thousands of bridges were destroyed; coal-mines and oil-fields were wrecked, and both manufacturing and agriculture were, in many districts, brought to a standstill. On this ensued, largely as a result of the desolation wrought by these years of embittered warfare, one of the worst and most extensive famines that Russia had ever known. In 1921 it could be estimated that, over an area one-sixth of the whole land surface of the globe, industry had sunk to one-fifth of its pre-war production, whilst agriculture was reduced by one-half, with typhus, enteric and syphilis vying with actual starvation to produce a fearful

¹ In this chapter we have been greatly helped (and even supplied with a title) by an informative work based on an acute analysis of soviet conditions, namely *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward (1933). Two able pamphlets by Russian trade union officials, entitled *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufmann, and *The Development of Socialist Methods and Forms of Labour*, by A. Aluf (both Moscow, 1932), put the communist view before the thousands of foreign wage-earners now working in the Soviet Union. Much information will also be found in the (English) report *The Ninth Trade Union Congress* (Moscow, 1932). See also *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1927), and *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman (1932). An able description by a temporary worker in the Putilov works at Leningrad is given in *Eine Frau erlebt den roten Alltag*, by Lili Korber (Berlin, 1932), translated as *Life in a Soviet Factory* (London, 1933).

mortality, and even more socially destructive physical and mental damage in those who survived. To climb back to even a low level of efficiency was a difficult task. The peasantry were not producing enough foodstuffs to feed the cities. The Bolsheviks themselves, a tiny minority in the population, were wholly inexperienced in civil administration, agricultural organisation or industrial management. In industry, the greatest handicap was the lack of skilled workmen, and even of labourers of any competence in industrial work, let alone mass production, machine-making or electrification. Nearly all the civil servants and bankers, with many of the professional men and managers and foremen of the factories and mines, had abandoned their posts, to join the various White armies, or to flee to foreign parts. Lenin and his colleagues were confronted with cold and hungry cities bereft of municipal organisation, in the midst of a population overwhelmingly agricultural in character, a peasantry of many different races and languages, some of them the merest savages, a large majority of the whole quite illiterate; dominated by superstition and demoralised by greed and hatred, and all the horrors of a *jacquerie* unparalleled in extent and brutality.

But the Bolsheviks were not dismayed. They had some advantages not always possessed by successful revolutionaries. Their leaders had a creed in which they fervently believed. They had evolved for themselves a code of social service and personal disinterestedness; and they had, as we shall show in a subsequent chapter, what no government had ever before possessed, namely, a supreme faith in science, and in its unswerving application to all the problems of society. Moreover, the very abandonment of their posts by nearly all the members of the governing classes left the field free. The very ignorance of the mass of the population with which the Communist Party had to deal, their very illiteracy, the very diversity of race and language, with the lack of any uniform "cake of custom", the fact that what had to be moulded was a mentally unexhausted and practically formless multitude—clay in the potter's hand—made it relatively easy, from one end of the vast territory to the other, to instil a new faith. There have been in the past, though we usually forget it, voluntary mass conversions to a new religion, as, for instance, to the Christianity of the Dark Ages. In Russia there ensued, in the years following 1917, equally considerable mass conversions to the creed of Lenin. To inculcate in these millions a new code of conduct, and even to alter their mode of life, has naturally been a longer and more difficult task than to convert them to the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, and to the collective ownership of the means of production. How the Communist Party has achieved this radical change in the motivation of industry, and, to a large extent, even of agriculture, and by what devices they have made the social machine work without the lure of individual profit to the landlord and the capitalist, on which nearly the whole of industry and agriculture in other countries depends, clearly deserves the consideration of economists and statesmen.

We may notice, to begin with, that powerful as is the incentive of private profit, the capitalist directors of industry have seldom made use of it for stimulating the exertions of the great mass of the workers whom they employed at wages. Indeed, it is part of the historical evolution of capitalism that it gradually deprived of the opportunity of making a profit one section after another of the persons carrying on the business of production, each of these independent handicraftsmen and small masters being, one after another, reduced to mere wage-earners in the "great industry". We must therefore distinguish between profit-making, with which Soviet Communism has almost entirely dispensed, and those other forms of self-interest to which the mass of industrial workers in Russia, as elsewhere, had already been restricted. The communist remotivation of wealth-production in this mass of wage and salary earners has involved, first, the remoulding of the old incentive of pecuniary self-interest so as to harmonise it with the welfare of the community as a whole; and secondly, the discovery and application of additional incentives, by bringing into play, among the masses of workers and peasants, for the purpose of increasing the productivity of labour, new motives hitherto unexplored. There is, for instance, the desire on the part of individuals and groups of individuals to measure themselves against others in trials of skill and endurance, and thus display their superiority. This may be termed the sports instinct. Then there are the sanctions of public honour and public shame. Higher in the scale of moral values stand the stimuli of intellectual curiosity and of joy in perfected craftsmanship; and, above all, the zeal for social service, irrespective of any special recognition, leading to sustained inconspicuous toil and even acts of heroism. It is needless to add that this separation of motives into two distinct categories, the old and the new, is artificial and for the purpose of lucid description only. No such cleavage corresponds with the facts. In actual practice, as we shall relate, all these separate motives, egoistic and altruistic, are inextricably combined in the appeal made to the masses by the legislative decrees and administrative policy of the USSR.

The Old Incentives Remodelled

The episode of "workers' control"¹ brought home to Lenin and his followers the leaderless chaos and widespread inefficiency occasioned by the extrusion of the profit-making entrepreneur, himself intent on getting an ever-increasing productivity for his own profit, as the director of wealth production. One of the characteristic diseases of non-profit-making enterprises the Bolsheviks termed "depersonalisation". . . . "What does depersonalisation mean?" asks Stalin, in his epoch-making address to a conference of leaders of industry in June 1931.² "It means complete absence of responsibility for the work performed, absence of responsibility

¹ See Chapter VIII., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

² *New Conditions, New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin (Moscow, 1931), p. 10.

for machinery, lathes and tools. Of course, where there is depersonalisation we cannot expect a serious increase in productivity of labour, improved quality of output, care for machinery, lathes and tools." It was this absence of personal responsibility, no less than the ignorance of shifting bodies of workers in each separate undertaking, which had led Lenin, in June 1918, to supersede "workers' control" in the direction of industry by one-man management, under the orders either of the state and the municipality in their various trusts, or of the consumers' cooperative movement. But this one-man management and responsibility to the state or municipal trust, or to the consumers' cooperative movement, whilst it prevented the factory from turning out goods that were not required, and from rendering services irrespective of the needs of the community, did not in itself increase the productivity of labour, or prevent the waste of raw material and the reckless deterioration of expensive machinery. What was required was that, not the director or manager only, but also each worker, should feel himself responsible for his own job, and exert himself, in season and out of season, to fulfil it at the lowest cost. "Formerly", as Stalin continued, "we could somehow or other manage to get along, even with the bad organisation of labour which accompanies depersonalisation, and the absence of responsibility of every man for the task entrusted to him. But matters are different now. The conditions have entirely changed. In view of the vast scale of production and the existence of gigantic works, depersonalisation becomes a plague to industry and constitutes a menace to all the successes in production and organisation we have achieved in our factories."¹

Not Equality of Wages

At this point we may observe that it is a false assumption, current among the uninstructed, and even among persons who think themselves educated, that the Communist Party in the USSR began its task of building the socialist state upon the basis of identical incomes for all workers by hand and brain, on the ground that all men are born equal, with an inherent right to equal shares in the commodities and services produced by the community in which they live and move and have their being. There has never been any such idea among the Marxists. Quite the contrary. Karl Marx and, after him, Lenin were always denouncing the conception of an abstract equality between man and man, whether in the new-born babe, or in the adult as moulded by circumstances. In so far as individual communists have indulged in ideals as to how the wealth of the community should be distributed among its members, the slogan has always been one of inequality. This, in fact, has constantly been expressed in the phrase "from each according to his faculties and to each according to his needs" which is certainly diametrically opposite to an equality among individuals, in the sense of identity either in rewards or in sacrifices.

¹ *New Conditions, New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin (Moscow, 1931), p. 10.

This maxim was elaborated with precision by Stalin, in his address to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, January 1934: "These people" ("leftist blockheads", he calls them elsewhere) "evidently think that socialism calls for equality, for levelling the requirements and the personal lives of the members of society. Needless to say, such an assumption has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. By equality Marxism means, not equality in personal requirements and personal life, but the abolition of class, *i.e.* (a) the equal emancipation of all toilers from exploitation, after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; (b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production, after they have been transformed into the property of the whole society; (c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to the amount of work they have done (*socialist society*); (d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to their requirements (*communist society*). And Marxism starts out with the assumption that people's abilities and requirements are not, and cannot be, equal in quality or in quantity, either in the period of socialism or in the period of communism."¹

So much for the ideals aimed at by orthodox Marxism. But Lenin himself was above all things practical. He refused to contemplate a state of society that was not yet born. He had to build the socialist state out of the human material presented by the 160 millions of workers and peasants, who had been taught, by centuries of political and economic oppression, to grasp all they could get by hook or by crook, and to give as little effort as they dared to the landlord and the capitalist. Moreover, Lenin recognised that the impulses implanted in the ordinary man to seek comfort and security, and in many men to better their customary condition of livelihood, were impulses which, if directed into channels of public usefulness, and blocked from the channel of getting something for nothing, were useful incentives, and should be duly encouraged by appropriate methods of remuneration for services rendered. This could be done under Soviet Communism without the danger of creating new social classes. In the countries in which capitalism had replaced feudalism by plutocracy—notably in Great Britain and the United States—different levels of income, especially when caused by differing private fortunes, with varying inheritances, inevitably result in the creation of markedly different social classes. With the abolition of private incomes from rent and profit, individual remuneration for services rendered might be sufficiently varied without impairing that general condition of social equality which is fundamental to both socialism and communism. An obvious expedient was the adoption of wages according to output; that is to say, the method of piece-work wages, as contrasted with a fixed daily or hourly rate for each employment.

¹ *Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party*, by Josef Stalin at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU.

How Piece-work Rates are Fixed

Among the recognised leaders of the trade union movement in capitalist countries¹ there are some who have been surprised, indeed shocked, that their colleagues in the USSR are wholeheartedly in favour of piece-work, wherever and whenever it can be applied without detriment to the quality of the product or to the health of the workers. "The basic system for the remuneration of labour in our country is the piece-work system, pure and simple", stated Shvernik, the general secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), to the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions.² "The piece-work system makes every worker materially interested in increasing the productivity of labour and raising his own qualifications. We must lay all emphasis on the fact that the piece-work system in our country is radically different from the piece-work system in the capitalist countries. There, the piece-work system is a means of exploitation. Here, where the state is exercising the maximum degree of care in the protection of labour, and where we have a working day lasting seven hours, the piece-work system accelerates the tempo of socialist construction, increases the productivity of labour, and guarantees the improvement of the material and general living conditions of the workers. . . . For this purpose it is absolutely necessary to reinforce our tariff Rate-Fixing Bureaus by enlisting members of the engineering and technical staff, and skilled workers who have had practical experience of technical rate-fixing, to assist them in their work." Nor have the soviet trade unionists, unlike those working under capitalist conditions, any objection to individual piece-work, as contrasted with a uniform piece-work scale for all concerned. "Only by keeping account of the individual production of each worker within the brigade will the growth of labour efficiency of the entire brigade be assured", explains another representative of the trade union movement. "Collective piece-work, without individual accounting within the brigades, brings us back to the wage levelling we have been trying to get away from; it is piece-work only in form, not in substance." . . . "We will take the Rykov shaft, where a 'share'

¹ For the objection to piece-work of about one-half of the British trade unionists, see *Industrial Democracy*, by S. and B. Webb, 1898, pp. 286-304, 328-334. It is there pointed out that what is objected to by those trade unions in which time-work rates are insisted on, is not so much piece-work rates, as individual piece-work where the rates are not safeguarded against undercutting by fixed piece-work lists arrived at by collective bargaining and governing the rates for specified jobs, payable to all those employed on those jobs. Where such piece-work lists are collectively agreed to, and are binding on all employers as on all workmen (for instance, among the cotton spinners and weavers), the British trade unions not only allow, but demand them. Where neither employers nor workmen have been able to prepare such lists (as in the building trade), British trade unions vehemently denounce the individual and unsafeguarded piece-work that cutting employers seek to impose. Other trade unions (such as those of the boilermakers, boot and shoe factory operatives and compositors) willingly accept both systems, working under piece-work lists of rates where such lists are collectively agreed to and fixed, or on time wages on such jobs as are not (or, like repair work, cannot be) included in the lists.

² *Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1932, pp. 57-61.

piece-work system was introduced in June and July 1931, to replace the former collective depersonalised piece-work system. It is now possible to keep an individual account of the production of each worker in each shift. This is how work is carried on in the Rykov shaft. At the beginning of each shift the foreman measures the stope and allots a fixed number of metres to each driller. Whoever finishes his share before the end of the shift takes on an additional lot. The earnings are computed as follows: suppose the stope yielded so and so many trucks per shift, equivalent to so and so many metres stoped. Consequently each metre stoped yielded so and so many trucks. Now, a computation is made of the number of metres each miner stoped, which is translated into a corresponding number of trucks, etc.”¹

This striking difference in outlook between many of the trade unions facing a capitalist employer, on the one hand, and, on the other, the trade unions under Soviet Communism, is easily understood. “Under the conditions of socialist economy”, Kaufman explains, “the working class determines through the medium of its planning organs”² what part of the products, created by the toil of the workers, is to be handed over to them in the form of individual money wages; what part is to be expended to meet the requirements of the public, material and cultural needs, such as the construction of dwellings, public health, education, etc., and what part is to be appropriated to develop socialist economy, the construction of new mills and factories, mines, power stations, state farms, etc. Thus *that part of the wages* which is not handed over directly to the individual workers is also spent on raising the living standard of the working class and on the development of socialist economy, which assures the further growth of the material welfare and the cultural standard of the workers.”³ In other words there is, in soviet production, no “enemy party”, against whom the workmen have to contend. This is, indeed, the essential difference between capitalist and communist production. Where profit-making is the recognised object of industrial undertakings, there is a constant danger of the employer taking advantage of the worker’s increased output by “cutting the rate”, and so compelling the piece-worker to give increased effort for the old time-work remuneration. Where the profit-making motive has been swept away, the danger of the rate being cut in

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufman (Moscow, 1932), pp. 19, 21.

² For the trade union’s participation in planning the standard rates of wages, as well as the quantity and conditions of production, see Chapter III. in Part I., “Man as a Producer”, in the section on Soviet Trade Unionism, especially pp. 141-148; and Chapter VIII. in Part II., “Planned Production for Community Consumption”, pp. 521-522.

³ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufmann (Moscow, 1932), p. 6. This statement by a trade unionist is put in generalised form by the American observer: “Wages represent that share of the common product which is paid to the worker for the satisfaction of his individual needs; wage payments are only one of the ways in which he gets his share of the things available for personal consumption, but through them he has some room to exercise his personal choice in what he will buy, so their manipulation to stimulate his productivity is an appeal to him as an individual. The general improvement of material and cultural conditions in which he shares appeals to him as a member of the class whose lot goes up together” (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 31).

order to increase the owner's profits is eliminated. Or, to put it in another way, when the one and only purpose of every enterprise is a continuously increasing output, to meet an automatically expanding effective demand for the commodities, there is no objection felt by the management to the workers' increased earnings under piece-work intensity. It is all to the good of all concerned that the workers should increase their speed of working, their economy of material or accessories, and their proportion of product free from faults, and, be it added, their maximum utilisation of labour-saving machinery, provided always that neither the quality deteriorates nor the workman's health suffers. Accordingly, in the USSR, there are none of the clever piece-work systems by which, in capitalist industry, the workers are made to gain less per unit the faster they work. Under Soviet Communism, the piece-work rates are never degressive. They are, in some cases, even progressive, the rate rising by stages for output beyond the norm. "After a fixed number of units of the items to be turned out has been produced", we are told, "every further unit is paid for at a higher rate than the preceding one. For instance, if a worker is supposed to produce 20 units, each requiring the same amount of work, at 25 kopeks each, his pay for the 21st piece will not be 25 kopeks, but more; for the 22nd unit still more, etc. Thus, material interest is supplied to stimulate the worker to save time and exceed the rates of production. Under the conditions of soviet economy this progressive piece-work system is a method of giving a material incentive to the more advanced producers."¹ . . . "At the Uralmashstroi (Construction of the Ural Machine Works) the rates [of progress] for laying foundations always used to remain unfulfilled; at the present time, since the introduction of the *progressivka*, they are overfulfilling the rates by 64 per cent. The earnings of the workers jumped from 5 roubles a day to 7.56. Many such instances could be cited. Everywhere the system of progressive piece-work wage payment calls forth an increase in labour efficiency accompanied by a simultaneous rise in earnings. . . . This rapid rise of rate was condemned because it would raise cost of each unit of production, but as a matter of fact this is not the case. Everybody knows that the cost of every commodity includes, in addition to the cost of the raw material and labour, all overhead expenses, such as heating and lighting premises, fire protection, maintenance of the executive and book-keeping staffs, depreciation of property, etc. These overhead expenses do not increase with increased output. Consequently the more this output increases, the smaller is the proportional share falling to each unit of production . . . it is essential that a definite relation be established between wage earnings and the quality of production, and not only its quantity. In this respect the experience of several shoe factories, particularly the 'Burevestnik' factory of Moscow, will prove very instructive. There a progressively increasing system of wage rates was introduced, made dependent upon decreasing the percentage of lower grades of footwear. Excellent results

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufmann (Moscow, 1932), p. 22.

were obtained from this system when it was introduced into several brigades in the form of an experiment. Transition to this progressive system required careful preparation, and what is still more important, rigid accounting of output. Every worker must see daily how much he has done and what he is to be paid for it.”¹

The Rate-fixers

It is needless to observe that the working out of these elaborate piece-work schedules over so vast an area as the USSR is far from perfect; and the trade union authorities have been busily engaged during the last few years in appointing and instructing rate-fixers. “A Technical Normalisation Bureau”, we are told, “called T.N.B. is to be found in every enterprise attached to the department of labour economics of the factory administration. Its duty is to establish rates of production and rates of remuneration, *i.e.* to fix the standard time required for the accomplishment of certain work with certain equipment, and the wage the worker is to be paid for it.”² But unfortunately such a rate-fixing bureau is not yet provided for every enterprise. In 1933, before handing over his department to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), the People’s Commissar of Labour was complaining seriously of the inadequacy of the supply of rate-fixers. “What we do not have at present is a supply of technicians and skilled workers who are also well acquainted with the processes of production. Such workers must be found at once, and drawn into the work of technical rate-fixing. Thus, in 15 factories controlled by the ‘Stal’ trust, there were 524 workers employed in the rate-fixing bureau in 1930, and only 369 on March 1st, 1931; those with university education numbered 53 in 1930 and 35 in 1931. In the ‘Artem’ mine there is only one rate-fixer for 5000 workers. In 35 mines of the Donets Basin there were 267 rate-fixers in May 1931, but not one of them an engineer or technician. . . . At the present time . . . 7000 rate-fixers are being trained but . . . the students chosen are themselves not of a kind as to guarantee a solution of the problems confronting us in the field of technical rate-fixing. . . . Courses must be organised for workers with at least three to five years’ experience.”³

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25. The importance of publicity as to rates and earnings, both of individuals and of the brigade or shift, is fully realised. “The workers are protected by a minimum income, and the speed is not allowed to menace the worker’s health. . . . A rate-fixing expert testified that in his experience ‘the speed-up system is totally absent’. The rates are computed for quality as well as quantity of output, and the workers both know and approve the ends for which they are set. They are not allowed to be cut during the job, and instead of being lowered with the increased efficiency of the worker because he is making too much, they progressively increase with his output. It is customary to put on huge blackboards the workers’ names, with quota, rates, amount done, wages and premiums earned. At a large construction I have seen one on a tree by the highway for all the world to see” (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 32-33).

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³ People’s Commissar for Labour (Tsikhon), speech in *Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 169. British and American trade unionists working by the piece have, outside the cotton trade, hardly begun to develop such a class.

The inadequacy of the rate-fixers will doubtless continue for some time to be a weakness in the soviet industrial organisation. The complaints of the workmen will, however, ensure that in due time a remedy will be found. At present, writes one of them, "The majority of the T.N.B.'s owe their personnel to casual selection, with no attention paid to qualification, experience in the line of work or social status. At the Dzerzhinsky works (Ukraine), for instance, where a special investigation of the staff engaged in technical normalisation was made, there are only 41 workers, instead of the required 64. Among them are former teachers, copying clerks, sanitary workers and letter carriers; the chief rate-fixer was an actor. At the same time the Cadres Department of the plant transferred 20 well-qualified workers of the T.N.B. staff with much experience in this line, and 25 specialists, to other departments of the plant. . . . At individual enterprises, promoted workers are left to their own devices. No theoretical instruction is given them. Training courses to qualify rate-fixers are rather rare phenomena."¹

So keen on piece-work are both workmen and managers in the USSR that it is sometimes objected that the system has been applied to kinds of work to which it is not suited. It has been found dangerous to stimulate railway engine-drivers to make up for lost time. It may not be desirable to tempt workers to work at high speed where extremely precise minute adjustments are required. There are many cases in which the highest quality of workmanship will not be attained if the workman is hurried. There has been, in some cases, even too much willingness to work overtime in order to increase both productivity and earnings. There has been some reluctance to use mechanical safeguards against accidents when they lessened the speed of working. And the incentive of piece-work remuneration has been applied to processes to which it was not suited, such as those requiring extreme precision, or those involved to repair work.² These are errors in industrial administration, which managers in the USSR are being trained to avoid, and trade union officials to look out for to prevent.

The Grading of Wages

What exactly is the basis upon which these elaborate piece-work rates are determined? A short answer would be that the piece-work rate for each job is based upon the time-work wage current in each category of workers, whether skilled or unskilled. But this simple answer covers up a radical distinction between Soviet Communism and capitalist enterprise. In the USSR there is no such thing as a "demarcation dispute" between

¹ *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufmann (Moscow, 1932), pp. 30-33.

² "Complaints have been made by foreign mechanics in the USSR against being asked to work 'by the piece' in such departments as the making of machine tools. 'Never before coming to the Soviet Union', writes one of them, 'have I seen piece-work in a tool room.' 'In spite of the so-called driving methods of the Ford factory [at Detroit] . . . no attempt was ever made to make a saving in the tool room, as all such attempts have resulted in tremendous losses'" (*Moscow Daily News*, September 14, 1932).

men of different crafts as to which craft shall have the privilege of performing a particular task.¹ To begin with, as we have described in our section on trade union structure,² all the workers in each establishment are members of one and the same trade union. Moreover, there is no set of craftsmen that fears discharge because there is no more work to be done of its particular kind. There is, on the contrary, always and everywhere, an almost calamitous shortage of every kind of skill, whether by hand or by brain. It is, in fact, essential to the success of planned production for community consumption, in a land of constantly increasing population, that there should continue to be a rapid multiplication of every kind of skilled workers. How can this much-needed skill be obtained? In all cities of the USSR endless attempts are made to provide all sorts of technical education, free of charge, in evening classes, in higher schools and colleges, and even in special trade schools inside the larger factories, in which the youthful workers are under instruction half time. But it has not always been found easy to induce young men and women to go through prolonged courses of technical training even without having to pay fees; nor is the young workman, earning regular wages at work of no particular skill, in all cases keen to give his evenings to learning a skilled craft. After many experiments, an ingenious system of grading the workers has been adopted, in one or other form, by practically all the trade unions. The grading is not by craft; nor by age or seniority; nor yet simply by any estimate of relative skill; nor of the length of time necessary to gain the skill. The grading is really determined, and from time to time changed, according to the requirements of the enterprise, or of all the enterprises with similar needs, in the various kinds of skill or craftsmanship, and to the extent to which these requirements are being automatically met by the supply of workers competent to perform the various tasks. The number of grades fixed by the trade union may be anything from 8 to 17—always excluding the apprentices, with the mere porters, cleaners or gate-keepers, on the one hand, and the foremen, technicians and managers on the other. The grades are expressed in the indices denoting the relative time-work rates of wages. We take an example of these time-work wage-rate schedules from the able pamphlet by a trade unionist from which we have already quoted. "We will illustrate this", he writes, "by the wage-rate schedule of the former Metal Workers' Union (now decentralised):

Category	.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Coefficient	.	1	1.2	1.45	1.7	1.95	2.2	2.5	2.8

"As may be seen from the above table, all workers who belonged to the former Metal Workers' Union were divided into eight categories. The

¹ The student will find a description of the demarcation disputes which used to plague the employers, especially in the North of England, in *Industrial Democracy*, by S. and B. Webb, 1897, pp. 508-527.

² Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", section on Soviet Trade Unionism, pp. 210-211.

wage-rate for the workers of the second category was 1.2 times higher than that of the first category, the rate of the workers in the third category 1.45 times higher than that of the first, the rate of the fourth 1.7 times higher, etc. . . . Individual wage-rate schedules are now being compiled, in conformity with the peculiarities of each branch of industry. They are to be drawn up in such a way as to leave as big a margin as possible between the various categories. At the same time, perhaps even before, the qualification manuals will be revised and these revised manuals will serve as a basis for dividing the workers in accordance with the categories listed in the wage schedule, which will depend upon their qualifications, and the difficulty, and the sanitary conditions of the work to be done. These new qualification manuals are compiled in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy and the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, and are issued separately for each branch of industry by each economic association in conjunction with the respective trade union central committee; and they take into consideration all the changes which have taken place in the organisation of production during the last few years.”¹

The student will observe that what is essential to the device of grading, if it is to fulfil its object of automatically leading to a continuous increase of skilled craftsmen, is that there should be no fixed numbers of the workers to be admitted to the higher grades. In practice, in the USSR any worker may, at any time, claim to be tried as a candidate for any higher grade. The young worker in the lowest grade (No. 1) may say “I think I can do the work of Grade 3”. The invariable answer is “Come and try; a fortnight’s trial will be allowed to you. If you show that you can do the work to the satisfaction alike of the management and of the trade union officials in the factory, you will at once receive the pay of your new grade.” This practice of rushing up individuals from lower to higher categories is not found to lead to any surplus of supermen. On the contrary, with the perpetual opening of additional factories, corresponding, and more than corresponding, with the annual increase of population, the demand for skilled craftsmen is so overpowering that the directors of factories and plants are always being pressed, and sometimes peremptorily required, by the recruiting department of the AUCCTU, to train each year a given number of responsible and skilled men who can lead and supervise the workers in new enterprises; whilst the directors of these new plants are now forbidden, under severe penalties, to send their own recruiting agents to “steal away”, by promises of better conditions, the leading workmen of older establishments. Thus, each establishment is thrown back on producing, from its own rank and file, at least all the skilled craftsmen that it requires. On our own visits during 1932 to works of all kinds, we were everywhere assured by the directors and managers, as well as by the local trade union committees, that the effect of this grading of the workers by different rates of wages had been marvellous. Everywhere we found

¹ *Why Pierework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufmann (Moscow, 1932), pp. 27-29.

the younger workers, women as well as men, desperately anxious to "improve their qualifications". The evening classes in technical subjects were everywhere crowded. At one large factory it was reported that 90 per cent of the entire personnel were thus studying. The upward march, from grade to grade, of the more ambitious, the more able, the more industrious, and the more zealous workers in industrial occupations is widespread and continuous. In no other country, not even in the United States, is it so general.

Payment According to Social Value

Very interesting is it to find all this manipulation of wage payments for different grades which always assumes a national minimum of desirable personal expenditure, becoming gradually more and more dominated by the principle of payment according to "social value". This principle is applied alike in the case of particular crafts, or kinds of skill, of which there is, at the moment, a shortage, or for which there is an increasing demand; and, at the other extreme, to a whole district to which it is desired to attract immigrants. When we asked, in 1932, why the work of coppersmiths had been placed in a higher grade than that of other smiths, we were informed that the rapid development of electrification was hindered by the lack of an adequate number of workers who could do coppersmithing with technical efficiency. In order to encourage more boys voluntarily to take to this particular craft in their apprenticeship, and young mechanics to qualify themselves as coppersmiths in evening classes, the craft of coppersmithing was put into a higher grade. In a remarkably short time the supply of coppersmiths was increased. The application of the same principle on a larger scale was seen, in 1931, when the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions realised in its collective bargaining that, taken as a whole, the "light industries" had, in the annual wage determinations, got ahead of the "heavy industries" in their standard rates of wages, whilst the latter were suffering from an insufficiency of competent workers, together with an excessive turnover of men. "In order to put an end to this evil", Stalin told a conference of leaders of industry in June 1931, "we must set up a wage scale that will take into account the difference between skilled labour and unskilled labour, between heavy work and light work. It cannot be tolerated that a highly skilled worker in a steel mill should earn no more than a sweeper. It cannot be tolerated that a locomotive driver on a railway should earn only as much as a copying clerk."¹ Shvernik, the general secretary of the All-Union Committee of Trade Unions, explained to the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions that "the struggle for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan required that the trade unions should completely reorganise the wage system, with a view to abolishing all absence of personal responsibility and all wage-levelling; and to giving each individual worker a material

¹ *New Conditions, New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin (Moscow, 1931), p. 7.

incentive to raise his qualification and increase the productivity of his labour. . . . A firm line was taken by the AUCCTU in the matter of regulating wages so as to give the leading branches of industry the most favoured position. The AUCCTU, in the instructions issued for the conclusion of new collective agreements for 1931, firmly insisted that the wages of the workers at the various enterprises should be regulated on a basis which will give the workers a material incentive to raise their qualifications and increase the productivity of their labour; the piece-work system must be adopted to the maximum degree, and skilled workers, especially those whose qualification is much in demand, must not be allowed to drift from enterprise to enterprise.”¹ It was in pursuance of this policy that the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) resolved that no further increases in the standard wage rates should be allowed to workers in the light industries until those for workers in the heavy industries had been substantially increased. In due course the workers in coal mining, and those in steel production, received a rise of something like 30 per cent; besides, in the Donets Basin, where the turnover was greatest, a steady but necessarily gradual improvement in their housing conditions, together with the provision of greater amenities.

Another instance of the deliberate fixing of wages according to the “social value” of a particular category of work is given by Kaufman, the trade unionist from whose pamphlet we have already quoted. “In an overwhelming number of cases,” he writes, “a foreman gets less pay than a skilled worker. Thus, before the reform decree of October 1931, a foreman in the metallurgical industry, responsible for the performance of considerable groups of workers, was getting 225 or 230 roubles per month, whereas the wages of highly skilled workers at many of our plants amounted to 300 roubles and more. Such a state of affairs resulted in the unwillingness of a highly skilled worker to become a foreman. It was necessary to make a long and persistent search for a man who ‘would agree’ to become a foreman. It happens frequently that a skilled worker, promoted to the position of foreman, after a month or two begs to be allowed to go back to the bench. . . . To prevent any disparity in the systems of remuneration paid to engineering technicians at different enterprises, the Inter-Union Bureau of Engineering Technicians’ Sections, attached to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, worked out basic principles for the guidance of local organisations in the reconstruction of the system of remuneration of engineering technicians.”²

The most extensive and most far-reaching application of the principle of payment according to social value was seen towards the end of 1933, when it was decided by the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets (TSIK) and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, that special steps must be taken to attract immigrants to the Far Eastern province of Siberia, and also to induce the present resi-

¹ *The Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 53-54.

² *Why Piecework in the USSR?* by L. Kaufmann (Moscow, 1932), pp. 36-37.

dents to remain there. This was inspired by the wish to effect a more rapid increase of the adult population of these regions in view of the possibility of a Japanese invasion. It was emphatically a question of "social value". Accordingly, a special increment of a substantial amount was made to the standard rates of wages payable to workers in all the industries and institutions in this province, and at the same time all the residents there were exempted from certain specified taxes. Similar concessions were extended to the inhabitants of districts bordering on Mongolia.

The Machinery of Arbitration

Behind all the apparatus connected with piece-work rates and the principle of payment according to "social value" lies the possibility of appeal against the local decisions to an impartial and disinterested authority. It is this right of appeal that prevents, in the USSR, the impatient stoppages of work, and the obstinate trials of endurance between management and wage-earners, that still occur in capitalist countries. There are now, we are assured, practically no strikes in the USSR and certainly no serious stoppages. How is this happy state of things arrived at?

Let us recall the institution of the Triangle that we have incidentally mentioned in our section on Soviet Trade Unionism.¹ In every industrial establishment or state farm (sovkhos) there is available at all times a local arbitral authority, ready at any moment promptly to arbitrate on any dispute affecting either individual workers or particular groups of sections of them. This triangle consists of a representative of the management, a representative (usually the local secretary) of the trade union, and the secretary of the Communist Party cell or committee within the establishment. This arbitral authority almost always succeeds in adjusting the dispute to the general satisfaction of the parties. But if one or other of them is seriously dissatisfied with this immediate local award, it is open to him to make formal appeal against it to a higher authority, indeed to an ascending series of higher authorities which it would be tedious to enumerate, up to a final appeal authority. This final authority was, until 1933, the People's Commissar of Labour of the particular constituent or autonomous republic within the territory of which the establishment was situated. Now, with the abolition of these Commissariats of Labour, the appeal is to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), acting through its presidium, which is always accessible without delay. The case is thus immediately dealt with, and a final award given, which is, we are assured, invariably accepted without obstruction by the parties concerned.

How can this pacific attitude of two obstinately contending disputants be explained? It is, we suggest, the result of two separate considerations. In the first place, both disputants are aware that, in any recalcitrance,

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", pp. 146-147.

neither of them could obtain any collective support. The manager would not be supported by the state or other trust from which he holds his appointment; nor could it even reproach him for accepting a final arbitral award which he had done his best to avert. The workman, if the final appeal to the AUCCTU has gone against him, will know that his own trade union, which is represented on the AUCCTU, cannot impugn the award, and give him its collective support. But there is another consideration that makes for acquiescence in the final award. Neither the management of the establishment, nor the whole aggregate of workers in it, strongly combined in their trade union, has any pecuniary interest in the particular case at issue, or in the way in which it has been decided. The aggregate total wage fund for the establishment has already been determined, as we have explained, in the complicated series of collective bargainings between the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the particular trade union, and the factory committee of the establishment on the one hand; and on the other, the representatives of the USSR Sovnarkom, the particular trust to which the establishment belongs, and the management of that establishment. Whether or not the particular workman who is aggrieved gets a higher piece-work rate for a particular job makes no perceptible difference to the yearly aggregate of wages paid during the year in the establishment. If the total cost of production can be reduced in relation to the total output of the year, as by lessening lost time or the amount of waste or scrap, or by improved organisation of work, both management and workers stand to gain, either in bonuses for increased output or in additional expenditure on the amenities that the trade union desires. The worst that can happen, if tempers remain hot, will be that the obstinate workman who feels that justice has not been done to his case may, after due notice, take his discharge. He will get no unemployment benefit, but this does not trouble him, as he knows he can get promptly taken on at another establishment.

The Menace of Foreign Competition

It will be noted that, in Soviet Communism, the representatives of the trade unions have no use for the argument that the acceptance of increased effort for the same wage, or lower wage for the same effort, by particular individuals or groups, lends, through the working of a competitive labour market, to reduce other people's wages. Equally, the representatives of the management have to renounce, once and for all, the argument, so potent in the world of profit-making capitalism, that a raising of wages in one country is impracticable, if other countries pay lower wages for the same grade of effort in the production of identical commodities. Under Soviet Communism, if other countries persist in "sweating" their workers, as a means of producing commodities at a lower cost than is practicable with a high standard of life, this is merely so much the better for the workers in the USSR, enjoying such a high standard of wages and

leisure, who will get the Japanese product all the cheaper. Thus, if Japan chooses to "sweat" her own textile operatives in order to be able to export textiles at an exceptionally low price, this will be to the advantage of countries who find such goods attractive to their citizens. From the humanitarian standpoint it may be wrong to connive at "sweating"; but one country can only with great hesitancy seek to interfere with the economic system of another.

The relative cheapness of the Japanese goods will, in fact, widen the range of alternatives practically open to the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade in the USSR. It may render it more advantageous to the USSR to import whatever kinds of commodities it desires to import in greater quantity from Japan than from other producing countries. It may do more than this. It may render it advantageous to the USSR actually to increase its total imports of particular kinds of commodities as a preferable alternative to establishing additional factories, or making the requisite enlargements of the old ones, within the USSR. In this case, it would be positively more advantageous to employ the annual increment of the workers in additional factories on enlargements for producing more of some other commodities in growing demand. In short, an increased cheapness of imported goods is always advantageous to the consumer of those goods. Under Soviet Communism this cheapness has no injurious effect on the wages of any workers in the importing country, or on any directors of industry. A low level of wages in foreign countries is, under capitalism, a standing menace to higher wages anywhere. Under Soviet Communism it is no menace to any section of the community. It merely enlarges the range of choice of the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade as to what shall be imported and exported.

But this is not all. As a body representing all workers and all grades, the AUCOTU is not concerned with the aspirations or the monthly earnings of any particular person, or any particular grade or craft, or those employed at any particular establishment. Its corporate interest is to secure, for the whole aggregate of its clients, the setting apart in the national budget, of the largest possible aggregate wage fund, as distinguished from the allocations proved to be necessary for other national requirements. In the course of this annual collective bargaining over the national budget, the trade union negotiators discover that the most cogent argument in support of increasing this aggregate wage fund, upon the amount of which the earnings of all their clients ultimately depend, is the prospect of an actual increase in the aggregate net productivity of all the enterprises throughout the USSR in which their clients are all engaged. Hence the rooted objection of the trade union representatives to any interruption of industry by strikes or lock-outs, or by "demarcation" disputes. Hence the intense public disapproval of "ca' canny", or any other shirking of work by individuals or groups; hence also the persistent desire, in season and out of season, for piece-work rates because this method of remuneration will increase output and diminish waste; hence, also, the promotion

of "socialist competition" among groups of workers as to which can do the most work, or save the most expense, within a given period; hence also the eager welcoming of new labour-saving machinery, as of every improvement of industrial organisation that promises to lessen the cost of production; hence, finally, the willing adoption of a system of grading wages in such a way as to lead to a constant increase of the number of skilled workmen in each craft; and the cordial approval of the adoption of the policy of fixing the rates according to the current "social value" of each kind of skill. The capitalist employers in every other country, whilst complacent about their own superior efficiency in profit-making, must now and then envy the industrial directors of the USSR the extraordinary increases of output obtained by the incentives that Soviet Communism supplies to its labour force!

Self-Employment as an Alternative to the Wage System

At this point we turn from the remodelling of the wage system at the hands of the soviet trade unions, in accord with other soviet institutions and with the consumers' cooperative movement, to a corresponding rehandling of the incentive of pecuniary self-interest in the quite different field of self-employment outside the wage system. We have accordingly briefly to survey from this standpoint, not only the operation of individual self-employment, but also such forms of joint self-employment as are exemplified by the industrial cooperative societies (incops) and the collective farms (kolkhosi), of which we have described the constitutional forms in the several sections of our chapter on "Man as a Producer".¹

Now, from the standpoint of the development of character and intelligence, and from that of the production of free initiative, much has rightly been claimed for self-employment, whether in the case of individual peasants or handicraftsmen, or in that of groups of workers in self-governing workshops or cooperative agricultural associations. One school of sociologists, of whom the leading exponents have been Pierre G. F. Le Play, in the middle of the nineteenth century, and such modern propagandists as Mr. Hilaire Belloc and Mr. G. K. Chesterton in our own day, have idealised peasant proprietorship. For the idealisation of the self-governing workshop we can look back to Robert Owen in Great Britain and Dr. Buchez in France; and, following these utopians, to John Stuart Mill in mid-Victorian days, and the late Professor Alfred Marshall. The trouble is that, when this self-employment, whether of individual or groups, takes place within a capitalist environment, the self-employers are apt to become the victims, either of the village usurer or gombeen man, or of the neighbouring landlord, or of the capitalist entrepreneur in wholesale or retail trade, all of whom are always ready to assist their clients in bad times in such a way as to bring them permanently into subjection as "sweated" workers. Painful experience has demonstrated how inevit-

¹ Chapter III. in Part I., pp. 172-234.

ably the individual handicraftsman, as represented by the handloom weaver in the British village, or the maker of the cheap furniture or slop clothing in the slums of London and other cities, becomes enslaved by the wholesale and retail traders, or of profit-making entrepreneurs specialising on "giving out" work to be done at home. Even in agriculture, in these days of wholesale mechanisation and the continuous application of science to the art of cultivation, necessitating large-scale production, with costly equipment, the use of expensive fertilisers and what not, peasant cultivation for sale, even in the more modern form of cooperative farming, fails to maintain itself in a competitive world market.

To-day, in western Europe, few and far between are the associated members of workshops that are genuinely self-governing; and calamitous is the fate of the individual producer under the sweating system. Even the peasant proprietors of France and Flanders, the most intelligent and the thriftiest of self-employers, are having a bad time. But in spite of a century of discouraging experience, the ideal of self-employment in the self-governing workshop has persisted among manual workers and philanthropists alike; and many and various have been the attempts of the trade unions to realise it in practice, always entailing on themselves heavy financial loss. Even the British consumers' cooperative movement owed its origin to the ideal of self-employment as set forth by the Rochdale Pioneers in 1846. The whole movement persisted in regarding this ideal as its ultimate aim long after British cooperation had successfully taken the opposite form of the service of the consumers, entirely managed by representatives of the purchasing members, who employed officials and manual workers at salaries and wages.

For all these reasons the writers of this book have always rejected the ideal of self-employment, whether of individuals or of groups of individuals.¹ We failed to take into account the extent to which the manifest disadvantages of a system of self-employment were connected with its existence in the midst of a capitalist civilisation. It is always unpleasant to admit that one has been wrong in a forecast of the future. But confronted with what is happening in the USSR we are forced to such an admission. But we must consider first self-employment by individuals.

Individual Self-Employment

It is not generally realised how great is the number of instances in which the Soviet Government has left undisturbed the performance of service, and even the making of commodities, by individual producers, under the incentive not of profit but of "price in the market". Such

¹ See *The Cooperative Movement in Great Britain*, by Beatrice Potter (Mrs. Sidney Webb), 1891. This book was promptly translated into Russian, where it was published in many editions. A subsequent analysis by the present writers of seventy years' experience of the self-governing workshop in western Europe was published under the title of "Co-operative Production and Profit-sharing" as a supplement to *The New Statesman* of February 14, 1914. See also *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, by S. and B. Webb, 1920, pp. 27-58, 154-157.

individual producers must not commit the offence of "exploiting" subordinate labour with a view to making a profit. They must therefore themselves render the service or make the commodity, in return for which they may enjoy, by way of remuneration for their own labour, any price that they can obtain in the market. The number and variety of these individual producers in self-employment in the USSR is greater than would be at first imagined. There are, for instance, in the cities, quite a large number of women independently earning a modest living by working for private customers as dressmakers, or as repairers of clothing, furs, furniture, etc. Others do the household laundry for those who can afford the luxury of putting it out. Similarly there are men who resole the family boots; others who make or mend household furniture; whilst others live as "handy-men", known to a wide circle of families to be able to execute promptly any necessary repairs to pipes or taps, roofs or windows. There are men with a connection among those clients who periodically pay to have their watches and clocks cleaned and repaired. The individual droschky drivers, owning their horses and vehicles, still pick up fares in some cities, or find a livelihood in casual jobs of hauling. There are everywhere shoobacks plying their humble trade. Quite other cases of individual producers are the "free-lance" journalists; together with the unsalaried authors or translators of books or plays, who sell their manuscripts to the various publishing agencies. Then there are the men and women who pick up a livelihood by giving private lessons in other languages to enterprising Russians, and lessons in Russian to foreign residents, varied by making translations or acting as guides and interpreters. There are musical executants, and actors and singers, not on any salary list, who live by chance engagements. Finally, we must remember that there are a small number of medical consultants not attached to any institution, and engaged solely in private practice and research; whilst there are a certain number of unsalaried researchers in other branches of knowledge, who supplement by occasional fees for technical articles, or for advice or laboratory work, their modest private incomes.¹ The aggregate product of all these thousands of "self-employed" individual workers in the various cities of the USSR may not amount to more than a fraction of 1 per cent of the total pecuniary value of the national output. But their services add considerably to the amenity of life, whilst the fact that their existence is willingly tolerated in a collectivist society reminds us that such a society easily leaves room for personal freedom and individual idiosyncrasy.

The Cultivation of Allotments

The Soviet Government, however, does not stop at mere toleration of self-employment as an alternative to the wage system under collectivist employment. Along certain lines the Party and the Government are

¹ In the USSR all these occupations are open to the "deprived" categories, if they

actually promoting and subsidising self-employment on a huge scale. Thus, hundreds of thousands of coal-miners, railway workers and factory operatives have lately been provided with plots of land, free of rent, together with tools and seed for easy deferred payments, in order that they may grow vegetables and other foodstuffs, and keep pigs and poultry,¹ either for consumption by their families or, at their option, for sale to the consumers' cooperative societies, or to the factory kitchens, or in the free markets of the cities.

This governmental encouragement of agricultural production by the industrial wage earners has a threefold motive. The Soviet Government naturally welcomes any increase in the aggregate quantity of foodstuffs, and especially an additional source of supply, both as a further insurance against a bad harvest and as lessening the public responsibility for the maintenance of the population. The product of an allotment is a useful supplement to the family income; whilst with the working day reduced to seven hours (and in coal-mining to six hours) there is a distinct social gain in providing healthy occupation for the worker's leisure. Finally, the occupancy of a plot of land is a potent means of counteracting the Russian workman's tendency to wander away from his job whenever he hears a rumour that the food supply or the housing accommodation or the factory conditions are better elsewhere. For all these reasons the Soviet Government finds it useful positively to subsidise individual production. The total number of these allotments may be expected to increase rapidly to several millions. It is interesting to learn that they are especially welcomed by the foreign workmen, principally from the United States, who are now settling in the USSR by hundreds every year.² Moreover,

will but accept the universal obligation to work for a living, and refrain from any action or propaganda against the régime under which they live.

¹ In 1933, "In the Donbas these vegetable gardens covered an area of 40,000 hectares, and tens of thousands of workers were able to provide themselves with vegetables and potatoes for the winter and to keep seeds for spring sowing. The distribution of plots has spread throughout all regions of the Soviet Union. For instance, in the Dnepropetrovsk Province (Ukraine) the plan of distribution has been completely fulfilled, and all the allotments provided with seeds and the necessary implements. . . . It cannot be said that this work is being successfully carried on everywhere. In the Ural Province, instead of 250,000 workers, only 220,000 were provided with allotments. In the Ivanovo Province 9000 hectares of land have been distributed instead of 18,000 hectares" (*Moscow Daily News*, March 3, 1934).

² "Excellent results of truck gardening in 1933, by foreigners at the Kharkov Tractor Plant, was reported to the foreign Bureau of the Central Trade Union Council by Lapandin, a representative of the trade union committee of the plant. One hundred and two foreign families, consisting of 39 Americans, 47 Germans, 12 Czechoslovakians and 4 of other nationalities, received about 100 acres of land. The lot was divided as follows: 32 acres—potatoes; 25 acres—beets; 12 acres—barley; 7 acres—cabbage; and 20 acres—millet. The garden work was excellent and the crops were extraordinarily good. Families with three people participating in the work got as much as a ton of potatoes and half a ton of other vegetables. Some families sold part of their surplus to the Insab store. Vegetables ranged from 8 to 10 tons to the hectare and cabbage 12 tons. As a result of this the foreigners were able to raise 860 rabbits, and the number is still increasing. The gardens were so excellent in Kharkov that the trade union committee organised several excursions to them. As a result the foreigners became more popular than ever.

"One hundred and twelve families have applied for land this year, and some of them

with the long-established habit of the Russians to form groups, which often take the form of cooperative societies for particular purposes, many of the allotment holders have already joined forces for the improvement of their cultivation, as well as for combined marketing of their surpluses.

Self-Employment in Manufacturing Artels (Incops)

We have already described ¹ the structure and activities of the self-governing industrial cooperative societies that have developed out of the ancient Russian artel. Most of these "Incops" (which do not pay wages to their members, but make merely monthly advances, finally sharing among them the whole net produce of their joint labours) are now federated in a complicated hierarchy, designed not so much to control their manifold activities, as to enable these to be carried on with a saving of expense, and with the addition of such common services as their own social insurance fund. What concerns us here is the extent to which use is made of the incentive of self-employment, with its correlative of obtaining for the members the full price in the market of the product of their joint labours. The Incops have now been freed from any obligation to sell their products to the government departments or trusts, except when these have supplied them with their materials, or otherwise entered into agreements for purchase of the product. The Incops may, at their option, have their own retail shops in the cities, or their own stalls in the free markets. Or they may, if they choose, enter into contracts to sell, at a freely agreed price, some or any of their productions, either to the government or municipal trusts, or to the consumers' cooperative societies, or to the supply departments of the factories, or other institutions.

Self-Employment in Collective Farms (Kolkhosi)

But by far the most extensive development of self-employment has been the formation of collective farms (kolkhosi), whether in their simplest form of agreements only for a definite amount of joint tillage; or in the complete form of the commune, in which every kind of production is a joint enterprise, the proceeds of which are shared among the members; or in the intermediate form of the artel, now greatly favoured and everywhere dominant, in which only the cereal or other principal crop is a joint enterprise, whilst each member retains for his own benefit his dwelling

want it assigned to them for a period of six years. Foreigners asked for 300 wagons of manure, which the trade-union committee obtained for them. The trade-union committee is getting a special kind of potato, red potato, for seed for the foreigners.

"Gardens this year will be cultivated individually only. Every person will be allotted 205 square metres of land, so that a family of five will get about an acre. No grain will be raised. Many foreigners of the plant helped their state farm last year. One family did exceptionally good work, putting in 880 days of work" (*Moscow Daily News*, February 20, 1934).

¹ Pp. 170-181.

and garden ground, his bees and poultry, and even a pig and a cow. In this development, now comprehending nearly a quarter of a million collective farms, in which about twenty million peasant holdings have been merged, with a total population of eighty millions, we see, after many experiments, the fullest use made of the incentive of personal ownership and individual gain; although this is united with the advantages of combined action wherever combination is found advantageous, and is everywhere controlled by an essentially collectivist environment.

We do not need to repeat our description of the successive changes in the financial and other relations between the Soviet Government and the kolkhosi during the past decade. It will suffice to state briefly the position in 1934-1935. Adhesion to the collective farm is entirely voluntary. Once admitted, however, the individual member can leave only upon conditions which he may find inconvenient. He will probably not be able to find land to occupy individually anywhere in the neighbourhood; and he will not be easily allowed to withdraw from the community the whole of the capital that he may have brought in. All the members of the kolkhos collectively determine the conditions of their common self-employment; and they dispose, at their will, of the whole of the crop that they combine to produce, after defraying expenses and making the stipulated payments to the government. These governmental dues are now all definitely fixed by regulation and agreement at the beginning of each agricultural year; so much for the agricultural tax; so much for hire of the tractors; so much for any other agricultural machinery supplied; so much in payment for the seed, for fertilisers and for anything else provided by the authorities beyond advice, encouragement and special help in trouble. Thus, the collective farms, in their self-employment, now enjoy the full incentive of retaining for themselves all that results from their additional labour and care. If they can bring more land under cultivation than in the previous year, or sow more hectares than had been arranged for, or do more weeding, or put more skill into gathering all the grain, or more care into the threshing or the storage of it, the payments exacted by the government will not thereby be raised. It is at any rate the fixed intention of the government that the kolkhos members shall themselves jointly enjoy the whole advantage of the increase that they have effected.

The cultivation of the incentive of personal gain is carried still further. At the outset many kolkhosi threw away this advantage, by sharing the produce among their family members according to the number of mouths to be fed. This has now been sternly discouraged, in favour of a distribution proportionate to the amount of work done by each working member, according to the record of the number of "workdays" devoted to the kolkhos service. The tasks are even graded, for computation of "workdays", partly according to their laboriousness or discomfort, but partly also according to their "social value" in managerial or other skill. Moreover, where practicable, the further incentive is adopted of payment

according to results. Piece-work rates are given for particular tasks. A whole brigade will be made responsible throughout the year for a particular department of work, and rewarded at the end of the year by a collective payment proportionate to the departmental output; and at the annual members' meeting all these arrangements will be revised in the light of experience, with the object of creating the greatest possible incentive to maximum production. To this end the basis of the monthly advances to members and that of the annual sharing may be altered. The grading of "workday" units may be changed, so as to improve the position of the manager or the accountant, or that of the member responsible for taking the produce to sell in the neighbouring city markets. This or that scheme of organisation by responsible brigades may be adopted, with this or that scale of payment proportionate to output. The policy of forgoing the chances of sale in the free market, in favour of contracting in advance for sales to other institutions, has to be considered and decided. And there is always the main issue to be determined, in the light of its effects on the mentality of the members, whether the whole of the harvest shall be distributed in shares as personal remuneration, or whether this or that allocation should not first be made from the surplus for some common purpose, such as the provision of a crèche or a kindergarten, or that of a club with a dance floor or a cinema.

But this is not the whole of the incentive to increased effort that is now given to the members of collective farms. In all cases there is reserved to each family its own individual production. So keen is the Soviet Government on each member of a collective farm having a cow of his own, that it has already distributed to such members more than a million calves to be thus separately reared.¹ "In the North Caucasus 101,000 peasant households without cows were able to obtain them, thanks to these credits. In the Ukraine 260,000 households bought cows. . . . In the Ukraine there are already many districts, and thousands of collective farms, where there is not one household which does not possess its own cow. Similar achievements have been attained in the Tartar Republic, in the Moscow Province, in Central Asia and so on. In many national republics the plans for supplying cows have been considerably overfulfilled. Thus in Uzbekistan 31,000 cows have been bought for the collective farmers instead of the planned 26,000; in Kirghizia 8600 cows have been bought instead of the 7000 planned, and so on."² Stalin had at least some ground for his prophecy to the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Udamniks in February 1933 that "In another year or two you will not find a single peasant who does not possess his own cow". Whatever is gained from the garden ground, the beehives, the poultry run, the piggery and the dairy by the spare-time labours of the member and his family is wholly

¹ The method adopted was that the agricultural bank was authorised to issue, without collateral security, credits to enable peasants to buy calves on deferred payments. In the course of a few months of 1933 these credits were actually issued to the amount of 52,300,000 roubles.

² *Moscow Daily News*, February 27, 1934.

at his own disposal. He may consume it or any part of it in supplement to his monthly advances and his annual share of the kolkhos surplus. Or he may sell the whole or any part of it to any other consumer, in the neighbouring free market or otherwise. He may even enter into an individual contract to supply the consumers' cooperative society, or a factory kitchen or any other institution, with eggs or honey, poultry or pigmeat. What he is not allowed to do is to sell to anyone who means to sell again—that is to say, in soviet parlance, to any speculator.

There is much more that could be said about the way in which the incentive of personal gain is now being used in the development of the kolkhosi. Thus, the kolkhosi of shore fishermen on the coasts or in the rivers and lakes, who, besides enjoying the produce of their own garden, grounds and livestock, pursue their fishing as a joint enterprise, share the proceeds, not equally but according to the work done by each member, with a graded scale, in which the "leading hand" in each group gets, for each time unit of work done, a double share of the produce, and each boy apprentice only half a share. The fishery kolkhosi are then enabled and encouraged to contract, for a specified period, for the sale of the whole or any fixed proportion of their catch, either with a government fishery trust, or with any consumers' cooperative society, or with any department of self-supply in a factory, or other institution. They are thus free, either by sale in the open market, to take advantage of any local and temporary shortage of supply; or, at their option, to obtain by previous contract an assured and regular price for their product. And the members of the "integral" cooperative societies,¹ in which the professional hunters and trappers of Northern and Eastern Siberia are included, may either limit their cooperation to a joint warehousing and marketing of their individual captures, or they may, at their option, pool among the members of a local group the proceeds of a season's work, in order jointly to fulfil a contract made with the Government Fur Trust, or with any institution, and share the price among themselves in any way they choose.

The Complicated Network of Agreements for Supplies

The more the student studies the organisation of distribution in the USSR of to-day, the more he will be impressed by the complicated network of voluntary agreements by means of which an ever-increasing proportion of the foodstuffs are being transferred from the individual producers to the individual consumers. This multifirmity of the distributing agency has become definitely a principle of soviet policy. "It would be wrong", declared Stalin in his report to the Communist Party in January 1933, "to think that soviet trade can be developed along only one channel: for example, the cooperative societies. In order to develop

¹ See, for the fishery kolkhosi, Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", pp. 221-223; and for the Integral Cooperative Societies, Chapter IV. in Part I., "Man as a Consumer", pp. 223-224.

soviet trade, all channels must be used: the cooperative societies, the state trading system and collective farm trading.”¹ The only channel to be avoided is any “revival of capitalism and the functioning of the private capitalist sector in the circulation of commodities”—meaning both the employment of wage-labour for the making of profit, and the purchase of commodities in order to resell them at a profit. “Soviet trade”, Stalin continued, “is trade without capitalists, great or small, trade without speculators, great or small. It is a special form of trade which has never existed in history before, and which we alone, the Bolsheviks, practise in the conditions of soviet development.”²

This deliberate development of free trade and free contract in a free market, as an incentive to increased production, is further explained in Stalin's address to the Seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934. “The state trading system,” he said, “the cooperative trading system, the local industries, the collective farms and the individual peasants must be drawn into this business. This is what we call expanded soviet trade, trade without capitalists, trade without profiteers. As you see, the expansion of soviet trade is a very urgent problem which, if not solved, will make further progress impossible.

“Nevertheless,” Stalin continued, “in spite of the fact that this truth is perfectly obvious, the Party, in the period under review, had to overcome a number of obstacles in the way of expanding soviet trade. . . . To begin with, in the ranks of a certain section of communists, there still reigns a supercilious, contemptuous attitude towards trade in general and towards soviet trade in particular. These communists, if they may be called that, look upon soviet trade as something of secondary importance, hardly worth bothering about, and regard those engaged in trade as doomed. . . . It goes without saying that the Party had to give a slight shaking-up to these communists, if they may be called that, and throw their aristocratic prejudices into the dustbin. . . . Furthermore, we had to liquidate the monopoly of the cooperatives in the market. In this connection we instructed all the commissariats to commence trading in their own goods, and the Commissariat for Supplies was instructed to develop an extensive trade in agricultural produce. On the one hand, this led to the improvement of cooperative trade as a result of competition; on the other hand, it led to a reduction in prices in the market, to the market being put in a sounder condition. A wide network of dining-rooms was established which provide food at reduced prices (‘public catering’); workers’ supply departments (ORS) were established in the factories, and all those who had no connection with the factory were taken off the supply list (in the factories under the control of the Commissariat for Heavy Industry alone 500,000 persons had to be removed from the list).

¹ Stalin's speech on “The Results of the First Five-Year Plan” to the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU, in *From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan*, 1933, p. 47.

² *Ibid.* p. 47.

"The State Bank was organised as a single centralised short-term credit bank with 2200 district branches capable of financing commercial operations. As a result of these measures we have in the period under review :

"(a) An increase in the number of shops and stores from 184,662 units in 1930 to 277,974 units in 1933.

"(b) A newly created network of regional goods bases numbering 1011 units, and inter-district goods bases numbering 864 units.

"(c) A newly created network of workers' supply departments numbering 1600 units.

"(d) An increase in the number of commercial stores for the sale of bread in 330 towns.

"(e) An increase in the number of public dining-rooms, which at the present time cater for 19,800,000 consumers.

"(f) An increase in state and cooperative trade, including that of public dining-rooms, from 18,900,000,000 roubles in 1930 to 49,000,000,000 roubles in 1933."¹

It is not easy to picture the complicated network of free contracting for supplies which now covers most of the thousand cities of the USSR. Thus, a large urban consumers' cooperative society, or *Centrosoyus* on behalf of forty thousand village societies, or the supply department of such a gigantic factory as Putilov at Leningrad or Selmashstroi at Rostov, may be simultaneously in contractual relations with any number of individual handicraftsmen, journalists or musicians ; with various *kolkhosi* or collective farms, whether *artels* or communes, for the supply of grain ; with many of the members of these same collective farms, or of others, who will supply eggs, poultry and honey ; with fishery *kolkhosi* from which will come daily supplies of fresh fish ; with manufacturing associations of owner-producers (*artels*), who make all sorts of household requisites, all of them striving to produce and sell under the incentive of getting for themselves the highest price that the free competition between crowds of different kinds of buyers and crowds of different kinds of sellers may determine.

The Bazaar

As an alternative to the system of contracting with a particular buyer, the self-employed peasants and handicraftsmen have, after each district has completed its payments to the government, always the option to resort to the free market, or bazaar, which now exists in all the cities. We need not trouble to trace the successive changes of law and administrative practice with regard to buying and selling in this characteristic feature of every eastern city. It must suffice to say that for some time past (1935) the free market, as between producers and consumers—to the exclusion of dealers and speculators—has been not only tolerated but

¹ *Stalin Reports on the Soviet Union*, Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, republished in volume entitled *From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 44-47.

actually encouraged, and often provided with improved accommodation for its crowd of customers. The Soviet Government, indeed, is now bent on increasing the importance of this free market, and especially on attracting additional supplies, and the regular attendance of the peasantry with foodstuffs to sell. It is calculated that in years of good harvests there is no need for any such insufficiency of supplies as has usually prevailed, now in one urban centre and now in another. It is believed that the failure has lain more in faulty distribution than in actual scarcity. With all the collective farms set free to sell as they choose, with a like freedom to all their members individually to do the same, not only with their separate shares but also with their own family products, and also the millions of industrial allotment holders, all these producers in competition with the surviving independent peasantry, it is hoped that the free markets in all the cities will presently become places in which the citizens can not only find all the foodstuffs they need for their individual housekeeping, but also be able to purchase them at the moderate prices that effective competition should secure. It seems, however, so far, that sellers in the free market are still getting for their wares higher prices than are deemed reasonable by the authorities. The plan of officially regulating prices in a free market has, in the long run, never succeeded. The Soviet Government has therefore tried a new expedient. "In the spring of last year," reported Mikoyan, People's Commissar of Supplies, "when market prices began to rise steeply not only in the Ukraine and other regions, but even in Moscow, Comrade Stalin conceived a remarkable idea and placed in our hands a remarkable weapon, by proposing to develop trading in state grain and other products through our stores, in order to lower prices on the collective farm market by exercising pressure through state economic intervention. The Commissariat of Supplies started selling bread freely in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev and other cities. Comrade Stalin has already reported to us that the Commissariat of Supplies is selling bread in 330 cities of the Soviet Union, and this leaves out Centrosoyus which is buying grain and is also selling bread in 179 district centres. Besides bread, we started selling meat, butter and milk, and opened stores (mainly large ones) for the sale of other food products of first-class quality in Moscow, Leningrad, the cities of Donbas and Dniepropetrovsk. To-day, 5600 shops of the People's Commissariat of Supplies are functioning, where food products are sold freely. Of these, 5100 are bread shops, 63 special meat shops, 93 are shops selling dairy produce, and 65 shops are selling general food products. We have developed meat trading in 22 cities and the sale of butter and cheese in 34 cities. The influence of this trading on the level of market prices is tremendous. Thus for instance, in Gorki, market prices fell, two or three days after the commencement of the sale of bread, by 61 per cent in the case of rye bread, in Taganrog by 56 per cent, in Kazan by 55 per cent, in Ivanovo by 49 per cent. In the case of wheaten bread, prices fell in Gorki by 45 per cent, in Kazan by 52 per cent. This measure has thus immediately

reduced the level of market prices by almost half. The free sale of bread also brought about a drop in prices of meat, butter, vegetables and other commodities. The influence of these stores on the collective farmers and collective farm market may be illustrated by one example which I cited a few days ago at the Moscow Province Party Conference. In June of last year, we began to sell milk in Moscow and Leningrad with the object of influencing market prices. We fixed the price 30 to 40 per cent below that ruling on the market. The market price immediately declined to the level of the state price, and even below. Prices being equal, the consumer bought his milk more willingly in a state shop, knowing that in the state shops there is a full guarantee against adulteration and that the milk is stored in hygienic conditions. In one of the bazaars the collective farmers decided to 'go one better', and fixed prices considerably below ours, nevertheless they did not sell their milk readily. Upon this they got their salesman to put on a white apron, compelled him to wash his hands, and then the consumers began to buy from the collective farmers more readily than from us. Against such 'competition' with the state we could, of course, have no objection; and we on our part again reduced the price, thereby reducing the collective farm price still more. When I told Comrade Stalin of this, he burst into laughter and said: 'This is what you have brought the collective farmer to--a white apron.' '. . . By means of our economic lever . . . we both reduced prices and taught the collective farmers to trade in a more enlightened manner.' ”¹

This remarkable employment of the characteristic capitalist incentive of free competition in the open market does more than prevent monopoly prices and set a new standard of cleanliness. It has greatly widened the customer's field of choice. "The trading network and stores", declared Mikoyan, "must become champions for the good quality of commodities, must take upon themselves the defence of the interests of the consumers against some of the factories which are worsening the quality of their production. The recently opened department stores of the Mostorg (Moscow Trading Organisation), under the People's Commissariat of Supplies, may serve as an example of how a shop should fight for better quality of industrial commodities. In the department stores of the Moscow and Kharkov Trading Organisations we now have over 10,000 different kinds of industrial commodities, while the usual department stores contain no more than 4000 sorts. You thus see, comrades, that the stores for free sales are simultaneously also a lever in the struggle for the good quality of commodities on the market. . . . In this way, the free sale of products, organised by the People's Commissariat of Supplies on the initiative of Comrade Stalin, besides being a most important lever of economic intervention, is creating a school of soviet trading; this trading gradually extending and reducing market prices in future, will replace the system of closed trading." ”²

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 3, 1934.

² *Ibid*, February 3, 1934.

Socialist Emulation

From the remodelling of old incentives we pass to the adoption, by the Soviet Government, of new incentives, practically unknown, or at least unutilised, in the capitalist world. The first of these is what is often called "socialist competition". It was an interesting observation of John Stuart Mill that there was nothing to be objected to, by those who looked to the supersession of capitalism by a new social order, in competition among individuals. It was, he declared, not competition that was "the deepest root of the evils and iniquities that fill the industrial world, but the subjection of labour to capital, and the enormous share which the possessors of the instruments of production are able to take from the produce".¹ Socialist competition—we prefer, in English, to use the phrase socialist emulation—is a communist invention which plays a large and apparently an ever-increasing part in the social organisation of the USSR. Everyone is familiar with the desire to "do the other fellow down" in games and sport, in solving cross-word puzzles, in aerial flights and automobile records of speed. What is original and, so far as we know, unprecedented is the transfer, in the USSR, of the sporting instinct to the everyday operations of industrial and agricultural production.

This application of the motive of emulation has the social advantage over tennis or golf, cricket or football, in that it is indissolubly linked up with the active participation of large numbers. There is no pleasurable excitement for the mere spectator! The only way to enjoy the sport of socialist emulation is to be actually on the playing-field, and incidentally rendering a social service. Lenin it was who foresaw the use to which this might be turned in socialist construction. "Socialist emulation" (*Soc-sorevnovanie*), he wrote in 1918, "ought to become one of the important tasks of the Soviet Power in the sphere of economic life. . . . Socialists never denied the principle of emulation as such. Socialist emulation is a very important and noble task in the reconstruction of society. . . . If we establish socialist emulation as a state function, we shall be able to find the future forms of socialist construction."²

It was, however, a long time before Lenin's words were turned into deeds. It was not at first realised that there may be just as much pleasurable excitement in trying which team can lay the most bricks, or the greatest length of railway track, or erect the greatest number of automobiles or tractors, or execute the greatest acreage of ploughing in a given time, as in the game of knocking little balls into holes, or in forcing a larger ball against all defences into the enemy's goal.³

¹ *Principles of Political Economy*, by John Stuart Mill (People's Edition), p. 477.

² *Lenin's Works*, vol. xxii. pp. 412-417 of 3rd edition (Russian); dictated by Lenin on March 28, 1918. It should be noted that there are, in Russian, different words for the competition characteristic of capitalism (*concurrentsiu*) and for the emulation unconnected therewith (*sorevnovanie*). Lenin observed this distinction, but other Russians writing in English, or their translators, often use "competition" for both meanings.

³ This social discovery may, perhaps, be ascribed to Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn,

Socialist emulation is said to have begun in the USSR in 1927. "The first year of the Five-Year Plan", remarked Shvernik, the secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), "witnessed a widespread development of socialist competition, which has become a mighty force in the struggle for a Bolshevik tempo in the industrialisation of our country. . . . The old trade union leaders disregarded this enthusiasm of the working masses. The fact that they tried to avoid assuming the leadership of socialist competition, as a function 'not proper to the unions', most strikingly reveals the rotten, opportunist character of the old leadership. On January 1, 1932, 65.6 per cent of the total number of workers were taking part in socialist competition. . . . The tremendous wave of productive energy and creative enthusiasm among the working class has enabled us to achieve wonders in the construction of socialism, and proves that in the USSR labour has already become for the vast masses of workers (in Stalin's words) 'a matter of honour, a matter of glory, a matter of valour and heroism'." ¹

There is no end to the variety of tasks to which socialist emulation is now applied in the USSR. In the factory or mine the different brigades or shifts will formally arrange competitive struggles with each other as to which will, within a given time, complete the largest amount of product, or produce with the lowest percentage of breakage, waste or scrap. Factory will compete with factory, under conditions formally agreed upon by their respective factory committees, as to which will accomplish soonest the quota assigned to each of them by the Five-Year Plan. In the soviet mercantile marine, ship will elaborately compete with ship in the speed of the common voyage, in economy of oil consumption over a given period, and even in the net profitableness of particular trips. The entire personnel of a Volga steamboat will challenge all the similar Volga steamboats as to which can show the best balance sheet for the round trip, or for a whole season. In the construction of the great Dnieper dam, where an enormous amount of concrete building has to be done, it was regularly made a matter of emulation, as to which could do the greatest aggregate in a given period, between the brigades belonging to one side of the river

who, when refused leave to go to play with his boy friends, and ordered by his aunt to "paint the fence", introduced this to his comrades as a new game of trying who could most quickly paint so many yards of fencing.

¹ *Shvernik's Speech in Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, p. 28.* Stalin's words are worth quoting in full: "The most remarkable feature of competition is the radical revolution it has wrought in men's views of labour, because it transforms labour from a disgraceful and painful burden, as it was reckoned before, into a matter of honour, a matter of glory, a matter of valour and heroism. There is not and cannot be anything similar to it in capitalist countries. There, under the capitalists, the most desirable end which earns social approval is to have an income from investments, to live on interest and to be freed from toil, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. Here in our USSR, on the contrary, the most desirable course, which earns social approval, becomes the possibility of being a hero of labour, a hero of the shock-brigade movement, surrounded with the glamour of the respect of millions of toilers" ("Socialist Competition and Shock Brigades an Integral Part of the Bolshevik Offensive", to the Sixteenth Party Congress; included in *Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition*, Moscow, 1933, pp. 41-42).

and those of the other side, the result of the struggle being proclaimed to the whole population by the display of different coloured lights. Occasionally city will compete with city. "The deputies and section workers of the Moscow City Soviet", we read in September 1932, "have issued an appeal to soviet deputies and workers of the Soviet Union to join the competition among the three capitals—Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov—for the fulfilment of the fourth final year of the Pyatiletka, as well as for the fulfilment of the decisions made by the Soviet Government pertaining to municipal economy and socialist reconstruction of cities."¹ The pleasurable excitement of socialist emulation was actually brought into play in 1931–33 among the tens of thousands of convicted criminals, "politicals" and kulaks employed, as we have already described, on the gigantic civil engineering works of the White Sea Canal. Brigade competed with brigade as to which could shift the greatest amount of earth, lay the greatest length of rail or construct the greatest amount of embankment within the prescribed period—sometimes, it is recorded, refusing to stop work when the hour for cessation arrived, in order to complete some particular task. Nor do the agriculturists escape the contagion. "Competition", wrote an enthusiast in 1932, "has swept the towns and is now penetrating the villages. Every newspaper speaks loudly of this fact. Every day brings glad tidings from the villages. Throughout the length and breadth of the country, the peasantry is answering the call to competition. Here are one or two facts which prove it: Vyatka has challenged Kostroma. Kostroma has taken up the challenge, mustered all its forces and has in its turn challenged Yaroslavl and Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The Volga region, the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine are competing for the best organised harvest campaign and for collectivisation. The Samara workshops manufacturing agricultural implements have challenged the peasants of the village Vladimirevko and the collective farm Green Grove. The workers have promised to raise the productivity of labour by 1 per cent, lower the cost of production and improve the quality of their work. The peasants in their turn promise to fulfil the norm for harvest collection and organise a collective farm to sow the land with best quality seed."² "More and more republics and provinces", we read in July 1933, "are joining the nation-wide competition initiated by the Tartar Republic for model organisation of the harvest and early delivery of grain to the state. The latest entry is Kharkov province, which has accepted the challenge of North Caucasus to compete with it on the following points:

"1. The speediest harvesting and threshing of grain in the state and collective farms. 2. The earliest delivery of grain to the state and machine, tractor stations, filling the year's quota ahead of the dates fixed by the government. 3. Securing the highest crop per hectare by combating theft and losses of grain during the harvest."³

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, September 20, 1932.

² *Socialist Competition of the Masses*, by E. Mikulina (Moscow, 1932), pp. 59–60.

³ *Moscow Daily News*, July 20, 1933.

Socialist emulation in the factory incidentally put new life into the "production commissions and production conferences", a particular form of "participation" in which the whole body of workmen were supposed to "improve production". Professor Harper described these in 1929 as lacking in interest to the workmen so long as the element of sport was wanting.¹ Socialist emulation immediately wrought a great change. "In all these activities", writes Mr. Joseph Freeman in 1932, "the trade union finds an effective instrument in the production conference, which has become the basic method for drawing the workers into the management of industry. The production conference is also the organising centre for 'socialist competition' and the various types of 'shock brigades'. It reaches every department and every individual worker at his bench. The members of the 'shock brigade', the 'Udarniki', are the backbone of the production conference. Since they are the most advanced workers they set an example to the others, and draw them into more active participation in production. More and more workers are participating in the conferences. Thus, at the beginning of 1932 about 75 per cent of the industrial workers in Moscow were participating in production conferences, as against 35 per cent in 1931. During the same period the percentage in Leningrad rose from 45 to 75."²

Socialist emulation became, too, a marked feature in the "counter-planning" by which, as we have described, the workers in any establishment insisted on increasing the quota of output that Gosplan had provisionally assigned to them. Thus, in constructing the great dam across the Dnieper, according to the programme, 427,000 cubic metres of concrete had to be laid, but the workers put forward a counter-plan of 500,000 cubic metres. The workers' brigades put up a heroic struggle and actually laid 518,000 cubic metres as against the 500,000 proposed in their own counter-plan! The assembling of the first turbine in Dnieprostroy was accomplished in 36 days, instead of the 90 days provided for by the programme of the administration."³

It is, of course, easy to suggest that any such enthusiasm can be no more than partial and short-lived. This would, it may be admitted, be the experience in capitalist countries, where the fundamental conflict

¹ "General conditions of work and policy of management of a given enterprise are also subject to discussion and a measure of control, through the production commissions and the more recently instituted production conferences. Production commissions are one of several commissions of a factory or local committee. They are expected to follow in a general way the working of the enterprise and to report suggestions for improvements of a technical or general character. The inactivity of these commissions led to the introduction of larger conferences, to discuss the conditions and problems of production. The conferences are open to all workmen and employees of the given enterprise, and the management and technical staffs are urged to attend. The percentage of participation in these conferences has not been large, and recently a campaign was started by the trade unions to give to these conferences more importance and authority and thus secure a larger attendance of workmen" (*Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 150).

² Report of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in *Pravda*, April 12, 1932; *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman, 1932, p. 132.

³ *Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 29-30.

between the wage-earners and their employers invariably brings to an early end any such spurt of unremunerated effort. Under Soviet Communism it has been demonstrated that the increase in productivity can be maintained, and even progressively increased. Thus Shvernik reports that a copper-rolling shop which, before the revolution, with a ten hours' day, used to produce 150 ingots, raised this daily output to 360 or 373 ingots; and then under counter-planning inspired by socialist emulation, the shifts went from 400 to 500 ingots, and then further progressed to 665 and 700 ingots; whilst in one case a shift triumphantly produced 832 ingots, "in honour of the Ninth Trade Union Congress and to celebrate the third anniversary of socialist competition".¹ Here again, the fact that any increase in the productivity of labour not merely increases automatically the earnings of piece-workers, but also either the annually determined wage-fund or else the allocation to social services, seems, to the workers concerned, a sufficient justification for using the sporting instinct to augment the wealth of the nation.

Shefstvo, or Patronage

There is one fundamental characteristic of socialist emulation which is entirely absent in capitalist competition, and rare even in the devotion to competitive games to which the British and American world have been so much addicted. In the USSR, the winners in any competition habitually turn to and help the losers, in order that these may attain at least an equal ability. The winning factory in socialist emulation with other factories will often send a shock brigade to one or other of the losing factories, to the great appreciation of the latter, in order to instruct the whole personnel of the defeated factory how to attain a level of production as great as, or even greater than, that of the winning factory. It is difficult to imagine the successful teams at cricket or football in England, or at baseball in the United States, feeling it a matter of honourable obligation to endeavour to teach those who had been defeated how they could turn the tables on their opponents on the next occasion. This interesting impulse towards mutual aid runs all through the recent life of the USSR. One of its most extensive developments is the patronage agreement, which often hardens into a patronage society, the members of which agree to contribute, besides their personal work, a small sum towards the incidental expenses. "The mutual-aid aspect of socialist competition", we are told, "comes to its fullest expression in the shefstvo, or patronage agreements, in which some institution or organisation becomes the patron of another. This is also spoken of as the process of adoption. . . . To-day this means an agreement for competition and mutual aid in fulfilling the Plan. The most universal form of such agreement is between factories and nearby collective farms and communes. For instance, the oil industry at Baku has 66 such agreements, the harvester plant at Selmash has 33. In working out this patronage, the Party supplies political

¹ *Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, p. 40.*

education, the labour union technical aid, the Comsomol youthful leaders. The kolkhosi to be adopted are divided between the departments; even the gas station takes one. The work is done through a shefstvo (patronage) society organised in each department, with a membership fee of ten kopeks a month.”¹ Professor Harper tells us that “there are many varieties of patronage societies. The underlying principle of all of them is that a group which is better organised, economically stronger, and politically more conscious, assumes, with respect to a group which is less well organised, economically weaker, and politically backward, the special responsibility of material and moral assistance. The first and the largest field for patronage activity is that of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry. Workman groups assume the patronage of peasants. The patronage of a regiment by a factory is a special expression of this type, because of the predominance of the peasants in the Red Army. But a regiment may become the patron of a Pioneer brigade. Soviet administrative institutions also assume patronage of a peasant community, so that the toiling intelligentsia may also help and influence the culturally backward village group. An educational institution ‘adopts’ another group on cultural grounds, and in turn becomes the object of special solicitude for an industrial group so that it may be brought into closer touch with the processes of production. . . . A Central Patronage Commission for the workman-peasant societies was introduced. The patronage of regiments has been coordinated under a department of the War Commissariat. For the Red Fleet the Comsomols assumed direction of all patronage activity among the sailors. . . . Within the patronage movement a workmen’s society of patronage of peasants is the most important type. . . . The leadership of the workmen with respect to the peasants, and the general policy of ‘face to the village’—all these principles or policies underlie the activities of these particular societies.”² “It was”, reports Professor S. N. Harper, “from the communist cells that the first workmen’s patronage societies developed. Among the commissions of a cell there was formed a patronage commission for the Party cell of a rural district. Through this contact the factory cell was to help the rural cell in the latter’s activity among the peasants. Then the factory committees took up the idea on the initiative of their communist fractions. In the first stages of the movement the principle of voluntary membership was frequently nullified by the practice of collective decision of the whole group to assume the patronage responsibility. In order to give the movement a mass character among the workmen, the factory committee became the accepted basis for all societies. The patronage society as finally developed is organised with a directing board, composed of representatives of the Party cell and the factory committee or of the ‘cult-commission’ of the latter. The original Party leadership is thus retained. Coordinating bodies are limited to provinces, as a patronage society never goes outside

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 122-123.

² *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by Professor S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 189.

the province in its activities. . . . The workmen of the cities, in their manifest eagerness for education, clearly welcome the patronage activities in their behalf on the part of the intelligentsia. The Pioneers, of course, are proud of being adopted by a regiment. For the sailors the patronage comes from members of their own classes, the youth of the workmen and peasants. It is in the patronage activity of workmen with respect to peasants that a political problem may develop. The general formula given by the communists is that whereas antagonism between rural and urban elements is inevitable under the capitalistic system, it is possible but not inevitable under the soviet order. The patronage societies, by the very character of their activities, are believed to make less possible an antagonism between workmen and peasants. The workmen's societies are being constantly pushed by the leaders to more organised effort and greater activity."¹ "Another form of patronage agreement", states another observer, "is that which the textile factory Trekhgorka, for example, signed with a kolkhos, promising to train effectively for trades the surplus workers whom the kolkhos promised to send to the factory. There are also the usual mutual agreements to increase production. In the lumber industry the saw-mill workers constitute themselves patrons over neighbouring villages, giving them aid in farming, repairing machinery, organisation of socialist forms of labour, and cultural activities. This method reaches down to the children. Sometimes a young Pioneer takes patronage over a certain machine in a factory. He then has to see if the worker carries out his agreement not to drink, be late or absent, and to keep the machine clean and oiled. On the other hand the Pioneer assumes obligations in his school days."²

There are endless varieties and developments of the idea of patronage. "Besides binding the factory workers to send skilled men to put in order the agricultural machinery before seed-time and harvest, and to carry on specified cultural work in the villages, such as organising kindergartens, libraries, nurseries and playgrounds, these agreements bind both sides to fulfil, and sometimes to surpass, the norms in their respective plans. For example, in the agreement between the drill department and the Pervaya Pyatiletka kolkhos, the latter agrees, among other things, 'to increase the areas of spring sowing by adding 4015 hectares [?]; to increase the crop over last year by 11 per cent; to lower production costs 15 per cent; to increase working oxen to 50, horses to 55, milk cows to 51, pigs to 31, and to get 2 full-blooded sows'. The drill department for the factory agrees, among other things, to lower production costs 15 per cent from the previous mean; to reduce absence without reason to 0.03 per cent, and drifters to 3 per cent; to get 50 of all workers on *hozraschet* (cost-accounting) by January 1st and 75 per cent by May 1st."³

¹ *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by Professor S. N. Harper, 1929, p. 193.

² *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 154-155.

³ *Ibid.* p. 153.

The Leningrad shipyard workers "patronised" the 1933-1934 Arctic expedition.

"A socialist patronage contract with the workers of the Leningrad Northern Shipyards

" Another example is the association of the AMO Automobile Works (Moscow) for the help of the Novo-Annensk district in the Lower Volga. The AMO sent to this district 30 highly skilled workers for the 'Amo Worker' state farm. Ten workers are now presidents of village soviets, etc. There are altogether 106 AMO workers in the district, some of whom occupy responsible party and soviet posts (district-committee secretaries, executive committee presidents, etc.). . . . Six motor lorries, sowers, two ploughs, spare parts and other equipment have been sent to the state farms under the special care of the AMO. The Works organised 26 crèches for the spring-sowing campaign. AMO Y.C.L. members [Comsomols] made 500 cots for the crèches out of scrapped metal in the Works, and a cinema-automobile was sent to the district. It is thanks to the energetic work of the AMO association for the care of the district that it was completely radiofied and telephonised by the time of the spring sowing. As well as this, an editing staff was sent to the district for the organisation on the spot of a permanent collective farm newspaper."¹

It is very largely by means of this patronage by the industrial workers that the vast network of primary school buildings all over the USSR is being completed. "With the school season about to commence, factories are right now concerned with the completion of new structures and the re-equipment and repair of existing buildings. Patronage over elementary schools has assumed truly colossal proportions. The industrial enterprises of the machine-building industry have alone taken patronage over 4350 schools, the railroad workers over 3400 schools, textile mills over 2600 schools, while other industries are to a similar extent engaged in assisting large numbers of elementary schools to cope with their problems. . . . A shortage of materials and labour sometimes prevents completion of schools on time. In such an event the factory that has patronage over the particular school is in a position to give invaluable assistance."²

The principle of patronage is, of course, not confined to factory workers or to the industrial trade unions. A rising young official in one of the higher grades of the soviet civil service described to us how, when he was serving in one of the leading government departments in Moscow, about a score of his colleagues in the office formed a patronage society in order to help a struggling kolkhos some fifty miles distant. This society, of which our informant was elected president, supplied this collective farm

was recently signed by Professor Otto J. Schmidt, commander of the Chelyushkin expedition. 'The moral support of our patrons, and of the toilers of the Soviet Union in general, will enable us to tackle the biggest obstacle met by Arctic expeditions—loneliness', said Professor Schmidt in his speech delivered at the Udamnik Square of the Central Park of Culture and Rest on Talagin Island.

"Two thousand Leningrad workers crowded the square, and the warm applause with which Schmidst and Vorosin, captain of the Chelyushkin, together with the heroes of the Sibiryakov, were greeted, was a good illustration of Schmidt's statement that 'in the Soviet Union every new venture personally concerns all the toilers'" (*Moscow Daily News*, July 22, 1933).

¹ *Bolshevism for Beginners*, by P. Kerzhentsev, 1931, p. 88.

² *Moscow Daily News*, August 21, 1933.

with elementary manuals on book-keeping, a typewriter and other office requisites. The members of the patronage society arranged to spend their annual holidays, in batches extending over three or four months, on the collective farm itself, where they helped in the farm work, looked after the accountancy, and generally educated the agriculturists of all ages. It is hard to imagine the "gentlemen of the Foreign Office" or of the War Office, in London, even those who used to work at Toyabec Hall, rendering, as a matter of course, this kind of service to an agricultural community of small holders in Essex or Kent.¹

A curious development of this idea of patronage is seen in the custom of some of the trade unions of selecting a considerable number of their ablest members to enter, with the consent of the management in each case, the offices of the enterprises in which they have been working, in the capacity—in most cases temporarily—of departmental vice-managers, or inspectors, or even assistant directors. The object is manifold. It is thought that, by this means, something can be done to counteract the ever-present tendency of the office-workers and managers to get out of touch with the feelings of the men at the bench and the forge. It is thought also that some check may thereby be put to "bureaucratism". Moreover, the practice may serve a useful purpose in enabling the best men and women to be picked out for substantive promotion. In 1933 it was reported to the Ninth All-Union Trade Union Congress that not fewer than 5000 such industrial workers were at that moment serving temporarily as assistant or vice-managers in 1500 enterprises, whilst as many as 40,000 more had been drawn into lower positions in the offices of these enterprises.²

"The furthest reach of patronage work", it is said, "is where it becomes a productive bond between the biggest factories and the agricultural district which supplies them with raw materials. For example, the textile workers have 'adopted' the cotton district of Central Asia. Through such agreements, the organisational experience of industry is transmitted to agriculture; it learns how to develop shock tactics, the new socialist forms of labour and the methods of socialist competition; it becomes socialised as well as mechanised."³ The position, to the westerner, becomes bewildering when, as is now frequently happening, one part of the constitutional machine is called upon voluntarily to inspect and supervise, and thereby render assistance to another part. Thus during 1933 the village soviets in the North Caucasus were officially incited to look into the management and efficiency of the collective farms in their

¹ We may note as typical that this particular kolkhos started in 1929 with 17 members; then in 1930, under the influences of unduly enthusiastic Party members, bounded up to 95 members. Upon Stalin's manifesto entitled "Dizzy with Success", 50 members withdrew. But in 1932 and 1933 the membership rose to about 80 members. The dozen or so remaining outside were then not allowed to join, out of resentment at their previous withdrawal. But it was believed that they would all be gradually admitted, one by one.

² *Ninth Trade Union Congress*, 1933.

³ *Moscow Daily News*, November 5, 1932.

neighbourhood; and to show them the way they should go. And the rural soviets of the Ukraine in the Don Basin were told to take under their patronage the coal mines in that region, which were seriously falling behind in their output, with a view to finding out what was wrong, and showing the workers and technicians how to get more coal. We shall later describe how it is impressed as a social duty upon every factory worker that he ought, through the trade union, to make his own suggestions to the factory manager as to how the running of the factory could be improved, including every new invention that he can think of. This form of voluntarism is open to the citizen at large. During the Moscow municipal election in 1932, it is said that more than one hundred thousand specific criticisms of the municipal administration were handed in, each one embodying a different suggestion for improvement. "Patronage of the workers over the state apparatus [*sic*] was of special importance during the reconstruction period. It arose through the initiative of the Moscow Electric Works during the period of the purge of the state apparatus; and it received immediately general recognition and became widespread. Half a year after the initiative of these Works, the Sixteenth Party Congress, according to the report of TSIK, expressed itself as follows: One of the most important achievements in the struggle with bureaucracy is the new form of workers' control from below, *patronage by the works over the state apparatus*. The system of patronage, and the transfer of the execution of certain functions of the state apparatus to the workers, are an important step towards the realisation of Lenin's view to the effect that 'our aim should be an unpaid performance of state functions by each worker after his eight hours' task has been fulfilled'. The seven hours' working day opens the possibility for the realisation of these views of Lenin. The primary task of patronage must consist in the daily control on the part of the patronage works as to the proper carrying out of the most important Party and government directives by the apparatus under patronage. It is just this familiarisation of the workers with the practical work of the departments which creates a powerful reserve of new proletarian staffs for the continuing of work in the soviet apparatus."

It would, we think, be hard to exaggerate the educational influence on the millions of the Soviet Union of the great and varied development that has been described under the heads of socialist emulation, voluntary work, and all the forms of patronage. An American observer rightly calls attention to some moral and intellectual by-products. "One is", says Mr. Ward, "that it is removing the former inferiority complex of the Russians as they acquire strength in and for the technique of socialist construction. Another is that it develops joy in work; it brings back into labour the song that the coming of industrialism drove away. . . . Often they go forth to the sowing or the harvest, and to their free work in cities, with banners flying and with songs. Also this joyous, competitive, mutual work promotes solidarity. It gradually ties the whole diverse multitude into a fellowship, including nationalities who were formerly at

each other's throats in pogroms and race wars. . . . Thus socialist competition, instead of dividing people into classes, like its antecedent in the capitalist world, is one of the shuttles running back and forth between the various sections of the population, weaving them into a unity of knowledge, purpose and accomplishment."¹

The Udarniki (Shock-Brigaders)

The shock-brigaders (udarniki) are workmen, and, occasionally, working women, not confined to Party members or Comsomols, who voluntarily undertake to give more and better service in their occupation, or to perform special tasks outside their occupation, in order to build up the socialist state, or, specifically, to ensure the fulfilment of the General Plan. They set themselves to raise the standard output, to diminish scrap or breakages, to put an end to time-wasting or unnecessary absenteeism, and to make the utmost use of the instrument of socialist emulation. The first brigade of udarniki was formed by Comsomols in the Listvensky factory late in 1928. This example was boomed in the soviet press, and was quickly imitated. By April 1, 1929, there were already seventy industrial enterprises in which shock brigades were at work. Ideas spread like wildfire in the USSR. In December 1929 an All-Union Congress of Shock-Brigaders was held at Moscow, when it was reported that there were already 300,000 of them in all parts of the country. This was confirmed by investigations made by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), which revealed no fewer than 1534 enterprises, having 1,101,000 workers, among whom the new spirit had shown itself, and of whom 60 per cent had actually taken part in socialist competitions, and 29 per cent were definitely enrolled as members of shock brigades.²

The activities of the shock-brigaders take a great variety of form, always with the common object of increasing output and diminishing cost. They work with furious intensity, shaming the other workers in the shop into putting more regularity and continuity into their efforts. They do not habitually exceed the normal factory day, except for the completion of special tasks, when a shock brigade may work continuously

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 151-152, 155.

² Extracted from article entitled "Socialist Competition and the Practice of Udarniki" (in Russian), *Materials annexed to Report of TSIK to the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1932, pp. 22-26. The following statistical tables were then given:

Number of Udarniki on March 1, 1930, in the principal trade unions:

Trade Unions	Number of Workers	Percentage of Udarniki
Metal workers .	567,250	60.0
Paper „ .	26,342	58.2
Textile „ .	181,281	48.8
Chemical „ .	29,641	47.1
Railway „ .	206,752	41.4
Carpenters .	88,516	41.0
Building workers .	150,858	38.0

all night. They do not usually receive or expect extra payment for their quite exceptional efforts, although on a piece-work basis their total earnings at the standard rates are naturally greater than those of the average workman. They find their reward in the public approval and the honours accorded to them, and in the special consideration frequently shown to them. They get the best chance of receiving theatre tickets or being sent on holiday excursions. In 1931 select companies of *udarniki* were given a cruise around European ports, and even to the Far East. *Udarniki* are apt to be elected to the various representative soviets and committees. They often enjoy the amenity of a separate dining-room in the factory restaurant, sometimes with flowers on the table, electroplated spoons and forks, and special dainties.¹ The student of social organisation will not fail to appreciate the effect of such a movement, not only upon the psychology of the *udarniki* themselves but also upon that of the whole mass of the wage-earning class, which, besides being stimulated to a universal increase in production, is, by the very approbation and honour that it gives to these exceptional members of its own community, unconsciously being educated in a higher and nobler motive for work than merely the wage that it yields. The numbers enrolled in the shock brigades continued to grow rapidly. By January 1933 the editor of *Izvestia* could claim that in the vanguard of the labouring forces there was an "army of three million shock-brigaders who had become inseparable from the Five-Year Plan, inseparable from Bolshevism and the soviets,

Number of *Udarniki* on January 1, 1932, in industry and railway transport :

	Number of Workers	Number of <i>Udarniki</i>
Industry . . .	5,040,600	3,236,100
Railway Transport .	1,253,300	643,000
Total . . .	6,293,900	3,879,100

Average percentage of *Udarniki* on January 1, 1932 :

Amongst workmen . . .	61.2
Amongst members of the Communist Party . . .	75.3
Amongst members of Comsomols	68.7

¹ In some places, we are told, "the shock [brigade] workers get special books entitling them to buy goods not available for ordinary workers, sometimes at the factory cooperative, and in the larger centres at special stores for their use. Also they do not have to wait in line to get their quota of staples, but are served ahead of the crowd. On the collective farms and in the lumber camps, where there is often a shortage of manufactured goods, the best workers get the first chance at them" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 33).

"At the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the question was raised of according a preferential supply of goods to all shock-workers. During the first quarter of 1931, the funds assigned for the supply of shock-brigaders amounted to about 20.4 per cent of the total fund of workers' supplies and in the fourth quarter this figure had risen to 39 per cent.

"It is a principle that those who fight in Bolshevik manner for increased production should be placed in the best positions as regards supplies" (*Shvernik's Speech in Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 69).

because they were the sinew and bone of socialist construction. The *udarniki*, he concluded, represent the proletariat which is being remoulded in the process of the reconstruction of the world.”¹

Cost-Accounting Brigades

A particular form of the shock brigade, called cost-accounting brigade, makes special use of the device of “costing”, in checking up the production of its own members, as a means of discovering in what way output may be increased and costs lessened. As already mentioned, this took its rise by the practice of a few *udarniki* in a Leningrad factory at the beginning of 1931, who found that a dissection of the labour time that they expended in the various stages of particular jobs enabled them to devise methods for considerably reducing the total labour cost. They described their experiment in *Trud*, the weekly journal of the AUCCTU, which made it the subject of successive articles. The idea was taken up with avidity by shock brigades all over the USSR. “On February 1, 1931,” reported the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), “we could number only ten business accounting brigades in the USSR, comprising 130 persons. By April 1, 1932, their number had increased to 155,000, comprising about one and a half million workers. . . . It was in Leningrad that the first initiative towards organising accounting brigades took its rise, and now no less than 70 per cent of the workers there are included in business accounting brigades. In the Moscow district there are 30,000 business accounting brigades, comprising about 400,000 workers. There are 25,000 business accounting brigades in the Ukraine, comprising 300,000 workers. . . . These figures bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the working class is creating new and higher forms of labour organisations, which make it possible to enlist even larger numbers of the working masses in the direct control of production. There is not a single branch of industry where business accounting brigades are not developing as the basic form of socialist competition, as the most highly perfected form in which the labour of a given enterprise can be organised. . . . Business accounting brigades fully assure that the worker exercises due influence upon the course of production, and solve the problem of teaching millions of workers how to control the national economy. . . . At the Dzerzhinsky Metallurgical Plant, in the Bessemer shop, where the work of the business accounting brigades has been excellent, 17 out of 22 business accounting brigades fulfilled their programme for January 1932 to the extent of 107 per cent, while the plant as a whole failed to fulfil its industrial programme. . . . In some cases the cost-accounting brigades effected veritable triumphs of economy. In the assembling shop of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant one brigade contrived to reduce the amount of bad work turned out by five times more than was specified in the programme. They thus saved 3800 roubles in three

¹ *Izvestia*, January 1933.

months. Cases of workers being absent from work without due cause were totally eliminated; and the number of workers was reduced from 72 to 32 by giving one worker charge of 3-4 machines. . . . Volokitin's business accounting brigade in the 'Red Putilov' Works (Leningrad) fulfilled its allotted task in 775 hours, instead of the 924 hours provided for by the programme. Such a miscalculation on the part of the technical administration in estimating the time required for performing a definite task could never have been discovered had not socialist competition and its highest form—the business accounting brigade—developed a genuinely socialist attitude to labour on the part of the workers. . . . Calculations made by the members of the business accounting brigades of this shift have shown that, provided the stoppages are eliminated, it may be possible to increase the assignment of work so as to fulfil the industrial programme by 150 per cent. Demin's brigade of roller hands in the Stalin Metallurgical Plant, after adopting business accounting, is now working with a gang of 45 workers, instead of the 60 formerly employed. . . . With the active participation of business accounting brigades, the technological process in the screw shop of the 'Red Profintern' Plant has been reorganised, the result being a considerable increase in the productivity of labour, better organisation of control, and above all, a doing away with all absence of personal responsibility in the control of production, which is now registered for each separate machine."¹ "In March 1932, a numerously attended All-Union Congress of Business Accounting Brigades analysed the condition of this particular movement, revealed the obstacles that hindered its further development, and outlined a programme for the improvement in quality of the work of the brigades."²

The social utility of these cost-accounting brigades has been freely recognised. "In the struggle for the development of socialist competition", declared Shvernik, "the initiative of the workers has taken various forms: social tugboats, chain brigades, brigades to fight for higher quality, brigades to reduce the cost of production. But the two forms of labour which have done most to raise socialist competition to a higher level are the counter-plans worked out by the individual shifts and the business accounting brigades."³

Naturally all these millions of *udarniki* are not all equally enthusiastic, or equally faithful to their undertaking to excel the ordinary worker in productive efficiency. But the slackers are watched and, in due course, reprimanded, warned and if necessary expelled.⁴ There is even some good to be got out of this dealing with the slackers. It is part of the social evolution of the idea, and not its least valuable part. "The determination to see that contracts are carried out means that the workers are

¹ *Shvernik's Speech in Ninth Trade Union Congress, 1933, pp. 33-35.*

² *Ibid.* p. 37.

³ *Ibid.* p. 28.

⁴ "The worst thing about the shock-brigade movement is that there are those who parade the thing, who make solemn assemblies and mutual greetings, assurances and vows before one another, and nothing more" (*The Comsomol—One Shock Brigade* (in Russian), by the General Secretary of the Comsomols).

to be subjected to the same discipline of keeping one's word that capitalism, in its best days, instilled in the traders and bankers. Also, when the kulak becomes transformed, he finds a new meaning for some of the habits which before made him a social enemy. In their changed form, they make him a valuable asset to the socialist cause. Truth-telling also becomes obligatory in a planned system, in order that the planner may not be deceived and misled."¹

Subbotniki, or Voluntary Labourers

The forerunner of shock brigades and socialist emulation was the practice of voluntary social work, undertaken gratuitously in order to achieve a particular object. It began during the civil war, in the form of "subbotniki", or "Saturday-ers", in which spontaneously formed groups of workers gave up their free time to toil in an emergency at some special task.² The workers on the railway at Kazan first made this sacrifice of their leisure, when Lenin publicly hailed their action as "the great start" of genuine communism. It rapidly became a regular practice among all sorts of workers, in offices and institutions as well as in industrial establishments. Now "every fall in Moscow a large part of the population turns out to help unload potatoes and vegetables, and again in the winter to dig the city out of a snowstorm which has stopped traffic". The *Moscow Daily News* reported that a group of villages had organised subbotniki to construct the rough wooden furniture required for a school in which illiterates were being taught by volunteer teachers. An American lumber specialist writes that in an emergency in the woods, 120 men turned out and, "by free work, did in four and a half hours what would ordinarily have taken those responsible for it eighty working days".³ Whilst the huge tractor works in Kharkov were being constructed, mountains of rubbish accumulated all around the buildings; and the inhabitants of the city made it a point of honour to clear it away, without diverting the regular staff from the building and equipping of the new plant that was so urgently required. Whole crowds assembled on their free days, and swarmed around the premises, eventually completing the entire task. On some afternoons, it was reported, it looked like a big holiday excursion getting off the tramcars, and it is estimated that from first to last the

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 61.

² "In 1919, the year of cold and starvation, the first communist 'subbotnik' was organised. Workers and Red Army men volunteered to repair locomotives, to load wood, coal, etc., after their day's work. When the civil war came to an end the workers organised 'subbotniki' to repair the factories. The miners of the Donbas, standing up to the waist in water, starving, and freezing, pumped the water out of the pits that had been flooded by the White Guards. In the years of reconstruction the enthusiasm of the workers found expression in a powerful movement of socialist competition and shock brigades. The correctness of Lenin's thesis that the socialist order does not diminish initiative, but creates a large field for it, was proved by this movement. The socialist epoch has given birth to a new type of men and women, to a new attitude towards labour" (*Socialist Industry in the USSR Victorious* (Moscow, 1931), pp. 22-23). See also p. 616.

³ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 113.

participants numbered at least thirty thousand. At Leningrad, the correspondent of a French newspaper was impressed by the crowd of volunteers whom he saw helping to repave the streets. "It was on the Ligovskaia in Leningrad, near the railway station, early in the summer, that I saw hundreds of men, women and children even, pulling the granite blocks up from the road. It was obvious that they could by no stretch of imagination have been navvies. Laughing crowds surrounded them and cheerfully urged them on. Girls who seemed more accustomed to typewriters were doing their best to pull up the heavy setts which were then passed from hand to hand. Men dressed as office-workers lent a hand too. And children also were loaded with their own small burdens. At intervals lorries would drive up with new reinforcements. . . . And all these improvised navvies had their hands protected with padded gloves. . . . That spectacle, unforgettable by me, is one of the most moving things I saw in the USSR, and I can vouch for it there was no element of forced labour in all this. Only the noblest enthusiasm spurred on these workers to partake in a task, the rewards of which would accrue to them later."¹ The Lugansk locomotive works were made ready for opening in time only by the mass efforts of a volunteer army made up of every sort of worker in the town.² The observer in the USSR runs up against this "free work" at unexpected points. A woman interpreter remarked that she was tired because, the night before, forty per cent of the Intourist staff had been sorting potatoes from 8 to 12 in a dirty, wet basement, as their free work. I asked why. "They belonged to everybody and should not be wasted." "The same method is used even with the work of the children. In one small school they were asked, for their social work last spring, to sort potatoes for planting. Only five stuck to the job until evening. These had their names put on the red board and were given an order on the cooperatives for a pair of shoes."³

The outstanding case of the use of voluntary labour during 1933-1934 was that of Metrostroï, the construction of the Moscow underground railway—a herculean adventure, pursued without faltering in times of food scarcity and intense domestic overcrowding, as a matter of "glory and heroism" by the ardent "builders of the socialist state". In addition to the tens of thousands of workers regularly employed in this great engineering construction, more than two hundred thousand men and women of all ages, Party members and non-Party alike, from practically all the factories and offices of Moscow, volunteered their services on various free days during nine months from January 23, 1933, in order that the first twelve-mile section could be opened on the seventeenth anniversary of the October Revolution. These subbotniki included, on some days, such leading figures as L. M. Kaganovich, one of the principal

¹ Article by M. D. Perret in *Le Travail* (Paris), translated in *Soviet Culture* for February 1934.

² *Moscow Daily News*, August 27, 1933.

³ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 34.

secretaries of the Communist Party: the officials and members of the Moscow city committee of the Party; and the commander of the Moscow military zone, who was seen "working all day in shaft No. 36-7". Nor was this voluntary labour limited to Moscow residents, or to the loading and discharging of materials, and the removal of mountains of earth. The workers in a great Leningrad machine shop undertook to give one free day a month to repairing gratuitously all the machines "put out of service on Metrostroi". The men in other factories pledged themselves voluntarily to see that all orders for Metrostroi were speeded up. "The shock brigades of the Krasny Proletari Plant put all their energy into a drive for supplying Moscow with cars ready to run on the opening day. The graphs displaying the daily and weekly progress of Metrostroi were publicly shown, not only throughout Moscow but also in all the leading industrial centres. During the summer months the 'curve of results' swung steadily upward."¹ The workers all over the USSR took pride in thinking that it was this "devotion to the cause" which guaranteed that the railway—superior to anything existing in Paris, London or New York—should be in operation as scheduled.

A Universal Obligation

What was begun by exceptionally zealous subbotniki has become generalised as a social obligation incumbent on all good citizens. Everybody is now expected, as a matter of course, to undertake, in addition to the occupation for which he receives a wage or a salary, some active social service in his free time, the gratuitous and zealous performance of which is required by "communist ethics", and enforced by the public opinion of his associates and neighbours. Nor is this merely the "one good deed a day" that is expected from the English boy scouts. Quite apart from little acts of courtesy and kindness, what is expected from the good citizen in the USSR, and astonishingly widely rendered, is hard manual labour for hours at a stretch, in whatever direction the work is, in the public interest, required. The Pioneers habitually spend long days in the harvest fields helping the members of the kolkhosi. Thousands of Comsomols turned out in 1931 to help in the repairing of the Moscow thoroughfares; and they were prominent in 1933 among those who worked on the Moscow underground railway. Others, of all ages and occupations, regularly spend so many hours per week in teaching illiterate men and women to read and write.² A large part of the routine work of municipal

¹ See the numerous descriptions of the voluntary workers on Metrostroi in *Izvestia* (Russian) and *Moscow Daily News* during the spring and summer of 1933.

² Shvernik, the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), claims that "The trade unions have enlisted millions of volunteers in active service for the liquidation of illiteracy. During 1931, 80 per cent of the 1,304,000 illiterate persons and 1,895,000 semi-literate persons were taught free of charge by these volunteers. In the trade union of the cotton-textile industry, where there are 22,958 illiterates, 17,085 of these are already being educated. The factories 'Communist Vanguard', 'Krasny

administration in Moscow and Leningrad, such as sanitary inspection and the collection of local contributions which would be performed in England by a salaried municipal staff, is regularly done gratuitously in these cities under the various municipal commissions, by fifty thousand or so volunteers, as part of the "free work" which they feel it their duty to perform.

This new obligation imposed by communist ethics, whilst never enforced by law, is not left altogether without sanction. The performance of some free work is expected from every citizen, though the choice of service is freely left to him. It is specifically a duty of the Party member, and of the candidate for membership, of the Comsomol and of the Pioneer. With all these, any non-performance may be remembered at the periodical "cleansings", and is likely to be visited with reprimand, and, eventually, even with expulsion. It is definitely required also of the trade unionist, and failure to perform it may be brought up against him when he is proposed for election to any soviet or trade union committee; whilst it will militate against him in the allocation of holiday journeys to rest houses, and even of theatre tickets. Such social service is now being increasingly expected from the members of collective farms, and its non-performance is remembered when there is any distribution of surpluses, or any allocation of favours. It has not escaped notice that the idea may be pushed too far. Official warnings have been given that the Pioneers must not be allowed to do too much manual work; that the Comsomals had better apply themselves to educational services rather than to industry, and that school teachers should preferably improve their own qualifications in their hours of leisure.

An International Comparison

It is interesting to recall, in this connection, the large amount of social work done in Great Britain and (apparently to a smaller extent) also in the United States,¹ notably in the administration of charitable institutions, in the unpaid magistracy, and in serving on the committees of local authorities of all kinds. How does the voluntary work, in free time, in the USSR, compare with that so faithfully and disinterestedly performed in some other countries? First of all, as to the relative extent of this participation in active social service. In western countries, this voluntary service is almost entirely confined to the middle and upper classes (apart from the "activists" in trade union and friendly society work), probably

Perkop' and 'Bolshevik', and the Yarzevsky Plant in Ivanovo district, have achieved all round general literacy" (*Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 84).

¹ It would be unfair not to mention also the persistent devotion to voluntary public service in pre-revolutionary Russia, especially after 1900; not so much by the aristocracy or the wealthy, as by many of the intelligentsia, notably doctors, teachers of all grades, and those who worked in zemstvos. During the war, especially in its first years, there was also widespread voluntary service in connection with loans, supplies, medical aid, etc.

not enlisting in any country as many as one or two hundred thousands of active participants. In the USSR it is the recognised social obligation of many millions, all of them living on wages or exiguous salaries. In the western countries, it is done, very largely, as a matter of philanthropy, and it is not enforced by public opinion as a universal duty; moreover the duty is done, usually, for the benefit of "the poor". In the USSR there is no thought of charity in the matter; and personal service, which is expected from all in proportion to their faculties, is done for the community as a whole. In the western countries, the social service, performed mainly by the small minority who have enjoyed exceptional educational advantages, almost always takes the form of voluntary participation in the exercise of authority; in fact, in the function of governing, and practically never in that of manual labour. In the USSR, on the other hand, the greater part of it is the performance of hard and monotonous manual labour, usually of the unskilled variety, in supplement of that of the regularly employed building or engineering operatives. Lastly, it is perhaps not unfair to say that, in the voluntary social service characteristic of the more public-spirited members of the upper and middle classes of the western world, there is the very smallest sense of fellowship with the masses of the people, whom the service is presumably intended to benefit. In the USSR a conscious fellowship is everything.

Looking back on the persistence and ever-increasing development of this voluntary gratuitous labour, rendered during the past fifteen years by literally millions of workers, it is impossible not to be impressed by its social significance. Lenin, who was not its originator, at once acclaimed its importance. Writing in 1919, he said that "The communist 'subbotniks' have an enormous historical importance, precisely because they demonstrate to us the class-conscious and voluntary initiative of the workers in increasing the productivity of labour; in passing on to a new labour discipline; in creating socialist conditions of economy and of life. Labour productivity is, in the final analysis, the prime and most important factor in the triumph of the new social order. Capitalism has created a degree of labour productivity unknown to serfdom. Capitalism can be finally overthrown, and will be finally overthrown, by the fact that socialism will create a new and much higher productivity of labour. This is a very difficult matter, and will take a long time; still, *it has been started*, and that is the main thing. If, in hungry Moscow, in the summer of 1919, hungry workers, who had gone through four hard years of imperialist war, and then through a year and a half of still harder civil war, could begin this great venture, what will be the further development when we shall have won the civil war and shall conquer the world? Communism means a higher labour productivity, as compared with that of capitalism, on the part of voluntary, conscious, united workers employing progressive technique."¹

¹ Article by Lenin, 1919: "Excerpts from the Great Initiative", *Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 26-27.

Public Honour and Shame

For thousands of years, in practically all countries of high civilisation, the public award of honours has been found a powerful incentive to social service. At all times the soldier and the statesman—during the past century or so, also the explorer and the inventor, and even the scientist and the genius in literature and the arts—have been rewarded by specific manifestations of public honour and esteem. In the USSR this award of public honour to outstanding merit, which is made chiefly in respect of the performance of “common” labour, takes many forms. In the factory there are “honour boards” of one or other kind—recalling Robert Owen’s use of this very device at New Lanark a century and a quarter ago—on which are displayed the names of the workers who have excelled and the nature of their achievement. The winning *udarniki* in socialist emulation may be called to the platform at a public meeting, amid the applause of the audience and the playing of the “Internationale”. On a higher level are the portraits of the heroes of labour that are painted for public exhibition, or the plaster statues designed to keep alive their renown in the local “park of culture and rest”. But honours are given also in forms common in the western world. The scientist whose work is appreciated by his colleagues may be specially coopted into the Academy of Science. The successful writer, poet or dramatist will be honoured by public receptions, or gala performances or readings of his works. There have even been established, for the outstanding heroes of labour and other social service, analogues of the orders of chivalry, of which European monarchies and republics have long made use.

The Soviet Orders of Merit

Of these orders there are now several. The Order of Lenin is awarded for exceptional public service, mainly in the field of manual labour, notably to men or women who have distinguished themselves in leading their fellow-workers to the successful fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan within four years. The Red Banner of Toil is awarded “by special decision” of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, or of a federated republic, at the request of the labour organisation, for outstanding service in the field of production, for scientific work, or for service to state or community. As a rule, persons are rewarded with this rank who have 35 years of service, but in exceptional cases this condition may be waived. . . . The Red Banner of Toil entitles the owner to a free pass on Moscow trams, a pass to travel once a year to any point in the USSR, and a pension of 30 roubles a year. Also it brings the regular pension nearer by adding so many years to the service record.¹ Among all the millions of trade unionists, “the best group”, declared the General Secretary of the AUCCTU in 1933, was “the group of Comrade

¹ *In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, p. 81.

Yanovsky, comprising 34 mill-cutters and drillers, of the Karl Marx plant in Leningrad. This group has been awarded the Order of the Red Banner. . . . This group systematically overfulfilled its industrial and financial plan—110 per cent in production and 119 per cent in productivity of labour. Bad work has been done away with altogether. This group has effected economies in metal to the value of 1336 roubles. Each member of the group has been awarded a bonus.”¹ There is also a third distinction, the Order of the Red Star.

The completion, earlier than had been arranged for the construction programme, of the Baltic and White Sea Canal, was made the occasion of a special award of these distinctive orders as well as other honours. Thirty-one of the best workers received either the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star. The award was all the more remarkable in that the 200,000 workers on this huge enterprise were almost wholly made up either of convicted criminals or of political offenders, or of kulaks deported from the areas in which collective farms had been formed. The thirty-one selected for the highest honours included on the one hand, G. G. Yagoda, the vice-president of the OGPU, under whose direction the entire labour force had been assigned to the work; L. I. Kogan, the chief of the canal construction; and C. G. Firin, the chief of the “Labour correction camp”, and, on the other, a number of the ex-criminals, who were held, by good services, to have expiated their dishonourable past.²

Public Dishonour

What is novel is the extensive use made of the incentive of organised public shaming of those who have fallen below the currently accepted standard of productive efficiency. This, too, recalls some of the devices of Robert Owen’s administration. Thus, the “honourable mention” of exceptional merit in the factory, is often balanced by the “dishonourable mention” in the wall-newspapers or on dishonour boards, of workers who have betrayed their trust by drunkenness, unnecessary absenteeism or culpable negligence resulting in breakage, wastage or accident. Sometimes such dishonourable workers are required ignominiously to seek their monthly pay at a separate place, perhaps shaped like a gigantic vodka bottle, covered with coloured posters denouncing the offence, and also the disadvantages of habits of drunkenness.³

¹ Shvernik’s speech in *Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, p. 94.

² At the same time, nearly 60,000 persons had their sentences reduced; over 12,200 more were exempted from the operation of “further measures of social defence”, and another 500 were restored to the rights of citizenship. (See *Moscow Daily News* during August 1933, especially the issues of 6th, 17th and 20th, and the Russian newspapers during that month.)

³ “At Selnash I was stopped one day by a sign over the washroom: ‘This is where the lazy fellows smoke the machines away’. Another day, on a blackboard in the plough shop were three columns headed ‘Drunkards’, ‘Absentees’, ‘Lazy fellows’. Underneath were the names of the delinquents. They were caricatured—the drunkard with a big bottle, and the absentee sleeping in bed, and the lazy man with his head tied up, pretending a toothache. The big scoreboard in the harvesting machinery department

This deliberate shaming of delinquents is sometimes the spontaneous outcome of the public opinion of fellow-workers. One of the foreign mechanics has described some illustrative examples. "Not long ago on the square near the dining-room at the Moscow (AMO) Auto Plant we observed a miniature graveyard consisting of six small coffins. On each was inscribed the name, date and machine broken by carelessness in the central machinery room. Naturally those responsible for this carelessness were cured long before the factory paper carried pictures of the coffins with articles by the other workers in the department. They expressed their opinions in no mild terms of their fellow-workers who had caused this damage. Some of the workers in the tool and die room found caricatures of themselves on the dining-room door one sunny noon. One was depicted as a wage-hog with his hoof over his heart,, merrily chasing an elusive rouble which the wind kept blowing away. Another was pictured dreaming how he could spend his high wages, while a third was investing his in a whisky joint, a rouble at a time. Of course, those caricatured didn't like it at all. But their fellow-workers had decided to keep their pictures on public view until they have made good in the shop. Many workers on seating themselves in the dining-room take a spoon or fork and start pounding and yelling for service. One picture in the factory paper with some sharp comment stopped all competition for the "Dining-Room Spoon Band".¹

The "wall-newspaper", which is seen displayed in a prominent place in practically every factory, institute or office in the USSR, is frequently used for the expression of popular judgments, not only on fellow-workers, but also on foremen, technicians and the managers or directors themselves. The visitor is assured frequently by the workmen themselves that, however much such criticisms or caricatures may be resented, their authors are never punished or victimised, even if the accusations are incorrect or unwarranted. They are, in fact, officially regarded as a form of "self-criticism", which is, on the whole, socially beneficial in its effects. It is, we think, characteristic that neither the pain suffered by the individuals thus held up to public odium, nor the possible weakening of discipline when foremen and managers are publicly criticised by subordinates, is allowed to stand in the way of an influence regarded as advantageous to the community as a whole, encouraged by occasional public exhibitions

contained each man's name and his record for fulfilling his quota in the plan; for scrap, idleness and absences; his classification as *udarnik*, and his premium. In front of the plant a giant worker was pictured with an enormous hammer under the slogan: 'Smash the drifting and careless, the false *udarniki*'. The drunkards and slackers have to get their pay at a special 'Black window', where they are jeered at by onlookers. Sometimes the place for receipt of wages is a hole cut in the middle of an enormous black bottle. At *Selmash* it was the mouth of an enormous red-nosed drinker, with a sign 'At the Black Pay window all the lazy absentees, drunkards and snatchers will get their pay on (such a date)'. To get it they had to mount steps and pass along a raised platform in full view. The children added to this publicity by coming into the factory and drawing caricatures of drunkards for the notice boards" (*In Place of Profit*, by Harry F. Ward, 1933, pp. 82-83).

¹ Article by J. Mullens in *Moscow Daily News*, January 3, 1933.

of chosen specimens of bad work, and even by the award of a banner to the establishment turning out the best issue of a wall-newspaper within the district or province.

The wall-newspapers themselves, and the factory newspapers, or "house organs" into which they develop in large establishments, are remarkable in their proletarian spontaneity. Unlike most, if not all, of the "house organs" of British or American industry, they are not, in the USSR, so far as we have been able to ascertain, edited or managed, or in any way directed, by the management of the establishment; nor yet confined to the topics or opinions that may be supposed to be agreeable to the management. They are officially recognised as organs of public opinion. "At a recent conference of worker-correspondents of the October district of Moscow, about 500 worker-writers from factories of the district crowded the hall of the KUTV club to listen to and participate in the discussion. Competition for the red banner to be awarded to the best factory paper in the district has been keen this year. The results of this competition—hundreds of printed and wall-papers—were proudly exhibited in the lobby of the club. These papers, some of them crude, partly hand-written, are a lesson in soviet political economy.

"The struggle for fulfilling factory production plans is illustrated by photos of the best *udarniki*. Drawings of turtles and crabs illustrate the weakest departments, those that are lagging behind. Biting satire lashes the bureaucrat who refuses to heed the warnings of the paper. In one case a factory newspaper succeeded in forcing heads of departments to investigate every complaint as soon as it appeared in the factory paper. This happened in the Peter Alexeyev Textile Factory, where Director Sharonov issued an order to all heads of departments to this effect. The head of the factory control commission, Richagov, is personally responsible for carrying out this order. In all serious cases he must report to the director the results of the investigations.

"The paper of this factory is 'For Tempo and Quality'. With 1390 workers, the factory has one printed daily paper, two daily wall-papers and fifteen weekly wall-papers. During 1932 the printed daily received 598 letters from the workers. It has 176 worker-correspondents. When a letter is received a copy of the complaint is sent to the Party secretary of the department with a definite date set for a reply. After investigation, the letter is printed and the head of the department is expected to remedy the situation immediately and report the results to the paper. If he does not reply soon enough, a reminder is printed or a cartoon. Usually the heads of departments do not wait to be reminded. In serious cases, the guilty ones are removed from the factory or even put on trial.

"In order to eliminate 'brak' [spoilage], the newspaper has introduced a diary among the weavers in which they mark down everything that interferes with their work. As a result of this diary all causes were removed, 'brak' eliminated, productivity increased and earnings as well. That is one of the many reasons why the workers are so active in their

factory press. Systematic educational work is carried on among the worker-correspondents in the factory, a special date set aside for their conferences. The other factory papers are carrying on similar work but not so successfully. The nearest competitor for the red banner, 'Regulator', of the brake factory (Tormazovny Zavod) has 300 worker-correspondents, but is lagging behind in the fight for better quality and educational work. The decision by the jury to award the banner to the Peter Alexeyev Textile Factory was greeted with applause and the 'Internationale' played by the band of one of the factories."¹

The organisation of the incentive of public shame reaches its highest point in the "comradely courts" which exist in nearly all large factories, and to which, not the workers only, but also the management, submit a large proportion of the "discipline cases", from which no community of individuals is free. A session of such a court in the gigantic Putilov works in Leningrad is vividly described by a woman who was a participant.² We find a more detailed account of the constitution, powers and working of these courts in a pamphlet by "comrade Busin" of the Kharkov Electro-Mechanical Factory (formerly AEA).

"These workers' factory courts arose in the hard fight against the former opportunist trade union leaders, who had declared that it was impossible for the trade union organisations to exercise functions as a court. The courts are competent to deal with the following cases :

"A. Fight against everything which disturbs the normal development of socialist production :

- (1) Violation of workers' discipline, coming late to work, idling, coming to work in an intoxicated condition, changing place of work without reason.
- (2) Systematic neglectful treatment of socialist property (machines, tools, etc.).
- (3) Turning out faulty work involving waste of material.

"B. Fight against the remnants of the old way of living. This includes :

- (1) Insult, slander or libel, assault not involving serious bodily injury.
- (2) Theft within the factory up to the value of 50 roubles, rowdiness, various kinds of unsocial acts, etc.
- (3) Various actions which hinder the work of social organisations.

"How are the judges elected ? The judges are elected in the departments, with the active participation of the staff, after a careful examination of the candidates. In our factory 381 judges have been elected. These consist of the best shock brigaders, with many years' experience in productive work. Among them are 80 women. They are divided into 26 'senates' with 26 chairmen and 51 deputy chairmen.

"Not only the judges and the parties to the dispute, but every worker

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, May 29, 1933.

² *Fine Frau erlebt den roten Alltag*, by Lili Korber (Berlin, 1932), translated as *Life in a Soviet Factory*, 1933, pp. 132, 155-160.

in the works, has the right to be present at the proceedings and to express his opinion regarding the case being dealt with. Contrary to bourgeois courts, applause or expressions of dissent on the part of the public, are not only not prohibited, but are desired.

" Here are a few typical cases :

" L., turner in the motor department I. Called to account for systematic loafing. When he saw how indignant his workmates were on account of his conduct, he declared that he realised how criminal was his conduct, and promised not to idle any more. The court ordered him to be placed on probation for six months. Since this sentence, L. has completely changed. He has not loafed for a single minute, and already before the expiration of his period of probation he performed such good work as a shock brigadier that he received a premium of 100 roubles.

" K., instructor, was accused of insulting and systematically pestering the working women. The sentence was the same as that in the case of L. To-day he is likewise one of the best shock-brigade workers.

" T., watchman in the factory. Accused of refusing to work and dis-organisational activity. He was let off with a warning. He took this warning to heart, and under the influence of the class-conscious portion of the masses became another man. Six weeks later he was advanced to a better-paid position.

" St., a woman book-keeper, was likewise warned by the court on account of being continually late in coming to work. Since then several months have passed, and St. has never been late.

" The worker Ch. was called to account for using insulting anti-semitic language towards a waitress, a Jewess. The proceedings were attended by more than 300 workers, and became a passionate demonstration for the policy of national freedom observed by the Soviet Power. With tears in his eyes the worker Ch. acknowledged his fault. The court administered him a severe reproof.

" A few statistics : In October 1932, the Workers' Factory Court dealt with 61 cases, namely, 18 cases of idling, 7 cases of leaving the workplace during work-time, 7 cases of stealing in the factory, 6 of turning out bad work, 6 of being asleep at work, 5 of insulting fellow-workers, 4 of systematically coming late, 3 of falsifying the work records, 2 of rowdiness, one case of assault, one of anti-semitic attacks, and one of wrongful use of cooperative food ticket.

" In 7 cases a comradely warning was given ; in 37 cases a severe reprimand was administered, in 3 cases fines were imposed, the proceeds to be employed for social purposes ; in 3 cases the accused were placed on probation, in 2 cases the accused were expelled from the trade union, and in 9 cases the accused were immediately dismissed.

" The Factory Workers' Courts were thoroughly reorganised in August, and the fight for socialist discipline made the chief object of their work. The result was that the production and financial plan, which before August was fulfilled only up to 70 per cent, on a monthly average, rose to 75 per

cent in the month of August, and to 105 per cent in October, chiefly owing to the activity of the Factory Workers' Courts.

"Of course these methods of bringing influence to bear on backward workers are not always effective. There are still many cases in which the old habits and the unsocialist attitude to socialist work is so deeply rooted in the consciousness of the new workers, or in those sections of the factory staff which consist of declassed elements, that it is necessary to exert a 'special pressure', such as is provided in the new law against slacking."¹

We can imagine nothing in which the soviet factory stands in sharper contrast with the British or American than the universal acceptance by the workers, and the cordial adoption by the management, of this system of "comradely courts", to which we recur in our Chapter XII. on "The Good Life".

Encouragement of Suggestions and Inventions by the Workers

One of the new incentives adopted by Soviet Communism that is most difficult for capitalist enterprise to appreciate is the deliberate mass invitation of suggestions for industrial improvement, as well as actual inventions of novel methods and processes, by the rank and file of the workers.² So extensive is the response to such encouragement in the USSR that it is open to the objection that the mere examination of these proposals, let alone any adequate investigation and experimental testing of even the most plausible of them, necessarily involves a considerable expenditure of time and thought by the management, and, occasionally, some confusion in the smooth running of each enterprise. The communist rejoinder to this objection—one actually expressed by more than one foreign expert in soviet service—is, first, that experience demonstrates the economic value of a very large number of the suggestions and inventions thus submitted. Not only in the USSR but also in capitalist countries, it has repeatedly been found that, whilst scientific discoveries and inventions of the first order of importance have usually been made by scientists equipped by training as well as inspired by genius, many of the smaller improvements in processes, notably in connection with friction and the heating of moving parts, with the prevention of waste, or with tricks of manual dexterity, unnoticed in the laboratories, have sprung from the practical experience of the workmen at the bench or the forge.³ But

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, March 9, 1933.

² We do not forget the practice, latterly adopted by capitalist undertakings of exceptional enlightenment, of putting up suggestion boxes, publicly inviting their own employees to submit suggestions for the improvement of their own processes, and even promising to reward by money premiums suggestions that prove of value in increasing their own profits. This practice, whilst it may be quoted in support of the wisdom of the Soviet Union's encouragement of proletarian inventiveness, seems to us to lack the social value of the mass appeal.

³ An American workman cites a whole series of minor improvements, all of them eliminating waste, that he has seen suggested, and many of them adopted. His comment is illuminating. "Maybe in America I would pay no attention to the same waste as I see

however this may be, Soviet Communism finds an even greater social value in arousing, among the whole mass of manual workers, the desire to improve the processes of industry ; the urge to invent ; indeed, the mere consciousness of active participation in the intellectual side of the work of socialist construction. Even if the proletarian suggestions and inventions proved to be of slight economic value, communist statesmen would still hold it well worth while to evoke them, and to expend time and thought in considering them, for the sake of the psychological effect. To render the manual workers inventive, and desirous of improving processes, is one way, and as communists hold, a successful way, of making the social order genuinely democratic. The capitalist profit-maker may see no advantage in this ; but no economist of intelligence, who thinks it worth while to spend money on public health and universal education, can altogether reject the argument.

It is, however, clear that, apart altogether from the social value, there has resulted from this new incentive a great increase in the number of inventions and suggestions of which use has been made. In 1933 the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) declared that " during 1930, in 57 syndicates under the control of the Supreme Council of National Economy, 273,000 rationalisation suggestions were sent in by the workers ; and in 1931 the figure had risen to 542,000. The economy effected by the application of these suggestions amounted during the first quarter of 1931 to 5,000,000 roubles ; during the second quarter to 6,247,000 roubles, and during the third quarter to 11,574,000 roubles. . . . The First All-Union Congress of the Society of Inventors (VOIZ) undertook to save the country one billion roubles during 1932 by means of inventions and improvements, whereas the programme drawn up by the Supreme Council of National Economy calls for only 300,000,000 roubles of economy from inventions and improvements throughout our entire industry. . . . Our trade unions do not always take a sufficiently strong attitude in the struggle to have the workers' suggestions put into effect, and to have bonuses awarded. They have thus failed to give an

here, because of the fact that I am not interested in saving the capitalists' wealth. But in the land where the workers rule and own everything, this waste of wealth hurts me." We quote some of his instances : " We had our lubricating oil standing in a can with the lid open. It stood near the emery wheel where the workers grind their tools. Grit from the emery wheel flow into the oil, which was afterwards used to lubricate the machines. Instead of lubricating the bearings, this oil acted as a lapping compound. Surprise was expressed that the machines needed so much repairing. . . . The workers feeding (a costly concrete mixer) use the most primitive method of carrying a few shovel-loads of material on a board with four handles which requires two workers. A wheelbarrow could be used, requiring one worker and holding three or four times as much material per load. . . . As I walk out of my house I see two beams lying in the gutter almost covered with earth . . . a six-inch iron pipe . . . going to waste. . . . All kinds of iron junk rusting away . . . about 20 or 30 pieces of machines that look like small pumps covered with rust. . . . Many piles of scrap metal lying around. . . . All this metal should find its way into a smelting machine. . . . Carelessness in the operation of machines is another form of waste. It is not uncommon to see an auto driver bounce over a hole in the road at full speed, or run up the side of a hill on high gear, or crash his gears when changing them " (*Moscow Daily News*, September 15, 1933).

incentive for the development of the rationalising movement among the broad masses of the working class.”¹

The apparatus for encouraging suggestions of improvements and actual inventions in the USSR is varied and all-pervading. The importance, indeed, the positive social duty, of making suggestions and inventions is part of the teaching of school and college, part also of the special instruction of Pioneers and Comsomols. It is repeatedly insisted on in the speeches of statesmen, in the press, on the radio, and at the cinema. The preparation of the Five-Year Plan, and especially the drawing-up of counter-plans by the workers of particular establishments, is made the occasion of evoking suggestions for improvements literally by thousands.² Occasionally a “month’s drive” for additional suggestions and inventions is proclaimed, when conferences of soviet officials, works representatives, delegates from local inventors’ societies and leading trade unionists report on the volume and character of the workers’ proposals, and on the action to be taken to ensure their respectful consideration.³ A unique congress of “collective farm inventors” specially interested in flax machinery, held in August 1933, was honoured by the presence of a member of the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, who brought with him a letter of encouragement from the president (Kalinin) of the USSR. Kalinin wrote that “the village inventors were destined to equip the collective farmers with technical knowledge, unloose a wave of creative initiative, and stimulate the productive forces of agriculture to an unprecedented degree”.⁴ Approbation is given to proletarian inventors by the trade unions, by factory committees at public meetings, and in the choice of candidates for elective offices. Frequent newspaper paragraphs keep the interest alive by seizing every opportunity to expose any alleged lack of interest by managements or experts in these proletarian suggestions.

¹ *Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 44-45.

² Thus it was reported to the Ninth Trade Union Congress that “The drawing-up of the counter-plan for the Urals-Kusbas Combine was attended by a mighty wave of workers’ initiative, by the spread of socialist competition and shock-brigade work, and by the fulfilment and overfulfilment of industrial plans. Tens of thousands of workers took part in discussions of the plan, in the work of the planning groups at the enterprises, in production conferences, etc.

“Over 5000 rationalisation suggestions were received in response to the special ‘loan of workers’ suggestions’ (issued by the Urals Trade Union Council) and some of these suggestions effected an economy of over one million roubles” (*Ninth Trade Union Congress*, Moscow, 1933, p. 43).

³ At such a conference in May 1933 the chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Union Inventors’ Society (VOIZ) reported that “hundreds of suggestions” made by workers in the various great factories had not yet been considered for adoption. The representative of the AUCUTU “suggested that two or three public trials be conducted in large workers’ centres, bringing bureaucrats and suppressors of rationalisation suggestions before a prosecutor”. This was welcomed by the secretary of TSIK, who said that “methods of persuasion, pressure and force” would be used in future against any intentional holding up of proposals. It was reported that, in the Leningrad district, 138 out of 700 postponed suggestions had now been adopted in the electric apparatus plant alone; whilst at the shoe factory 34 suggestions out of 83 had been put in practice; and at another plant 61 suggestions (*Moscow Daily News*, May 27, 1933).

⁴ *Moscow Daily News*, September 3, 1933.

which the Workers and Peasants' Inspection Commissions are urged to investigate and rectify. The Council of Labour and Defence (STO) has a standing commission (BRIZ), or Bureau of Workers' Inventions, whose sole duty is the stimulation of inventiveness by careful consideration of the workers' suggestions.¹ Also financial encouragement is not lacking. In the aggregate a very large number of small premiums, together with some of considerable magnitude, are awarded annually to those, mostly manual workers, but not altogether excluding scientific technicians and professors, who have made the most valuable suggestions or inventions. These premiums, of the total amount of which we can find no record or estimate, are given by all sorts of organisations, by trade unions and cooperative societies, by sovkhosi and kolkhosi, by trusts and particular enterprises, and occasionally even by People's Commissars of the USSR or of the several republics. It is, perhaps, not the smallest part of the social value of this encouragement of workers' inventiveness that it is not merely a governmental but a mass encouragement, in itself a remarkable feature of the new motivation of production.

Multiformity in Employment

We need hardly refute once more the strange assertion of there being in the USSR, because it is a collectivist state, only a single employer of labour. The case is quite the contrary. The very multiformity to which Soviet Communism is addicted, in the organisation of wealth production and distribution as in other public matters, may be cited, if not as itself a new incentive, at least as a necessary condition of the fullest application of the new incentives that we have described. It is true that, apart from the nomadic tribes, and the surviving five or six millions of independent peasant households, working very largely for self-subsistence, the greater part of the production and distribution of commodities is collectivised and community-owned. But this does not involve anything like uniformity of system or of organisation. There are several hundred USSR trusts and combines, and no one of them is exactly like the others. More diverse still are the thousands of separate enterprises, whether factories or institutes, mines or farms, oil-fields or power stations, which are independently conducted for their peculiar purposes, unassociated with any trust or combine, and responsible to one or other higher authority. There are also village enterprises, rayon (district) enterprises, municipal enterprises, oblast (provincial) enterprises, enterprises of the several

¹ In order to relieve this Bureau of Workers' Inventions, which is overwhelmed by the flood of proposals, it has recently been ordered that, in particular industries, the work should be done by the management. Thus, in the important Donbas area, "brigadiers and chiefs of shafts and of mine administration will in future be responsible for the acceptance, approval and realisation of rationalisation suggestions and inventions" made by coal workers and specialists. This was suggested by the All-Union Inventors' Society (VOIZ) for all industries (Decree of April 8, 1933, of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; *Moscow Daily News*, July 11, 1933).

constituent or autonomous republics, none of them identical in management or organisation with the corresponding enterprises directly subject to the People's Commissars or Sovnarkom of the USSR. The trade unions and factory managements themselves now conduct quite extensive productive enterprises outside their primary occupations, in the shape of farms, dairies, piggeries, etc., for "self-supply". So also do many of the forty-odd-thousand cooperative societies, whose business now far exceeds mere distribution, and those productive undertakings differ markedly in system and organisation one from another. It is among these different employments, all of them separately taking on additional staff, that the individual worker, and notably the boy or girl leaving school, has the utmost possible freedom of choice.

It is a condition alike of the free exercise of this choice of occupation and of the full play of various incentives, that, as we have ourselves found at various parts of the USSR, the thousands of separate employers are actively competing with each other in their search for this or that kind of skilled worker, whilst each is habitually struggling against all the rest for an adequate supply of unskilled and even raw peasant labour. So injurious to production became this competition for workmen among employing agencies that it had to be specifically forbidden by government decree, and superseded by regulated recruiting. Further action had to be taken to check the injurious habit, ingrained in the Russian worker, of wandering from place to place, and from job to job, often on mere rumour that there was a better food supply or more liberal housing accommodation in some other place, at which he could rely on finding an unsatisfied demand for labour. This has indirectly been the incentive to all sorts of local and particular improvements in conditions, from higher standard rates in occupations found to be specially unpopular, and increased expenditure on housing in particular areas from which wandering is found to be more than usually persistent, up to a special provision of clubhouses and cinemas and free allotments for the coal-miners of the Donets Basin, in order to induce them to remain in the employment that they had chosen.

But this is far from completing the picture of multiformity and diversity that the USSR presents. An opening is found for special incentives for those who are individually or jointly their own employers, necessarily differing from those operating on the wage-earners. These incentives are found, in great variety of development, among the manufacturing associations of owner-producers (the incops), into which so many of the ancient handicraftsmen's artels have been grouped. In agriculture an analogous development has merged some twenty million peasant holdings into about a quarter of a million collective farms which, as we have seen, differ indefinitely among themselves in the degree of their collectivisation, from mere joint-tillage, through more or less elaborate artels, up to wholly communised associations whose members share equally in board and lodging as well as in work and product. There is even a survival of isolated individual production, and that not only among the

nomadic tribes and the independent peasantry. The twenty million families in the collective farms nearly all have their own individual garden plots, poultry runs, piggeries, beehives, cowsheds and what not. The Donets Basin coal-miners are not the only industrial workers who cultivate their own allotments. There are, in the wide spaces of the USSR, thousands of hunters and trappers and fishermen, who hunt and fish mainly for the subsistence of their families. There are still tens of thousands of individual handicraftsmen, unassociated in artels or incops, who produce by hand labour more or less artistic commodities of various kinds. Thus, there is an almost endless variety of kinds and methods and systems of production. In short, the characteristic feature of wealth production in the USSR, far from being identity of economic relation or industrial structure, is that of extreme multiformity.

This characteristic of multiformity, which is seen in nearly every department of soviet structure, is not an accidental development. Lenin, in his proposals and forecasts, more than once alludes to this very feature of multiformity as a positive advantage in the socialist community, and specifically as enabling the utilisation of many incentives in evoking the utmost participation by different kinds of individuals. And this conception appears among the soviet leaders of to-day. Shvernik, in his speech to the Ninth Trade Union Congress, quoted Lenin as declaring that "multiformity is a guarantee of vitality. It is a pledge that the single aim will be successfully achieved. The more varied, the better and the richer be the common experience, the truer and greater will be the achievements of socialism, the easier will be the practical work; and only practical work will be able to evolve the best methods and means of struggle."¹

The Practice of Self-Criticism

Nowhere in the world outside the USSR is there such a continuous volume of pitiless criticism of every branch of government, every industrial enterprise and every cultural establishment. This perpetual campaign of exposure, which finds expression in every public utterance of the leading statesmen, in every issue of the press, and in every trade union or cooperative meeting, is not only officially tolerated, but also deliberately instigated, as a powerful incentive to improvement, alike in direction and in execution.² Thus, the public speeches by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and

¹ *Ninth Trade Union Congress*, 1933, p. 30.

² Speaking on Socialist Emulation and Shock Brigades, in his Report to the Party Congress in 1933, Stalin said: "First the Party developed wide *self-criticism* concentrating the attention of the masses on the defects in our work of construction, the defects in our organisation and institutions. As early as the Fifteenth Congress, the necessity of developing self-criticism was proclaimed. The Shalchty case, and the sabotage in various branches of industry, which revealed the lack of revolutionary sensitiveness in individual sections of the Party, on the one hand, and the struggle with the kulaks and the defects in our village organisations which were revealed, on the other, gave a further stimulus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928, the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign of self-criticism, calling upon all forces of the Party and the working class to

other soviet statesmen—in striking contrast with those of British, French or American statesmen—nearly always lead up to a tirade of criticism of some part of soviet administration. They usually begin with a glowing, and, as we may think, an optimistic account of the successful progress of the department or institution under discussion, of its remarkable achievements and of the valuable services of those working in it towards the “Building of the socialist state”. This is rendered all the more alluring by a vision of the dismal failure of capitalism in Europe and America. But invariably the speaker descends presently to an outspoken criticism of the technical shortcomings of the particular enterprise, with a detailed exposure of its partial or temporary failures, and often a scathing denunciation of particular cases of slackness or waste or other inefficiency, and similar criticism is invited from below. Official speakers will often blame conferences and congresses for their failure to criticise their own superior councils and committees, as well as their own officials, for their shortcomings and their failures. Thus Shvernik, the secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, in his concluding speech to the Ninth Trade Union Congress, complains that the congress itself had not criticised the mistakes made by the AUCCTU. “In our work there are still many weak spots, and it would have been quite right for the comrades to have criticised more energetically the work of the AUCCTU, central committees, trade union councils, factory committees, and the lower representative trade union organisations. The basic defect of the discussion was the weakness of the criticism, especially of concrete criticism, which must be particularly emphasised here. We can reorganise ourselves quickly and properly only if our work is accompanied by the severest criticism of our defects. This does not mean that we must engage in self-flagellation. Nothing of the sort. I am speaking of proletarian self-criticism which must attend our work at every step. We are doing a great work; we have a huge army of workers; the work is becoming more and more complicated daily. Our shortcomings and mistakes must be revealed by us more quickly and more fully in order to remove successfully by joint effort all the obstacles impeding our forward movement.”

The newspapers, whether *Pravda*, *Izvestia* or *Trud* on the one hand, or the local and specialist organs on the other, take a similar line in their editorials. But their principal contribution to “self-criticism” is the publication of a perpetual stream of news items, partly from their extensive corps of “village correspondents”, describing particular instances of inefficiency or wrong-doing by managers, officials or manual workers

develop self-criticism ‘from top to bottom and from the bottom to the top’, without respect of person. Condemning the Trotskyist criticism, which came from the other side of the barricades, and was intended to discredit and weaken the Soviet Government, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to be the merciless exposure of the weaknesses in our work in order to *improve* our construction and *strengthen* the Soviet Government. It is well known that the call of the Party aroused the most lively response amongst the masses of the working class and the peasantry” (*Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Competition*, Moscow, 1933, pp. 39-40).

anywhere in the USSR. Sometimes there will be a statement (as in *Pravda* in August 1933) from "a group of Leningrad workmen", appealing to their fellows to get rid of wastage of time now that they enjoy a seven hours' day. "The decisive and important task of the Second Five-Year Plan", the statement continues, "is to increase labour productivity. But we must admit that in this endeavour we have left much undone. We are not utilising our time to a sufficient extent: we often waste working hours because of organisational inefficiencies in production, and also because we fail to hold ourselves to a code of strict labour discipline."¹

These news items are naturally of different degrees of accuracy or authority. Sometimes they are little more than complaints of aggrieved citizens about official incivility or neglect; or about the short supply or inferior quality of commodities. Sometimes they are reports of cases in the local courts of justice, or of proceedings of the local soviets. They afford just the kind of publicity to official shortcomings that is useful as a check on wrong doing and as an incentive to improvement. But, as they leave out of view all the instances in which the officials are working to the public satisfaction, and also the successful achievements of the various institutions and enterprises, they do not present an accurate picture of the administration. They are accordingly misused when they are uncritically made the basis of books attacking the Bolshevik Government. So abundant is this material that whole volumes have been published in foreign capitals by adversaries of Bolshevism, entirely made up of extracts from the "official newspapers", proving, as it is claimed, the complete and hopeless failure of every branch of soviet administration.² The "wall newspapers", which we have described as an institution of every soviet establishment, give local and particular expression to this "self-criticism" in their caricatures, denunciations and jocular references about managers, foremen and workmen. There is similar unbridled expression in the trade union meetings and production conferences.

The soviet faith in the value of "self-criticism" is shown by the publicity often given to the severe animadversions of foreign experts whose professional criticism has been specially invited. What other government would give to the newspapers such a scathing revelation of technical

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 23, 1933.

One of the workers at the Baltic Plant in Leningrad, writing for the same issue of *Pravda*, pleads for a "solid working day". "There was a time", he says, "when I myself as well as all my fellow-workers, strove to kill as much time as possible in a nine or ten hour day... Now, of course, the case is quite different. To kill time on the job at present is equivalent to theft—theft from your own self, from your comrades, and from the entire working class" (*ibid.*).

² See, for instance, *In the Land of Communist Dictatorship*, by A. V. Baikov (1929); and *La Russie nue*, by Panait Istrati (1929), translated as *Russia Unveiled* (1932); as to whose perfidy see *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 333-334. The recipe is easy. The author has only to take a year's file of several soviet newspapers; classify the extracts under a dozen or a score of headings; and describe the array of several hundred breakdowns and offences as a picture of the whole 170 millions of the USSR. What a revelation could be made of the "state of the nation" of Great Britain or the United States by a similar analysis of, say, the popular Sunday newspapers!

incompetence as is contained in the report of an American consulting engineer on the First Factory Building Trust, from which we copy the following extract? "In this trust each project is left to the discretion of the group designated to prepare it. Interchange of complete information with the field engineers is not arranged. The date for completion of the work program is vague. Knowledge of available equipment and material is lacking. Building plans are not obtained in time from the planning trusts. In some cases they are not obtained at all. Plans are not received and studies are begun, and in some cases completed, without accurate information. These studies, the work of weeks of time of several engineers, are then rendered useless. Conditions prevailing at the site are not discovered until elaborate plans for the work are made in ignorance of them. Technical councils held to pass upon these studies do not deserve their name. As many as 20 men are present, none familiar with the project or its detail problems. Economic studies are rarely presented and never investigated or checked. Strength calculations occasionally needed were never demonstrated.

"Actual examples of such disastrously inefficient work are illuminating. At Lubertsy a large lumber storage plant was planned. The construction of the storage platforms was dependent on the length of the timber to be stored. Information on the length of this lumber was never obtained. The storage platforms were designed, wasting thousands of roubles and badly needed material. Several attempts by the consultant to find the lumber lengths were unavailing because of the lack of cooperation from other elements in the trust.

"A large grain distillery and an electric power station are under construction at Efremov. Thousands of cubic metres of excavation have to be dug, transported, and redistributed. A complete plan for elaborate mechanical excavation and loaders was prepared, requiring weeks of time of several engineers. In the end it was discovered that horses and scrapers were available at the site. Only after I had discussed the project with the client's representative was it found that the excavation for the machinery foundation could be made at the same time as that for the building itself, saving considerably in time, cost of labour, and use of equipment.

"Complicated bricks and reinforced concrete design of the electric power station required plans of falsework and scaffolding. By request I developed these plans, and alternate designs were prepared by the trust's design department. One of my most important drawings of the scaffolding was turned over to the head of the department. There it was lost, and could not be found for the technical council. Nevertheless, I explained the methods proposed and they were favourably received by the majority and the client's representative. The latter then informed the council that the job had complete scaffolds built and ready for use!

"A critical factor in the construction schedule of the power station was the relative time of installation of the boilers. If they were to be

placed during erection of the building, special precautions would be required for several critical elements of the work. If they were to be placed after the structure itself was built, the clear space would simplify the work. The department planned all the work on the basis of the former arrangement, with elaborate and uneconomical methods for excavation, concrete transportation and truss erection. I learned from the client's representative that the boilers would be placed later when the building was finished. The expensively prepared work program then had to be discarded as quite useless.

"The grain bins of the distillery building presented a problem in form design for reinforced concrete. More than a month's time was spent by the department in preparing these plans. I was also asked to prepare form designs for this purpose and concreting methods as well. Using original suspended forms, my designs showed a saving of 7000 roubles. These plans were approved by the majority of the technical council present. The Chief Engineer had been absent practically the entire session and had not seen my design nor heard it explained. He rendered a hasty opinion that the design required skilled labour, which made it undesirable. The superficiality of this judgment was visible by one glance at the two methods, the department's being very much more complicated and difficult than mine. But it was then discovered that no steel and cement were available for the bins at all and that they would have to be built of wood. Thus the entire month's work was wasted."¹

In this reliance on "self-criticism", the governing order (the Communist Party) does not spare its own members. These are, indeed, all subjected periodically to a peculiar and very effective form of "self-criticism", which forms the basis of the periodical examination or "chistka" that we have already described.² It is a fundamental condition of the Communist Party, which takes upon itself the function of public leadership, that its members should be held to a higher standard of personal conduct than is expected from the ordinary citizen. It is very largely by the instrument of self-criticism at the periodical purging of the Order, that this high standard is maintained. Every member (apart from the Politbureau of fewer than a dozen), from the highest to the lowest, has to stand up in open meeting, before the appointed commission of three or five well-tried members of long standing, together with a crowd of members and non-members alike, and make a full confession of his own failures and short-comings as a worker for Communism. He is required to recite the principal circumstances of his life, to describe the work that he has done for the cause, and what he is now doing; and to state frankly and faithfully where he feels that he has fallen short. Then he has to answer the questions, often of a critical and even incriminating character concerning his public and private conduct, whether put by the commission, or by his fellow-members or colleagues, or by anyone in the meeting,

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, November 15, 1932.

² Chapter V. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership", pp. 290-300.

which is open to the public, and may be reported in the press. The commissioners then have to decide, subject to appeal to a higher tribunal, whether the person under examination is worthy to be continued as a member, or whether he should be reprimanded and suspended for a term, or reduced to the lower grade of candidate or sympathiser, or altogether expelled from the Party.¹

Universal Measurement

At this point there must be emphasised an indispensable requisite, of far-reaching social importance, for the smooth working and the continued success of the various incentives to production that Soviet Communism substitutes for the making of pecuniary profit by the individual entrepreneur. To the experienced administrator it needs no demonstration that upon the practice of coercion and terrorism, as the principal factor, no efficient production can be established. Nor can it be maintained on wages alone. Apart from the tiny minority of moral geniuses, men and women require, for long-continued efforts and sacrifices, something more than mere subsistence. Except in moments of exaltation, they need assurance that their work is worth while. One of the ways in which this assurance can be given to them is the recognition, by their fellow-workers and neighbours, of their disinterested service. This is the social justification of the award of honours, to which we have already alluded. Public honours, however, can only usefully be bestowed upon the best and most devoted workers. For the mass of men and women something can be done by systematic record of what they are individually producing. All this involves, as one of the corner-stones of socialist construction, an all-embracing system of measurement.

It will be seen that many of the incentives that we have described in this chapter themselves require systematic measurement and publicity. To take first the most elementary example, all systems of remuneration by piece-work rates require the continuous accurate measurement, preferably by disinterested persons, of the amount of each worker's output. The success of socialist emulation similarly depends on accurate and impartial measurement of the achievements of the several competitors. The beneficial influence on the mass of workers of the performances of shock brigades and cost-accounting brigades—perhaps even the continued self-satisfaction of their own members—is absolutely dependent on the

¹ The student will recall the analogous proceedings of some of the religious orders from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. But their self-criticism and public examinations related only to their observance of the rites and performance of the duties required by the Deity and the Church.

In the peculiar communistic community of Oneida (New York State) in the nineteenth century, outspoken criticism of life and conduct, by all the members in meeting assembled, of each of them in turn, was a regular instrument of discipline and training. But no non-members were allowed to criticise, or to be present; and the member under criticism, far from being expected to confess, was not permitted to speak (*History of American Socialisms*, by J. H. Noyes; Philadelphia, 1870).

exact and detailed recording of their results, and on the publicity accorded to them. Any successful application of the principle of "Payment according to Social Value" must necessarily be based on statistical demonstrations of the need for additional workers of particular kinds in order to achieve some social end. The effect of any grading of wages must equally be checked by statistics, in order to justify any change, or to warrant the continuance of the grading, or its adoption elsewhere. Even the allocation, by the Soviet Government, of labour force and raw materials to the construction of new capital works, rather than to the production in greater quantity of commodities for immediate consumption, demands considerable statistical measurement, and accurate comparison between the estimated costs of rival enterprises, if a reasonable decision between competing uses for the available capital resources is to be arrived at. The capitalist profit-maker, especially the entrepreneur on a small scale, may choose to dispense with measurement and to ignore statistics, content only with the net result in his profit and loss account. The small retail shopkeeper may even keep no accounts at all; although that way bankruptcy lies, even if he is content when there is money left in the till after he has paid for his stock and all his current expenses, and fed his family out of it.

It is interesting to trace, in the USSR, the gradual realisation of the importance of precise and accurate statistics of the working of every part of the social structure. The statistical apparatus of the USSR has, in fact, during the past decade, become far and away the most extensive and the most comprehensive in the world. So vast are its operations, in the immense area with which it is concerned, that, whilst much has to be left unprinted, the mere volume of the statistics periodically published appears to exceed that of the British Empire or the United States. And it is constantly increasing in magnitude and minuteness. In a recent speech by Molotov, the president of the USSR Sovnarkom, he emphasised the importance of developing, what few governments have yet seriously undertaken, namely, universal "cost accounting" in every corporate undertaking.¹ "The work of our economic organisations", he reminded the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party, "develops in accordance with the national economic plan. On this basis, agreements are concluded between them at prices fixed by the state. At the same time, the Party demands the inculcation of cost accounting in economic practice—cost

¹ It may not be necessary or desirable, where the capital outlay is found from the nation's income, rather than from loans bearing interest, to debit the working account of each capital enterprise with the interest on its cost. But the omission so to debit each capital undertaking with the interest on its cost, deprives the government of a useful index of its economic net advantage relative to that of other capital undertakings. For this reason the British Cooperative Movement, especially in the vast enterprises of the English and Scottish Wholesale Societies, has rigidly adhered to the practice of actually charging each separate business undertaking with the full interest on its capital cost, even if this has been entirely found out of income, in order that the directors and members may have always before them this useful guide as to the relative profitability of the several undertakings. The Soviet Government, whilst not troubling about the original

accounting, the enforcement of which should bring about greater initiative and a certain independence of the economic organisations, defining at the same time their exact responsibility for the fulfilment of the state tasks in accordance with agreements. Not every economic organisation succeeds at once in correctly carrying out these tasks as a whole. It often happens that cost accounting is reduced to mere formality with references to existing plans and contracts, while in practice the economic organisations sink to the level of merely employing methods of office work. On the other hand, sometimes cost accounting is interpreted too 'freely'. . . . Indeed, is it not a fact that we have cases in which those who direct trusts, cooperative organisations, factories, or soviet farms, sell their produce more profitably, upsetting the fixed prices, and fail to meet their obligations to the state, taking in reality the unclean path of speculation? And yet, the plan and the agreements and cost accounting, all of these are elements of Bolshevik economic policy, the realisation of which demands, of course, a Bolshevik attitude."¹

The Improvement in Accounting

The trend towards more complete and more specific statistical accounting in the USSR—in supplement of all that has already been achieved—was described five years ago by a German critic. Herr Feiling in 1930 pointed out that "The whole organisation is making strenuous efforts, within the limits of the centralised, monopolistic, industrial and trading constitution, to provide opportunities for checking and comparing the returns of all the business establishments, and by means of the data thus supplied to assess the returns from any particular concern; exactly as in the case of private enterprise, which is here faithfully copied. The trusts, and individual concerns inside the larger trusts, prepare and publish balance-sheets just like joint-stock companies. The capital for which they are responsible has, since the currency reform, been approximately ascertained for the first time, despite the expropriation without compensation of the previous owners, and the amounts transferred to the individual concerns by the state or arising from their own reserve funds are likewise added to this responsible capital. To ensure clarity in the balance-sheet, and to facilitate the comparison of results, no use is made of the opportunity which presents itself of treating as written-off the new capital

capital costs of undertakings dating from pre-war days, which may fairly be held to have been long since written-off as depreciation, now holds each economic enterprise responsible for all new or additional capital invested in its undertakings, and for actual repayment of loans, and payment of bank interest, with a system of accounting of great strictness and complexity. (See the detailed article on "Industry and Accounting in the USSR", by V. A. Diakonov, in *Harvard Business Review*, for January 1933.)

A calculus of this kind is, of course, inapplicable where the object and purpose of the enterprise is to produce something pecuniarily "invaluable", and even immeasurable quantitatively; such as the health and pleasure for which a park is provided; or the education given by a school or college; or the national security afforded by an adequately mechanised defensive force.

¹ *From the First to the Second Five-Year Plan* (Moscow, 1933), p. 120.

created by taxes or by prices. An ordinary profit and loss account, as with private undertakings, is also prescribed. No provision is made for bad debts, for writing down doubtful assets, or for interest upon the credits to which the business has resorted, and which are, in fact, often granted free of interest. The profit realised, however, is distributed according to a uniform scale: 10 per cent is straightaway allocated to income tax and 3 per cent to the support of technical education. Of the balance, 10 per cent is assigned to a fund for improving the situation of the works, especially in respect of housing, 10 per cent is placed to reserve, and a similar amount to a further special fund; whilst 52 per cent serves for the expansion of industry, that is, for the expansion in various ways of the special branch of industry to which the concern in question belongs. The remaining 40 to 45 per cent, after contributions to funds for scholarships, profit-sharing, bonuses, etc., goes as the real dividend to the revenue authority, which for its part spends it within the limits of the budget upon the maintenance of industry generally. Thus, in the distribution of profits, there is revealed a characteristic division between the interests of the individual concern, the individual branch of business, and the economic system as a whole."¹

But it is not only for the purpose of avoiding eventual bankruptcy, or even for that of getting the best out of the working population, that a socialist community must, perforce, have the most scientific system of accounting, and notably one more searching, more candid and more public than that with which the capitalist system contents itself. There is, in our opinion, another and an even more important reason why a socialist community may be expected to base all its operations of wealth production and distribution upon the corner-stone of the principle of what we have called "measurement and publicity". The adoption of this principle in all industry affords, as we see the matter, the only safe means of dispensing with the personal exercise of authority by one man over another — by the manager over all the factory personnel, by the foreman over his gang, by the inspector over the enterprises that he inspects. It is this personal exercise of authority that is everywhere resented by those subjected to it. When the criticism or blame is suggested or implied by statistics impartially arrived at upon objective measurement, presented by trained experts *unconnected with the persons actually wielding power over others*, there may be annoyance, but there is no room for resentment. We may take as an example the independent audit of cash accounts and balances which has, within the past hundred years, become almost universal in Great Britain. The independent auditor exercises no authority. He comes in; scrutinises the accounts; makes his report, and then departs. He blames no one; he reprimands no one; he dismisses no one; he merely states the facts. We foresee a time when the technical inspector will be an equally independent expert. We can imagine a

¹ *The Experiment of Bolshevism*, by Arthur Feiling (English edition, 1930), pp. 105-106.

standing commission of independent statisticians and technicians called in to report successively on the working and results of each large enterprise in turn, merely for the information of the government and the public. When the report is made, the directors and managers of the enterprise, together with the factory committees and the meetings of trade union members, the managements of other enterprises of the same kind, and even the other government departments, would be invited, *before any publicity was given to the report*, to make their own observations upon it, including the considerations which the investigating commission may be thought to have overlooked, and not at all excluding the further explanations that might show that substantial errors had been made. The reforms that the independent expert report had shown to be necessary could then be determined on by the appropriate superior authority, with the general support of public opinion, and (because they would be divorced from any exercise of personal authority) with the least possible resentment or obstruction on the part of those who might think themselves aggrieved by the decision.¹ To this advantage we recur in our Chapter XII., "The Good Life".

Communist Shortcomings and Achievements

What are we to think of this extensive array of incentives, old and new, which Soviet Communism substitutes for the motive of profit-making on which the capitalist world relies for the direction of industry?

The Wasteful Costs of Inexperience

One shrewd friend, to whom the draft of this chapter was submitted, was led to ask why, with so potent a set of incentives to efficiency, the industrial enterprises in the USSR, in comparison with those of western Europe and the United States, still presented so general a picture of inefficiency? The same question had already occurred to the present writers. The first answer is found in the unprecedented low level of industrial aptitude in the mass of the population of the USSR, out of which the new industrial community had to be constructed—their illiteracy, their lack of acquaintance with machinery of any kind, their habitual unpunctuality and irregularity, the dirt and squalor in which they lived, with the consequent frequency of disease and disablement, their addiction to drunkenness and sloth, and many other characteristics incompatible with any high degree of organisation and of any continuous industrial efficiency.² In fact, a diplomatist of long experience among the peoples of eastern Europe confidently declared, on the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, that it was absolutely impossible to make.

¹ We may refer to *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, by S. and B. Webb, 1920, pp. 186-187, 195-199, 239, 269, 272, 286, 309, 328, 356.

² To cite only one authority for this adverse judgment, out of the many that might be given, see *Russian Characteristics*, by E. B. Lanin (Dr. E. J. Dillon), 1890, which we cite in Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

out of the peasants of the Russian steppe, any large-scale organisation of industry at all, and that to get out of such a mass anything like efficiency, even in a whole generation, was simply out of the question. It stands, we think, actually to the credit of the soviet system that, with something like twenty million raw peasants drawn into mass production on the largest scale, there has been attained, in a single decade, even a moderate degree of average efficiency; and that there should have already emerged a very satisfactory proportion of highly skilled mechanics and machine operators.

To the present writers it seems that the industrial shortcomings of the Soviet Union are to be seen, less in the work of the individual operative than in the manner in which his labour is coordinated and directed in mass production. It happened, quite accidentally, that the first great industrial enterprise in the USSR that was visited by the present writers was the Molotov automobile factory at what was then Nizhni-Novgorod, which has since been named after the favourite soviet author Gorki. After a widely advertised opening of the factory on May 1, 1932, the whole enterprise obstinately stuck! The huge buildings, copied from Ford's works at Detroit, were filled with expensive machinery. Tens of thousands of workmen had been collected and placed upon the pay-roll. But the "conveyor"—the long belt on which the automobiles were to be assembled and from which they were to drop off, completed, at the rate of one every five or ten minutes—refused to move. This was due to no inefficiency among the thousands of workers. The belt on which it rested had, in various places, sagged owing to insecure foundations. The pretentious buildings of concrete and glass were open to the blasts of wind blowing loose sand into the machinery. And even if the conveyor could be made to move, there was nothing like a complete stock of the varied series of components which had to be successively affixed one by one, as the great belt passed along. Yet without the presence, all day long, of every one of these components no single automobile could be completed. After a whole morning's inspection of the mess and muddle, and a tireless cross-examination of the officials, from the director and the local Party secretary, down to the humblest English or American mechanic who could be found, it was impossible to avoid the impression that the case was hopeless. No wonder the Riga correspondent of *The Times* reported that the works would never be reopened, and that the whole enterprise, in which many millions of dollars had been sunk, would have to be abandoned!

A fortnight later the present writers were at Stalingrad, going over the great factory of tractors, which had been opened two years before. It was instructive to learn that it had had much the same experience as the Molotov factory at Gorki. After the official opening, the machinery stuck! Everything seemed to be wrong. But the enterprise was not abandoned. Months ensued before even one tractor could be satisfactorily completed. A full year elapsed before such tractors as were delivered could be regarded as anywhere near the standard of quality of the imported

article. Yet within two years of patient readjustment at Stalingrad, 114 efficient tractors were dropping off the conveyor every twenty-four hours. It was therefore not surprising to learn subsequently that the Gorki factory was working equally well, and that by the end of 1934 it had actually delivered 85,000 motor cars and motor lorries.

Less than two years later than at Gorki, a corresponding great factory for producing similar vehicles was opened at Kharkov. By this time the lesson had been learnt. The equipment and organisation of the Kharkov factory was made completely ready before the start was made. With no better workmen than those at Stalingrad and Gorki the conveyor worked from the beginning, and some tractors were finished on the opening day. Presently the output rose to a steady average of several hundreds per day, the number varying according to the degree of complication of the machines called for.

A similar lesson was enforced in the vast constructions now working at the new city of Magnitogorsk. More than one serious explosion, or other fatal accident, occurred during the first year of operation, due to the failure to prevent the mishandling of dangerous machines by inexperienced young workmen. These fatalities, essentially the result of bad organisation of labour known to be wholly untrained, involved heavy repair and replacement costs. But the experience was not wasted; and Magnitogorsk is already (1935) regularly turning out, without accident or other check, a satisfactory output.

The Bolshevik authorities are fully aware that the inefficiency with which nearly all their industrial enterprises start, and the length of time taken to remedy patent deficiencies, is economically wasteful, and excessively costly. Stalin himself has publicly described both the soviet authorities' blunders and their difficulties. "We were", he said, "faced with the dilemma: either to begin by teaching people in technical schools; and to postpone for ten years the production and mass exploitation of machines, while technically literate cadres would be trained in schools; or to proceed immediately with the creation of machines and to develop their mass exploitation in the national economy, so as to teach people technique; [and] prepare cadres in the very process of production and exploitation of machines. We chose the second course. We openly and deliberately agreed to the inevitable costs and extra expenditures involved in the shortage of technically prepared people capable of handling machines. True, no small number of machines was smashed during this time. But to make up for this we have gained what is most precious—time—and have created what is most valuable in economy—cadres. In three to four years we created cadres of technically literate people, both in the field of production of various machines (tractors, automobiles, tanks, airplanes, and so on), and in the field of their mass exploitation. What was accomplished in Europe in the course of decades, we succeeded in accomplishing, roughly and in the main, in the course of three to four years. The costs and extra expenses, the breakage of machines and other losses, have been more than

compensated. . . . Men must be grown as carefully and attentively as a gardener grows a favourite fruit tree. To educate, to help grow, to offer a prospect, to promote in time, to transfer in time to another position if the man does not manage his work, without waiting for him to fail completely; carefully to grow and train people; correctly to distribute and organise them in production; to organise wages so that they would strengthen the decisive links of production and prompt people on to higher skill—this is what we need in order to create a large army of industrial-technical cadres.”¹

The Inefficiency caused by Overlapping of Control

There is, however, a more serious shortcoming in soviet industrial organisation, even when an enterprise gets fairly started, and when those concerned have acquired some technical experience. The very multiformity that is otherwise so useful in the Soviet Union, often results in a wasteful disunity in direction, with noise and confusion in the workshops, much chattering and arguing, and sometimes repeating or undoing what has already been done. We insert a vivacious and lifelike description of a conversation in a railway train, in which these shortcomings of soviet industrial administration are commented on. This is taken from what is avowedly a work of fiction, not in itself evidence. But the present writers have several times heard much the same criticism from German engineers returning from the USSR.

“You have begun to do a great many things and to talk a great deal about the things you do,” said the foreign specialist. “But we’ve been doing the same things very well for a very long time now, and we say nothing about them; we can’t spare the time. . . . You collect people in different places so that they can do things, and then what happens? Then everybody begins to hinder these poor people, to get in their way, and annoy them—and this happens in every single case. . . . The place where work is going on is the front, say. The people who are working are soldiers, for the time being, soldiers. The superintendent of the works is the commander, for the time being. The first question is—now that you have collected people together—how to give them good forage, good food, otherwise they will not be able to do the maximum of work. And what did I see? Inspection of cooperatives was going on everywhere, because all the cooperatives were short in their accounts. Obviously it would be better to do things well at first, and well afterwards, instead of doing them badly at first and then having to have a general investigation afterwards. The second question is, whom are the people to obey? Where there are many masters there is no master. One poor worker does the work, and over him there are eight or nine or even ten commanders: the engineer, the director, the workers’ committee, the secretary of the Party local, the workers’ control, the workers’ inspection, the factory inspector, the district

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 29, 1934.

executive committee, the workers' press, visitors—and then the worker himself wants to be a commander and reports people to the Ogpu, and shouts and tries to make himself bigger than he is. One frightens another ; he frightens the next man ; work goes first this way and then that way ; everything goes wrong, and much more time and strength and money is spent than is necessary. I've seen this ; I've heard it myself. There is one very good rule that says : If you want to command, you must first learn to obey. But here everyone wants to command and no one wants to obey.”¹

The reply made to this scathing criticism in the course of the same conversation in the train is, we think, illuminating. “ You have said that we were uneconomical, and we were very wasteful in our attitude towards people and in the employment of their strength. . . . Some very eloquent facts have been produced showing how anyone who isn't too lazy can visit a works and hinder people from working. He called the visitors—very aptly—tourists. But this is really a very new principle—the principle of general education. We lose, it is true, in one way, but we gain in another. These millions of molecules that have been raised and heated by us cannot study in schools. No Commissariat of Education could possibly cope with them. The Commissariat of Education has a huge budget, but even this is painfully small in comparison with our requirements. Now there is an extra expense—the education and enlightenment of the masses. We teach these masses by this system of free tourist excursions, and we ourselves are always learning from them, from their presence, their criticism, their demands. You say we are doing things that Europe does better, cheaper, cleaner and quicker than us. Yes, Europe is making things—but *we are by no means merely making things* ! That's the whole point, and that's what you don't see ; therein lies the new principle, therein lies the explanation ! ”

“ Not doing things ? Then what is it you're doing ? ”

“ We're doing planned things, my dear sir ! See the difference. It's a tremendous difference. In every factory, every new construction that you visit, you can see things being done or worked out—plus a new society, plus the trade union, plus the training of adolescents, plus club work, plus production meetings, plus control, plus calculations, plus plan ! The thing plus plan comes from above, the thing plus control—that's from below. It seems to you that there are scores of masters here. You're mistaken ; there are scores of factors, not masters. And the expansion of every single factor at the cost of another is part of a struggle for measures, for a system, a struggle for a new society. If when we examine a given segment, we discover an extra shoot which has entered a circle where it doesn't belong, this shoot is the extra expense for education. Thanks to this we are building up a new mechanism, making a new source of power available, setting up new landmarks. That is the new principle

¹ “ Heard in the Train ”, from the novel *Hydrocentral*, by M. Shaginyan (Moscow, 1934).

that you sought and did not find—an economic system minus private owners! It isn't that we have scores of masters, but scores of factors and people who represent them. An attractive world, and you visited it and did not notice this!"

Where are the Captains of Industry?

The incentives "in place of profit" described in the foregoing pages, whether old ones remodelled, or new ones made practicable by planned production for community consumption, cannot, in themselves, produce a body of "captains of industry" able to supply the best possible organisation of the masses of operatives which is required in production on a large scale. Unlike the motive of making profit, the soviet incentives act upon the entire mass of those engaged in the work. No participant altogether escapes their influence. Accordingly, these incentives, whilst they may momentarily exalt this or that hero of industry, create no separate class in the community. Moreover, though these stimuli usually bring some tangible additions to personal income, and increased creature comforts, they do not lead to the accumulation of private fortunes. They create, in industry, nothing like a virtual governing body of self-made millionaires, passing into an hereditary upper stratum of wealthy families.

It may be said that, just for this reason, the whole array of soviet incentives, whilst it may stimulate universal industry and vastly increase the productivity of labour, fails to evoke the industrial leadership which, in other countries, is assumed to be the function of the capitalist entrepreneur or director, the improving landowner or stockbreeder, or the company promoter or financial magnate. This comment is largely justified. For leadership in industry, as in all public affairs, Soviet Communism relies, as a substitute for a capitalist class, not on the incentives that we have analysed, but on the peculiar Order that we have described in our chapter on "The Vocation of Leadership",¹ namely the Communist Party, together with its probationers called candidates, and its junior branch of Comsomols. These extensive organisations, under their self-denying ordinance of individual poverty and implicit obedience to their own corporations, have assumed the leadership of the community, to the well-being of which they undertake to devote their lives. It is they who, as a corporate body, formulate industrial, as all other policy, and decide both the General Plan and its execution in thousands of productive enterprises. It is one moiety of them who individually fill nearly all the directing and managerial positions, whether these are reached by election from below, or by appointment from above. It is the other moiety of them, as individual wage-earners continuing to work at the bench or at the forge, on the farm or in the mine, whose personal character and public judgments insensibly direct the mass of fellow workers among whom they live. It is very largely they who man

¹ Chapter V. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership", pp. 262-323.

the shock brigades that set the pace; they who are elected to trade union offices; they who constitute the "activists" by whom the whole mass is set in motion. What are the incentives, "in place of profit", that spur the membership of this self-selected vocational Order to the zealous performance of their function of leadership, in which they show a devotion certainly not less than that of the capitalists of the western world? We can only repeat our survey of the diversity of motives by which they are moved. There is the pleasure, or the persistent glow of satisfaction, which every person of ability and character feels in the successful exercise of his vocation; none the less when this vocation is obviously and directly exercised in the service of the community than when it is in pursuit of his own wealth, or, as we may add, in the expression of his own personality in art, or in the promotion of his chosen branch of science. Scarcely distinguishable from this is the sense of achievement, which some may call the sense of success or the sense of power, in directing or influencing the actions of others. Further, the sustained emphasis on the application of science to every problem of society which, as we shall describe in a subsequent chapter,¹ is implicit in Marxism, is a perpetually recurring stimulus to intellectual curiosity and invention. Nor can we doubt—though communists vehemently disclaim it—that we have here something analogous to the feeling of the devotees of the old religions, who are irresistibly impelled to the performance of duty by influences which non-believers find unintelligible or merely mystical.

But there is a further factor in the maintenance of a high level of character, ability and zeal of this vocational Order. As we have described elsewhere, its entire membership is not only constantly watched from the centre, but also subjected, every three or four years, to a drastic purging, by which something like 20 or 30 per cent of the members are actually expelled from the Order, or relegated to the lower degree of candidates or sympathisers. Every member has thus to stand his trial; make confession of his shortcomings, in private life as well as in public office; and answer the accusations that will be publicly brought against him. This is not merely a deterrent to weaklings or wrongdoers. It has a great effect in keeping the whole Order always up to the mark, by continual elimination of those falling below its standard.

This leadership in Soviet Communism differs essentially, in two all-important features, from that of the capitalist class in western nations. Its constant and deliberate purpose is not the enrichment of any individual, any family or any social class—not even the non-pecuniary advantage of individual, family or class—but exclusively the lasting benefit of the community as a whole. And the policy, which from time to time it adopts and puts in operation with a view to securing the advantage of the whole community, is always one in which the entire Order, unlike any capitalist class, works together in unison to achieve the common end.

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind", pp. 761-817.

The Substitute for Profit-making

It is in the intimate combination of the array of incentives which Soviet Communism has known how to employ, and the peculiar organisation by which leadership is provided—and not in the one without the other—that we find the working substitute both for the profit-making motive and for the class of capitalist directors of industry, neither of which is allowed in the USSR. What can be said of the results of this substitution? Leaving aside any demonstration by statistics, which few people find convincing, we suggest that Soviet Communism has to its credit the undeniable economic and industrial recovery and advance of the USSR since 1921. From the lowest depths to which the country was reduced, after the Civil War and the Great Famine of 1921, the transformation in every branch of social life is unmistakable. This in itself affords no evidence that the recovery and advance have been actually caused by the new motivation or by the new leadership. It might conceivably have taken place in spite of them. But it is conclusive proof that the new leadership and the new motivation have not been incompatible with the recovery and the advance. The Bolshevik experiment has, in the course of the past decade, demonstrated beyond all denial that neither the incentive of profit-making nor the existence of a capitalist class as the leaders and directors of industry is indispensable to wealth production on a colossal scale, or to its continuous increase. Such a result is worth consideration in detail.

Continuous Initiative and Risk-taking

There are two necessary conditions of advancing wealth-production which the western economists have continued to regard as belonging exclusively to a régime of the pursuit of individual riches, under the direction of a relatively wealthy capitalist class. Under any other system, it was argued, and notably under any form of government ownership of industry, there could be no courageous initiative, and no venturesome incurring of risk in new developments. Without a wealthy class, in receipt of incomes substantially in excess of the capacity to consume, there could be, it was said, no such accumulation of capital as would permit of great new enterprises yielding only distant, and therefore necessarily uncertain, returns. Both these economic assumptions have been, we suggest, conclusively disproved by the past fifteen years of USSR history. Far from showing any lack of initiative, in great matters or in small; far from any refusal to incur risks in new developments, Soviet Communism has proved to be, in all fields, almost wildly initiating. It has shown itself adventurous even to a fault in incurring risks. It has gone to the limit in sacrificing the present to the future. It has been experimenting restlessly, if not recklessly, in new developments in all directions. No student of the USSR can fail to be impressed by what

seems to be even excess in the desire for change and in the spirit of adventure, in industry, in science, in various forms of art and in social institutions, as compared even with the United States.

With regard to the rate of creation of new capital by means of saving out of income, Soviet Communism has, in the past decade, left all the world behind. Most capitalist countries are content to "save"—that is, divert to capital investment what might otherwise be immediately consumed in commodities and services—2 or 3 per cent of the total national income. Great Britain, at its wealthiest time, just before the Great War, was saving as much as 9 or 10 per cent of the total national income. But the Soviet Union, during most of the years since 1927, has "saved" from the national income, and invested in new enterprises, and in works and machinery of the nature of capital, at least 20 per cent, and sometimes as much as 30 per cent, of the total national income. In fact, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the amount of "saving" (meaning allocation to capital investments instead of immediate consumption) has kept pace with the intellectual initiative.

This is not to assert that Soviet Communism, within little more than a decade, has yet succeeded in raising the standard of life of its 170 millions of people from the appallingly low level of 1921 (to say nothing of the unplumbed depths of tsarist poverty) to anything like the normal standard, *when in employment*, of the British or the American, the Swiss or the Scandinavian people. What can be said with some confidence is that there is nothing in Soviet Communism to warrant the assumption that a communist nation must always remain below the level of any capitalist community in the world. Yet, at the present time, there is, in the USSR, undoubtedly a relatively low level of industrial efficiency compared with the best that the United States and Great Britain can show. In particular there is an unevenness of achievement, and not a few breakdowns in administration, which make it useful to analyse further the various participants in production.

An Analysis of the Producers

We may divide the economic and political organisation of any society into three sections or layers, according to the character of their respective functions. The smallest in magnitude of these three sections, and some would say the most important, is that on which falls the task and the burden of intellectual leadership, whether in economic production, in national policy, or in cultural developments. The largest in magnitude, to which it has been part of the cult of Marxism to attribute the greatest importance, is that of the mass of workers whose life is spent in manual labour. Intermediate between these two sections there is a third; an extensive and heterogeneous class, somewhat analogous to the non-commissioned officers, and to the staffs at the base or depot of a modern army; or to the mass of routine clerical workers in the national and

municipal offices. This intermediate category includes all sorts of subordinate deputy managers and routine executants; foremen and inspectors; secretaries,¹ clerks and shop assistants; and men and women in sole charge of minor posts or distant offices. They are alike in no other feature than that of not being manual-working producers, and yet not being burdened with responsibility for policy, or required to come to any decision as to what should be the end or purpose of the particular function entrusted to them.

Now, it is part of the peculiarity of Soviet Communism that these three sections or layers in the USSR do not to-day constitute distinct social classes, and least of all, hereditary classes. Whatever differences there may be in personal or family incomes—and such differences are far less than in any other country—these differences do not correspond with differences in heritage, rank, education, manners, or habits of life, or even with the particular functions which the individuals fulfil. It is nevertheless possible, we venture to suggest, to compare, with substantial general accuracy, the degree of success with which, in the USSR, each of the three sections or layers as a whole, exercises the social function ascribed to it.

The first-named section or layer, that of the intellectual leaders of the community in policy and direction, appears to us, as a whole, to have shown consummate ability and a devotion beyond all praise. In both respects it is certainly not inferior to that of the corresponding group of persons in any other country, either in initiative and courage, in economic or social policy, in the utilisation of the knowledge of expert specialists or in the direction and supreme management of the nation's production and social life.² In all these respects, we venture to say, the soviet statesmen are markedly superior to the common run of business men in England or America, intent on their narrow aim of making profit.

The largest section or layer, that of the mass of the workers, mostly recruited very recently from the peasantry, has reached, in a short time,

¹ Sometimes it is irresponsibility of the enormous number of secretaries that is complained of. Thus a novelist remarks of the present day: "I must say, by the way, that secretaries are the crying evil of our soviet existence. Enormous power is centred in their hands, since they are the nearest intermediaries between the executives and the population, and are at the same time never held responsible for their actions. They are the 'responsible irresponsibles' or those irreplaceable people who cause to groan both the government and the unfortunate public" (*Semi-Precious Stones*, by A. I. Voinova, London, 1934, p. 358).

² It is, we think, of distinct advantage that none of these leaders in the USSR can be distracted from his work of leadership by great personal possessions in the form of luxurious mansions or steam yachts, or by conspicuous expenditure on amusements or travel. The very concentration of their energies may encourage gigantic projects. This has been suggested in a clever novel: "I knew that, in spite of the most severe sobriety of our epoch, and perhaps because of the complete absence of anything fantastic in our life, one could in our country attain the confirmation of some fancifully magical plan far more quickly and painlessly than the confirmation of, say, some small, ordinary project, conceived to cover the most crying needs of our industry." "Yes", I thought, crossing streets and going out of one crooked alley into another, "we are accustomed to thinking on a large scale, in the plane of eternal, not temporary problems, and the swing of our life requires something gigantic. All else seems boring and tasteless!" (*Semi-Precious Stones*, by A. I. Voinova, London, 1934, p. 405).

considering the low level from which it started, a creditable degree of mechanical skill and factory discipline, though, for the most part, still falling short of that of the most highly skilled workers of the most advanced capitalist countries. This shortcoming, is, however, more than compensated for by the intense enthusiasm for production which Soviet Communism has known how to inspire in them. In no other country does the mass of the manual workers throw so much energy into an actual increase of the output of industry. In no other country has trade unionism achieved so much in improving the processes of industry, diminishing waste of time or material, speeding up labour, and generally increasing the net productivity of each enterprise. We know of no working class, in any of the countries in which there has been no such elimination of the capitalist employer, that, taken as a whole, cooperates so cordially and so strenuously in wealth production as the industrial wage-earners of the USSR.

It is with what we have called the intermediate section or layer that Soviet Communism has so far achieved the least success. We venture the judgment that, taken as a whole, this section falls considerably below, in honesty and efficiency, both the leaders above and the mass of the wage-earners underneath. This is what is sometimes expressed by the criticism that, in the USSR the policy, the project or the plan is always superior to the execution of it. The subordinate officials such as the inspectors, the rate-fixers and the foremen; the clerks and shop assistants; the chairmen of local soviets and the directors and book-keepers of collective farms; the station-masters, train conductors and other leading transport workers; the men and women in charge of small posts or distant offices—taken as a whole, and with many honourable exceptions—have not yet acquired the habits of punctuality, honesty, regularity, exactness and, above all, absolute fidelity to the trust necessarily placed in them, upon which the most successful administration depends. This is not a new complaint about the countries east of the Vistula. We believe that those who knew the Russia of twenty years ago recognise an improvement in these respects. Much may be hoped for when the children now at school have taken the places of their parents. But at present the human links between the policy-makers and the primary workers are, as a whole, inferior in loyalty and efficiency both to the leaders and to the industrial wage-earners, and far behind those of Great Britain; and it is to this deficiency that the patent defects of soviet administration are very largely to be attributed.

We trace the continued shortcomings of this intermediate class to the failure of the soviet incentives to reach the particular occupations by which the whole class earns its living. To take certain cases as illustrative, the work of the salesman in a government retail shop or a co-operative store, or that of the station-master of a provincial railway depot, cannot easily be put on a piece-work basis. It cannot well come under the influence of "socialist competition", or be made the subject either of

public honour or of public shame. There is even a great difficulty in bringing such occupations within the sphere of stock-taking and audit. Their work cannot be accurately measured, and without exact measurement it cannot be made the subject of useful publicity. Inspection is a clumsy instrument, and one particularly difficult to use in so vast an area as the USSR. Moreover, in order to prevent collusion, who is to inspect the work of the inspectors? It may be said, too, that there has been an indisposition on the part of the members of the Communist Party, and of the Comsomols, to enlist in many of the occupations comprised in this intermediate section or layer. The enthusiastic young communist will throw himself vigorously into the manual labour of making things. He or she will go down into the mine, or voluntarily spend arduous days completing the new Moscow underground railway. Male and female alike will, with equal enthusiasm, undertake a special mission involving hardship or danger. They will be happy and zealous in commanding even the smallest detachment on any service whatsoever. But they dislike the function of trading, and the handling of goods, even when it is designated the social service of the distribution of commodities. Far from seeking such a sheltered occupation as that of salesman in a cooperative store, or that of a clerk in the office of a government trust, communist youth frequently refuses to recognise this as part of the necessary service of the community. This lowers the common level, in such occupations, of fidelity, zeal and efficiency.

How have the leaders tried to overcome the inertia, the lack of zeal, and in some cases the dishonesty or the active sabotage, of this intermediate layer in the organisation of Soviet Communism? Lenin's idea was to cure these evils, which he summarised as "bureaucracy", by bringing the common sense of the mass of the people to bear on every branch of administration. Under the system of "workers' and peasants' inspection" every office was periodically visited, sometimes without notice, by a sort of jury, drawn from the common people, who insisted on having demonstrated to them the practical utility of every piece of "red tape". Stalin, who was placed at the head of what became an extensive organisation extending all over the USSR, fortified these indiscriminate juries of inspection by a staff of officials trained in administrative routine, who tactfully directed the juryman's eyes to matters needing reform and put into useful shape the jury's criticism and suggestions. We have elsewhere described the extent to which this great organisation of "workers' and peasants' inspection" was thought to be effective and useful.¹ After more than a decade it was, in 1933-1934, superseded by other devices. Whilst it had served to increase the feeling of participation and control among the workers at large, it was held to have very largely failed in changing the character of what we have styled the intermediate category. Moreover, it became recognised that, however valuable might be this irresponsible popular inspection, together with the perpetual inventiveness

¹ For the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection see Appendix VI. pp. 365-368 of Part I.

and discussion about the factory or office organisation to which the mass of workers were stirred, the whole thing added considerably to the work of the managers and directors, involved them in constant loss of valuable time, and definitely lowered the efficiency of the enterprise. Rykov brought this aspect of "industrial democracy" forcibly before the Fifteenth Party Congress. He quoted the protest of a manager interfered with in his duties by nine separate control commissions and committees of inspection. He says: "My time is wasted on reports, conference negotiations. The trade union organisations formed three factory councils, three organisations for discussing production and three commissions for setting up standards and settling disputes. When I am to find time for my work?" Finally this manager was haled before the secret police by "a childish whim of an official of the GPU who wished to show that he was a person of authority". Rykov concludes: "This whole system of revision and control combined with a lack of personal responsibility is hardly calculated to ensure successful work. Our system is still centralised to a degree based on mistrust of every minor link of the chain."¹

The administrative expedient to which the Soviet Government was driven, with regard to a large part of the intermediate class—notably between 1928 and 1931—was that of punishment. Those detected in breach of trust or neglect of duty, those suspected of disaffection or disloyalty, and even those in whose sphere of work there had occurred any glaring breakdown or failure from any cause whatever, were summarily removed from office, or relegated to less responsible and more disagreeable work. In many cases the offenders were severely dealt with by the OGPU and sentenced to imprisonment or relegation to Siberia. In extreme cases, where "counter-revolutionary" activities such as sabotage have been proved or suspected, men have been summarily shot. In defence of this policy of punishment, communists assert that it is just in this intermediate category that a large proportion of the people who were opposed to the Bolshevik régime found refuge. Many of the offices and institutions swarmed with ex-officers, ex-professors, ex-employers, and others formerly living on incomes derived from securities. Some of these, at least, remained permanently disaffected; and even if, for the most part, they ceased actively to intrigue against the government, they continued to be centres of disloyalty, not really trying to fulfil their functions with anything beyond the very minimum of efficiency.² But when this state of things is met by drastic and summary punishment, necessarily without meticulous regard to the degree of individual guilt, the matter is made

¹ *Russia To-day*, by Sherwood Eddy, 1934, pp. 7-8.

² One of their own colour has admitted their offence. "If we ignore for the moment", writes Boris Brutzkus, "the self-accusations wrung from the morally or physically tortured intellectuals at their public trials, we can see that there is some truth in the complaints made against them. They were undeniably hostile to the existing régime. . . . They could not possibly connive at such cruel measures. . . . They endeavoured to put a brake on these activities, relying for support on the Right Wing's disaffection" (*Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, by Boris Brutzkus, 1935, pp. 233-234).

worse rather than better. The universal fear of dismissal, if not of more severe punishment, is not an atmosphere in which there can be produced either fidelity in service or energy in its performance, and still less, intellectual initiative and inventiveness. The Soviet Government would do well to set on foot a scientific study of the effect, alike on opinion, on judgment and on will—and therefore upon administrative efficiency—of the emotion of fear. If the practical irremovability of the British civil servant has its drawbacks, it has at least the advantage that he can give his whole mind fearlessly to his function. It would be a serious drawback if it had to be accepted that the soviet technician, inspector or foreman must always be subject to the paralysis caused by the fear, not only of losing his job, but of exemplary punishment; and punishment devised not to improve his character but merely to deter others from doing likewise! ¹

Some appreciation of these considerations seems to have penetrated to those responsible for soviet policy. In 1931, as we have already mentioned, Stalin took the opportunity, in his address entitled *New Conditions—New Tasks*, to call for a new attitude towards “the old technical intelligentsia”. Very characteristically, Stalin began by justifying what he proposed to abandon. These people, he said, had, during the past year or two become “infected with the wrecking disease. In fact,” he declared, “wrecking had become a sort of fashion; while some of them directly engaged in wrecking activities, others abetted the wreckers; others washed their hands of them and maintained a position of neutrality, while others vacillated in their adherence between the soviet power and the wreckers. Of course the majority of the technical intelligentsia continued to work more or less loyally.” But, at the present time, Stalin went on to say, the position had changed. The Soviet Government had demonstrated its strength. There could be no longer any delusion as to its permanency. The great majority of the intelligentsia were now working loyally, and the few remaining wreckers had been driven underground. Consequently, he declared, “it follows that we must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia. . . . It would be foolish and unwise to regard almost every expert and engineer of the old schools as an undetected criminal and wrecker. . . . Our task is to change our attitude towards the engineers and technicians of the old schools, to show them greater attention and solicitude, to display more boldness in inviting their cooperation. . . .” ²

In 1933–1934 the whole apparatus of “workers’ and peasants’ inspection” was, as we have said, superseded by a new administrative device. Following the decision of the Seventeenth Party Congress, two new “Control Commissions” were established, one for the Party working

¹ To this subject of punishment and the scale of moral values which it entails we shall return in Chapter XI, “Science the Salvation of Mankind”, and Chapter XII, “The Good Life”. See also Chapter VII, “The Liquidation of the Landlord and the Capitalist”, pp. 455–463; all these in Part II.

² *New Conditions—New Tasks*, by Josef Stalin (Moscow, 1931), pp. 15–18.

directly under its Central Committee, and the other (for which the Party equally suggested the membership) for the USSR Sovnarkom, under whose directions it was to act. The special function of both commissions was systematically to "check up" the execution of all decisions and orders from the centre. Each commission was to appoint a staff of confidential officials who were systematically to compare what was actually done with what had been ordered to be done. The agents of the Party Control Commission would scrutinise the conduct and efficiency of Party members, whilst the agents of the Sovnarkom's Control Commission would consider specially the results themselves. By these means it was hoped to assess with greater accuracy and promptitude the manner in which every branch of administration was working, and to bring to bear on all grades a strong incentive to improvement. It remains to be seen what will be the effect of this new apparatus upon what we have called the intermediate category.

To end this chapter on the communist incentives "in place of profit" we may be permitted to draw the student's attention to its strangely ironic conclusion. The one striking superiority of the capitalist organisation of industry over that of Soviet Communism is not found in the profit-makers' control and direction of production and distribution, in such a way as to secure the most perfect satisfaction of the whole community's needs or desires. Nor does any such superiority manifest itself in the capitalists' capacity to evoke, from the mass of the manual workers, either that universal continuous participation in the work of production, or that assiduity and inventiveness, which are both indispensable to the maximum output of the community as a whole. Alike in directing industry so as to satisfy the needs and desires of the entire community, and in obtaining from the whole mass of manual workers the utmost useful participation in production, Soviet Communism bids fair actually to surpass the achievement of profit-making capitalism. Yet, as we have suggested, there is one part of the structure of wealth-production in which the organisation of capitalist industry has so far shown itself superior in efficiency to that of Soviet Communism. This is in the zeal, honesty, punctuality and loyalty to be counted on in Great Britain and some other countries of western Europe in the large and heterogeneous category of salaried workers who fill the intermediate positions between the directors and controllers of policy on the one hand, and the manual workers engaged in direct production on the other. It is in this middle section of the organisation, comprising the clerical and accounting staffs, the foremen and overseers who combine high craftsmanship with managerial capacity, the chiefs of railway depots and local repair shops, the train conductors, the multitude of store managers, shop assistants and cashiers—the human links between those few who plan and direct and the many who actually produce—that the capitalists' industry at present shows its greatest superiority. It is owing to the manifest shortcomings of this intermediate section in the USSR that the aggregate results of soviet industry have

not been all that might have been expected ; that there has been in so many soviet enterprises such a terrifying wearing out and breaking of machinery, such a waste of material and components, and such an amount of production of inferior quality. In the industrial organisation of Great Britain, we venture to say, this intermediate section is markedly superior to the corresponding section in the USSR. And yet it is exactly this salaried " lower middle class " that has been, under modern capitalism, most assiduously excluded from the incentive of profit-making ! In the USSR, improvement in this intermediate section is looked for in quite a different direction. As Stalin said, " man must be grown as carefully and attentively as a gardener grows a favourite fruit tree ". In the following chapter we shall describe how strenuously and how systematically the Bolsheviks have tackled this problem of the " remaking of man ".

CHAPTER X

THE REMAKING OF MAN

IN no direction does the purpose and policy of the Soviet Government stand in sharper contrast with the purpose and policy of any other administration than in its attitude towards the character and habits of the citizens at large. Monarchs and parliaments, humane oligarchies and enlightened democracies, have often desired the welfare of their subjects, and have even sometimes sought to shape their policy towards this end. But at best this has been more of a hope than a purpose. The Soviet Government from the first made it a fundamental purpose of its policy not merely to benefit the people whom it served but actually to transform them.¹ Far from believing that human nature could not be changed, Lenin and his colleagues thought that the principal object and duty of a government should be to change drastically the human nature with which it dealt. Rightly or wrongly, they ascribed the physical and mental characteristics of the Russian people almost wholly to the influence of the environment in which, for so many generations, it had lived. They duly recognised the influence of heredity. But they held that even the characteristics inherited genetically from the parents, and through them from all previous generations, are themselves, if not wholly at least very largely, the results of the successive environments to which their endless series of ancestors had been subjected. Even if further scientific investigation should prove indubitably that most acquired characteristics are not transmitted by genetic inheritance, and if it should reveal in man something which is certainly not the accumulated result of past environment, however remote, this would not lessen the importance of providing new environmental conditions which would be potent in effecting in each generation the further improvement that was desired. Clearly there is a social heritage as well as a physical one. Every child is certainly to no small degree moulded by the material and mental conditions of the parental home; and, through these, by the structure and working of the society within which infancy and childhood, adolescence and manhood are passed. Not without reason therefore did the Bolsheviks hold that, among all the environmental conditions which go to the shaping of man, those created by social institutions are alike the most potent and the most easily transformed. It was for this ultimate reason that Lenin's Government undertook the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, and replaced profit-making by community service as the mainspring of wealth production.² It was with this object that the Soviet Government has

¹ The following slogan of the Moscow Sports Clubs is significant: "We are not only rebuilding human society on an economic basis: we are mending the human race on scientific principles".

² See Chapter VII. in Part II., "The Liquidation of the Landlord and the Capitalist", pp. 438-494.

transformed both industry and agriculture into what we have called "Planned Production for Community Consumption".¹ This creation of a new environment is what is sought in the establishment of a "classless" society in which every person would be equally free from "exploitation", and every child equally enabled to develop whatever ability it possessed, in a service of the community effectively open, on equal terms, to both sexes and all races. Finally, the same object and purpose is to be seen in the determined concentration of all the energies of the community upon the universal improvement of the social conditions of each successive generation during this life, to the complete exclusion of any "other-worldliness", and of any diversion by what is regarded as a mythical supernaturalism for which science can find no warrant.

Why have other governments, in Europe or America, not had a like devouring eagerness and persistent purpose for the deliberate raising of their peoples to a higher level? A thousand years ago, in the age of faith, man's improvement was regarded as the function, not of the civil government, but of the Christian Church. The rise of national governments, and the Protestant Reformation, combined to make the state machinery essentially worldly. Whilst remaining professedly Christian, it became more and more governed in its policy and purpose by an individualism which left a free hand to profit-making capitalism. In the eighteenth century, under the influence of Rousseau, it came to be thought that government, far from having as its function the improvement of man, was in itself an evil influence—to be as far as possible limited in its interference with the freedom of the individual. From this creed nineteenth-century liberalism deduced the idea that it was positively wrong for the government to retain any organic connection with religion, or to encroach on the domain of the church or churches, which included the whole conception of "a good life" in obedience to the commands of an omnipotent deity. With the decay, over a large part of Europe and America, of belief in any supernaturalism, "the bottom has dropped out" of the code of behaviour which the churches had formulated.

It is a distinctive feature of Soviet Communism that the organised society which it establishes deliberately and avowedly assumes the function of promoting, among all its participants, what it conceives to be "the good life"; a life to be spent, not in the worship of a mythical deity, or in preparation for some future existence, but, during each successive generation, in the promotion of the well-being of the whole community of men. For the worship of God Soviet Communism substitutes the service of man. Man, after centuries of oppression a poor image of what he might be, has accordingly to be remade, and a new civilisation established.

One of the puzzle-questions for the historians of society is how new civilisations arise. Do the successive new species of social institutions, exhibiting new relations between man and man, changed processes of

¹ See Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption", pp. 495-568.

production, a fresh destination of property, a novel conception of the relation of the individual to the universe, and a new code of conduct, spring directly from the highest of existing civilisations, or from more primitive types, less differentiated, less minutely elaborated, and less stabilised in structure and function? Without doubt Soviet Communism, for good or for evil, sprang from a low type of society, if we judge it by the standards of western civilisation—its masses illiterate, superstitious, exceptionally diseased, and in places actually barbarous; its governing classes, largely of foreign origin, degenerate, and in more than one sense corrupt; with a political constitution hopelessly inefficient and obsolete. Here is a succinct account of Tsarist Russia in 1917 when Lenin assumed office, by a cosmopolitan observer,¹ whom we take leave to characterise as quite the best informed of all whose books are on record; and one at that time contemptuous of Bolshevism, and all the more to be trusted, as without partiality for that creed, in that the October Revolution had swept away his savings. Dr. E. J. Dillon, after describing the extreme heterogeneity of race and religion among the inhabitants of Tsarist Russia, continued as follows:

“Turning from the nationalities to the bulk of the Russian people—the agricultural population—one was struck with the circumstance that it was mediæval in its institutions, Asiatic in its strivings and prehistoric in its conceptions of life. The peasants believed that the Japanese had won the Manchurian campaign by assuming the form of microbes, getting into the boots of the Russian soldiers, biting their legs, and bringing about their death. When there was an epidemic in a district they often killed the doctors ‘for poisoning the wells and spreading the disease’. They still burn witches with delight, disinter the dead to lay a ghost, strip unfaithful wives stark naked, tie them to carts and whip them through the village. It is fair, therefore, to say that the level of culture of the peasantry, in whose name Russia is now being ruined, is considerably lower than that of Western Europe. And when the only restraints that

¹ Dr. Emile Joseph Dillon (born in 1856 in England, the son of an Irish father and English mother; educated at French and German universities); lived in Russia from 1877 to 1914, and revisited the country in 1918 and 1929; was a student and afterwards a professor at Russian universities, long editor of a Russian newspaper, travelling extensively during his nearly forty years’ stay; knowing many languages, and personally acquainted with almost every phase of Russian life, from ministers of state, the nobility and the bureaucracy, through successive generations of revolutionaries, down to the artisan and the peasant. He was for nearly thirty years a consummate “foreign correspondent” of British and other newspapers, and author of many books in Russian and other languages. The student should compare his three books on Russia, spread over thirty-nine years. In 1890 he published (as E. B. Lanin) *Russian Characteristics* (804 pp.), a penetrating analysis which the ex-minister Milyukov once declared to be the most accurate description of the Russian people. In 1918, on viewing the situation just after the Bolshevik assumption of office, he published under his own name *The Eclipse of Russia* (420 pp.), in which, altogether disbelieving in the Bolsheviks, he expressed his despair. In 1920, he came again, and published *Russia To-day and To-morrow* (338 pp.), bearing eloquent testimony to an immense improvement in almost every respect. He was so much impressed that he was intending to revisit Russia, when he unfortunately fell ill, dying at Barcelona in 1933.

keep such a multitude in order are suddenly removed the consequences to the community are bound to be catastrophic. The peasantry, like the intelligentsia, is wanting in the social sense that endows a race with cohesiveness, solidity and political unity. Between the people and anarchism for generations there stood the frail partition formed by its primitive ideas of God and the Tsar ; and since the Manchurian campaign these were rapidly melting away. . . . Too often the Russian peasant dwells in a hovel more filthy than a sty, more noxious than a phosphoric match factory. He goes to bed at six and even at five o'clock in the winter, because he cannot afford money to buy petroleum enough for artificial light. He has no meat, no eggs, no butter, no milk, often no cabbage, and lives mainly on black bread and potatoes. Lives ? He starves on an insufficient quantity of them. At this moment [1917] there are numerous peasants in Bessarabia who for lack of that stable food are dying of hunger. At this moment in White Russia, after the departure of the reserves for the seat of war, there are many households in which not even a pound of rye corn is left for the support of the families who have lost their bread-winners. And yet those starving men, women and children, had raised plenty of corn to live upon—for the Russian tiller of the soil eats chiefly black bread, and is glad when he has enough of that. But they were forced to sell it immediately after the harvest in order to pay the taxes. And they sold it for nominal prices—so cheap that the foreigners could resell it to them cheaper than Russian corn merchants ! . . . Wholly indifferent to politics, of which they understood nothing, but cunning withal and land-greedy, the peasants were only a long row of ciphers to which the articulate class, mainly officialdom, lent significance. All that they wanted was land, how it was obtained being a matter of no moment to them. Their view of property was that their own possessions were inviolable, whereas those of the actual owners should be wrested from them without more ado. This simplicist socialism was the crystallisation of ages of ignorance, thralldom and misguidance. It was manifest that the complete enfranchisement of these elements would necessarily entail the dissolution of the Tsardom. . . . Eleven years ago [*i.e.* in 1907] I wrote : ‘ The agrarian question in Russia is the alpha and omega of the revolution. It furnishes the lever by means of which the ancient régime, despite the support of the army, may be heaved into the limbo of things that were and are not. So important is the land problem that, if it could be definitely suppressed or satisfactorily solved, the revolution would be a tame affair indeed. . . . For it must not be forgotten that fully 80 per cent of the population are illiterate, and that millions of them are plunged in such benighted ignorance and crass superstition as foreigners can hardly conceive of. Hence they sorely need guidance. . . . The cry, “ the land for the peasants ” intoxicates, nay, maddens them. They are then ready to commit any crime against property and life in the hope of realising their object. The explosive force that may be thus called into being and utilised for the purpose of

overthrowing the present social and political order is enormous. The formidable army of the Tsar dwindles into nothing when compared to it, because itself is the source of the army to which it imparts its own strivings and tendencies. . . . The resultant is an easy-going, patient, shiftless, ignorant, unvarnished and fitfully ferocious mass . . . half a child and half an imperfectly tamed wild beast . . . whom the German writers flippantly connect, by an isocultural line, with the Gauchos of Paraguay! ' ' ' ¹

On leaving Russia in 1918 Dr. Dillon dismissed Lenin and his colleagues in these terms: "In the Bolshevik movement there is not the vestige of a constructive or social idea. Even the Western admirers of Lenin and Trotsky cannot discover any. Genuine socialism means the organic ordering of the social whole, and of this in the Bolshevik process there is no trace. Far from that, a part is treated as the whole, and the remainder is no better off than were the serfs under Alexander I. and Nicholas I. For Bolshevism is Tsardom upside-down. To capitalists it metes out treatment as bad as that which the Tsars dealt to serfs. It suppresses newspapers, forbids liberty, arrests or banishes the elected of the nation, and connives at or encourages crimes of diabolical ferocity." ²

Ten years later [1928] Dr. Dillon revisited the USSR, and was lost in amazement at what he saw. "Everywhere people are thinking, working, combining, making scientific discoveries and industrial inventions. If one could obtain a bird's-eye view of the numerous activities of the citizens of the Soviet Republics one would hardly trust the evidence of one's senses. Nothing like it; nothing approaching it in variety, intensity, tenacity of purpose has ever yet been witnessed. Revolutionary endeavour is melting colossal obstacles and fusing heterogeneous elements into one great people; not indeed a nation in the old-world meaning but a strong people cemented by quasi-religious enthusiasm. . . . The Bolsheviks then have accomplished much of what they aimed at, and more than seemed attainable by any human organisation under the adverse conditions with which they had to cope. They have mobilised well over 150,000,000 of listless dead-and-alive human beings, and infused into them a new spirit. They have wrecked and buried the entire old-world order in one-sixth of the globe, and are digging graves for it everywhere else. They have shown themselves able and resolved to meet emergency, and to fructify opportunity. Their way of dealing with home rule and the nationalities is a masterpiece of ingenuity and elegance. None of the able statesmen of to-day in other lands has attempted to vie with them in their method of satisfying the claims of minorities. In all these, and many other enterprises, they are moved by a force which is irresistible, almost thaumaturgical. . . . Bolshevism is no ordinary historic event. It is one of the vast world-cathartic agencies to which we sometimes give the name of Fate, which

¹ *The Eclipse of Russia*, by E. J. Dillon (1918), pp. 13, 15, 372-374. 383.

² *Ibid.* p. 388.

appear at long intervals to consume the human tares and clear the ground for a new order of men and things. The Hebrews under Moses and Joshua, the Huns under Attila, the Mongols under Djinghis Khan, and the Bolsheviks under Lenin, are all tarred with the same transcendental brush. Bolshevism takes its origin in the unplumbed depths of being; nor could it have come into existence were it not for the necessity of putting an end to the injustice and iniquities that infect our superannuated civilisation. It is amoral and inexorable because transcendental. It has come, as Christianity came, not for peace but for the sword; and its victims outnumber those of the most sanguinary wars. To me it seems to be the mightiest driving force for good or for evil in the world to-day. It is certainly a stern reality, smelling perhaps of sulphur and brimstone, but with a mission on earth, and a mission which will undoubtedly be fulfilled."¹

The Woman

In their remaking of the Russian people, Lenin and his followers began, not with Adam, but with Eve! For the October Revolution meant to the scores of millions of peasant or wage-earning women, not merely liberation from the exploitation of the landlord and the capitalist, a liberation which could only be made effective in the course of years; but also an immediate release from the authority of the father or the husband. From thenceforth the woman was to be in all respects of equal status with the man; whether as a citizen, as a producer, as a consumer, or even as a member of the Vocation of Leadership.²

The piecemeal emancipation of women has been proceeding for nearly a century over a large part of Europe and America. But, as has been rightly observed, "the process of emancipation now going on in Russia differs from all earlier ones in the recorded history of mankind in that it is carried out according to plan, and on an unprecedented scale. And however that process may turn out in the course of historical development, one thing has already been attained: the humanisation of woman. A fundamental remoulding and reordering of all human relations is being

¹ *Russia To-day and To-morrow* (1929), pp. 328, 336, 337. The three books of Dr. Dillon should be read together.

² For the position of women in the USSR, apart from such Russian works as *The Historical Development of Women's Life, of Marriage and the Family*, by K. N. Kovalyov (Moscow, 1931); *History of the Women Workers' Movement in Russia*, by A. M. Kollontai; *Women in the Struggle for a New Society*, by F. Nyurma (Kharkov, 1930); and innumerable practical manuals, the reader may conveniently consult *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Famina Halle, 1933, 405 pp., with extensive bibliography; *Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Soviet Union*, by Dr. Esther Conus, Chief Physician of the State Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy, Moscow (1933, 117 pp.); *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Jessica Smith (New York, out of print); *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field (1932, 263 pp.), with bibliography; *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933, 320 pp.); *The New Russia*, by Dorothy Thompson (1929), chap. x.

A convenient survey is given in the recent Russian work *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lebedeva (Moscow, 1934, 263 pp.).

attempted in the Soviet State on a hitherto undreamt-of scale. . . . Here for the first time the feminist question is conceived as part of the great social question and is being brought near to its solution through *the conscious will of the community*.¹

How great and startling was this emancipation of the Russian women will be plain when we remember that in 1917 something like one-tenth of the whole population of what is now the USSR were Moslems, among whom women were veiled, and scarcely regarded as human beings. They were sold to their husbands, even as young as eleven, and made to work just as if they were chattel slaves. On the husband's death the widow became legally the property of his nearest relative, along with his domestic utensils, his live stock and the rest of his possessions, all alike saleable to anyone willing to buy. But even those who belonged to the Orthodox Church were little better off. They had practically no legal rights against their husbands. The civil code of Tsarist Russia laid it down in express terms that "a wife is bound to obey her husband in all things, and in no wise to be insubordinate to his authority" (Section 107, Volume X). She could undertake no employment for hire without his permission (Section 2202, Volume X). A woman who became a teacher, a nurse or a telegraph operator was immediately discharged on marriage. Passports were not usually issued to married women, the wife's name being inscribed on that of her husband. Hence she could not leave home without him. A wife who went away without his permission might be brought back by the police as if she were an escaped convict. Only in exceptional cases, on special application, with the husband's express permission, could any passport be issued to a married woman. The law left to women almost no outlet of escape from the control even of the worst husband, not even if he consented to a divorce. Nearly all the peasant women, and three-fourths of the women of the wage-earning class in the cities, were wholly illiterate. Such was the lot, right down to the revolution of 1917, of half the adult population of the country.

The purpose of the Bolsheviks was not emancipation for its own sake, but the raising of women as part of the humanity which had to be remade. It was seen that the first step in this elevation, so far as the women were concerned, was to set them free. It is, for this reason that the Russian Social Democratic Party had always made the emancipation of women one of its fundamental principles. Marx had pointed out at the first congress of the International at Geneva in 1866 that the struggle of the working class against capitalism would be unsuccessful unless women were freed from their various economic bondages. The tiny Bolshevik Party had always admitted women as professional revolutionaries on the same terms as men; and women sat on its most responsible and most secret committees. Within a year after the Bolshevik revolution, "in November 1918, the first All-Russian Conference of proletarian and peasant women met in Moscow, with almost 1200 delegates, even then representatives

¹ *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), Preface, p. ix.

of nearly a million working women in Soviet Russia".¹ This was largely a spontaneous movement among the women whom the revolution had stirred; and Lenin held, from the first, that the women's organisation should be on no narrow party basis. The Bolsheviks saw to it, indeed, that the delegates were practically all of the peasant or wage-earning class, and adherents of the revolution. Organisers went all over the country to secure the election of delegates. "Hundreds of working women from the remotest factories and villages had come to Moscow with complaints, grievances and doubts, with all their cares, great and small. They all wanted to hear from Lenin why peace had not come immediately after the October Revolution, why hunger and cold were still rampant throughout the country. The mass of the women, wholly inexperienced, had hardly an inkling at that time how hard and long is the path of socialist construction, how many obstacles must be overcome before the final victory of the proletariat. . . . The Party succeeded in organising a revolutionary storm troop from the masses of women, and [was able] to direct their activities towards constructional work. From this moment steady systematic and purposeful work began upon the masses, designed to create the prerequisite condition of equal rights for working women. Women began to be drawn into the work of the socialist construction, and trained leaders were called in. . . . The conference was variegated and brilliant."²

The emancipation was never thought of as merely the removal of legal disabilities, or even of electoral disqualifications. The economic and even the household subjection of women had equally to be abolished. "A victory for socialism", Lenin had said, "is impossible, until a whole half of toiling mankind, the working women, enjoys equal rights with men; and until she no longer is kept a slave by her household and family". The complete equality of the sexes became the basis of all laws and executive decrees. Whether married or single, women voted on the same qualification as men, and enjoyed equal eligibility for public offices. They freely became members of trade unions and cooperative societies, and of every other association. They were, as a matter of course, accorded the same standard rates of wage or salary as men for the same tasks, and they became eligible for employment of every kind or grade. They retained, in marriage, the ownership of whatever they had possessed; they shared during marriage in the ownership of whatever was subsequently acquired by either member of the partnership. They had the same rights as men to terminate marriage by divorce, with equal obligations, according to

¹ "What is a peasant woman? Nothing but trash. They are all as blind as moles. They know nothing. A peasant woman (a baba) has neither seen nor heard anything. A man may learn as he tweets others casually in a tavern, or perchance in gaol, or if he serves in the army. But what can you expect of a woman? Does anyone teach her? The only one who ever teaches her is a drunken moujik when he lashes her with the reins—that is all the teaching she gets" (the words of the peasant Mitritch, in Leo Tolstoy's play *The Power of Darkness*; quoted in *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Soviet Union*, by Dr. Esther Conus, 1933, p. 4).

² *Women in the Struggle for the New Society*, by F. Nyurina (1930, in Russian), quoted in *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 94-95.

means, for the maintenance of any children of the marriage and of a necessitous spouse. And from this initial sweeping emancipation there has been no retreat or withdrawal. Already, in 1920, Lenin could claim that in no country in the world were women so completely and unreservedly freed from sex disability, whether legal or customary, as in the USSR. "The Government of the proletarian dictatorship," he said, "together with the Communist Party and the trade unions, is, of course leaving no stone unturned in the effort to overcome the backward ideas of men and women, to destroy the old uncommunist psychology. In law there is naturally complete equality of rights for men and women. And everywhere there is evidence of a sincere wish to put this equality into practice. We are bringing the women into the social economy, into legislation and government. All educational institutions are open to them, so that they can increase their professional and social capacities. We are establishing communal kitchens and public eating-houses, laundries, and repairing shops, infant asylums, kindergartens, children's homes, educational institutes of all kinds. In short, we are seriously carrying out the demand of our programme for the transference of the economic and educational functions of the separate household to society. That will mean freedom for the woman from the old household drudgery and dependence on man. That enables her to exercise to the full her talents and her inclinations. The children are brought up under more favourable conditions than at home. We have the most advanced protective laws for women workers in the world, and the officials of the organised workers carry them out. We are establishing maternity hospitals, homes for mothers and children, mothercraft clinics, organising lecture courses on child care, exhibitions teaching mothers how to look after themselves and their children, and similar things. We are making the most serious efforts to maintain women who are unemployed and unprovided for." ¹

The testimony is universal, and we think unchallenged, that the result of this emancipation has been, within less than a couple of decades, a rapid and almost sudden bound forward, not merely in the practical freedom of the woman but also in her mental and physical development; and this not only in her health and longevity, but also in her intellectual attainments and in her achievements in nearly every branch of human activity. Though in 1917 the extraordinarily great percentage of illiterates among women was far higher than that among men, it could be estimated in 1934 that nine-tenths of all the adults throughout the whole of the USSR, and quite as many women as men, could at least read and write. In the same year the proportion of girls in attendance at school was practically as high as that of boys. In the USSR women's emancipation has made a sorely needed addition to the labour force, not only in

¹ Lenin, as quoted in *Reminiscences of Lenin*, by Clara Zetkin (1929), p. 57. A slightly different translation is given in *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 97-98.

offices and in the light industries, but also in agriculture¹ and the heavy industries.

The women of the USSR now (1935) supply not only two-thirds of all the teachers but also two-thirds of all the doctors, and a large proportion of the specially trained agronomists. They often fill a majority of the places in the numerous research institutions in every branch of science. They furnish nearly one-third of all the qualified industrial technicians, who are, after a five years' university course, now annually recruited for the incessantly growing engineering, machine-making, chemical and electrical plants. They supply a large contingent of the train-working and railway administrative staffs. They are to be found, in fact, working in every occupation, not excepting the army, or the mercantile marine, or the extensive aviation service. One (Alexandra Kollontai) has had a successful career in diplomacy, and is now (1935) Soviet Minister at Stockholm. Another (Varvara Nikolaievna Yakovleva) is (1935) Finance Minister of the RSTSR, with its hundred millions of inhabitants. More than a hundred women have been awarded, for distinguished service, the Order of Lenin or that of the Red Banner.

Motherhood

It is, however, not enough to set women free from legal and political fetters, and even from the economic disabilities due to ancient prejudices. There is one function exclusively feminine, of supreme public importance, the due performance of which imposes on women, not only a serious strain on health, but also, in capitalist countries, a heavy financial burden. The mere expense of motherhood, coupled with that of infant care, is one of the potent causes of the chronic poverty of large sections of the wage-earning class. For centuries this was succoured only by private philanthropy, and sometimes (especially in England) as part of a system of public Poor Relief to which a stigma of disgrace was attached. Only in the present century have some countries included, in their national systems of social insurance, a scanty and inadequate "maternity benefit". In the Bolshevik conception of the Remaking of Man a large place was found, from the outset, for the maintenance of the pregnant woman so that she might fulfil her function as mother, worker and citizen. Just as the man in any office or employment is repaid, as a matter of course, over and above his wage salary, the various "functional expenses" which he has to incur in the performance of his duties, so it is held that the woman who

¹ It was stated in the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets in January 1935 that, in the Ukraine alone, a quarter of a million peasant women, members of collective farms, had been selected by their male and female colleagues, for positions of responsibility; over 12,000 for membership of the management boards of the collective farms, in more than 8000 cases as chairmen; some 3000 were chosen to be brigade leaders, and 30,000 to be assistant leaders; nearly 200,000 had been appointed organisers; 2577 had been elected as the managers of kolkhosi; over 18,000 had become inspectors of quality, whilst there were nearly 3000 women in charge of tractors (speech by P. P. Lyubchenko, joint-president of Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, in *Moscow Daily News*, February 1, 1935.)

fulfils her peculiar function of child-bearing, although it is impossible to enable her altogether to avoid the pain and discomfort, should at least be permitted to escape from the exceptional pecuniary burden that is involved. In the USSR the whole cost of child-bearing is, as far as possible, treated as a functional expense of the woman in the performance of her public duty.

The purpose of Soviet Communism in this matter is not merely to be kind to the sufferers—not even chiefly an improvement of the health of the community, or the reduction of the frightful rate of infant mortality of Tsarist Russia— but specifically the promotion of equality of conditions between men and women. It is in order to go as far as possible towards raising women to an equality with men in the performance of work, with equal opportunities in the choice of occupation, that so much more is done collectively for maternity and infancy in the USSR than in any other country of the world. What is new in the USSR is, of course, not the maternity hospital, nor the crèche, nor any similar service, which were not altogether unknown in Tsarist Russia, and are to be seen, in tiny numbers, sporadically and capriciously provided by private philanthropy, in nearly every other country to-day. What is unique under Soviet Communism is the universality, ubiquity and completeness of the provision made at the public expense for all the mothers in so vast a country, where over six million births take place annually. This universality of provision was not an invention of Lenin and his colleagues. It was one of the many revolutionary social proposals of Karl Marx nearly seventy years ago,¹ which capitalism has left to the first collectivist state to put in operation with any approach to completeness.

For the woman about to become a mother (*whether or not her union is legally registered*), who is employed at a wage or salary in any kind of work in town or country, or who is the wife of anyone so employed, the USSR offers, entirely free of charge, without any individual contribution, wherever the system is in full operation, medical care during pregnancy; admission for confinement to a maternity hospital; twelve or sixteen weeks' leave of absence from her work² on whatever wages she has been

¹ "As early as sixty-five years ago, at the Geneva Congress of the First International under the chairmanship of Karl Marx [1866], this question was discussed. Marx insisted on the introduction of state protection of motherhood and childhood in the programmes of all the workers' parties of the world. He pointed out that unless women were freed from the old economic bondages the struggle of the working class against capitalism would be unsuccessful" (*Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field, 1932, p. 23).

² Mothers receive leave of absence before and after childbirth in two categories, one being entitled to eight weeks before and eight weeks after, whilst the other has six weeks before and six weeks after. In the first category by the regulations of 1921 stand factory workers and manual labourers, all women working at night including office employees, women employed in commerce, post office workers, instructors, teachers in village schools or boarding schools and similar institutions, athletic instructors, educational workers in prisons, staff workers in colonies for defective children, artists and theatrical people and newspaper writers, doctors and nurses in villages or in surgical, maternity and infectious disease hospitals and lunatic asylums, and those working in famine districts or in epidemics, with dentists and masseuses. In the second category stand all other women earning their

earning; constant medical supervision and aid; the right to be reinstated in her job when medically fit, with regular intervals every three and a half hours in which the infant can be breastfed; a grant of money for the infant's clothing, with a monthly grant for the first year towards the infant's food; and the provision of a crèche in which from two months to five years old the infant may be safely cared for during the mother's working hours.¹ This seems, to the foreigner, an astonishing list of maternity benefits. But every one of them is covered by the conception of freeing the woman from her "functional expenses", and from the "economic bondage" in which her fulfilment of her exceptional function, so vital to the community, would otherwise tend to place her. The aim is, so far as this is physically possible, to set her as free to work in any occupation, to be as productive in her work, and to make as good an income from it, as if she did not become a mother. In short, in the view of Soviet Communism, maternity is never to be treated (as it sometimes is elsewhere) as if it were a misdemeanour, punishable either by summary dismissal from the job (as in the British and some other government services, and also in some private employments), or at least, in all cases, by a substantial pecuniary fine. It is in fact held that the least that should be done for the mother is to relieve her of all the pecuniary cost involved in the fulfilment of her exceptional function. The whole cost is borne, partly by the commissariat of health of each constituent or autonomous republic, and partly by the service of social insurance, in

living, other than those subject to night work, and including stenographers, secretaries, teachers in city day schools, cooks and housekeepers and other domestic workers, and women who work in kolkhosi (collective farms). Students holding scholarships in university or educational institutions of like grade are for this purpose treated as workers in the second category. Women who have had abortion performed have a right to three weeks' vacation with pay. (*Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, pp. 65-67.)

At the congress of udarniks from collective farms, in February 1935, a woman delegate proudly stated that, in her kolkhos, the members' meeting had gone even further in care for maternity. Every member bearing a child was allowed three months' absence from work before and three months after confinement, without any diminution of her share in the common produce. (*Moscow Daily News*, February 1935.)

¹ In a satirical novel we read an amusing reference to the privileged position which women occupy as employees owing to the provision of maternity benefit:

"She's pregnant again."

"Who?" I asked in surprise, unable to make head or tail of the events which had transpired during my brief absence.

"What do you mean, who? Kokina, of course! Just look at her red head!"

Kokina sat, leaning over her desk and smelling out the latest news. Her face was thoughtful, but calm.

"The instructor whispered:

"I assure you, she's already a document of protection in her pocket. Can't undermine her!"

"What's the matter?" I asked, looking round at my colleagues. There was a feeling of utter gloom, and our department resembled an undertaker's parlour rather than a decorous soviet institution.

"The devil knows! There's talk of dissolving us," said the instructor, with an envious glance at Kokina. "There's no sorrow or sighing in that quarter! It's too bad I'm not a lady. . . . They get their pleasure, and then a three-months leave with full salary, and no fear of being dismissed! . . . It's a great life!" (*Semi-Precious Stones*, by A. I. Voinova, 1934, p. 61.)

which there is no individual contribution.

We do not need to describe in any detail the maternity hospitals to be found in every city of the USSR, and, on a smaller scale, to an increasing extent in the rural centres. What is extraordinary is the degree to which this institutional provision for childbirth has already been made throughout the USSR. To supplement the large, and sometimes magnificent maternity hospitals, in the principal cities,¹ there is, in most rural areas, less ambitious provision for smaller numbers. Thus "at Kazan, the capital of the Tartar Republic, we found in 1932 that in each ambulatorium [throughout that republic] there are two beds for confinements. . . . On state and collective farms in this republic hospital provision [for childbirth] is rapidly increasing." Speaking generally for the whole USSR, it can be said that in the cities nearly all the confinements of wage-earning mothers, and at least 90 per cent of the whole, now take place in maternity hospitals. In the rural districts, which still contribute four-fifths of the total number of births, about 20 per cent are officially stated to take place in institutions, small or large, a fraction which is rapidly increasing year after year.²

A distinctive feature of soviet policy in this field is the high degree of "unification of all the related provisions for mothers and their infants", which is universally aimed at, and in the institutions of the larger cities, achieved to a remarkable degree. Thus, at the Leningrad Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, "there are prenatal clinics; clinics at which contraceptive advice is given; and clinics for the various periods of infancy and childhood, all these being coordinated with arrangements for domiciliary medical care as needed. . . . The nurses appear to be acquainted with every mother and child in their respective subdistricts. On attending a prenatal centre the expectant mother receives a card which entitles her to (a) the right of precedence in tramcars and a sheltered place in them; (b) service in shops without waiting in a queue; (c) a supplementary food ration; (d) lighter work in the office or shop in which she is employed; and (e) . . . two months' rest without loss of wages."³ Another instance of this administrative unity is the fact that a usual adjunct of a well-organised maternity centre is a legal department, in which a qualified lawyer is always in attendance, ready to give gratuitous advice to any woman who seeks it, about her legal remedy against any man who has wronged her, or against the factory management which has

¹ Is there any maternity hospital in the world for public and gratuitous treatment, other than that at Moscow, where every woman has not only earphones provided so that she can listen to the music broadcast by wireless, but also a telephone by her bedside which permits her, free of charge, to converse with her husband and children, or with friends?

² *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 175, 178, 179.

In London the proportion is about 10 per cent.

The number of beds in "somatic and lying-in hospitals" in the cities of the USSR was, in 1935, officially given as 89,200 in 1913, 143,000 in 1928 and 230,000 in 1932. Those in rural localities were given as 49,400 in 1913, 60,000 in 1928 and 107,000 in 1932 (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 211).

³ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 176-177.

withheld any of her rightful privileges, or against any person who has injured either her children or herself.

Of the quality of the provision thus made for maternity we may content ourselves with quoting the latest and most authoritative British and American report. "Leaving aside the provision for abortion" [presently to be considered], Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury sum up the extensive survey that they made in 1933 in the following terms: "Our observations of soviet arrangements for the medical and hygienic care of mothers and their children have filled us with admiration, and with wonder that such good work, scientific and advanced work, should be undertaken and successfully accomplished in the period when the finances of the country are at a low ebb. The maternity and child-welfare institutions and arrangements seen by us gave us the impression that they were nowhere being stinted or restricted because of financial stress."¹

Infancy

We have still to describe the extensive provision for the care of infants, from birth to the entry into kindergarten or elementary school, which, though still very far from completely covering the whole area, is rapidly extending from urban to rural districts of the USSR. And here we need not trouble the reader with any description of how these institutions feed, clothe, wash, teach, train and amuse the babies. What has significance for us is the extent to which this service² is being organised as an ubiquitous public function; its universal supervision by local public committees representing the trade unions and all other groups of citizens, the doctors concerned and the district authorities; the high degree of unification that it attains; and the psychological effect of making the whole work not a matter of charity but a function of citizenship.

There is first the system of "advisory centres" for mothers with

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 177.

² The service of infant care in the USSR has been described, usually without adequate realisation of the system as a whole, by many recent observers. Among their books, the most informative and complete seem to us to be *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina W. Halo (German edition, 1932; English translation, 1933); especially the chapter entitled "Mother and Child", from which we have drawn largely. See also in corroboration the relevant chapters in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928); *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by Alice Withrow Field (1932); *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by Margaret I. Cole (1933); *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933); *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933).

An official authority is the valuable survey entitled *Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Soviet Union*, by Dr. Esther Conus, chief physician of the dispensary of the State Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy (Moscow, 1933, 118 pp.). A convenient survey (in Russian) will be found in the later work, *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lobedeva (Moscow, 1934).

Among German sources may be noted the article by A. Dvoretzky, "Der Sauglings- und Mutterschutz im neuen Russland", in *Münchener medizinische Wochenschrift* (1926), pp. 463-464; and *Der Schutz der russischen Arbeiterinnen*, by Vera Rappoport (Berlin, 1934, 64 pp.), with bibliography of over 100 items.

infants, which are already claiming, in the cities, to be able to bring every mother, and especially every solitary mother, after her confinement, within the range of their advisory and welfare activities. In 1930 there are reported to have been nearly 2000 such centres at work; and by the end of 1931 the number had grown to about 3000. Most of them have "milk kitchens" attached, where the infants' rations of milk are distributed daily. The whole system is directed by local bodies called the Commission for the Betterment of Labour and the Standard of Living (KOTIB). This commission is formed in each place by the local soviet. In addition to the representatives of this soviet, and the medical staffs of the advisory centres, the commissions include men and women delegates from the factory committees of all the industrial plants of the district, as well as from every administrative or trading institution. These commissions supervise not only the advisory centres, but also the crèches, the schools and the maternity homes of the district. They have also the duty of "combating the abandonment of infants", by keeping a watch on all pregnant women who have no one to help them; and to arrange for the prompt admission to children's residential homes of all children actually abandoned, as well as of others for whom the mothers cannot properly care, and who might otherwise be abandoned. The mortality in such children's homes, which was formerly excessive, has been greatly reduced.¹ But wherever possible, abandoned children are now "boarded out" with carefully chosen and closely inspected families of city workers, by whom, in fact, they are in many cases ultimately adopted as their own.

For the rural areas there are an increasing number of advisory centres in the sovkhosi and kolkhosi. A remarkable feature is the itinerant advisory centre, a system of "flying squads" of doctors, nurses and legal consultants (usually women), with one or two delegates of the commission, who are sent, especially in the busy time of harvest when the local organisations are overwhelmed with work, to villages as yet unprovided with a permanent centre. The itinerant advisers stay a month or two in such a village, holding exhibitions and distributing leaflets, and giving to all the women hygienic and medical advice and assistance, together with "social and juridical consultations" to enable the mothers to overcome destitution, to discover paternity or to obtain alimony; in addition to seeing that she gets milk for her infant, and all her other rights as a citizen.

The next stage in the organisation of infancy care is the provision of crèches in which, from two months old, the infant may be cared for whilst the mother is at work. This was one of the ideas on which Lenin most strongly insisted. He described the crèche, in setting free the mother from the burden of a constant care of the young children, and thus enabling

¹ We do not give the apparently satisfactory death-rates that were quoted to us, as institutional death-rates are of no statistical value without a precise tabulation of the ages and length of stay of all the inmates.

her to earn an independent livelihood, as being the "germ cell of the communist society". Accordingly, there has grown up in the USSR during the past decade a vast network of crèches of different kinds. There are factory crèches attached to practically all industrial enterprises, as well as to all offices and other places in which as many as a few scores of women are employed. There are, in the cities, also district crèches for the infants of women employed in smaller establishments of all kinds. There are, in many cities, also evening crèches, in connection with working women's clubs and other recreational centres. A beginning has been made with crèches at the larger railway stations, so as to enable mothers visiting the city, or waiting for a train, to get through their shopping or other business, without the children suffering. There are night crèches for the convenience of mothers engaged in night work. There are now even special compartments on some of the long-distance trains, in which passenger mothers may leave their young children in charge of trained nurses. In the rural districts there are summer crèches in all state farms (sovkhosi), and in an ever-increasing number of the collective farms (kolkhosi), as well as in all the communes. These rural summer crèches are specially useful in combating the great mortality among young children in the hot weather, whilst the mothers are set free for harvest work. "In the new Russia", we are told, "it is impossible to imagine any industrial establishment, any undertaking, any kolkhos, any tractor station, any collective undertaking, without such a crèche."¹ In the industrial districts there were reported to be 33,000 beds in crèches in 1928, and by 1931 the number had grown to about 130,000. In the kolkhosi, there were 135,000 beds in summer crèches in 1928, and no fewer than a million and a half in 1931, whilst during 1932 and 1933 this vast number is said to have been doubled.² It still (1935) continues to grow by leaps and bounds. And wherever there is a crèche—whether or not a nominal charge is made to the mother for some particular service—the

¹ *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle, 1933, p. 161.

² For the RSFSR alone, the following statistics indicate a more than twentyfold growth in the provision of crèches in five years:

	1928	1929	1933
<i>In Cities:</i>			
Crèches	499	953	3,355
Beds in them	31,955	39,016	161,822
<i>In Rural Districts:</i>			
Permanent crèches	66	313	11,599
Beds in them	1,640	7,534	267,958
Seasonal crèches	3,704	6,731	109,392
Beds in them	100,306	175,000	2,734,804

For the USSR the number of places in the crèches was officially given in 1934 as, in 1913, 550 regular and 10,000 seasonal; in 1928, 59,300 regular and 197,800 seasonal; and in 1932, 623,900 regular and 3,920,300 seasonal. (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 210.)

maintenance and care of the infant during something like one-third of the day, without any charge, becomes, not only a collective function but also a matter of collective provision. Under the Second Five-Year Plan the network of advisory centres, milk kitchens, crèches, infants' nurseries, nursery schools and kindergartens is being, year by year, made more nearly coextensive with the whole area of the USSR, with the corollary that a considerable proportion of the feeding, some part of the clothing, and the whole of the medical care of a great majority of all the young children, from birth up to the age of seven or eight, will have become a public charge. And this without withdrawing the children from the home or from maternal care, and without any idea of pauperism or charity; and, as it seems to us, without any more lessening of the sense of parental responsibility than is involved in other countries in the almost universal provision of free primary schooling for children of larger growth; and, indeed, with actually less supersession of the domestic home than is effected by the British middle-class and upper-class boarding school.

Birth Control

With a birth-rate and a rate of increase of population both larger than in any other great nation, it might have been expected that contraceptive practices would be widely adopted in the USSR. We do not gather that this is the case. Neither the official reports nor private conversations, and more convincing than either of these, none of the indications that can be drawn from the vital statistics, support the inference that intentional contraception is even as commonly practised in the USSR as in Holland or Australia, France or Germany, England or the United States. There are various reasons for this difference. There is still, we think, a greater degree of popular ignorance on the subject than in western Europe. There is greater difficulty in obtaining the means. There is a more intense overcrowding of the dwellings. There is much less assurance, alike among the statesmen and scientists and among the mass of citizens, that any reduction in the total number of births would be advantageous to the community, or desirable on any public grounds. And probably one of the results of the extensive and elaborate provision for maternity and infancy, which is a distinctive feature of Soviet Communism, is to lessen the personal dislike of repeated maternity, which is nowadays felt by more women than is commonly acknowledged.

But there is, in the USSR, no public objection to contraception, still less any restriction of its propaganda, or any prohibition of the sale of the means of contraception, or any ban upon the subject. On the contrary, it is freely discussed in the cities among young and old. It is made the theme of instructive posters and medical advice, especially in connection with the marriage offices, on the one hand, and with the treatment of venereal diseases on the other. The "points of consultation", the ambulatoria and the clinics, are all free to give advice and instruction on

the subject, and they habitually take advantage of this freedom. We do not find that there is, in the USSR, any criticism upon this attitude of frankness and freedom.

The Control of Abortion

There remains to be described what has excited, perhaps, greater surprise in the western world than any other of the social experiments of Soviet Communism, namely, its candid recognition and sympathetic control of the practice of abortion. It is common knowledge that this practice, in spite of its danger to the individual, and its almost universal condemnation by the churches, by the criminal law, and by public opinion, has been—apparently at all times and in all countries—extensively resorted to. We have no materials for judgment as to whether it was actually more prevalent in Tsarist Russia than in other European countries. Nor can we form any opinion upon the accuracy of the whispered estimates, running into hundreds of thousands, and even to a million, of the number of abortions during a single year in the United States, or in the France and Germany of the present generation. What is indisputable is that, in each country, there have been, and still are every year, literally thousands of cases in which death promptly follows the illegal operation—in Germany about 10,000—whilst in tens of thousands of others serious damage results to health. Equally certain is it that, apart from illegal operations, a number of different abortifacients are, even in the England of to-day, where the practice is believed to be less frequent than on the Continent, commonly known, easily obtained, and, in fact, purchased in large quantities. It will, we think, not be questioned by anyone acquainted with the facts that there is here a social problem of grave import and serious difficulty.¹

After the revolution the question was forced upon the attention of the Soviet Government by the women themselves. We give the facts as stated by an able American woman who has made a special study of the

¹ Among the more recent and more important references to this subject we may cite *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), chap. xiv. and pp. 21, 49, 176-177, 182-185; *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by A. W. Field (1932), chap. iv. and p. 67; *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 139-144; *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by A. J. Haines (1928), pp. 66-67; *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole (1933), pp. 153-154; "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World*, January 15, 1932; "Abortion in Russia", by Henry Harris, M.D., in *Eugenics Review* for April 1933; "La Médecine en Russie soviétique", by Dr. Raymond Leibovici, in *Enquête au pays des Soviets*, in the illustrated journal *Fu*, special number for November 1931, pp. 2582-2584. Another French statement will be found in the article entitled "L'Évolution démographique et les résultats de l'avortement légal en U.R.S.S.", par Fernand Boyerat, Vice-président du Conseil Supérieur de la Natalité, in *Le Musée social*, July 1932. The latest Russian view is given in the relevant chapter of *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lebedeva (Moscow, 1934), 263 pp.

Two articles by Dr. Á. Gens will be found in the *Archiv für soziale hygiène und demographie*, "Der künstliche Abortus als soziale und Milieu-erscheinung", in 1928 (pp. 554-558); and "Die Ergebnisse einer statistischen Untersuchung über die Fehlgeburten in Moskau im Jahre 1925", in 1926-1927 (pp. 336-339):

subject.¹ "When the working woman became aware that she was living under a government which claimed that it not only believed that women should share equal rights with men, but would, to the best of its ability, help women to become men's equals, one of the first things she asked was the right to refuse to give birth to children that she did not want. Because birth control was practically unheard of in the Russia of 1918, it was legalised abortion for which the women asked. The question was discussed at great length in all places where women met together, and in the newspapers, as is the Russian custom since the October Revolution. The points on both sides were numerous and strong. The women were almost unanimous in the feeling that they could never be socially or economically independent so long as they had to bear continually recurring pregnancies. They were also very decisive in the opinion that as long as they were forced to bear children every time they became pregnant, they could never be strong enough nor have sufficient enthusiasm to bring up a family as they should. . . . The doctors in Russia were faced with more difficulties than were the Russian women before committing themselves as to the way of solving the question. As one of the doctors in the maternity hospital which is connected with the Institute for Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in Moscow told me, 'the question is one of the most difficult with which any doctor, or any human for that matter, could be faced'. Waiving the moral issue, the physicians were under no illusions as to the harm abortion can cause, even when performed under the finest conditions and by the best medical experts. But we were faced with the undeniable fact that Russian women would continue illegal and underhand abortions as long as they were faced with many unwanted pregnancies. At that time there was, and even now there is, no absolutely safe and harmless contraceptive. We were convinced that it was not the young healthy women who wanted abortion, because the Revolution had banished the illegitimate child, making marriage and cohabitation practically synonymous; it was the poor woman with children who was unable to support more, who wanted and needed relief, and we were still more convinced that if she did not get it from the state she would do the best she could for herself. It gradually grew to seem logical in the eyes of the medical profession that the best way of fighting abortion was to fight it openly; and I do not think we took a false step when we did so, for we now have not only cut down the number of deaths due to underhand abortion, but we are also in a position to fight abortion by well-advised birth control."

The public discussion, with frequent debates among the doctors, and a long fight in the various legislative committees—strange though this must seem to those who believe that Soviet Communism works by a dictatorship—lasted over two years (1917–1920). When at last a decision

¹ *Protection of Women and Children in Soviet Russia*, by (Mrs.) Alice Withrow Field (1932), pp. 81–84. The testimony is similar of Dr. Raymond Leibovici in *Enquête au pays des Soviets*, the special number of *Vu*, November 1931, pp. 2582–2584.

was arrived at by the highest legislative authority, the law was changed in a manner that was, and still remains, unique in all the annals of legislation.¹ The decree of November 1920 for the RSFSR, which has since been copied in the other constituent republics, substituted, in the case of abortion, for the age-long policy of prohibition of a practice that could not be stamped out by repression, the unprecedented policy of converting it into a social service under strict public control. Fifteen years' experience, whilst steadily developing the service, has left the law unchanged.² Abortion may only be performed by licensed surgeons in institutions of the nature of hospitals; and save in very exceptional circumstances, must always be the result of a surgical operation, not by administration of drugs. After the operation the woman must remain in bed for three whole days, and must not be permitted to resume work for two weeks. Abortion must not be performed for a first pregnancy, unless childbirth would seriously endanger the mother's life. It must not be performed if the pregnancy has continued for more than three months. It is recommended that the operation should be performed in a state hospital wherever there is a section devoted to maternity. It is prescribed that abortions should be discouraged if the woman concerned has had fewer than three children, or if she has adequate means for supporting another child, or if her health would not be unpaired by another pregnancy, or if her living conditions constitute a good environment for the children, or if, in general, there is no social, physical or economic reason for abortion.

Subject to these conditions, no qualified doctor may refuse to perform the operation, although he remains free to discourage it to any extent. In state hospitals no charge will be made to women who are within the range of social insurance, or whose husbands are within the range. This includes all persons employed for wages or salary, without limitation of amount or kind of occupation; and also all members of collective farms (*kolkhosi*) or federated manufacturing artels (*incops*). To other women the usual hospital charge, which is small, may be made. Any person producing abortion otherwise than under the prescribed conditions—whether an unlicensed medical practitioner, a *feldsher*, a *babka*, a midwife even if qualified and licensed as such, or any other person—will be prosecuted for manslaughter if death results.

We may now describe the service as it may be seen at work in Moscow or Leningrad. The woman goes first to her Point of Consultation, the ambulatorium or medical station for her district, where she is entitled (if a wage-earner or the wife of one) to free medical advice. She gives the nurse in attendance particulars as to her name, address and occupation, and those of her husband, and the matter on which she seeks advice. Unless the case is urgent, an appointment is fixed for her at a time convenient to herself. A nurse is at once despatched to visit her home,

¹ In Sweden similar legislation is now (1935) contemplated.

² Except for a minor amendment in 1926 specifically fixing three months as the maximum period of pregnancy at which the operation is permitted.

where she has a friendly conversation with the applicant, in which she elicits as much as possible of her history and circumstances. The visiting nurse then fills up a form for the doctor's information, giving all that has been noted as relevant to his diagnosis and treatment. He is thus prepared for the woman on her visit at the appointed time. She will be received, not in any bare office, but in a pleasantly furnished consulting-room equal to that usual in British private practice, and fitted with every medical convenience. An invariable practice in the USSR is that no one, whether officer or patient or friend, enters such a consulting-room, any more than a hospital ward, without being clothed with a white apron or overall. After examination and enquiry, if the woman definitely asks for an operation for abortion, the doctor always seeks to discourage her, unless she is very poor, having already not fewer than three children, and not more than twelve weeks advanced in pregnancy. He will, in any case, warn her that abortion is prejudicial to health; and that there are ten times as many deaths from abortion, as hitherto commonly practised, as from childbirth. If, however, the woman insists, he may, if he is satisfied, give her an order on the state hospital, where the operation may be performed. If the doctor is not satisfied of the necessity of the operation he will send an insistent woman to the hospital for examination. It is reported that, of the pregnant women who enter for examination, about one-sixth desire an abortion; but it is found that about one-half of these can be dissuaded from it. The result is that the number of abortions actually performed is a small percentage of the cases in which enquiry is made. When the operation is performed, and the three days' rest in bed has expired, the woman is definitely instructed to seek advice from her local doctor as to methods of prevention of another pregnancy; and it is said that most of them who have undergone the operation are willing to try their use.

It remains to be said that exact statistical records are kept by the public hospitals (and there are no others in the USSR) of all operations for abortion; and that the results thus shown fill foreign medical experts with astonishment. The surgeons employed have developed the highest possible skill. The cases are carefully selected. The conditions under which the operations are performed are the very best. Consequently the results of the operation are so uniformly good as to be almost incredible. Already in 1920 it was said that the deaths from the operation were 0.74 per hundred cases (less than one per cent). "Dr. Alexandre Roubakine of Moscow University informed us that of 11,000 abortions induced in the Moscow hospitals in 1925 not a single case proved fatal. In the same year, he said, there was not a single fatal case out of 2366 abortions in Saratov. . . . Dr. Gens informed us that in twelve years, legalised abortion had saved the lives of 300,000 women [as compared with the illegal practice which, it is assumed, would have continued]; and he considered that hygienists should, from this viewpoint, strongly support it. He added that special skill had been developed in the operation, which now

occupied only three to five minutes, instead of half an hour as formerly.”¹ Two French doctors who investigated the subject in 1932 report that, out of 52,412 abortions in Moscow within the year, only 2139 or less than 4 per cent had any untoward incident whatever.²

Meanwhile, it is believed that illegal operations for abortion, which are severely punished by the criminal courts, have, in the USSR, almost entirely ceased to occur. Thus the paradoxical result has been obtained that in the USSR, where abortion is permitted under strict control, it is to-day far less frequently practised than it is in Germany and France where it is a criminal offence! “In the Soviet Union,” declared Dr. Gens, the director of the department for abortion of the Moscow Institute for the Protection of Mothers and Infants, “in spite of legalisation there are relatively few abortions: *we are the country in which abortion is least practised.*”³

To complete this survey of the position of Soviet Russia with regard to the control of births, it must be added that whereas the annual number of permitted abortions in the whole of the USSR is apparently well under a quarter of a million; and the practice of artificial contraception is believed not to be at all widespread, the annual number of births is over six millions, whilst the infantile mortality under one year has been halved. The birth-rate for the USSR is still round about 40 per thousand, which is more than double the figure of most European countries and the United States. “A Russian woman who wishes to relinquish her social function of maternity, and is unwilling to fulfil her civic duty, need bring no children into the world. But for the most part she does it, and without the compulsion to bring to birth which is still sacrosanct in Western Europe, because it is her will to have children, if only in respect of her own healthy instincts. Besides, the Russians are crazy about children, and the love of children in the people, which is still—in spite of technical developments, mechanisation and Americanisation—in close touch with nature, and in a sense still in its own childhood, is an aspect of its character illustrated by many touching instances.”⁴

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Nowsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 182. “‘Years of scientific work’, we are assured by Dr. Gens, the director of the department for abortion of the Moscow Institute for the Protection of Mothers and Infants, ‘have proved that abortion performed in a hospital is practically never fatal. There is one death among 25,000 abortions. In Western Europe an average of one or two per cent die. In Germany, where about a million abortions are performed annually, at least 10,000 women die every year from artificial abortion. In the Soviet Union it would be 30,000 a year if abortion were not legalised. But if that is the case—and there is no doubt of it—then 300,000 women have been saved in Soviet Russia during the last ten years, in which a hundred thousand have come to grief in Germany. All comment is superfluous.’” (*Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina W. Halle, 1933). The article by Dr. Gens in the 1926-1927 volume of *Archiv für soziale hygieine demographie* gives more detailed statistics (“Die Ergebnisse einer statistischen Untersuchung über die Fehlgeburten in Moskau im Jahre 1925”).

² “‘État actuel de la médecine anti-conceptionnelle en URSS’, by Dr. Hamant and Dr. Cuenot, in *Gynécologie et Obstétrique*, October 1932; quoted in *Red Medicine* by Sir A. Nowsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 183-184.

³ *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), p. 144.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

Creating Health

Many medical men of different nationalities have in the last few years explored the health services of the USSR.¹ They have seen many hospitals and medical research institutes that seemed to them amazingly well equipped and competently staffed. Scarcely any of them has failed to expatiate on the contemporaneous existence of insanitary conditions reminiscent of the England of a century ago.² Equally general is their recognition of the inadequacy of the medical provision for the millions of inhabitants of the vast spaces outside the urban areas. But the unevenness of development, and the incompleteness of achievement, of a health service not yet twenty years old, making its way among an extremely heterogeneous population of 170 millions, spread over one-sixth of the world's land surface, needed no journey to reveal, and calls for no further comment. More instructive is it to discover by what ideas the health service of the USSR is inspired, and towards what goal it is developing.

The most significant and perhaps the most novel feature in the medical profession in the USSR is that its ideal is less that of curing individual

¹ The latest and most authoritative of descriptions in English is *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1934), 324 pp. This does not, however, supersede the very complete survey entitled *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928, 177 pp.), which remains the most useful introduction for the layman. An authoritative later summary is afforded by the volume entitled *Health Protection in the USSR*, by Dr. A. Semashko, who was People's Commissar of Health for the RSFSR from 1918 to 1930 (1934, 176 pp.); compare also his twelve articles entitled "Das Gesundheitswesen in Sowjetrussland", in *Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift* (1924).

Other accounts are: "A Review of Medical Education in Soviet Russia", by Dr. W. Horsley Gantt, in *British Medical Journal*, June 14, 1924; "Doctors in Soviet Russia", by R. A. Reynolds, *The Nation* (New York), September 24, 1930; "Russia in Reconstruction, Population, and Birth Control", by L. Haden Guest, in *Lancet*, December 5, 1931; "Medical and other Conditions in Soviet Russia", by L. F. Barker, in *Scientific Monthly* (New York), July 1932; "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World*, January 14, 1932; "Health and Social Welfare in Soviet Russia", by "a distinguished doctor" who withholds his name, in *Progress*, Nov.-Dec. 1932; and *A Physician's Tour in Soviet Russia*, by Sir James Purves-Stewart, 1932. Precise information as to the health services in sample rural areas is succinctly given in *Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders (1927), "The Village Doctor", pp. 163-169.

Among German reports see "Zehn Jahre Sowjet-Medizin", by A. Dvoretzky, in *Münchener medizinische Wochenschrift* (1928), pp. 455-456, 497-499; and nine articles entitled "Eindrücke einer Arztreise nach Russland", by H. Rosenhaupt, in *Soziale Medizin*, 1929.

The articles relating to Russia in the successive annual issues of the League of Nations *International Health Year Book* contain useful surveys.

The publications in Russian on various aspects of the problem of health, and the organisation of medical services, are literally innumerable. We need cite only *Five Years of the Soviet Medical Services, 1918-23*, with portrait of Dr. Semashko, 236 pp., issued by the Commissariat of Health, RSFSR, 1924. The successive reports of this commissariat to the All-Union Congresses of Soviets describe the progress made.

For maternity, infancy, and abortion see separate list at pp. 666 and 670.

² We usually forget to-day how recent is the British and American devotion to baths, open-air living and scientific plumbing! Equally do we ignore the terrible overcrowding and insanitation that prevailed alike in town and country in the England of a hundred years ago. Chadwick's monumental reports on the "Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Great Britain" (1842) should be referred to.

patients than of creating a healthy community. In comparison with the medical profession in the United States or Great Britain, that of the Soviet Union is more vividly conscious that it is engaged in the Remaking of Man. This is partly a result of the communist point of view, although, as mentioned elsewhere, only a minority of the doctors are members of the Communist Party. But it is doubtless due in part also to the exceptionally bad state of the people with whom the soviet doctors have had to deal. "The Tsarist Government", as Dr. Semashko has pointed out, "left to the soviet power a terrible heritage of insanitary conditions. The exceptionally bad material conditions of the working masses of town and country; the police oppression which stifled all public activity; the merciless exploitation of the workers and poorer peasants; the low cultural level of the population, and the consequent low sanitary culture, all combined to create a favourable soil for epidemic diseases . . . which took an annual toll of millions of lives. . . . One-fourth of all the diseases was directly due to bad economic and living conditions. . . . The rate of mortality among the population . . . during the last decade before the war . . . was 28.4 to 30 per 1000. . . . The general economic conditions and consequently the sanitary conditions of the population became still worse. . . . The war completely undermined both the health of the population and the medical organisation."¹

The same reason partly accounts, we think, for an equally significant feature of the soviet health service, that of its universality. The health service of the USSR, unlike all other public health services, has never been principally a means of combating the most infectious diseases that threaten the rich as well as the poor. It was, from the start, just as much concerned with the ailments causing suffering only to the individuals immediately affected. Nor was the design merely that of dealing with illnesses that were specially prevalent, or exceptionally disabling, or unusually dangerous. All the imperfections that mar the human being are equally within its sphere. From the start it has been free from the historical distinction between preventive and curative treatment, which, especially in England, still cramps the organisation of medical services. Moreover, the controversy elsewhere raging between those who ascribe our physical and mental ills to "nature" and those who deem them the result of "nurture" seems almost irrelevant in the USSR, where the evil effects of an age-long environment of terrible destructiveness are only too patent, whilst the boundless possibilities of changing it, alike for parents and for offspring, open up an endless vista of betterment, both for the present sufferers and for the generations to come. The health service of Soviet Communism has always sought to cover the whole span of human life, not, indeed, excluding even the period that is antenatal. Its beneficent work has never known any limits of age or sex, of race or nationality, of religion or occupation, or rank or opulence. And, in marked contrast with such other empires as the British, the French and the Dutch, internal

¹ *Health Protection in the USSR*, by Dr. N. A. Semashko (1934), pp. 11, 12, 14, 15.

boundaries matter as little to the sanitarians of the USSR as other differences, for are not all the scores of races from ocean to ocean equally citizens of the Soviet Union, and equally entitled to restoration to perfect health? Such being the case, there has, from the first, never been any idea of philanthropy or charity about the care for the sick, which, like every other branch of the public services, is given to all the wage-earners, and also the poorest peasants, free of charge, and even to those with the means of payment for the most part equally gratuitously.

We trace this unprecedentedly wide conception of the sphere of a public health service, first to the fundamental conceptions of the communism of Lenin, and, under his inspiration, to the outstanding personality of Dr. Nikolai Alexandrovich Semashko, who was, from 1907 to 1917, a medical associate of Lenin in enforced exile; and to whom was entrusted, in July 1918, the organisation of the Commissariat of Health for the RSFSR. His aim, as he expressed it, was the actual "socialisation" of medicine; that is, "the taking over by the state of the responsibility of providing for everyone, at his earliest need, a free and well-qualified medical treatment. Only then will disappear, like a shadow before sunlight, all private hospitals and all commercial private practice. This is the perspective of communist medicine."¹ It is noteworthy that the new ministry that Dr. Semashko was called upon to organise had, in its title, no reference to sickness or disease, none to poverty and none to philanthropy. The first article of the statute of 1921, regulating the Commissariat of Health, expressly made it "responsible for all matters involving the people's health, and for the establishment of all regulations promoting it, *with the aim of improving the health standards of the nation*, and of abolishing all conditions prejudicial to health".² What the new department of government had to conduct was a campaign for the restoration of the whole population to health, not specifically for the treatment of disease; and for raising to a higher level the health of all, not merely that of the persons actually stricken down by illness. Dr. Semashko saw his main task as the construction, throughout the length and breadth of the land, of a comprehensive and united health service based on all practicable prophylactic measures; on the promptest discovery and diagnosis of any person falling below a prescribed standard of physical and mental fitness; on the establishment of extensive research in every department of medical science; on the provision, in genuine accessibility, of the wisest treatment not only for the doctor's patients but for the entire population at all ages, in whom "positive health" had to be "created". We have automatically put these four branches of a complete health service in the order in which we think that an up-to-date and enlightened

¹ *The Foundations of Soviet Medicine*, by Dr. N. A. Semashko (Moscow, 1926, in Russian); quoted in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928), p. 15. See also *Health Protection in the USSR*, by N. A. Semashko (1934, 176 pp.); and his series of twelve articles, "Das Gesundheitswesen in Sowjetrussland", in *Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift* (1924).

² Article I. of decree of Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, 1921.

British or American medical expert would place them. But what is significant—and all of a piece with the revolutionary transformation of ideas characteristic of Soviet Communism—is that, in Dr. Semashko's mind, and in the impress that during more than a decade his powerful personality placed on the health service that he created, the order of these four branches is reversed. The last is placed first. "The goal of Soviet medicine," he declared, "the reason it works not only for the healing but for the prevention of ill-health, is to create the positive health of the population."¹ It is needless to say that not all Dr. Semashko's energy and tact, for which he acquired a great reputation, and not even the constant support that Lenin, so long as he lived, constantly afforded to his work, could immediately cover so vast an area as the USSR with anything like the complete service at which the Commissariat of Health aimed. Nor could he, in the first quinquennium, obtain funds sufficient to create the great staff, and build and equip all the institutions, general or special, that the service required. What seems to us remarkable, in the eighteen years' records of this, in mere magnitude the greatest health administration in the world, is its continuous progress, year after year, in every branch of its work, and the ever-growing financial resources which it has been able to command, in a period in which nearly all other health departments in the world have been cut down.

For the first three years after his appointment, in the midst of war and famine, Dr. Semashko could do little more than make a start with whatever was most urgently needed; plan for the future; and meanwhile attend, very imperfectly, to the Red Army, to the victims of the epidemics that followed the war, and to famine relief. But from 1921 onward, the work of the commissariat, in all its main lines, began a rapid development. "All doctors, feldshers,² nurses and pharmacists", it is reported, "became civil servants, and all hospitals, sanatoria and drug stores became state institutions; unified schemes of medical work appropriate to rural conditions, as well as others for town and cities, were drawn up and fitted into the general plan of *volost*, *uyezd* and *gubernia*.³ A standardisation of duty and of salaries, based on professional responsibility and local economic conditions, was worked out, to be applied throughout the country; programmes of child-welfare work and campaigns against venereal disease and tuberculosis were prepared on a nation-wide scale; central institutes were established for research and teaching in various branches of medical science, to which provincial doctors could come for

¹ *Foundations of Soviet Medicine*, by Dr. Semashko (1926, in Russian).

² "The feldsher originally came from the army, where he had received his training as a surgeon's assistant, but the *zemstvo* finally established schools for the production of this half-baked medico, which assured him a little more systemised training than he had received in the army" (*Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, 1927, p. 163).

Down to 1921 the feldsher was often, over areas of hundreds of square miles, the only source of medical aid. We can hardly count, in this connection, the efforts of the *babka*. ("The *babka* is the ancient village herb-woman, known to all lands at some stage of their history, and particularly sought as a midwife." *Ibid.* p. 164.)

³ Now *selsoviet*, *rayon* and *oblast*.

postgraduate study ; the wholesale preparation of drugs and the purchase of those produced abroad was carried on as a state business, without the cost incident to private production and advertisement."¹

How the Health Service is Administered

The nation-wide army engaged in this campaign for creating positive health, now (1935) approaching half a million of all ranks, is not, as might easily be imagined, wholly centralised. There is, in fact, no commissariat of health for the USSR. Not only each of the seven constituent republics, or rather nine, including the three members of the Transcaucasian Federation—but also each of the fifteen autonomous republics within these nine—has its own commissariat of health, working under its own sovnrakom. Each makes, by its own legislature, and administers by its own officials, its own sanitary laws and regulations. But, by Lenin's foresight, the RSFSR was first in the field, and has remained pre-eminent, both in activity and efficiency ; whilst its relative magnitude has enabled it continuously to lead the way in developments which are universally followed.² If we describe the organisation in the RSFSR, which contains a large part of the backward regions, as well as the most advanced, it may be taken as typical of the other parts of USSR.

The People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR is not, within his own sphere, even so much of an autocrat as the minister at the head of the health department of some of the countries of western Europe. Down to 1934 his immediate assistants constituted a collegium with whom he was bound to take counsel on all issues of lasting importance, and before coming to any important decision not called for by actual emergency. On this collegium there sat the Assistant Commissar (who in 1928 was also the President of the Red Cross organisation for the USSR and head of the separate health department for the defence forces) ; the president of the medical workers' trade union ; the head of the finance bureau of the commissariat ; and a representative of the peasants. Moreover, this collegium habitually called into council particular experts specially qualified to advise upon the issues under discussion, whether they were heads of departments or institutions, or scientific experts or representatives of

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 26.

² So much is this the case in practice that, in the summary of health services which Dr. Semashko had to condense into 176 pages (*Health Protection in the USSR*, 1934), he treats the constitutionally independent health services of the couple of dozen constituent and autonomous republics explicitly as "those of subordinate authorities". This is probably justified by the fact that the 1923 fundamental law of the USSR gives to the federal organs the right to "draw up common regulations in the sphere of health". The People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR is the principal adviser, within this sphere, of the federal authorities. "Of more practical importance than formal laws in coordinating the health activities of the different parts of the country," it is well observed, "are the frequent congresses on many phases of public health work. These congresses are usually held in university towns irrespective of their political or geographical situation, and are attended by doctors and other medical workers from all parts of Russia" (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, p. 58).

other commissariats or of trade unions. A standing committee of the collegium was the planning commission, which worked out in detail the suggestions or decisions and submitted them, in the form of a Five Year Plan, for the final approval of the collegium, before the plan was approved by the Commissar, and communicated to the State Planning Commission.

In 1934, as we have elsewhere described, the collegiums of the various commissariats were all abolished on a general reorganisation of ministerial departments. In the Commissariat of Health full provision was made for the continuance of the practice of expert consultation before important ministerial decisions of policy. In particular, the Commissar continued to be made aware of the latest conclusions of medical science, and kept in the closest touch with the best scientific experts that the USSR could supply. Down to 1934 there had been, parallel with the collegium but without its ministerial responsibilities, a Supreme Medical Council, described as a group of "about thirty specialists in various branches of medical science, who must give their expert advice regarding the scientific foundation for all the health regulations drafted by the commissariat. Almost all of the members of this council are directors of the various state scientific institutes, and have back of their decisions the results of research in the best laboratories of the country. They may invite to the council meetings any person whose services they may consider necessary for the better understanding of the matter in hand. Besides its advisory functions the council is authorised to call congresses of medical workers, to institute debates and discussions, and to appoint commissions to study any phase of health."¹

This consultative medical council has now (1934) been enlarged up to seventy persons, who are invited to serve by the People's Commissar, usually on the recommendation of the council itself. They include, in addition to the principal heads of departments of the RSFSR Commissariat of Health, and those of the autonomous republics, krais and oblasts of the RSFSR, the leading doctors at the head of medical research institutes and hospitals and representatives of learned societies, and—be it noted—also of the trade unions concerned. This council meets regularly every few months to discuss the most important problems arising in the work of the commissariat.

The work of the Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR is divided among a dozen departments, many of them subdivided into three to eight bureaux, making in all over thirty separate branches. A summarised list will serve to indicate the width of range of the administration. There are departments for organisation and administration, including personnel, coordination, central library, statistics, foreign information, etc.; for therapeutic institutions, including hospitals, out-patient departments, sanatoria, medical aid to insured persons, etc.; for epidemiology, covering the campaigns against infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, venereal disease, epidemics, etc.; for hygienic education, and therapeutic mech-

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, pp. 46-47.

auies ; for protection of motherhood and infancy, including maternity homes, crèches, consultations, etc. ; for protection of children's health from 3 to 18 ; for pharmacies and supply of drugs ; for health work along routes of travel by waterways (river, canal, lake and harbour), with its own regional centres independent of the local authorities (although its local representatives usually sit upon the local soviets) ; for state sanitation inspection, including food, industry, housing, schools, transport and health resorts ; for medical education ; for medical research institutes ; for convalescent and holiday homes ; and for finance, including the capital construction of medical institutions, and the book-keeping and preparation of the estimates, together with control and audit of all expenditure.¹

Provision for Health in the Budget of the USSR

The financial arrangements of the soviet health service are, in one sense, simple, for the whole of the expenditure, and also the revenues connected with health administration, of all the nine commissariats of health of the constituent republics are ultimately included in the combined budget of the USSR, as are those of the commissariats of health of the fifteen autonomous republics ; and thus they all form part of the finances of the Soviet Union. But since 1922 the cost of most of the hospitals and other institutions, together with the salaries and expenses of the local medical staffs, are included, in the first instance, in the various local budgets, which have to be made to balance. Their cost is thus met, to begin with, from the charges and taxes locally levied, together with the locally collected social insurance contributions and other special funds. At least 75 per cent of the whole expenditure on health is thus met. The Commissariat of Health for the RSFSR finds the cost of the " flying squad " despatched to cope with serious local outbreaks of disease ; of the laboratories preparing vaccines and sera, as well as of certain research laboratories ; of institutions maintained as models in each branch of the work ; of particular hospitals of non-local character, such as those for crippled soldiers, psychiatric patients, sufferers from leprosy, etc. ; of medicines procured from abroad ; and of the staff of medical experts retained for service in criminal investigations and the courts of justice. The commissariats of health in the other republics have similar though smaller services to maintain.

The Staffing of the Service

The special point of interest in the health service of the USSR is the fixed determination of the soviet authorities, without too narrowly count-

¹ It may be noted that the department concerned with health work among the various branches of the defence forces has been transferred to the Commissariat of Defence. That for health work along routes of travel is confined to waterways, health work on the railways being under the Commissariat of Means of Communication.

ing the cost, to provide the whole country, and not the cities only, with a medical staff numerically adequate to the need, however great that may prove to be, and however difficult the task of recruiting. Tsarist Russia, within the present frontiers of the USSR, had fewer than 13,000 qualified doctors, or less than one per 7000 of the whole population; and this, in the rural areas, meant less than one per 21,000.¹ Soviet Communism has had in mind a standard everywhere of something like one for each thousand. Naturally this has not yet been attained. Since the end of the civil war the number of medical practitioners, nurses and other officers, two-thirds of them women, has been increasing year by year. By the tenth anniversary of Dr. Semashko's entrance into office the total had doubled. In 1928 the qualified medical practitioners stood at one to 4000 of the population. By the middle of 1935, whilst the total staff had risen to three times the figure of 1918, the qualified medical practitioners throughout the whole USSR had been multiplied seven times, and had become one to every 2000 of the population.² Unfortunately there is manifested among the doctors the same attraction to the cities as among the population at large, and the annual increase in their numbers was, for some time, not many more than were immediately absorbed in manning the institutions and special services, notably those in connection with the factories and schools, actually started in the rapidly growing urban areas. But each year the number of men and women completing their five years' course for qualification as medical practitioners increases; and this now enables an ever larger contingent to be annually assigned to the villages. As is usual in the USSR for all occupations, the maximum number of candidates admitted to each of the medical colleges for training is necessarily decided by the government, actually by the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), if only because each involves a subvention from public funds. In the absence of parental fortunes there was no way of creating anything like enough additional doctors; and moreover, no other way of making the training effectively open to all suitable persons, than providing every one who was chosen, not only with free tuition, but also with an annual stipend or scholarship varying with his means, so as to ensure at least sufficient for maintenance. Candidates for training, who may be of any age, are nominated by all sorts of bodies, mostly by trade union and school committees, though individual applications are not excluded. "On these applications", to take the instance of the medical school of Rostov, "the local soviet first sits, and their recommendations come before a commission consisting of a representative of (1) the administrative medical

¹ "According to available statistics for 1912 there was one graduate physician for every 21,000 of the village population of all Russia" (*Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, 1927, p. 163).

² "In that part of Russia now included in the RSFSR there were, in 1913, 12,677 doctors" (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, 1928, p. 94).

"In 1931, according to Dr. Roubakine, the total number of physicians [in the USSR] was about 76,000" (*Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme, K.C.B., and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury, 1934, p. 218). In the middle of 1935 the estimated number exceeded 80,000.

faculty; (2) the professorial staff; (3) the trade unions; and (4) the student workers.”¹ Admittedly, young men and women actually engaged in manual work in industry or agriculture still enjoy some preference, and the more so if they are also of proletarian parentage. But there is now no exclusion of sons and daughters of the intelligentsia, especially if, as is usually the case, they have been temporarily engaged in manual labour. Other things being equal, those more advanced in education stand a better chance of admission than those with only elementary schooling. The mixed commission rejects candidates who are plainly unfitted for the training or for the occupation, but is naturally concerned to enrol the full number permitted.

The training for the medical practitioner in the USSR combines, from the first an unusual amount of practical work with theoretic teaching. “In his first year he must assist in minor medical and surgical work, including cleaning up after the work is finished. In his second year the medical student has to help in actual nursing; and in his next three years the student likewise engages in practical medical work at various hospitals, polyclinics and ambulatoria, while continuing his scientific training. When qualified, the doctor is offered a post at once. He may have specialised from the end of his third year, though this is a debatable policy. He is required to be fairly competent in all branches of medicine, as he may have to practise alone in a country district. . . . A recent regulation has made the conditions . . . more stringent.”² Something like 9000 new students are now admitted annually to the sixty-two institutions in the USSR giving medical training, which have, in the aggregate, nearly 50,000 men and women students. There were only six such institutions in 1912. There were then no medical research institutions, whilst in 1935 there are a couple of hundred. It looks as if it may be nearly another decade before the far-flung millions, from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the Arctic Ocean to the mountains of Central Asia, can be all supplied with a fully qualified doctor for each 250 families. Yet this is the goal at which the Soviet Government steadfastly aims, and for which it persistently plans.

The reader will ask about the quality of the training thus supplied wholesale, and about the efficiency of the gigantic health service so created. Tsarist Russia, whilst it had relatively few doctors, and generally neglected nine-tenths of the population, gave the nobility and the wealthy a medical attendance that was, by contemporary standards, fairly efficient. It produced also a certain number of men of outstanding genius, such as Mechnikov, Speransky and Pavlov, who gained international reputation in various branches of medical science. It is difficult to measure against this a medical profession which, under Soviet Communism, grapples with a different task. It is almost too freely admitted to-day by the older doctors that the average of medical attainments throughout the profession,

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Nowsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury, 1934, p. 213.

² *Ibid.* p. 214.

and especially the average schooling of the medical student, are below the pre-war level. On the other hand, there is said to be a change for the better in the spirit in which the work is generally done, notably as regards enthusiasm in practice and scientific research, and in the almost universal desire "to improve one's qualifications". Every country practitioner now gets six months' "study leave" on full pay every three years, an opportunity not generally provided in any other country, and one which the soviet doctor eagerly embraces. "Even now", in the latest and most authoritative judgment, "it is indubitable that, although the average individual standard of medical students of to-day is lower than that of the fewer students in pre-revolution times, the aggregate quantity, as well as the quality, of medical aid available for the mass of the people is being enormously increased and improved."¹

Hospitals

It is characteristic that increased and improved provision for the sick does not exclusively or predominantly take the form—in Great Britain and the United States the favourite form alike of benevolent donors and of progressive municipal councillors—of a multiplication of hospitals. Indeed, so serious and widespread was the destruction caused by the six years of warfare and the famine of 1921, that there were in the USSR, until 1924, actually fewer hospitals regularly accepting in-patients for treatment of specific diseases than there had been before the war.² In this, as in other matters, it took something like seven years even to get up to the level of 1914. But during the past decade the advance has been

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury, 1934, p. 212.

It should be stated that the hours of work of the doctor in the USSR are restricted to a maximum of six per day; with annual vacations on full pay, in addition, for those practising in rural areas, to the "study leave" already mentioned. Many of them in the cities hold two appointments and draw two salaries. Others employ their leisure in scientific research. Private practice is not forbidden, but only a small proportion—chiefly some of the elder men in the larger cities—enjoy any appreciable income from this source. There appears to be also a tiny handful who hold no salaried appointments, but divide their time between private patients and research.

Students, on obtaining their qualification, are immediately appointed to posts, by the Commissariat of Health, very largely for an initial term of three years, to a rural district, from which they may be promoted after a few years' service. It may be added that medical men who are members of the Communist Party (including candidates for membership and Comsomols) may be, at any time, required by the Party authorities to accept appointment anywhere, in accordance with their pledge of obedience. This may be largely the reason why only a minority of them become Party members, although an additional reason for not joining is their feeling that the considerable amount of voluntary "social work" expected from members may be, as they say, inconsistent with their duties to their patients.

² It is only fair to remember that the later decades of tsardom had seen some improvement in hospital provision. The sanitary and other reforms of the zemstvos, in the generation preceding the Great War, are nowadays seldom adequately realised. "All the public health work done was inaugurated by the Zemstvo and maintained by that semi-social, semi-political organisation. From 1872 to 1911 they had increased the expenditure for public health from two to forty-eight million roubles annually. . . . A network of very creditable hospitals had been spread over the country, stationed in most of the provincial

great. By the end of 1934 the number of hospitals, properly so called, in the cities of the RSFSR had more than doubled, the total for the RSFSR being now (1935) between five and six thousand. In the other constituent republics, including especially those inhabited by the more backward races, the increase in hospital provision during the past decade has been, relatively to the population, even greater than in the RSFSR. Since 1917 the total number of hospital beds in the USSR has been trebled. The great hospitals in the principal cities are among the largest in the world. "During our visit", writes Dr. Somerville Hastings, "we were taken over two large general hospitals, each with approximately 2000 beds, the Metchnikov at Leningrad and the Botkin at Moscow. Both were well-built, well-equipped modern hospitals, and in each case, as far as we could see, the standard of work was high."¹ It is, however, not for general hospitals that the health service under Soviet Communism can claim particular distinction, so much as in the relation that these bear to the research institutes on the one hand, and to the more specialised institutions and the remainder of the health organisation on the other; and to the measures taken for the promotion of more perfect health among the larger part of the whole population who are not yet patients.

Medical Centres

The question may be asked, how, in the vast population of the USSR, does the individual find the medical aid that the Commissariat of Health provides for his particular benefit? True to the principle of multi-formity, soviet arrangements allow of no single answer to such a question.

The highest degree of organisation is naturally found in the largest cities. "In Moscow and Leningrad", as a medical observer reports, "the population is divided for medical purposes into units of between 40,000 and 80,000 people; and all the health activities of each of these units are (or will be as soon as possible) centred around what is described as a prophylactorium. Each unit . . . is divided again into groups of 2000 or 3000 persons, and in medical charge of each of these groups are two or three doctors and one or more nurses or health visitors. In Leningrad one doctor deals with the adults and one with the children, but in Moscow, the work is further subdivided so that one doctor attends to the mothers and children under 3, one to those between 3 and 16, and one to the remainder. In addition to these clinicians, there are also sanitary officers, who deal with factory hygiene as well as sanitation. The members of the clinical staff see their patients in their homes if necessary; but if towns and district centres, and even in many of the smaller villages. But by far the greater part of the population of Russia in need of medical attendance never came in touch with a physician at all" (*Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders, 1927, p. 163).

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¹ "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World*, January 15, 1932.

well enough they come to the health centre (prophylactorium).¹ We were shown over one of these centres in Leningrad, and told that 2000 patients were seen there every day, all by appointment. . . . Where it is necessary for a patient to see a specialist an appointment is made and the district nurse goes with him, first collecting his personal and family medical history sheets. The specialists see their patients in the health centre (prophylactorium), and the medical records are retained and filed there also. . . . But the function of the Russian health centre is not only to deal with declared disease. It is in the true sense a prophylactorium. In it is a large hall in which lectures are given on health subjects. On its walls are posters and diagrams concerning health matters. . . . There are also wall cases containing samples of the proper food, clothing and even toys of children of various ages. In the prophylactorium is the birth control clinic, with, of course, samples of the apparatus required; and a lawyer attends at stated intervals to give advice, especially to women concerning their rights and those of their children. At the prophylactorium the bottles of milk—unfortunately sterilised as a rule [that is to say, not pasteurised]—are given out two or three times a day to parents of all children under four; and a psycho-technical examination [is] made of children when they leave school to determine what vocations they are most suited for.”²

The high degree of organisation of all the various agencies in the soviet health service is emphasised in a description by an American specialist. “The medical profession in Moscow”, writes Dr. Frankwood E. Williams,³ “can be taken as an example of the type that is being worked out in all parts of Russia, though still far from being realised throughout the country. Moscow is divided into fourteen districts. Each district is covered with a network of community clinics, leading usually from a central district clinic, through neighbourhood clinics, to the factories, the schools and other institutions within the district. Lines in the other direction lead from the central clinic to the hospitals, general and special, located in Moscow, and its environs. Passage up and down these lines is easy. *The organisation functions as a whole, not as a loosely jointed series of clinics and hospitals, each jealous and ambitious, but ‘cooperative’.*

¹ In some places the present writers were informed that a simple rule as to attendance existed. If the person seeking medical aid is physically able to walk to the doctor, he is expected to do so, provided that his temperature is not noticeably above normal. But if he “has a temperature” he is entitled, and expected, to notify the doctor, who must promptly visit him.

² “Medicine in Soviet Russia”, by Dr. Somerville Hastings, p. 7. This generalised account does not sufficiently stress the fact that the consultations of women and children include both periodical inspection of those who are well as well as preventative and curative treatment of those who are ill. Also that, whilst the therapist and paediatrist play the principal part, it is they who call in the gynaecologist and other specialists, thus ensuring an all-round service, in combination with the most advanced medical technical equipment.

³ “Russia, a Nation of Adolescents”, by Frankwood E. Williams, in *Survey Graphic*, New York, for April 1932; largely reproduced in his book *How Soviet Russia Fights Neurosis* (1935).

An individual can be passed effectively through the entire chain from factory, home, school, to hospital if that is necessary ; or his case can be attended to at various points in the chain if that is all that is required. The aim is efficient and prompt treatment *of anyone* who is ill, to the full extent of his need ; the restoration of the individual's effectiveness as quickly as can be done with safety ; the teaching of hygiene and the prevention of illness.

"The central clinic in each district is a large organisation not only for general medicine but for the handling of special problems. The neighbourhood clinic is naturally smaller, and devoted to general medicine and the specialities most likely to be needed. From all clinics both general clinicians and specialists are 'on call' to visit the sick in the homes. In addition to psychiatrists daily 'on call' at the clinics, there are two psychiatrists 'on call' during the night.

"The work and plan of the Ordintea Street General Prophylactic Dispensary, [and that] in the name of Prof. Rein, in the Lenin District of Moscow, are good examples of community clinic organisation and planning. In this district there are 60 neighbourhood clinics. In 1927-1928, when the clinic was organised, there were 33. They were increased to 38 in 1929, to 47 in 1930 ; and the plan calls for a further increase in 1932 to 70, and in 1933 to 80. In 1929 there were 80 general physicians visiting in the homes from this clinic ; in 1930, 100 ; 1931, 130 ; the plan calls for an increase to 160 during 1932-1933. In 1929-1930 the pediatricians on the staff were increased to 31 . . . in 1931 to 36. The plan calls for 42 in 1932, and 46 in 1933. In 1933 the staff is to consist of more than 236 physicians, 160 general, 46 pediatricians, 20 tuberculosis specialists for adults, and 10 for children, with the addition of nose and throat specialists, and so on. . . . The plan for this district calls for a medical unit for each factory employing 400 or more workers ; for smaller factories a nurse, first-aid unit."

But extensive organisation of this kind, and elaborate institutions with any amount of equipment, often fail to carry conviction to the sceptical of the actual working of the machine. We can realise it better by the artless testimony of an English workman engaged on constructing the new underground railway at Moscow, who had, as he thought, merely a bad cold. "I wish", he writes, "to describe what happened a few months ago when I had a bad cold and went to the Metrostoi Medical Station (I am working on the construction of the subway). . . . A few questions and I was given the number of the doctor's room. A few minutes' wait, during which I had time to observe the medical propaganda charts and models in the hall, and my name was called. 'A cold,' the doctor said. 'Let me examine your throat ; now your nostrils, and your ears.' I discovered that I had a slight nasal catarrh, and some foreign matter in my ears. After a syringeing I could hear ever so much better. Then I got two prescriptions, one for my nose, and the other for my throat. She also said she had better examine my lungs ; I laughed, but

realised how thorough the soviet doctor was. After giving me an O.K. she sent me to the dentist. I have not had a toothache for years, but nevertheless she insisted it would be better. Then I got one tooth stopped and two pulled out. The extraction was the most painless I have experienced. When the gums were set I was warned I would have to go back and get fitted for a set of false teeth. This would be given free, as is also the medicine. I left the clinic with my prescriptions, and a great respect for the soviet doctors and the system."¹

In smaller cities, whilst there may be one or more highly organised prophylactoria on the model of those at Moscow and Leningrad, these are usually not used for the ordinary consultations, which take place within stated hours, at the smaller public offices known as points of consultation or ambulatoria, provided for the doctor in charge of each unit of population in the locality concerned.

Health Centres in Factories

The term "health centre" is used in the USSR for only one kind among the many to which it is applied in America and Great Britain. But that kind is one in which the USSR has gone far ahead of every other country. This is the medical unit established inside the factory or industrial plant, exclusively for the service of the operatives of the establishment and their families. It is primarily a "first-aid" centre, as known in England and the United States, for immediate treatment which cannot be postponed. But in any but the smallest undertakings, it develops into much more highly organised institutions. In establishments having fewer than 1000 operatives, the health centre may be little more than a "first-aid" post, in immediate communication with the district hospital. In factories and plants counting between 1000 and 6000 operatives, there will be various "first-aid" posts, with a "polyclinic" with several qualified doctors in attendance, dealing with a constant stream of out-patients. In larger establishments with between 6000 and 10,000 employees there will be several such departments, with specialists in attendance on certain days. In undertakings exceeding 10,000 workers, the medical organisation will include scores of "first-aid" posts, various "polyclinics", and sometimes more than 100 qualified doctors, with all sorts of specialists in periodical attendance, and extensive medical equipment, sometimes superior to that of the local district hospital. Thus, in the immense Stalingrad tractor works, with over 40,000 operatives, the present writers found, in 1932, the principal medical officer in charge of a staff of no fewer than 110 qualified doctors (four-fifths of them women), together with 135 more or less trained women nurses. They took as their sphere the daily health of a population of workers and their families, numbering between 70,000 and 80,000 persons. The well-equipped premises of this factory health centre were adequate to the daily average

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 21, 1934.

of some 2500 visits. It confined itself to "out-patient practice", sending cases requiring institutional treatment, including all confinements, to the hospital of the city of Stalingrad. But the treatment of these 2500 daily applicants went far beyond the "bottle of medicine" that was supplied where necessary. The centre itself gave, gratuitously, many forms of treatment, including, for instance, radiant heat-therapy, psycho-therapy, mud-baths, and special baths for rheumatism in sand brought from the Caucasus, along with home nursing and various applications of massage. The arrangements for special diets for patients were elaborate. The immense restaurant of the factory provided daily six different invalid diets in separate dining-rooms, for which the patients presented the doctor's orders. For the infants between two months and three years old there were six separate crèches in as many houses, admitting children in shifts corresponding with the factory hours for women operatives. But children could, by arrangement, be left for the whole day so as to permit the mother to go shopping in the city, or to complete some task of work at home. The children were divided among different rooms according to age, there being about one attendant to every ten children present.

Rural Consultation Points

Outside the cities, apart from the scattered factories with their own extensive workers' settlements, the medical arrangements are necessarily less elaborate. Each doctor, or small group of doctors, has an extensive district to cover, mostly with makeshift premises, incomplete equipment and scanty means of locomotion of every degree of inadequacy in different districts. The level from which Dr. Semashko started was appallingly low. "In many districts the proportion of physicians to inhabitants was one to forty thousand. It was no uncommon case for a man with a broken leg to have to drive two days to reach a doctor to set it."¹ But even for the rural areas a comprehensive plan was promptly drawn up; and this is being, year by year, ever more adequately carried out. Already in 1927 a careful observer of the life of the villagers could report that "The medical plans of the country supply free service to all regularly employed workers and peasants. To this end every village centre of considerable size, or at least every township centre, has its public health clinic. In most cases these clinics are housed in former peasant houses remodelled to meet the needs of the work. . . . Particularly on market days the ante rooms are crowded with all manner of bandaged and stricken humanity. We found the chief clinic receiving seventy patients a day in the summer season. . . . In the winter this number is doubled."²

We get a glimpse of the rural health administration from the doctor's point of view, in a record of the conversation of an English observer, who penetrated into the province of Vladimir as early as 1920. "With the

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 10.

² *Village Life under the Soviets*, by Karl Borders (1927), p. 165.

medical staff of the department of health [of the province of Vladimir, Mr. Brailsford reports], I had a memorable talk. Only one doctor in the whole province was a communist [meaning a Party member], and he was not in a responsible position. On the other hand, not a single doctor had fled in the general exodus of the wealthy class. Every man and woman had stuck to his post. . . . All medical service is free, and the doctors live like any other workers of the highest category. . . . There was a shortage of every sort of drug, disinfectant and instrument. . . . None the less the department of health had gone to work with courage, intelligence and the Russian talent for improvisation. It had set up fifty delousing and disinfecting stations against typhus; and there was, in consequence, no epidemic last winter [1919]. It had got typhoid down below the pre-war average. It had opened four new sanatoria for tuberculosis. It had organised perambulating lectures for the villages on hygiene, and the care of children and the sick, and was using the cinema for the same purpose. These doctors told me that open prostitution had wholly disappeared since the Revolution. . . . Doctors as a whole were happy, they insisted, because they were devoted to their work, and felt they could 'serve their ideal'. They were 'realising the dreams of a lifetime', which had seemed visionary hitherto. So long as they felt that the soviet was 'working for civilisation and health' they would serve it loyally, though none of them were communists (here one of them repeated much the same thing in German to make sure that I had understood). Under the old régime they had met with continual obstacles, but now they received every possible encouragement. As he shook hands with me at parting the director said emphatically, 'I have never asked the Soviet Government in vain for anything whatsoever'."¹

We have little measurement of the further improvement that has undoubtedly taken place in the rural districts during the past seven years; and we can venture no statement about the general average of the health services in the rural areas of the USSR. But there is a consensus of opinion that it is very considerably better than before the Revolution, and that it is, in all respects, and in the great majority of districts, steadily improving year by year. Between 1927-1928 and 1931-1932 the number of hospital beds available in the villages increased from 43,590 to over 80,000, and the number of qualified doctors at work in rural medical districts from 4667 to over 7000.² In 1933, the number of beds available in village institutions for the sick, in the RSFSR alone, was given to us as 78,046, being an increase on the number of 1928 of no less than 62 per cent. The increase in the total number of beds in institutions for the sick (including maternity) in the whole of the USSR, between 1917 and 1932, has been stated as from 109,630 to 355,240. The Second Five-Year Plan provides for an even greater increase by 1937; but it is clearly foreseen that it will then still be far from a completely adequate provision for so vast a population.

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), pp. 67-68.

² *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 244.

The Flying Squad

A feature of the rural health service is the flying squad of doctors and nurses which is sent for a limited time into one rural district after another, either to cope with special needs for trachoma, malaria or venereal disease ; or exceptional outbreaks of smallpox, enteric or scarlet fever ; or where, owing to the sparseness of population, there is only a poorly organised medical service ; or merely to make a sanitary survey of specially backward districts. These "flying squads", which do not yet use aeroplanes (although doctors urgently needed occasionally do, and patients are sometimes brought in from outlying villages by an aeroplane ambulance), are equipped with the means of setting up temporary clinics, including primitive laboratories and extensive medical supplies. "Treatment is carried on for a time, and an intensive educational campaign adapted to the peasants' understanding and living conditions. Then the active cases are turned over to the regular local medical organisation for a continuation of the treatment ; and the flying squad moves on to another neighbourhood. The permanent stations for certain specialised services, as well as the squads themselves, are usually supported by non-local funds." ¹ The bureaux for venereal diseases and for the campaign against tuberculosis, which are permanent branches of the Commissariat of Health, have similar organisations. Special medical brigades are also sent into country districts during the sowing and harvesting seasons to reinforce the local organisation for the service of workers engaged in the fields.

The Campaign Against Tuberculosis

We cannot dwell upon all the various developments of the struggle to restore the whole population of the USSR to normal health. But it is noteworthy that, as mentioned above, in addition to the geographically dispersed medical units for general work, some of the principal diseases are systematically made the subject of special campaigns. Plague and typhus, enteric and smallpox, venereal disease and malaria, all have their organised concentrations of medical forces, not only temporary but in some cases continuously in service, and effectively articulated with the general scheme. We take as an example the campaign against tuberculosis, for many years past the greatest scourge of the Russian people, and still the cause of more days lost through illness than any other single ailment.

Specialising in the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis in its various manifestations there are, at the top, in the USSR, more than a score of institutes definitely applying themselves to scientific research. Central institutes at Moscow and Kharkov, with others at Minsk, Tiflis and Samarkand, direct and coordinate over a dozen local research centres in the several constituent and autonomous republics, the workers in which

¹ *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 56.

meet periodically in All-Union congresses. The records of all this scientific work are published, month by month, since 1923, in the voluminous journal (in Russian) entitled *Problems of Tuberculosis*, in addition to numerous monographs.

At the other end of the chain, in immediate contact with the sufferers, are the special tuberculosis dispensaries, of which a far-reaching network has been gradually spread all over the USSR. In 1918 they numbered only 4; in 1921, only 15; but in 1924 they were 84; in 1928, 233; in 1929, 273; in 1932, 365; and in 1933 as many as 404. "An anti-tuberculosis dispensary", said Dr. Semashko, "differs from a simple out-patient clinic in this, that it aims not only to cure the sick person, but to examine into his living and working conditions; if his apartment is not sanitary it tries to help him to find another more sanitary; if the patient needs some kind of material help the dispensary finds this help. The dispensary inspects the factories and warehouses in its neighbourhood, and if it notices something dangerous to health on the premises (if they are full of dust, if there is poor ventilation, if poisonous gases are emitted), the dispensary tries, by bringing pressure to bear on the administration of the business, to eliminate that danger. The dispensary carries on a widespread propaganda . . . by means of lectures and reports. . . . Finally the dispensary maintains close relationship with the workers' organisations : . . . at the dispensary there is always a Council of Social Aid . . . made up of representatives of these organisations. Thus a dispensary not only prescribes for sick people and sends them to sanatoria and hospitals, but also prevents disease . . . it works . . . to create the positive health of the population."¹

Serving alike the research institutes on the one hand, and the special dispensaries on the other, there has been developed an astonishing array of tuberculosis hospitals large and small, for every manifestation of the disease; of sanatoria for patients at all stages, in all suitable localities, chosen for their height above the sea-level, or for their location in mild climates, or for special reasons such as that of the koumiss cure; and of auxiliary institutions of all kinds, such as forest schools, open-air centres for sun bathing, night sanatoria, etc. In 1928 there were 2757 tuberculosis hospitals, and in 1933, 4007; in 1928, 10,505 institutions classed as tuberculosis sanatoria, and in 1933, 15,242; in 1928, 7447 localities providing convalescent homes in suitable localities, and in 1933, 10,556; whilst the auxiliary tuberculosis institutions of all sorts grew from 7637 in 1928 to 10,181 in 1933.²

¹ *The Foundations of Soviet Medicine*, by Dr. Semashko (Russian) (1926), quoted in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (New York, 1928), pp. 20-21.

² *La lutte contre la tuberculose dans la RSFSR*, par Dr. Nesline (Commissariat of Health, Moscow, 1934). Among other articles, the following may be consulted: "La lutte contre la tuberculose en Russie", par A. Starobinsky, in *Revue de phthisie et de la médecine sociale* (Paris, 1924), pp. 243-256; "Die Tuberkulosebekämpfung in Sowjetrussland", by S. Bagotsky, in *Zeitschrift für ärztliche Fortbildung* (Jena, 1924), pp. 532-534; Dr. E. G. Munblitt's paper "The Tuberculosis Campaign in the USSR" (in German), in *Russian-German Medical Journal* for April 1926; and ch. xii, "The Anti-Tuberculosis

The Night Sanatorium

We cannot trouble the reader with further descriptions of this persistent campaign against tuberculosis in the USSR. Work of this kind can, of course, be paralleled in other countries, though, as we imagine, not often with equal unity, coordination and persistent energy. But one of the institutions is apparently a unique specialty, as far as we can ascertain not in use elsewhere. This is the night sanatorium, which commands the enthusiastic approval of all medical visitors, and is now a prominent feature of the health service of Moscow and various other cities. In populations so thickly crowded together as those of the cities of the USSR, or those of the working-class quarters in other countries, where whole families inhabit single rooms, which are seldom adequately ventilated, the insanitary conditions in which the night is passed are a potent factor of disease. Where it is not practicable immediately to move such families to healthier quarters, the soviet authorities have discovered that temporary provision may be made to ensure for the wage-earners healthier conditions during more than half the twenty-four hours. "When there is a sick child at home that might disturb the breadwinner's sleep, or where, for instance, consumption is threatened, the doctor gives the necessary certificate, and, instead of going home, the worker leaves the factory for the night sanatorium. There he is given a hot bath, changes into fresh clothes, has a hot meal, after which he listens to music or a propaganda lecture, and goes early to bed in a well-ventilated room."¹ Night sanatoria have proved themselves of the greatest value in Russia, and "we were assured", reports another medical expert, "that in many cases incipient disease, both mental and physical, had been aborted by their use".² A French doctor describes a night sanatorium "at Krasnaya Presnya, in one of the suburbs of Moscow, which may correspond to St. Denis near Paris. There we find 70 persons, all women, who are able to work, not ill, but at the moment in a weak state. Here they will stay for two months, in better sleeping-quarters than they have at home, supplied with exceptionally nourishing food, under medical supervision. They go out to their work. The state loses nothing by them; and they profit. At the end of two months they will resume their home life, considerably set up in health. Their places will be filled by 70 men."³ Moscow has 10 of these night sanatoria, admitting not only sufferers from tuberculosis in its early stages, but also those in whom tuberculosis is latent or only suspected; persons suffering from nervous exhaustion or digestive troubles; and

Campaign in Russia", in *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, New York, 1928, pp. 200-223.

¹ In these night sanatoria "the windows of the bedrooms are nailed open even in the coldest weather, and in Moscow this often means 30 degrees below zero Fahrenheit" (*Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines, 1928, p. 107).

² "Medicine in Soviet Russia", by Dr. Somerville Hastings, in *The Medical World* (January 15, 1932), p. 9.

³ Translated from *Oui, mais Moscou*, by Pierre Dominique (Paris, 1932), p. 177.

occasionally merely from overwork or neurasthenia, together with convalescents of all kinds.¹

Leningrad uses for these institutions several of the mansions of the former wealthy. "So successful and popular are these night sanatoria among the workers that many other industrial centres have copied Moscow in opening them. [In 1926 in the USSR] there were over 5000 beds offering this temporary service to patients still able to carry on their ordinary working duties if their leisure time could be a period of recuperation."² By 1934 their number had been greatly increased. The night sanatoria are, of course, no substitutes for hospitals and convalescent homes for advanced tuberculosis cases; and as we have described, the soviet provision of such institutions is extensive and increasing. But the night sanatoria have proved invaluable, not only as "therapeutic-prophylactic institutions", in which patients are found to improve even more quickly whilst they can still continue at work than when they are reduced to idleness in hospitals; but also as "schools of sanitary culture".

We cannot pretend to be able to judge from the available statistics, how the undoubted improvement in the USSR, as regards all forms of tuberculosis, compares with the experience of other countries. The deaths ascribed to tuberculosis in Moscow, which rose to the high number of 39.7 per 10,000 in the population in the year of distress, 1920, fell to 16.1 in 1924;³ and to no more than 11.6 in 1931 (in Leningrad to 16.3). The days lost through tuberculosis in Moscow, per 100 workers in nine principal branches of industry, fell from 8.9 in 1925 to no more than 2.3 in 1931. We were informed that the improvement had steadily continued.

Provision for Street Casualties

The very serious consideration that is now being given in Great Britain to casualties on the roads may serve as an excuse for dwelling on one particular field in which Moscow city may have something to teach the health services of the great cities of the western world. Its provision for the victims of casualties in the streets and urgent surgical cases in public places stands unrivalled in prompt and all-embracing efficiency.

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir Arthur Newsholme, K.C.B., and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), pp. 14, 22, 27, 102, 111, 229, 236, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256.

² *Health Work in Soviet Russia*, by Anna J. Haines (1928), p. 107. "These part-time sanatoria are also provided for school children. The children are recommended for the institution by the school and tuberculosis dispensary doctors through the ward, because of their incipient tuberculosis or state of especial malnutrition. As many more children need this care than there are institutions to receive them, two or three nurses take the lists recommended by the doctors and visit the homes of the children, selecting those whose home surroundings are such as would preclude the possibility of their improvement in health at home. . . . This institution is run as a day sanatorium between the hours of 8 A.M. and 5 P.M. for both boys and girls from 4 to 14 years, and as a night sanatorium between the hours of 5 P.M. and 8 A.M. for girls only from 9 to 14 years. . . . Both night and day children receive a full ration of food from the sanatorium" (*ibid.*, pp. 108-113).

³ *Ibid.* p. 115; *La Lutte contre la tuberculose dans la RSFSR*, par Dr. Nesline (Moscow, 1934), p. 20.

The Sklifassovsky Institute, situated near the centre of Moscow, occupies the buildings of an ancient mansion which Napoleon, in 1812, diverted to army uses, after which it remained as a hospital in which the distinguished medical professor, Dr. Sklifassovsky, latterly spent both money and time in establishing an embryonic "first-aid" organisation for the city. This has been greatly enlarged and elaborated by its present chief, Dr. Serge Judine, under the Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR, with the idea of ensuring the instant rescue from the streets, and also from other public places, such as factories or theatres, at any hour of the day or night, of any person the victim of accident or assault, or otherwise urgently requiring medical aid, in any part of the city. The institute is now a fully equipped hospital which will presently have more than 600 beds (two-thirds always reserved for urgent surgical cases), with a qualified medical staff of fifteen, including six "internes", besides students in training. But more interesting than the hospital, because more unique, is the efficient use made of the telephone and the motor ambulance. Seven medically equipped motor ambulances, with stretchers attached, stand constantly ready to start at a moment's notice, with driver, doctor and male attendant standing by, who are always prepared to give urgent first-aid treatment actually during transit. Eleven other motor ambulances, carrying each a woman nurse, stand ready for cases in which immediate conveyance is alone required. Half a dozen motor-cabs are also available for "sitting cases". Among the seven doctors, who are at all times on duty solely for this service of fetching a patient, one is always a psychiatrist, prepared to handle patients suffering from manias, etc. But all this little army of services waiting to be called is not concentrated at the central station. In order to save time in so large a city area, two-sevenths of the force waits at local stations in the distant suburbs. The telephone is the nerve-centre of the whole organisation. Seven separate lines (five from as many geographical districts, one from the central police office, and one from the central transport office) converge in a special listening chamber, in which three young doctors share among themselves the twenty-four hours' continuous vigil.

What happens when someone is in any way injured at any hour of the twenty-four, in any part of Moscow? Any person whatsoever who witnesses the injury goes at once to the nearest telephone box and calls first-aid, giving the locality. Much the same happens in surgical emergencies such as acute appendicitis, ulcerous perforations or dangerous haemorrhage. Any doctor—indeed any person whatsoever—may telephone at any hour stating the need and the address. Whether or not the call is warranted by the circumstances, the response is instantaneous and invariable. The doctor at the telephone instantly signs a brief order to go, and at the same moment sounds an alarm bell. The doctor next for service seizes the order through a hatchway in the wall, and goes at once to the waiting motor ambulance. At the same moment he presses an electric button, which lights a signal lamp in the listening-room, indicating

that he is waiting to start. A second lamp instantly glows to indicate that the attendant is also waiting. A third lamp promptly shows that the driver is at the wheel. A fourth lamp almost immediately reports that the porter at the gate has seen the ambulance leave the yard. Meanwhile the index of the alarm has been moving to register the time that has elapsed. This time-lag may be only 40 seconds. It never exceeds 2 minutes. When one of the present writers watched the proceedings in 1934 none of the doctors took more than one minute to get actually started. How many calls are thus attended to in the 24 hours? During a busy period of 10 days there may be 650 day calls and 550 night calls, making an average of 120 in each 24 hours, or one every 12 minutes. The ambulances make about 2000 journeys per month, bringing back more than that number of acutely sick or wounded. One-fifth are traffic accidents, others are urgent surgical cases. Not published, as a fixed principle of soviet policy, are the numbers of suicides, poisonings and murders. But the lunatics number 500 a year, the dangerous epileptics over 200, and the drunkards suffering from delirium tremens nearly as many. What other city in the world can show so well organised or so expeditious a service? ¹

Medical Research

From one end of the immense health service to the other in the cities of the RSFSR and the Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in the other constituent republics, and in the villages generally, the medical observer notices the great stress laid on, and the great part played by, research in the science and art of health. There are now over 200 organised medical research institutes of one kind or other. Every aspect of physical or mental health, as well as every disease or abnormality, seems to have its own intellectual centre—and usually more than one—in which a group of

¹ Summarised from eloquent account by Dr. Raymond Leibovici, hospital surgeon of Paris, in the special number "Enquête au pays des Soviets" of the French illustrated journal *Vu*, November 18, 1931. See also *Oui, mais Moscou*, by Pierre Dominique (1931), pp. 173-174. One of the present writers went specially in 1934 to verify these accounts, and found them even understating the efficiency of the work.

The following statistics were supplied:

	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934, six months
Number of calls . . .	18,838	23,464	29,963	36,808	16,979
Of these, Accidents were . . .	8,849	11,951	15,719	16,742	8,747

The accidents were stated to be principally street traffic casualties, and it was pointed out that during the past three years their number had only slightly increased, in spite of a continuous increase both of city residents and of motor vehicles.

It should be added that a First Aid and Ambulance Service, on lines similar to those of the Sklifassovsky Institute at Moscow, although less extensively equipped, is now maintained at Leningrad and Rostov in the RSFSR; and at Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa in the Ukraine, at Tashkent in Turkestan (where an aeroplane ambulance brings in patients from the villages), and in various other cities of the USSR.

doctors are engaged, during some part of their time, on specialised investigations with a view to new discoveries. The lay observer is inclined to think that the Russian doctors follow more closely the scientific journals of western Europe and the United States than the doctors of those countries follow the discoveries of their Russian colleagues. The difficulties preventing such inter-communication between medical investigators of different countries are to be regretted.

A City of the Science and Art of Health

There is no limit to the far-seeing schemes in the USSR for the creation of an altogether new level of positive health in the whole people. As a part of the Second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Government has allotted a site of more than a square mile in the Silver Forest on the Moscow River, a ten minutes' drive from the capital, for " Medical City ", designed to be the largest and most modern medical institute in the world. The actual construction of the great network of buildings, which are planned to cost 150,000,000 roubles, is scheduled to begin in 1935. The organisation that will use the new plant is already functioning as the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine. It is under the direct authority of the USSR Government, by which its findings are turned over to the commissariats of health for application in hospitals throughout the Soviet Union. The director is Professor Lev Nicolaevich Feodorov, pupil of the great Pavlov. The enlarged institution plans to cover all kinds of health and medical work, both practical and theoretical. A feature will be the " Clinic of the Healthy Man ", where observations will be made of the behaviour of normal men and women after working, eating, resting, etc. There will be special chambers, where the temperature, air-pressure and other conditions of different climates—arctic, sub-tropic and even submarine and stratospheric—will be reproduced and their effects on living organisms studied. The institute will constitute a whole city in itself, with a technical personnel of 5500 doctors, nurses and research workers, and 600 patients, each of the latter in a private room; and with almost one laboratory per patient! There will be blocks of apartment houses for the staff; and shops, theatres, libraries and other features of a complete town.

This grandiose conception of a " City of the Science and Art of Health " may well take a whole decade to come fully into operation, at a total expense that staggers imagination. On the other hand, its possible results, not only to medical science but also in the daily health of a population which may then have reached two hundred millions are immeasurable. To this intense interest in research we recur in the following chapter, dealing with the place of science in the communist conception of the universe.¹

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II., " Science the Salvation of Mankind ".

The Establishment of Economic Security

Lenin seems to have realised from the very outset of his government what is still only imperfectly understood by statesmen in other countries, namely, that the condition of chronic insecurity in which a capitalist wage system keeps the mass of the workers is, in itself, a grave social evil. Not from men living always in danger of reduction to destitution by any interruption of their wage-earning can the community expect either perfect zeal or maximum development. One of Lenin's earliest announcements after assuming office promised an immediate expansion of the timid and tentative social insurance that had been introduced in 1912. The result was the transformation of this small and limited insurance fund into a system of unlimited and universal security to the entire wage-earning population, which stood in constant danger of being bereft of an income by any of the hazards of life. In our judgment this provision of economic security has been, during the past eighteen years, an important factor in making each workman conscious, not only of his soviet citizenship, but also of his joint ownership with his fellows of the whole of the means of production. The soviet worker realises, as the wage-earners of no other country do, that the future maintenance, in any adversity, of his wife and children, together with his own, have become a direct charge upon the community's yearly production, and a charge of which the administration is now entirely in the hands of his trade union organisation.¹

On this path of providing economic security, the Soviet Government at once boldly struck out, immeasurably beyond anything that had been contemplated by Prince Bismarck and Mr. Lloyd George under the name of social insurance. Thus, there is, in the USSR, no attempt to build up

¹ Apart from the numerous reports and statistics published in Russian, detailed information as to social insurance is not easy to pick out of the most available books (already cited) which usually treat generally either of the conditions of labour or of the administration of medical aid. There is a useful bibliography of Russian sources, which are numerous and varied, in *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price (1928, 130 pp.), which is still the most convenient general survey; superseding the author's previous studies of 1913 and 1922 which were published among others on *Administration of Labor Laws and Factory Inspection in certain European Countries* (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 142, and *Monthly Labour Review*, vol. xvi., June 1923); *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (1927), and *Studies and Reports on the Medical Inspection of Labour* (both by the International Labour Office), should also be consulted, together with *Russia after Ten Years* (report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927, 96 pp.); and *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn and R. G. Tugwell (New York, 1928, 374 pp.); especially chap. ix. on "Labor Legislation and Social Insurance", by Paul H. Douglas; together with *The Condition of Labor in the USSR*, by L. Ginsburg (1927). Some information as to the administrative organisation of the past few years may be obtained in English from the volume entitled *The Ninth Trade Union Congress* (1933, 226 pp.), being the speeches of Shvernik and Kagnovich; and from the pamphlets entitled *Speech of Welcome to Foreign Delegates* (1933, 28 pp.) and *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions* (1933, 50 pp.), both by N. M. Shvernik. A useful article by Vassili Afanasievich Kotov, collegium member and chief of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSTSR appeared in the *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933; see also his books on the subject (in Russian), *Social Insurance in Socialist Construction* (Moscow, 1933, 136 pp.) and the diagrammatic statistics entitled *Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*.

a capital fund from which the future benefits will be met ; there is consequently no question of charging high premiums to young and healthy people in order to accumulate reserves out of which to meet the increasing cost of their sickness and superannuation as they grow older ; and there is accordingly no idea of limiting the benefits by the amount of any fund so accumulated. There is, in fact, except for book-keeping purposes, no separate insurance fund ; the benefits each year are, in the main, provided from the collections of the year. Soviet Communism makes the discovery that the community does not grow older year by year, and therefore more liable to break down, as each individual does ; and with this fact, so successfully obscured by individualism, all necessity for the actuarial complications involved in the European and American conception of insurance simply disappear. Incidentally, the need for exacting, week by week, an individual contribution from each workman also disappears. Under Soviet Communism thrift recovers its primary meaning of a wise allocation of present resources. The provision for those who are at any particular time out of health, for the consequences of accidents whenever they occur, and for a socially beneficent and humane treatment of those who may be involuntarily unemployed, on the one hand ; and for the permanently disabled, the widow and the orphan, the aged and the superannuated, on the other, becomes part of the allocation of the annual income of the community, instead of a burden upon each individual or each locality. It may then be recognised that any such communal provision can most properly be made, not by accumulation and investment in securities, but year by year, out of income as the need occurs.¹

How the System of Economic Security Developed

It would be hard to unravel, and tedious to recount, the various stages through which, between 1917 and 1935, both the administration and the benefits of soviet social insurance have passed.² It must suffice to note

¹ We do not need here to discuss whether the advantageous effects upon character, of individual saving through personal contributions to separate insurance funds, are sufficient, in the capitalist countries, to outweigh the cost and complications of such funds. It is a mistake to suppose that there is no room for individual saving under Soviet Communism. There are other channels for saving which, in the USSR, allow for relatively large amounts being thus accumulated. The state savings banks, the successive internal loans, the growing share capital of the consumers' cooperative movement, the steady increase of capital accumulations of the manufacturing associations of owner-producers (incoops) and of the collective farms (kolkhosi) and communes, the increasing ownership of the members of cooperative housing societies in the cities, and the policies taken out in the state life insurance department, together with the growing personal possessions in small live-stock and household furniture of the members of the collective farms and those of the wage and salary earners in the urban areas, represent in the aggregate a large amount of individual savings. This, however, is doubtless still far behind the personal accumulations of the wage-earning class in Great Britain or in Scandinavia.

² These stages, down to 1926, are summarised, somewhat harshly, in *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1927) ; and, between 1927 and 1933, in the pamphlet *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik (1933, 50 pp.).

that the representatives of the workers in the cities pressed, persistently if sporadically, both for universality in the range of the scheme, and for generosity in the amount of its provisions. It was, from the first, agreed that no contribution should be collected from the workers themselves, whether managers or labourers. What is significant is the character of the consideration given to the continued demands for increase in the range and amount of the benefits. It is not too much to say that we find, in the discussions, no "enemy party". There has been no association of profit-making employers bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Government to resist such encroachments on capitalist interests! No one objected to the trade unions, which include, it will be remembered, the most highly salaried directors and technicians, as well as all grades of manual labourers, obtaining all the net product. Whether the demand was for the inclusion, from the very first day of employment, of all sections of workers engaged at wages or salaries; or for full wages during temporary sickness without limit of time, from the first day of incapacity to work; or for the most complete and costly medical treatment; or for relieving the mother from the whole financial burden of maternity; or for promptly succouring the household left desolate through the death of the breadwinner, the issue raised was, not one of a division of the surplus between profits and wages, but merely the distribution of an agreed aggregate wage fund between what should be spent as "personal wages" and as "socialised wages" respectively. If the mass of the workmen preferred an enlargement of the socialised wages rather than further increase in the personal wages, the managements of the industrial trusts, or the Soviet Government, had no reason to object. The socialised wage, which came to the workmen and their families in their days of special need, at the time when they required exceptional succour, and in the form that was most advantageous to them, plainly "went further", from the standpoint of the community, than a like aggregate expenditure in monthly cash wages all round. What the administrators had to consider, with regard to each demand, was not so much what it would cost, as what would be the effect of this or that modification of the scheme of economic security upon the productivity of industry. In so far as the desired change made for increased protection against destitution, or improved health among the working population, or among the mothers, or among the children, and did not necessitate an actual reduction of personal wages, it was, from the standpoint of the Soviet Government, as of their administrative advisers, all to the good. On the other hand, any enlargement of benefits that tended to decrease the working efficiency of the individual worker, or the aggregate productivity of the establishment, had to be resisted, even if its direct cost could easily be afforded. If the rates of personal wages were not sufficiently high, in all grades above the lowest, to create the most general striving in the lower grades for an improvement in their several qualifications; and, if the rates in the higher grades were not sufficient to evoke the utmost effort from their members, the maximum

productivity would not be attained. If the distribution of insurance benefits could be made such as would encourage the shock-brigaders and the "activists", whilst discouraging the merely apathetic members, this again would be all to the good. What had specially to be resisted was any change that threatened to increase slackness or absenteeism, or promote malingering. The alterations that the workmen sought in the machinery of administration had to be scrutinised in the same dry light. The factory committee, elected by the trade unionists, could be trusted to decide strictly on admission to benefit only if the committee, supported by the public opinion of the factory, realised that every day lost by the absence of a slacker or a malingerer involved a distinct lessening of output, from which the entire staff of the establishment would suffer in a diminution of the expected increase of wages. Nothing but such a public opinion would enable the doctors, responsible to the People's Commissar of Health, to be sternly rigid in refusing medical certificates to those who failed to convince them of a genuine incapacity to continue at work. It is in the light of these considerations that the latest reforms in administration, now in course of being put in operation, and also the distinctive features of soviet insurance, must be viewed.

In the detailed administration there has been manifested a decided increase in the tendency to decentralisation. This has been going on during the last few years.¹ An important step was the establishment, mostly in the new enterprises started under the First Five-Year Plan, of local paying centres run by salaried officials in particular industrial areas. These grew rapidly in number, with the upgrowth of new industrial plants, state farms and machine and tractor stations, until in 1933 there were no fewer than 3500 of them. A still more important development was the establishment of 11 divisional offices, to keep separately the accounts, for the whole social insurance work throughout the USSR, of as many particular trade unions. These divisional offices in 1933 covered 6 million workers, and issued annually in benefits 930 million roubles, thus relieving the central social insurance office of a quarter of its accounting functions. The third step, decided on in 1932, was to extend this decentralisation of account-keeping to all the 47 trade unions (presently becoming 154), involving the setting up of many more divisional offices, one for each trade union; and making each of the 47 (now 154) trade union central councils severally responsible for the supervision and direction of the divisional office dealing with its own members from one end of the USSR to the other. At the same time the determination of policy, and, indeed, all general questions, were actually further centralised by the abolition of the several People's Commissars of Labour of the two dozen constituent and autonomous republics, and the transfer of all their functions, notably the administration of social insurance, to a single authority for the USSR as a whole. This was effected by concentration of these functions in the

¹ This is succinctly described (in Russian) in *Social Insurance in Socialist Construction*, by V. A. Kobov (Moscow, 1933, 136 pp.).

supreme trade union authority, the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, in its triennial sessions; and, between these sessions, in the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which that congress elects. The whole edifice of health insurance is now administered, so far as the actual performance of medical services is concerned, by the professional staffs of the several People's Commissars of Health of the couple of dozen constituent and autonomous republics, who are largely dominated by the People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR. With regard to everything else, including all the money payments, whether in personal benefits or in refund to the Health Commissariats of the doctors' salaries, the administration is in the hands of the several hierarchies of councils of the 154 trade unions, responsible in each case to the central council of the particular union, under the general direction, for the whole USSR, of the central committee representing all the 154 trade unions. The detailed work, including the admission to benefit, and even the fixing of its amount, is entrusted, under the instructions and supervision of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, to the factory committees, together with their subordinate insurance committees, elected by the trade unionists in the several establishments. Against any of their decisions there is an appeal to the higher authorities of the particular trade union, and, in need, even to the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions; but to no outside authority. This was described by Shvernik, the secretary of the AUCCTU, as "The trade unions . . . passing over from control to direct administration".¹ The factory committee is even made responsible for seeing that the management pays its contribution to social insurance with due regularity.

¹ *New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik (1933), p. 18.

As Shvernik explains, normally, in all enterprises, the authorities to decide upon the payment of benefits under social insurance, and to fix their rates, will be the factory committees of the several enterprises, in accordance with the instructions of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). "The actual payment of benefits will be made by the management on the order of the factory committee, from the contributions paid by the management in accordance with the social insurance law. This will avoid delays and generally improve social insurance service for workers and office employees. In enterprises employing over 5000 workers these functions may be transferred from the general factory committee to the local committees in various shops or departments of the plant. In regard to workers and office employees in small enterprises or institutions, the trade union district or local committees authorise the payment of the social insurance benefit, actual payment being made by the management of the enterprise. In the case of individuals working for private employers (household servants and so on) insurance benefit is determined and paid by the local district committee of the trade union.

"The instructions contain a further provision under which appeals against refusal of benefit or rate fixed are submitted to the higher authority of the trade union, whose decision is binding. Appeals against incorrect payment or delays on the part of the management are submitted to the factory committee, which makes the final decision" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

It will be noted by the student that the admission of the trade union to administration, in social insurance, as in taking over the "closed cooperatives" (see pp. 258-259), amounts to giving to the producers the administration, *not of what they produce, but of what they consume*. The trade union, in these cases, acts as an association of certain groups of the consumers of particular commodities or services.

Distinctive Features

The first feature of social insurance in the USSR that will strike the student, and one that warrants the name of a system of economic security, is the wide range of its activities and the variety of its benefits. In contrast with the modest funeral benefit and exiguous sick-pay that began to be provided two centuries ago by the scanty pence of exceptionally provident groups of workmen—the British friendly societies—out of which the whole European system of social insurance may be said to have developed—we find in the USSR very nearly the whole wage-earning population, men, women and children (although not all peasants), provided, irrespective of any limit set by actuarial calculations or individual contributions, with an astonishingly long list of protective advantages, meeting, as they occur, not only the exceptional and occasional, but also many of the periodical needs of life, from birth to burial.¹ Only a part of these protective advantages of the system of economic security are now commonly referred to as social insurance; indeed, many of them we have

¹ The considered judgment of an American expert in social insurance which he had studied in all the countries of Europe is impressive. Dr. Price in 1928 declared that "There are several distinctive features in the social insurance law of Soviet Russia which render this law much more beneficial to the workers than any other law extant. In the first place, the benefits of the social insurance act embrace *all* workers, members of labor unions, engaged for hire. . . . Secondly, the organization and control, the collection of the insurance and its expenditure and distribution are all in the hands of the labor unions . . . and the workers themselves. Thirdly, while in all countries the workers are obligated to contribute a certain proportion of the insurance funds, ordinarily from thirty to forty per cent, in Soviet Russia the workers contribute nothing, but all the funds are collected from the enterprise—the establishment. In other words, a certain per cent of the wages, but not from the wages, is added by the enterprise, and is devoted to the purposes of social insurance. Fourthly, the rate of insurance contributions is larger than in any other country, for while in other countries it ranges from two to four per cent of the wages, in Russia it amounts on the average to not less than fourteen per cent, thus giving three and a half times as much protection as other countries. Finally, the soviet social insurance makes the most generous and extensive provisions for payments during temporary and permanent disability, for maternity and child welfare, and especially for medical care" (*Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price, 1928, pp. 98-99).

The members of the federated manufacturing associations of owner producers (industrial cooperatives), who are technically not "employed", and who are consequently excluded from trade union membership, have a system of social insurance very much on the lines of that administered by the trade unions and managed by their supreme council. See, in Russian, *A Collection of Regulations on the Industrial Cooperatives and Kustar Industry*, by I. A. Selitzky and R. I. Khoysky, edited by Professor D. M. Genkin (Moscow, 1932); *On Treasuries of Mutual Insurance, and Mutual help in the Incops*, by Vseko-promsovietskass (1933); *The Mutual Insurance of the Incops on the New Road*, by A. Baulin and L. Heifitz (Moscow, 1934); *The Monetary Types of Benefits*, by K. Kats (Moscow, 1934); *The Bolshevik Tempo in Reconstruction of Treasuries*, by Vseko-prom-sovietkass (1934).

The members of the collective farms (kolkhosi), who are also as owner producers excluded from trade union membership, are now beginning to develop a similar system of economic security for orphans and the sick, including maternity and also accidents within each farm. This takes the simple form of allowing those unable to work nevertheless to receive their share of the joint produce. Only the nomadic tribes and the individual hunters and fishermen, and the surviving individual peasantry, together with the dwindling categories of the "deprived" and the non-wage-earning families of those sections, are now altogether outside the range of social insurance.

already described in our sections on maternity, infancy and health. It adds to the confusion that, on the usual principle of multiformity, many of these protective advantages are supplemented by additional provisions, made, in the USSR, not only by the government, central or local, but also by all sorts of organisations, out of all sorts of funds, and largely from voluntary collections.

A second point of interest in the social insurance provided by Soviet Communism is the simplicity of the machinery by which the collection of funds and the distribution of cash "benefits" is effected. On the revenue side the whole contribution is made, as part of its own working expenses, by the management of any establishment, of any kind whatsoever, employing persons at wages or salary. This contribution avoids all reference to the individuals concerned, and consists of a definitely fixed percentage of the aggregate of wages and salaries, including bonuses and other extra payments. This has automatically to be paid over at stated periods, by direct placing of the amounts to the credit of the social insurance authority at one or other branch of the State Bank, thus involving the very minimum of expenses or trouble for collection. On the expenditure side, nearly the entire medical service is, as we have described, rendered by the professional staff employed by the commissariat of health of each constituent or autonomous republic, and thus does not trouble the administrators of the money benefit. Admission to benefit, and the distribution of the money allowances, are both now entrusted to the several trade unions. The work is done in each factory, office or institution for its particular employees, for the most part gratuitously, as voluntary service, by some 50,000 "active" members of the trade unions concerned, under a special insurance commission appointed by each factory committee. This consists partly of members of the factory committee itself, but mostly of other trade unionists volunteering to serve. Under the reorganisation announced in the speech of L. Kaganovich at the Ninth Congress of Trade Unions in April 1932, and in that of N. M. Shvernik to the plenum of the AUCCU in June 1933, the factory committee is responsible, for the proper performance of its social insurance work, to the central committee of its own union. But the supreme authority, which alone deals with general questions of social insurance policy, is not any one trade union, even in its highest council, but the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, in its triennial sessions; and, between these sessions, the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCU) which the congress elects.¹

¹ Prior to 1933 the supreme administrative authority for social insurance in each constituent republic was shared between the People's Commissar of Labour and the People's Commissar of Health, responsible to the Sovnarkom (cabinet) of that republic. All these People's Commissars were, however, under the necessity of keeping their administration of health and of the labour laws in line, which meant, in substance, following the lead of that of the RSFSR under the directions of the USSR People's Commissar of Finance, in whose budget for the USSR their own several budgets had finally to be incorporated. The reform of 1933, which abolished the People's Commissars for Labour, and transferred all the functions of their commissariats in the several constituent republics

It is a remarkable feature of social insurance in the USSR that the contributions which the management of every establishment, whether "economic" or "cultural", employing persons at wages or salary is required to make, are not and have never been uniform, either in amount or in the rate per worker. They have, until 1933, been assessed, on the management of each establishment by the People's Commissars of Labour of the several constituent and autonomous republics, at a rate fixed for each enterprise in consultation with the trade unions, the several commissariats of health, and other experts and organisations conversant with the conditions. From 1933 onward they fall to be assessed by the presidium of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in similar consultation. The considerations to be taken into account are not strictly defined. They naturally include the particular hazard to health and liability to accident of the several occupations, but the economic and even the organisational position of each enterprise is not excluded. It could be stated in 1927 that "the average cost of insurance is about 14 per cent of the wages of the insured, and ranges from 10 to 20 per cent of the wages. Industrial and other establishments are divided into four groups. The first pays 16 per cent; the second, 18 per cent; the third, 20 per cent; and the fourth, 22 per cent, of the wages towards the insurance funds. Certain public institutions which are in bad financial condition enjoy privileged rates which amount only to 10, 12 and 14 per cent of the wages. Thus, certain state industries pay but 10 per cent, railroad and river transportation but 12 per cent, and forest industries but 14 per cent."¹ Whilst some of the rates vary from one year to another, no change in principle with regard to these contributions seems to be called for.

With the rapid and continuous growth of "industrialisation" the figures become ever more colossal. The total assessments for social insurance mount steadily year by year. In the fiscal year 1925-1926 the receipts were about 700 millions of roubles; in 1927-1928 they exceeded 1050 million roubles; in 1931 they were 2849 million roubles; in 1932 they seem to have reached 4399 million roubles; and in 1933, after the completion of the First Five-Year Plan, they attained no less than 4610 million roubles. This, as it was proudly remarked, was not far short of twice the aggregate budgets for all governmental expenditure whatsoever of four neighbouring states, namely, Italy (1870 million roubles), Poland (510 million roubles), Roumania (280 million roubles) and Latvia (48 million roubles). In 1934 the totals of social insurance reached 5050 million roubles, whilst the corresponding budget for 1935 was over 6079 million roubles, being more than five times as much as in 1927-1928. It

to the trade union organisation of the whole USSR, headed by the AUCCTU, which acts for the whole country, may therefore—whilst further decentralising the administration of each function of the trade unions within each constituent republic—have amounted to a measure of centralisation for the USSR as a whole, in trade union administration generally, including all the services of social insurance and labour protection.

¹ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by George M. Price, M.D. (1928), p. 101.

is the administration of this immense sum of receipts and expenditure that is entrusted to the committees, councils and congresses of the 18 million members of the soviet trade unions. One-fourth of the total is distributed in cash benefits for temporary sickness ; about one-fourth repays the cost of medical aid supplied by the People's Commissars of Health, including hospitals ; more than a third is distributed in pensions to the aged and permanently disabled, and to widows and orphans ; whilst no inconsiderable fraction is spent in aid of housing accommodation on the one hand and the maintenance of rest houses on the other, both of them being regarded as directly benefiting the workers' health.

The elaborateness of the various benefits payable in cash, and the extent to which they are adjusted according to individual needs, are alike marks of a system of economic security. It is indeed a distinctive feature of the social insurance of the USSR that these cash benefits and other advantages, like the contributions of the several managements, exhibit no systematic or complete uniformity, either between district and district or between man and man. In many cases, as we shall see, they are given in proportion to the ascertained need of the particular family.

Death Benefit

In the history of what in Great Britain are called "friendly" benefits, the first to be adopted is always that of the cost of funerals. This is naturally included in the USSR scheme of economic security, actually in a much more liberal way than in any other country, but without any uniform or specified amount. On the death of any person included within the range of social insurance, including any dependent member of his household, the whole cost of civil interment is provided as a matter of course, to an amount varying from district to district according to the local charges. For a child, the payment is half as much as is allowed for an adult. In 1927 the average allowance was 28 roubles. But much more than burial is done for the bereaved family. The condition of the household is considered, and if the survivors (including those of deceased old-age pensioners) are without adequate means of livelihood, their immediate needs are promptly met from the social insurance funds. The household income is temporarily increased according to what is required ; and steps are taken to find employment for those members who are capable of earning. If the total earnings, together with the provision for children made in the crèche or nursery school, kindergarten or elementary school, do not suffice for maintenance, the widowed mother may be further relieved. In fact, the primitive funeral benefit has been developed into an extensive provision, free from any taint of charity or pauperism, for the dependants of the deceased who are left in need. "If a worker leaves dependants who have no other means of support they are entitled to pensions from the social insurance department. A husband or wife of the deceased will be regarded as dependent provided they are unable to work,

or have children below the age of 8 who claim their attention. Children under 16 years, and those over 16 who have been disabled before they reached that age, are also classed as dependants. If a worker dies from an industrial accident or disease, his dependants will receive somewhat more than if he dies from non-industrial causes. The scale for the first class of cases is one-third of the previous earnings for one dependant, one-half for two dependants and three-fourths for three or more; while for the second class the scale is two-ninths, one-third and four-ninths respectively."¹ There is accordingly no room in the USSR for the enterprise of the so-called industrial insurance corporations which extract so many millions annually from wage-earners of Great Britain and of the United States.

Sickness Benefit

In all countries the most costly benefit in times of normal employment is that payable when the worker is certified to be temporarily unable to pursue his or her occupation, whether from ordinary illness, or in consequence of an accident, or from an occupational disease; or because the family is placed in quarantine owing to the presence of infectious disease, or merely because the worker is required to absent himself or herself from work to care for a sick dependant. Any worker within the range of social insurance, and being a member of a trade union, becomes eligible for this benefit irrespective of the amount of salary or wage, and also irrespective of the means of the family, as soon as he or she has completed two months' service in any one establishment, obtains a certificate from the establishment doctor and does not refuse or neglect to conform to the medical treatment prescribed.² Unlike the practice elsewhere, in the USSR the cash benefit becomes payable, not after any waiting period, but from the very first day of incapacity for earning. The amount of the cash benefit is not any arbitrarily fixed and uniform sum, but full wages—meaning, however, only the standard time rate, not the piece-work earnings, and subject to a maximum of 7½ roubles per day or 180 roubles per month. "The worker is in addition furnished with free medical attendance throughout the period of his disability. This medical service is not

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927), p. 49.

"Funeral benefit is paid on production of a death certificate, and in the case of a dependant a certificate of relationship must also be presented" (Provisional Instructions, issued November 1930, by the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in *Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

On July 1, 1926, the number of relatives of deceased persons in receipt of pensions from the Social Insurance Funds was 246,273 (*Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, International Labour Office, 1927, p. 91). In 1932 it had risen to 432,800. (See the diagrammatic statistics (in Russian) in *Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*, by V. A. Kotov (1934).)

² "Under the most recent arrangements the factory committee determines the right to benefit, its amounts and period, on the basis of medical certificate, period of work (total and in the given place of work, statement whether insured, member of trade union, shock worker)" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

confined to the general practitioner as is the case under the British Health Insurance system, but carries with it the services of such specialists as oculists, dentists and surgeons. Free hospital care is also provided, as are drugs, medicine and appliances such as artificial limbs. It should be emphasised that this medical care is not confined as under the British system to the wage-earners alone, but is also extended to their families."¹

Invalidity and Old-Age Benefit

Where a worker within the range of social insurance is wholly or partially unable to work, not by reason of an illness assumed to be temporary, but by infirmity of an apparently permanent character, including that due to old age,² he or she is entitled to claim an examination by a small commission of medical experts for the determination of the degree and character of the disability and infirmity. This, according to the scheme in force in 1927, is divided into six groups as follows, three involving total and three partial disability. The highest is that of total disability coupled with a condition requiring the constant attendance or assistance of another person; such is the condition of the blind, the paralysed or the bedridden. A second group is that of those totally disabled but not requiring personal attendance, such as those seriously crippled, but able to get about on crutches. This is distinguished from the third group, where the disability to perform remunerative work is total, but is without personal disability apart from work, such as the extreme infirmity of healthy old age. The three other groups are defined by degrees of partial inability to perform remunerative work of some sort, which may be assessed at one-third disability, one-sixth disability or one-tenth disability. The amount of cash benefit, which is payable whatever the amount of salary or wage latterly earned, and also irrespective of means, is made to depend on whether the disability is due to industrial accident or occupational disease on the one hand, or on the other, to general causes, such as old age, or chronic infirmity unconnected with the occupation. If falling within the former class, after a prescribed minimum of service varying from 6 to 9 years, according to occupations, Group I. receives full wages; Group II. two-thirds wages; Group III. one-half wages; Group IV. one-third wages. If within the latter class, no cash

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927), p. 42.

² The old-age pensions, apart from those for premature disability, have been recently increased. They are now given to workers with 20 to 25 years' service (varying according to occupation), at the age of 60, or for women 55. In specially onerous or dangerous trades, such as coal-mining, the age for pension is 50, and the qualification only 15 or 20 years' service. The pension is usually 75 per cent of wages, varying according to occupation, but in no case less than 50 per cent.

In 1931 the number of pensions paid to "the invalids of labour" for premature retirement from illness, accident and occupational diseases had risen to 705,000 besides 40,500 old-age pensions and 26,700 for long service (*Social Insurance in the USSR, 1923-1932*, by V. A. Kotov, 1932, p. 25).

benefits are payable for Groups IV., V. and VI., but Group I. gets two-thirds wages, Group II. four-ninths wages, and Group III. one-third wages. "The average monthly payment in March 1927 for the first grade of disabled from industrial causes was 45 roubles; and 34 roubles for the non-industrially disabled."¹

It must not be assumed that such liberal provision for infirmity and old age prevails for all workers all over the USSR, even in the case of trade union members. The scheme is, however, steadily extending both its geographical and its industrial range. In 1927-1928 the total paid in cash benefits in respect of permanent disability was stated as 204 million roubles, with something like 300,000 beneficiaries. In 1932 the total payments from social insurance funds under this head had risen to 480 million roubles.

Maternity Benefit

We have already seen that women, whether trade union members themselves, or the wives of members,² receive free medical attendance in pregnancy and childbirth; and those earning wages or salary are required to take either twelve or sixteen weeks' leave of absence from their employment during which they receive full time-work wages, all regardless of the amount of salary or wage, and also irrespective of family means. They must further be set free from work for half an hour, without loss of wages at intervals of three and a half hours, in order that the infant may be breast-fed. But they also receive a fixed money grant for the infant's requirements in clothes, etc., now amounting to 32 roubles. There is even a further grant toward the infant's maintenance, now amounting to 20 roubles per month, sometimes issued in kind, for the first nine months of the infant's life. "This payment . . . is used by the Commissariat of Health as a means of keeping in touch with these mothers and getting

¹ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price (1928), p. 104.

On July 1, 1927, the number of persons receiving pensions in respect of disablement in the USSR was 309,589 (*The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, International Labour Office, 1927, p. 191).

In 1933 the scheme of invalidity pensions was stated as follows: "Under the Soviet social insurance legislation labour invalids are: workers and employees who have partially lost their ability to work at their trade and are forced to engage in easier occupation (third category); those who have completely lost their ability to work but are not in need of outside care (second category); and those who have completely lost their ability to work and are in need of being taken care of by another person (first category). Workers employed in the leading industries (metal, coal, chemical, mining, machine building, etc.) may under certain conditions receive pensions up to 90 per cent of their wages, if classed under the first category; up to 70 per cent if belonging to the second category; and up to 50 per cent if belonging to the third category." For workers in other industries the percentages of pensions to wages are 80, 60 and 46 respectively. If the disability has occurred by accident or occupational disease, the percentages are 100, 75 and 50 respectively (article by V. A. Kotov, head of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSTSR, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933).

² Whether or not the mating had been legally registered as a marriage. See the Russian work *The Protection of Motherhood and Childhood in the Country of the Soviets*, by V. P. Lëbedeva (Moscow, 1934), 263 pp.

them to follow medical advice in caring for their children.”¹ In 1925-1926 the cash benefits in connection with maternity payable from social insurance funds amounted to no less than 93 million roubles, including “24 million roubles for the period before and after confinement, 23 million to buy necessities for the infants, and 46 millions to feed them”.² In 1934 these amounts had risen nearly sixfold.

Unemployment Benefit

As we have already mentioned, no unemployment benefit has been payable in the USSR since October 1930, as the trade union officials, in supersession of the former labour exchanges, can now undertake promptly to find employment at trade union rates of wages in an occupation within the capacity of any able-bodied man or woman, although not necessarily in their own trade or at their present place of residence. He or she can be assisted to move to the place where the vacancy exists. In the case of young men or women, who may be deemed eligible for training for work requiring some degree of skill which they do not possess, the necessary training may be provided free, accompanied by allowances for maintenance. Anyone incapable of work must be medically certified, and is then dealt with under the heading of sickness or infirmity. It is believed that through the operation of Planned Production for Community Consumption as explained in our previous chapter, there need never be any involuntary mass unemployment of wage-earners in the USSR.

The severe limitation of the previous unemployment cash benefit in the USSR is in contrast with the extreme liberality of the payments to the sick, the infirm and the aged. It may be instructive to set out the arrangements for unemployment benefit as they existed between 1925 and 1930.

The unemployment benefit of the USSR differed, in fact, so long as it was in operation, substantially from all the other forms of social insurance developed by Soviet Communism. It was so far from being a system of economic security that only a fraction—perhaps one-fifth, or even less—of the workers actually without employment in any month obtained any money payment.³ Unlike the sickness and maternity benefits, it was

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation to Soviet Russia, 1927).

² “On the presentation of a birth certificate, a wage certificate of the previous month, and a certificate from the child’s place of residence, the factory shop committee issues an order for payment to the mother of 32 roubles for baby clothes, and a first payment of 20 roubles for infant nursing. As soon as the latter has been paid, an order is issued for the second part of the benefit” (Provisional Instructions issued November 1933, by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, in *Moscow Daily News*, November 18, 1933).

³ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George Price (1928), p. 105.

⁴ The number of men and women receiving unemployment benefit during 1925-1926 varied from 236,000 to 587,000. “It will be seen that only a little over a fourth of those who were out of work were given unemployment benefit. The amounts distributed are, however, considerable, amounting to 30.5 million roubles in 1924-1925, and approximately 41.5 million roubles in 1925-1926” (*Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, edited by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn and R. G. Tugwell, New York, 1928, p. 235).

It is, however, to be noted that: “The unemployed are also given in addition very

limited (by a stringent "means test") to those without any income whatsoever. It never amounted to anything like full wages, being only between one-fifth and one-half of the applicant's previous earnings. Moreover, the applicant, although not required to be actually a trade union member, had to prove a definite minimum of previous industrial employment.

Down to 1930, members of trade unions unable to find employment, whose membership was of one year's standing, could register as unemployed and as claimants for unemployment benefit, either with their trade union unit or at the government labour exchange. If they had for any valid reason dropped out of trade union membership, they could, on production of evidence of previous trade union affiliation and of their last employment, be registered at the government labour exchange. There was also, for all but skilled workers and juveniles, a qualifying period of employment; in the case of unskilled manual working members of trade unions, one year's service in some non-agricultural occupation; for non-members, three years' service. For other salaried employees the qualifying period was, for members three years' service and for non-members five years'. No unemployment benefit was payable to workers in agriculture, even if they had been employed at wages.

The amount of unemployment benefit varied in a complicated way according to the category of the applicant, the average time-work wage in his district and the number of persons dependent on him. "The country", we read, "is divided into six belts and the average earnings of all workers computed for each. Skilled manual workers and salaried employees with a higher education (Class A) are paid one-third of the average earnings in their belt. Semi-skilled manual workers and higher grade salaried employees (Class B) are paid one-fourth of the average; and unskilled manual workers and all the remaining salaried employees (Class C) are paid one-fifth. This is an interesting compromise between the flat-rate system of benefits irrespective of earning power, as in the British system, and the payment of percentage of individual earnings. . . . Since Class C, however, when at work, earned much less than Class A, this in practice means that the members of Class C receive a higher percentage of their earnings than do Class A. The average monthly payments in March 1927 to the unemployed in the first group was 17 roubles; the average for the remainder was 11 roubles 40 kopeks. The usual practice of increasing the amount of unemployment benefits according to the number of dependants is also followed. Those with one dependant are great reductions in rent so that in the cities they are virtually given free housing. Another interesting method of relief is the establishment of cooperative labour societies where the unemployed who are not eligible for benefits are employed for six months' periods in producing articles of a handicraft nature. At the end of six months one worker is replaced by another unemployed worker. The goods are sold on the open market but there is a slight deficit which is met by grants from the social insurance fund amounting to 6.5 million roubles in 1925-1926. Construction work in government projects absorbs still more of the unemployed, and in all about 110,000 were cared for by these methods during the last year" (*ibid.* p. 235).

given an additional sum amounting to 15 per cent of the sum paid in benefits; those with two dependants are paid an additional 25 per cent, and those with three or more, 35 per cent. The entire amount received by the worker in benefits, however, must not exceed one-half of his previous earnings."¹

The period during which unemployment benefit would be paid was also strictly limited. It was payable only for a period of nine months in any one year in the case of skilled workmen, and six months in the case of the unskilled; but no more than eighteen monthly payments were made over any length of time to any skilled man, or twelve to any unskilled man. On the other hand, the unemployed were entitled to receive, during their unemployment, the usual cash benefits in respect of sickness, pregnancy or confinement; free medical attendance; the allowance for newborn infants; and death benefits—just as if they were employed.

Other Benefits of Social Insurance

We have even now not exhausted the ramifications of social insurance in the USSR. Out of the social insurance monies collected from the managements of all the enterprises, economic or cultural, employing persons at wages or salaries—in all cases assessed as a percentage upon the aggregate wage-bill—various miscellaneous advantages are provided or subsidised for the benefit of the wage-earners. With one of these, that of improved dwelling accommodation, we deal separately as part of the transformation of the environment.²

Rest Houses and Sanatoria

An interesting adjunct of the social insurance departments is the vast array of trade union "rest houses" (holiday homes) and sanatoria (con-

¹ *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1927), pp. 46-47. The total disbursed in unemployed benefits in 1928-1929 was only 136 million roubles, when there were 10,540,000 insured persons. Thus the average unemployed benefit drawn in that year by each insured person was only 13 roubles, which probably represented something like one month's average unemployment benefit (article by V. A. Kotov, head of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSFSR, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933).

² The financial contribution thus made to housing is important. "The social insurance departments", it could be said as early as 1927, "have invested large sums of money in [the] building of workers' houses; 60 million roubles, or 10 per cent of the total capital, has been invested in these workers' houses." More generally, the social insurance contribution takes the form of subsidising other schemes of providing improved dwellings. "In 1926-1927 there were invested 340 million roubles in these undertakings. In 1926-1927 there were 380,000 workers supplied with new houses" (*Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price, 1928, p. 106). In 1933 the amount to be spent on the construction of new dwellings from social insurance funds was estimated at 600 million roubles (*New Functions of the Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik, 1933, p. 20).

In 1932 the total expenditure on housing from social insurance funds was no less than 700 million roubles (article by V. A. Kotov, head of the Social Insurance Bureau of the RSFSR, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933; and see his *Social Insurance in Socialist Construction* (Russian), Moscow, 1933).

valescent homes), largely provided by the various governments in the allocation for this purpose of royal palaces and mansions of the wealthy, from the Tsar's immense residences at Peterhof (near Leningrad) and Livadia (in the Crimea), down to the rich homes on the islands of the Neva, and in the suburbs of all the cities, as well as at various spas in the Caucasus and the luxurious villas that line the shores of the Black Sea. Many of these residences are wholly or partly maintained, whilst new ones are being built and furnished, out of social insurance funds, with the object of eventually having sufficient accommodation to allow every worker to spend his or her annual holiday, and every sick person to enjoy the necessary period of convalescence, in the most advantageous surroundings. At present only a fraction of the working population can be so accommodated. But already "in 1925-1926, 455,286 persons were housed in rest homes, constituting 5.11 per cent of the workers. In 1925-1926 nearly eight million roubles were paid by the insurance funds; and in 1927-1928 nearly twelve million roubles."¹ In 1933 the estimated amount to be so spent from social insurance funds was 20 million roubles. In 1933 "the social insurance bodies have at their disposal 311 rest homes, accommodating 73,000 people; 98 sanatoria, some of which are situated in watering-places, accommodating 19,925 people. The value of these rest homes and sanatoria, including their equipment, exceeds 130 million roubles. The rest homes can receive 1,140,000 people [yearly] on a basis of fortnightly vacations, while the sanatoriums, on a basis of monthly vacations, can receive 141,330. . . . The new construction is also put at our disposal. At present 50 rest homes calculated to accommodate 16,745 people, and 29 sanatoriums calculated to accommodate 10,925 people, are being built. The capital invested in this new construction amounts to 158 million roubles . . . but this does not exhaust the assets. The rest homes and sanatoriums have large subsidiary farm lands whose total sown area exceeds 41,000 hectares. Also these farms already own over 5000 head of milch cows, over 10,000 pigs, over a quarter of a million head of poultry, and so on. . . . This farming is still new to the social insurance bodies, for the business is not yet two years old."²

Personal Credit

A remarkable adjunct of soviet social insurance, a characteristic example of the extent to which, in the USSR, voluntary cooperation is intertwined with collective organisation, is the vast network of "mutual aid" societies with which the greater part of the USSR is covered.³ This is wholly a growth of the past ten years. The societies are practically

¹ *Labor Protection in Soviet Russia*, by Dr. George M. Price (1928), p. 106.

² *New Functions for Soviet Trade Unions*, by N. M. Shvernik (1933), p. 21.

³ For Mutual Aid Societies see *Soviet Trade Unions*, by Robert W. Dunn (1928), pp. 220-221. The circular relating to their organisation issued by the AUCCTU in 1925 is mentioned in *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia* (International Labour Office, 1927), p. 186; *The Ninth Congress of Trade Unions* (1933), pp. 166-167.

personal credit associations, having as their main purpose the grant of small loans to their members, without any security whatsoever. The societies are not of the nature of the cooperative credit societies, so widely extended in Germany, India and other countries, where the members usually have to find sureties guaranteeing the repayment of their loans, and where the loans are almost always to enable the borrower to extend his own profit-making enterprises. The loans made by the Soviet mutual aid societies are seldom, if ever, secured by the guarantee of sureties; they are free of interest; and they are wholly unconnected with any profit-making enterprise of the borrower. These societies meet a common need of the wage-earning class in all countries, in cases when there is nothing on which the pawnbroker will make the necessary advance, of an opportunity of borrowing a small sum for some extraordinary expenditure - it may be a necessary journey, or some outlay incidental to illness, or some requirement of an adolescent son or daughter, or even the payment of a fine incurred for some petty misdemeanour. In Great Britain and the United States there is little or nothing to stand, in such needs, between the borrower and the unscrupulous money-lender. The Soviet mutual aid societies make loans without interest for such purposes as taking a holiday; or paying a visit to Moscow for shopping; or for a journey to visit sick relatives; or for laying in cheaply the winter's stock of fuel and other household commodities; or even for buying one of the state lottery bonds. Moreover, in some cases the mutual aid society makes charitable gifts to its members in special distress; and it frequently supplements the social insurance sickness benefits in the cases of low-paid workers receiving sums inadequate for the support of their families.¹ It was, in fact, out of the insufficiency of the social insurance benefits in its earlier years that these mutual aid societies arose in 1932-1933 among the trade unionists themselves. They are still closely associated with them, but are formally quite independent. They are open to all workers, whether trade unionists or not; but most of the members belong to one or other trade union. In 1927 it was estimated that as many as 40 per cent of all the trade unionists belonged also to a mutual aid society, of which there were estimated to be 20,000 in the USSR. They are mostly under the influence of the trade union to which most of the members belong, and they may even be said to be under its general direction. They are fully recognised by the All-Union Central Committee of the Trade Unions, which has issued a decree regulating their activities. Their members pay regular con-

¹ They are recognised as the organ of benevolence of the trade unions. "At the same time", said the People's Commissar of Labour in 1932, "there are some workers in low qualification who are the only breadwinners of the family. The material condition of such workers is not very satisfactory. We must help these workers, pay special attention to them, raise qualifications so that they can increase their wages, and help them by giving places to their children in the crèches, kindergartens, etc. We also have a very good method of assisting these workers by means of the Mutual Aid Societies. All these methods must be studied and investigated, both by the department of Labour and by the trade unions" (*Ninth Congress of Trade Unions*, 1933, report by the People's Commissariat of Labour (A. M. Tsikhon), pp. 166-167).

tributions, usually of one-half of one per cent of the wage earned, the amount being fixed by the general meeting of members, by which the society is governed.

Imperfections of the System

The scheme of economic security by way of social insurance in the USSR is so general in its character, so elaborate in its provision and so liberal in its treatment of all classes of sufferers ¹ that it is hard to describe it otherwise than in terms of eulogy. It is none the less necessary to think deliberately of its imperfections and shortcomings, and to attempt some measurement of them. Let us note, in the first place, that the scheme of social insurance is still very far from extending to the whole population of the USSR. Excluded from nearly all its benefits are the nomadic tribes, and indeed also many of the numerous backward peoples of Siberia and the Caucasian highlands and those within the Arctic circle or in remote parts of Central Asia; the surviving individual peasantry throughout the whole Union, representing a population of nearly twenty millions, and the isolated families up and down the land living upon hunting or fishing. The population of the quarter of a million collective farms (kolkhosi), numbering something like seventy or eighty millions, have, in their communal support of invalids or orphans among their membership, a system of economic security of their own. But apart from the above-named exclusions, which cover a very large part, perhaps one-seventh, of the whole population, it must be realised that, as we have elsewhere described, the whole service of health can be considered adequate only in the urban or industrialised areas. In the vast Ural plains all the social services are improving year by year, but measured against British or Swiss or Scandinavian experience, the medical aid, good as it is in particular cases, cannot at present be said to reach a high degree of promptitude or accessibility, even compared with the ubiquitous medical service under the English Poor Law.

The money benefits are expressed in scales of great liberality, with remarkable adaptation to individual needs. But the total payments during the year seem to indicate that the sufferers do not all get the benefits to which they appear to be entitled. The insurance machinery is apparently not so comprehensive at the periphery as it is in the great centres of population. It looks as if there were, in the great open spaces of the USSR, a good many hapless individuals, mostly among the dwindling number of independent workers, who are pressed down by want and sickness, and who fail to secure either the medical treatment or the pecuniary assistance that the system of social insurance provides for those who are members of one or other kind of collective organisation.

From the standpoint of British and German experience the gravest defect in the system of Soviet Communism might be thought to be its encouragement of malingering. It is hard to believe that with so

¹ Except the able-bodied unemployed.

generous a scale of benefits there are not many persons receiving them who are not rightly entitled to do so. The "wall newspapers" of the factories often contain allusions to this or that person as a notorious "slacker", too often staying away from work on one pretext or another. The payment of full time wages from the very first day of absence through illness, and therefore even for the slightest and most transient indisposition, must certainly (it would be said elsewhere) produce a whole crowd of malingerers. This is declared not to occur. Many people, who ought to know, assert that there is very little malingering in the USSR, and that the medical inspection and supervision is so thorough, and so completely disinterested and impartial, that the certification may be implicitly trusted. We cannot pretend to judge. In support of the contention it is to be noted that there is no "free choice of doctor". It seems to us that unusual authority is accorded to the certificate of inability to work given by the medical officer, who is employed by the People's Commissar of Health, and is in no way amenable to pressure from the patients or claimants of sickness benefit. Moreover "sick leave after ten days is only continued after consultation between the doctor treating the case and a medical board composed of several doctors. If differences of opinion arise, the case is referred to the medical supervisory committee. There are thus", reports Sir Arthur Newsholme, who speaks as an expert, "ample safeguards against malingering, which is said not to exist."¹

American observers tend to confirm the judgment of eminent British authorities on this point; and supply more interesting grounds for their belief. "There are," it is said, "no doubt, cases of malingering, but social consciousness of the workers and the effective medical service combine to keep it within minor dimensions. This is proved by the fact that the average number of days lost in the USSR, exclusive of time lost by childbirth and nursing, was only 8 in 1924-1925, 8.8 in 1925-1926, and a yearly rate during the first six months of 1926-1927 fiscal year of only 7.8."² This low rate seems to have been maintained even whilst the social insurance benefits have been increasing in generosity. The head of the social insurance bureau of the RSFSR, V. A. Kotov, stated that "while in 1929, for 100 insured persons 885 days were lost through sickness, in 1932 this figure dropped to 754".³ The American observers go

¹ *Red Medicine*, by Sir A. Newsholme and Dr. J. A. Kingsbury (1933), p. 190.

² *Russia after Ten Years* (Report of the American Trade Union Delegation of the Soviet Union, 1927), pp. 43-44. It may be observed that these statistics of days lost through sickness among twenty millions of insured persons, representing a quarter of the whole population of the USSR, do not lend any support to the wild assertions of widespread starvation, or even of universal insufficiency of food, during recent so-called "famine years".

³ Article by V. A. Kotov, in *Moscow Daily News* (weekly edition), June 5, 1933. The diagrammatic statistics of V. A. Kotov (in Russian, *Social Insurance in the USSR, 1928-1932*, pp. 18-23) enable us to continue these figures. In 1928 the number of days paid for in respect of temporary incapacity were 8.41; in 1930, 8.38; in 1931, 8.12. In the different quarters of these years the range was only between 10 and 13 days. Tuberculosis, influenza, ulcerations and lesions were the worst causes, together with rheumatism.

The principal industries alone show a larger number of days lost than the entire total

on to note that "this is in sharp contrast with the German experience, where, with a waiting period, and with benefits amounting to only a part of the wage, the average number of days lost annually has ranged within recent years between 12 and 15. . . . The country with by far the more liberal system of benefits shows less lost time, although medicine and public sanitation are more advanced in Germany than in Russia. The full reasons for this are not yet conclusively established, but from our enquiries we are convinced that it is largely due to (1) the full medical attendance and treatment which are given to the workers and their families; and (2) the tendency of ill or injured workers, when the benefits are only a fraction of their wages, to return to work before they are well, thus rendering them more susceptible to future illnesses, and consequently causing them to lose additional time. A low scale of benefits seems therefore to be false economy, even when judged by the purely monetary standards." The latest statistics for the USSR show a continuance of the fall in the percentage of days lost through sickness, in years in which the British as well as the German figures register disquieting increases. The reduction is particularly marked in most of the heavy industries, due, it is suggested, to improvements in the sanitation and safety of the factories.

We can only add that, so far as we have been able to ascertain, expert opinion in the USSR sees no reason for alarm as to the possible adverse effect on productivity of the extremely generous provisions of its scheme of social insurance, any more than from the very wide endowment of the wage-earning community with economic security.

Training for Life

Four days after its seizure of power, the Bolshevik Government formulated, in a decree by A. V. Lunacharsky, a remarkable long-term programme of educational reconstruction, evidently inspired largely by Lenin himself, which attracted no attention whatever in the western world. If to-day we refer to this revolutionary programme, it is not because it gives an accurate picture of any of the social services that now exist in the USSR. It is needless to say that the sweeping proposals of 1917, have in 1935 not yet been put in operation all the way from the Baltic to the Pacific. It is probable, indeed, that (in eighteen years) no one of them has been carried out in its entirety. In these pages we seek only to distinguish the main trends of Soviet Communism in the vast field of the training of the new generation for life; the direction in which this service has moved since 1917, and in which it is still moving. What

of insured persons. Thus the average worker in the rubber industry in 1928 lost 16 days, reduced in 1932 to less than 11 days; in the leather industry 15 days, reduced in 1932 to 11; in basic chemicals, and also in the boot and shoe industry, under 14 days, reduced in 1932 to less than 11 and less than 9 respectively. All the industries reduced their average of days lost in 1932 as compared with 1928, by between 15 and 33 per cent (*The USSR in Figures*, Moscow, 1934, p. 203).

seems to us significant is that we can find no better way of emphasising these trends than by summarising what was laid down in the hectic first week of the assumption of government, and expanded into 32 articles by the decree of October 16, 1918.¹

Tsarist Russia was, of course, not without an educational service of magnitude, and within its chosen narrow scope, even of a certain efficiency. By the efforts of the more enlightened Zemstvos and a few philanthropists, this service had been considerably extended during the generation preceding the war. But educational work was scarcely encouraged by the Tsar, the Holy Synod and the bureaucracy, and was tolerated only as a class system on old fashioned lines, designed mainly for the production of enough doctors, lawyers, teachers, clerical officials and other specialists for the use of the Court and the government, the nobility and the wealthy. The idea of educating the mass of the population, even as far as reading and writing, found no favour with the autocracy. What Lenin and his colleagues committed themselves to in 1917 was the complete sweeping

¹ Lunacharsky's decree, signed by him as People's Commissar of Education on October 29, 1917, and published on November 1, 1917, together with the fuller decree of October 16, 1918, will be found in the (Russian) *Collection of Decrees and Resolutions on Education* (Moscow, 1918), vol. 1, pp. 156 and 107. There are available, apart from the mass of Russian sources, many useful descriptions in English of educational work in the USSR. Perhaps the most convenient summary is given in the *Educational Year Book* for 1933, in an authoritative article by Dr. N. Hans, who has also published a volume on *The History of Russian Educational Policy (1701-1917)* (1931, 206 pp.); and another (with S. Hensen), extremely critical, entitled *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia* (1929, 250 pp.); continued down to 1932 in a German edition entitled *Fünfzehn Jahre Sowjetschulwesen* (1933, 260 pp.). These should be supplemented for past history by *Education and Autocracy in Russia from the Origin of the Bolsheviks*, by D. B. Teary (University of Buffalo Press, 1919); and for soviet projects by *Les Problèmes de l'instruction publique en régime soviétique*, by A. V. Lunacharsky (Paris, 1925), as well as by the valuable publication by VOKS at Moscow, entitled *The School in the USSR*, and *The Higher School in the USSR* (both 1933). Other sympathetic surveys from different angles will be found in *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, by Professor S. N. Harper (1929); *New Minds, New Men*, by T. Woody (1931), with bibliography of over 400 items; *The New Schools of New Russia*, by Lucy L. W. Wilson (1928); and the articles by John Dewey in *The New Republic* for November and December 1928, largely republished as *Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World* (1929). A useful succinct account of recent date is *The Broad Highway of Soviet Education*, by C. A. Harrison, with preface and notes by Beatrice L. King (1934). *Soviet Education*, by R. D. Charques (1932, 48 pp.), is an exposition of the ideas inspiring all the work. These ideas, as expressed in Stalin's speeches, are given in a compilation entitled *On Technology*, by J. Stalin, issued by the Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers (Moscow, 1932, 80 pp.). Much of actual practice may be picked up from *Youth in Soviet Union*, by Vladimir Zaitsov (1934). See also *Education in Soviet Russia*, by Scott Nearing (1926); *Schools, Scholars and Teachers in Soviet Russia*, by N. T. Goode (1929); the chapters by G. S. Counts and C. Washburn in *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade* (1928); see also "Education in the USSR", by G. S. Counts, in *The New Republic*, February 13, 1935. The lengthy exposition of theory and policy by a distinguished soviet professor, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic*, by A. Pinkevich (1929), should also be consulted. His smaller manual, *Science and Education in the USSR* (1935, 176 pp.), gives a later survey. Over 60 recent German publications on education in the USSR are listed in the bibliography entitled *Die Sowjet-Union 1917-1932*, edited by Klaus Mohnert (1933). Among French works may be noted *La Pédagogie scolaire en Russie soviétique*, by Eugene Doyand (Paris, 1932); and *Les Problèmes fondamentaux de l'École du Travail*, by Pistrak (Paris, 1927); *Organisation et principes de l'enseignement en URSS*, par Jean V. Trillat (Paris, 1933, 70 pp.).

away of this autocratically limited, pedantically inspired, class system of pedagogic dogmatism, in order to substitute for it a universal and classless provision of both "enlightenment"¹ and training for life in all its fullness and variety, for all ages from infancy to manhood; disregarding practically all ancient scholastic tradition; avowedly based exclusively on the latest science in every branch, and free from every kind of mysticism; devoted to the end of fitting everyone for life in the service of the community; the whole system to be, in principle, gratuitous, secular and universally obligatory. But Lenin's programme expressed in Lunacharsky's decree, and expanded by that of October 16, 1918, also outlined precisely how these revolutionary ideas were to be carried out. It included such specific proposals as the universal adoption of co-education in all subjects and at all ages; and a ten years' regular course of schooling from 8 to 17 inclusive for every boy and girl from the Baltic to the Pacific without any examinations or any punishments. To this was soon added the organisation of an equally universal provision of appropriately graded "pre-schooling" from the infant in its third year up to the age of 8; and of a no less widely spread five years' course of specialised vocational and scientific training from 18 to 22, for all careers, and this not for a selected minority, but with stipends or maintenance allowances, for all, who show themselves capable of it. Most revolutionary of all was, perhaps, the determination to unite, at all stages, in what we shall have to call the "polytechnical school", theory and practice, learning and doing, science and experiment, the teacher's lectures with the pupil's own constructive creation—always with the fundamental object of training for life, and under the influence of a deliberate intention of bridging, and even ultimately of superseding, the distinction between the brain worker and the manual labourer, not to say also the intellectual cleavage between the city and the village. It is in this broad outline that we find the main trends of the soviet educational system of to-day.

Universalism

We need waste no words in appraising either the mere magnitude of the increase effected since 1917, or in reciting the particular achievements in 1935 of the soviet service of education. We may note, however, that so great was the social devastation of 1914–1921 that, for years, nearly all the schools and colleges in the USSR sank down to the lowest depths, with the teachers on starvation wages; destitute alike of proper accommodation and often even of heating, together with books and writing

¹ "It cannot be made too clear at the start that soviet education embraces much more than the school system. A point worth noting to begin with is that the strict meaning of the word *prosveshchenia*, which is always used nowadays to signify 'education' is 'enlightenment'. 'The People's Commissariat of Enlightenment' is indeed a much juster and more accurate title than 'Board of Education' for the soviet government department which administers education in each of the constituent republics of the Union" (*Soviet Education*, by R. D. Charques, 1932, p. 11).

paper, ink and pencils.¹ So little attention could be given to education by the sorely taxed soviet authorities that it took a whole decade even to get back to the pre-war totals of schools and scholars.²

The most important feature to-day is the extraordinary "universalism" of the system. In the whole of the USSR, education, in the full sense of training for life, has now to be provided, as a matter of course, gratuitously and with attendance made compulsory, in every town and village, for every child, irrespective of sex or race or colour or creed or nationality even among the numerous backward races of the USSR. There is no other fragment of the earth's surface, at all comparable in extent, in which anything like this conception of an educational service prevails.³

It is, indeed, firmly held that communism can be effectively established only on the basis of universal participation in the life of the community. Thus, it involves, merely to begin with, universal literacy. "Without literacy", said Lenin, "no politics, but only rumours, small talk and prejudices."⁴ When the Bolsheviks took office something like 70 or 80 per cent of the whole people were illiterate. To-day, throughout European Russia at any rate, and also in all the settled parts of Siberia, all but a tiny

¹ This is described, not without malignancy, in "The Russian Schools under the Yoke of the Bolsheviks", by E. Kovalevsky, in *Ten Years of Bolshevik Domination*, edited by Joseph Bickerman and published in English at Berlin, 1928.

² Stalin described in 1934 the increase since 1929 under the following heads:

(a) The introduction throughout the USSR of universal compulsory elementary education and an increase of literacy among the population from 67 per cent at the end of 1930 to 90 per cent at the end of 1933.

(b) An increase in the number attending schools of all grades from 14,358,000 in 1929, to 26,419,000 in 1933. Of these the number receiving elementary education increased from 11,687,000 to 19,163,000; middle school education increased from 2,453,000 to 6,671,000; and higher education increased from 207,000 to 491,000.

(c) An increase in the number of children receiving pre-school education from 838,000 in 1929, to 5,917,000 in 1933.

(d) An increase in the number of higher educational establishments, general and special, from 91 units in 1914 to 600 units in 1933.

(e) An increase in the number of scientific research institutes from 400 units in 1929 to 840 units in 1933.

(f) An increase in the number of club institutes from 32,000 in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933.

(g) An increase in the number of cinema theatres, cinema installations in clubs, and travelling cinemas, from 9800 units in 1929, to 29,200 units in 1933.

(h) An increase in the circulation of newspapers from 12,500,000 in 1929 to 36,500,000 in 1933.

"It would not be amiss to point out that the number of workers among the students in our higher educational establishments represents 51.4 per cent of the total, and that of toiling peasants 16.5 per cent, whereas in Germany, for example, the number of workers among the students in higher educational establishments in 1932-1933 was only 3.2 per cent and that of small peasants only 2.4 per cent" (*Stalin Reports on the Soviet Union*, Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, 1934, p. 42).

We may add that the number of children who finished their elementary school course in 1929 was estimated at 1,200,000, whilst the corresponding number in 1932 was 3,451,000.

³ Compare the position of the service of education in India, which has had the advantages of British rule for more than a century; or in the manifold colonial empire of six European powers over nearly the whole continent of Africa; or even in the United States, which still has 5 per cent of adult illiteracy, and (in 1935) literally tens of thousands of schools closed because of lack of funds.

⁴ Quoted in the article by M. Epstein, Assistant People's Commissar for Education, RSFSR, in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, 1933), p. 34.

remnant of the elderly and the aged have left this stage. "Recently we noticed in the newspapers a new item, modestly put in small type. . . . *Everyone in Moscow who was this year called up for military service was able to read and write.*"¹ It has taken little more than a decade to get schools in practically all the villages of the USSR, however imperfect may still be the teaching and the accommodation, and to bring, at least in all the settled areas, nearly all the children into school. In 1914, there were only seven millions at school; in 1929 there were over eleven millions. Not until 1931 could school attendance be made universally compulsory by law, and the numbers then rose to nineteen millions. Although it is not to be supposed that schools have yet reached every nook and corner of Soviet Asia, the Caucasian mountains, or the Arctic circle, by 1935 the aggregate total on the school and college registers for full-time education of all grades had grown to over 26 millions, or one person in six. Meanwhile the number of children under 8 in kindergartens and other institutions of "pre-schooling" had grown to over six millions, making in all thirty-three millions, or actually one in five of the census population under full-time instruction of one or other kind of grade.

The universalism in education in the USSR, is in one respect, in outstanding contrast with the school system of Great Britain and other capitalist countries. In the Soviet Union there are no schools designed specially for the reception of the children of the middle class and the wealthy bourgeoisie or the aristocracy. All infants and children of school age and all adolescents obtaining higher education, classified merely by age or by grade of study, attend the same schools and colleges, whatever the position or the income of their parents.² There is, alike in practice and in formal regulation, none of the segregation or grading of pupils according to parental rank or profession, wealth or income, which in other countries has so much influence alike on the schools themselves and on the pupils.

But it is another aspect of this universalism in the service of education that seems to us the most striking. From the first the Bolshevik programme included the concession of "cultural autonomy" to every one of the numerous races or nationalities out of which the Soviet Union is constituted. It is held that, in order to make education genuinely universal, the children of every race must have access to teaching in *their own vernaculars*. Nothing had been more characteristic of the tsarist government than its persistent policy of "russification".³ Going to the

¹ *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, 1933), p. 76.

² The present writers inspected one of the ordinary ten-year schools of the Moscow City Soviet, and were interested to learn that, whilst the children of Stalin were in attendance at the school, it was privately forbidden to point them out to visitors, or in any way to distinguish between them and other pupils, as this might have an injurious effect on their character and development. In another ordinary school the child of a former People's Commissar of the USSR was in attendance; and in another the child of a soviet ambassador to a foreign court.

³ To this day, it should be remembered, the governments of Poland, Hungary, Italy—we must add also Germany, Roumania and Yugoslavia—are accused, by substantial national minorities, of denying to their children, in one or other district, this elementary right of schooling in their mother tongue.

opposite extreme, Soviet Communism aimed at providing schools in the vernacular for all its constituent races, great or small, even where, as in some three dozen cases, the vernacular had never been reduced to writing. It was, indeed, necessary to invent alphabets for them—the Latin, not the Russian, being taken as the basis—and to print for them the first books that they had ever seen. There are, we are told, in 1935, schools in the USSR teaching in more than 80 different languages, in all of which the various state publishing enterprises now issue books, besides publishing also works in a score or more of foreign tongues.¹ There are now (1935) newspapers in 88 languages.

In practice, by a decision of the RSFSR Commissariat of Education of April 27, 1927, these nationalities are divided into four groups. In five cases, namely Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, Georgian and Armenian, the vernacular language is the medium of instruction throughout the local educational system, including all the colleges of university rank and the research institutes. The second group is that of nationalities of substantial populations, having their own alphabets and books, and their own intelligentsia. Here education up to 18 takes place in the native tongue; but institutions for persons above that age use Russian, although there must always be special chairs in the native language and literatures in all the higher institutions within the several territories. The third group comprises such of the lesser nationalities, for which alphabets have had to be provided, as live together in compact communities. In these cases the primary schools or grades use the vernacular, but secondary education and all higher institutions adopt Russian as the medium. Finally, there is a group of very small peoples, including also dispersed and often nomadic tribes, who have still no alphabet, or have only just had one made for them, and who have no books, and indeed, no national culture. For these, whatever may be done in "pre-schooling" up to 8 years old, only Russian elementary schools are provided, at any rate for the present.²

Under the influence of this universalism, it is precisely the backward races and the backward districts that have made the greatest proportionate progress. "Let us take for example the Tartar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Literacy among the Tartar population amounted to 15 per cent before the revolution; in the autumn of 1932 . . . 94 per cent . . . Primary schools before the revolution 35; now compulsory education has been introduced, not only for first grade schools but even for the seven-year school. Moreover the Tartar Republic is about to

¹ Already in 1929 there were primary (or first-grade) schools in 66 languages; seven-year schools in 37, and nine-year schools in 23. There were kindergartens in 30 languages. At the other end of the scale there were higher technical institutes in 32 languages, and universities in 5 (*Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hesson, 1930, p. 183).

² *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hesson, 1930, pp. 178-179. See also article by N. Hans on "Education in the USSR", in *Educational Year Book* for 1933.

introduce universal pre-school education. . . . Now there are 20 universities [meaning colleges for the further education of persons over 18] with 2371 students, and there are special Tartar branches of the universities which conduct their courses mostly in the native languages."¹ But the Tartar Republic is not the most remarkable case. "In the Bashkir Republic before the revolution, 1.8 per cent of the children attended primary school. In 1929 the percentage rose to 58.4; in 1930 to 71.8; in 1931 universal compulsory education was introduced. The number of secondary schools in 1929-31 was 121, with 16,300 children: in the following year there were 149 . . . with 20,300 children. Arrangements are now being made to introduce universal seven-year schooling. . . . The republic has 4 universities (a teachers' college, an agricultural institute, a medical school, a higher agricultural school), 30 technical schools, 2 workers' institutes, 2 workers' faculties and 2 special schools." Much the same report comes from the other districts.²

This spectacular encouragement of practically all the vernaculars has had four distinct motives. It was seen to be a necessary condition of the unity which has become the basis of the strength and permanence of the soviet power. It is manifestly the feature of cultural autonomy on which each minority most obstinately insists. Without the provision of schools in the vernaculars there could have been no such rapid conquest of illiteracy as the Soviet Union has achieved. Moreover, without using the vernaculars there could have been no such widespread propaganda of communist doctrine, and no such gigantic circulation of the reported speeches of the leading personalities as is now common. It is interesting to notice that enabling each minority to have its own schools does not wholly promote the growth of national separatism. Thus, neither in the Ukraine nor in Georgia is there local uniformity in the educational service. If Russian is not to be the language of all the schools in those republics, so equally is not Ukrainian or Georgian. Wherever the necessary minimum of families exist in a town or village, any such minority may have its

¹ "Schools for Soviet Nationalities", by L. Davydov, in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933, p. 66). In 1934 it could be claimed, we know not how accurately, that the Tartar Republic had a much larger proportion of students in technical institutes (29 per 10,000 population) than either Germany or Great Britain, which each had less than 20 per 10,000.

² *Ibid.* pp. 66-67. This "universalism" has extorted the admiration of hostile critics. "The achievements of the Soviet Government in the field of national education are very considerable. . . . These results were possible through a special system of financial subventions from central funds to the minorities. Thus whereas the Russians in the RSFSR receive from the treasury about 1.2 chernovetz roubles per head for educational needs, the autonomous republics and regions receive from the same source about 3.8 chernovetz roubles per head. Without this central help the autonomous territories, usually the most backward . . . would not have been able to undertake the enormous task. This policy of the Soviet Government may be just and generous, being the only way to repay Russia's debt to these aboriginal inhabitants of territories conquered during the centuries by Russians, and left neglected by the Imperial Government. . . . In spite of the partisan character of education imparted, the national renaissance of all Russian minorities is an actual fact which brings within itself immense possibilities in the future" (*Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hessen, 1930, p. 185).

own school, using its own mother-tongue. Accordingly there are, in the Ukraine, not only Ukrainian schools, but also Polish, Yiddish, Russian, White Russian, German, Greek, Estonian, Lettish, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Bulgarian and what not; in fact schools using no fewer than twenty different vernaculars. In Georgia there are, not only Georgian schools, but also schools teaching in Armenian, Greek, German, Hebrew, Yiddish, Russian, Turkish, Assyrian, Polish, Kurdish and other tongues.

There is, indeed, necessarily an overriding unity amid all the prudent diversities of the service of education of the USSR. The majority of the teachers are, at present, necessarily of Russian extraction, and usually of Russian training. All of them have been educated in Russian literature. In all schools, Russian is, if not the first, always the second language. Nine-tenths of all the existing books are in the Russian language. Among the lesser nationalities, only the Ukraine, which has been in some respects in advance of the RSFSR, can find a complete educational staff of its own. All the rest have still to depend, for all but common schooling, to a considerable extent on the products of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Moreover, the local autonomy of the educational service in the couple of dozen constituent and autonomous republics does not extend to fundamental principles, in which the whole of the USSR has, according to constitutional practice, to keep in line with the RSFSR. Finally, an increasing proportion, though still only fewer than a quarter, of all the teachers are members of, or candidates for, the Communist Party, or the Young Communist League (Komsomols). The whole tone of every school is avowedly and markedly communist and no rival doctrine is inculcated.

This continuous dissemination of communist doctrine through the entire service of education—which is parallel with, and doubtless equally pervasive with, the common practice, in every national system of schooling (and not least in Great Britain and the United States), of basing the school life upon the dominant creed and constitution of the particular country—has a great influence on the backward races of the USSR. “For many nationalities”, it has been said, “some of which are still in [the] nomadic stage of evolution, the Marxist doctrine of the struggle of capital and labour is as incomprehensible and unreal as some mystic philosophy. They acquire the new dogma as a new religion, and simply exchange Buddha and Mahomet for Marx and Lenin. What they really imbibe very easily is the propaganda against the western capitalist world. The internationalism of the Communist Party is reflected in their minds as a militant patriotism for the first workers’ and peasants’ state, which is the fatherland of all enslaved eastern nationalities. In Moscow they are induced to see the centre of the new Eurasian world opposed to the rotten civilisation of bourgeois Europe.”¹ Take it all in all, we must agree that the trend of universalism in the soviet service of education has “immense possibilities in the future”!

¹ *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, by N. Hans and S. Hassen, 1930, p. 185.

Polytechnikisation

Turning now to the curriculum and pedagogic methods of the schools, we have to note, during the past five years, a far-reaching change, definitely making for greater efficiency. The whole decade, 1921-1930, was a period of luxuriant experiment, when the lessons of other countries were ignored; discipline was neglected; the pupils were supposed to govern the school; the teachers did as they liked, whilst the inspectors favoured one system after another.¹ The result has been described by foreign observers as a "joyous Bedlam", in which the pupils learned all sorts of things, and the cleverest among them not a little, but seldom the formal lessons common to other countries. "The soviet school child", noted one observer, "was apt to get a very uneven kind of training, and to develop precocious brightness in some things, with woeful lack of precise knowledge in others." In 1931 the authorities seem to have realised that this was not an ideal training for life. If gossip is to be trusted, one member after another, in a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (TSIK), rose to complain that his own children, though eager and bright, could not spell, were weak in their arithmetic, and knew more about the bad conditions of labour in capitalist countries than about the geography of the USSR. In 1931 Andrei Bubnov succeeded A. V. Lunacharsky as People's Commissar of Education for the RSFSR, and the whole system was reformed from top to bottom. School discipline was restored. Subjects were once more taught separately, the common apparatus of examinations and exact marking was introduced and the curriculum for each grade was drastically remodelled.

Communist enthusiasts are prone to see throughout these far-reaching changes in the soviet educational system the gradual adoption of a principle which is summed up in a strange new word—polytechnikisation. "This reform", says one of its leading advocates, "has no precedent, in point of force, significance and scientific basis, in the whole history of popular education."² In its simplest form this trend is manifested in the scheme of reorganisation of the elementary and secondary schools, in supersession of the "Dalton Plan" and the "Complex" or "Project Scheme", which at first charmed the educational administrators. In the "polytechnical school" the teacher is not to be spared the grind of

¹ This is pictured in the so-called *Diary of a Russian Schoolboy*, by N. Ognyov (1928); actually written by a teacher in a soviet school.

² "Polytechnical" because it imparts to the children the scientific fundamentals of the most essential branches of production in the national economy, combining, in the process of tuition and education, general subjects with productive labour as applied in progressive production and technique" ("The Polytechnical School", by S. Gaissimovich, Assistant Director of the Scientific Research Institute of Polytechnical Education, in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933), p. 54).

The decree of October 16, 1918, had declared that "the principle of productive labour should underlie the whole educational system: the teaching in the schools must bear a polytechnical character" (*Collection of Decrees and Resolutions on Education* (in Russian), Moscow, 1918, vol. i. p. 107).

individual teaching, and not even the task of delivering set lectures to his class. The pupils are no longer to be relieved from the mental effort of actually learning and remembering what the teacher tells them. The new feature is that the giving of information by the teacher is always to be accompanied by specific action on the part of the scholars; as, for instance, by their performance of the operations that the teacher is describing. "Both industrially and educationally", notes an English authority, "Soviet Russia's policy is a gigantic exercise according to Samuel Butler's principle 'learn by doing'."¹ With this object, the school, whether "four year" (or, as we should say, elementary); or "seven year" or "ten year" (which we should call secondary), is now placed in constant and intimate association with one or more of the neighbouring factories, or in the country, with adjacent state or collective farms. The school becomes a centre of instruction, not only in reading and writing in one or more languages, but also in the principles of all the sciences, *taught always as the basis of the various arts of production*. This invariable bias towards "technology" is, in the elementary and secondary school, not at all with the idea of "pre-apprenticeship" to any one craft, but definitely in order to create in all the pupils a common intellectual basis of scientific method for all the various courses of vocational training, in one or other of which, on the completion of their school years, they will severally elect to engage. It is with this end in view that the teachers' lessons in science are to comprise descriptions of the various products, including some account of their history and their specific utility, together with the different processes of material production, in close relation to the teacher's expositions and explanations of the scientific principles, mechanical or physical, chemical or biological, on which these processes of production are based. In the schemes of the most enthusiastic advocates of polytechnikisation the pupils were not merely to experiment with models or test-tubes in the school laboratory or workshop, but also to spend part of each week in the factory or on the farm, actually using the machinery and the tools of each productive process; witnessing the output of their own manual effort; being shown how to overcome their manual inefficiency and compelled to realise how the processes illustrate and confirm what the teacher had told them of the scientific principles underlying the work. This, however, was seldom found either practicable or convenient. Moreover, it proved to be not even very educational. In the schools actually visited in 1934, it had been wholly or mainly replaced by visits of a whole class to the factory under the guidance of the teacher.² But if an English

¹ *Industry and Education in Soviet Russia*, by J. C. Crowther (1932).

² It may be thought that this practice of taking the pupils inside the factory, with the teachers themselves explaining the manufacturing processes, is in line with the practice of "educational visits" adopted in the best of the English elementary schools. An important difference is that the London boys and girls are mostly taken to such places as Westminster Abbey and the National Gallery, with the object of making them realise the past. The Moscow boys and girls are taken to the engineering and clothing factories, printing establishments and gigantic bakeries, in one or other of which most of them will

teacher imagines that such a "polytechnical school" is merely a variant of the "manual training" or the "vocational bias", sometimes advocated for English schools; or if the employer thinks it an admirable device for making skilled craftsmen, he shows that he has not understood what the soviet pedagogues are aiming at. They are not seeking to direct the pupils' attention to particular occupations, or to persuade them to choose such occupations when they leave school, or even to create in them any special fitness for these occupations. Whether the boys and girls eventually become carpenters or cultivators, tractor drivers or school teachers, administrators or dramatic authors, does not, at the school stage, concern the educators. What is quite sincerely intended by the polytechnical school is the very opposite of training in any particular vocation or craftsmanship; in fact, an improvement in the intellectual equipment of *all* the pupils throughout the land, irrespective of the particular occupations that they will severally choose. It is held that, merely to compel children to listen to lectures, or to witness experiments or even to "play about" by themselves, in the school workshop or laboratory, is not the way to render *the whole body of citizens, which is what these pupils are to become*, either scientifically minded or intellectually active. Nor will even a passive understanding of the lessons learned at school stir, in the adolescent, the intellectual curiosity, the initiative and the inventiveness that the Soviet Union seeks to create in all its citizens.¹ And thus we have at present in the USSR, not yet all the teachers in all the schools, but literally thousands of them,² as yet mostly in the seven- or ten-year schools, find employment. The object is to make them understand the principles and applications of contemporary sciences as applied in production.

The four chief industries now chosen for this practical demonstration of scientific principles are engineering, manufacturing chemistry, the production of electricity, and agriculture. (*Science and Education in the USSR*, by Professor Pinkevich, 1935, pp. 30-33.)

¹ "And how in the world," asked one of our party, when we were introduced to the mathematics professor, 'do you succeed in converting mathematics to concreteness?' For answer the professor opened a cupboard and displayed a row of tins of different shapes and sizes. 'Which require the least material? Which pack best into a given space? Which . . . ?' There is no lack of practical problems for the mathematicians" (*The Broad Highway of Soviet Education*, by C. A. Harrison, 1934, pp. 23-24).

The soviet pedagogic experts make the largest claims for this new technique of education between 8 to 17. One of them writes as follows: "The above-described process of the reciprocal fructification of physics, chemistry, mathematics and natural history, by technology, productive labour and modern technique, is one of the most outstanding features of soviet instruction and education. It secures the training of a perfectly new intelligentsia . . . which possesses not only the culture of reasoning, pondering and expressing opinions [but also] the culture of the intellect that is closely connected with labour and action. Material production on which the new man is being educated in the soviet school, secures to him a knowledge of the value and significance of the sciences. . . . These are people who think and reason for the sake of acting, and who act and build consciously and intellectually" ("The Polytechnical School", by S. Gaissinovich, in *The School in the USSR*, VOKS, Moscow, 1933, p. 61).

² The "seven-year polytechnical school" was stated to be the rule in most cities in 1933, and was expected to be extended to "the whole of the country-side" by 1937 (*Moscow Daily News*, March 3, 1934). This apparently impossible programme is already being carried out, by the simple expedient of annually prolonging the stay in each school by one year. Thus, in 1934 or 1935, the four-year schools automatically become five-year schools; in 1935 or 1936, six-year schools; and in 1936 or 1937, seven-year schools. In

educating their pupils in science by describing the things that we consume or use; whence they are derived and how they are grown or manufactured; the machines and the processes that are employed, and, at the same time, the scientific principles or generalisations that the machines and the processes exemplify. And literally hundreds of thousands of pupils are, in the light of the teachers' lectures, learning by making things; though, as we think, at this stage not usually in the factory but more commonly by watching the product emerge from the process which their own manual effort has—at any rate in a small way, in the school workshop or laboratory or garden plot—set going and guided.¹

Now, the present writers are not competent to assess the pedagogic efficiency of this "polytechnikising" of the elementary and secondary schools. It must be understood as a deliberate attempt to bring the school closely into contact with adult life and practice. All schooling is to become training for the active work, the recreation and the leisure of the producer. It is taken for granted that there can be no room in the

the course of this gradual enlargement of the numbers in attendance at each school an additional teacher will be provided. It should be noted that the upper standards of a seven-year school all learn one foreign language. Either English or German is chosen. One of the present writers saw such a school, with its German-taught pupils of 12-15, in a village in the province of Moscow. It is amazing to contemplate that, if the programme can be carried out, the school in every village from the Baltic to the Pacific will be teaching a foreign language. In not one village in England is there (1935) such a school!

¹ The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, by Marx and Engels, explicitly proposed the "combination of education with industrial production" as well as the "combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; the gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the population". The conception of "polytechnikisation" of education is to be found repeatedly in the writing of Marx (notably in the proceedings of the Geneva Congress of the First International in 1866) and Engels; it was more than once expounded by Lenin; and it appears in the earliest educational pronouncements of the Bolshevik Government in 1917-1918. It was specially advocated in *The Labour School*, a notable book (in Russian and German) by Professor P. Blonskij, in 1920. But for the first decade and a half the schools had to get along as they could, in a welter of pedagogic experimentation coupled with mass campaigning against illiteracy. Not until practically all the children had been got to school could the transformation of the outlook of the schools and their teachers be seriously undertaken. In the years 1930-1932 the plan for "polytechnikising" the schools was worked out, and promulgated in "directives" to be put in operation by the several Commissariats of Education. The English student will find useful the chapters by Professor B. Gruzdev, L. Kamenev and S. Gaissinovich in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933); *The Five-Year Plan and the Cultural Revolution*, by Alfred Kurella (Workers Bookshop, 16 King Street, London, E.C., 1931); *The Broad Highway of Soviet Education*, by C. A. Harrison, with preface by Beatrice King (Society for Cultural Relations, London, 1932); *Cultural Construction in the Third Decisive Year*, by D. Skomorovsky (Moscow, 1931); and two articles by Beatrice King in *The British Russian Gazette* for January and March 1933. Among French works we may notice *Les Problèmes fondamentaux de l'École du Travail* by Pistrak (Paris, 1927); and *Les Problèmes de l'instruction publique en régime soviétique*, by A. V. Lunacharsky (Paris, 1925), especially chap. iv. "Le culte de la production", pp. 103-131; *Organisation et principes de l'enseignement en URSS*, par Jean V. Trillat (Paris, 1933, 70 pp.).

"It was in September 1931 that a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party insisted, as part of a general reform of the school system, on universal 'polytechnikisation'. At the beginning of 1934 the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR took in hand the systematic improvement of the teachers' training colleges, and the necessary raising of the teachers' qualifications" (*Moscow Daily News*, March 3, 1934).

soviet school system for any training for the life of a non-producer. Every boy or girl, without exception, —even those whose parents have in the past been non-producers —will be brought up, from the first, with a view to the eventual adoption of an occupation, useful to the community. This occupation may be either that of manual labour or that of an intellectual profession. The young people will all be given equal opportunities of choice at 16 or 17, as between different occupations, so far as accommodation and the requirements of the community permit, according to their faculties and desires.¹ But no provision at all is made for the education of a "leisure class", which assumes that its function is merely that of existing, more or less beautifully, at the expense of others; or even that of spending a lifetime in "philosophising" without doing. Moreover, there is another reason for making no distinction, so far as elementary and secondary schooling is concerned, between those who may eventually adopt one occupation or another. It is not only for the exercise of their occupation that schooling has to prepare them; they have to be trained for life itself. On the assumption of universal participation, upon which Soviet Communism is based, all boys and girls have not only to be trained for a productive occupation, but also educated for active and intelligent citizenship, and further, for all the rest of the activities of life. And, if only to obtain the maximum benefit for the community this training for the whole of life must be universal. It is not supposed that all citizens will have the same faculties, or indeed, equal capacity; but there must be no attempt to create a special class for whom, whether by law or custom, or by the device of prescribing particular scholastic attainments to which access is restricted, any or all of the brain-working occupations are reserved. It is held that neither the parents' wealth, nor their official or professional status, nor even their intellectual attainments or distinction, ought to obtain for their children any preference in opportunities of further education, or in the adoption of an occupation, over others less fortunate in their parentage. Vocational training, including further or higher, and more specialised education—beginning only on the completion of the common school course which, it is assumed, will in the near future be at 18—must be open, without distinction of sex or race or colour, any more than of parental rank or affluence, to all having the necessary capacity and liking for the particular occupation chosen. As the community has

¹ The position of the children of the "deprived" categories, on the one hand, and those of the intelligentsia on the other, must be mentioned as, in some respects, exceptional. They are nowhere excluded from the regular day school, whether (as we should say) elementary or secondary. They are not formally or generally excluded from institutions of higher education, or from vocational training. But during the first decade, when there was a great rush of children of manual working parents towards further education and the brain-working vocations, these received preference for admission, just as, in practice, before the Revolution, the children of the wealthy or of the intelligentsia received preference over those of working class parentage. With an increase in the accommodation and, as we think, with growing humanitarianism, the exclusion of children of the deprived categories, has, we believe, come to an end. It is, however, often thought desirable for these youths between school and college to pass a year or two in a factory, which (as many English parents have discovered) is, in itself, not a bad course to adopt.

to pay for the maintenance as well as the training of most of the aspirants, the number to be admitted to the several courses of vocational training has necessarily to be decided, year by year, by the governmental authorities, in accordance with the requirements of the several services or professions. It follows that a selection must often be made among the aspirants; and this is, in practice, effected by a competitive examination. Only the most promising can be admitted for the occupations in which there are temporarily more applicants than places to be filled.¹

Almost contemporaneously with the "polytechnikisation" of the schools, and to some extent in pursuance of a similar conception of education as training for life, a drastic reorganisation of all the universities and technical colleges was carried out. The universities,² some of which had survived from tsarist times, have been somewhat overshadowed by the separate specialised colleges or institutes, the number of which has been increased up to (1935) over 800. To each of these institutions has been assigned the definite function of training its students between 18 and 23 either for the practice of a particular occupation or profession, or for research in a particular branch of science. And for the better promotion of this deliberate training for life, the supreme administration of most of the various colleges and institutes was taken away from the Commissariat of Education, and entrusted to the commissariats responsible for the several branches of industry or administration that the students intended to serve. Thus the colleges and institutes training engineers, industrial chemists and similar technicians, were placed under the USSR Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which has a special department for their

¹ "The Commissariat of Education retained complete control only over the Pedagogic Institutes and those of Fine Arts. But the Department of Vocational Education has retained certain rights of supervision over the whole field of vocational education. At present there are no less than 12 different commissariats which have their separate network of vocational schools" ("Education in the USSR", by N. Hans, in *Educational Year Book*, 1933, p. 573).

Concurrently with this reform the total number of higher institutes, corresponding roughly to British university colleges, in medicine, commerce and industry, engineering, law, economics, pedagogy and the fine arts, has been increased to over 800, having over 400,000 students over 18, pursuing courses from three to six years. Perhaps the largest and most magnificent of these is that modestly termed the Polytechnical Institute at Leningrad, which has ten faculties, with about 1000 professors and teachers, and 10,000 students of either sex (about to be increased to 13,000); all over 18, and pursuing a five years' course in one or other branch of applied science or technology, leading to immediate appointments as specialist technicians in one or other branch of industry. This technical university covers with its buildings more than one square mile; its chief physics laboratory commands, for its experiments, an electrical current of a million volts; its library subscribes for 135 foreign scientific periodicals. It has a special faculty for "cultural" studies, including foreign languages, history and literature. English and German are compulsory in all the faculties, whilst French is optional.

² Although emphasis is constantly laid on the activities of the scientific colleges and institutes (which usually deal with more than physical or biological science, and always involve one or more foreign languages), the universities, old and new, continue to exist and even to grow, although not usually proliferating into additional faculties. The universities are now (1935) 21 in number, with various faculties, most of which count also as scientific research institutes in particular subjects, and are closely associated alike with the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR commissariats concerned with production.

supervision. Those training chemists in dye-stuffs are under the USSR Commissariat of Light Industries, which includes textiles. The medical colleges come under the superintendence of the several commissariats of health of the various republics. Similarly those training teachers remain with the several commissariats of education; on the other hand those training agronomists, of whom so many more are now required for the state and collective farms, are directed by the new USSR Commissariat of Agriculture. It would be an error to assume that this administrative reorganisation, according to subjects or faculties, of the 800 colleges and institutes of what, in Great Britain or Germany would be considered of university rank, implies or requires any limitation of the curriculum. Those competent to judge have testified to the fact, almost to their own surprise, that the purest of mathematics, and the least applied of the other sciences, still hold an honoured place in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. It does mean, indeed, that each institution is to make itself as efficient as possible in its definite function of turning out the best-equipped professionals in its particular line. But it is recognised that the best-equipped engineer or chemist, teacher or researcher, is not produced by excluding from his training either pure mathematics or the most abstract physics, or that which is sometimes particularly designated as culture. It is quite understood that history and literature, foreign languages, and a knowledge of the institutions and accomplishments of other countries, not to mention some acquaintance with all the sciences, are as much required to produce the perfect technician as specialised proficiency in his own technique.¹ He is, however, not required to spend years in the study of the language, literature and philosophy of ancient Greece and Rome.

It is contemplated and hoped that the great gulf which has heretofore existed between the brain-working occupations, and those left to the manual workers will be, by these educational reforms, narrowed and bridged, if not, in the course of time, entirely removed. It is held that there is no brain-working occupation—not even that of poet or painter, administrator or army officer—in which the professional would not be better, not only for “polytechnical” education in childhood or youth, but also for some actual training in manual arts, and even, when he is in full vigour, for some intermixture of manual work with his intellectual activities. Equally it is contended that there is no manual-working occupation which would not be better performed if the worker had a scientifically trained mind, and realised the place in the life of the community that his occupation held. In the one duty that (apart from the steadily dwindling “deprived” categories) all men and women have in common in the soviet state, namely that of active participation in citizenship and public work; as also in the part of life—actually the greater part—that all are equally entitled to enjoy, namely the hours of rest,

¹ In 1934 it was specially directed that world history, as a subject in itself, desirable in every faculty, should be taken up again. From October 1934 scores of courses in history are being given in all the principal educational centres.

recreation and leisure ; it is held that effective training of body and of mind are alike indispensable for maximum achievement.

There are analogous tendencies in other parts of the soviet system. At all stages, and in all branches, the pupil is made to do more for himself than is usual in other countries. It is held that within reason, the more manual work that can be found for him to do, in the course of his mental education, the better will be that education. Even in the kindergarten the visitor may see the toddler taught to "serve by doing". After accomplishing the arts of dressing and undressing without assistance, the child sets out the table and clears away ; moves the little chairs and tables, fetches whatever is required, and puts things back properly in their places. In the elementary school needlework is practised by boys and girls alike, but only in the first two years (8 to 10) ; and only as a common preparation for life, to the extent of enabling both boys and girls to do their own sewing on of buttons, mending tears in garments, darning socks and stockings, and elementary knitting.¹ The school boys (or girls) are diverted from merely "playing at Indians" to jointly helping the peasant to weed and harvest. A school has been known to spend its vacation in the country in actually reconstructing with the children's own hands, and without any but the minimum of technical assistance, a broken-down dam so as to produce electricity by water power, together with the apparatus by which the village is now lighted and the water raised from the wells. Or the whole school undertakes a "regional survey" of its neighbourhood ; discovers for itself alike its geography and its geology, its flora and fauna ; unearths its prehistoric remains and classifies its modern buildings ; applies geometry and trigonometry to measuring the area of the fields, the width of the rivers and the heights of the trees, and analyses, in structure and function, the various social institutions of the locality. The students in the medical faculty between 18 and 23 have regularly to undertake the keeping in order of their laboratories and preparing their own drugs, even to washing the bottles ; it is they who habitually provide the whole attendance on the operating surgeons ; and they often do all the work of dressing and bandaging which elsewhere falls to the nurses. The young men and women in the engineering colleges usually make themselves proficient in one or other mechanical craft in the course of their theoretical studies. It is not infrequent that one of the managerial staff of a great engineering factory is removed from the office, and relegated to the bench or the forge of the same or some similar enterprise, not altogether by way of punishment for inefficiency or neglect, but partly because it is thought that, after a sort of "refresher course" in manual operations, he will be actually better qualified for reappointment to a managerial position in another enterprise. There is, in fact, no distinction drawn between the brain worker and the manual worker, other than

¹ Girls intending to engage in a "needle trade", whether merely dressmaking or work in a garment factory, get the appropriate technical training after 15. Moreover, there are often voluntary circles in which girls join in various arts of needlework outside school hours.

in their respective functional proficiency. The fact that one man studies longer than another may make him able to do more things, and may lead him to specialise on work for which the other is not equipped, but it does not put him in any different social position, and may often not lead to any higher remuneration.

The Organisation of Leisure

It may have seemed, from the emphasis placed on the "polytechnicising" of all schools, and the stress laid, even in the highest colleges and institutes, on technology, as if the trend in soviet education was entirely materialistic, in the sense of seeking only an ever-increasing output of material commodities. This is far from being the case. Indeed, the trend towards "cultural" developments is, in the soviet service of education, at least as marked as that towards vocationalism.¹ What is significant is

¹ Even in the most highly developed polytechnical school, the curriculum includes what are usually thought of as "cultural" subjects. Thus, the People's Commissar of Education in the RSFSR, speaking to the Fifteenth All-Union Congress of Soviets, gave the following analysis of the time-table for the fifth, sixth and seventh years (ages 13, 14 and 15):

Range	Per Cent of School Time	Number of Hours per Month
1. Labour in production	18	22½
2. Physical Science (mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history, drawing)	38	48
3. Social Science including literature and geography	23	30
4. Languages	7	9
5. Music and physical culture	9	11½
6. Club work	5	6½
	100	127

Quoted in *Universal Education and the Polytechnicisation of the Schools* (Russian) (Moscow, 1931), p. 102.

Here is the "model time-table", issued by the Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR for the guidance of local authorities and teachers for children from 8 to 16:

Grade	Hours per Week (6 Days)							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Russian	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	3 (or 4)
Mathematics	5	5	5	5	5 (or 6)	4 (or 5)	5 (or 4)	4
Natural science	2	2	2	3 (or 2)	4	7	7	7
Social science	2	2	2	2 (or 3)	1	1
Geography	3	3	2	2	1	1
Shop work	2	2	2	2	5 (or 4)	4 (or 3)	5	5
Foreign language	2	2	2	2	2
Physical culture	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Drawing	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Music	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
History	2	2	3 (or 2)	3 (or 2)
Technology (materials)	1
	20	20	22	25	30	31	31	30

that these two trends are not regarded as antagonists or rivals in the training for life, still less as appertaining to separate strata or classes of the population. All men and women, without exception, are expected to become workers and producers, whether by hand or by brain, and therefore all, without exception, require appropriate technological training. But all men and women are likewise expected to become active citizens, participating in all the life of the community, no less in their hours of leisure than in their work time. A significant feature in the daily routine of the government departments of education in the Soviet Union is the large part occupied with specifically "cultural" developments, both within and beyond the schools and colleges; a much greater part, it is clear, than in the corresponding government departments of England or New York State. The result is seen in the great expansion of "cultural" activities among the population during the past decade, which to say the least, does not fall short of the contemporary growth in industrial production.

Physical Culture

Characteristically enough, in this story of the Remaking of Man, we have to begin with physical culture,¹ in which the people of Tsarist Russia were exceptionally deficient. For the children of all ages, from the crèche to the highest class in the ten-year school, there is nowadays nothing so universally taught, and so incessantly repeated, as training in the bodily habits that make for perfect health. In 1923 an All-Union Council for Physical Culture was established, consisting of representatives of the trade unions, the Communist Party and the Comsomols, on the one hand, and of the Commissariats of Education, Health and Defence. Under the influence of this council, and largely at the expense of the commissariats of education of the several constituent and autonomous republics, physical exercises of all kinds have been made the subject of repeated scientific investigation, and of literally hundreds of textbooks and treatises, which the State publishing enterprises have issued to the teachers in hundreds of thousands of copies: thus in numbers vastly exceeding those for Great Britain, Germany or the United States.¹ For the adolescents an important channel of influence for both sexes is the rapidly growing Young Communist League (Comsomols) now (1935) counting some five million members, mostly between 17 and 25. In every Comsomol cell the maintenance of perfect health is demanded from every member. Daily physical exercises become a social obligation, the fulfilment of which is urged every morning throughout the land by the innumerable loud speakers of the state radio service. But the most striking manifestation of this "universalism" in physical culture is the increase during the past few years in organised participation in every form of sport or games, from running,

¹ The titles of a number of these publications, scarcely any of which have been translated, are given in *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody (1932), pp. 434, 437 and 483-510. See also an article on "Physical Culture in the USSR", by T. Hutchins, in *British Russian Gazette*, October 1931.

skating, ski jumping, rowing, bicycling, fencing and gymnastic entertainments, to football, basket-ball, bowls, lawn tennis, baseball and folk dancing.¹ Voluntary military drill and rifle-shooting competitions attract their thousands. Gliding and parachute jumping are growing specialities and there are already a considerable number of amateur aviators. Millions of young people now "take to the road" for their rest-days and annual vacations; and there is a substantial beginning of mountaineering stimulated and promoted by "proletarian" tourist agencies.² Of *fizculturniki*, or regular members of physical culture clubs or circles—meaning associations for practising any outdoor game or sport—there were said to be, in the USSR, some two millions in 1927, over five millions in 1931, and by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1937 there are expected to be many more, some say no fewer than thirty millions! Over 50,000 of these members paraded in the Red Square in 1931 on the tenth anniversary of the "Red Sports International", when Stalin and other leading statesmen greeted them from Lenin's mausoleum. Vast stadiums have been erected for their accommodation in nearly every great city from Leningrad to Tashkent. Twenty years ago hardly anything of this habit of outdoor games and sport existed among the Russian people. Nowadays there is some ground for the estimate that a vastly greater aggregate number, and even a larger proportion, of the adolescents of the USSR are to be found, say on a day in June, actively engaged in outdoor games or sports, than (if we exclude those who merely look on) in Great Britain or the United States. Three salient differences strike the observer. One is the extent to which, in the Soviet Union, all this cultivation of games and sport is consciously based on the conviction, in the young people themselves, that it promotes and maintains physical health and therefore constitutes a part of civic duty. Another is the close association, not only of physical exercises, but also of all organised games, with medical supervision and research. "Without medical control no physical culture" is the slogan. "We are not only rebuilding human society on an economic basis; we are mending the human race on scientific principles." Hence not only half a dozen separate institutes for research in different branches of physical culture,³ but also systematic medical examination, spring and

¹ Neither cricket nor golf seems yet to have become naturalised in the USSR. Incidentally, we may observe, the "professional" is unknown in soviet sport; and there is the very minimum of betting or wagering for money in connection with games.

² "If the young Soviet worker wants to spend his vacation hiking in some part of the Soviet Union, he has only to join the Society for Proletarian Tours and Excursions. In almost every corner of the vast Soviet Union this society has established tourist centres, providing an ideal jumping-off place for hikes and excursions, and enabling the young worker, at an extremely moderate cost, to get acquainted with such beautiful places as the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Urals, Kazakhstan, Central Asia; to explore the rivers, lakes and forests of the central part of the USSR, or to see things of an antiquarian interest, relics of older civilisations. This society also organises excursions to the new soviet factories, where the achievements of modern technique may be seen" (*Youth in the Soviet Union*, by Vladimir Zaitsev, 1934, p. 52).

³ Such as the Institute for the Health of Children, the Institute for Therapeutic Physical Culture, the Institute for Physical Therapy and Orthopedy, the Institute for Occupational

autumn, of every member of a games association ; and a resident doctor at every trade union " rest house " or holiday home. The third difference is the cordial encouragement, the cooperation and the financial subventions that are universally accorded to what has quickly become a national habit, not only by the People's Commissars of Education and Health in the various constituent and autonomous republics, but also by every government department that can be helpful.

Political Culture

In the USSR, second only in magnitude to the deliberate promotion of physical culture, is the planned dissemination of what is termed political culture. Apart from the dwindling categories of the " deprived ", every person over 18 is expected to be, not only a voter, but also a voter with understanding of what he is voting about, and, as we have elsewhere explained, even an active participant in public administration of one kind or another. For efficiency, this obviously requires universal training. Accordingly elaborate provision is made by every organ of the government for the spread of what is not unreasonably deemed political culture. We need not describe its foundation in the school, where the atmosphere, and even the curriculum, is as much interpenetrated by Marxian communism, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the coming of the world revolution, as that of the English school by a conventional Christianity, loyalty to a constitutional monarchy and the glories of the British Empire. More specific instruction runs through all the activities of the Young Communist League (Comsomols), whose members form a large proportion of the " activists ", not only in trade union administration, but also in the prolonged educational campaigns by which more than 90 per cent of the electors are rallied to vote at the periodical soviet elections in the large cities. There are orthodox textbooks of " Political Grammar ", backed by quite an extensive literature, in the hands of all the aspirants for appointment as teachers in the elementary and secondary schools. On this literature they are lectured during their courses at the equivalent of the English training colleges. But probably the most powerful and the most continuous influence is the periodical press. Few people in the western world realise that the daily, weekly or monthly newspaper is actually more widely read, and more universally penetrative, in the USSR than even in the United States.¹ Yet the content of this immense periodical press is the very opposite of what the newspaper proprietors of the western

Diseases, the Institute for Social Hygiene, the Institute for Health Resorts and Spas, not to mention the Psycho-physiological laboratories of the Commissariat of Defence.

¹ For a fuller description of the newspaper and magazine Press in the USSR see *Die Presse Sowjet Russlands*, by Just (Berlin, 1931), also the statistics in *Press and Publishing in the Soviet Union* (School of Slavonic Studies, 1935). The chapter by R. W. Postgate on " Radio Press and Publishing " in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, pp. 205-248, gives an admirable account of how the several types of newspapers are organised, and the place they fill in the social organism.

world believe to be indispensable to nation-wide circulations. Imagine a widely circulating newspaper, all copies of which are paid for (there being, in the USSR, no system of "returns"), yet carrying hardly any paid advertisements, and offering no bribes of insurance, no competitions for prizes, and no distribution of books or other gifts among its readers—a newspaper, moreover, which contains absolutely no "police court news" and no reports of divorce cases; nothing about the fashions in dress; no stories of sex or murder or suicide or accidents; and no gossiping personalities about the private life of royalties, or millionaires, or national celebrities¹. The ten thousand periodicals of the USSR, daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly, issued in 88 languages, catering for readers of all sorts and all occupations, are endless in their diversity. But in one respect they are uniform. They are wholly occupied with "public affairs", that is to say, with politics in its widest sense, including, of course, wealth production. Some of them print telegrams of foreign news (but only news of this kind), of which a copious supply is provided by the Soviet Telegraph Agency (TASS, established in 1925) from all the principal countries of the world. They all deal, more or less instructively, in editorial articles, with issues of public policy great or small. But they also relate innumerable incidents of public administration; exciting stories, full of statistics, of the achievements and successes of this or that factory or farm or school; and, still more frequently, gruesome accounts of the local breakdowns and failures of this or that branch of public administration. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, nowhere in the world is there such unsparing revelation of the blunders and losses of state factories or government departments, or of the acts of oppression or malversation by public officials, as in the soviet newspapers, which are served by something like three millions of village correspondents.¹ This is encouraged and approved by the Soviet Government, as the surest means of obtaining the redress of popular grievances, and of preventing a repetition of the misdeeds of local agents. What is not permitted is any advocacy of the private employment of wage labour in order to make a profit out of it, which is known as exploitation; or of buying things with a view to selling them at a profit, which is termed speculation; or any praise of the political systems of foreign countries; or, indeed, any suggestion that any other form of social organisation would be preferable to that of Soviet Communism. To the foreigner the remarkable thing is that such newspapers, filled with nothing but reports and discussions about public affairs, including short stories illustrating these subjects, but without even the attraction of political party contests, and devoid of any of the contents that secure great circulations in France, Great Britain or the United States, should be eagerly bought and devoured by nearly every family in the USSR.² As a means of instructing every citizen about the collective

¹ See *ante*, pp. 629-630.

² The aggregate circulation of each issue in 1935 is apparently not far short of 40 millions, which is about the number of separate households in the USSR. The principal

organisation of agriculture, industry and government, on which his well-being depends, and of making him acquainted with the details of its local administration—that is to say, in giving him the rudiments of political culture—there can be no question of the efficacy of such a press. There will, of course, be less agreement about the educative result of always presenting the existing system of government as if it were the only one to be considered. This involves forgoing such sharpening of the intellect as may result from the clash of arguments for and against democracy or monarchy, liberalism or conservatism, the Republican Party or the Democratic Party. The soviet educationists esteem more highly, in the training for life, the wide dissemination of the knowledge that they regard as essential for universal participation in public affairs.

A similar universal grounding in political culture is being created, in all their personal intercourse with their fellow-citizens, by the two or three million members of the Communist Party. Every candidate for admission as a Party member has actually to prove his own “political culture”, as well as his belief in the Party tenets. It was a feature of the “chistka” or purge of the Party in 1933 that one of the requirements insisted on, as a qualification for remaining a member—in addition to faith, loyalty and works, together with a high standard of decency in personal life—was ability to expound and explain to the average citizen the policy and programme of the government in which they were taking part. Quite a number of honest and loyal members of the Party, of long standing and good life, were excluded from membership, and relegated to a newly invented lower grade of “sympathisers”, not for any “heresy” but merely because of their shortcomings in intellectual capacity and political knowledge.¹

It is, in fact, one of the principal objects of soviet education that no adult should remain “politically illiterate”. To understand the A B C of public policy, and to be acquainted with the machinery of government administration, may not be exactly the idea of political culture entertained by the British or American academic world. But to make the whole hundred millions of adult men and women between the Baltic and the Pacific even so far “politically literate”, almost as soon as most of them have become alphabetically literate, would be no mean educational achievement—certainly in mere magnitude, a greater extension of “culture” in this one part of life than any government of the western world has yet approached.² And nothing less than this is within the programme

peasant newspaper, *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, has a circulation of three millions, reputed to be the largest in the world.

¹ See Chapter V. in Part I. pp. 290-291.

² It is worth notice how much this universal spread of a common “political literacy” among races of different experiences and temperaments is facilitated by the soviet policy of entrusting the local administration of each of the backward races of the USSR, not to members of the dominant Russian race, but to sedulously trained and indoctrinated members of the particular race, speaking the vernacular, familiar with local habits and sympathetic with specifically racial customs. The influence of such local administrators in promulgating what they have learned in Moscow must be considerable.

of the People's Commissars of Education of the various constituent and autonomous republics of the USSR.

Artistic Culture

The wide diffusion of artistic culture among a whole people has seldom, if ever, been recognised as part of the duty of government. Yet in the USSR the artistic culture of the masses has its own place in the service of education; and Lunacharsky, who was for fifteen years People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR, was particularly concerned with its promotion. We may consider that there is little trace of it in the school curriculum, although music and drawing appear in that of every village school. Even the Russian pedagogues have found no way of teaching art along with the alphabet, though we must not ignore the subtle personal influence, in the USSR as elsewhere, of the artistically gifted teacher. There is, however, a very good beginning of artistic culture in some, at least, of the schools. Here is an attractive description, as long ago as 1920, of what goes on in the "forest schools" in the summer villas built by the well-to-do in the forest around Moscow, now converted into convalescent homes for ailing children, or simply holiday homes for others. "The unique thing here," said Mr. Brailsford on his visit in 1920, "and indeed in all the Russian schools, was the prominence given to aesthetic culture. Every villa had its piano. The children evidently revelled in drawing and painting, and were encouraged to exercise their creative fancy. Some of their portraits, and even more of their interpretations of Russian fairy tales, showed unusual talent. They vied with each other, moreover, in writing verses. Each little colony had its 'soviet', in which the children, with the aid of a teacher, learned to discuss their own affairs. I saw one of these in session, the girls very solemn and businesslike, and obviously leading the community, the boys much slower and much more reserved. Minutes were kept punctiliously, and the game was evidently educative."¹

How successfully the most promising children are picked out for special training in music or dancing, painting or sculpture, we are unable to report. One hears of cases of such selection at the age of 12 or 14; and of promotion to music and dancing academies and to special courses of art training. It is plain that what may be termed the artistic professions are being successfully recruited, and that the numbers engaged in them have greatly increased. In the Moscow schools the elder children are encouraged to form "literary circles", "musical circles" and "dramatic circles", which are occasionally visited by successful writers and artists, interested in discussing with them their artistic progress.

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1931), p. 81.

"Nor is the idyllic aspect wholly absent. Even William Morris, if he had heard the choir in Vladimir, watched the children in their camps and playing-fields, seen their drawings of fairy tales, and stood behind the village carpenters at work on their new models of handicraft, would have recognised some of the elements of his dream" (*ibid.* p. 198).

So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, the influence of the People's Commissars of Education may be traced rather in getting the utmost for the creation of a popular feeling for art out of the picture galleries and museums, the theatre and the ballet; out of music and literature; and, in all the arts, also out of the practitioners themselves.

Museums and Picture Galleries

It may be suggested that no government has ever done so much, within little over a dozen years, as that of the USSR in the way, not merely of maintaining, developing and increasing the public museums and picture galleries throughout the land, but also of widening and deepening their influence on the mass of the people. Museums of all sorts now exist in all the large cities of the USSR, and indeed, often by individual effort, also in some of the villages. Collections of pictures, and of old things of artistic workmanship, are necessarily more limited in number, but those of Moscow and Leningrad are, as they have always been, among the best in the world. What is distinctive of Soviet Communism in this respect is the amount of thought and effort that has been put into the task of getting them visited and appreciated by the people, and of making them the means of universally diffusing some modicum of artistic culture. Not content with a daily opening free of charge, the People's Commissars of Education have managed to get the museums and galleries of their republics constantly resorted to by organised crowds of children and older students, of soldiers and sailors, of factory workers and of peasants, whom the visitor meets at all hours of the day. These throngs are taken from room to room by specially qualified attendants, mostly educated women, who do their best not merely to explain the exhibits but to point out their artistic qualities—it may be added, not always without political bias! How much dissemination of artistic culture can be achieved in this way, we do not pretend to estimate. But we hazard the suggestion that the Soviet Government puts more effort into getting the utmost artistic mass-education out of the magnificent collections that it has inherited, and those additional ones that it has formed, than any other government in the world.¹

Theatre and Ballet

It is significant that the theatre, the opera, the ballet and the cinema are, in every republic within the USSR, as much within the sphere of the commissariat of education as the school itself. Here also, as with the museums and the picture galleries, what is distinctive of Soviet Communism is, not so much what is provided for the public, as what is done

¹ "Lenin said that what we think of art is not important; but what the millions say about art is important, for art commences only when its roots are spread broadly through the masses" (*Memoirs of Clara Zetkin*, 1929, quoted in "The Fight for Cultural Advance", by M. Epstein, Assistant People's Commissar for Education in the RSFSR, in *The School in the USSR*, VOKS, Moscow, 1933, p. 35).

to get educational value out of it. The theatre, the opera and the ballet were of outstanding excellence in Tsarist Russia, but any educative influence that they had was confined to a small class. To-day in the USSR they appeal literally to millions; they are not limited to the great cities, but exist in every town. Many villages, state farms and collective farms have their own cinemas, to the aggregate numbers of tens of thousands. The larger factories, and many other workers' clubs, provide their own stages and their own amateur actors, besides frequently inviting travelling companies. More than sixty theatres are now (1935) open in the collective farms, which are regularly visited by travelling companies of salaried actors. In the large cities the theatres are filled every night with proletarian audiences; most of the tickets being distributed in advance, at some 25 or 30 per cent discount off the public prices, through the trade unions and other popular organisations. Red Army men of all ranks obtain tickets free of any charge. Probably in no other country have so large a proportion of the urban wage-earners, and even some of the villagers, acquired the "theatre-going habit".¹

What seems a unique institution is the "children's theatre", open all the year round, designed expressly for children of 9 to 12 years, or 13 to 15 years, and served by its special staffs of playwrights and producers and over a thousand actors and actresses, nearly all of whom confine their activities to this specialised drama. It should be said that no person under 16 is admitted to the ordinary theatre, so that the adults may be unfettered in their choice of plays by any consideration of what may be thought unfit or unseemly for childish ears. But the theatre is too important a factor to be excluded from the children's education; accordingly special children's theatres are maintained for continuous performances at the expense of the several commissariats of education. In 1934 there were ten in Moscow (one for each municipal district), and more than a hundred in the other cities of the USSR. The performance is always in the afternoon, either for the younger or the older children, who are drawn from the seven- or ten-year schools of the district. Each child pays a few kopeks for its seat, a payment exacted in order to make the child feel that it is really "going to the theatre" like the grown-ups! The plays are interestingly written about subjects and situations within the children's comprehension. They are produced and acted with all the technical excellence of the Russian stage. They are free from didacticism, and of anything that can fairly be called propaganda, although they are, of course, subtly penetrated with a "healthy moral tone" and a strong

¹ Kislovodsk, in the Caucasus, formerly the Aix-les-Bains of Tsarist Russia, has become exclusively a town of trade union "rest houses" and convalescent homes, thronged throughout the year by twelve to fifteen thousand proletarian guests of all ages. When visited in 1932 by one of the authors, the entertainments provided consisted of an excellent theatre, opera and ballet and an orchestral concert of classical music; but none of the "merry-go-rounds", etc., found at Blackpool or Coney Island. The only other alternative to walking in the beautiful gardens, enjoying the Nazan baths, and engaging in modest mountaineering, was an endless series of lectures on technology and Marxism!

"civic patriotism". The packed child-audiences are thrilled with excitement at every phase of the drama acted before them. If the theatre has all the educative influence on adults that it is supposed to have, it seems difficult to overestimate the importance, in child training, of such a carefully designed children's theatre.¹

Music

In music, too, within little more than a decade, the enjoyment of music and no small amount of acquaintance with the greatest composers has passed, in the USSR, from a small class to literally tens of millions of factory workers and peasants. Not all the trade unionists, it is needless to say, strive to get the cheap tickets for the opera and the orchestral concerts, which in the larger cities are always at the disposal of their organisations; but the visitor is surprised at the numbers who have acquired this new taste. The whole of the Red Army; the entire personnel of the OGPU, including its special troops; and the crews of the rapidly growing maritime fleet, are all provided with opportunities for hearing good music.²

Most of the factories, and now many of the collective farms, have formed their own bands and orchestras, possibly of no great attainments, but testifying, at least, to a growth of musical culture. The latest development is the increasing habit of listening to the music broadcast by the radio from some sixty or so stations to more than a couple of million owners of wireless sets, as well as to hundreds of thousands of loud-speakers. Noteworthy, too, is the sudden new demand by the members of village cooperative societies in 1933-1935, when they found themselves in possession of unexpectedly large yields from their collective farms, for the gramophones that government factories are now turning out by the ten thousand, and even for pianos!

Literature

For literary culture a government can do most by publishing books at prices that ensure wide circulation; by promoting libraries that place books within reach even of those who cannot buy, and by honouring the authors who produce good literature. Soviet Communism does a good

¹ The children's theatre is described in the article entitled "The Babnov Central House of Children's Art Schools", by A. Lunacharsky, in *Soviet Culture Review*, No. 2 of 1934, pp. 23-28 (VOKS, Moscow). For the development of the theatre in the USSR see the number entitled "The Theatre in the USSR" of the VOKS magazine, *Social Construction in the USSR*, vol. vi., 1934; and *The Soviet Theatre*, by P. A. Markov (1934, 176 pp.).

The Autumn Number of *The Studio* (London and New York, 1935) is devoted to "Art in the USSR", surveying achievements in all forms.

² The authors can testify that a ship's company, expecting to stay only two or three nights at Leningrad, spontaneously pressed the captain to wireless a message to ensure their getting seats for the performance of an opera that they particularly wished to hear.

deal in all these ways. During the past decade the output of the various governmental publishing departments has increased by leaps and bounds; and so great is the popular demand for books that practically every issue goes immediately "out of print". During 1932 the number of separate "titles" published reached the figure of 55,000, with a total issue exceeding five hundred million copies—an aggregate product which, even allowing for differences in the way of dealing with pamphlets, etc., probably exceeds the output for the year of all the publishers in the rest of the world. The mass of book and pamphlet literature thus hurled at the population of the USSR is naturally of varied character. The largest section to-day is that of school and college textbooks for the twenty-six millions of students of all ages, with which we may include the new demand by hundreds of thousands of factory operatives for instructional booklets explaining how to operate particular kinds of machinery. Another large section consists of reports, in cheap pamphlet form, of the informative speeches of the political leaders, which, having genuinely educational objects, irrespective of electoral contests, are, in content, unlike those of the statesmen in other countries. Not so many copies are printed, although the editions are vastly greater than is usual elsewhere, of the works of the heroes of Russian literature during the last hundred years, from Pushkin to Tolstoy; together with those of contemporary novelists and poets, dramatists and humorists, in all the principal languages of the USSR. Finally, there must be mentioned the large editions that are issued of translations of the principal English, German, French and Italian authors, from Dante and Chaucer and Shakespeare and Voltaire and Balzac and Flaubert and Goethe and Dickens down to some of the most widely read contemporary novelists of Great Britain and the United States. This annual torrent of literature is issued at low prices, from a cent or a penny up to a pound or more for magnificent collections of reproductions in colours of the best pictures; a common figure for a single volume being one rouble. A large proportion is bought by the innumerable libraries that have sprung up in the branches of every kind of organisation, whether trade union, cooperative, Comsomol, army, sporting, school, institute, or club. From one end of the USSR to the other there may well be, in 1935, more than fifty thousand of these libraries, large or small, nearly all of them having funds to spend on a perpetual enlargement of their collections.¹

Whether or not the whole of the population in the USSR are going to be "cultivated" in the western sense of the term, it is clear that they are steadily becoming a reading people. Every boy and girl, every

¹ We have statistics only of the large libraries with more than 80,000 volumes. These have increased, since 1917, from 29 to 111 in number. Some of the factories come into this list. The Molotov Automobile Works at Gorki has 113,000 volumes, with 18,000 registered readers. The Stalingrad Tractor Works has two libraries, one of general literature, with 86,000 volumes, and the other of scientific and technical works, with 116,000 volumes. The Institute for the Mechanisation of Agriculture in the North Caucasus has 82,000 volumes (*Moscow Daily News*, April 15, 1935).

factory operative, every office employee— we may almost say every peasant under thirty years of age— seems to be an omnivorous reader. Not altogether without reason has it been claimed that, in the USSR, it is the state publishing house, rather than the university professoriate or even the great army of school teachers, that is, in the service of general culture, the most potent agency.

Holidays and Amusements

Equally significant is the fact that the provision for recreation, the organisation of the oddly named “ parks of culture and rest ”, and the provision of “ rest houses ” in which the workers can spend their vacations, all fall within the sphere of the People’s Commissars of Education of the various republics. They have, in fact, all to be included in the Remaking of Man, on which Soviet Communism is basing its new civilisation. The innumerable clubs for workers in factories or state farms ; the steadily growing provision for social intercourse of one or other sort in the more successful of the collective farms ; the “ red corners ” in factory or institute, and on board ship ; the often elaborate arrangements made for the organised amusement of the various sections of visitors in the parks of the larger cities¹— manifestations of the advantages of popular organisation, more genuinely spontaneous and uncontrolled than is believed by the foreigner—all receive the beneficent patronage of the commissariats of education. Most of the palaces of bygone royalty, and the mansions and summer villas of the former wealthy, have been adjusted to their new uses as holiday homes for the wage-earners, the management and the allocation of railway tickets being left in the hands of the committees of the several trade unions. It is worth notice that, whilst vodka can be purchased in bottles at the special government shops devoted entirely to this commerce (which are usually covered with government posters urging you not to drink), it is an accepted universal rule that no alcoholic drink of any sort is obtainable at any workers’ club or holiday “ rest house ”, any more than at any theatre or concert hall, or at any railway station or communal dining place.

The Meaning of Culture

Is there any inaccuracy in describing all this varied organisation of the people’s leisure hours, equally with the time spent in school and college, as the promotion of popular culture ? This, it may be said, is to give a

¹ These arrangements are often minutely sensible. In the urban parks and gardens there are often free shelters for temporary refuge from rainstorms ; broad covered places with one or more open sides, furnished with small tables and abundant chairs. In many of these a woman attendant will be found in charge of a counter, loaded with the current issues of various newspapers and magazines, and a small selection of popular books. These are all available gratuitously for the temporary use of any applicant, who deposits against the loan his trade union or party membership card, which he reclaims on returning his reading matter when the rainstorm ceases.

new meaning to the word "culture" as it has commonly been used in England. There is, it must be candidly admitted, in the USSR of to-day, little of the sort of culture that used to be recognised as such in the Oxford or Cambridge common rooms, or in the artistic coteries of Bloomsbury or Chelsea; and even less governmental recognition of it, or encouragement to it.¹ It is worth while analysing the divergent meanings of the word.

Both under Soviet Communism and in Great Britain the *élite* emphasise in culture the idea of self-improvement and self-development. Both agree in the importance of physical culture as an element in the good life. Both agree, too, whether intuitively or as a scientifically valid inference from psychology, in estimating more highly, as a means of physical culture, the instrument of outdoor games or mountaineering than that of even the best gymnastic exhibitions, or formally ordered exercises. But Soviet Communism avoids, whilst Great Britain usually commits, the error of regarding culture, not as knowledge of what is best in the world and a competent evaluation of the whole universe in which we live, but as essentially, or at least predominatingly, "bookish" in its nature. Or, if not exclusively "bookish", culture may indicate mainly a preoccupation with selected parts of the activities of the world, such as music or painting, poetry or literary style; or even the collecting of things thought beautiful. Moreover, it seems as if the British conception of culture were closely bound up with the absence of any use-value in the pursuit or practice of the cultured life, apart from what may be admitted to be the utility of promoting culture itself. In Britain the devotee of culture is apt to regard, with what the soviet communists think a silly complacency, the fact that his efforts to increase or develop his own culture are divorced from any practical use in the transformation of the world. These differences between divergent views of culture lead to graver contrasts. Is it unfair to say that the British devotees of culture not only accept as

¹ There is, we believe, no teaching of Greek or Latin in the elementary or secondary schools of the USSR, though German or English is commonly taught even in the villages, in all seven- or ten-year schools. In one or other of the 800 colleges, academies and research institutes of university grade a large proportion of the living languages of the world are studied with practical objects. Greek and Latin, like Sanscrit and Hebrew, are studied by those pursuing anthropology, archaeology or philology. There is, similarly, no formal teaching of philosophy, and (except in the Communist Academy (for which see pp. 778-780) for the higher education of Party members and then only for the purpose of refuting criticisms of Marxism) next to no exposition or criticism of the works on philosophy, theology or metaphysics, by either mediaeval or modern authors. There is, in fact, a positive discouragement of any purely "bookish" culture. We do not presume to estimate how much may not be lost by this all-pervading "positivism", as Auguste Comte might have termed it. A few of the largest public libraries strive to keep their collections up to date by importing from other countries their more important new works on philosophy. The Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute at Moscow makes a point of obtaining everything dealing with Marxism, in whatever language published.

We have already mentioned (p. 731) that, in 1934, it was decided that the subject of history should be added to the college courses. From October 1934, whole series of lectures on the history of various nations in the world are being given by scores of professors, often illuminated by descriptions of their social institutions, and sketches of their literatures.

inevitable the exclusion of the masses from the "realms of gold" in which they themselves find so much virtuous enjoyment, but also secretly rejoice at their own exclusive possession of something in which the common lump of men cannot share? And is not this the explanation of a certain polished arrogance of mind among these superior people, producing, even in the most amiable of them, a certain veiled condescension towards the people at large? ¹ In the usage of Soviet Communism there is, in the conception of culture, no such connotation of inevitable exclusiveness, of a pleasant aloofness, or of a consciousness of superiority. It is, at any rate, definitely the policy of the Soviet Government—as it is very far from being that of any other government in the world—that the possession of culture shall be made, not necessarily identical or equal, but genuinely universal; that none of the known means of awakening the powers of the child, or stimulating the development of the adolescent, or refining the life of the adult, shall be withheld from, or denied to, any resident in the USSR; and that, as fast as the increasing wealth production permits, these means shall actually be put, for individual use or enjoyment according to their several faculties, at the disposal of literally everybody. Soviet communists actually believe that, by a sustained effort of self-sacrifice on the part of the older people, the entire generation that is growing up in the USSR can be raised to a high level of culture. There will be some who will see in that very belief, and in the strenuous efforts that it inspires, a real evidence of culture in the best sense of the world.

The Civilisation of a Whole Nation

It is, in fact, in its universalism that we see the most significant of all the trends of the service of education in the Soviet Union, whether we think of the young or the old, the great cities or the backward races; whether the stress is on physical health or on technical training, on wealth production or on universal participation in the affairs of state; on music or on the drama. More than anywhere else the government in the USSR is concerned with the young. "The guiding idea of the Soviet Republic", it has been said, "is to give the children a preference in everything, from food and clothing to less tangible goods. The explanation of this deliberate policy is not sentimental. Communism is a Messianic doctrine, which lives for the future, and acts with long sighted vision. Its ambition is to base the greatness of the world's first socialist republic upon a generation of children who will be mentally and physically the superiors of the men and women of to-day."² In education, even more than in any other sphere, Soviet Communism has made a new departure in the world's history. Never before has there been a genuine attempt to make an adequate or complete education universal. As was pointed out as early

¹ It was in vain that Matthew Arnold quoted Menander to the cultivated coteries of his time. Have they not, in the matter of culture, steadfastly refused to "choose equality"?

² *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), p. 76.

in the course of the soviet experiment as 1921, in a book that attracted too little notice in Great Britain,¹ the policy of the USSR in this field is without precedent. All down the ages, in every country, "the privileged ruling and employing class never seriously intended that the children of the manual workers should enjoy the same opportunities as their own. Even advanced Liberals in contemporary England speak of their ideas as 'the educational ladder' by which they mean a system which will help the more capable children of the manual workers to climb above their class. Whatever a few idealists may have planned or preached, there is no real attempt to rear the whole mass of working-class children in the best culture of their age. . . . To my mind," wrote Mr. Brailsford in 1921, "the most inspiring thing in Russia is that the socialist revolution, instantly and instinctively, began to realise the ideal of universal education, which the interests and prejudices of class have thwarted in the rest of Europe. Every fair-minded observer has given the Bolsheviks credit for their prompt efforts to send an illiterate people to school. Their ambition is much bolder. They intend, from infancy to adolescence, to make, for every Russian child, the conditions, both physical and intellectual, which will enable its mind to evolve its utmost capacities. They intend that none of the comforts, none of the pleasures, none of the stimuli which awaken the powers of a child born in Europe in a cultured middle-class home shall be lacking to the children of the humblest Russian workers. Their belief is that, by a great and self-sacrificing effort, the entire generation which is coming to maturity in Russia can be raised to a high level of culture." Mr. Brailsford did not fail to point out that the soviet communists had many difficulties to overcome. "They will", he said, "not at once attain their full ambition. They are hampered by poverty. They suffer from a dearth of teachers who share their outlook. Many a long year will pass before the primitive isolated Russian village can absorb more than the bare rudiments of civilisation. But this they have achieved. They have broken the barriers which class and poverty had raised against education."² We emphasise Mr. Brailsford's point that it is in the conception of the civilisation of the whole nation that is found the true significance of Soviet Communism. "For as yet Europe has had no cultivated nation, but only a number of relatively cultivated classes."³

Educational Shortcomings

The goal and the ideal may be beyond all praise, but the achievement lags woefully behind. Great as has been the advance in all branches and grades of education in the USSR, the shortcomings are (1935) still formidable. Of the immense programme placed before the people, probably not one item has been carried out in its entirety. Twenty-two millions of children are in attendance at school, but hardly anywhere, in city or

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 74-75.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 198.

country, are there school buildings sufficient to contain them. The newest erections are of the highest excellence, but in practically all the cities, and in some of the larger villages, the children have to come in two shifts—occasionally even three shifts spread over a long day.¹ There are not yet enough teachers to bring all the classes down, not to the maximum of twenty-five, as required by the decree of 1918, but to a maximum even of fifty. Of the half a million teachers, probably those having only the scantiest of pedagogic qualifications account for one-half. It may be possible within the next two or three years to turn all the four-year schools into seven-year schools throughout the USSR, as the Ukraine has already done, and even to increase proportionately the teaching staff. But it will be impossible for many a day to find trained and qualified teachers for every hamlet and village between the Baltic and the Pacific. In the higher colleges and institutes the professors complain that the bulk of the students come with an imperfect grounding in what should be secondary subjects; and have to spend much of their years of vocational training to repairing some of these deficiencies. The training of teachers suffers specially from this inadequate preparation. At best, the five-year course is all too short to equip fully either the medical practitioner or the engineer, still less the scientific researcher. The demand for technicians of every kind is so great that students are snatched away from college, and given responsible appointments, long before they are equal to such tasks. It is a tribute to the versatility and adaptability of the race, and to the all-pervading zeal and devotion to the public service, that these immature and imperfectly trained young men and women achieve a degree of success that is remarkable. But how great is the need for improvement, and how far the Soviet Union has still to go, no one knows better than the People's Commissars and the academicians themselves. In view of the immensity of the task, and the height of the ideal, this scarcely amounts to a criticism.

Looking at the whole range of the social services of the USSR, and taking into view also the organisation of the productive forces as described in our two preceding chapters, there is, however, one fundamental criticism to which we are tempted. Whatever else has been achieved by Soviet Communism, it has not gone far in the direction of making life beautiful. But how can it be expected to have done so within less than a couple of decades? "We are", declared Lenin² in 1921, "a beggarly,

¹ In Moscow, in 1934, in spite of having opened 100 new schools within the last five years, all the schools (some 500 in number) work in two shifts, except 35, in which there are three shifts; where there are ten-year schools (8 to 17 inclusive) attendance is not legally compulsory after the fifteenth birthday.

In the villages the school may have any sort of accommodation—an enlarged peasant's hut, very occasionally a disused church, and increasingly a new building, often erected free of charge by the workmen of a neighbouring factory, who take the village school under their patronage (see p. 605).

² At the second All-Russian Congress for Political Education in 1921, quoted by M. Epstein, Assistant People's Commissar for Education of the RSFSR, in "The Fight for Cultural Advance", in *The School in the USSR* (VOKS, Moscow, 1933), p. 30.

uncultured people. We should speak of that semi-Asiatic cultural backwardness, which we have not yet thrown off. . . . We are a people, to put it mildly, on the level, as it were, of semi-barbarism." This ugliness of Russian life is the outcome not of communism but of the previous centuries of tsardom. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that—except for the magnificent Neva front and the Red Square at Moscow—the wide expanse of the Eurasian plain is still almost as devoid of beauty as of comfort, and not yet much better provided with either than was Tsarist Russia. Yet even here there is definite progress in the newest buildings of Moscow and Kharkov, together with the new underground railway, and in much else.¹ And so impressive is the advance already made, and so contagious the atmosphere of hopefulness, that the observer comes away half prepared to believe that even beauty will, in due time, be achieved as well as the comforts of life.

Changing the Environment

In the various social services hitherto described, we have seen how largely Soviet Communism relies, for the Remaking of Man, on the development in body and mind, in capacity and character, of the individual child, of the individual adolescent and of the individual man or woman, whether as citizen, as producer or as consumer—not to say also as a member of the organised Vocation of Leadership. It is to this end of the maximum development of every person that, in the Soviet Union, all the various social institutions seek to create positive health in every member of the community, to equip everyone with education and culture, and to guarantee, at all ages and in all the vicissitudes of life, that state of economic security in which alone an uninterrupted course of individual development is practicable.² But to deal in any or all of these ways exclusively with the individual is not enough. Man in society is, not entirely, but to no small extent, dependent on the environment, exterior to himself, in which he lives and moves. It is accordingly of importance, if the peoples of the USSR are to be successively raised to higher stages of civilisation, that the environment in which they have to dwell, and from the influence of which, in the past, at least much of their degradation has come, should be itself transformed.

Governments in the past have seldom thought of deliberately changing the environment of their peoples. This is not explicitly set out, even in the twentieth-century textbooks of political science of the western world, as one of the purposes of government. Yet how can mankind be improved, or even in any way changed, without changing its environment? The Soviet Government naturally gives a large place, in its policy of the Remaking of Man, to measures for the transformation of the environment,

¹ From an architectural standpoint the best three recent buildings may be Lenin's mausoleum by Shchussov, the Palace of Industry at Kharkov by Serafino and the magnificent sanatorium for rheumatism at Odessa.

² *Speech of Welcome to Foreign Delegates*, by N. M. Shvornik, Secretary of the AUCCTU (1933), pp. 17-18.

alike of the dwellers in cities and of those in the rural areas. Under this head come a whole series of colossal projects, many of them already being partially put in operation year by year, as opportunity permits. These range from gigantic schemes of artificial irrigation in order to keep back the inroads of the desert on the cultivated land, on the one hand ; and of subsoil drainage of the huge part now made up of swamps and marshes, on the other, up to plans for an all-pervading electrification of the whole area of the USSR, and for the completion of a continuous network of roads and navigable waterways throughout the vast plain. We have perforce to confine ourselves here to the one important part of the environment constituted by the buildings, in and about which the 170 millions of people in the USSR spend so many hours out of the twenty-four ; together with the various common services made necessary by the aggregation of these buildings, and of those who frequent them, in the multitude of villages, and notably in the rapid expansion of populous cities.

The Service of Housing

It is a paradox of social statistics in every country that some of the greatest advances in social organisation are made the subjects of the bitterest reproaches. This is the case with regard to the service of housing in the Soviet Union. The living conditions of the mass of the people in the industrial centres of Tsarist Russia, as well as in the villages, were so appallingly bad, and the rapid growth of the city population during the past decade has been so overwhelming, that the utmost efforts at rehousing have so far scarcely kept pace with the ever-enlarging needs. Hence, in spite of really great achievements, Soviet Communism is blamed to-day for the fact that the housing of the people is still a blot upon the picture !

No reasonable judgment can be arrived at about the trend in the service of housing until we realise what things were like before the Revolution. Nowadays we usually attempt to measure overcrowding by counting how many individuals have to live in a single room. But in the industrial districts of Tsarist Russia more than half of the factory workers had no rooms at all ! " According to the findings of a special investigation made in St. Petersburg in 1908, only 40 per cent of the textile workers had separate rooms ; the remainder found shelter in overcrowded barracks, where they occupied separate bunks. On an average a working family had only three square metres of floor space " (literally only 10 square feet), " and this in St. Petersburg, where the workers enjoyed comparatively better living conditions than elsewhere." Nor was this terrible overcrowding caused merely by urban conditions. In 1920 an English visitor found his way, the first foreigner for six years, to " the factory in the forest ", twenty miles from the small town of Vladimír, where capitalism had built a cotton mill to take advantage of the incredibly low level of wages among the peasants. " No trade union was tolerated here before the Revolution. Every form of association among the workers, even for

purposes of education or recreation, was forbidden. I saw", continues this observer, "the vast barracks in which they had been housed. Each family had for its dwelling a narrow though lofty cell (one cannot call it a room) lit by a tiny window high up in the wall. Often as many as seven or eight pairs of lungs inhabited these cells, and the allowance of space was supposed to be seven cubic feet [equal to seven feet by one and by one] for each person. The factory was well lit by electricity. There was no artificial light in the barracks, and the sanitary arrangements were unspeakable."¹ Matters were at any rate no better in the mining districts. "At Asbest", in the Urals, relates a Canadian expert of his first impressions, "I saw the workers living, for the greater part, under the conditions that existed when the mines were under private ownership. Most of them were quartered in large log-houses consisting usually of one huge room, either unpartitioned or divided by flimsy curtains. An entire family—man, wife and children—would have a space possibly six feet by twelve, in which to live, sleep and cook. The beds were composed of boards covered by a heap of rags. The workers seldom if ever undressed. There was no attempt at providing latrines or other like facilities. Some families which we observed were living in a sort of earth hovel; others in huts half of which were hardly more than excavations in the ground, rudely roofed over."²

For the first decade after the Bolshevik seizure of power, though many plans were made, and some new dwellings erected, the Soviet Government found no time or power to make any substantial advance in housing, either in the old cities or the new, at the mines or in the villages. With the formulation of the First Five-Year Plan, however, a bound forward was made in all directions. The aggregate amount of new building has, during the past seven years (1928-1934), steadily increased year after year, a large proportion of the materials and labour force available being allocated to the provision of additional dwellings for the rapidly increasing population of the cities, the oil-fields and the mining areas; whilst, among the agriculturists, every state farm (sovkhos) and many of the more thriving kolkhosi, whether communes or artels, have made new provision both for farm buildings and for the accommodation of part of their workers. Comparable statistics are not easily discoverable, but it seems probable that, in the mere amount of state, municipal, selosoviet and cooperative building, during the past seven years (1927-1934), the USSR has actually done more than any other nation within that period. In the cities of the USSR, from April to October, the noise of building operations never (1932-1935) ceases, day and night.

Systematic Town Planning

What are the salient trends in this considerable rehousing of the people between the Baltic and the Pacific? We first note the amount

¹ *The Russian Workers' Republic*, by H. N. Brailsford (1921), pp. 12 and 13.

² *Working for the Soviets*, by W. A. Rukeyser (1932), p. 152.

of thought and foresight that has been put into the task, with the widespread adoption of town planning. Equally conspicuous in most cases has been the haste and consequent defectiveness of the actual operation of building and equipping the new dwellings. There has certainly been no monopoly in housing. The need has been so overwhelming that many different agencies have been not only allowed, but actually persuaded, to lend a hand in providing accommodation to whatever extent and in whatever style they could. Finally, it will be seen that, whatever ideas may have been entertained in some quarters of a utopian communal life, the public demand has mostly compelled the provision of substantially self-contained family dwellings, comprising several rooms, and often a separate kitchen; usually with no more arrangements in common among the adjacent families than have been customary in western Europe for a whole generation.

We take these four main trends in detail.

With regard to housing, as in so many other activities of Soviet Communism, we see the characteristic devotion of endless time and thought to getting the best scheme or plan. The planning of new cities, or the rebuilding of old ones, is in the USSR not a fad of philanthropists or utopian architects, but a recognised part of the art of public administration, forced on the attention of statesmen and officials, architects and builders, and also the general public, by elaborate specialist museums and research institutes, and by organising periodical public exhibitions, with exceptionally vivid maps and diagrams, explaining how each city can best be transformed and developed. The extension of such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, for the next twenty or thirty years, has been exhaustively studied and graphically delineated, having regard to the more convenient location of additional factories, the amount of new housing required, the means of communication and locomotion, the supply of water and electricity, the disposal of surface water, sewage and garbage, the maintenance of open spaces and the construction of stadiums, the provision of the necessary number of schools and places of higher education, hospitals and clinics, public baths, fire stations and every kind of public office. At Kharkov the corresponding organisation, called Guipergrad, an institution for the study of the development and extension of existing cities, is reported to have a membership of 1100, of whom no fewer than 900 are professional architects or building engineers, has worked out, with equal elaborate detail, the future development of the city, which is steadily approaching one million inhabitants. At Dnieprostroi, where the greatest hydro-electric generating plant in the world is supplying a rapidly growing congeries of factories, more than three years were spent by the expert officials representing the central government, the local governments and the various industrial corporations, in planning every detail of the growth, during the ensuing thirty years, of an estimated urban aggregation of a million people. This design includes a civic centre surrounded by six autonomous self-contained satellite cities, free from the drawbacks of

"suburbs". The most striking example of this deliberate town planning has been manifested in such new cities as Magnitogorsk and such transformations as Chelyabinsk. Doubtless there are mistakes and unforeseen contingencies in all this elaborate forecasting of future action. But it is hard to believe that deliberate planning is not better than leaving everything to haphazard individual decision when the moment arrives. Architects from western countries find this part of the housing problem ably dealt with in the USSR. We quote one enthusiastic summary by a British expert. "The town planning," he said, "the city planning, the regional planning, is all good. They have considered everything, power for the factories, convenience of getting raw material to the works and finished products away from them. The new cities are zoned and belted in the most approved and up-to-date way. They have provided amply for all aesthetic, health and recreational wants, planting trees everywhere, building fine cinemas and theatres, ample hospitals and schools. Everything has been well and wisely planned."¹

Unfortunately, as is equally characteristic of the present phase of Soviet Communism, the elaborate planning of the future is not accompanied, so far as building is concerned, by an equally high standard of execution. The considerable work in providing additional housing in the cities and other industrial areas, during the past seven years, has been done in great haste, largely by peasant youths very imperfectly trained as building craftsmen. The haste was part of the "Bolshevik tempo", deliberately adopted for the heavy industries, to be explained as arising from the intense desire to make the USSR self-sufficient before the constantly apprehended attack (or blockade or embargo) by the capitalist powers could be begun. Whether or not this fear was justified, the acceleration which it demanded has had an adverse result on the incessant building operations of 1928-1934, in the frequent failure to finish off the hundreds of thousands of new dwellings up to anything like western standards of quality. The observant visitor comes across endless complaints of leaky roofs, windows that refuse either to open or to shut, warped doors, floors attacked by dry rot, and imperfect plumbing; of buildings left long unprovided with any water supply or sanitary conveniences, and of the lack of arrangements for adequate lighting or heating. But defective as the new dwellings may be, from the standpoint of Vienna or Amsterdam, or from that of the best that Great Britain or America can show, they are plainly superior to the overcrowded hovels that they superseded. The frank comments of the English architect whom we have already quoted are at least instructive. Writing in 1932, Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis said of the USSR: "Just as their new industrial cities are immeasurably better in layout and general lines, so are our individual

¹ "A Holiday in Russia", by Clough Williams-Ellis, in *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, October 15, 1931, p. 11; see in confirmation the informative chapter on "Architecture and Town-Planning", by Geoffrey Ridley, in *Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia*, edited by M. I. Cole, 1933, pp. 100-124.

buildings immeasurably better in finish and workmanship. And here you come to the reason why Russia is exciting. Here, in my own sphere, is the challenge—is it better to do the wrong thing well or the right thing badly? Your answer to this will depend, as your answer to the Russian challenge in general, on whether you care more for the present or for the future. Russia's mistakes in city buildings are remediable. She will have to put new doors and windows, sometimes new floors, into her houses. Sometime, in some not far distant five-year plan, she will have to reconsider some light-hearted notions she has as to plumbing. It will be exceedingly annoying to have to do all this, but unless Russia and the present Russian mentality change in the next twenty years, all this will be done. What about our mistakes? Our mistakes need dynamite. The water will run out of our baths, our windows will open and shut, but our streets are wrong, our factories or our houses are in the wrong place, we have spoilt our rivers, and even our fine new roads, and unless the present English mentality changes strangely in the next twenty years, we shall not set these things right."¹

The number and variety of the agencies called upon to help in this work of rehousing are bewildering. The USSR Government has led the way by repeatedly demanding instant attention to the need, and by itself building, not only new offices nearly everywhere, but also huge blocks of flats in Moscow for the civil servants. The hundreds of municipal soviets, in great cities and small, have been constantly stirred up to build both blocks of flats and small houses for their growing populations. Many of the manufacturing corporations—the government enterprises called trusts—have erected more or less extensive blocks of flats for their office employees and their manual workers. Most of the larger factories have done the same, as part of the annual running expenses, often at the instance of the trade union, and as a concession made in the annual collective bargaining, which is, as we have described, everywhere so actively conducted in the opening months of each year.² Special efforts have been made to improve the housing accommodation in such areas as the Donets coal mines and the Baku oil-fields, in order to counteract the troublesome tendency of the workers to wander away elsewhere. In all the new manufacturing suburbs of old cities (as at Gorki, Stalingrad and Kharkov) and in the creation of new cities (as at Dnieprostroi and Magnitogorsk) the provision of dwellings for the workers almost necessarily had to be undertaken simultaneously with the erection of the factories, in order to attract the new recruits. But not all this extensive and varied activity, at hundreds of different centres, by central and local governments in their various departments, and by industrial trusts and separate factories, trade unions, and consumers' cooperative societies, could keep down the continuous deficit of housing accommodation. In Moscow and

¹ "A Holiday in Russia", by Clough Williams-Ellis, in *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, October 15, 1932, p. 11.

² See pp. 219-224.

Leningrad, and to a lesser extent in a few other cities, cooperative housing associations were encouraged, by allocation of sites and concessions in the way of credit, to build houses for their own members. Individual owners were in some cases permitted, and even assisted, to enlarge buildings for their own occupation. As is so often found to be the case in the USSR, with its fundamental conception of multiformity, there has been, in the vast enterprise of housing, no idea of there being only a single employer, a single controller or a single agency. The only thing forbidden is the profit-making building contractor hiring wage labour, or the individual speculator in housing accommodation.

Nor did the government of the USSR claim for itself any monopoly, either of policy or of execution. The work undertaken by or under any authority in any part of the USSR has, of course, to be reported to Gosplan for inclusion in the General Plan. The total of projected expenditure has, accordingly, to be approved each year by the USSR Central Executive Committee (TSIK). The principal legislative decrees about housing are enacted by TSIK, and ratified by the All-Union Congress of Soviets. The responsibility for providing adequate dwelling accommodation for all the people rests primarily on the several constituent and autonomous republics, and on the local soviets, to be carried out generally by special administrative commissions, and to be supervised, in the main, by the several People's Commissars of Health, or Commissars of Communal Affairs.

At various times since the Revolution, there have been experiments in common arrangements, in which groups of students or other unmarried persons, and sometimes families, joined together in dispensing with separate housekeeping, separate kitchens and often separate meals. Some persons looked forward to a time when the family would cease to be the unit for housing accommodation. Some of the new dwellings that were being provided in connection with great industrial enterprises, as for instance at the Molotov Automobile Works at Gorki, were actually laid out as communes. But it was soon found that such arrangements were unattractive to the mass of the workers and their wives, and the family unit of accommodation was reverted to. In recent years the whole provision of new dwellings has taken the form of flats of two, three or four rooms, each flat usually having its own kitchen, and usually also its own water supply, bath-room and water closet, though there is some sharing among two or three contiguous small flats. The arrangements in common for the inhabitants of a whole block sometimes comprise a crèche and a children's playground; less frequently a branch store of the local cooperative society; whilst occasionally part of the ground floor is utilised for the local offices of public departments, such as the district pharmacy, and perhaps the consultation point of the local health administration. There are, however, we think, nowhere any more arrangements in common than in the later blocks of dwellings of the Vienna Municipality or the London County Council; usually, in fact, there seem to be fewer.

With all this multifarious activity by so many different authorities,

all intent on building additional workers' dwellings, it is impossible to get any definite statistics of the aggregate amount actually completed.¹ We append statements covering the two periods 1926-1930 and 1931-1934. "During the last five years [1926-1930]", reported L. M. Kaganovich, in 1931, "over 3½ billion roubles have been spent on new house construction throughout the USSR, and over 30 million square metres of new dwelling space have been added . . . up to 1931 about one million workers' families have been settled in these new houses, whereas in 1931 alone 600,000 workers' families will be provided for. . . . In spite of the inadequacy of what has been done in this sphere from the point of view of the ever growing needs of the workers and toilers, let the bourgeois slanderers point to one country in Europe where such extensive housing construction has been undertaken during the past five years [1926-1930]. During this period a number of cities have been reconstructed, such as Baku, Grosny, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Nizhni-Novgorod [now Gorki], etc. Moreover a number of entirely new cities have been built, such as Magnitogorsk, Dneprostroi, Kuznetsk, Dzerzhinsk, etc."²

"Since 1931 [to 1934]", reported the People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR, "about 6300 million roubles have been invested in housing and communal construction. Over 19 million square metres of living space have been constructed. . . . In Moscow, for example, about 2,200,000 square metres of new living space were built between 1931 and 1934; whilst in the [other] cities of Moscow Province over one million square metres were built, and in the city and province of Leningrad 2,200,000. Housing construction has also been developed on a large scale in the Urals and in Western Siberia. In the cities and new constructions of these regions . . . 4,700,000 square metres have been built. Particularly outstanding is the fact that before the Revolution in the textile regions of Tver there were up to 2·5 square metres of living space per person, while now in Kalinin there are five to six square metres. No bourgeois country has ever known housing construction on such a scale. . . . It is necessary, however, to say, with Bolshevik directness," he proceeds, "that our achievements in housing construction do not as yet satisfy us. In this branch of municipal economy there are great shortcomings. In 1933, 9,700,000 square metres of living space were constructed in the cities of the RSFSR, whereas on January 1, 1934, only 5 million square metres had been brought into use. Matters were not better in 1934. During the first eleven months the executive committees fulfilled the housing construction plan by 78·5 per cent, the cooperatives

¹ Comparison with other countries is made difficult by the difference in method of measurement. In Great Britain we count by rooms, whereas in the USSR measurement is by square metres of floor, or living space. A British apartment or flat of three rooms, suited to not more than six persons of all ages, in a block of workmen's dwellings has usually about 72 or 85 square yards of floor space; or, as the Russians would say, 56 or 67 square metres of living space.

² *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich (1931), pp. 9, 62.

by 85 per cent, and so on. Matters are proceeding more successfully in the Western Province, Bashkiria and Karakstan; and worse in Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and in the Far Eastern Territory. The situation is absolutely impermissible in Ivanovov, where 9640 square metres were brought into use in the first eight months (annual plan 52,200 square metres). In Yaroslavl only 36,400 were ready for October 1st. In housing construction cooperatives have considerably grown. They now include up to 400,000 persons. During these years 1,700,000 square metres of living space have been built and brought into use. In addition to this, the housing cooperatives have put up 578,000 of standard houses." Dwelling on the problem of quality of housing construction, Komarov emphasised that "in many cases it does not correspond to the growing cultural needs of the toilers. Insufficient attention is paid to the architectural form and interior planning and finish. An example of this is the workers' settlement of the Molotov automobile plant in Gorki. In Voronezh a new house for specialists had to be largely reconstructed in order to be brought into use. . . . The housing facilities of the cities of the RSFSR have greatly increased during the past few years, and at the beginning of 1934 reached 132 million square metres. . . . Great tasks face us in the field of housing. The Seventeenth Party Congress issued a directive to construct 64 million square metres of living space in the Second Five-Year Plan. From 40 to 45 million square metres of this fall to the cities of the RSFSR." ¹

Strive as they may, the soviet authorities will not be able, for many a year, to house decently their rapidly growing population.

Municipal Services

Scarcely less important than adequate dwelling accommodation in influence upon health and character, are the various common services that the close aggregation of buildings and persons in cities renders necessary. In such matters as water supply and main drainage, paving and lighting, means of transport, public baths and other accessories of the civilised life of a densely crowded population, the Soviet Government has already transformed many of the cities of the USSR almost beyond recognition. Prior to the Revolution such municipal services as existed usually extended only to the parts of the cities inhabited by the wealthy and official classes. For the most part the streets, if paved at all, were only roughly paved with cobble-stones, and hardly any were regularly cleaned or properly lighted. The transformation has been greater than the statistics can record. Writing in 1931, Kaganovich gives the following

¹ Report of N. P. Komarov, People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR at the Sixteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, January 18, 1935; in *Moscow Daily News*, January 20, 1935.

The aggregate of 132 million square metres given as the existing accommodation in the cities of the RSFSR alone, would, in Great Britain, be regarded as housing without illegal overcrowding about 3 million families averaging five persons each, which appears to be less than has been built for letting, including private enterprise, since the Great War, in the cities of Great Britain.

particulars: "According to figures for 1911, out of 1063 inhabited points with a population of over 10,000 only 249 (20.6 per cent) possessed water supply systems . . . and even those almost exclusively served only the centres of the cities. By 1926 the number of cities with water supply systems had increased to 283 . . . [by 1931] the number . . . has increased to 333 . . . not to speak of the restoration of old systems. 32 cities [in 1931] now possess drainage systems, as compared with 19 before the revolution. Tramway systems have been newly installed in 10 cities, not to speak of the extensive development of the previously existing systems. Before the war 61 cities . . . were supplied with electricity. The number is now 393."¹

In 1935, the People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR (covering about four-sevenths of the population of the USSR) reported as follows on the progress from 1931 to 1934: "During the past few years 660 million roubles have been expended for sanitary and technical measures. New water systems have been built in Dzerzhinsk, Shakhty, Engels, Lysva, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Kineshma and other cities. The water systems in Gorki, Samara, Chelyabinsk, Perm, Stalingrad, Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk have been radically reconstructed. Before the Revolution the Moscow water system supplied 23 million gallons of water a day. Now it supplies 124 million gallons. . . . Sewage systems, bath-houses and communal electric service have also greatly increased. A total of 166.7 million roubles has been invested in communal electric stations from 1931 to 1934. The capacity of electric stations has increased during this time [by] 82,000 kilowatts. . . . Central-heating stations and gas systems were also developing, particularly in Moscow, where the number of gas meters increased from 33,500 in 1931 to 50,500 in 1934. . . . In 1933 and 1934 new street car lines were built in 11 cities. . . . In the Second Five-Year Plan street car lines will be built in 16 cities. . . . Autobus communications have also expanded. Before the October Revolution there were no autobuses in the country at all. In 1930 there were bus lines in 36 cities, and in 1934 in 97 cities . . . the construction of our subway [in Moscow]—the best in the world—has been carried on, under the observation of Comrade Stalin, under the immediate leadership of the Moscow committee of the Party and of Comrade Kaganovich. No country in the world has known such a rapid tempo of subway construction. . . . In 1928 the first asphalt pavement was laid in Moscow, while at the end of last year [1934] 1,900,000 square metres of streets and squares were covered with asphalt."²

Looking back on this lengthy exposition of the proceedings of the Soviet Government in the Remaking of Man, we note the range and

¹ *The Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and other Cities in the USSR*, by L. M. Kaganovich (1931), pp. 62-63.

² Report of N. P. Komarov, People's Commissar of Communal Affairs of the RSFSR, to the Sixteenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, January 18, 1935; in *Moscow Daily News*, January 20, 1935.

variety of the expedients that have been brought to the task. But these varieties of organised social services, extending from birth to burial, constitute only a relatively small part of the process of the Remaking of Man that is going on in the USSR. For all their social utility and all their width of range, the processes of woman's emancipation and juvenile education, social insurance and replanning the cities, are nevertheless only supplementary, in their effect on the population, to the organisation of life itself. This is not always understood by critics of the social services. Yet every man or woman physically and mentally able to engage in productive work is necessarily subject to a lifelong education and training by the effect upon him of the conditions of his employment. To the statesman of the Soviet Union, what is produced in the factory or the mine, on the farm or the oil-field, is not merely wealth, but also the workers themselves, as they are moulded by their work. The forty thousand male and female operatives at the Stalingrad Tractor Works, whom the factory itself has created out of the raw peasants who began to build it, are as much part of its product as the tractors that it constructs out of steel.¹ This Remaking of Man by the factory in which he works is not taken into account by the balance-sheet and profit and loss account insisted on by the western economist; but it is forcibly within the consciousness alike of the Bolshevik statesmen and even of the Bolshevik factory managers themselves.

Svistun, the director of the Kharkov tractor factory, one of the most successful soviet enterprises, is distinguished for the constant attention that he pays to the effect of industrial employment on the life and the character of workers. "We make tractors," Svistun said to Louis Fischer in 1931, "but I also want to make new men."²

"In the words of Marx," says a skilled mechanic, "the working-class, in remoulding society, must remould itself as well. This remoulding process takes place every day; it produces those examples of heroic labour which are well known to the proletariat of all nations; it creates our shock brigades and whole shock-brigading workshops."³ "A soviet factory", sums up Maxim Gorky, "is a school of socialistic culture, and not a capitalist slaughter-house."⁴

Nor is it only the technical operations of building the plant and working the machinery that mould the men and women engaged in wealth production. In our chapter entitled "In Place of Profit" we have sought to describe the incentives, new and old, that are deliberately brought to bear on the workers in the Soviet Union.⁵ No less influential in the

¹ This is vividly revealed in the collection of autobiographical sketches of these workers, published in English under the title of *Those who built Stalingrad*, with foreword by Maxim Gorky (1935, 268 pp.). "Having read this book," writes Gorky, "the non-Party youth of the Union of Soviets will see how these people have built the plant, and how the plant has re-educated these people."

² *Machines and Men in Russia*, by Louis Fischer, 1932, p. 130.

³ *Where the Workers are in Power*, by D. Zaslavsky (Moscow, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1933), p. 35.

⁴ *Those who built Stalingrad* (1935), foreword.

⁵ Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

formation of character is the great amount of participation in industrial administration that is involved, both in the prolonged and extensive collective bargaining¹ in which the trade union engages every year, and also in the management of all the social enterprises run by the trade union itself, and all its arrays of committees and members' meetings, including also the Comradely Courts.²

But this is not all. The political organisation of the citizens, from the bottom to the top of the pyramid of soviets, including the service of literally hundreds of thousands of men and women in unpaid public offices in city and village,³ and the frequent bursts of voluntary work by crowds of "Saturdayers",⁴ afford a perpetual "training in public service" to the factory operatives and office employees, and now to the member of the collective farms. Cooperating in a similar way in the Remaking of Man in the USSR are also the innumerable voluntary associations of one or other kind,⁵ in which so many millions of people of all ages are enrolled. Nor can the urge for individual self-improvement be omitted from this summary of the factors in the Remaking of Man. To the western observer it looks as if all the younger men and women working in the factories and offices, and an ever-increasing proportion of the villagers, were almost more bent on improving their qualifications or widening their experience than on amusing themselves. The astonishing numbers attending free evening classes in all the cities; the widespread endeavour to get into the technicums or the workers' faculties preparing for entrance to a scientific institute or university; the rush of ambitious inventors who think they have discovered a technical improvement; the eager nomination, by trade union branches, of promising members earning good money for promotion to three or five years' scientific training upon a government stipend giving only bare maintenance; the constant popular pressure for instructive lectures as well as for dramatic performances in the workers' clubs, and for the enlargement of their libraries, where scientific and technical books are often engaged by waiting lists, ten deep, of expectant borrowers; all these, and many other manifestations of the individual urge, are cooperating in this large-scale Remaking of Man. Throughout this seething mass of social movement, what is impressive is, not only the independence of individual initiative, with the unity of spirit in which the common aims are pursued, but also the immensity of the number of those who are brought within the influence of a deliberate social training. In the following chapter we shall attempt to analyse the purpose that inspires this tireless effort, and the instrument on which reliance is placed for its realisation, together with the errors and shortcomings that obstruct its optimum result.

¹ Pp. 143-147.

² Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", section on Trade Unionism, pp. 124-160.

³ Chapter II. in Part I., "Man as a Citizen".

⁴ Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

⁵ Chapter VI. in Part I., "Dictatorship or Democracy?"

CHAPTER XI

SCIENCE THE SALVATION OF MANKIND

At this last stage of our enquiry, can we discern, in the constitution and activities described in the foregoing pages, the essential basis of Soviet Communism? What has been the emotional faith that has led the Bolsheviks to their amazing conquests of the manifold difficulties with which they have had to cope? What are the instruments upon which they rely to fulfil their purpose? What is their conception of the relation of man to man, and of man to the universe? In short, what is the philosophy on which they are, as they think, building a new civilisation?

It may be thought that we could have avoided this task by giving, as an answer to the enquiries, a summary of the philosophic conclusions of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Many such expositions of the communist philosophy are nowadays available for British or American readers; and accessible in scores of other languages.¹ If we prefer not to paraphrase even the most authoritative summary of "Marxism", but to attempt an analysis of a different kind, this is not because we undervalue the terseness of these summaries, or the refreshing originality with which they break away from the conventional phraseology of the age-long controversies from Plato to Kant, and from Hegel to Bradley. There is a more practical reason for writing this chapter afresh. It may be humiliating to an American or a Briton to confess it, but the fact cannot be ignored that the common summaries of "Marxism" fail to penetrate to the mind of the ordinary reader of English.² He does not understand what is meant by

¹ The student will need no list of the voluminous works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, all of which have been republished in various languages. To the English or American reader we may cite, in addition, the following among the many explanatory works: *What Marx Really Meant*, by G. D. H. Cole (1933, 317 pp.); *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, by Sidney Hook (1933, 288 pp.); *The Communist Answer to the World's Needs*, by Julius F. Hecker (1935, 323 pp.); *On Marxism To-day*, by Maurice Dobb (1932, 48 pp.); *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism*, by H. Levy, John MacMurray, Ralph Fox, R. Page Arnot, J. D. Bernal and E. P. Carr (1934, 154 pp.); *Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton (1933, 360 pp.), especially pp. 220-224.

English readers will find useful the volume entitled *Marxism and Modern Thought*, by N. I. Bukharin and others (1935); and *Dialectical Materialism*, by V. Adoratsky, 1933, 96 pp. Also *A Handbook of Marxism*, edited by Emile Burns, 1935, 1088 pp., being an extensive collection of the more important texts and speeches.

² "Communist ideology employs a language which is foreign to our ears. It rests on an historical foundation of controversies which have never interested us. It has never been interpreted within a framework of verbal conventions which are familiar to us. The consistency of the communist outlook is difficult for an Englishman to comprehend. Englishmen who are most disposed to take a materialistic view are most distrustful of mere logic. An apparent flaw in the consistency of communists makes it still more difficult to understand them. They insist on the historical approach to other categories of human activity. They do not appear to apply this to their own methods of propaganda. They do not expound their teachings with any evident regard for the traditional background of those with whom they disagree" ("Contemporary Philosophy in Soviet Russia", by Lancelot Hogben, in *Psyche*, October 1931, p. 3).

such un-English phrases as "dialectical materialism" and "the materialist conception of history", in which what are called "contradictions" are endlessly developing; or by the "passing of quantity into quality", and the "interpenetration of opposites"; "thesis" being followed by "antithesis", and "negation" by the "negation of negations", until a "synthesis" is reached; and the "classless society" is ushered in by the "dictatorship of the proletariat", after which the unending series of changes starts a similar procession towards another synthesis, the nature of which cannot at present be foreseen. We prefer to content ourselves with examining the methods of thinking, and the aim and purpose, of Soviet Communism as these are exhibited, not so much in the words of the philosophic writers as in the policy and actions of the Soviet Government (especially during the past decade); and in those of the Central Committee of the Communist Party as directed successively by Lenin and Stalin.

Marxism, it has been said, is both a method and a doctrine, each of them supporting the other. The survey and analysis of the history of the past—the method summed up in the phrase "the materialist conception of history"—led Marx and Engels, and, after their death, Lenin, to the confident assertion that the successive transformations of the way in which the production of food and other commodities was carried on must necessarily be accompanied, in each country, by changes in the organisation of society and of government. They saw these changes happening in the form of struggles between different classes to achieve dominance. Just as the social order that has been termed feudalism gave way, through successive struggles, to the social order termed capitalism, so (it was asserted) capitalism would, in successive struggles, be superseded by communism. In vain, at each stage of this evolution do the defenders of the *status quo* put their faith in the permanence of the particular equilibrium that seems to them to have been reached. Dialectical materialism taught that nothing stood still, and that there was never an equilibrium. The mere difference in the pace and direction of the motion set up by the stresses and strains inherent in every form of society as in every form of material substances (in Marxian terminology the "contradictions") involved conflicts and struggles between classes, and consequent changes in the mutual relations between them. It was inevitable that the growing numbers and importance of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie should eventually find intolerable the social relations and governmental forms which feudalism had created. The system of capitalism, which was substituted for that of feudalism, underwent its own successive developments, in which the new class of the proletariat (labourers owning none of the means of production, and having no other way of getting food than the sale of their labour-force for wages), steadily increased in numbers and in consciousness of their own propertyless condition. The capitalist employers, competing disastrously for profit with each other, and suffering from successive crises in which prosperous booms precipitated ruinous

slumps, try to escape competition by combining in cartels and trusts and amalgamations, taxing the consumer by monopoly prices, and necessarily requiring such huge capitals that their management inevitably falls into the hands of the financiers. Incidentally this leads to "imperialism", or the exploitation of tribal races or undeveloped foreign regions, and wars for their conquest. Meanwhile the proletariat grows continually, and spasmodically rebels, whilst the governments of the financiers, hunting profits by the scent of gold, without any attempt to understand what they are doing, become more and more muddled and less and less able to maintain their control of the economic forces. Inevitably there comes a revolutionary upheaval in which the expropriators are themselves expropriated by the only growing class, the proletarians.¹

Now, we are not here concerned with the question of the truth or validity of this doctrine or method of historical analysis, nor with its assertion of the inevitability of an eventual world revolution in which the "dictatorship of the proletariat" takes the place of the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie". What we have to note is the dynamic effect of the method and the doctrine itself in the particular case of the Russian revolution of October 1917. In our judgment this dynamic effect was considerable, alike on the mind and will of Lenin himself; upon the Bolsheviks whom he attracted and educated; upon the members of the Petrograd and other soviets; and eventually upon the mass of the population. We suggest that the future historian will attribute to the belief in the inevitability of the proletarian revolution no small part of the remarkable success of the upheaval which Lenin so persistently advocated, and, at the correct moment, so energetically led. In the eighteen years that have elapsed since the seizure of power, it has been, more than anything else, the popular acceptance of this conception of the inevitability of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that has enabled the successors of Lenin in the government not only to maintain their power but also to overcome so many of their difficulties.

The Struggle with Nature

There is no conception more fundamental to Soviet Communism than that of man's perpetual struggle towards a greater command of the

¹ This evolution of social organisation the Marxian describes as dialectical materialism. The phrase requires explanation to an Englishman. Professor H. Levy has ventured on the following translation, in a paper included in *Aspects of Dialectical Materialism*, by H. Levy, John MacMurray, Ralph Fox, R. Page Arnot, J. D. Bernal and E. P. Carr (1934, pp. 2-3): "We say that any two successive stages in the development are dialectically connected. Thus the word contains something of the sense of 'developmental'. Any attempt to discuss one of these stages statically without taking into full consideration the fact that that stage was itself changing, and was part of a changing or growing process, and in particular part of an evolutionary chain, would be undialectical. But there is more than this implied in it. The development is regarded not necessarily as proceeding at what might be called a pedestrian pace. Like an individual walking in the country downhill, his internal momentum increases, he breaks into a run, and finishes up with a leap across the stream in the valley to climb slowly up the next slope. To say the process

universe in which he finds himself. This struggle has various phases. Primitive man had literally to fight for bare life. He had day by day to get food and to defend himself against other animals, not excluding his fellow-men. Man in society has still to obtain sufficient food, clothing and shelter, together with security for the continuous maintenance of himself and his family against aggression both from within his particular social organisation and from without. Civilised man struggles not only for these necessities on steadily ascending levels of the common standard but also for the further development of himself, of his own community, and of mankind, in intellect and character, including the acquisition of every kind of culture. Accordingly the Bolshevik aim, as we have described it in the preceding chapter, has been the Remaking of Man. The Bolsheviks held that man's power over nature could come only from his advancing knowledge of the universe. Accordingly, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have persistently and whole-heartedly put their faith in the instrument of science, used under the direction of their dominant purpose. "Soviet rule", observed a distinguished French statesman on a recent visit to Moscow, "has bestowed on science all the authority of which it deprived religion; science is the new dogma. . . . Pure science", he sums up, "is unquestionably a cult in the Soviet Union."¹

The outstanding feature in the mentality of the soviet administrators is, indeed, this implicit and unswerving belief, as the main instrument of achievement, in knowledge itself; that is to say, in man's continually increasing apprehension of the facts of the universe. This devotion to science does not mean what the Englishman understands by materialism. To the Bolshevik the mind of man, with all its emotions and ideas and sensations and memories, is as much within man's knowledge as his body; and both body and mind are as much parts of the universe to be studied as the stones or the trees or the weather. What the Bolshevik takes as his instrument for social advance is the aggregate of definite knowledge of all these things. That knowledge—discovered in man's experience of life upon this earth; analysed by the classifications that man makes; impressed on man's mind by a continuous process of "trial and error"; repeatedly verified by qualitative comparison and quantitative measurement of the phenomena to ensure that the "order of thought" always corresponds with the ascertained "order of things"; and finally generalised into what we misleadingly term "laws" of nature—is simply what is known in the western world as science.

But we must clearly understand that, to the Bolsheviks, the science in which, as an instrument, they put so much faith, is sharply distinguished from either metaphysics or theology. It is man's ascertained knowledge is dialectical implies also, therefore, that it is not simply a pedestrian development, but that during the process internal forces are aroused which drive it with accelerating speed to the completion of the process and with a bound to the next stage." The student will note that the Marxian use of "dialectical" is neither that of Kant nor that of Hegel.

¹ *Bashwood from Paris*, by Edouard Herriot (1934), p. 215.

of nature (including human nature), that they find so effective in achieving their purpose. They may claim to be masters of practical psychology but they definitely repudiate any "absolute" within or behind nature, of which man knows nothing. It is the external world itself, *as man apprehends it*, that the Bolsheviks study. Just as the physicist or the chemist, the biologist or the anthropologist, regards, as the object of his investigations, the external world itself as known to man, and does not, in his scientific studies, trouble himself with speculations about the "thing in itself" or about a suppositious "reality" behind phenomena of which he can know nothing, so the Bolsheviks dismiss as futile, or at any rate as without significance to science, all the various metaphysical speculations which two thousand years of philosophers have preferred to discuss. This, as we must repeat, is not to exclude the study of mind equally with that of body. Man is found to have ideas about things, and memories, just as he has sensations and emotions; and these states of mind themselves form part of the universe that man apprehends and investigates. But the ideas, like the memories, the sensations and the emotions, are merely man's way of thinking about things. The Bolsheviks are emphatic in the declaration that the ideas about things are not prior to the things to which they relate. Thus, they definitely reject as baseless the suggestion that there exists a primordial idea or plan or pattern, of which the universe itself is the expression, or which it is working out.

The application of science in order to improve on the way in which, without man's intervention, changes would occur is a late acquisition of man. From the Neolithic Age down to the end of the great navigations of the sixteenth century, man, broadly speaking, took the resources of nature as they were, and, as Professor Hogben has suggested, the economic problem of this period in social evolution was one of communications—of how to get at these resources. To create both a calendar and a geodesy as the necessary cultural basis of an international economy permitting the exchange of local natural products and those of a primitive agriculture was no mean achievement of the Egyptians and the Ancient Greeks.¹ But this ancient science, upon which the calendrical and seafaring technology of the time was based, was mainly important in enabling a relatively small section of each community to move around in order to get as much as possible out of the limited resources of different localities.

From the seventeenth century onward the centre of progressive science gradually shifted to northern Europe, where slave labour was not available. Attention then became particularly directed to non-human sources of power, by means of which extensive operations in deep-shaft mining and large-scale metallurgy could be carried on in ways impracticable for the ancients. During the last three hundred years science has been more and more concerned with the discovery and application of new forms

¹ "Mathematics in Antiquity", by Lancelot Hogben, in the issue of *Antiquity*, June 1935, citing Dr. Nongebaur's *Vorlesungen ueber Geschichte der antiken mathematischen Wissenschaften*.

of force, new sources of power, new combinations of elements and new elements themselves, by means of which the commodities and services desired by man could be produced, in enormous quantities, with a minimum of expenditure of human labour-force. The greater part of the science of to day is concerned with enabling man in society, if he will only take the trouble to learn, so to improve on the non-human ways of change as not only to produce in almost unlimited quantity what nature, with less aid from man, produced in small amounts, but also to bring forth new substances and new forms of force which the pre-scientific age had never seen. In this respect the century of Faraday and Clerk Maxwell, Marx and Darwin, Mendeleyev and Pasteur, Rutherford and Einstein, stands out above all past human existence. And the chapter is not closed. Every year man's knowledge is increased. By the unceasing investigation of every part of the universe, including those important parts that we call social institutions and human behaviour, science is continually being extended, revised and rewritten.

The Bolshevist conception of science as the instrument of man's command over nature, differs, as it seems to us, in some respects from that commonly enunciated by the scientists of the western world.

There is, first, the invariable conjunction of matter with motion, as one of its qualities. To the Bolshevik the whole universe, and every part of it, appears always on the move. Nothing, whether alive or dead, thing or thought, group or relation, is ever static. Absolute immobility is a figment of the imagination, within human experience completely non-existent. Nature, even the smallest part of it, is nowhere or for the briefest moment of time in equilibrium. To imagine a state of equilibrium otherwise than as strictly relative to particular changing conditions is merely misleading. Such a supposition vitiates every inference that includes it.

This universal mobility, or actual conjunction of matter with motion as one of its inseparable attributes, necessarily involves a perpetual shifting of relations between the different parts of the universe. The various substances that we see or feel, the atoms or molecules of which they are composed, the electrons of which the atoms are made up, the thoughts which they evoke in the human mind, are always changing their relation to each other and to the human observer. They are parting at different rates with the energy with which they are all charged. And every change reacts not only on the minds of men but also on every other part of the universe.

This unevenness of change in different fragments of the universe, including both the human observers themselves and the relations between them and the various fragments observed, has the important feature that the changes are always mutual or reciprocal. It is not merely that everything alters even whilst we are looking at it. The change perpetually taking place in each fragment of the universe effects a corresponding change in every other fragment of the universe, including the human observer himself, and the human society of which he forms a part. Thus,

to cite a commonly used example, the organisation, and also the technical methods, of production of commodities useful to man are, and have always been, not only different in different countries at the same time, but also periodically changing from century to century, and even from decade to decade. And every such change effects a corresponding change in the persons engaged in production and in the relations to each other of the classes constituting each human society.¹ The habits and customs out of which social life is made change with the relations in production. The forms of social and political organisation and the human beings themselves change.

Further, the Bolshevist conception of change, whether of things or of thoughts, of individuals or of social groups, always includes the antecedents of the change and its consequences. For every change must necessarily be not only from some former state but also towards some later state. Any conception of a change of things or of thoughts must, to have any meaning, include both these aspects. In an analogous way our comprehension of an idea, which is a thought in our minds, is not completely realistic unless we enquire how and whence it came, and to what action or other effect it necessarily leads.²

The purposive action in which human thought issues—which is one among the varied changes in the universe effected by each change in the human mind—is not usually, and never advantageously, a case of putting into practice only one branch of our knowledge of the universe. For the thought to become dynamically complete, as a plan, in the sense of accom-

¹ Understanding may be helped by the following graphic illustration. "Reduced to its boldest essentials, that philosophy may be stated in the following series of propositions. Every part of the universe is in a state of continual development. This development proceeds by way of an 'inner contradiction of opposites', which may be visualised as a sort of internal tension created by the pull of opposing forces at work in every entity or concept. This tension is finally resolved in a new balance of forces, or synthesis, whereupon a fresh pull is set up and the whole business, which is known as dialectical process, begins all over again. Further, this dialectical process is now a continuous, now a discontinuous affair, each new synthesis being brought about much in the same way as victory in a tug-of-war. First there is a long pull by both teams, then suddenly one flops. And it is essentially the same process alike in the physical world, in the world of social organisation and the world of thought. (The quantum theory comes in handy here, the jumpy behaviour of electrons affording an elegant parallel to the epochs of revolution in social history; while the picture is made perfect if we include also the mutations that occur in the animal and vegetable kingdoms.) And finally, it is a *material* process. It exists in itself, and is in no way dependent on the mind of God (which does not exist at all) or the mind of man, which is, indeed, itself subject to the very same dialectical movement. The most that man can do is to act in accordance with 'conscious necessity': to understand the nature of things and fall in with it, instead of trying to kick against the pricks. But this is not to say that the universe is a mechanistic affair, a mere structure of atoms blindly controlled by a balance of forces. It is to be interpreted in terms of growth rather than of equilibrium, to be visualised as an organism rather than as a machine" (*Plan or No Plan*, by Barbara Wootton, 1934, pp. 222-223).

² This was fancifully expressed by the American philosopher Charles Saunders Pierce: "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passport at both these gates is to be arrested as unauthorised by reason" (*Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Pierce*, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Harvard, 1935, vol. v., "Lectures").

plishing any social purpose, all the branches of knowledge that have any relevance to the purpose must be simultaneously present in the mind, and be put conjointly into operation. The engineer building a bridge, or the agriculturist cultivating a farm, will fail to accomplish his purpose completely, without error or shortcoming, if he uses only his knowledge of mathematics or mechanics, without calling in and his knowledge of chemistry or biology as the case may be. In planning the enterprise account must also be taken, and made the subject of equally scientific study, of the purpose for which the bridge or farm is being created, and the effect which it will have on social customs and other social institutions, alike in the neighbourhood and elsewhere. Nor must the maker of the plan omit, if he wishes his work to have unbroken success, any of the effects of the conditions of employment upon the workers who take part in the construction, and also its subsequent results on those who will enjoy its amenities or consume its products. That is to say, we have to realise, as is not yet adequately understood, that the branches of knowledge that we call sociology and ethics – as yet very imperfectly worked out – are as indispensable to completely successful social construction and human progress as the physical and biological sciences. In short, all experience of social development, whether economic or political, demonstrates that it takes all branches of knowledge, and requires their most intimate conjunction, to achieve completely any desired end in social change.

We see here, also, why “science”, to be useful in our command over nature, must become “technology”. The Bolsheviks do not even understand why the westerners make any distinction between the two, or between pure and applied science, a distinction which seems both dangerous and unscientific. They ask how any genuine science (that is to say, any real knowledge of the universe) can be “pure” in the sense of having no relation to the external world, or to those changes in the external world which any change in our scientific thought effects. The Bolsheviks naturally understand that some of the knowledge of the universe that we gain may not be immediately capable of use in the accomplishment of any conscious purpose; while other knowledge can be at once applied to satisfy our desires. They even estimate as highly as the westerners those scientific advances that are so abstract as to transcend, at present, all imaginable possibilities of usefulness. But the Bolsheviks do not regard the most abstract or the least purposeful scientific truths as essentially different from those that can be immediately applied to surmount a contemporary difficulty. Just as all scientific truths are derived, in their view, exclusively from a study of the facts of the universe, including among those facts successive states of the human minds in the universe, so all scientific truths must inevitably relate to changes in those facts, whether or not the truths are immediately seen to be applicable to the purposeful making of other changes. Scientific thinking is valid only when it is carried on in terms of conceivable action. There is no genuine knowledge of the universe that is not potentially useful to mankind, not

merely in the sense that action may one day be taken on it, but also in the fact that every new knowledge necessarily affects the way in which we hold all the rest of our stock.

It would be foolish to suggest that the Bolsheviks have created a new science, or that they have, in little more than a decade, mounted on the shoulders of the scientific world of the west. The Bolsheviks in the USSR, like the present generation in every other country, rightly claim to be the heirs of all the knowledge and all the culture of the past, irrespective of the particular communities in which the various advances were first made. Marx and Lenin, and after them Stalin, have repeatedly made it clear to their followers that it is only by claiming this heritage, and making themselves completely masters of it, that they can hope either to achieve any further advances or to build successfully the socialist society which is their goal. What the western world may chiefly learn from them to-day is not so much such additions as they may already have made to the sum of human knowledge, as the manner and the spirit in which they are seeking to educate, in a true appreciation of science, alike their scientists, their administrators and their citizens.¹ In contrast with the soviet conception of the "polytechnicalisation" of the schooling of all sections of the population, British education and British social organisation have led to a regrettable dichotomy. Scientists and technologists, whose work is changing the material basis of civilisation, are too often trained in complete ignorance of the social results of their activities and of the social responsibilities these entail; whilst statesmen, historians and sociologists are generally educated in ignorance of the technological changes which do so much to mould the character of our civilisation. Thus the dialectical implications of science are often not present to the mind of the western mathematician or physicist, chemist or biologist; still less to the mind of the western student of social institutions (sociology) or of human conduct or behaviour (ethics). We may even suggest that these aspects of science are not always borne in mind in the scientist's own studies, when he shuts himself up in his own narrow specialism, which he may even delight in keeping what he calls "pure" and unconnected with the world of action.

The Organisation of Scientific Research

In the preceding chapter we have described how science, as an indispensable guide to action, has dominated the whole soviet educational system, from the kindergarten through the polytechnical schools and technical institutes to the highest ranges of the universities and other places of research. In addition to the score of universities, which are increasingly freeing themselves from the metaphysics and philosophies of bygone thinkers and from the dominance of the ancient literatures in which their thoughts had been expressed, there were, in 1934, no fewer than 840 separate scientific colleges and institutes, with 188 branches

¹ Chapter X, in Part II, "The Remaking of Man", section on "Training for Life".

variously grouped and directed, all of them of what elsewhere would be deemed university grade or rank; and each devoted to its own function of turning out trained men and women (to whom, from eighteen onward, they give a five years course), either as qualified technicians in particular branches of production or other public services, or as researchers and professors in one or other branch of science. Thus, above and beyond the couple of hundred thousand schools and "technicums" (technical institutes), and "tabfacs" (workers' preparatory faculties) of lower than university grade, in the curriculum of all of which science is predominant, we find to-day in the USSR, what exists in no other country, an elaborately planned network of more than a thousand research laboratories, with their own extensive libraries and collections, scattered over the vast territory between the Arctic Ocean on the north and the Black Sea or the Central Asian Mountains on the south, at each of which selected staffs of trained researchers, with salaries and expenses provided, are working in coordination on particular problems, allocated largely with special reference to local needs, opportunities or resources.¹

It is instructive to learn for what reasons, and by what stages, so elaborate an organisation of research was instituted. Here is a description by a distinguished member of the ancient Academy of Sciences, Professor T. Rainov, of the gradual evolution of a general plan for the advancement of knowledge. "At the beginning", he says, "planning in the field of scientific work was carried out in an inadequately organised way. It proceeded mainly along the lines of activities of large depart-

¹ "Prior to the October Revolution there were only some scores of scientific institutions in Russia. At the present time their number exceeds a thousand. The vast majority of them originated during the First and during the early years of the Second Five-Year Plans.

Subjects	Institutes	Branches	Location	Institutes	Branches
Academic centres . . .	54	...	RSFSR . . .	581	112
Industry . . .	194	84	Ukraine . . .	139	54
Agriculture . . .	140	42	White Russia . . .	34	4
Transport and Commu- nication . . .	21	23	Transcaucasia . . .	41	13
Social-economy Sciences	49	10	Uzbekistan . . .	28	4
Medicine . . .	271	15	Turkmenistan . . .	10	1
Education . . .	111	12	Tadzhikistan . . .	7	...
	840	186 [<i>sic</i>]		840	188

(*USSR in Construction*, issue for June 1934.)

"The total number of people engaged in scientific institutes in 1929 was 4612; in 1930, 11,639; in 1931, 16,853; and in 1932, 29,375. The number of (assistant) investigators with university education in 1929, 6320; and in 1932, 10,659. In 1930 the capital investment was 32 million roubles; in 1931, 73 millions. The operating expenses in 1930 totalled 57 million roubles; in 1931, 138 million; and in 1932, 176 million roubles" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 5, 1932).

The Diary of a Science Worker, a student's manual annually published in Russian, gives an illuminating vision of the wealth of opportunity afforded to the young man or woman of 18, and effectively opened to the poorest by the apparently unlimited number of stipends (scholarships covering a bare maintenance).

ments, which in their turn corresponded to important fields of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This practice particularly developed after large groups of scientific institutions, which formerly had been under the People's Commissariat of Education, passed over to the industrial commissariats in order to draw scientific work nearer to practice. The planning of science was not yet completely decentralised at this stage.

"This was manifested first of all in financing scientific institutions. In planning their budgets, questions naturally arose of a network of scientific research institutes, and of eliminating parallelism and overlapping activities. The necessity of working in close contact with practical construction often led to collisions of scientific institutions of different departments in the same industrial enterprises; and then, of course, the question arose of interdepartmental coordination of scientific work. Finally, participation of scientific institutions of different departments in conferences and congresses, particularly on broad complex problems, contributed also to such a decentralisation.

"This ground was prepared for further concentrated and consolidated planning of science in the USSR. The necessity of solving problems concerning organisation and methods of planning scientific research work and coordinating the work of scientific organisations of different departments were discussed at the first All-Union Conference on Planning Scientific Research Work, convened in the spring of 1931. The Second All-Union Conference, at the end of December 1932, worked out a plan of scientific research work in the field of physical, chemical and engineering schemes for the Second Five-Year Plan period, and particularly for 1933. The conference devoted special attention to one important problem, that of taking measures to utilise the results of scientific work in production. The resolutions of the conference, later approved by the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, are of enormous importance. Henceforth the planning of science extends from the outlining of scientific topics to the utilisation of the results of scientific work in practice, and thus becomes an essential part of socialist planning as a whole."

A Research Centre organised inside Gosplan

"One of the resolutions of the first conference provided for the organisation of a centre of planning scientific research work within the State Planning Commission. A number of measures had been taken by the Government to organise such a centre. To extend unified planning on the very content of scientific work the State Planning Commission could lean first of all upon the Communist Academy. According to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Communist Academy was made responsible for the elaboration and adoption of Marxist-Leninist methods of scientific work. The first conference on planning science emphasised this rôle of the Communist Academy, and suggested that the Academy should carry out its rôle of

methodological centre in the field of planning scientific work also. A further step was taken in 1934 when, according to decrees of the Government, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was placed under the supervision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the institutions of the Academy were removed to Moscow. The Academy of Sciences has now become the most important scientific basis of the State Planning Commission in planning science."¹

Future Lines of Planning

"It is now quite clear that the planning of science will go on in the future along the following lines: individual scientific institutions outline their plans in accordance with the general problems of the economic and industrial plan of the country for a given period. These plans, proposed from below and corrected by the higher organisations, will serve as material for the elaboration of one compound plan by the State Planning Commission and the authoritative central scientific organisations, such as the Academy of Sciences and the Communist Academy, and others collaborating with the commission."²

How Research is Planned and Executed

It is interesting to examine how this huge volume of research work, by so many different institutes, is organised and conducted.³ The

¹ "The recent decree of the Central Executive Committee," says Academician Karpinsky, "which places the USSR Academy of Sciences under the direct supervision of the Council of People's Commissars, is enthusiastically greeted by the Academicians and the 3000 scientific and technical workers of the Academy."

"The decree is a new and important step toward linking the everyday work of the Academy with the needs of socialist construction. Much has already been achieved along this line. The Academy, which formerly studied only purely theoretical questions, has become an important factor in the life of our country, and as such must keep in constant touch with the People's Commissariats which direct the development of various branches of the national economy."

"The committee for supervising the scientific institutions under the Central Executive Committee, however, under whose supervision the Academy has been, could not insure our institution such contacts, and sometimes even delayed our work."

"The removal of this unnecessary intermediate link opens bright prospects of cooperation between the Academy and socialist industry and agriculture, as well as with scientific institutes not connected with the Academy, which sometimes duplicate our work" (*Moscow Daily News*, December 20, 1933).

² "Planned Science and Socialist Construction in the USSR", by Professor T. Rainov, in *Moscow Daily News*, September 5, 1934. Dr. Rainov makes it clear that "the problems outlined by the first conference on planning science are to remain the essential elements of this unified planning of science. These problems comprise: (1) Determination of the rôle played by the whole system of scientific research work in the budget of the country. (2) Planning the topics of scientific work. (3) Planned building of scientific research institutes. (4) Planned distribution of these institutes. (5) Planning of developing scientific cadres and educating new scientific workers. (6) Planned financing of scientific work" (*ibid.*).

³ We do not attempt to cite the very considerable number of books on science published in Russian. The following are some of the more accessible descriptions by competent British observers, of what they have seen in the USSR: *Science in Soviet Russia* (1930, 128 pp.) and *Industry and Education in Soviet Russia* (1932, 94 pp.), both by J. C. Crowther;

supreme control is now practically vested in the Sovnarkom of the USSR, which has annually to approve the estimates of expenditure, submitted in the budget, for ratification by the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets.¹ This control is exercised in practice by the several USSR People's Commissars concerned with the various branches of production, each of whom has some of the scientific institutes attached to his commissariat. The largest number of them, more than one-fourth of the whole, come under the purview of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, who has had to develop a Scientific Research Sector (NIS) specially charged with this branch of his administration. This sector works through specialist committees, of which there are at present about a dozen, composed almost entirely of the principal researchers in the sciences concerned. These committees, we read, "contain about ten or fifteen members. They have two main meetings in the year; some of them more. They draw up a plan of research for their subject to cover a year's working. This includes a statement of the general line of research which is to be undertaken in each institute. There is sometimes much difficulty in apportioning research to the various institutes. For instance, much discussion was necessary in apportioning the research of high-tension direct-current transmission between the Moscow Institute of Experimental Electro-Technics, the Leningrad Institute of Electro-Physics, the Physico-Technical Institute of Kharkov, the laboratory of the Electrosila Factory, and the laboratory of the Electrical Machine Factory at Kharkov."²

The Academy of Sciences

The intellectual supervision of all the research in the USSR, and therefore the responsibility for the allocation and coordination of the work of

"Technical Education in Russia", by B. Mount Jones, in *The New Russia* (1931), pp. 66-79; *A Scientist Among the Soviets*, by Julian Huxley (1932, 120 pp.).

Works by Russians in English include *Science at the Cross Roads* (236 pp.), being the papers contributed by the USSR delegates to the International Congress on the History of Science and Technology in London, July 1931; *The Basis of the Technological Economic Plan of Reconstruction of the USSR*, by G. W. Krizhanovskiy (Moscow, 1931, 32 pp.); many valuable articles in the VOKS monthly issue, vols. i.-v. of 1933, especially that under the title of *Scientific Construction in the USSR*; also the issue for June 1934 of *USSR in Construction*; the convenient volume, *Science and Education in the USSR*, by Professor A. Pinkovich (1935, 176 pp.); and the volume entitled *Marrism and Modern Thought*, by N. I. Bukharin and others (1935).

¹ "During 1932-1937 4020 million roubles are to be invested in research institutes in the USSR" (*USSR in Construction*, issue for June 1934).

Some of the research institutes are under different offices ranking for this purpose as commissariats, such as Gosplan, the Central Road Administration, the Hydrometallurgical Committee, the Civil Air Fleet Administration, and other organs of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the USSR. Others are under Centrosoyuz and the All-Union Producers' Cooperative Unions. Others, again, are under the People's Commissars of the various constituent or autonomous republics, or the State Publishing House (Ogiz) of the RSFSR. We deal separately with the institutes directly responsible to the USSR Academy of Sciences itself, and with those under the Communist Academy.

² *Manchester Guardian*, June 2, 1934.

all the thousand institutes, is now undertaken by the ancient Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the functions of which were drastically transformed by a decree of 1930. "Established", as one of its members reports,¹ "over two centuries ago, in 1724-1725, and placed under the control of officials appointed by the Government, the Academy of Sciences, during the tsarist period of its existence, constituted a sort of official department of science; and although it had in its ranks many distinguished Russian scientists of that time, it also contained many members whose sole distinction consisted in being docile and tractable servants of tsarism. The old Academy had none of the prestige, nor did it occupy the special place in the economic life of the country, which the new rejuvenated Academy of the USSR has acquired in recent years. . . . At the present time the Academy numbers 93 active members (Academicians). The oldest of them by age (born in 1846) and by time of election (in 1886) is the present President of the Academy, A. P. Karpinsky.

"Until 1932 the Academy had no representatives of the technical sciences in its ranks. In 1932 the academic body was enlarged by the election of 14 distinguished specialists in technical disciplines, among whom were the creators of the great technical constructions started and accomplished by the Soviet Union in recent years (Dnieprostroi, etc.). Among them we find Academicians Alexandrov, Winter, Graftio and others."²

The subjects adopted for special study by the Academy's Five-Year Plan may be classed, we read, "into the following complexes: (1) The complex of problems relating to the study of the structure of matter, and based on the latest achievements in astronomy, physics, chemical physics, and chemistry; (2) the group of problems relating to the study of utilisation of the natural resources of the Soviet Union; (3) the problems connected with the systematic investigation of the power resources of the Soviet Union, with the opening up of new sources of power, with questions of distant power transmissions and electrification of industry, transport and agriculture; (4) the group of problems relating to the new construc-

¹ Professor I. Korol, in the issue for June 1934 of *USSR in Construction*.

² Although the Academy now fully accepts the soviet régime, only a small proportion of its members belong to the Party. At the present time the 93 Academicians are of the following specialities: mathematical sciences, 4; physics, 8; technique, 18; chemistry, 10; geology, 8; biology, 13; history, 6; social economy, 6; European languages and literatures, 10; orientology, 8; and philosophy, 2. Besides the Active Members the Academy has 68 Honorary Members and 300 Correspondent Members. The Active Members constitute the General Assembly of the Academy, which is its supreme organ. The General Assembly meets in sessions that are held 5-7 times annually in conformity with a plan drawn up for a whole year in advance, in which provision is made both for the periods of the sessions and the basic questions to be discussed.

The Academy is divided into two departments: the Department of Mathematical and Natural Sciences and the Department of Social Sciences. The growth of its work in recent years may be measured by its annual budget, which amounted in 1928 to 3,903,000 roubles; in 1932 to 16,746,000 roubles; whilst the estimate for 1934 was 44,500,000 roubles. It publishes a number of journals, such as *Izvestia* (News) of the Academy, and also *Izvestia* of its separate scientific institutes, besides such popular scientific journals as *Herald of the Academy of Sciences* and *Priroda* (Nature).

tion developing throughout the Soviet Union, with questions of distribution of the productive forces, seismic investigations, investigation of building materials, questions of health protection, etc. ; (5) the group of problems connected with the chemification of the country ; (6) the complex of problems relating to the study of the evolution of the organic world, the solution of which should stimulate greater harvests, assist in combating drought, in cultivating new crops, in the intensification of cattle-raising, in the creation of raw material basis for light industry ; (7) the complex of socio-historical problems connected with the task of overcoming capitalism and the survivals of earlier social formations in the mentality of the people."¹

The activities of the Academy are, in fact, not hampered by any limitations, either of geography or of subject. Thus it is stated² that "the widely dispersed network of scientific research institutes (under the supervision) of the Academy, consisting of two main sections, that of applied science and that of the natural sciences and mathematics, have, for their main object, the direction of the whole system of scientific knowledge towards meeting the requirements of the country and furthering the growth of its economic reconstruction. The sphere of activity of the Academy embraces, as it were, the whole of the territory of the Soviet Union. Although its main activities are concentrated in the institutions, laboratories and museums of the capital, the Academy has nevertheless succeeded in extending its influence to the farthest corners of the Soviet Union by establishing scientific research stations and organising expeditions in all parts of the country ; for example, a number of branches and subsidiary institutes of the Academy have been set up in the Urals, the Caucasus and the Far East, forming, as it were, a vital link between the capital and the wide periphery of the Union. . . . The activities of the Academy of Sciences in the domain of the social sciences are also of great scientific value, and play a definite part in the cultural reconstruction of the life of the peoples of the USSR: We shall take as an example the Historico-Archaeographical Institute and the Eastern Institute. The former, which is carrying on the work of the Archaeological Commission, which had been in existence for about a hundred years (for a long time not included in the Academy), is engaged in seeking, collecting, preserving, treating and editing historical publications, and deals also with other pertinent historical subjects, on the basis of Marxian methodology.

¹ "This spring a conference of the four Academies and of the Scientific Research sector of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry will be convened for that purpose. This conference will be followed by numerous meetings of representatives of various institutes working in the same field but supervised by different organisations. . . . The Academy, Volgin pointed out, has no technical research institutes of its own, but such committees can easily replace them by coordinating the work of the non-academic and scientific-technical institutions, the best leaders of which are members of the Academy. . . . The transport committee has already rendered valuable assistance to the railroads" (Report on the activities of the USSR Academy of Sciences for 1932, made by the secretary (V. P. Volgin) to the annual meeting: *Moscow Daily News*, February 21, 1933).

² *Progress* (London) for October-November 1933, pp. 235-239.

"In studying the development of the Russian Empire, pre-revolutionary historians confined themselves almost exclusively to Great Russia, which to them represented the whole of the empire. The other peoples inhabiting Russia were considered of little importance. It follows therefore that the history of Great Russia has been written in some detail, while that of the majority of the other peoples of the USSR has to be started from the very beginning, that is to say, from the gathering of historical records and systematising them. That is why the Archaeographical Institute devotes a great deal of time to the study of those peoples who were most suppressed under the old régime. To make it possible to write the history of these peoples the Institute has been publishing various documents from the State archives.

"The archives of the seventeenth century relating to Astrakhan give a fair outline not only of the local economic life of the people, but also of the economic and political relations between the various groups of the population belonging to the Turko-Tartar nationalities. The Uzbek-Turkoman and Tadjik nationalities will find a reflex of their past in the records which have been preserved and which depict the trade relations between Moscow and Middle Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These documents refer frequently to the international position of Middle Asia at that time; to the economic and social structure of the Middle Asiatic khanates Bukhara, Balha and Khiva; to the independent rôle played by Middle Asiatic trade, and to the trade dealings of Eastern Europe; they supply information of the political inter-relations between the Uzbek khanates and the Turkoman, Kalmyk and Kazak-Kirghiz tribes, and so on.

"The Eastern Institute has for its main object the study of the social problems of the Far East. Its activities are conducted along two directions, literary and historico-economic. Its literary work is closely bound up with questions concerning the national culture of the Eastern peoples and the furtherance thereof. Of the many languages and dialects spoken by the peoples of the Soviet Union only a few have been studied at all."

A feature in which the Academy of Sciences is unique is its close contact with the manual workers in the principal industrial centres. This "contact between the Academy of Sciences and the organised working-class public is", we read, "steadily growing. Among all the academies of the world the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is the only one to report on its work to the proletarian audience. The Academy has received hundreds of 'instructions' from the workers at its provincial sessions. The Academy has established a committee of scientific consultation and propaganda. Members of the Academy visit factories, deliver addresses and consult on the most important problems of production."¹ Here is a description of one of these popular assemblies:

"This is an 'open meeting'. No academy of science in the world but this could even envisage such a meeting.

¹ *USSR in Construction*, issue for June 1934.

"It is in Vyborg, proletarian quarter of Leningrad, famous for its revolutionary history. Here, the workers have at their disposal a splendid Palace of Culture, in the great hall of which they are now gathered. The Academicians are the guests of the Vyborg workers to-day; to-morrow they will be the guests of the men and women of the Red Putilov Works.

"Zaslavsky [the correspondent] vividly described the scene. In the body of the hall—the proletariat, fresh from factory, plant, technical school, docks. On to the spacious stage file the Academicians amid thunderous applause from the gathering. Here are names famous throughout the world, in astronomy, physiology, biology, geology and other sciences. Here leonine frosted heads, broad stooped shoulders—many of the traditional figures of the scientists of the bygone era. Some still wear the ancient frock coat of ceremony, with the traditional contempt of their kind for clothes.

"They have come to make one of their periodical reports to the workers. But this is no adulterated 'popular' science—no mild evening of 'adult education' in which benevolent professors unbend and condescendingly, in ultra-simplified language, hand working-men some easy titbits of geology or astronomy. Of such is the 'adult educational movement' of capitalist lands."²

"There are five or six such meetings of the Academicians each year. These public sessions have become a feature. The Academicians visit factories, travel throughout the land meeting workmen, reporting to them, hearing of the worker's experiences and difficulties. And on each side there is a genuine and frank friendliness. It was not always so, of course. For long after the revolution there were scientists who stood aloof from the revolution, from the working class, for they feared for their science. But time proved them wrong, with emphasis."¹

A report of the activities of the Academy during 1932-1933 delivered by V. P. Volgin, Permanent Secretary of the Academy, pointed out that "during the last seven years the Academy institutions underwent a radical reorganisation, destroying the wall separating the Academy from the revolutionary life of our country. While remaining the All-Union centre of theoretical research, the Academy has succeeded in linking up its activities with the practical needs of socialist construction. . . . The Physico-Mathematical Institute of the Association, which is supposed to

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, December 22, 1932.

² *Ibid.* The constant note in the USSR is the intimate connection of the scientists with the producers concerned with their researches. We noted that Academician Vavilov, the President of the Leningrad Academy of Agricultural Sciences, in May 1933 "left Leningrad for Central Asia, where he will inspect the progress of the sowing campaign. He will also superintend the work of the experimental station organised near Tashkent by the Institute of Plant Culture, for the purpose of introducing new crops in Kazakhstan" (*ibid.*, May 11, 1933).

In the United Kingdom and the United States the meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and the corresponding American associations, usefully promote a general publicity for scientific work, but they appear to fall behind the USSR institutions in direct connection with the industries themselves.

carry out theoretical research only (problems of technical physics are studied by the physical, technical and other institutes of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry), continued its investigations of quantum electrodynamics, and prepared the way for the experimental study of the structure of matter (the disintegration of the atomic nucleus).” Work of like nature is being done in their own spheres by the Chemical Association, the Platinum Institute, the Soil Institute, the Biological Association, the laboratory of the Biochemistry and Physiology of Plants, the Zoological Institute, the Historico-Archaeological Institute and the Institutes of Slavic Culture and Orientology, and the Institute of Russian Literature.¹

The Communist Academy

The Academy of Sciences is not in sole charge of the intellectual direction, and the allocation and coordination of the work, of the thousand or more scientific institutes of the USSR. This important function is shared with another organ, completely independent of the Academy of Sciences, and entitled the Communist Academy.² This body, established during the first few months of Lenin's administration, is described in the following paragraphs of the amending decree of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of November 26, 1926 :

“(1) The Communist Academy, constituting the highest All-Union learned institution, has for its purpose the study and elaboration of questions of social science and natural science, as well as of questions of socialist construction, upon the grounds of Marxism and Leninism.

“(2) The tasks of the Communist Academy include : (a) elaboration of problems of Marxism and Leninism ; (b) combating of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois distortions of Marxism-Leninism ; and (c) rigid advocacy of the standpoint of dialectical materialism both in the social and the natural sciences, and repudiation of the survivals of idealism.”³

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 21, 1934.

² The Communist Academy, which was originally called the Socialist Academy, had its origin at a session of the Council of People's Commissars on March 15, 1918, when Lenin accepted a proposal of two revolutionary intellectuals, the professors M. N. Pokrovsky and M. A. Reussner, and ordered a decree to be drawn up. This decree, enacted June 25, 1918, established “The Socialist Academy of Social Science” as “a free association of persons having for its purpose the study and teaching of social sciences from the standpoint of scientific socialism and communism, as well as of sciences cognate to the aforesaid branches of knowledge”. It was to have “two basic sections : (a) scientific research and (b) scientific education”. It was given considerable powers and a free hand, but it was “attached to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee”, from which it drew the necessary funds. In 1919 a new decree (April 15, 1919) defined it as “an autonomous association of workers in scientific socialism pursuing the aims of scientific organisation, scientific research and instruction”. It was to unite and bring together “the workers of scientific socialism in the RSFSR”. Not until 1923 did it take the name of the Communist Academy ; and not until 1926 was its purpose and its task expressly defined in terms of “Marxism and Leninism”.

See article “The Communist Academy”, by V. Ostrovityanov and R. Premysler, in *Scientific Construction in the USSR*, being vol. v. of VOKS (1933), pp. 28-36.

³ Decree of Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of All-Union Congress of Soviets, November 26, 1926.

The organisation and the specific functions of the Communist Academy, which has always been confined to Party members, have undergone various changes. In 1934 it was governed by a presidium of 15 members, one of whom acts as president; whilst the present and three other members elected by the presidium constitute the bureau of the presidium by whom the day-by-day administration is conducted.

The nature of the work of this Academy in the organisation of Scientific Research may be gathered from the following authoritative account of its development:

"During the first Pyatiletka the Communist Academy widely elaborated the problems of socialist construction, waging a fight against bourgeois, trozkist, right and 'left' opportunistic theories. A turning-point both in the work of the soviet theoretical front in general and in the work of the Communist Academy in particular, was signalised by Stalin's address before the Conference of Agrarian Marxists. His speech, dedicated to problems of agrarian policy, gave guiding suggestions for the entire ideological front. This speech also gave a full list of demands upon science dictated by the transition from the period of restoration to the period of reconstruction—the period of the unfolded socialist advance.

"This turning-point was accompanied by scientific discussion, which developed on the economic, agrarian and literary fronts, on the front of the theory of state and law, and elsewhere. The result of these discussions was the realisation, under the leadership of the Party and of the Government, of the complete exposure and repudiation of the idealistic distortions of Marxism in the fields of political economy, philosophy, Party history, literary critique, pedagogics, etc.

"A most important stage in the work of the Communist Academy was marked by the ruling of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on March 15, 1933, upon the report of the presidium of the Academy. While noting the correct political line carried out by the Academy in the struggle against anti-Marxian and revisionist tendencies, the Central Committee pointed out the necessity of continued untiring efforts 'to eradicate both existing and emerging theories in various branches which reflect the bourgeois and social-democratic influence' . . . (together with) 'the necessity of concentrating communist thought upon theoretical elaboration of problems of socialist construction and the class-struggle of the proletariat'.

"In conformity with this ruling the Institutes of the Communist Academy began to reconstruct their work, coordinating it to a larger degree with the problems of socialist construction.

"Thus the Institute of Soviet Construction took part in the elaboration of a whole series of questions connected with the reconstruction of the work of the soviets and the administration of revolutionary justice; the Institute of World Economy developed activity in the study of the economic situation, and elaborated a number of questions pertaining to the world economic crisis; the Agrarian Institute began to coordinate its

work more closely with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, the Institute of Economics began to elaborate concrete problems of socialist construction, etc.

"In the course of the first Pyatiletka the Communist Academy was transformed into a complex organism incorporating in itself a whole number of scientific research establishments. By 1931 it embraced nine separate Institutes, and also the Natural Science Association, which included in itself eleven separate scientific establishments. To this should be added the nine editorial offices for special scientific journals, and also 16 Marxist Societies.

"The Institutes of Red Professors, then incorporated in the Communist Academy, were attended by about 2500 students.

"This quantitative growth placed difficulties in the way of concrete guidance of the scientific work. In this connection the Communist Academy was confronted squarely with the question of decentralisation of the scientific research work, which was carried out in 1932.

"At the present time the Communist Academy has 7 Institutes: (a) Institute of Economics, (b) Institute of World Economy and World Politics, (c) Institute of Soviet Construction and Law, (d) Agrarian Institute, (e) Institutes of Philosophy, (f) History and Literature and (g) Art. The Communist Academy has also its branch in Leningrad."¹

One of the most important of these institutes--that termed the All-Union Academy of Agriculture, also called the Agrarian Institute--was established in 1933, at the command of the Seventeenth Party Congress, "to work out forms and methods of reconstructing collective farms, and to build up theory on the basis of local experience". Revzina, the head of the institute, states that "Our institute was founded to help the Party and the Government to realise these tasks by summing up, elucidating and generalising the experience of the existing collective farms. We broadcast the experience of the best collectives so that all may use it, and reveal the shortcomings and mistakes in the work of others. . . . The Party, in its political instructions, has battled against two forces which hinder the organisation of work. The first is lack of individual responsibility and the second is the idea of equal shares in the produce irrespective of how much work had been done. When collectivisation takes place in an agricultural region formerly operated privately, people who lose their parcel of private land tend to lose also a sense of individual responsibility in the local social life. Some feel no individual obligation to the social order. To abolish irresponsible attitudes towards collective property the Central Committee of the Communist Party passed a decree on February 4, 1933, which resulted in stabilisation of the collective labour force in the permanent collective brigade, which has a definite piece of land allotted to it. It is given collective funds for productive purposes and it bears full responsibility for the work on its parcel of land." The

¹ Article by V. Ostrovityanov and R. Premysler in the volume of VOKS entitled *Scientific Construction in the USSR*, vol. v.

Agrarian Institute has advised the use of piecework and of bonus grants, as well as the formation of links between a definite field brigade and allocation of tractors. "The experience of the MTS Policy Sections established this year, is summed up and studied by the Institute . . . also the important problems of accounting which is absolutely necessary for sections."¹

We do not understand in what relation the Communist Academy, with its seven institutes, stands to the Department of Social Science of the Academy of Sciences, which, as we have mentioned, has its own institutes in the same field, notably the Historico-Archaeographical Institute, the Institutes of Slavic Culture and Orientology, the Institute of Languages, the Institute of Russian Literature and the Council for the Study of the Productive Forces. It is, indeed, currently reported in Moscow (1935) that, now that a Marxist handling of scientific enquiries is universally adopted, the Communist Academy will presently be formally dissolved. Its institutes will be handed over, possibly with some reallocation of subjects, to the Academy of Sciences.

Popular Participation in Research

One of the significant developments of the past decade is the wide interest taken in scientific research, and the extent to which the active participation of the mechanic and the machine-minder, the practical administrator and even the schoolboy has been secured. Not only is every factory and state farm expected to maintain its own scientific laboratory and conduct its own experiments, but each individual worker is encouraged to offer his own suggestions, and even to make his own inventions.

There are to-day in the USSR literally hundreds of thousands of manual working wage-earners, including many Comsomols and other college students, who believe that they have made original inventions of some sort; who think of themselves as inventors, and who spend much of their leisure in experimenting with new devices. There are societies of inventors, with large memberships, who are perpetually meeting in conferences and discussing how invention can best be promoted. There is a Central Council of Inventors, which has assigned two and three-quarter million roubles as a fund for awarding premiums to the best-organised inventors' nucleus in a factory; the money to be used to "improve the material conditions of inventors" in factories which put their plans in operation. "A commission in charge of the drive (VOIZ)

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, August 6, 1933. In July 1934 the All-Union Academy of Agriculture was reorganised by decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Its branches were abolished, to be superseded by subordinate research institutes to which particular lines of research will be allocated. The Academy was placed under a commission of 50 members, 30 being nominated by the People's Commissars of Agriculture and the State Farms, and 20 "correspondent members" chosen from the highest scientists. The direction is entrusted to a president and two assistants, with a "science secretary" (*ibid.*, July 21, 1934).

has been set up by the All Union Committee of Trade Unions, consisting of representatives of the Committee, the Inventions Committee (BRIZ) of the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), the Central Council of the Inventors' Society, the Central Committee of the Young Communists' League, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and two of the daily Moscow papers, *Pravda* and *Trud*, organs of the Communist Party and the trade unions respectively.¹

"Meetings and conferences of inventors and rationalisers of Moscow have been and are still being held at their respective enterprises, where workers and engineers have pledged to turn in at least one new rationalisation proposal each for the Seventeenth Party Congress Invention Fund.

"The Central Council of VOIZ is sending its employees to Gorki, Ukraine, Leningrad, Ural and North Caucasus to help organise the activities of worker-inventors of these cities and republics in connection with the approaching Congress. A special conference of young worker-inventors of Gorki province has been scheduled to be held in Gorki prior to the opening of the Party Congress."²

We can best complete this description of the widespread popular participation in scientific research by the following account of how a boy of 12 was encouraged to pursue his passion for invention at an institution peculiar to the USSR, which illustrates the official attitude towards the amateur inventor, who is elsewhere so often regarded as a troublesome nuisance.

"Not so long ago Paul—he is just 12 years old—developed a passion for electricity. He installed a door bell which stubbornly refused to ring. All of his free time he fussed about in his room or in the corridor near the wires and fuses. I suspect—and not without good cause—that the failure of the lighting in our apartment last week was the result of his work.

"Leaving at last the bell, Paul designed an electric motor. To be sure, his machine had little resemblance to an ordinary motor. It was the size of Paul's fist and represented a sort of flat reel on which was wound thin wire covered with white insulation. The motor lacked the main property common to all motors: it did not move, nor did it bring anything into motion.

"Paul got excited, went somewhere and enquired about something. Apparently his enquiries were successful: his snub-nosed face began to beam with joy. After school, when he had finished his dinner, Paul began to dress; he put on a warm overcoat and an earcap.

"Where are you going?' asked his father, not lifting his eyes from the newspaper.

"To the Children's Technical Station,' Paul replied with an air of importance. . . . It did not take him long to find the house. House No. 8 was the third from the corner. Paul entered a big yard. At the

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, May 10, 1932.

² *Ibid.*, December 27, 1933.

end of it was a small wooden house, and still further, on the other side, was a three-storey brick building. . . .

“ ‘What have you come for, youngster?’

“ Picking up courage Paul asked in turn:

“ ‘And who are you? Are you one of the workers of the Technical Station?’

“ ‘Yes, I’m its manager.’

“ Paul’s cheek-boned face brightened up.

“ ‘You’re the man I want. I . . . I have made an electric motor, only it does not work. And in general . . .’

“ The manager of the station smiled.

“ ‘Well, you have done right to come here. Come with me.’

“ They went to the door bearing the sign: ‘Personal Consultation’. . . . They entered a big, well-lit room. It was full of people, and despite the fact that everybody talked, it was not noisy. It was the business-like air of a beehive in which everything was in perfect order. . . . Paul joined the group which was crowded about the consultant. Very soon he learned what the defects of his motor were. He was sent to the electro-technical shop located in the same wooden house. With shining eyes and thumping heart Paul saw his motor beginning to rotate. But his enthusiasm was immediately dampened for he was told that his model was uneconomical, took too much current, gave little effect; the other defects of his motor were also pointed out to him, and it was explained how to rectify them.

“ In the shop there was everything necessary for a young electrical inventor and designer to make experiments and tests; there were real motors and dynamos, transformers, rheostats, currents up to 40,000 volts in tension. Here he spent his first evening as well as a number of future evenings with the other boys in serious and thoughtful work. . . . Children’s Technical Stations are to be found in every district of Moscow and new ones are constantly springing up. Only this year a well-equipped station has been established in the Trekhgornaya factory. Their number in the provinces also grows very rapidly. The Central Station is connected with 25 of them, but their total number is incomparably larger, and grows almost daily—the polytechnisation of the school has provided a powerful impetus to their development. Recently a station was organised in the Gorki Automobile works. The workers of the station frequently come to Moscow to the Central Station to study its work and experience. The three young communists whom Paul found talking to the head of the Central Station, Olkhovsky, were workers of the Voronezh station who came to see and learn. . . .

“ These boys sometimes develop into extremely skilled technicians and inventors. Thus some of the boys who worked in the avio-model shop have become valuable specialists for the airplane factories and aviator schools.

“ The Children’s Technical Stations, which organise and promote

the growing Children's Technical Movement, constitute one of the most characteristic features of socialist education based upon labour principles, self-development; upon the principle of giving the abilities and gifts of many every opportunity of utmost development from the earliest age. And how many inventive talents will be carefully fostered from their very embryo; it is even difficult to foresee what abundant fruits the generation which is to day 12 13 15 years old will yield to the future. . . . And since 'technique during the period of reconstruction decides everything', one cannot but agree with the words of Olkhovsky: 'The Children's Technical Movement is no trifle. . . . Give it time to develop and you will see what tremendous results it will yield. The prospects are breath-taking!' " ¹

The Work of the several Research Institutes

We have neither competence nor information to enable us to form any judgment of the actual achievement of the vast array of research institutes all over the USSR; nor of the success that has attended their centralised intellectual direction and planning. Nor can we pretend even to an accurate description of the organisation and work of these thousand odd separate institutes. We can give only illustrations of the exuberant initiative, the boundless variety and the insatiable intellectual curiosity manifested in these researches. From the darkness in the depths of the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea to the cosmic rays in the stratosphere; from the various factors of the weather (including "the making of rain") to the causes or conditions of earthquake; from the utilisation of as yet unworked mineral deposits to the growing of new fruits, the modifying of existing cereals, and the breeding of new hybrids of animals, no part of the material universe is left unprobed and untested. Perhaps the most original feature of the typical scientific institute in the Soviet Union is its deliberate planning of its own research. "Each department", we are told by a well-informed English scientific observer, ²

¹ Article by A. Paley in VOKS, vol. i-ii., 1933, pp. 151-156. See also the issue of VOKS entitled *The School in the USSR*, describing these Children's Technical Stations. It is explained that "in these centres, children of a mechanical turn of mind who wish to try out some gadget they have constructed are made welcome. Expert advice is at hand on all problems of a mechanical nature, with workshops in which practical work in various branches of science may be carried out. Help is given by correspondence also, the manager of the Moscow station receiving thirty to forty letters daily from enquiring and aspiring inventors in the provinces. There are 'radio', 'electro', 'photo', 'auto', and other rooms, each with its special apparatus, its own consultant, and its own group of students.

"In these schools the expensive apparatus and models which would be beyond the means of ordinary schools are concentrated. Sometimes the children who make use of them develop into skilled technicians and inventors. Boys who once worked in the 'aero-model' shop are now valuable specialists in airplane factories and aviation schools. The inventiveness of youth is a quantity too valuable to waste. At times problems in rationalisation are sent by the factories to these 'stations', and often adequate solutions are found for them."

² "The Organisation of Research" in *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, June 2, 1934.

"draws up a plan for work from January 1 to December 31 of each year. The plan is given in detail for each quarter, and there must even be a suggestion of what will be done on each day. At the end of each month the research worker assesses what percentage he has accomplished of his plan. This is usually about 80 per cent to 90 per cent [we may charitably assume that this refers to the particular experiments that are to be tried], and the assessments are notably honest. The workers in each department are organised as a team or brigade, and each holds frequent meetings to discuss its own work and the policy of the institute. Every brigade has to give an account of its economic as well as its scientific activity. Each research problem has its own cheque book, which accompanies all orders for apparatus. Hence the cost of the work on each problem is automatically recorded, and can be compared with the estimates of the costs in the plan." Such mechanical records of laboratory work are not to be despised. Even so did Faraday day by day enumerate and mechanically record all his thousands of experiments, most of which, of course, were apparently fruitless. It would be a mistake to suppose that, in the USSR, the mere execution of such innumerable experiments is confused with that unlimited curiosity and boundless adventure with ideas, out of which new discoveries sometimes unexpectedly emerge.

The equipment of some, although not all, of these institutes has excited the admiration and envy of all the foreign scientists who have visited them. In many departments the newest and most complicated apparatus for every branch of the experimental work has been obtained, apparently regardless of cost, from Europe and America, whilst much more, including many new contrivances, has been manufactured within the USSR.¹ It was, of course, impossible to equip all the institutes simultaneously; and it is reported that those dealing with the more urgent problems arising out of the First Five-Year Plan were given priority. Other subjects, such as biochemistry for instance, had, perforce, to wait for the new equipment they required until the more liberal appropriations of the Second Five-Year Plan could be drawn upon. When the soviet determination is remembered, to concentrate all energies on making the USSR as quickly as possible independent of other nations so far as the making of every kind of machinery was concerned, we shall not be surprised to find that as many as one-fourth of all the scientific institutes fall within the domain of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. In the Second Five-Year Plan it seemed almost a matter of life and death to secure a prompt increase in the production of foodstuffs; and a large accession of strength was then thrown into agricultural research

¹ "The Soviet Government shows its appreciation . . . by granting facilities to scientists in the pursuit of their work, and by appointing a special commission for the improvement of the material conditions of scientists. Clubs, rest houses, and sanatoria for scientists have been opened throughout the Soviet Union. In their living conditions, travel, and food, scientists are classified in the highest category, and every effort is made to enable them to give their undivided attention to constructive and inventive work" (*Moscow Daily News*, November 2, 1932).

and the development of the food industries, in addition to the multiplication of other "consumers' goods", which had been at first subordinated to machine construction. Probably in a Third or Fourth Five-Year Plan other priorities will have to be attended to; and we should expect the relative distribution of institutes, so far as their subjects of research are concerned, to be very different from that of to-day. Thus the current researches in the USSR are not all at the same advanced point. There may well be some institutes at work on problems which British or French or American scientists feel to have been already adequately dealt with in their own laboratories. There is, we fear, still too much isolation of thought between western science and that of the USSR. The records of investigations in various fields - we may instance anthropology and geology - seem to be inadequately known to British and American scientists.

Mathematics and Physics

One of the fields in which these research institutes have earned an international reputation, at any rate for good work, if not for new discoveries, is that of physics in its newest branches. Those under the control of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, through its scientific department (NIS), seem to have made great advances in combined work. Among them may be named the "Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry in Moscow, the Institute of Chemical Physics in Leningrad, the Physico-Technical Institutes of Leningrad and Kharkov, the Optical Institute of Leningrad and the Electro-Technical Institute. . . . The research in these institutes by investigators such as Frumkin, Semenov and Joffe" ¹ is mentioned as deserving of notice.

The Materials and Processes of Wealth Production

Original work of at least equal importance, and of more immediate practical value, has been done in the concentrated joint attack upon the scientific problems actually encountered in bringing mining and manufacturing industries to the complicated technological balance necessitated by the First and Second Five-Year Plans. "The establishment of a scientific technical department", we read of NIS in the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, "has assured close cooperation between theoretical research and practical work. During the past four years, heavy industry alone has created 235 scientific research institutions to take care of its diverse branches. Fuel (coal, oil, peat, briquettes); metals (ferrous, non-ferrous, light and rare); chemistry, with all its numerous specialities; construction as well as construction materials; aviation; auto and tractor industry and machine-building, each has its own special institute treating its specific problems. These are to be found not only in the old industrial centres but throughout the Union, even in far away districts such as the Urals, Eastern Siberia, and Central Asia." ²

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, November 2, 1932.

² *Ibid.*, November 5, 1932.

Agriculture

During recent years, under pressure of the constantly apprehended deficiency of foodstuffs—it is never forgotten that Tsarist Russia suffered in every decade from actual famines—special attention has been paid to problems of agriculture. Literally hundreds of institutes for biology and for genetics, for animal husbandry and for plant culture, for the application to farming of electricity and even of aviation, and for many other branches of knowledge, are cooperating in discovering how to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the innumerable varieties of foodstuffs. “There are to-day in the USSR”, we read in 1933, “no fewer than 1233 scientific stations for observations and experiments in farming, of which more than 1000 have been founded since 1930.” This is a larger number than were opened in the whole world during the first 75 years of scientific study of farming, since the first such station was opened in France in 1835. “Working in the domain of plant-culture alone there are 646 institutions, 100 on fruits, 79 on oil-bearing plants, 76 on vegetables, 61 on cotton, 60 on maize and sorghum, 60 on potatoes, 52 on grain, 45 on new crops, 25 on flax. In the field of animal husbandry 254 scientific institutions are working.¹ . . . Some 26,000 scientific and technical workers are engaged in the work of these institutions. The demand for new scientific workers in agriculture has been so pressing that the Communist Universities, whose function was to train leaders for government and Party posts, have recently been converted into agricultural schools, training leaders for farming.

“This network of scientific stations is flung far across the country, from the 40 stations in Transcaucasia, the 31 in Uzbek Republic, the 5 in far-way Tadzhikistan, to the famous Khibinsk Station, north of the Arctic Circle, which is leading the fight to carry cultivated crops into the north.

“They comprise institutions such as the Plant Institute of Leningrad, the Institute of Mechanisation and Electrification of Farming, the Fertiliser Institute, the Irrigation Institute, the Saratov Institute, studying

¹ Preliminary results of Professor Herman J. Muller's work at the Academy of Sciences on Genetics, Vavilov said, “indicate that mutations are obtained more easily in products of cross-breeding than in pure stock. Moreover, scientists at the Leningrad Laboratory have discovered that it is easier to cause mutations by X-rays if the fly which is the object of the experiment is fed on salts derived from heavy chemical elements. Thanks to the work of Dr. Medvedev it is now possible to compare the effects of such treatment on two different species of flies. . . . Workers in America have discovered that if a group of seeds are divided, one part planted immediately and the other kept for five years, the second batch yields mutations different from those of the first. There is undoubtedly some connection between this phenomenon and the mutations which Professor Muller has produced by the use of X-rays, so that cooperation between this institute and the American scientist is likely to be mutually beneficial. . . . ‘There is a group of very capable young men at these laboratories’, an American observer said. ‘In general, I find that the average scientific worker here is much younger than in America. In many ways I prefer young scientists, they are filled with enthusiasm which old men lack’” (*Moscow Daily News*, October 27, 1933).

farming in dry districts. They are allied with hundreds of thousands of 'collective farmer inventors', who are creating new methods, trying them out and passing them on to scientific stations, and applying the results of the stations on their own farms."¹

"Professor N. I. Vavilov continues to direct the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science in Leningrad while supervising the new Biological Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The former organisation has a general staff of about 18,000 persons at various stations throughout the USSR. Professor N. I. Vavilov's latest researches have been concerned with the origin of domesticated animals. He has followed his demonstration of the origin of domesticated plants in certain world centres by similar researches on domesticated animals." We owe to him the discovery that nearly all the cultivated fruit trees originated in Iran. The Persian jungle is virtually a mass of wild cherry, plum, apple and other fruit trees. The fruits are very small but of the same sort. "The story of the Garden of Eden is derived from the character of the Persian Jungle", and the Bolsheviks find it strange that one of their scientists should be the first to show that it rests on a basis of historical fact. Professor Vavilov's latest results indicate that Asia has played an important part, not only in the origin of domesticated animals, but also in that of the human race.

"Soviet science is intensely active. Changes and extensions are in progress everywhere. In spite of high educational pressure there is a severe shortage of scientific directors for all the extensions, but the new type of young communist scientist is appearing. Will he succeed in simultaneously making scientific discoveries and adhering to the Communist Party's political line?"²

Genetics

"Interesting results have been achieved by another foreign scientist permanently employed in the [Genetics] Institute. The Bulgarian geneticist Postov succeeded in overcoming the sterility of the so-called 'distant hybrids' (the product of cross-breeding regular tobacco with its distant wild ancestor is usually sterile). When Postov included, in the cross-breeding process, a third participant (another variety of wild tobacco) the hybrid obtained appeared to be fecund.

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 15, 1933. Anna Louise Strong, reporting interview with Vavilov, adds a significant anecdote: "Vavilov, the chief scientific adviser of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and known throughout the world of agricultural scientists for his brilliant studies in plants, once told me of a visit he paid to the foremost experimental station in England. The director admitted that, in spite of excellent equipment and highly trained scientific workers, he was at a lack for scientific problems on which he might hopefully apply his zeal.

"'So also was our science in the old days,' added Vavilov. 'We scientists had learned more than we could ever hope to see applied in the backward peasant fields of Russia. But now, since the socialisation of farming makes possible swift application of science, life itself sets us daily more fascinating problems than we have time to solve.'"

² *Manchester Guardian*, March 23, 1935.

"Vavilov expressed the opinion that the method of obtaining treble and quadruple hybrids adopted by Postov has long ago been used in nature, so that a number of species should be considered as synthetic products. . . .

"According to Vavilov, the practical results of this discovery are immense. Were it possible to obtain a fecund hybrid of the huge American variety of tobacco, which is usually destroyed as a weed but which contains much lemon acid in its leaves, shortage of this acid would cease to exist in our country. Without waiting for this, Soviet scientists have found a way of obtaining the precious acid from the leaves of makhorka, which, however, contains much less than the American tobacco.

"Speaking of the results of his last year's expedition to Central and South America, the Academician stated that, contrary to existing beliefs, he has established that the huge tracts of South America played a rather insignificant part in the genesis of cultivated plants. Some of the most important of them, like cotton, corn and many kinds of vegetables, first appeared in the comparatively small mountainous part of South America, Guatemala and Honduras. Potatoes, on the other hand, were 'born' in the highlands of Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador at an altitude of 3500-4000 metres. An exploration of the latter territory enabled Vavilov to obtain 16 hitherto unknown varieties of potato, some of which are unaffected by frost or pests. These varieties of Ecuador potato are already being successfully cultivated on the experimental farm of the Institute of Plant Industry near Leningrad." ¹

"To-day's experimentation does not wait for the slow processes of nature to test its work. The Saratov Institute, for instance, has great sheds in which it creates its own drought, hot winds, winter conditions. Rapid propagation methods have been found for cotton whereby the qualities of a new variety can be spread over the whole of Central Asia within four years. In animal husbandry the methods of artificial impregnation allow a similarly swift introduction of new strains. Science itself takes on the speed of the Pyatiletka (Five-Year Plan). This is the chief characterisation of agricultural science for the past three years." ²

The progress of science in agriculture in the USSR is thus commented on by one of the leading British scientists. "Elsewhere", writes Sir Daniel Hall, "the man of science must take up an apologetic attitude at the present time with regard to agriculture. For two generations he has been entreated to make the land more productive and to reduce costs; but as an American professor of agriculture writes to me: 'Ten million acres of cotton and some thousands of tobacco have been ploughed under. The latest move is the killing of some 5 million pigs weighing under 1000 lb. and the slaughter of some 200,000 prospective mother sows. If this will bring national prosperity I have wasted my life.' The man of science may be forgiven if he concludes that he is no longer

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, February 22, 1933.

² *Ibid.*

wanted and may retire to his ivory tower, but whatever food for irony the world spectacle presents he will not be allowed to enjoy it in detachment, for if the deluge comes he will be swept down with the rest. . . . We have one example before us in the Russian plan. This represents what we might call an engineer's lay-out to obtain maximum efficiency of production from the land, given a perfectly clean sheet as to land, labour and capital, without any hampering conditions other than those imposed by soil and climate. It is the method of industrial exploitation such as we see at work in some of the great farms of the United States and of tropical countries, raised to a higher power, from thousands to millions of acres, by the all controlling state organisation. Its aim is to secure from the soil the food and other raw materials required by the nation by the minimum employment of man-power, made effective by the application of science and machinery, thus liberating the greater proportion of the labour hitherto so employed for other forms of production which will add to the real wealth of the community. It demands for its realisation a wealth of directive skill and a technique of national organisation which only began to be attempted during the war. It necessitates a social revolution which no other country is prepared to carry through."¹

The Fight for Health

But the research institutes are far from being limited to the sciences bearing specially on processes of the production of foodstuffs and other commodities. Nearly half a hundred of them come under the direction of the People's Commissars of Health of the seven constituent republics, amongst which the RSFSR and the Ukraine take the lead. We have space only for brief accounts of a few of these medical institutes.

The Central Institute of Röntgenology

The Central Institute of Röntgenology, Radiology and Cancer was actually the first scientific research institute to be established under Lenin's administration. Founded in 1918 it celebrated its fifteenth anniversary in 1933. "During the first years of the institute's existence, which coincided with the civil war and general devastation of the country, the scientists working there were the only ones engaged in research work in the city whose population fed on 100 grams of rye bread daily. . . . This institute is not only a research organisation but an educational one too. In the course of the fifteen years of its existence it has trained 170 people as specialists on röntgenology. Of these, 26 are now professors and 76 have been transferred to other organisations. In addition to this about 700 physicians specialised in X-ray treatment."²

¹ Lecture on "Science and Agriculture" reported in *Nature*, London, November 11, 1933; included in volume entitled *The Frustration of Science*, with preface by Professor Soddy (1935), pp. 13-29.

² *Moscow Daily News*, May 6, 1933.

The Leningrad Institute of the Brain

Another institute dating from 1818 is the Leningrad Institute of the Brain, which was founded by "the late Academician Bekhterev, whose name the institute bears. Organised in the first year of the Revolution, the institute at first held a modest place, but gradually it grew and developed into a great scientific organisation occupying two many-storeyed buildings. . . . The institute has under its control a school of 3000 pupils, a school for defective children, and a psychiatric hospital. By the extensive researches conducted by this institute, confirmed as they have been by other work in Western Europe and the United States, its members consider that the theory of the existence of inherently higher and lower races of mankind has been completely demolished."¹

The Leningrad Institute of Experimental Medicine

New vistas of human development and longevity have been opened up by the discoveries of the great Leningrad Institute of Experimental Medicine, in connection with which the celebrated Professor Pavlov continues his laboratory experiments in conditioned and unconditioned reflexes. Six new "complex clinics" were to be opened in 1934-1935, particularly for the study of metabolism, cancer, the higher nervous activities, contagious diseases and the influence of external factors on living conditions. The rays discovered to emanate from all living beings, now proved to be generated by chemical processes in the organism, are believed to play an important rôle in the formation of malignant tumours. "The institute takes as its province all biological phenomena in their relations to each other and to the conditions of specific social mediums. . . . The central section of the institute is the sanatorium clinic, which provides for the study of both healthy and sick people. Taking together all its various departments, laboratories and clinics, this institute claims to have no equal throughout the world." One of the topics receiving special attention in this institute is the biological mechanism of senescence.

The Moscow Institute of Endocrinology

This institute, in conjunction with another at Leningrad, maintains a continuous series of investigations into the mysterious ductless glands and hormones from which so much new light is expected. At the moment attention seems to be concentrated upon the possible bearing of recent discoveries on the relation of heredity to environment—the opposite ends of a pole round which has raged the battle of generations of scientists. "Some said environment was more important in its effect on the individual—others maintained that heredity accounted for everything a man did. But never the twain did meet. Now we have the soviet scientists

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, June 15, 1933.

coming forth with the announcement that they will make environment influence heredity—that they will remake a race, not one generation only but succeeding generations, by changing the living conditions of this one.” Referring to the discoveries of Professor Muller, in which new insects have been created by the application of the Röntgen ray to the common form, Professor Stepan B. Pavlenka, scientific director of the Moscow Institute of Endocrinology, declared that “there is no reason why the theory of such a mutation should not be applied to man. It’s the other side of eugenics. Heretofore advocates of improving the race always took into account the environment under which people lived and said ‘Bearing these conditions in mind, you must do the following’. . . . We don’t bear conditions in mind. We study and change them. And, changing conditions, we hope to change the race. . . . Undoubtedly, in the not far distant future, medical science will determine under what conditions of life the organs of the body remain young and healthy, will discover certain other glandular extracts which rejuvenate, as we have done already, and man will live half again as long as he does now. . . . Most important of these activities”, he says, “is the mass work which they are conducting to determine the cause and cure of endemic diseases—goitre in some sections of the USSR, and the ‘urovsk’ (disfiguring) illness long peculiar to certain Far-Eastern regions. . . . Since 1930, when the Moscow Institute sent expeditions to study and treat this disease, it has considerably decreased. . . . In Moscow, the seat of this nation-wide activity of endocrinologists, the institute conducts scientific research work in laboratories well equipped with instruments, and manned by competent physicians and technicians. There are 87 of them; and in addition a corps of young medicos who aspire to become professors of endocrinology, and of older men who got their training before endocrinology became part of medicine, and have now come for six months or a year for graduate work in the field.”

The Campaign against Rheumatism

One of the specific problems with which the Commissariats of Health had to grapple in the USSR was the enormous prevalence of rheumatism, to which is attributable no less than 18 per cent of all the disablement from ill-health. For this subject no special institute seems to have been established. But a large proportion of all the institutes, chiefly biological and medical, have been called upon to contribute to the investigations organised by the All-Union Committee for the Fight against Rheumatism, under a medical professor, Maxim Petrovich Kouchalovsky of the First Clinical Hospital of Moscow. The campaign took two main forms, one of which has been wide popular propaganda among the workers in all industries as to how to avoid conditions favourable to rheumatism. “Before this campaign could be started it was necessary to determine the exact nature of rheumatism, and to find out what made it so prevalent

in certain trades. It was Professor Speranski who simplified the first of these tasks by showing that the primary result of the toxin of rheumatism is to alter and harm the nerves, while the secondary result is that the injured nerves often but not always impair the sufferer's ability for motion.

"It was found that 18 per cent of all disease is due to rheumatism, a fact which had not been previously known, since in 40 per cent of all cases rheumatism attacks some internal organism such as the heart.

"Having gained an understanding of the nature of the malady with which they had to deal, the committee set about studying the conditions under which it arises, a research in which the Professor Danishevski played an important part. It was discovered that three times as many persons had rheumatism in the country as in the city, and that the illness was most common among farm workers, transport men and miners.

"Further study disclosed that a job at which the worker became heated and then cooled off quickly was particularly dangerous, as was any employment which steadily overloaded particular parts of the body with work. Absence of certain foods in the diet was a contributing factor, while repeated blows on the same place often causes the disease when it would not otherwise arise.

"Although the main emphasis in this country is being directed towards the prevention of rheumatism, the Committee is not neglecting those already suffering from the disease. For the successful treatment of patients, Professor Konchalovsky favours a combination of various methods of cure, rather than implicit reliance on a single remedy. For instance, although he has found mud baths of little value in the handling of acute rheumatism, he believes them to be the best treatment of the chronic ailment. Fortunately, the USSR is richly supplied with mud baths, the finest being at Odessa, Saki, Kharkov and Astrakhan." It is not claimed that the problem of rheumatism is yet completely solved. It calls for further combinations of effort. "The attack against rheumatism can only be won by raising the standard of living of the masses."

Hence equal emphasis is now placed on popular education. "A campaign for mass education on this line is being carried on by the medical authorities, and the government, trade union and industrial officials are giving it invaluable support. Meetings are being held, literature distributed, and speakers sent throughout the USSR. Professor Konchalovsky has himself addressed many groups of transport workers on this subject.

"A campaign of this thoroughness is possible only in a socialist country where the health of every worker is a matter of importance to the government. Because of it, more emphasis is being put on proper clothing in occupations which are particularly subject to rheumatism. For instance, workers loading freight cars are being made aware of the danger of becoming chilled on their way from the shed to the cars. Miners are learning that warm dry clothing is essential if they are to continue to work efficiently in cold damp mines. Draughts which formerly claimed a high toll of rheumatics in factories are now being eliminated. More varied

diets are being served in the restaurants catering to the railroad and mine workers. Jobs which involve frequent knocks on the same part of the worker's body are being abolished, or the length of the shift is reduced."

The Central Aero Hydro-Dynamic Institute

In another branch of work, the requirements of aviation, civil and military, led, as early as 1918, to the establishment of what is reported to be the most comprehensively designed and the most completely equipped scientific research institute of its kind in the world. Indeed, so elaborate was the lay-out, and so rapid has been its development, that no fewer than four independent institutes have been, during the past sixteen years, separated off and set up by themselves to pursue specialist lines of investigation that the emerging problems have called for.¹

The Central Aero Hydro-Dynamic Institute (ZAGI), located at Moscow, and ten times as extensive as when it started, now confines itself to the designing, constructing and testing of every kind of flying machine, from the smallest "moth" single-seater aeroplane up to the most gigantic semi-rigid dirigible. The basic equipment of the experimental department, which is reported to have no equal in the world, are the aerodynamic and hydro dynamic tubes of great length and magnitude. In these elaborate experimental wind-tunnels and canals have been constructed, in which can be tested, under the diverse conditions of wind and weather, every design, every component and every kind of material. Equally elaborate are the devices and equipment for testing and experimenting with the machines in flight. The accurately recorded reports of the experiments in all the departments of the institute render its series of scientific monographs entitled *The Works of ZAGI* one of the most valuable contributions to the science, studied, we are told, in the scientific institutions concerned with aviation all over the world.

The Exploring Expeditions

Another feature of the research work is the great number of exploring expeditions that are sent out every summer, either by single institutes or by temporary combinations of institutes, to investigate the geology and mineralogy, the flora and fauna, the characteristic or novel diseases and generally the resources and opportunities of the little-known parts of the USSR. Similar expeditions excavate the mounds or graves or other structural remains of past civilisations throughout the great plain, or study the languages, customs and tribal organisation of the hundred or more racial groups in the USSR, among which are found the remnants

¹ These are the institutes dealing respectively with wind-driven engines and with hydraulics; together with the Central Institute of Aviation Motors and the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials. See for ZAGI and its offspring the article entitled "The Central Aero Hydro-Dynamic Institute", by Professor A. I. Nekrasov, its Assistant Director, in *Soviet Culture Review*, No. 2 of 1934.

of tribes in almost every stage of primitive savagery and barbarism. More than two hundred separate parties carrying out these archæological and anthropological investigations are organised by the Academy of Sciences every year. Meanwhile, a larger sum is spent annually in the USSR on an ever more intensive and more nearly complete geological survey of the whole area, than by all the other governments of Europe and Asia put together. "During the last five years the number of geological field parties has steadily grown. In 1927-1928 there were 628 parties; in 1928-1929, 988; and in 1932 the number of parties grew to 2500. In other words, during the elapsed period the number of field parties increased five times; and in the last two years most of the parties were engaged in surveying operations, lithological, geological and topographical."¹

The Unevenness in the Devotion to Science

It is, we think, clear that the Soviet Government, inspired and guided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, has, during the past decade, manifested a greater devotion to science than any other government in the world. Not only does it spend more on the teaching of science and on the promotion of scientific research, but it habitually defers more, in its policy and practice, to the lessons of science. In this sense it is the most "positivist" administration that the world has seen!

If, however, we examine with greater particularity the attention paid to science by the Soviet Government, we note an unevenness, even after more than a decade of work, as between the different branches of man's study of the universe. There is, in the USSR to-day, much more teaching and study devoted to the parts of the universe dealt with by mathematics and mechanics, physics and chemistry, biology and radiology—and vastly more research after new knowledge—than to social institutions, on the one hand, and the behaviour of individuals on the other. Yet social institutions and human behaviour constitute important parts of the universe in which we live. They exhibit phenomena distinct from those presented to us by the other parts of the universe that the several scientists take as their special fields. It is true that what can be learned from observation of social institutions (sociology) or from that of human behaviour (ethics) is not so much in popular demand as what can be learned from physical or biological science; and cannot so readily be converted into technologies comparable with those of mechanical and electrical constructions, mining and metallurgy, or agriculture and stock-breeding. Yet, just because sociology and ethics are still only on the threshold of becoming positive sciences of the same order of validity as chemistry and biology, there is, we suggest, even more new knowledge to be expected from unprejudiced objective study of the phenomena here

¹ "Studying the Soil of the USSR", by Academician I. Gubkin, in *Scientific Construction in the USSR*, VOKS, vol. v., 1933.

concerned, than from further investigation of those parts of the universe to which so much attention has been already paid.

We are struck by the fact that among all the thousand and more institutes of scientific research now at work under the intellectual supervision of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, there seems to be none¹ taking as its sphere the structure and function of the contemporary administrative organs themselves, from the smallest selosoviet up to the All-Union Congress of Soviets: from the humblest industrial artel up to the Commissariat of Heavy Industries; from the village cooperative store up to *Centrosoyus*; from the least important *kolkhos* up to the most important *sovkhos* or the Grain Trust; from the little social circle in the factory club up to such giants of voluntary association as *Osoaviakhim* and *Mopr*. If these innumerable and infinitely varied social organisations, each of them having attributes of its own, were biological organisms, belonging to different species and genera, the scientific botanists and zoologists would be swarming to scrutinise, and to register with the utmost particularity, the minutest differences in the form and the method of working that each of them displays; the actual course of development of each kind, and the particular relations that it has to all the other kinds. There is probably as much new knowledge to be acquired—to cite only one example—by such a precise and detailed description of the organisation and working of all the thousand city soviets of the USSR, in comparison with similar precise descriptions of the congresses of soviets of the rayons and oblasts, as there has been in the botanists' precise descriptions of a thousand varieties of wheat, or the aviation engineers' comparative tests of scores of different types of flying machine.

The duty of scientific study is as great in respect of one part of the universe as in respect of others. The scientific method of observation and experiment, hypothesis and verification, is the same for all parts of the universe. It is true that the tools that the scientist employs in the fields of sociology and ethics differ from those that he employs in the field of chemistry or in that of biology. It may be that the investigations present greater difficulties. But the scientific investigator in the fields of sociology or ethics is not without instruments of discovery appropriate to this own enquiries, which are as effective as the microscope and the galvanometer.

We do not suggest that the Soviet Union has made no discoveries in the sphere of sociology. On the contrary, it has to its credit two new inventions in social institutions of fundamental importance, which we

¹ We do not overlook the various institutes in the Department of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences, which we have already mentioned. But these seem to confine themselves to language and literature on the one hand, and on the other to social institutions of past civilisations or remote primitive tribes. Nor can we ignore the seven institutes of the Communist Academy, which we have enumerated, and to which we shall recur. But none of these appears to be undertaking a systematic objective descriptive analysis of all the attributes of contemporary social institutions, such as the biologist makes of all the different species of plants and animals, or as the chemist makes of every substance submitted to him.

have described in previous chapters,¹ and which are destined, we believe, to be accepted by other countries and remodelled according to their peculiar circumstances. We count, as one of these, the entirely novel social structure of the USSR, with its universal popular participation as citizens, producers and consumers, that we have described as "multiform democracy" guided by a Vocation of Leadership, operating a governmental apparatus that transcends the old categories of legislature and executive, or politics and economics, by the more comprehensive one of social administration. The other discovery is the equally original conception of entirely dispensing with the capitalist entrepreneur and his profit-making motive, in the engagement of wage-labour; and of planning all production deliberately for community consumption. To these new departures in politics and economics we shall recur in the following chapters.² But it must be remembered that both these outstanding sociological inventions which the Soviet Government has to its credit were not the product of merely practical administrators or untutored revolutionaries. They emerged in action only as the indirect outcome of the lifelong studies of three of the most laborious as well as the most imaginative sociologists of the past hundred years. Can we name any economist or political scientist who scrutinised and investigated, longer and more continuously, past and present social institutions themselves, than Karl Marx on the one hand, and Lenin on the other? Is there any industrial administrator in any country who is known to have examined more minutely, and pondered over more deeply, the prospective effects of contemporary capitalism than Friedrich Engels? Think of the decades spent by Marx in the library of the British Museum, studying every scrap of documentary evidence whilst producing his voluminous descriptions and generalisations on western industrialism. As for Lenin, he may be said to have spent his whole life, from youth to the age of forty-six, whether exiled in Siberia, or sitting, day after day, from the time of opening to the hour of closing, in the public libraries of Geneva and Zürich, Paris and London, in a sustained study from documents and observation, of the structure and working of all contemporary social institutions, whether the autocracies of eastern and central Europe or the parliamentary democracies of Britain, France and Switzerland; whether the mir and the artel of the Eurasian continent, or the trade unions, the cooperatives and the political labour parties of the western world; or of factory and commercial administration, whether under nineteenth-century capitalism or twentieth-century imperialism. It was exactly because Lenin was a scientist and not a mere politician or administrator, and had spent laborious years in observing or studying, not people's opinions, but the facts themselves, as to the nature and development of the mir and the artel, the trade union and the cooperative society, the working of parliamentary machinery and the strength and weakness of political

¹ Chapters I. to VI. in Part I., and Chapter VIII. in Part II.

² Chapter XII. in Part II., "The Good Life", and Epilogue, "A New Civilisation?"

parties, that, when the moment for action came, he was able to suggest and elaborate the entirely novel social institutions which are achieving such a considerable measure of success in the USSR. Continuance of like inventiveness in meeting new emergencies cannot, without prolonged scientific study analogous to that of Marx, Engels and Lenin, be counted on. Thus, the scientific research institute, as the practical method of organising and multiplying such study, has its uses in sociology no less than in physics or biology.

Hence it is to be regretted that more has not yet been done in the USSR, in the way of precise objective comparative descriptions, as devoid of prepossessions as those of the biologist within his own sphere, of the structure and working of particular social institutions, within the USSR, and without.¹ The vast increase of definite knowledge about what certainly constitutes, in the consciousness of each individual, an important part of his universe, would anyhow enlarge his "culture". But it would do more than this. There is, as yet, in any country in the world, only the beginnings of a science of sociology, but it has already taught something of value to the practical man. It would, we are convinced, teach the world much more, if the USSR, in conjunction with other civilised countries, would give to this nascent science as much attention as has been given to mechanics and physics, chemistry and biology.

The Science of Human Behaviour

It is less easy to make a persuasive case in favour of a scientific study of human behaviour. Ethics, as such a science would be called, has hitherto been largely dominated by an imperfect psychology (which may be improved when the biologists know more about the processes of human consciousness); as well as by unscientific importations from metaphysics and theology. But an exact descriptive study of actual behaviour by men and women under particular circumstances, including

¹ We hold the systematic collection of data to be as indispensable to sociology as it has proved to be in biology. But, of course, the collection of data is not enough.

"Data of one kind or another", it has been said, "are not so difficult to obtain; but generalisation is another matter. The social scientist may resent the premature generalisations of his predecessors. He will himself not get very far unless he himself tentatively generalises; unless, in a word, he has ideas as well as data. Essays and investigations may be piled mountain-high; they will never by themselves constitute a science or a philosophy of economics, psychology or society. The two processes—the making of hypotheses and the gathering of data—must go on together, reacting upon each other. For in the social sciences, as elsewhere, the generalisation is at once a test of, and a stimulus to, minute and realistic research. The generalisations will not endure; why should they? They have not endured in mathematics, physics and chemistry. But, then, neither have the data. Science, social or other, is a structure; a series of judgments, revised without ceasing, goes to make up the incontestable progress of science. We must believe in this progress, but we must never accord more than a limited amount of confidence to the forms in which it is successively vested" (*Pasteur: the History of a Mind*, by E. Duclaux (English translation, 1900), p. 111, quoted by Abraham Flexner in his *Universities, American, English, German* (1930), pp. 12-13; and also in *A Study of History*, by Arnold J. Toynbee (1934), vol. i. p. 50).

the effect upon them of different stimuli, whether in encouragement or in repression, would probably throw light on certain problems that confront teachers and statesmen in the USSR and elsewhere. What, for instance, is the effect upon productive efficiency of the emotion of fear? What is found to be the reaction, to the fear of criminal prosecution, in (a) the manual-working factory operative or miner; (b) the foreman or assistant manager; and (c) the director of the whole plant? How is initiative affected, and willingness to try experiments, by apprehension that lack of success in departure from routine may lead to reprimand or dismissal? What is the effect of "terrorist" measures, taken in order to deter counter-revolutionaries, upon members of the intelligentsia who, though not communist in opinion, are yet loyally serving the community in which they live?

Why is it that the intermediate grades in the USSR, between the manual workers on the one hand and the commissars and directors on the other, are, as we have already mentioned,¹ deemed to be, on the whole, less zealous in performance of duty, less intellectually alert and less loyally devoted to the service of the public, than their associates in the other two grades? What sort of stimulus could be devised to induce in them something like the effect of introducing piece-work rates in mechanical production?

What is the effect, upon the mentality of particular categories of men and women, of any sudden change in policy which upsets their "established expectations"? It was doubtless convenient to reverse drastically the "New Economic Policy", or the conditions of membership of the kolkhosi, when the previous arrangements had proved undesirable. But what was the social loss incurred when people found that conduct in which they had been encouraged was suddenly made a penal offence? How could the discouragement of initiative and industry, consequent on this infringement of established expectation, have been avoided?

We add another instance of the need for a more systematic and complete application of communist science in the field of human behaviour. Is the communist use of the emotion of hatred scientifically justified by its effects; or even correct "Marxism"? The Great War of 1914-1918, which has upset so much of European civilisation, was accompanied in nearly all countries by serious explosions of hatred against the peoples, as well as the governments, of the enemy nations; not by any means least in Great Britain and the United States. It is for science to investigate the causes and consequences of such seemingly irrational emotions, just as much as the causes and consequences of outbreaks of plague and cholera. What are the causes and consequences of anti-semitism, now in one country, and now in another? Why is it that, in the USSR, as in other countries, the Communist Party is distinguished from all other controversialists by the peculiar virulence of the hatred that it concentrates on the bourgeoisie, leading to hatred of the various religious

¹ See Chapter IX. "In Place of Profit", in Part II., pp. 569-652.

denominations, hatred of the other parties created by different factions among the wage-earners, hatred even of those in its own ranks who are thought to be "deviating" either to the left or to the right of the general line formulated in the Party decisions of the moment. Is there any truth in the old adage that "Anger is a bad counsellor", and may not the adage apply also to hatred, because of the specifically blinding effect of the one and the other? Under the influence of the emotion of hate, as of anger, mankind often fails to see the right road, and even falls into the ditch. Moreover, hatred of our opponents or enemies seems inconsistent with the very basis of Marxism. The opponents of communist proposals are, equally with those proposals, the outcome of the evolutionary process, as explained by dialectical materialism. It is not owing to "original sin" that the enemies of communism persist in counter-revolutionary activities, but because they have been "made that way" by the circumstances of their lives. Communists may be entirely justified in suppressing those who take another view than theirs, but does this afford any justification for hating them? Is there any validity in the observation that hatred misleads the haters themselves into inconsistencies of action? We might discover that hatred produces just as surely "contradictions" in communist policy as competitive acquisitiveness does in capitalism. The scientific investigator might learn much from the policy of Soviet Communism with regard to the treatment of criminals. In dealing with "ordinary crime", such as theft or embezzlement, assault or public disorder, soviet justice regards the offender as succumbing to a momentary lapse, which may become a criminal habit unless his circumstances are changed. The aim is to "re-educate" the sufferer from his liability to such lapses, by giving him the experience of an ordered life of production; so that he may become persuaded that such a life of social virtue actually "pays better" than one of crime! In this wise and humane treatment of "ordinary" criminals, soviet communism may claim to lead the world. It might be discovered that under the emotion of hatred, the soviet treatment of the political offender has often been fundamentally different from that dealt out to the thief or the drunkard. Is there any truth in the assertions that in some of the OGPU's concentration camps, and even in some of its closed places of detention for "political" offenders—after discounting the exaggerations which disfigure and discredit nearly all the "revelations" on this point which have been published abroad—there has prevailed not only very unscientific insanitation and overcrowding, with an unnecessary amount of disease and mortality, but also bad cases of deliberate cruelty and torture, possibly only by subordinate officials, equal to the worst that is alleged against the fascist dictatorships? Yet these "political offenders" are just as much the result of their past circumstances as the thieves and drunkards, and the brutal assailants of women, who, except in regular epidemics of crime, are so much more humanely and so much more wisely treated in the USSR. The so-called "political offenders" also need to

be convinced that what they rebel against is, if they would only try it, wiser and better and more successful than their own mistaken policy. They may need segregation during the process of conversion: and if persuasion ultimately fails, and they continue liable to incessant outbreaks of criminal violence (such as political assassination) they may (like incurable lunatics) require permanent but kindly seclusion from the world. If it should be found that our ill-treatment of criminals springs from hatred, it might be discovered that we do not mend matters by hating these offenders; we only harm our own natures by causing or allowing our opponents to suffer cruelty or ill-treatment.

Yet another problem in human behaviour. What is the effect, alike on "the leader" and on the mass of the people, of the extreme adulation now given in one country or another to the chosen head of the community for the time being? Is this adulation of one citizen among many thousands of devoted workers consistent with their relative merits, or in harmony with the spirit of equalitarian comradeship? It is easy to understand the practical utility, for a politically illiterate community, of what the hunter knows as the leader of the herd. But with the advance in political culture the drawbacks to such a form of national leadership demand attention. How far is the exaggeration and repetition, which seem to be inherent in this national habit, detrimental to veracity in the adulator, and to his own resistance of the temptation to hypocrisy? What other evils are suggested by the contemporary experience of leadership in Italy and the German Reich? What lesson can be learnt from the less intelligent but more conventional adulation of royal personages in Great Britain? Will it always be necessary to create such a "head of the community", rather than give impersonal prominence to the highest council of administrators?

All these problems of human behaviour are of pressing importance in the USSR, as in other countries. They supply valid reasons for the establishment of one or more scientific research institutes—free from theological or metaphysical prepossessions; and using, as scientists must, not exclusively the current "first approximation" to a theory, or indeed any one hypothesis, but tentatively all imaginable hypotheses for successive classifications of facts into generalisations capable of verification by further comparative study of the facts. It is in this way, as is indicated by the history of the physical and biological sciences, that the world is most likely to acquire new knowledge of those relatively obscure parts of the universe that to-day await illumination by the progress of those inchoate sciences termed sociology and ethics.

The Disease of Orthodoxy

We have given our analysis of the principles and practice of the Soviet Government in the customary phraseology of English speech. We have preferred to avoid the special terms invented by Hegel on the

one hand, and by Marx and Engels on the other, in which "dialectical materialism" is usually explained. We have adopted this course as the one most likely to convey to the British and the Americans the meaning that we wish to express. But we expect to find our action in this respect objected to by some of those who claim to be Marxians. Many of these persons seem actually to resent any attempt to explain the Marxian dogmas otherwise than by repeating a Marxian phraseology, which does not, to English readers, bear its meaning upon its face. It is a commonplace of human experience that the easiest way to provoke violent contradiction is to paraphrase a creed in words to which its votaries are unaccustomed.

We think that this insistence upon peculiar phraseology is a minor symptom of what we venture to call the disease of orthodoxy, from which public discussion in the USSR will doubtless in due time recover. There is, at present, too frequently an attempt to deal with problems, not by scientific investigation of the facts, but by the application of phrases culled from the writings of Marx and Engels, and now also from those of Lenin and Stalin. Any conclusion in other terms is often, not demonstrated to be scientifically incorrect, but summarily denounced as being either a "left deviation" or a "right deviation"; that is to say, as unorthodox.¹

Such a worship of orthodoxy is, of course, contrary to the methods of science, on which the actual practice of the Soviet Union is generally based. The particular expressions that Marx used nearly a hundred years ago are important to his biographer, and also to the historian of thought and doctrine. They are also indispensable to the student of to-day as constituting not only a valuable "first approximation to a theory of the

¹ Is this disease of orthodoxy in the ranks of the Communist Party a "hang-over" from the Orthodox Church? We are told by the British historian of the Eastern Church that Athanasius was the "founder of orthodoxy". "It is a term", so Dr. Stanley writes, "which implies, to a certain extent, narrowness, fixedness, perhaps even hardness of intellect, and deadness of feeling; at times, rancorous animosity. In these respects its great founder cannot be said to be altogether free from the reproach cast on his followers in the same line. His elaborate expositions of doctrine sufficiently exemplify the minuteness of argument which perhaps may have been the cause of his being regarded as a special pleader or jurisconsult. His invectives against the Arians prove how far even a heroic soul can be betrayed by party spirit and the violence of the times. Amongst his favourite epithets for them are: 'devils, antichrists, maniacs, Jews, polytheists, atheists, dogs, wolves, lions, hares, chameleons, hydras, eels, cuttlefish, gnats, beetles, leeches'. There may be cases where such language is justifiable, but, as a general rule, and with all respect for him who uses it, this style of controversy can be mentioned as a warning only, not as an example" (*Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, by Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D. (1862), pp. 246-247).

We seem to hear an echo of the epithets that Athanasius hurled at the Arians, when the communists describe opponents in their own country as bloodsuckers, vampires, leeches, wreckers, traitors, double-dealers, petty bourgeois, rogues, adventurers, fakirs; and the socialist or labour leaders of other countries as social fascists, dissemblers, capitalist hirelings, flunkies of big business, boot-lickers, place-hunters and sneaking snobs. "There may be cases", as Dr. Stanley urbanely observes, "where such language is justified", but (especially when negotiating a united front with these same leaders) the comment that he adds may be apt, "this style of controversy can be mentioned as a warning only, not as an example".

dynamics of social institutions" but also a remarkable collection of hypotheses in economics and political science, by the light of which, among others, the facts of the present day may usefully be approached and systematised. But the scientists of each generation are bound by their training to investigate the contemporary facts for themselves, using the generalisations of all previous writers, even the greatest of them. *not as dogmas to be accepted in the words of the master, but only as hypotheses*, which were suggested by the facts of the time, but which have to be tested by repeated comparison with current facts, seeing that it is only from such a process of verification that scientifically valid conclusions can be drawn. This view we imagine to be good dialectical materialism; or, as the Briton or American would say, good science. It is, as we have seen, of the very essence of dialectical materialism to recognise that all things are perpetually in motion, changing even as we investigate them. This condition of ceaseless change is specially marked in those parts of the universe which are dealt with by that scientific study of social institutions which is termed sociology, and by that scientific study of human behaviour to which we still apply the ancient term *ethics*. These parts of the universe are quite exceptionally changeable. The subject-matters of the studies called mechanics and physics, chemistry and biology, although we believe them to be always in motion, are not affected by what we think about them, nor by how we experiment with fragments of them. But in the domains of sociology and ethics, the very universe itself that we have under investigation is changed by our thinking about it, and by what we do to it. Not only their relations one to another, but the social institutions themselves, and the actual conduct of individual men and women, are apt to be altered by any publication of the knowledge that we acquire about them; and they may be completely transformed by the judgments that we form upon them. The world of social institutions and human conduct to-day is plainly very different—economically, socially and politically—from what it was when Marx and Engels wrote. Our knowledge in every branch of science has, since then, enormously increased in amount, and markedly changed in substance. It cannot therefore be taken for granted that the generalisations and conclusions arrived at in 1845 are exactly true in 1935; or that any phraseology used at the former date even appropriately expresses the knowledge of a century later. As hypothesis in the process of investigation, a phrase or a slogan may be invaluable, even after it has been discarded as no longer expressing the contemporary facts. Used as dogma from which it is impermissible to depart, it arrests intellectual progress.

We may cite, as an example, the case of "Darwinism" in biology. Charles Darwin is honoured by British and American biologists as a revolutionary discoverer in their science. But none of them quotes to-day, as authoritative, any particular sentence from his voluminous writings; still less do the biologists of to-day argue about what he may have meant

by his phrases. No one insists upon maintaining "Darwinian biology". Indeed, any student who uses the phrase "Darwinian biology" to-day is understood to imply theories which have since been emended or superseded by new knowledge. It is taken for granted that biology, like every other science, has grown since Darwin's day. It has changed even as the result of Darwin's own work, which, after three-quarters of a century, continues to cause Darwin's own conclusions to be still further modified.¹ It is, in fact, the destiny of the genuine science of each generation, by the subsequent increase in human knowledge that it causes, to render its own conclusions partly obsolete. Is it suggested that "Marxian economics" can be, in this respect, an exception to all other science? Those who erect the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin into a sort of "Holy Writ", not to be questioned, corrected or extended by any advance in the science of sociology, would do well to remember that they are thereby denying the validity of the very process of dialectical materialism; and reverting, indeed, to the doctrinal rigidity of the Orthodox Church. It was, we imagine, in this sense that Marx was moved to declare, in his later years, that he was "not a Marxist!"

Needless to say, the Communist Party is as fully aware of the evil effects of the disease of orthodoxy as of its prevalence in the ranks of the Party. In 1932, for instance, A. I. Stetsky, one of the secretaries of the Party and a member of the Central Committee, made a firm stand against the glaring manifestation of the disease in the phraseology employed by communist writings in the USSR. He objected to the "mere process of attaching dialectic or Marxist-Leninist labels to one or other sphere of knowledge".² He pointed out that "not so very long ago, at a gathering of Moscow surgeons, brave comrade Papovian read a paper on 'Marxism and Surgery'. It was a paper which contained neither Marxism nor Surgery." A journalist, a theoretician on technology, had written an article "The Dialectics of an Internal Combustion Motor". Stetsky added that a society of Marxist technicians had heard addresses on "The Dialectics of a Synchronising Machine", and "The Dialectics of Graded Steel". He said that the journal *The Soviet Herald of Venereology and Dermatology* "aims at considering all problems that it discusses from the point of view of dialectical materialism"—a staggeringly wide sweep indeed! A number of other special journals, such as *The Journal of Epidermology and Micro-Biology*, declare that they have similar aims. *The Journal for Marxist-Leninist Natural Science* has the following slogans: "We stand for Party in mathematics"; "We stand for the purity of the Marxist-Leninist theory in surgery". In *The Journal of the Scientific Research Institute of Machine-building and Metal Working* Comrade S. I.

¹ Similarly, the "Newtonian laws" of motion or of gravity, which remained unquestioned for centuries, are now seen to be only "first approximations", to which Einstein has added refinements of supreme importance.

² In the article entitled "Simplification and the Simplifiers" in *Pravda*, June 5, 1932. This is referred to, not quite correctly, in *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlain (1935), p. 296.

Gurkiz writes, quite unabashed, an article "On the Marxist-Leninist Theory in Farriery", where he says; "It must be borne in mind that not a single process in our conditions must be carried out without sufficient Marxist-Leninist foundation, just as no machine must be put down, and, still more, imported from abroad". The author complains that "things are specially bad in this respect in the field of smith-stamping work. Here people work, not only without a Marxist-Leninist basis, but without even any logical, let alone scientific, consideration of the process." "What a pity", remarks Stetsky, "that the author had not thought fit to inform Comrade Ordjonikidze [People's Commissar of Heavy Industry] a little earlier of his staggering discovery." During the Five-Year Plan (which has been firmly fixed on a Marxian basis) people have managed to work at the blast furnaces, the Marten furnaces and in blacksmiths' shops in ignorance of "the Marxist-Leninist basis of the technological process". "It only remains for us", adds Stetsky, "to desire that the author should give a basis at least for farriery!" But Stetsky adduced an even more remarkable example of what he deplored. "Here, for instance, are the writings of a certain theoretician under the promising heading: Materialist Dialectics and the Fishing Industry. Here is a dialectic characteristic of the fishing industry in the district: "It is now in the primary stage of its 'becoming', its birth. It has only just appeared." Or, for instance, the following dialectic gem: "Yet the swarm of fish in any ocean is ultimately not so much a dynamic object as a dynamic process in motion (to use philosophical language) in all its categories. It is in this that the dialectical clarity of the fishing industry is to be found." ¹

"Is it not", Stetsky asks, "the greatest crime . . . to make attempts to 're-equip' any field of knowledge by using a few quotations, and one or two statements as to 'the unity of contradictions' [or] 'the transformation of quantity into quality' ? Is it not mockery of dialectics to attempt to make it into a kind of master-key, the presence of which (in the form of one or two generalisations) enables one to open all secret places, all doors of any department of knowledge ? No, materialist dialectics is never a magic formula, which, if one had learnt it off by heart, gives one, without any further labour and trouble, the key to all the secrets of Nature, to the mastery of all special knowledge—from surgery to boot-making ! . . . Nothing is as opposed to real, and not merely verbal Marxian dialectics as attempts of this kind. For it is one of the fundamental laws of this dialectic that there is no abstract truth ; truth is always concrete. . . . Marx, Engels, Lenin, have . . . constantly emphasised the fact that dialectics is '*the correct reflection of the external development of the universe*' ; that building any science on the basis of dialectics means *studying persistently and in detail, the relevant cycle of phenomena of its development.*" "It is useful", Stetsky adds, "to quote the following characteristics of our teaching from Lenin: 'We do

¹ "The Socialist Reconstruction of the Fisheries", by D. V. Nov, July 5, 1931.

not by any means regard Marx's theory as something complete and not to be touched; we are, on the contrary, convinced that he has only put down the corner-stones of that science which socialists must further in all directions if they do not wish to lag behind life. We think that, for Russian socialists in particular, independent work on Marx's theory is necessary; for that theory gives merely a general directing statement, which is applied, in particular, differently in England and in France, differently in France and in Germany; differently in Germany and in Russia' " (Lenin's *Works*, Russian edition, vol. ii. p. 492).

In support of his complaint, Stetsky also quotes a declaration of Friedrich Engels: " We shall all agree that in any field of science *it doesn't matter whether it is the natural sciences or history one must start with the given facts*; that is to say, in natural science, we must start with various objective forms of the movement of matter. . . . In theoretical natural science it is impossible to build up correlations and bring them into facts. *They must be extracted from the latter, and when once they have been found they must be proved in so far as possible by experiment.*" ¹

The historian of the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1935 will become aware of many instances in which the disease of orthodoxy has gravely affected the course of administration. Naturally, it has been among the lesser lights of the Party that the disease has been most prevalent; Lenin himself, arch-controversialist though he had been in exile, was intensely realist as an administrator, always going straight to the facts, whatever the dogmatic theorist might say; and never fearing even the accusation of opportunism. Innumerable instances may be cited. In insisting on accepting the German terms of peace in 1918; in seeking, through Chicherin, during 1918-1919, every possible basis of accommodation with the capitalist governments; in trying, in the period of War Communism, every promising experiment in the industrial reconstruction that was so urgently required; in offering concessions to foreign capitalists for the development of the soviet natural resources; in sanctioning, during the crisis of the Civil War, all the desperate expedients, unknown to Marxian theory, that Trotsky and the other military commanders could invent; and finally, in springing upon the Party in 1921, the entirely unorthodox " New Economic Policy ", Lenin sought unceasingly to teach his followers how fatal it is, when grappling with unforeseen difficulties, to be blinded in the consideration of the current facts, or hampered in initiative, by even the most authoritative theory out of the past.²

¹ F. Engels, *The Dialectics of Nature*, p. 91 of 1931 Russian edition, Ogiz, Moscow.

² " On this account it is ", we were told by the chief historian of civilisation in England, " that although the acquisition of fresh knowledge is the necessary precursor of every step in social progress, such acquisition must itself be preceded by a love of enquiry, and therefore by a spirit of doubt; because without doubt there will be no enquiry, and without enquiry there will be no knowledge. For knowledge is not an inert and passive principle, which comes to us whether we will or no; but it must be sought before it can be won; it is the product of great labour and therefore of great sacrifice. And it is absurd to suppose that men will incur the labour, and make the sacrifice, for subjects respecting which they are already perfectly content. They who do not feel the darkness, will never look

Stalin has expounded the same lesson in many an act of state. We need refer here only to two examples. One is the prolonged stand that he made against the Great Russian chauvinists, who in vain quoted Marx against him, with regard to the national minorities; first in promoting and developing the policy of cultural autonomy within the Russian Socialist Republic; and then, in 1923, as we have elsewhere described,¹ in insisting, even at the last minute, on such a revision of the draft statute constituting the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as transformed that creation from what would have been little better than a unitary state into an effective federation of constituent republics. The second great example of Stalin's teaching of scientific realism in the teeth of dogma is afforded by the ending of the long controversy with Trotsky and his followers, among whom were numbered many of the chief theoreticians of the Party. It is, we believe, to Stalin himself that must be ascribed the ingenious decision on the agricultural front, as the only way of escaping from the danger of ever-recurrent famine, to group, within a decade, practically the whole twenty-five millions of peasant holdings into collective farms of the *artel* type, which alone would ensure the prompt mechanisation of arable culture. This sweeping measure of collectivisation was accompanied, contrary to Marxian theory, by the continuance of these same peasants as independent producers in individual ownership of the means of production, so far as these consisted of house and garden and paddock, even of considerable extent; a cow and a pig, and often more than one; a swarm of poultry and a row of beehives, in the use of which, for private wealth production, the fortunate owners were to be encouraged, and even subsidised. Who would have thought, from a study of Marx, that it would have been part of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to make all the millions of individual owner-producers well-to-do?

“*Anti-Godism*”

So far we have described the positive and creative aspects of the cult of science in the USSR. There is also a negative and destructive side: the violent denunciation and energetic uprooting, from one end of the Soviet Union to the other, of religion, and especially of the Christian religion.

Here it must be recalled that in Tsarist Russia Christianity was at its

for the light. If on any point we have attained to certainty, we make no further enquiry on that point; because enquiry would be useless, or perhaps dangerous. The doubt must intervene, before the investigation can begin. Here, then, we have the act of doubting as the originator, or, at all events, the necessary antecedent, of all progress. Here we have that scepticism, the very name of which is an abomination to the ignorant; because it troubles their cherished superstitions; because it imposes on them the fatigue of enquiry; and because it rouses even sluggish understandings to ask if things are as they are commonly supposed, and if all is really true which they from their childhood have been taught to believe” (*History of Civilisation in England*, by H. T. Buckle, 1857, pp. 334).

¹ See Chapter II. in Part I., “*Man as a Citizen*”, pp. 63-67.

worst. The Tsar was the supreme autocrat of the Orthodox Church; and he had, during the last few years of his reign, Rasputin as his spiritual adviser. This adventurer had, by his unsavoury combination of drinking bouts and sexual orgies with religious fanaticism, together with habitual venality, completely disgusted, not only the ordinary capitalist but also the corrupt inner circles of Russian society—a disgust so great as eventually to lead to his violent removal from the scene by a relative of the Tsar himself.¹ The village priesthood, taken as a whole, was illiterate and grasping. The monasteries, enjoying large revenues, were nests of miracle-mongering. Throughout the vast Eurasian continent indigenous pagan magic and incantations held their own amid the Christian rites and such Christian doctrine as the peasant was taught. It is scarcely to be wondered that, after reading a “plain, objective and not unsympathetic account of Russian religion”, the professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of London declared in 1934 that he could “only come to one conclusion, and it is a conclusion that all true friends of religion will share—*nearly all that religion has been, and has meant, in Russia ought to perish for ever from the face of the earth and from the memory of men*”.²

Whatever may have been the shortcomings and defects of the Greek Orthodox Church, it must be recognised that the attitude taken up by the Communist Party has excited a pained surprise and intense disapproval among earnest Christians in Western Europe and the United States, which has militated against any friendship with the USSR. On the other hand, it is exactly the explicit denial of the intervention of any God, or indeed of any will other than human will, in the universe, that has attracted, to Soviet Communism, the sympathies of many intellectuals, and especially of scientists in all civilised countries.³

¹ It may be recalled that Rasputin was not only the spiritual adviser to the royal family, but was also recognised and even honoured by the Primate of the Russian Church. Thus the well-known Ukrainian nobleman and landlord, Vladimir Korostovetz, who was an official in the tsarist Foreign Office, after describing his interview with the metropolitan Pitirim, the “highest representative of the Church”, tells us: “When I had taken leave and was going down the stairs, I saw a carriage drive up and two figures get out. One of the men I recognised immediately, for it was Sturmer, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was helping his companion out of the carriage. Dressed in a Russian rubashka, with a great wedge-shaped beard, stooping a little, the second figure appeared—Rasputin. Both were going to call on their friend, Pitirim, and only then I understood why the reception had been closed. What vile intrigues are these three men now going to hatch for Russia? was my thought as I left the monastery” (*Seed and Harvest*, by Vladimir Korostovetz, 1931, pp. 193-194).

² Professor John MacMurray, in a review of Dr. Julius F. Hecker's *Religion and Communism*, in the English magazine *Soviet Culture*, February 1934, p. 15.

³ This attitude has been well put by a contemporary English thinker: “The most ‘civilised’ men have refused to accept superstition and magic as an explanation of the universe and man's place in it. They have denied that the strength and unprovability of a belief are adequate grounds for believing that the belief is true. They have maintained that beliefs which are the offsprings of emotion, sedatives of our fears, or the fulfilment of our desires, are suspect. . . . The civilised man soon finds that the knowledge which reason and experience can give him is strictly limited, and that all his knowledge is founded upon beliefs which are mere intuitions and which he has no reason to believe true. If he sticks to ‘science’ and describes the world or even the universe as it appears to him, he remains on fairly firm ground; he may even succeed in splitting an invisible atom or

Marx and Engels, in all their voluminous writings, took up a position of positive and uncompromising atheism. Like them, Lenin insisted, as the basis of all his teaching, on a resolute denial of there being any known manifestation of the supernatural. He steadfastly insisted that the universe known to mankind (including mind equally with matter) was the sphere of science; and that this steadily advancing knowledge, the result of human experience of the universe, was the only useful instrument and the only valid guide of human action. There is, it was declared, nowhere any miracle, nowhere any "immortality"; no "soul" other than the plainly temporary "mind" of man; and no survival or revival of personality after death. Lenin refused to admit any hesitation or dubiety in the matter. He would not consent to any veiling of these dogmatic conclusions by the use of such words as agnosticism or spiritualism. He wrote a whole volume¹ to mark off, most resolutely, from his own following, anyone who presumed to treat religion as anything but superstition, leading to mere magic without scientific basis, and serving, as Marx had once said, as opium for the people.

When the Bolsheviks came into power in 1917, they made this defiant and dogmatic atheism the basis of their action.² There is evidence that it did not lack extensive popular support. Up and down the country there ensued, in the villages as well as in the factories, a great deal of

weighing an invisible star. . . . The metaphysical beliefs of the civilised man are cold compared with those of the savage; for the savage's beliefs are dictated to him by his emotions, whereas the civilised man suspects any of his beliefs which he believes because they satisfy his emotions. It is also true that the metaphysics of civilisation are negative and uncreative in the sense that they refuse to claim knowledge of things about which they have no knowledge; but the criticism is only important if it is more creative to believe what is not true than to believe that you do not know" (*Quack, Quack!* by Leonard Woolf, 1935, pp. 164-165).

¹ *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 1909.

² The reader may be referred to the excellent work *Religion and Communism*, by Dr. Julius P. Hecker (1933, 303 pp.), for a full and systematic examination of the position in the USSR, with an appendix of the principal decrees and other documents. His earlier work, *Religion under the Soviets*, New York, 1927, may still usefully be read. See also the chapter "Religious Freedom and Control" (pp. 90-104) in *Liberty under the Soviets*, by Roger N. Baldwin, New York, 1928 and 1930, 272 pp. The decrees may also be found in the British Parliamentary Paper (Cmd. 3641 of 1930) entitled *Certain Legislation respecting Religion in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*.

The "persecution" of religion in the USSR, at different periods and in particular localities, has been described, usually under the influence of deeply moved feelings of abhorrence, in such works as *The Bolshevik Persecution of Christianity*, by Francis McCullagh (1924); *The Russian Crucifixion*, by F. A. Mackenzie (1931). The case is stated with more restraint, and doubtless with greater accuracy, in *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin (1935), chapter xvi., "The Crusade against Religion", pp. 311-326. See also *Communism and Religion*, by Ivor Thomas (1934), 28 pp.; *Fifteen Years of Religion and Anti-Religion in Russia*, by Paul B. Anderson (1933, 78 pp.); and *Militant Atheism: the World-Wide Propaganda of Communism*, by the Right Reverend Monsignor M. D'Herbigny (1933, 80 pp.). The following may also be consulted: *The Russian Revolution*, by Nicholas Berdyaev, 1931, 95 pp.; *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody, 1932; and *Russia To-day, what we can learn from it*, by Sherwood Eddy, 1935, 316 pp. A pamphlet taking the other side, published by the Cooperative Society of Foreign Workers, gives more useful information of the present position: *Religion and the Church in the USSR*, by M. Steinman (Moscow, 1933, 64 pp.).

what we can only describe as spontaneous mass conversions to atheism ; very much as there had been, a thousand years before, mass conversions to Christianity.

In the first years of the confusion of " War Communism " and in the agonies of the Civil War and the famine of 1921, there were, in many villages and cities, all sorts of popular excesses against the Church and its priests, as there were against the landlords and capitalists. The lands belonging to the monasteries and other Church institutions were seized and shared among the local peasants ; the kulaks being described as the leaders of the looters.¹ An unknown number of priests who had made themselves objectionable to the villagers, or who had resisted expropriation, were killed. In many villages churches, often by popular acclamation, were converted into clubs or schools or storehouses for grain.

The Soviet Government, failed, for some years, to get control of the popular feeling ; and doubtless sympathised with it in all but its worst excesses. All the schools were immediately secularised ; all religious teaching having been forbidden in Lunacharsky's proclamation of October 26, 1917. The closing of churches, and their diversion to secular uses, by mere majority vote at the village meeting, continued for some time unchecked. Anti-god museums were established in the cities, often in secularised churches and monasteries, in which were exhibited exposures of the sham miracles² by which the clergy had deceived the people ; " sacred " relics which had been made objects of worship ; pictures displaying the close association of church dignitaries with the Tsar and with the army officers ; diagrams of graphic statistics showing how great were the revenues extracted by the Church from the peasantry ; and everything else calculated to inflame public opinion against the organised religion that had hitherto deluded the people.

The direct propaganda of atheism was undertaken, at first by individuals, and presently by groups and local societies who, from 1922 onward were supported by a weekly newspaper called *Bezbozhnik* (The Godless). A conference at Moscow in 1925 adopted, after discussion, a series of theses laying down the lines upon which religion should be combated ; and the methods to be adopted for the propaganda of atheism among the various sections of the population, including children and adolescents, college students, the Red Army, village clubs, the various national minorities and so on. The individual propagandists and the local groups and societies were drawn together in one great " Union of the Godless ", which gradually established a vast network of branches, with cells among the membership of every kind of society, from one end of the USSR to the other. In 1929 an " All-Union Conference of Anti-Religious Societies " at Moscow changed the name of its central organisation to

¹ " Of all the human monsters I have ever met in my travels I cannot recall any so malignant and odious as the Russian kulak. In the revolutionary horrors of 1905 and 1919 he was the ruling spirit—a fiend incarnate " (*The Eclipse of Russia*, by E. J. Dillon, 1918, p. 87).

² Such as the pretended non-decomposition of bodies of " saints ".

"The Union of Militant Atheists". At that date it counted about 9000 local cells or branches, with an aggregate membership that did not exceed half a million, among whom over one hundred different racial and language groups were represented. Very energetic campaigns were then launched for the expansion of its work, in which anti-religious propaganda was combined with efforts to assist the development of collective farms, to popularise the increase in the defensive forces of the USSR, and to promote the industrialisation arranged for in the Five-Year Plan. The past six years have witnessed an extraordinary growth of the movement.¹ From 9000 cells and branches, it sprang year by year to 30,000, 50,000 and 70,000, with an aggregate membership, paying tiny fees, counted by millions.²

Naturally, the majority of this great membership take little active part in the activities of the Union, and content themselves with paying the small annual dues, and perhaps subscribing to one or other of the atheist periodicals. On the other hand, the number of those who have passed through the organisation is much greater than its current membership; and that of the people who have become completely indifferent to religion is greater still. "At least half the population", states Dr. Hecker in 1935,³ "is already unchurched, and more or less indifferent to the old religious taboos and traditions. . . . The Moslems, which formerly were the most fanatical in adhering to their religion, are now turning away from it in large numbers; the reasons are chiefly social and economic. To the Moslem women it means emancipation from their age-long degradation; to the men it means freeing themselves from the oppression of their former feudal lords. In joining the collective the former semi-slave farm labourer becomes independent; a new life begins for him, and he readily abandons his old religion which has taught him submission to a master. . . . Anti-religious propaganda among the minor nationalities is at the same time an agitation for a social revolution, and its far-reaching consequences are widening."⁴

¹ The membership over 14 for 1932 was given as five and a half millions, about 70 per cent men and 30 per cent women; about 45 per cent between 14 and 22; 45 per cent between 23 and 45; and only 10 per cent above 46. Of this membership it was estimated that some 40 per cent were members or candidates of the Party, or Comsomols, whilst about 60 per cent were non-Party. In addition, there is a junior organisation for children under 14 which counts about two million members, nearly equally divided between boys and girls (*Religion and Communism*, by Julius F. Hecker, 1933, p. 219).

² "Confidence in themselves as a new conquering class, youthful naïveté and joy in pioneering, and the relish of the machine and the untold wealth that it yields, inspire the youth of the Soviet Union to deeds of which the meaning and purpose are fixed in advance by the philosophic system which has become their faith, and lead them to break with a religion built up on man's humility in the face of the incomprehensible and his recognition of the limitedness of his powers. The new youth are full of contempt and incomprehension of an outlook which does not regard the immanence of human reason as the super-eminent source of the energies of human life and of man's history. In their view science has killed God" (*Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, by Hans Kohn, 1933, pp. 15-16).

³ *Religion and Communism*, by Julius F. Hecker (1933), pp. 220, 226.

⁴ There is an "International of Proletarian Freethinkers" which was started by German and Czechoslovakian atheists in 1925, and was joined by the Soviet "Union of

The social atmosphere in the USSR is unfriendly to any form of supernaturalism; just as the social atmosphere of the United States or Great Britain is unfriendly to any dogmatic atheism. But so far as the present writers could ascertain in 1932 and 1934, there is, in the USSR to-day, nothing that can properly be called persecution of those who are Christians, any more than there is of Jews, Moslems or Buddhists.¹ There is no law against the avowal of belief in any religious creed, or the private practice of its rites. There is no exclusion from office (apart from the voluntarily recruited Vocation of Leadership) of men or women who are believers. There is nowadays no rejection from the public schools and colleges of the children of believers. Churches, mosques and synagogues are still open for public worship, which any person is free to attend. The services are conducted in each case by the religious teachers (priests, mullahs, etc.) whom the respective congregations choose to maintain.²

Militant Atheists" in 1926. The latter set themselves to turn the international work in the direction of supporting a revolutionary uprising in the several countries, whereupon the merely "reformist" freethinkers withdrew to form the so-called Brussels International of Freethinkers. The International of Proletarian Freethinkers, passing completely into soviet control, is now centred in Moscow, where it claims to maintain correspondence with groups in more than thirty countries.

¹ We do not understand how Mr. W. H. Chamberlin can assert, as he does in his article in *Foreign Affairs* (New York), that "representatives of all religious faiths are being persecuted [in the USSR in 1935] at least as vigorously as Dissenters and Catholics were persecuted under Charles II. [in England]". Fortunately, Mr. Chamberlin enumerates carefully all the forms that the "persecution" takes. The Soviet Government refuses to print or to import religious books. Practically all seminaries for priests are suppressed. The churches are forbidden to carry on charitable or recreational work. The children of priests are denied access to higher education. There is frequent arbitrary closing of particular churches. Priests and others active in religious work are sometimes summarily arrested and deported on grounds that they do not understand. Mr. Chamberlin is evidently unacquainted with past history if he thinks that the six kinds of "oppression" which he recites amount to anything like the penal treatment meted out to "Dissenters and Catholics" in the England or the Ireland of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or even in the New England of those times.

² In 1934 the present writers were informed that there were more than forty churches in Moscow open for religious worship; about half that number in Kiev, and corresponding numbers in other large cities; but there are none in the newly established manufacturing cities. There are Roman Catholic services in Leningrad and Moscow, which are unmolested and well attended. The Jews have their synagogues; the Moslems their mosques (in the city of Kazan, for instance, several); there are even Buddhist temples; and various evangelical sectaries have their own places of worship—in the cities in greatly reduced numbers, but (as far as can be seen) not inadequate for the present congregations, which are, however, greatly swollen at Easter. In the villages it was reported that three-fourths of the churches were still open for religious worship though with greatly dwindled congregations; and that the number secularised, though running into thousands, formed only a small percentage of the whole. Mr. Chamberlin gives the number of churches still open as about 38,000 for the whole of the USSR, which would be about 70 per cent of those existing before the Revolution (*Russia's Iron Age*, 1935, p. 325). The Soviet Government has, for some years, refused to allow any village church to be secularised by a bare majority. Nothing less than an overwhelming vote of the village electors will now suffice. In the villages with Jewish populations the synagogues continue their services, and the Jewish families their ancient rites.

In some areas (as the present writers were told in the Tartar Autonomous Republic in 1932) a large proportion, if not a majority, of the mullahs followed the bulk of their congregations in abandoning Islam and taking to secular work in the service of the Soviet Union; whilst most of the other mullahs went away.

All the buildings are national property, and they are leased free of rent, but subject to the payment of the ordinary taxes, and to the keeping of the building in proper repair, to self-formed registered societies of particular religious denominations, which make themselves responsible for the maintenance of the clergy and other expenses. Births, marriages and burials may be blessed by religious rites, either in the home, at the cemetery or in church, by desire and at the expense of the persons concerned. The priests of the Greek Orthodox Church are to be seen, in the cities, walking the streets in their religious garb,¹ and in the country working in their gardens, without molestation or abuse. Icons may still be seen without concealment in many a peasant's *izba*, even in the collective farms. Christians, Jews and Moslems are not, as such, refused employment, nor are their children excluded from the schools and colleges, although no provision is made there for religious instruction of any kind. Parents are not forbidden to give, within the home, religious teaching to their own children; but no school (and no assemblage of children outside each family) for the purpose of religious instruction is permitted. The religious societies and the clergy are forbidden to undertake or promote any educational or charitable or recreational work as a corporate function of their congregation, or in connection with the churches. The priests, in short, are allowed to do nothing beyond holding services for worship, and performing religious rites connected with births, marriages and funerals at the request and expense of the family concerned.² By an alteration of the law made in 1929, any public propaganda of religion (apart from conducting services and preaching sermons in church) is made a penal offence; although anti-religious propaganda continues to be permitted, and even encouraged. No religious books (at any rate in the Russian language) are issued by the government publishing establish-

¹ There is even said to be an exceptional case of a priest of the Greek Orthodox Church, who conducts weekly services, and also serves as a part-time official in a government department. He is an exceptionally qualified scientific specialist whose consultative assistance is so highly valued that he is allowed to attend in his priestly garments.

² By judicial decision in 1935, it was laid down that it was a punishable offence to baptize any child without the consent of its parents.

During the first nine months of the years 1927 and 1928 the percentages of births, marriages and burials in Moscow at which religious rites were performed was as under:

	1927	1928
Births without . . .	33.0	38.1
„ with . . .	59.7	57.8
Unknown . . .	7.3	4.1
Burials without . . .	30.1	33.3
„ with . . .	66.8	65.7
Unknown . . .	3.2	1.0
Marriages without . . .	81.6	86.3
„ with . . .	15.6	11.8
Unknown . . .	2.8	1.9

(*Religion and Communism*, by J. F. Hecker, 1935, p. 220.)

ments ; and none are allowed to come in from abroad. In short, although there is no persecution of individuals because of their holding any religious belief, there is a great deal of restriction of any corporate or public religious activities. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party show no favour to any religious belief, and persistently direct the whole force of public opinion against it. To imagine or believe that there is anything in or affecting the universe or mankind, in any unnatural or supernatural way, contrary to the ascertained truths of science, and at the same time not amenable to scientific investigation, is—so the communists declare—merely the superstition, and the faith in magic, of the ignorant. 'But the ordinary citizen is not punished for his ignorance in being a believer, even in what is thought to be magic. There is no persecution of the silent yearning for a spiritual vision of the universe. What the Communist Party maintains is a rigid rule for itself. Its own membership, including probationary candidature for its membership, is open to no one who does not whole-heartedly and outspokenly declare himself an atheist, and a complete denier of the existence of every form or kind of the supernatural.

The persistence of this intolerance of any faith in supernaturalism may be attributed to a mixture of motives. The clergy of the various religious denominations are believed, not unnaturally, to continue in a state of determined hostility to the very existence of the Soviet Government, and to all its activities. Those of the Greek Orthodox Church continue to look to Paris, where an Orthodox Theological College is maintained by some White *émigrés*, from which it is hoped to keep up a supply of priests to fill the places left vacant by death and desertion. The religious congregations in Moscow and other cities are suspected of sympathy with the "counter-revolutionary" intrigues and conspiracies that are supposed to be perennial. All these motives for intolerance may fade away as the Soviet Government feels its own existence definitely ensured. But even then the continuance, among the people at large, of religious belief as inculcated by the priests, may still be regarded as an obstacle to their whole-hearted acceptance of the science by which alone the people's work in agriculture and other forms of production, can be made ever more efficient. In the rural districts the priests have allowed the peasants to go on fixing when to sow and when to begin to reap, not from any knowledge of agriculture or of the weather, but upon the traditional saints' days. In times of drought their remedy was to lead the peasants in procession round the fields in order to pray for rain. They still teach the peasants that the yield of the harvest depends, not so much on the efficiency of the cultivation, as on the ceremonial blessing of the fields. Even to-day the priests are apt to inculcate, for the maintenance of health and the prevention of disease, not the preventive or remedial measures advocated by the medical practitioners provided by the commissariats of health, but the anointings and prayers in which alone the priests themselves usually believe. And there has been, both in the

Orthodox Church and among some of the sectaries, a darker side. Part of the degradation of this theology down to the Revolution was its association with a dangerous eroticism, for which absolution was obtained by confession. In some cases there was even self-immolation by masses with some mysterious faith of thereby ensuring salvation in immortality. In short, it seems to the Communist Party, and to the Soviet Government, as if religion, even where it is not an opiate to the people, discouraging all effort for social improvement in this world, must be regarded as no better than the superstitious magic characteristic of barbarism and savagery. As such, it needs to be resisted and if possible extirpated.

It is, however, now recognised by the responsible leaders that it is unnecessary, and even imprudent, to affront the feelings of pious believers by insults to their religion and by ridicule of its observances. The Soviet Government has more than once intervened to moderate the provocative activity of the Union of the Godless. No church can now be closed in the cities (otherwise than by removal for a street improvement) unless no religious society can be formed to undertake its maintenance, and provide for its use by regular services; or in the villages, unless an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the locality insist upon the transfer of the building to secular uses. The wisdom of this amount of tolerance has been cogently argued by a popular communist propagandist.¹ "A believer", writes Kerzhentsev, "whose religious feelings are affronted will only become still more religious. Thus the forcible closing of a church against the will of the population will merely evoke a desperate, passionate struggle and confirm the dupes of the priests in their faith. The cultural standards of the population must be raised, books of popular science circulated, and cinemas and theatres substituted for church ceremonies, for people go to church for entertainment too, for the sake of the singing or ritual. In this way we shall achieve the emancipation of the workers from the yoke of religion."

But this is not enough. It is being argued by some that the sweeping denial of all possibility of any supernaturalism, which is now insisted on by the Communist Party in the USSR, is detrimental alike to personal veracity and clear thinking, and to scientific progress. It is one thing to take a stand upon science, which comprises all that is known, and to refuse to believe or assent to any statement about the universe or about mankind, which is either contradicted or unsupported by evidence that will stand scientific examination. What seems unwarranted, even according to dialectical materialism, is the dogmatic denial of the very possibility of the existence of anything that is unknown to science—unknown, that is to say, to the scientists of to-day. After all, the science of each generation is not only perpetually contradicting many of the dicta of the scientists of the preceding generation, but is also demonstrating the existence of whole ranges of phenomena—we need only instance radiology—of which our grandfathers had no inkling. Moreover, we have

¹ *Bolshevism for Beginners*, by P. Kerzhentsev (1931), p. 78.

to recognise that the human species is not "the only pebble on the beach". The universe known to man is greater than, and different from, that known to the dog, and both of these are hopelessly beyond the ken of the ant. Can we be quite sure that there do not exist, within what we call the universe, in a way as unimaginable by us as the wonders of radiology were by Marx and Darwin, entities so completely beyond our ken as we are beyond that of the ant? This possibility affords no warrant for a belief in the existence of gods or angels, any more than in buddhas or devils; and no ground whatever for a belief in personal immortality, or in heaven or walhalla. But the very limitation of our present knowledge should suggest that it might have a healthier educational effect on the unlearned if we explained that we simply did not know, and why we could not necessarily expect to know—that is to say, if we took up the position, not of a dogmatic atheism but of a strictly scientific agnosticism. To put the case on the lowest ground, the dogmatic atheist is not unlikely, as Kerzhentsev has explained, unexpectedly and by repulsion, to create the obstinate theist!

Whether further study of the nature of man's mind, and of the not uncommon craving for the assumption of some purpose inherent in the universe as a whole, may not one day lead to the recognition, even by the scientists themselves, of something beyond the knowledge yielded by man's actual experience—some means of communion with something anterior or superior to the universe itself—remains a speculation, perhaps a yearning, about which nothing can be asserted.¹

In the foregoing pages we have sought to survey, in its highest ranges, the vigorous and continuous cult of science in the USSR, just as we have described, in our chapter on The Remaking of Man, the strenuous attempt to develop the intelligence and increase the knowledge, not of a selected few among a selected race, but of the masses of factory operatives and peasants, of hunters and fishers, of wandering tribesmen, of the innumerable religious and primitive superstitions of the vast Eurasian continent. But all this activity in stimulating the intellect of the inhabitants of the

¹ "Primitive and early civilisations peopled the universe with whole galaxies of gods and demons. As man lived and learned, he found exact explanations for phenomena previously attributed to the gods. The more progressive (or, at least aggressive) peoples, in the material sense, gradually reduced supernatural omnipotents to one, whom they regarded as ruler. The Bolshevik society, seeking to write another chapter in the Book of Changes, denies the supernatural *in toto* and abolishes the last of the gods, devils and angels. Regardless of personal beliefs, regardless of what may be the outcome of it, it is clear that the communist experiment with religion is another human effort to emancipate the mind from supernatural fears. Such steps as have heretofore been taken in this progressive liberation, have been made by the learned and the well-to-do, and the results have been restricted to a narrow circle. Will the proletarian culture, now forming, contribute permanent extensions to man's freedom, and what will it be? The liberating principle of democratic societies has been individualism; that of Bolshevik society is to be collectivism. In the quest for freedom, which will contribute most? Both can be wedded to science, or to religion. It seems that judgement of the present experiment will ultimately depend simply upon the proved greater effectiveness, of one principle or the other in satisfying needs, material, emotional and intellectual" (*New Minds, New Men?*, by Thomas Woody, 1932, p. 256).

USSR, it may be said, leaves untouched the realm of conscience in the mind of man. By sweeping away all supernaturalism, there is destroyed, at a blow, the code of conduct founded on divine revelation by the different religions--Judaic, Buddhist, Christian or Moslem--together with the not less formidable codes of the primitive tribes. Has not this produced, among all the peoples of the USSR, a state of ethical anarchy as to the relation of man to man, equally with the relation of man to the universe? What, it will be asked, has been the result of this anarchy on human conduct, as manifested in man's relation to the community either as a citizen, or as a producer, or as a consumer; or on his personal behaviour as a friend or mate, as a child or parent; or on his own life in pursuit of his own wellbeing? In the following chapter we shall endeavour to uncover the dominant purpose which steels the will and directs the aim of the Bolshevist statesmen, and holds the Communist Party to its devoted activities. We have to describe the scale of values that defines for them the "good life", and trace the dawn and the progress of a new conscience, out of which may ultimately come even that "withering of the state" of which Marx wrote nearly a century ago.

CHAPTER XII

THE GOOD LIFE

THOSE who have had the patience to read through the preceding chapters of this volume will have been impressed by the energy and persistence with which the soviet statesmen have pursued their aims. Whether in deliberately planning a vastly increased production of commodities and services ;¹ or in organising with unparalleled ingenuity the labour of the producers ;² or in providing for the health, education and economic security in all the vicissitudes of life of the entire community ;³ or in adopting, as the main instrument of their achievement the fullest application of science,⁴ Lenin and Stalin, and the organised Vocation of Leadership which they have moulded and inspired, have been governed by a single purpose.⁵ This purpose, as we have explained, has been the universal advance in civilisation of the people of the USSR. What was to be obtained for them all were the conditions of the good life.

The Pursuit of Plenty

The road for an advance in civilisation—the conditions of the good life—lay clear before them. The vast population with which the Soviet Government had to deal was, in 1917, with statistically few exceptions, not only ignorant, with a specially low standard of health, and coarsened and brutalised by centuries of oppression ; but also miserably poor, and suffering periodically from actual famine. The first requisite for the good life in the USSR was to increase very greatly the annual production of the commodities and services by the enjoyment of which it is possible for

¹ Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

² Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

³ Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

⁴ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

⁵ Western scientists, as it seems to us, supply no confident answer as to the origin and causation of human purpose. They cannot maintain, to-day, the conception of inspiration from outside the universe, or from behind the phenomena, of which alone man is aware. They feel obliged to believe that the mind of civilised man, with all its contents or phases, has been slowly built up throughout the long ages of man's ascent in the biological scale. Our purpose, like our will and our emotions, can, the scientists tell us, represent nothing but an amalgamation or a residuum of all our inheritance ; moulded in successive generations by home and other social environment ; worked on by all sorts of education and training ; affected by our personal habits and our particular experiences ; and rising in our minds, we know not why or how, as an urge that compels our actions. We do not understand that the Marxian communist would differ from this conclusion. What he adds is his own interpretation and summary of the evolution of social organisation, after the long period of the "primitive" societies, down to the establishment of the "classless" community. As suggestive in this connection may be named the substantial book entitled *Ethics*, by Nicholas Hartmann, 1926, admirably translated by Dr. Stanton Coit, 3 vols., 1932 ; and also *The Dawn of Conscience*, by James H. Breasted, New York, 1934.

man to rise, stage after stage, from barbarism to civilisation. It was crystal clear to Lenin, and his companions, that, as the necessary basis for any universal improvement in health, education, technical capacity, culture, manners and refinement, poverty had to be converted into plenty.

For the Whole Population

What was equally clear to them—and in this they differed from the statesmen of other countries—was that the “plenty” had to be secured, not for any superior class or classes, and not for any particular race or races, even if these classes or races proved themselves to be more capable or more industrious or more enlightened than the rest of the population, but universally and without exclusions, for all the inhabitants of the USSR.

Now, the very idea of universality of participation in the plenty of a prosperous community was never present to the minds of nineteenth-century statesmen. This was not because they lacked humanity or charity. They were merely convinced that such a universalism was impracticable. They had been taught that “the poor ye have always with you”. Under a system of private ownership of the means of production, in which the direct motive for enterprise and employment is, not an increased supply of commodities for the enjoyment of the whole people, but the making of profit for the benefit of individuals among them, experience proved that, with the ever-increasing aggregation of capital into larger units, whilst a minority became wealthy, the majority remained poor. Lenin and his companions believed that these aggregations must inevitably pass into public ownership, and that the substitution of collective for individual property in the means of large-scale production, and the deliberately planned administration of these in a condition of social equality, overcame the supposed impracticability of making plenty universal. They had, accordingly, no motive for accepting as inevitable the poverty of the poor, whether the poor were in poverty through their individual weakness of character or capacity, or through that of the race or class to which they belonged.

It will be noted that the Bolshevik conception of the universality of plenty was unconnected with any belief in the social value, or even in the possibility, of identity or equality among individuals, whether in work, capacity or morality, or in the amount or kind of service rendered, or in the rate of earnings or wages or other form of income. What was aspired to in the future was the very opposite of equality among individuals, namely, a state of society in which each person would voluntarily serve according to his ability, and receive from the community whatever was appropriate to his needs. Only, as the ability varies enormously, whilst the material needs are much the same for the ablest as for the stupidest, and the cultural needs do not greatly differ in cost, there is no reason to fear that this formula would again divide society into rich and poor as the institution of private property inevitably does.

With Advanced Industrialism

The desired condition of universalism in plenty could be secured, it was confidently held, only by a considerable degree of industrialisation. A community predominatingly agricultural, with farming carried on by a multitude of peasants, was, it was believed, necessarily a community without plenty. Without full use of scientific technology, it was impossible to secure the immeasurable increase yielded by mass production. Individual production is, as regards all material commodities, always small production, yielding, if at all equally divided, little above bare subsistence. The great wealth formerly obtained, even from agriculture, by a relatively small number of proprietors by their employment of innumerable slaves or serfs, or rack-rented peasants, and still enjoyed in capitalist countries by means of the private employment of wage labourers, could be, in mass production, both surpassed and universally enjoyed, without exploitation of slave or serf or proletarian, only by making power-driven machinery in common ownership serve, not individual landlords or capitalists, but the industrialised collectivist state. Under Soviet Communism, in fact, the machine becomes the ubiquitous slave of mankind.

In Social Equality

This universalism in plenty, to be secured by the abolition of individual ownership and private management of the instruments of large-scale production, together with the definite penalisation of trading in commodities for profit, and of the employment of persons at wages with a view to the making of profit from their labour, was assumed to result in a condition of social equality. Whilst production by personal effort could be allowed, and the personal ownership of whatever the individual himself could earn, and even the investment of his savings at interest in the government savings bank or loans, the amount of inheritance could be strictly limited by taxation, whilst no social privileges need be permitted, even to those (such as authors or artists of genius) whose peculiar talents enable them to produce works which can be enjoyed without being consumed in the process, and thus to obtain exceptionally large incomes without speculation or exploitation. Above all, there need be no monopoly of education or training. These boons could be ensured, along with the necessary allowances for maintenance, to the offspring of all parents as quickly as sufficient teaching could be provided, without distinction of sex or race, or parental position or wealth. The aim was an equalitarian society where health and economic security, education and culture, manners and refinement, would be, in the absence of any privileged class, or any privileged race, substantially common to all, because effectively open to all. Nothing less than this creation of a new and unprecedented social order is the Bolshevik aim.

The "Classless Society"

This condition of social equality will not be completely attained, so the Bolsheviks have held, until they have established what is termed the "classless society". Such a vision of the social organisation of the future usually baffles the British and American students. In England, the classless society is understood as one in which the individual men and women, being all of one social class, would be all alike; or, more precisely, would manifest a much higher degree of uniformity than the members of the numerous different sections nowadays found in any highly developed capitalist community. A classless society, in this sense, it is felt, would involve a loss of individuality, and a monotonous sameness, which would be distressing, if not actually inimical to progress. At the same time, it is made a matter of reproach to Soviet Communism that, after nearly twenty years, the USSR shows no sign even of approaching such a monotonous uniformity among individuals! It is, indeed, alleged, without evidence, that a distinct new differentiation among social classes is, in the USSR, becoming increasingly visible.

These criticisms are, in our opinion, alike based on a simple mis-translation or misunderstanding of what Soviet Communism means by the classless society. Karl Marx, and, after him, successive generations of followers, have chosen to take, as a summary of social evolution in the period of capitalism, a continuous and relentless economic struggle between competing social groups or sections. These, it is assumed, will increasingly coalesce into two opposing hosts, the one host (called the bourgeoisie) eventually uniting all the various groups or sections who live on rent or interest or the profit which is gained, whether directly or indirectly, by the employment of persons at wages, or by buying and selling commodities, or by the various financial manipulations to which this leads; whilst the other host (called the proletariat) comes to comprise, not only the great mass of wage-carvers inheriting that status from slave or serf or wage-earning ancestry, but also the numerous groups or sections, losers in the economic struggle (called the petty-bourgeoisie, or the "white collar workers" or the poor peasants), whom the economic struggle will have remorselessly pressed down into the proletariat. Marx foresaw that the wage-earning proletariat would come to form an ever larger proportion of each capitalist community, while the bourgeoisie though uniting many groups or sections, would be steadily reduced in aggregate numbers by the constant absorption of all small business enterprises into larger ones; and the consequent relegation of impoverished profit-makers and their children to the ranks of the proletariat. At last, in the view of Marx, there would inevitably be a social explosion, in which the vast multitude of the swollen proletariat would expropriate the relatively small number of bourgeois, thus establishing a society in which there would be no longer individual profit-makers, purchasing labour-force for hire, nor any proletarian workers selling their labour-force for

ever-dwindling wages as their only means of subsistence. All able-bodied persons would be serving the community according to their faculties, whilst they, and also all sections of the non-able-bodied, would be supported by the community according to their needs. This would be the "classless society".

Now we are not here concerned with the truth or accuracy of this extremely summarised version of the economic and social history of the world, between the stage of primitive savagery or barbarism, which science now declares to have existed for many hundreds of thousands of years, and the final catastrophe of world capitalism which seemed indefinitely remote until the Russian catastrophe, and its sequel in the successful establishment of the USSR, foreshortened the prospect startlingly. The consummation expected by Marx has to a very large extent become a political fact in the Soviet Union, though in the other countries it is still in the air. It is even possible that, on the completion in 1937 of the Second Five-Year Plan, or at any rate at no distant date, the leaders of the Soviet Union may be able to declare that the phase called the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" has passed, as the state is now almost continuous with the whole population, and the "classless society" has been substantially established. For by that time there may well be, in all the wide expanse of the USSR, practically no individual capitalists purchasing labour-force from proletarian labourers driven to sell their labour-force to those seeking to make a profit out of it; nor even any private traders buying commodities which they have not themselves made, in order to sell them at a higher price. There will accordingly no longer be any division of society into the two classes of exploiter and exploited; or, as that great Jewish statesman Disraeli expressed it, in the same decade as Marx,¹ into "the two nations" of the rich and the poor. But the soviet leaders will certainly not mean by such an assertion that there is anything like uniformity among the inhabitants of the USSR, either in capacity or attainments, in intellectual development or training, in personal habits or pursuits, in the social associations that they constitute or the groups to which they belong. On the contrary, communists claim that, by the greatly increased opportunity for self-development afforded to those who have hitherto been the poorest, and the greatly enlarged variety of occupations effectively opened to the entire population, Soviet Communism is creating positively more differentiation of individuality than exists in any capitalist country.

There are certainly some grounds for such a claim. We habitually forget how limited is the choice of occupation (say, of the boy in an English mining village), and how small are the opportunities of self-development (say, of the Balkan landless labourer's child)—how scanty and primitive is the schooling, and how rare the technical training, that is, even to-day, allowed to more than half the population of Great Britain

¹ Benjamin Disraeli's novel, *Sybil, or the Two Nations*, was first published in 1845.

--how huge are the numbers to whom, in all capitalist countries, any development of inborn genius and any rise in civilisation are, save in exceptional cases, practically denied. It is significant that something like one-half of all the adult male population of advanced capitalist communities consists of lifelong labourers or nondescripts who never become able to earn the wage of a skilled craftsman. The position in the Soviet Union is very different. The principle of universalism, on which, as we have shown, the provision for health, schooling, training for life and choice of occupation is based in the USSR, with its drastic ousting of all disqualifications of sex or race, inferiority of social position or lack of means, necessarily implies a vast unloosing of human energy, a great increase in available capacity, and, at least, a not inconsiderable development of genius that would otherwise not have been able to fructify. That other principle of multiformity, to which Lenin attached so much importance, incidentally opens up a diversity of ways among which the increased energy, capacity and genius have plainly a more effective choice of opportunity than in more rigidly canalised communities. It is not merely that there is, in the USSR, as we have shown, not a single employer, but, instead, hundreds of thousands of managements constantly seeking to enrol recruits. There is not even a single type of industrial organisation, but instead, a whole variety of difficult kinds of service. These range from the innumerable enterprises of the array of executive governments constituting the Union, the score of constituent or autonomous republics and the tens of thousands of oblasts, rayons and selsoviets; up to the multifarious executive agencies of the trade unions and the consumers' cooperative societies; the whole of these employing, in the aggregate, some 25 millions of wage-earners. Then there is the quite different status of membership or partnership in the tens of thousands of industrial articles of owner-producers, or in the quarter of a million collective farms, with an aggregate adult membership approaching 50 millions; to say nothing of the numerous fishery kolkhosi and the "integral" cooperatives of the hunters and trappers. Finally there are, even to this day, millions of individual self-employers whose ranks anyone can join in the wide open spaces, either among the still surviving independent peasantry, or among the independent hunters and trappers, or among the independent fishermen on the coasts, or among the independent prospectors for minerals. We have elsewhere described how tens of thousands of scientific workers are thronging the thousand or more scientific research institutes in every branch of knowledge. It looks as if nowhere in the world—not even in the United States—is there so much variety and diversity in the choice of employments effectively open to every member of the population as in the USSR. And this diversity and multiplicity of occupation and employment is continuously increasing with the growth and extension, throughout the vast area, of an ever more nearly complete social equality in the good life.

A Compulsory Environment

Now the principal objection made in the western world to Soviet Communism, and especially to its claim to be establishing the good life, is the destruction of personal freedom that is felt to be involved. Freedom it is said, is not only a fundamental condition of the good life; it is also its very essence. Any attempt deliberately to organise the good life for other people against their will; any project of providing the means of the good life for the whole of any population; any corporate action by the government of the community, even in economic or cultural matters, or anything in the nature of a General Plan to which all must conform; and still more, any legislative prohibitions in the realm of individual conduct, even with the best of motives, necessarily amounts, it is urged, to an intolerable infringement of the individual liberty on which the good life absolutely depends. This is a fundamental objection to the whole manner of life in the USSR which has to be candidly examined. How far can it be truly said that the individual citizen enjoys less freedom in the Soviet Union than in Great Britain or the United States? ¹

Legal Prohibitions

First let us note there seem to be not a few prohibitions with regard to personal life imposed by positive law in Great Britain or France, not to mention pre-war Germany, in which the inhabitant of the USSR has a superior freedom. We need only refer to the British law as to divorce which is complained of among all social classes: even if we do not adduce the English statute, not yet wholly repealed, punishing sleeping out in the open air without having "visible means of subsistence"! There is the English law of trespass, involving the deliberate exclusion of the masses, not only from the extensive parklands of the wealthy in the countryside, and from the expensively cultivated gardens in the squares of the London West End, but also from wandering at will along sea cliffs, through mountain passes and forests, in fields and over moors, and by the side of streams, in many of the most beautiful regions of Great Britain. To the present writers the sport of killing the birds that fly in the air, and the fish that swim the streams, seem a remnant of barbarism; but if such recreation be desirable it is, in Great Britain, confined, in one or other way, to a fraction of the population, and is severely punished as poaching when indulged in by the common man, unable to afford expensive gun and game licences, though the catch would mean something in the pot for the Sunday dinner. What seems to the soviet authorities far more important to the community than these class restrictions on the personal freedom of the masses, in the interests of a tiny minority, is that not a particular class but the whole people should enjoy throughout their

¹ The best examination of this question known to us is the candid and scrupulously accurate volume by Roger N. Baldwin, *Liberty under the Soviets*, New York, 1930, 272 pp.

lives the widest possible enlargement of their mental or cultural environment, and the maximum opportunity of using this freedom, without discrimination of age or sex, race or colour, simultaneously with an equally universal increase of leisure.

Such a universal extension of freedom requires, however, that the public authorities should see to it that nothing is provided for public use or enjoyment that is definitely harmful to the community. Thus, nothing may be printed in the USSR, whether book or pamphlet or circular, which has not been passed by the agent of the public censorship (Glavlit) who sits in every printing establishment. As no individual can lawfully employ labour for his own profit, all the thousands of newspapers and other periodicals that are so eagerly read by the public, catering, as they do, for every group or interest, and for every locality, are run, not by capitalist proprietors, but by one or other of the manifold agencies of the collectivity. The same is true of all the theatres, concerts, cinemas and other popular entertainments. The couple of hundred thousand places of education in city or village, between the Baltic and the Pacific, from nursery school or kindergarten, up to university college or research institute, are equally provided and maintained by one or other public authority. In short, it may be said that in the USSR no social institution of any kind, however voluntary its membership or clientele, escapes the universal plan. The mental and cultural environment is thus everywhere under the direction, not, it is true, of any single government organ, but of one or other of the literally hundreds of thousands of authorities of public character. This universal supervision is directed by a deliberate purpose.

The practice of the USSR reveals the nature of this purpose, and the extent to which the mental environment is regulated. In the first place, nothing is permitted that is deemed "counter-revolutionary". This does not mean that no criticism of the government is allowed. On the contrary, there is, as the student will have concluded, no country in the world in which there is actually so much widespread public criticism of the government, and such incessant revelation of its shortcomings, as in the USSR. Nearly every issue of the newspaper contains details of breakdowns and failures; of the scandalous behaviour of officials whose names are given; of cases of neglect and oppression; and of the need for this or that alteration or improvement of government policy or administration.¹ The "wall newspaper", in which, in every factory and

¹ We have already pointed out that, so incessant is this stream of exposure and criticism, that whole volumes of attack on the soviet system have been published in most countries by its enemies, who find it easy to collect and arrange this "self-criticism" as if the exceptional cases were typical of the whole administration. See p. 628.

The much-maligned censorship of the work of the foreign correspondents at Moscow is, we are convinced, carried out on similar lines. It is well described by an American journalist:

"Russian censorship, where the Russian censorship is effective, lets much news come through. Dispatch in pocket, the American correspondent takes the soviet Foreign Office elevator up several floors to a somewhat messy room in which a Russian, who speaks

office, the staff publicly criticise, and even lampoon, their superiors, is a universal institution all over the USSR. No such public criticism by the wage-earner of his employer, or of his foreman, is allowed in capitalist countries. The Soviet Government approves of all this publicity as "self-criticism", even when it is criticism of itself as employer; and is itself not backward in contributing to it. Hardly a speech is made by a People's Commissar or other leader which does not include some exposure of departmental failure, and a more or less sharp denunciation of erring officials. It is only the calling in question of the fundamental principles of communism, or some aggressive criticism of theoretic "Marxism"—and, of course, any incitement to political "faction"—that is barred as "counter-revolutionary".

On the other hand, there are various additional systematic exclusions from any form of publicity. Nothing pornographic is allowed in literature or other form of art. There is, indeed, less public "sex appeal", of any sort, in the cities of the USSR than in those of any other country. No incitement to racial hatred is permitted; so far, at least, as concerns the Jews, Tartars, Gypsies, Negroes or any other race within the USSR. No libel on any citizen in his private capacity will be passed. It is also soviet policy, in order to exclude the subtle influence of imitation, to forbid the publication of the details, and even the statistics, of divorces, crimes, suicides and accidents. It is, perhaps, as a matter of good taste, which may be dignified into "mental hygiene", that the soviet newspaper contains no "society news", and no gossip about the habits and doings of the personalities prominent in art, literature, sport, music or the drama, or even of the leading soviet statesmen and administrators. There is no mention of their families, or of their comings and goings. We do not know whether it is because of these manifold exclusions or in spite of them that the soviet newspapers are so widely read or so eagerly

and reads English, goes over with him what he has written. The censor will pass *every time* any factual description of things that the American has seen; he will pass *every time* any of those articles or speeches abounding in savage self-criticism which soviet papers amazingly print, and which soviet leaders amazingly make. (Indeed, most of the hot stuff and inside dope peddled by the rumour-mongers of Riga, is taken directly from soviet papers, dressed up in attractively fantastic form, and sold with particular success in England.)

"The censor will not pass, but will ask the correspondent to modify, any condensed summary or interpretation of a series of events or a speech with which he disagrees. Also the censor will delete what is maliciously hostile, grossly provocative, deliberately untrue, or insulting to the state or its leaders. But even such stuff comes out of Russia by the ton—in books and articles written after the writer emerges. Or even without the formality of emergence.

"But in spite of this complete change in the amount of Russian information available, in spite of a censorship certainly more intelligent and certainly less ruthless than that of most South American and some East European states, and in spite of much excellent and accurate reporting, the old fable of the soviet mystery remains. Americans, because they were once educated to the scent of propaganda, refuse to believe their eyes. They persist in the conviction that there is a 'Russian answer'—that there is a Russian 'low-down'—that they have not 'been told'. They have developed what might be called an ignorance complex. The fundamental facts of the Russian State are clear and legible and well known" (*Fortune*, New York, March 1932, p. 57).

devoured.¹ The circulation of each issue of the periodical press in the USSR now approximates, in the aggregate, to the total number of family households between the Gulf of Finland and Kamchatka.

Plan or No Plan

How far does this systematic planning of the mental environment of the soviet citizen constitute a greater restriction of his personal liberty than is suffered by the citizen of every great country in which people live in closer conjunction with each other than, say, the Gauchos of Patagonia, or the pioneer farmers of the North American prairie or the South African veldt?

Let us take, to begin with, the position of the schools and the teachers. So far as concerns nine-tenths of the children of school age, in Great Britain, their parents have no freedom of choice as to school or teacher or curriculum. They must, in fact, put up with whatever building and equipment, teaching staff and curriculum, is provided within reach of their homes.² The teachers are equally obliged to adopt, as the basis of their instruction of their pupils, and even of their intimate conversations with them, the fundamental conceptions of the national civilisation, such as constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy, British Imperialism, the capitalist organisation of industry, and a conventional Christianity. In no part of the country could a teacher in a public elementary school keep his (or her) job, however sincere and fervent his belief, if he was known to inculcate atheism, communism, the abolition of parliament, republicanism, or the dissolution of the British Empire. Indeed, dismissal would probably follow any open propaganda of such opinions even outside the school. The teaching staffs in the endowed and so-called "public" schools have little, if any, more freedom of opinion in this respect than those in the elementary school service. Even professors and lecturers in the British universities find it prudent, at least until they attain outstanding eminence in their several subjects, to abstain from public expression of any of their opinions on fundamental issues that run counter to the prevalent orthodoxy.

Practically the only point in the sphere of education in which there is more individual freedom in mental environment in Great Britain than in the USSR is in the heretical parent's choice of a school for the children who are not clever enough or fortunate enough to win a substantial scholarship tenable elsewhere. . . . If he can afford to pay fees and incur travelling and other expenses quite out of the reach of all the wage-

¹ People queue up in Moscow and elsewhere, at the newspaper distributing points, in their eagerness to get the latest editions of the evening paper.

² The fact that in England and Wales the Government supports many schools built and still dominated by the Roman Catholics, or by the Anglican Church, so that on the one point of religious creed parents can exercise this much choice of school, if there happens to be more than one within reach, does not appreciably effect the monopoly of a single (and, in effect, prescribed) curriculum and school atmosphere.

earners and nearly all the lower middle class, an unorthodox parent can send his children to one or other of the few dozen mildly heterodox or quietly agnostic boarding-schools, in which alone a mental environment is available which is less rigid than that practically enforced on the children (and the teachers) of nine-tenths of the population. In these exceptional schools the curriculum depends mainly upon the view taken by the proprietor or director of what is essentially a private profit-making enterprise as to the wishes of the parents whom he seeks to attract; and the teachers need only be reasonably circumspect about their own particular heterodoxies.¹

Consider now the great part of the mental environment of an advanced industrial community that is constituted by the newspapers and magazines, on the one hand, and on the other, by the places of public entertainment, from the drama down to "the dogs" (greyhound racing after the "electric hare"). In Great Britain and the United States all these enterprises are provided by capitalists seeking to make profit out of them. Subject only to general legal restrictions,² not very rigidly enforced, and intended to prevent such patent evils as outrages on decency, libels on private individuals, injury to other people's property, and danger from fire, the enterprising capitalist is free to provide whatever entertainment he thinks will, by attracting most customers, yield him the largest profit. Or he may, if he prefers, use the newspaper or place of entertainment that he owns, partly to promulgate his own opinions, or to further the interests of himself or his creed or political party. Frequently he combines both motives, sometimes sacrificing some or all of his profit to his propaganda, and sometimes finding that all his motives work together to produce a maximum result. But whatever line of policy he chooses to adopt in his enterprise, the mental environment he is creating is beyond the control of the individual citizen, whose sole remedy, and that only a partial one, is to forgo the newspaper or the entertainment.

How about the freedom of the million-fold "listeners-in" to the national service of broadcasting? One of the most interesting experiments in sociology is actually being made in this sphere. The new invention of radio broadcasting is being operated in different countries in different ways. In the USSR and the United Kingdom the service is

¹ It is habitually forgotten how numerous and extensive are the classes to whom, in Great Britain among other countries, freedom of expression of opinions displeasing to the government, or to the majority of the citizens, is denied, either formally, by regulation, or informally, by the danger of losing their means of livelihood. The whole of the armed forces; the various local police forces; the entire staff of school teachers; the domestic servants of the well-to-do; the local postmasters and letter carriers; the employees in industrial undertakings; the retail shopkeepers in small communities; the farm labourers in rural areas; the medical practitioners; the solicitors, architects, portrait painters, sculptors and others who depend on the custom of the property owners—all these, and many more, find it prudent to keep silence about any heterodox views that they may hold.

² Only for the public performance of stage plays is there in Great Britain a preventive censorship (each play must be submitted, along with a fee, to a court official, not responsible to parliament, without whose express licence no public performance can take place).

provided for the people by public authority.¹ In the United States and some other countries this service is left to capitalist enterprise. The listening world has in neither case any further liberty than that of listening or cutting-off. But both expert opinion and popular feeling in the United Kingdom, including both English and Americans who have tried both systems, are emphatic that the system of monopolist public provision, constantly open to influence by public opinion, and not directly purchasable for use by rich men for their own purposes, is preferable to leaving the provision to be undertaken by the profit-making capitalist, even in respect of the personal liberty of the listeners, which is, in the United Kingdom and the USSR, protected from invasion by undesired advertisements.²

The position is much the same with regard to what is called propaganda. There is, of course, propaganda in the USSR, in every form, whether newspaper or book, school or university, entertainment or advertisement. It would be hard to decide whether there is, in the aggregate, more or less of it than in Great Britain and the United States. The difference is that in the USSR all the propaganda is deliberately planned, in what is believed to be the public interest, by the multiplicity of essentially public authorities, and expressly for the purpose of public education; whereas in capitalist countries the planning is done by the multiplicity of capitalist or other private propagandists, either individually or in various combinations, but always in what they conceive to be their own interests, or, at best, according to their own caprices, without any decision by the community as a whole, or its authorised representatives. For the individual citizen the propaganda is as inescapable in the one case as in the other. In all countries his mind is bludgeoned to compel him to admit a whole series of ideas. Where systems differ is in who wields the bludgeon and with what purpose.

The conclusion to which the student is driven is that, as regards the great mass of the population in a densely crowded country, possibly as many as nine-tenths of the whole, by far the larger part of the mental environment is always and everywhere compulsory. From childhood to senility no one of this large majority can escape its potent and persistent influence. In modern life it is literally all-pervading. So long as eyes

¹ It may be noted that the USSR shows here more freedom than the United Kingdom; in the former, reception is open to all without fee, whereas in the United Kingdom reception is limited to those able to pay a licence of ten shillings a year.

² A characteristically modern part of the mental environment of the population is the prevalence of staring or illuminated advertisements, designed to catch the eyes of as many millions as possible, either in the city streets, or along the rural thoroughfares, or in disfigurement of the landscape. In the USSR the little that is done in this way is deliberately planned with public objects, and is never allowed for the profit of any individual. In Great Britain and the United States such unplanned advertisements for private profit are only just coming to be regarded, if not as public nuisances, at any rate as an entirely wasteful expenditure from the standpoint of the community, and as mentally detrimental to the individual who cannot escape the insidious and persistent suggestiveness of the advertisers' characteristic mendacity.

and ears are open, we cannot avoid its sights and its sounds. Infants and children, adolescents and adults, will inevitably be taught and trained — that is, subjected to artificial surroundings which may be either planned or unplanned. Not only nurseries and schools, but also books and newspapers, churches and cinemas, laws and advertisements, are all engaged in creating the people's mental environment.

The Western Freedom of the Rich

To the educated intellectual of the western world (especially if he enjoys a rentier income, or can earn adequate fees or royalties from a succession of clients, to none of whom he is beholden) the foregoing argument will appear mere sophistry. It is amazing how blind we can be to the living conditions to which the vast majority of our fellow-citizens are subjected, if we are ourselves in other circumstances! If he is not trammelled by wearing a crown or by membership of the court circle, and not enmeshed in the obligations of a landed estate, or active participation in business, the intellectual well-to-do citizen of London or New York can surround himself exclusively with books of his own choice; can subscribe only to the newspaper which he dislikes least; can amuse himself expensively without going to the cinema that he despises; can attend the church that he finds congenial, or none at all if he so prefers; can travel in the countries that are to his taste, or "follow the sun" so as to live always in the climate that suits his bodily comfort. Very naturally he becomes as little conscious of the circumambient mental environment that coerces his less fortunate fellow-citizens as he is of the weight of the atmosphere—to the influence of which even he is, at all times, irresistibly subjected. Of course he is not by any means as free as he thinks he is. Although he may largely exclude or dismiss it from his consciousness, no man can escape the influence of the mental environment involved in his nationality, his home circumstances, his education, his residence in a particular country at a particular stage of civilisation, and his participation in, or dependence on, the contemporary economic and political organisation. What he can do, and usually does do, is to regard as a condition of freedom a mental environment that is apparently unplanned, because it is constituted by an unknown congeries of irresponsible and mutually competing factors; whilst he denounces as a condition of coercion a mental environment that is deliberately planned, exclusively in what is conceived to be the public interest, by the known and authorised representatives of the community as a whole. Yet between them there may be no difference in the actual degree of coercion or restraint of the average individual. There will, however, be a vast difference in the degree to which the whole population enjoys the conditions of the good life.

Where is Freedom ?

What, then, do we mean by freedom ? It is clearly something which practically all human beings desire, and the lack of which most people find irksome. It is certainly an important element in the good life. It coincides in meaning, we suggest, with "doing as one chooses". Let it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that this freedom is the highest human good. Those whose intellectual training has been unconsciously based on the hypothesis of a static universe almost inevitably think of freedom as the *absence of restraint*; those who assume that every part of the universe (including minds) is always in motion are apt to think of freedom as the *presence of opportunity* to act as they desire.

The division among the thinkers of the world is manifested in the subtle change in the meaning commonly given to the term freedom. More than a century ago, the beginning of this change of meaning was expressed in the unexpected comment that under the English constitution every man was free, but only in the sense in which he was "free to resort to the London Tavern"—that is to say, if he could afford the expense ! There is no freedom where there is no opportunity of taking advantage of it. As Professor Tawney points out, "Except in a sense which is purely formal, equality of opportunity is not merely a matter of legal equality. Its existence depends, not merely on the absence of disabilities, but on the presence of abilities. It obtains in so far as, and only in so far as, each member of a community, whatever his birth, or occupation, or social position, possesses in fact, and not merely in form, equal chances of using to the full his natural endowments of physique, of character, and of intelligence. In proportion as the capacities of some are sterilised or stunted by their social environment, while those of others are favoured or pampered by it, equality of opportunity becomes a graceful, but attenuated figment. It recedes from the world of reality to that of perorations."¹

In Moscow, where the whole population has lately been, at times, severely "rationed" for bread and meat and fats, there may well seem to have been more restraint on purchases than in London. Yet, as the rationing has been coincident, for the past five years, with opportunities for every able-bodied man or woman to obtain employment at trade union wages, there may easily have been greater actual freedom in the choice of food to the poorer citizens in Moscow than in London. For, in Great Britain, the housewives of the millions of unemployed labourers "on the dole", or even the millions of other families precariously existing on wages under two pounds a week (out of which rent and clothing and nearly a hundred meals a week² have to be provided)—say,

¹ *Equality*, by R. H. Tawney (1929), p. 139.

² For a family of five, at three meals per day, it would be 105 per week, which, at three-pence each, would cost over twenty-six shillings per week for food alone. Yet threepence per meal, at British prices, does not allow for much choice among foodstuffs !

altogether, something like one-third of the whole population—find their constitutional and legal freedom somewhat unsubstantial. In fact, they feel themselves quite otherwise than free! Life to them seems one continuous stringent and coercive “rationing”, not only of particular foodstuffs, but of nearly every exercise of will, and nearly every indulgence of desire.

But we may leave the philosophers of the western world to bring, in their own way, their definition of freedom up to date. What we are concerned with here is the view of freedom taken in the USSR. What is there prized as the highest good is *the maximising of opportunity, to act according to individual desire, of the entire aggregate of individuals in the community*. This effective enlargement, or wider opening, of the mental and cultural environment of all the people, without discrimination of race or colour, age or sex, income or position, is one main object of the deliberate planning of the good life in the USSR. The shifting of emphasis, from absence of restraint to presence of opportunity, as the condition of the good life, is, as we have already noted, characteristic of the changed view of the universe taken by modern science. It is coincident also with the transition from the “economics of scarcity” to the “economics of plenty”. The shifting of emphasis from the freedom of one person to the aggregate of the freedoms of all the persons in the community is in harmony with the characteristic note of universalism that we have so often found in soviet statesmanship, based on the assumption of the high value of social equality and the positive evil of sex or class or race privileges.

If, as is universally taken for granted in soviet circles, everybody is to count as one, and nobody for more than one, the road towards the maximising of the aggregate of individual freedoms in the community lies along the path of an ever-increasing equality of opportunity. Equality, of course, is not identity. The nearer the kind of opportunity can be adjusted to the kind of faculty of each individual, the greater will be the community's aggregate of individual opportunity, and therefore of personal freedoms. It is thought that, ultimately, organisation on the basis of “from each according to his faculties, and to each according to his needs” will provide the closest adjustment.

It will now be clear why a certain amount of restraint, and a variety in kinds of restraint, are necessary conditions of this maximising of the aggregate of individual freedoms. There is, in any given place, at any given time, only a certain amount of opportunity open to the population in the aggregate. Anyone who takes to himself more than the appropriate amount and kind of opportunity that falls properly to his share, not only robs another of some or all of the opportunity that he might otherwise have enjoyed, but also, by increasing inequality, inevitably lessens the aggregate amount of individual freedoms within the community. The social organisation which allows the British shipowner to treat himself and his family to a long and expensive holiday in Switzer-

land and Italy, whilst the hundreds of dock labourers who are unloading his ships, together with their families, get nothing more like a holiday than their wageless days of involuntary unemployment, not only injures them, but also diminishes the total aggregate of freedom within the community. Lenin is said once to have observed in his epigrammatic way: "It is true that liberty is precious—so precious that it must be rationed".¹ So long as the available quantum of liberty is not unlimited, the aggregate amount enjoyed within the community is, by appropriate rationing on an equalitarian basis, actually increased.

It remains to be added that freedom to do what one likes depends finally upon the existence of plenty of the means of doing it, however that plenty may be shared among the individuals within each country. Thus, we come up against the question of how to maximise plenty; that is to say, how to increase the aggregate of whatever genuinely constitutes the nation's wealth. Whether the Soviet Government will eventually succeed in its avowed aim of outstripping all capitalist countries in the production per head of useful commodities and services remains to be answered by the event. All that can be said at present is: (1) that by ordinary commercial measurements (which include a mass of social disabilities) the USSR cannot yet be shown to have reached the level of productivity per head of population enjoyed by the United Kingdom or some other European countries, or in the years prior to 1929, by the United States; (2) that the aggregate production, whether of capital equipment or of commodities and services, has increased in the USSR during the past decade by leaps and bounds, whilst that of all other countries has either fallen off or has at best remained stationary; (3) assuming that the increase in wealth production and in population continue at their present compound rates, it seems likely that, in the course of two or three decades, the USSR will have become the wealthiest country in the world, and at the same time the community enjoying the greatest aggregate of individual freedoms.

Unity in Action with Adventure in Thought

There is, we admit, a caveat to the foregoing argument. What the British or American intellectual is concerned about is not the aggregate of personal freedoms enjoyed by the total population, about which he thinks little and cares less, but the very serious loss suffered not only by himself, but also by the community, if the absolute freedom of speculative thinking by the tiny minority capable of original thought on any subject whatsoever is in any way interfered with. It is upon the complete

¹ When, during the Great War, Great Britain rationed sugar, the issue to every person of the ration card without which no sugar could be obtained was regarded by all persons of means as a restraint on their freedom. The same ration card was cherished by the poorest class as enlarging their freedom, ensuring to them the opportunity to purchase sugar which they would otherwise lack.

"liberty of prophesying" among this minority—the membership of which cannot be determined in advance—that the intellectual progress of the world ultimately depends. Without this unlimited freedom to correct current errors, to think new thoughts, and to make intellectual discoveries, the world would succumb to the disease of orthodoxy, and fail to cope with the everchanging conditions of social life. We might even not escape retrogression into primitive barbarism.¹

There is, assuredly, some validity in this assertion of the social importance of unlimited freedom of intellectual discussion, irrespective of the rightness or social value of the new thoughts to which, in any particular generation, it may prove to lead. On the other hand, an indulgence in unlimited freedom of discussion, especially if accompanied by unlimited duration of debate, has the drawback that it is apt to militate against the effectiveness of corporate action.

It is therefore necessary to consider the conditions under which both effective action and freedom of discussion are practicable. Take first the case of a great engineering work, or of a gigantic aeroplane, of novel design and uncertain success. The communist view is that in devising the plan, and in coming to the decision to make the experiment of construction, it is plainly desirable to provide for the utmost freedom of discussion. At this stage the widest participation is called for. Only by encouraging outspoken criticism of the project from all points of view, and with all degrees of competence, and the careful weighing of every objection and every alternative, can it be ensured that the decision eventually come to will be the wisest and most accurate then and there available. But once the decision is arrived at, the position is changed. It is held that the success of the enterprise will be jeopardised, and may easily be brought to naught, if all those concerned in the work, from the manual labourers, and the skilled mechanics, the foremen and the assistant managers, up to the highest technicians and the director himself, do not whole-heartedly cooperate, with complete assurance and entire devotion, in the execution of the particular plan that has been decided on. Whilst the work is in progress any public expression of doubt, or even of fear that the plan will not be successful, is an act of disloyalty, and even of treachery, because of its possible effect on the wills and on the efforts of the rest of the staff. A grumbling sceptic, or public "grouser", however able and conscientious he may be, may, by his creation of a "defeatist"

¹ This, we imagine, is what Mr. H. G. Wells meant when he declared (with what seems to us a strange misunderstanding of the position in the Soviet Union) that, unless the Communist Party promptly restored unlimited freedom of thought and public discussion, the USSR would, within less than a generation, find itself outstripped in intellectual development by Great Britain and the United States! This conclusion ignores the fact that whilst in capitalist countries there is to-day an admitted "frustration of science" through lack of funds and other encouragement, the advancement of science is a veritable cult in the USSR, upon which millions are expended and in which every individual who has, or thinks he has, ability to invent or discover is encouraged to participate. It is only one more instance of the incurable blindness of the wealthy intellectual to realise that freedom is as much the presence of opportunity as the absence of restraint.

atmosphere, actually bring about the fulfilment of his own prophecies of failure. The most that a conscientious man may do, if he is convinced that the plan is dangerously erroneous, is to communicate privately to the director the grounds on which he believes that disaster is imminent unless a change is made. If he has then no heart in the work, and no faith in its success, he should ask to be relieved, and posted to another job—still keeping silence about his doubts, so far as public discussion is concerned, lest he should, by incautious talk, himself bring about the failure or the disaster that he fears. In any corporate action, a loyal unity of thought is so important that, if anything is to be achieved, public discussion must be suspended between the promulgation of the decision and the accomplishment of the task.

Now, from the communist standpoint, the position of the Soviet Government, which has on hand the hugest of tasks in the transformation, within a decade or two, of the millions of people of the USSR into a socialist state, is akin to that of the engineer undertaking a great and difficult work of construction. Such a task demands, for its accomplishment from everyone concerned, nothing short of complete loyalty and implicit confidence. It may be argued that the task is not one that should have been undertaken; and that the Soviet Government ought to have contented itself with the multitudinous discussion and the relatively trivial details of reform that characterise parliamentary democracies. It is the view of the Vocation of Leadership in the USSR that the drastic transformation of the manner of life of the Russian people, and that within the ensuing decade or so, is imperatively required. Only by creating the conditions of the good life can the good life be begun. It can well be argued that the decision to this effect has been substantially ratified not only by the acquiescence of public opinion, but also by the active cooperation of at least a majority of the citizens in the measures of administration. It seems to follow that, during the years of accomplishment of its task, the Soviet Government is bound to take the action which seems necessary to make its work successful. Such a course is admitted to be necessary when one country is actually at war with another; when neither faction, nor anything likely to lead to faction, is allowed, and even "defeatist" talk is made a criminal offence. When a government is engaged in a desperate struggle, not with another government but with the forces of nature, the danger of incitements to faction, and even of "defeatist" talk, may well be as great as in war. And the Soviet Government adds to the argument that it is, in a real sense, actually on the defensive against some or all of the capitalist governments whose hostility did not cease with the withdrawal of their troops from soviet territory little more than a dozen years ago. At various points beyond its frontiers centres of sedition are still actively maintained, actually with government connivance, eagerly grasping at every opportunity of intervention. Soviet territory is still periodically invaded by secret emissaries, who come in illegally to foment disaffection and revolt, not even stopping

short of assassination of soviet officials. The aspirations of national minorities in Georgia and in the Ukraine, which are now mainly cultural, are still being skilfully manipulated towards the purpose of overthrowing the Moscow Government. The threats of invasion by Japan, or by Hitler's Germany, seem to promise to these seditionists, almost from day to day, new opportunities for successful uprisings. When we remember how necessary the repression of all incitements to faction and of every manifestation of "defeatism" seemed to the British Government when it enforced the Defence of the Realm Act, as well as to all the other belligerent governments in the Great War, we can hardly wonder at the corresponding action of the Government of the Soviet Union to-day.

But even the unity in action may be purchased at a high price if it requires the stoppage of thought among the nation's thinkers. It is, unfortunately, part of the nature of things that the new and original thinking, on which all human progress ultimately depends, cannot be done to order. The most powerful government, whilst it may plentifully endow thinkers, fails when it tries to prescribe, or to limit, the new thinking that it wants done. No one can foresee what new thoughts will emerge, nor how nor when they will occur. Experience indicates that, when thinkers are forbidden to think along particular lines, or to discuss particular issues, they are extremely likely to be unable, as well as unwilling, to think at all! What is worst of all for new and original thinking is an atmosphere of fear; and it is just this atmosphere that is produced by any penalising of intellectual discussion among the thinkers themselves. It has, in fact, been found by experience that it does not pay to stop freedom of thought.

The Solution of the Problem

We have already discussed, in connection with our description of the Disease of Orthodoxy,¹ the imperative necessity of continual adventure in thought. Is there any escape from the dilemma prescribed by the practical necessity of unity in action, and the no less important requirement of freedom of thought?

We suggest that the problem is one created only by the closet philosopher, and that the solution is found in practice. The answer has, in fact, been discovered, by experiment, by the Soviet Government, as by other administrations. Take, for instance, the practice with regard to the freedom of discussion of physiological or medical questions. The soviet censorship (Glavlit) refuses absolutely to allow the printing of pornography. But there is complete freedom of discussion, and of expression in print, in properly scientific language, by physiological or medical thinkers, about sexual functions, diseases or perversions. These descriptions and discussions would be peremptorily stopped by the censorship if they were so expressed as to come under the definition of

¹ Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

pornography. Anything in this realm is allowed to be published, in any form, and at any price, which excludes the suspicion of pornographic intent.

It is in this example that we find the solution. What is necessary to the freedom of the thinker and the investigator is unfettered communication to his fellow-thinkers or contemporary investigators. It is not communication to the unthinking public that he needs for the fostering of original thought. There seems no reason why the freedom of discussion and expression allowed by common consent, within reasonable limits, to the physiologists and the medical practitioners, should not be allowed to the thinkers and investigators into the fundamental conceptions on which each society is based. What is complained of is that this is, to-day, not allowed in the USSR, as in many other countries, out of fear of faction. But it is not faction that such thinkers are after, and not popular discussion by the mass of unthinking men, any more than it is pornography that the physiologists and doctors have in view. What is desired is only the testing of their ideas that is given by discussion among their intellectual colleagues and equals. Hence the psychological speculators in thought, the philosophic critics of social theories, the metaphysical proposers of new utopias, should not ask or expect the State Publishing Houses to publish their lucubrations in popular pamphlets at the price of a few kopeks. The publication that such thinkers need and value is in the form of "proceedings" or "transactions" of a philosophical society, accessible to non-members but not brought indiscriminately to their notice; or in that of substantial treatises unlikely to find purchasers outside the narrow circle of those capable of understanding the phraseology which such discussions require. To the present writers it seems that this might everywhere be permitted practically without limit. Published in this way, without newspaper reverberation, the most unrestrained adventures in thought are not likely to militate against unity of action in the particular constructive enterprises of the moment. Such highly intellectualised adventures in thought do not reach the uninstructed mass of the people, or even the actual practitioners of particular technologies, except by the slow process of filtering down, as and when the new ideas become generally accepted as scientifically valid by the instructed minority.¹ Yet such an amount of opportunity of discussion and publication is enough to set going, and to maintain, that unrestrained freedom of thought and unlimited speculation about what is at present unknown to science which is indispensable to the future progress of the USSR no less than to that of other communities.

¹ English readers will remember the anecdote told of Pitt. As Prime Minister he was consulted about criminally prosecuting William Godwin for the publication of an extremely subversive book (*Political Justice*). Pitt asked at what price the volume was published, and was told "Three guineas". His decision was that no book published at so high a price as three guineas was worth troubling about—meaning that, at such a price, it would circulate only among people unlikely to be improperly influenced by it.

We do not suggest that nothing more is called for, in the way of freedom of utterance, than the limited opportunity for the intellectuals that we have adumbrated. That amount of opportunity might well be conceded even in a state of war. When, however, the Soviet Government feels itself as secure as the British Government does, there seems no reason why popular lectures and speeches at open meetings, and discussions in cheap pamphlets and newspapers, should be any more restricted than they are in England. The feeling of the ordinary citizen—of the common man without intellectual pretensions—that he may without fear of prosecution or police oppression listen to what he chooses, say what he likes and propose whatever occurs to him, is an element of his good life which is ultimately of considerable value to the community. We may hopefully expect that, with the soviet characteristic of universalism in all its administration, those in authority in the USSR will, in due season, take this view.

The Evolution of Communist Ethics

So far we have explained the various social expedients devised by the Communist Party of the USSR to provide, as a matter of deliberate social construction, the conditions of the good life for all. But one of the most important factors in the social environment created in every community is the code of conduct that arises out of whatever social order is established; a code accepted and enforced, either by law or by public opinion of a majority of the inhabitants. Is there such a code of conduct in the USSR, and how does it differ from those of the western civilisation?

It so happened that the present writers had the opportunity in 1932 of asking a pertinent question of one of the most influential and most widely respected of Bolshevik leaders, one who was reported to be an embodiment of the Conscience of the Communist Party. The question was: "What is the criterion of good or bad in the conduct of a member of the Communist Party?" His answer—possibly the best he had time for, when thus questioned by importunate foreign enquirers—was, substantially, that whatever conduced to the building up of the classless society was good, and whatever impeded it was bad.

The answer so courteously given to us in 1932, as the outcome of intuition after a lifetime of experience, did less than justice to the Communist Party. It is plain from such study as we have been able to give to the proceedings of the People's Courts, and, still more, the Comradely Courts in the factory or the apartment house, on the one hand; and to the discussions common in the meetings of the millions of Comsomols on the other; that what may fairly be termed a system of ethics is being gradually evolved among the citizens of the USSR. This moral code is still in the experimental stage. There has not yet been time, amid all the transformations of the social order which have had to be put in operation over so vast an area, for even the principles of the new com-

munist ethics to be either authoritatively proclaimed or universally accepted.¹

No Sense of Original Sin

The immediate effect of the revolution, with its destruction of "autocracy, orthodoxy and [so far as 'Great Russia' was concerned] nationality", was, as we have seen, a general repudiation of historic Christianity. The unabashed and complete denial of any form of supernaturalism involved the abandonment of the code of morals founded on divine revelation. It is hard for anyone who has grown up in a Protestant country, and no less for a Roman Catholic, to realise how fundamental is the difference that this rejection of supernaturalism has made in the minds of the people. There is, in the USSR to-day, even among those who still cherish their icons, and whatever may be their conduct, an almost complete absence of any sense of original sin.

This loss of a sense of sin in the theological sense does not mean the disappearance of conscience, which, as we have been taught by Turgenev and Tolstoy, the Russians possess in great measure. But it has been accompanied by a transformation of the conception of personal obligation. In contrast both with the Mosaic Commandments, and with such obligations as were emphasised by the Greek Orthodox Church, which were mostly in the form of specific prohibitions of what is wrong, the code of conduct of the Soviet Union has been, from its inception, almost entirely concerned with positive injunctions to do what is right. Morality is no longer mainly negative in form, but substantially affirmative.²

¹ Apart from the endless elaborations of Marxism, we are unable usefully to refer the student to many books. A well-known member of the Communist Party, Emelyan Yaroslavsky, has written books in Russian, apparently not yet translated, the titles of which are given as *Party Ethics* (1924) and *Morals and the Way of Life* (1926). A series of articles edited by A. Borisov, with preface by Emelyan Yaroslavsky, entitled *The Old Morals and the New*, published in Russian in 1925. Much information as to ethical ideas and the practical conduct of life in the USSR may be picked up from the very informative book *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933, with bibliography, 320 pp.); *Women in Soviet Russia*, by Jessica Smith (New York, 1927), unfortunately out of print; *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Famina Halle (1933, with bibliography, 410 pp.); *The Soviet Worker*, by Joseph Freeman (1932); *New Minds, New Men?*, by Thomas Woody (1931, with bibliography); *Die Jugend in Sowjetrussland*, by Klaus Mehnert (Berlin, 1932) translated as *Youth in Soviet Russia* (1933, 270 pp.); *Humanity Uprooted*, by Maurice Hindus (1929, 369 pp.); *Marriage and Morals in Soviet Russia*, by Anna Louise Strong; and such novels as (Russian) *The Love of the Worker Bee*, by Alexandra Kollontai, translated as *Free Love*; *Cement*, by Feodor Gladkov (1929, 322 pp.); *Without Cherry Blossom*, by Panteleimon Romanov; *I Love*, by A. Avdoyenko (1934, 283 pp.); *The Soil Uprooted*, by M. Sholokhov, London edition, 1935.

² This change has involved the loss of any appreciation of personal holiness in the sense in which this has been understood by believers in the supernatural. Bolshevik teachers and writers would not include either personal holiness in this sense, or the pursuit of it, among the factors or conditions of the good life. Their perpetual campaign of education includes no inculcation of the desirability of seeking such a state of mind. Not the perfecting of one's own soul or self, but the service of others, and the advancement of the community, constitutes virtue. No one is deemed to be good unless he does what he can for his fellow-men. He is not judged by his works, for his works may be unsuccessful from no fault of his own; but by the motives and incentives that govern his actions. Even if his works are socially useful and successful, if he is a "careerist" or a "self-seeker", he is not a good man.

No Absolute Morals

Another correlative of the loss of the sense of sin against God has been, in the Soviet Union, the abandonment of the idea that there is anything absolute, fundamental, universal or everlasting, about a scale of values.¹ Any judgment of conduct, it is held, is, everywhere and inevitably, the outcome of life. The contemporary code that public opinion supports is necessarily relative to the actual conditions of existence in each community during the generation that is passing away. The position is, and always must be, constantly changing. Morality depends on the state of the world for the time being. The Bolshevik standpoint has been stated in the following terms. "Everything which we describe as ways of life among mankind, as human relations and conditions, whether they are regulated by law or merely by custom, traditions and habits, is summed up to-day in the Russian language by the now stereotyped word *byt*, derived etymologically from the verb *byty*, to be. The expression is untranslatable in its richly laden brevity, containing an objective and a subjective aspect which interpenetrate and blend dialectically; it comprises the whole surrounding world in which man is placed as well as his attitude towards it. . . . In a country where the new economic order is in process of construction with such intensive vehemence the milieu is not fixed, not established once for all. And so man, together with his attitude of mind, cannot be the finished product of his surroundings, but *changes with them every day, at the same time as, and just because, he changes them every day.*"²

Ethics emerging from Life

Accordingly, it is held that the essentially relativist code of conduct that is developing in the Soviet Union must, in disregard of any previous prescriptions, emerge from the new life.³ It is necessarily based on a

¹ The revulsion against the assumption that morality is necessarily connected with supernaturalism or a belief in personal immortality, has led, in some quarters, to a repudiation of the term ethics. "The very conception of communist ethics", wrote N. Bukharin in 1924, "is not correct. We must not talk of ethics as of something which is inspired by fetishism, but of a certain conduct in order to obtain a certain end. This leads to the necessity to work out certain rules of our conduct; to have, so to say, our own commandments" (included in *The Old Morals and the New*, a series of articles, edited by A. Borisov, with a preface by Emelyan Yaroslavsky (in Russian) 2nd edition, Moscow, 1925, pp. 18-22).

² *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 338-339.

³ This view of ethics has been brilliantly set forth in the works of the eminent Egyptologist, James H. Breasted. Thus in the Foreword to *The Dawn of Conscience* (1935), p. xv, he observes:

"The fact that the moral ideas of early men were the product of their own social experience is one of profoundest meaning for thinking people of to-day. Out of prehistoric savagery, on the basis of his own experience, man arose to visions of character. That achievement which transformed advancing life, human or animal, on our globe was one from a characterless universe, as far as it is known to us, to a world of inner values transcending matter—a world for the first time aware of such values, for the first time conscious of character and striving to attain it."

recognition of the facts of social life under Soviet Communism, resolutely abandoning the shamefacedness, the furtiveness and the secrecy by which the elders are still troubled, and which are deemed to be merely useless "hang overs" from ecclesiastical superstition and devil-worship. Thus, to take one example, there is in the USSR practically no prudish suppression or ignoring of the bodily functions, not excluding those of sexual intercourse and reproduction. Children grow up accustomed to human equally with animal nudity; and whilst they gradually learn that certain parts of conduct are suited not for company but for privacy, they are never taught that any bodily function has a special quality of indecency.

We pause, at this point, to reassure the reader who regards all this revolution in morals as something very dreadful. However much the Victorian English may be shocked by some of the habits and some of the moral judgments of Soviet Communism, it must be realised that the inhabitants of the USSR find equally shocking some of the habits and moral judgments of the inhabitants of Great Britain and the United States. The conduct regarded as virtuous or decent in one part of the world is, as a matter of fact, regarded as quite the opposite in other parts. Morality, it has been said, is actually a question of latitude and longitude. The making of profit by buying in order to sell at a higher price—"re-grating" our ancestors called what the soviet citizens brand as "speculation"—is in the USSR a criminal offence, but, in the United Kingdom, if on a large enough scale, often the pathway to a peerage. It is hard for the Englishman to realise that the corporal punishment of children, like flogging for serious offences in the army and navy, is as abhorrent to the soviet citizen as the summary shooting of those who merely acquire wealth from the public by false pretences would be to the London banker. In the USSR even the parental slapping of disobedient children is not only a serious moral delinquency, but actually a criminal offence. The unabashed cuddling that takes place, sitting on the seats or lying on the grass, in the London parks would be inconceivable in the Park of Culture and Rest at Moscow.¹ On the other hand, it is in no way contrary to the moral code of the Soviet Union, any more than it was to that of Tsarist

¹ One of the authors spent ten days in 1932 at Kislovodsk, which had been the Aix-les-Bains of Tsarist Russia, and where the royal palaces, luxurious villas and extravagant hotels have all been converted into trade-union rest-houses, either for holidaymakers or for convalescents. There were present in the June weather some ten or fifteen thousand visitors, nearly all manual-working wage-earners, enjoying the beautiful gardens and the various entertainments. The social observer noted that there was no drunkenness, no shouting or brawling, and no staying up after 11 p.m. There was very little spooning, and no litter, so that the social observer felt quite embarrassed about throwing away her cigarette-ends instead of placing them dutifully in the receptacles provided. Every rest-house had its medical staff, and provided the various diets called for by individual diathesis. The younger men and women indulged in games, athletics and a mild mountaineering. There was an excellent opera and ballet, a theatre playing every evening, and a good orchestra giving daily concerts. There were no merry-go-rounds, or cockshies, or shooting galleries or exhibitions of monstrosities. But there were endless lectures in the rest-houses on Marxism and questions of technology which the observer found well attended.

Russia, for adults to bathe together in complete nudity; although bathing costumes are becoming usual in Moscow and Leningrad. It seems no more immoral for those who love each other to cohabit without either a religious ceremony or official registration than it is for English or American adults to marry without parental consent, or (among Protestants) to remarry after legal divorce.

The Soviet Union is specially interesting to the student of comparative ethics in that it is trying an experiment unprecedented in world history. "No society", it has been observed, "has heretofore attempted to create its morality consciously. The factors that go to make up the general feeling of what is and is not 'done' are, as has been said, subtle, and half or wholly unconscious. The soviets are still shaping and stating some moral rules. . . . Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, at a Party Conference in 1924, asked that it be definitely stated what was permissible behaviour for a communist and what not. . . . The Party Conference, after long deliberation, agreed that no one code of behaviour for the new man could be settled on, but certain general principles could be stated."¹

"Nor is it by accident or anarchically that these things are changing. The new man is planned as the new society is projected. The god of communism is not merely to modernise factories, collectivise farms or turn out Five-Year Plan figures. The final purpose of communism is to create happiness for men, to lay the basis for the living of 'the good life'. The Soviet citizen devotes his life to the building of a socialist society because he is convinced that such a society will improve everybody's life. 'We must do all in our power to create a new man with a new psychology,' said Lunacharsky in 1931 at a meeting of the Communist Academy."²

What are the principal injunctions to the soviet child and the soviet citizen that, in 1935, seem to be shaping themselves into a code of conduct in the USSR?

The Constant Service of the Community

First among the moral obligations that communist morality imposes on the individual man or woman is that of service to the community in which he or she resides. This does not mean that the claim of the individual to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" is denied or ignored. What is asserted is that man in society is not wholly, or even principally, an individual product; and that, by the very nature of things, he has no thoughts or feelings, no claims or rights which are exclusively and entirely the outcome of his own individual intuition or experience. He, with all his demands and aspirations, is the creation of the society, from the family group right up to the republic, into which he is born, and amid which he lives. Without some form of social grouping, *Homo sapiens* is non-existent. The individual is thus the group in one of its manifestations. Equally the group life is only one of the directions taken by the lives of its individual members. The service which morality requires the

¹ *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933), pp. 18, 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

individual to give to the community is only a particular outcome of the instinct of self-preservation without which individual life could not continue: a form of the service which he renders to himself in order that his own individuality may be developed to the fullest practicable extent. The prosperity and success of the community as a whole is a condition precedent to the utmost prosperity and success of the individuals of whom the community is composed. Scientifically considered, there is not, and can never be, any conflict between the genuine interest of the individual in the highest and fullest development of his own nature and his own life, and the genuine interest of the community in being constituted of the highest and most fully developed individuals. Morality is thus, in a very real sense, part of the nature of the universe, to be not invented but discovered. It is, indeed, for man to settle what shall be the purpose of life, a question which science cannot answer. But, given man's purpose, it is knowledge of the universe, including knowledge about social institutions and human behaviour no less than knowledge about mechanics and physics, that will enable him to recognise and adopt the processes by which he can carry out his purpose; and that will even lead him to invent instruments and devices, from the steam engine up to the "shock brigade", from the hydraulic ram up to "socialist competition", in order to increase his desired achievements. Thus, to the properly instructed soviet communist, scientific ethics is simultaneously both social morality and individual morality, because these are fundamentally and inevitably identical. Any breach of the moral code, whether by the community or by the individual, is a failure on the part of the one or the other accurately to realise the facts; a failure due either to mere ignorance or to a weak and partial intellectual conception which is overborne by an emotional storm out of the depths of the subconscious mind.¹

The Payment of Debt

What has not yet been generally recognised or admitted in the western world, is that every person starts independent life seriously *in debt to the community* in which he has been born; taken care of; fed

¹ The natural instinct of the Russians for collectivism as against individualism is noted by Nicholas Berdyaev as a characteristic of the Orthodox Church, in contrast with the Protestant and the Roman Catholic. "It must, however, also be noted that individualism is inherent not only in Protestantism, but in the whole of western Christianity. The idea of the salvation of the individual soul, as well as the idea of the predestination of a small number to salvation, is a species of celestial, metaphysical individualism. The spirit of 'sobornost', the idea of the *collective* character of the ways of salvation, is opposed to this sort of individualism. In the Church we are saved with our brethren, all together. We hope for a universal salvation, that is to say, for the transfiguration of the whole cosmos. The spirit of 'sobornost' is better expressed in Orthodoxy than it is in Catholicism. Orthodoxy is resolutely *anti-individualistic*, though Catholics do not understand this. But this cosmic 'sobornost' has not found its proper expression in the theology of the schools, nor in ascetic literature. It can be found only in the religious thought of the nineteenth century, in Khomiakov, Dostoievsky, Bukharev, Solovyov and Feodorov" (*Freedom of the Spirit*, by Nicholas Berdyaev, chap. x. p. 355).

and clothed; educated and trained. Others have worked in order that he might have these advantages. It is therefore the primary duty of every individual to use whatever faculties he possesses for the purpose of wealth production in one or other form, including any kind of social service, at least to the extent of repaying to the community what he or she has cost it, and also, wherever faculty permits, providing for the progressive improvement of the conditions of its life. The duty of work is thus universal and inescapable. Alone among modern thinkers Bernard Shaw has perceived the deplorable disease prevalent among the children of wealthy persons, who habitually live without rendering service to the community in which they have been born and bred. He puts the point forcibly to his readers among the English and American women in the following terms: "Anyone who does less than her share of work, and yet takes her full share of the wealth produced by work, is a thief, and should be dealt with as any other sort of thief is dealt with".¹ In fact, it is only by every person contributing to the community's wealth production that the community can give each individual a share in the wealth produced. Only in this way can everybody be assured of continuity of economic security throughout life, that is to say, of maintenance alike in sickness and old age, as well as in the strength of manhood.

Inseparably bound up with this obligation to take part in the production of commodities or services is the conception that the work must be done by each person himself, by hand or by brain. Paramount is the injunction to abstain from and to resist "exploitation", meaning any employment of others at wages for the purpose of making a profit out of their labour. The foreign observer is sometimes tempted to think that abstention from exploitation is the ethical duty that is, in the USSR, most forcibly and frequently impressed on the youthful mind.

Along with this paramount individual responsibility is a universal and ubiquitous collective responsibility. Every social institution in the USSR, from the selosoviet, the rayon soviet and the oblast soviet, up to

¹ *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism*, by Bernard Shaw (1928), p. 72. The author adds impressively: "By far the most unjust and mischievous privilege claimed by the rich [in Great Britain] is the privilege of being idle with complete legal impunity; yet unfortunately they have established this privilege so firmly that we take it as a matter of course, and even venerate it as the mark of a real lady or gentleman, without ever considering that a person who consumes goods or accepts services without producing equivalent goods or performing equivalent services in return, inflicts on the country precisely the same injury as a thief does; in fact, that is what theft means. We do not dream of allowing people to murder, kidnap, break into houses, sink, burn and destroy at sea or on land, or claim exemption from military service, merely because they have inherited a landed estate or a thousand a year from some industrious ancestor; yet we tolerate idling, which does more harm in one year than all the legally punishable crimes in the world in ten. . . . To live like a drone on the labour and service of others is to be a lady or a gentleman; to enrich the country by labour and service is to be base, lowly, vulgar, contemptible, fed and clothed on the assumption that anything is good enough for hewers of wood and drawers of water. This is nothing else than an attempt to turn the order of nature upside down, and to take 'Evil: be thou my good' as the national motto. If we persist in it, it must finally bring upon us another of those wrecks of civilisation in which all the great empires in the past have crashed" (*ibid.* pp. 58-59).

the congress and sovmarkom of each constituent or autonomous republic—equally every consumers' cooperative society and every industrial artel or kolkhos—is held collectively responsible for the fulfilment of all its functions, and even for the success of all its enterprises. In contrast with the British or American system of minutely defining the powers of every "collective", whether local governing body or business corporation, and then scarcely troubling to enforce the fulfilment of the functions entrusted to it, the soviet system is based, as we have shown,¹ on a wide omniscience of every social institution, so far as its activities apply only to its members, or to the inhabitants of the area to which its powers extend. It is practically unrestricted by such a doctrine as *Ultra Vires* by which in England every corporate body is disabled from going a hair's-breadth outside the minutely specified list of powers conferred upon it. It is left free to do whatever it thinks best for the persons concerned. So long as its operations do not conflict with those of any superior authority, and are not actually in contravention of any decision of a higher council—so long also as these operations appear to be successful in their working—the humblest or remotest social institution will not be interfered with. But if these operations are not, in fact, successful, or give rise to serious complaints, they will be peremptorily vetoed and cancelled, and the erring institution will be reprimanded, and, in the worst cases of recalcitrance or failure, summarily superseded.

The Maximising of Health

Perhaps the most extensive field of duty in communist ethics—a field in which the community has actively to cooperate with the individual, but in which the individual must incessantly look after himself—is that of the creation and the maximising of positive health of body and mind. We have already noticed the manner in which this conception of duty has influenced the development of the public health service.² We see it now, in communist ethics, in its aspect of individual obligation, along with the necessity of positive instruction as to how that obligation can be fulfilled. No one wishes to be ill or decrepit; but the human being is not born with the knowledge of how to avoid becoming ill and prematurely enfeebled. It is amazing that, notwithstanding the immense waste and loss caused by unnecessary sickness and premature senility, no community has yet whole-heartedly seen to it that every one of its citizens is taught how to acquire and maintain positive health. In the Soviet Union the public authorities for education and health seem to attempt, and even to accomplish, more in this way than any other government. Yet, in the vast population of the USSR, the majority of individuals are still far from knowing how to keep their health, and

¹ See Chapter II. in Part I., "Man as a Citizen"; and the powers of the village soviet in the appendix to Part I. pp. 358-362.

² Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

are consequently unable to fulfil their social obligations in this respect. Not every thinking citizen realises that only by everyone taking thought and choosing wisely can health be maintained. Apart from the avoidance of pathogenic microbes, which is largely a matter for the local authority to deal with, the range of individual duty is large. Personal cleanliness, daily shower-bath or immersion, intolerance of parasites and of filth of every kind, regularity of all the bodily functions, adequate physical exercise, free ventilation of the dwelling by night as well as by day, definite restriction of eating to something less than the demands of appetite, all become something more than "self-regarding" lines of conduct, and assume the dignity of social obligations. It is in a similar light that is seen the necessity of prudent self-restraint in every form of enjoyment. From this is evolved a common judgment as to drinking, smoking, gambling and sexual intercourse. We seem to see the code of conduct in these matters developing on the line of requiring from both sexes the perpetual maintenance of perfect health of mind and body. The code does not demand total abstinence. But it regards yielding to temptation as a weakness to be deplored, and, because one lapse leads to others, and eventually to injurious habits, to be definitely blamed. Excess is plainly misconduct, because science shows it to be inimical to health. Moreover, much that cannot be actually condemned is to be deprecated as being in bad taste, and unworthy of a Party member.

The student will notice that the communist policy is the very reverse of ascetic. What moved Karl Marx to a lifetime of political conspiracy and economic study in grinding poverty—what steeled the will to revolution of Lenin and his companions—was the misery and incompleteness of life that contemporary economic conditions everywhere inflicted on the mass of the people. The very object of the Bolsheviks in overturning the Provisional Government in October 1917 was to transform the social order of the USSR in such a way as to secure for the whole of the people, the conditions of a good life. And these conditions of the good life meant nothing more recondite than such amenities as were enjoyed by the professional classes of London or Paris. The most influential of the friends and supporters whom Lenin had gathered around him during his years of exile, out of whom the Sovnarkom of People's Commissars and the other administrative organs were formed in 1917-1918, were, with few exceptions, not manual workers themselves, though often of proletarian origin; but men of considerable education, who had been trained as lawyers, doctors, professors, scientists and writers of books; men who were personally acquainted with the conditions of a cultivated existence among the professional classes in the cities of France and England, Switzerland and Austria. They had no desire to endow the whole Russian people with the senseless luxury of the tsarist aristocracy or the American millionaires. But, on the other hand, they had no sympathy with the asceticism of St. Francis d'Assisi. The communists of the Soviet Union have not the faintest respect for the narrow lives of

privation and confinement in which the more saintly of the monks of the Orthodox Church, like those of western Christianity, sought salvation. The stories of the saints now excite nothing but disgust, coupled with a disapproval that is not averted by the knowledge that these misguided persons were genuinely seeking personal holiness.

Sexual Intercourse

When in the western countries we talk about a moral or an immoral man, still more about a moral or an immoral woman, it is understood to refer to their sexual relations rather than to any other form of morality or immorality. This concentration on sex is unknown in the USSR. In the first decade of Bolshevik administration there was a general understanding that sexual intercourse was a personal matter, taking place by mutual consent between men and women of the same or of different races, colours or religions, for which no religious or other ceremony was required, whilst even official registration of the union was entirely optional. But sexual intercourse, and cohabitation, might entail social consequences involving special obligations (such as due provision for offspring, and for maintenance of a discarded spouse incapable of self-support) which the law should enforce. On the same principle of freedom in personal relations, divorce, at the option of either party, was as optional as a registered marriage; but both parties, according to their several means, were required to fulfil the above-mentioned financial obligations.

In the second decade we notice a gradual change of attitude. Lenin had never sympathised with the licentiousness that had marked the first years after the Revolution. Highly characteristic was his repugnance to the view put forward in the early days of the Revolution that sexual intercourse was as natural as eating, and no more to be criticised than the drinking of a glass of water when thirsty. Lenin said to Clara Zetkin in 1921: ¹ "I think this glass of water theory is completely unmarxist, and, moreover, anti-social. In sexual life there is not only simple nature to be considered, but also cultural characteristics, whether they are of a high or low order. In his *Origin of the Family* Engels showed how significant is the development and refinement of the general sex urge into individual sex love. The relations of the sexes to each other are not simply an expression of the play of forces between the economics of society and a physical need, isolated in thought, by study, from the physiological aspect. It is rationalism, and not Marxism, to want to trace changes in these relations directly, and dissociated from their connections with ideology as a whole, to the economic foundations of society. Of course, thirst must be satisfied. But will the normal man in normal circumstances lie down in the gutter and drink out of a puddle,

¹ *Reminiscences of Lenin*, by Clara Zetkin (1929), pp. 49-51; largely given in another translation in *Woman in Soviet Russia*, by Fannina Halle (1933), pp. 113-114.

or out of a glass with a rim greasy from many lips ? But the social aspect is most important of all. Drinking water is of course an individual affair. In love two lives are concerned, and a third, a new life, arises. It is that which gives it its social interest which gives rise to a duty towards the community.

“ ‘As a communist I have not the least sympathy for the glass of water theory, although it bears the fine title “satisfaction of love”. In any case, this liberation of love is neither new, nor communist. You will remember that, about the middle of the last century, it was preached as the “emancipation of the heart” in romantic literature. In bourgeois practice it became the emancipation of the flesh. At that time the preaching was more talented than it is to-day, and as for the practice, I cannot judge. I don’t mean to preach asceticism by my criticism. Not in the least. Communism will not bring asceticism, but joy of life, power of life, and a satisfied love of life will help to do that. In my opinion the present widespread hypertrophy in sexual matters does not give joy and force to life, but takes it away. In the age of revolution that is bad, very bad.

“ ‘Young people, particularly, need the joy and force of life ; healthy sport, swimming, racing, walking, bodily exercises of every kind, and many-sided intellectual interests, learning, studying, inquiry, as far as possible in common. That will give young people more than eternal theories and discussions about sexual problems and the so-called “living to the full”. Healthy bodies, healthy minds ! Neither monk nor Don Juan, nor the intermediate attitude of the German philistines. You know young Comrade X ? A splendid boy, and highly talented, and yet I fear that nothing good will come out of him. He reels and staggers from one love affair to the next. That won’t do for the political struggle, for the revolution. And I wouldn’t bet on the reliability, the endurance in struggle, of these women who confuse their personal romances with politics. Nor on the men who run after every petticoat and get entrapped by every young woman. No, no ! that does not square with the revolution.’

“ ‘Lenin sprang up, banged his hand on the table, and paced the room for a while.

“ ‘The revolution demands concentration, increase of forces. From the masses, from individuals. It cannot tolerate orgiastic conditions, such as are normal for the decadent heroes and heroines of D’Annunzio. Dissoluteness in sexual life is bourgeois, is a phenomenon of decay. The proletariat is a rising class. It doesn’t need intoxication as a narcotic or a stimulus. Intoxication as little by sexual exaggeration as by alcohol. It must not and shall not forget ; forget the shame, the filth, the savagery of capitalism. It receives the strongest urge to fight from a class situation, from the communist ideal. It needs clarity, clarity and again clarity. And so I repeat, no weakening, no waste, no destruction of forces. Self-control, self-discipline, not slavery, not even in love. But forgive me,

Clara, I have wandered far from the starting point of our conversation. Why didn't you call me to order? My tongue has run away with me. I am deeply concerned about the future of our youth. It is a part of the revolution. And if harmful tendencies are appearing, creeping over from bourgeois society into the world of revolution—as the roots of many weeds spread—it is better to combat them early. Such questions are part of the woman question.”

Lenin's view as to the social obligations involved in sexual intercourse gradually became authoritative so far as the Communist Party was concerned. “Is marriage a private relation between two-legged animals that interests only themselves, and in which society has no right to meddle?” wrote Ryazanov. “We should teach young communists that marriage is not a personal act, but an act of deep social significance.” “Marriage has two sides, the intimate side and the social,” said Soltz, “and we must never forget the social side. We are against a profligate or disorderly life because it affects the children. We wouldn't mix in a man's affairs if he changed his wife every third day, if his children and his work did not suffer from that. When we talk of love we have always to remember that sex relations imply not only a physiological relationship.”¹

Public opinion among the Comsomols, as well as among Party members, increasingly emphasised the importance of stability of marital relationships. Down to the present day (1935), however, there has been no change in the law of 1920 making divorce at least as easy as legally registered marriage, and treating unregistered unions as in every way equivalent to marriages. But at least in the Communist Party and among the Comsomols, sexual promiscuity, like all forms of self-indulgence, has come to be definitely thought contrary to communist ethics, on the grounds enumerated by Lenin; it is a frequent cause of disease; it impairs the productivity of labour; it is disturbing to accurate judgment and inimical to intellectual acquisition and scientific discovery, besides frequently involving cruelty to individual sufferers. Stability and mutual loyalty have become steadily more generally enforced not only by public opinion but also, so far as Party members and Comsomols were concerned, by the ordinary Party sanctions. Disloyalty in marital relations, and even exceptional instability have become definite offences against communist ethics, leading not only to reprimands but also, in bad cases, to expulsion.

Similar pressure of public opinion has been appearing in the trade unions, of which some three-fourths of the members are outside the ranks of Party and Comsomol membership. A conference convened in 1935 by *Trud*, the organ of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), was addressed, among others, by Soltz, as Assistant of the Procurator of the USSR. He urged that the trade unions should take more interest in the private lives of their members and their relations

¹ *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter (1933), p. 124.

with their families. The editor of *Trud* pointed out that the trade unions should judge the value of their members not only by the work they do but also by their behaviour in their homes and their attitude towards their wives and children.

This growing puritanism in the marriage relation was reinforced, in the same year (1935), by the discovery that the provisions requiring one or other of the divorced parents to make payments for the maintenance of the children of the union, were being evaded or disregarded in many thousands of cases. According to a joint statement recently published by Soltz and the People's Commissar of Justice, N. V. Krylenko, in the last three years the courts of the RSFSR alone dealt with 500,000 cases arising out of such awards. The number during 1933 was 142,000, and during 1934 it had risen to about 200,000. Despite this absorption of the minor judiciary with such cases, it is admitted that many hundreds of thousands of children are not receiving the support from their fathers to which they are legally entitled, and even after the courts have dealt with the cases the parents find means of evading payment.

According to Krylenko, the causes of this situation are the inadequacy of the penalties for failures to pay awards, the ease with which parents can evade payment simply by changing their place of residence, and the complicated methods used to collect the payments. It is suggested that the penalty for failure to pay children's allowances should be increased from six months' forced labour or a fine of 300 roubles to not less than one year's imprisonment.

Concurrently, the legal division of the Mother and Child Institute of the Soviet Commissariat of Public Health has just published the report of a survey of the marital relations existing in 2000 families of Moscow industrial workers, numbering 7000 persons.¹ This report concludes with important proposals for new regulations for the granting of divorces. It recommends the abolition of simple notice of divorce through the Post Office. It suggests that the party who is not the applicant for divorce should be summoned to the divorce bureau, the "Zags" (Bureau for the Registration of Acts of Social Significance), which should enquire whether his or her rights would be violated by the granting of a divorce, and whether, in the case of a wife, she is pregnant or unable to work, and should also examine the position of the offspring of the marriage in case a divorce is granted. The proposed regulations also provide that persons contracting a marriage must report their former marriages and the number of living children they have. The report demands stricter

¹ Report of the Legal Division of the Mother and Child Institute of the Commissariat of Health for the RSFSR (in Russian), July 1935. See summary in *Manchester Guardian*, August 30, 1935; and for the whole change of opinion, Louis Fischer's article in *The Nation* (New York), August 21, 1935. Incidentally the investigation revealed that Russians are now marrying at a later age than they did before the Revolution. In 30.7 per cent of all marriages contracted before the Revolution the women were under seventeen years of age and 78 per cent under twenty, but only 56.9 per cent of those women interviewed who were married after the Revolution were under twenty at the time of their marriage. This change has an important bearing on the birth-rate.

administration of the laws providing penalties for concealing various circumstances, such as the existence of diseases which would make the marriage illegal, and for maliciously contracting premeditated short-term marriages. Finally, the report recommends that the youth in the advanced schools should be given a course outlining the laws dealing with family life and marital relations.

It is understood that new legislation and more stringent regulations are pending, both on divorce and on the enforcement of alimony. Drafts have already been submitted to the trade-union organisations in all the principal industrial centres; and discussions are (1935) already taking place in the soviet newspapers,¹ in the radio broadcasts, and at clubs and trade union meetings about the proposals under consideration. We can form no opinion as to when the new legislation will be passed.

Prostitution

The attitude towards prostitution is characteristic. "The prostitute", it has been said, "is not acknowledged as punishable, unless she be guilty of spreading disease; but those who promote prostitution are. As a social phenomenon prostitution is regarded as springing primarily from economic causes and not from innate perversity or depravity of the female sex. To decrease or eliminate the necessity for it, it is urged that special care be taken about dismissing women from employment; [that] agricultural and industrial artels be formed to give women employment; [that] the qualifications of women for labour be increased by creating sufficient vacancies for them in professional technical schools; [that] dormitories be organised for the unemployed and houses opened for accommodation of women temporarily in the cities; and that agitation be carried on in schools, clubs and all organisations of youth, setting forth the character of prostitution, its dangers and incompatibility with the life of a workers' republic. These preventive measures are supplemented by efforts to combat prostitution already existing which is considered as an inheritance from bourgeois society. These efforts fall under the head of (1) inspection of all places where prostitution may be carried on; (2) struggle against those who promote dens of debauch; and (3) free treatment for venereal diseases in dispensaries. Special detailed instructions are issued to the militia concerning the necessary steps and precautions in investigating prostitution."²

In another direction the jurists at work on the preparation of the criminal code were puzzled to know what to do about what is condemned as a crime by the laws of every civilised country. On what ground were they to make the mating of near kin (incest) a criminal offence? It is said that a number of physiologists and medical practitioners were privately consulted; and that they reported that, whilst incest might be

¹ Notably in *Pravda* during June and July 1935.

² *New Minds, New Men?*, by Thomas Woody (New York, 1932), p. 375.

repugnant, there was neither historical nor contemporary evidence to prove that it was injurious to the offspring or to the public health. Accordingly, although the marriage offices are directed to refuse to register marriages between persons connected directly by descent, including brothers and sisters, incest is not a criminal offence. Homosexuality was similarly long omitted from the criminal code of the USSR.¹

What is "Not Done"

A significant feature of communist ethics is that its prohibitions are practically never independent, but relate essentially to failures to comply with its positive injunctions. Alcoholic drinking is blamed, and still more, habitual drunkenness or drug addiction, because it is a breach of the rule requiring the maintenance of perfect health. It is held to impair judgment and lessen efficiency, even where it does not seem immediately to lead to ill-health. Even in strict moderation the drinking of vodka is held to be wasteful and detrimental to the wealth of the community. Total abstinence from alcoholic drink, and even from smoking, is strongly recommended, and seems to be increasingly common among the Comsomols. As we have already pointed out, "spooning" in public is "not done" in the USSR. Many other things, such as the scattering of litter on the ground, whether paper or cigarette-ends, are tabooed.

Communist morality is avowedly distinct from the law of the land. An authoritative definition emphasises this point. Ethics, writes A. A. Soltz, "is a sum of traditions and customs accepted in a given society, the fulment of which is obligatory *without any prosecution at law, or any punitive sanction*".²

Nevertheless, it seems that the injunctions and prohibitions of communist ethics are, when a case is brought before the People's Court, to a considerable but variable extent enforced by soviet law. There is, in fact, in the USSR, no hard and fast line between actions which are simply "not done", and are discouraged by public opinion, and those which, if brought into court, may be punished by judicial sentence. The Comradely Courts of the factories and offices and apartment houses, like the Comsomol groups, have no legal jurisdiction, although their reprimands are often accompanied by fines which are invariably paid. On the other hand, the People's Courts, which are statutory tribunals of first instance, deal with offenders without any nice regard to the words of the criminal code; and their decisions and sentences habitually take account, to a considerable extent, at any rate in the severity of the penalties inflicted,

¹ In March 1934, without any public discussion, the presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) suddenly issued a decree requiring all the republics of the USSR to add to their criminal codes an article making homosexuality between adult men punishable by three to five years' imprisonment; and if done with minors or dependants or accompanied by force, by imprisonment from five to eight years. It is understood that this drastic action followed on the discovery of centres of demoralisation of boys, due to the influence of certain foreigners who were summarily expelled from soviet territory.

² *Red Virtue*, by Ella Winter, pp. 10-30.

of the public opinion as to what is or is not "done".

On the other hand, many actions regarded as crimes in other countries are, in the USSR, left only to moral reprobation. The soviet authorities have, in fact, been slow to bring to bear upon moral issues the method of statutory prohibition of actions deemed to be wrong. The war-time prohibition of the supply of vodka was quickly repealed when the bad effects of such a law in positively increasing the consumption of dangerous home-made substitutes became manifest. "We do not try", said a leading moralist, "to legislate our people into good behaviour; we do not try to pass one moral law for all our people. . . . To a large extent our morals must grow out of the way of life."¹ Much is deliberately left to public opinion. "The fundamental human urges of vanity, pride, ambition, the desire for approbation—the wish to stand well with one's fellows—these are", it has been said, "as strong in the Soviet Union as in our own world. Young Russians want as much as anyone else to do the 'done' thing; what is done and what is thought are stronger incentives to behaviour even than with us."² Thus an attempt to commit suicide is not a criminal offence in the USSR, but is nevertheless contrary to morals. "Though not a crime, it is necessary to condemn suicide", writes Yaroslavsky. "Only tired and weak people seek this way out. True, no general opinion will fit everyone's case; each case must be analysed individually; but we cannot consider suicide a way out. We cannot acquit the man who takes his own life. . . . We must register a stern disapproval of suicide; then fewer people will take that way out; we should be attentive to the needs of people who find themselves in difficult situations, of course; but we must not acquit the weak, nor praise them for their wrong step, a step which is harmful to communism."³

Personal Acquisitiveness

There is, in the USSR, a widespread and persistent discouragement of the personal acquisitiveness in which the Protestant bourgeoisie of the Western world saw a social virtue. The communists, on the contrary, are inclined to see in it the root of nearly all social evil. What is "not done" under Soviet Communism is the seeking of personal riches. The individual ownership of property is not forbidden by law, though many forms of wealth and what would otherwise be opportunities for acquisition are monopolised by the Government, just as in Great Britain all individual ownership is barred in such important enterprises as the internal telegraph, telephone and radio system; the whole business of postal communication; and the coinage of money. In the USSR both incomes and inheritance in excess of a small maximum are heavily taxed at progressive rates, as indeed they now are to a lesser extent in nearly

¹ Emelyan Yaroslavsky, a popular writer on ethics and member of the Central Control Commission, said this to Ella Winter. See her *Red Virtue* (1933), p. 25.

² *Ibid.* p. 19.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

all countries. The most marked difference in this connection between the USSR and the capitalist world is that the growth of wealth in private hands is regarded, both officially and by public opinion, not as a good thing in itself, but as always a source of danger to the community, and one which may, in particular cases, become a positive evil.

The only definite limit on personal income is that which the members (and candidates for membership) of the Communist Party voluntarily impose upon themselves. This was first adopted by the Paris Commune of 1871, which laid it down that none of the administrators or officials should receive a salary higher than that which could be earned by a zealous and highly skilled manual worker. Marx immediately applauded this regulation, which Lenin repeatedly insisted on, as obviating the danger of the Government of the state falling into the hands of a class pecuniarily distinguished from the proletariat to be governed. It has been consistently adhered to in the USSR for all the members of the Party, though the maximum has been successively raised with the rise in prices and wages. To this day the rulers of the USSR receive only the equivalent of the earnings of the most highly skilled and zealous craftsman. They live in flats of three or four rooms, usually with no more than a single "domestic worker" and with the wife, even of a high official, often going out to earn wages in one of the Government factories or offices, or as a journalist on the staff of one of the newspapers.

There is, indeed, little that an individual can, safely and comfortably, do in the way of personal consumption with any considerable income in the USSR.¹ Anything like ostentatious expenditure or luxurious living leads to comment and blame, and presently to suspicion of counter-revolutionary sentiments or activity. In a member of the Party it presently leads to reprimand or removal to some other locality, and, if persisted in, to expulsion from the Party. It is, indeed, not easy to find safe ways of spending any large income. The successful writer or actor cannot, in the crowded cities, buy for money more than the allotted floor space in the way of dwelling. He cannot go far in collecting a library, or the pictures he admires, because he cannot get enough rooms in which to place them. He has hitherto found it difficult to luxuriate in "deficit commodities" even when he has been willing to pay exorbitant prices; although this may have procured him a little of them. He may pick up discarded jewellery for his wife, but she will not find it comfortable to display more than one piece at a time, and she will have nowhere to keep it safely. What one can do with a large income is to travel extensively within the wide bounds of the USSR, with such comfort as can be got; to go to unlimited theatres and concerts; to improve the education of one's children by engaging private tutors; to devote oneself to scientific research or the writing of books; to indulge within the limits of discretion, in the joys of drinking and gambling; to get special

¹ This is the theme of an amusing novel, translated into English as *The Little Golden Calf*, by Ilya Ilf and Eugene Petlov (1932, 384 pp.).

medical attendance and nursing for any members of one's family who are ill; to have one's own automobile, and one's own chauffeur, and, if desired, even more than one. But nobody will find it comfortable to abandon his vocation in order to lead a life of leisure. Unless his health had failed, or old age had come, such a course of conduct would presently get him into trouble in one way or another; and the end might come, one night, in a peremptory summons to the headquarters of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, where a severe examination in one of its departments, very much like the GPU, would bring to light the fact that he was infringing a fundamental principle of the soviet régime, that "if a man do not work neither shall he eat"—in short, that he was guilty of conduct so immoral as to be counter-revolutionary!

The attitude towards saving and investing by the individual is somewhat confused. For waste of any kind there is universal condemnation, which in the case of ostentatious living—what Veblen called "conspicuous waste"—excites general contempt. But pecuniary saving by the individual has ceased to be a recognised virtue. The child is not taught to save. Pioneers and Comsomols seldom think of saving as a personal duty. The wage-earner realises that he will be adequately provided for in sickness and infirmity, in unemployment and old age. His children will at all times have the essential of health. His widow will not be allowed to starve. His own burial or that of a member of his family will be no burden on the survivors. Why should he save? The social object of individual saving in capitalist countries—the increase of the nation's capital—is, in the USSR, secured by Government action to a far greater extent than it is achieved in other countries by personal savings.¹

On the other hand, the Government Savings Bank offers a high rate of interest on deposits both small and great; and may also occasionally oblige the depositor by transferring without charge any sum on his order to the account of any other person in the USSR, thus establishing in principle a system of drawing by cheque on a current account, which the British Government Post Office Savings Bank refuses to allow. Moreover, the State Bank (Gosbank) sells for cash attractive "obligations" of the Soviet Government, yielding either rouble dividends or

¹ In Great Britain, among the wage-earners, and to some extent also among the lower middle class, the motives for saving are mainly twofold. Such persons hardly ever save for the purpose of increasing the capital available for additional industrial enterprises. Partly they save for security of maintenance of themselves and their families in future vicissitudes, notably sickness and unemployment, burial and old age, and unforeseen contingencies. This incentive is superseded in the USSR by the universal provision under social insurance of all wage or salary earners; and by the cooperative provision for non-working members in the collective farms and fisheries. The other motive for saving in Great Britain is the desire to accumulate, out of exiguous weekly incomes, sums sufficient to purchase articles of clothing, boots, furniture, bicycles or wireless sets on which they have set their hearts, or for annual holidays. This motive for saving is apparently nearly as effective in the USSR as in Great Britain, especially now that payment by instalments has spread so widely in the latter country.

lottery prizes, or (if purchased in *valuta*), a solid 7 per cent interest remitted quarterly to any part of the world, and redeemable on demand in gold roubles or their current equivalent in *valuta* of any other country. This may seem to encourage saving, and even the creation of an income independent of work. But the amount so invested by any individual in the USSR is not large, and such an investor finds his total income lessened by an income-tax on his earnings with the steepest of progressions, whilst his capital accumulations are, in due course, equally cut down by the steepest of progressive death duties. The whole arrangement seems to be regarded as a temporary convenience to the Soviet Government in attracting a certain amount of capital in *valuta* from abroad, for which purpose newspaper advertisements are now (1935) used in Great Britain, the United States and France. It also enables the Government, by attracting paper roubles from the investor in the USSR, to reduce to that extent the issue of additional paper money that would otherwise be required to increase the working capital of each office or trust. To take a share in each successive internal loan is, in fact, regarded as the patriotic duty of all recipients of wages or salary, often collectively determined by vote of each local unit of the trade union, which calls upon its members to contribute a month's income, as a way of ensuring the fulfilment of the current Five-Year Plan. This is universally regarded as a sacrifice of additional personal consumption, in the nature of a tax on the wage or salary, refusal of which would be justified only by exceptional family circumstances. So much is this the case that those who invest a month's earnings in the internal loans, on which no interest is usually paid, but only lottery prizes on the drawn bonds, frequently omit to claim their prizes!

The Duty of the Party Member

It remains to be stated that the members of the Communist Party (including the so-called candidates who are treated as probationary members, with the one disability that they are not allowed to vote in Party meetings) are held to a higher standard of personal conduct than the ordinary citizen. They have voluntarily pledged themselves to two of the three characteristic obligations of the religious orders of Christianity, namely to poverty, to the extent of never accepting for themselves any larger salary or wages than the common maximum laid down by the Party rule; and to obedience to the corporate decisions and commands of the Party authorities. Any breach of duty in these matters may be visited by reprimand and demotion; and may ultimately lead to expulsion from the Party.¹ But there is no enforcement of these Party obligations by the soviet courts of law.

¹ It may be explained that, contrary to an impression common abroad, the Party member who is dismissed from office, or even expelled from the Party, is not left to starve. Since 1930, at any rate, he finds no serious difficulty in getting taken on again, though probably in a less responsible capacity, in one or other of the public enterprises always

Apart from these two obligations to the Party, members have no moral duties other than those of non-Party persons. Unlike the monastic orders of Christendom or Buddhism, the Communist Party prescribes to its members no exceptional mode of life, and no such special duties as continuous prayer, or praise, or meditation. But in their life as citizens, Party members are expected to reach and to maintain a higher standard of behaviour than the non-Party mass. If a man or woman is summoned before the People's Court or other legal tribunal, the first question asked is whether he or she is a Party member. Upon conviction for any offence against the law the Party member will be condemned to a more severe penalty than a non-Party man. If the conduct of a Party member becomes a matter of public scandal, whether about drinking habits, or profligacy in sexual relations, or merely lavish expenditure on personal amusement, he will be reprimanded and warned, and eventually expelled from the Party which he is considered to have disgraced.¹

To Each according to his Needs

At this point we recall the answer given to us by the distinguished communist leader of thought, already referred to at the opening of this section, when we asked what was the criterion of good and evil, to the effect that whatever contributed to the building up of the classless society was good, and whatever impeded it was bad. It is, indeed, a fundamental principle of communist ethics that every individual should actively strive to bring about a condition of social equality. He must insist on the complete abolition of privilege, whether for the benefit of a particular sex, or class, or grade, or rank, or even of a particular race. It is a

seeking additional employees. As for the prominent members of the Party removed from high office or even expelled from the Party, we see them habitually given other posts, often of dignity and importance, and even of equal salary, though of less political influence, and usually away from Moscow or Leningrad. Thus Tomsky, after being ousted from leadership of the trade unions, was appointed head of Ogiiz (the State Publishing House of the RSFSR); Ryanazov, after dismissal from the Marx-Engels Institute, became director of the Museum at Saratov; Rakovsky, who had supported Trotsky, was made head of a provincial university, and, after his dignified recantation and submission, was appointed Assistant People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR and sent as chief Government representative to international conferences (Red Cross, etc.); whilst Zinoviev and Kamenev were repeatedly readmitted to the Party and found new salaried posts after their successive expulsions. In 1935 Enukidze, who had been secretary to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) for over a decade, was removed from that important office for habitual negligence, and immediately transferred to the presidency of the Transcaucasian Federation. When further investigation brought to light unsuspected depths of the grossest negligence, he was expelled from the Party and dismissed from his new office with public disgrace. But he was promptly made assistant to the Government superintendent of Kislovodsk (see p. 841), a not unpleasant position.

¹ N. Bukharin wrote in 1924: "These are the commandments: not to smoke; not to drink; to follow certain rules as to sexual relations; to develop in everybody a sense of class consciousness and class ambition; to promote communist education; to create communist specialists, sportsmen, social workers, etc." (included in *The Old Morals and the New*, edited by A. Borisov, with preface by Emelyan Yaroslavsky, 2nd edition, Moscow, 1925, pp. 18-27).

positive duty of every individual to seek the good life for all, without disqualification of any.

There is no hesitation or dubiety about the means by which this social equality in the good life can be attained. The first requirement is a great increase in the production of wealth, with a view to a maximal distribution of its benefits among the whole of the people. The communism taught by Marx and Engels convinced the Bolsheviks, and (as we think) has now convinced the bulk of the population of the USSR, that only by the complete liquidation of the landlord and capitalist, with their constant exploitation of the workers, and by the substitution, in wealth production, of public service for profit-making, could the necessary transformation of the illiterate, superstitious, brutalised, diseased and poverty-stricken population of the USSR be effected. It has accordingly been in the framework of the collectivisation of wealth production, becoming ever more nearly complete, that the Communist Party has adopted, enlarged and developed, almost out of recognition, the various social services that the western world has still only imperfectly and tentatively put in operation. Notable among them, as we have described,¹ are those relating to health, with maternity and infant care; the provision for sickness, unemployment and old age; education from the kindergarten to the university; and the town and country planning, and the rehousing, forming part of the transformation of the physical environment of every family, which is being effected.

In the transformation of the character and habits of the people that is being thus wrought, it has proved possible to proceed, almost at a bound, much further towards the formula of "from each according to his ability, and to each according to his needs", in the organisation of social services, than in that of wealth production as described in a previous chapter.² It has been found that the environmental conditions of health in body and mind, the provision of education, and opportunities for every kind of culture, can be successfully distributed without money and without price to every person in the land. Over this important part of the field it has proved practicable to deal with the individual irrespective of the amount of wealth that he produces or possesses, genuinely according to the particular needs of himself and his dependants. So far as health, education and economic security are concerned, complete equality of opportunity is of the nature of the case. Whatever may be the race or colour, or the affluence or the political influence of the family head, the wife and mother, the infant, the school child, the college adolescent, and the adult seeking to extend his knowledge, in the USSR, find provided for them in these realms, usually without fee, and virtually without limit, whatever their peculiar needs require.

The western world has, with great hesitation and many qualms of doubt, latterly gone a little way in this direction, even if only in adopting

¹ Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

² Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

the new term "social services". But for the most part, capitalist society has refused to abandon the "pew-rent" principle which the Protestant Churches in the nineteenth century applied to the ministrations of religion. Just as those who took part in Protestant religious worship were, in England and the United States, usually allotted seats nicely graduated in amenity according to the annual payment made for them, and therefore according to social class, so such advantages as any schooling beyond the rudiments, any treatment of the sick superior to the "bottle of physic", and any but the scantiest family dwelling, together with all provision of holidays, travel and culture, are, for the most part, even to this day, allotted to those only who can pay for them, and, very largely, in proportion to the payment made by each. Such an organisation of society is diametrically the opposite of that required by communist ethics, and one which every soviet citizen is called upon to withstand and prevent.

Ethical Progress in the USSR

It is hard, in such a flux as we have described, to formulate any judgment as to communist ethics as a whole. We see the emergence and the continuous evolution of a systematic code of behaviour. What is "done" and "not done" is a matter of incessant discussion, especially among the young people of either sex, and particularly in the many tens of thousands of local units of the Comsomols. There has been, during the second decade of the revolution, a definite reaction against the outburst of licence that followed on the general overturn of 1917. Public opinion had asserted itself, with steadily increasing force, to lessen the bad behaviour that was found to render life uncomfortable to the mass. Universal schooling; voluntary attendance at evening classes; the growth of clubs and sports associations; and greatly increased facilities for rational amusement, have cooperated with a definite increase in discipline, inside the factory and outside, to bring about a general betterment of personal conduct. There is visible in the summer of 1935, and not only among the Comsomols, a distinct tendency towards what we can only style puritanism of a rational kind, founded, not on religion, but on hygiene and on economics; and manifesting itself, not in prayer and fasting, but in the modern essentials of the good life, notably in improvement of one's own qualifications and character, in the fulfilment of family duties, and in a personal behaviour useful to society and considerate of the comfort of others.

The Withering of the State

And what about the future? Had Marx and Lenin no vision of a more glorious flowering of the individual in the perfected socialist state than that which can be enjoyed in the USSR of to-day? The soviet authorities never fail to explain, to their own people as well as to foreign

enquirers, that the element of direct and positive coercion involved in the planning of the environment, whether economic or cultural, is, by the very nature of the communist organisation of society, transient and temporary. The state, it is asserted, is destined and intended gradually to wither away, so that, eventually, the "government of persons" will be wholly replaced by the "administration of things". What is the meaning of this apparently incredible but undoubtedly sincere forecast of social evolution under Soviet Communism?

We must note first the definition given to the word "state". To the average Briton or American, unaffected by anything that Hegel may have asserted, the word "state" (as in "these United States") means nothing else than the nation, or community of citizens, as organised in the correlative forms of government and governed. To the Marxian, as to the Hegelian, the state means something quite different, namely—apart from the mass of the people who are governed—the *essentially coercive machinery of government itself*, established in capitalist countries, as communists assert, by the dominant social class or classes, for the maintenance of private property in the means of production and the increase of the resultant unearned income.¹ Such a community is some-

¹ Professor Laski, in his stimulating book *The State in Theory and Practice* (1935), gives the following definition of the state: "We say that the Russian state went communist in the November Revolution of 1917: we mean, in fact, that a body of men became its government who were able to use the sovereignty of the Russian state for the purposes we broadly call communist. Whenever a state acts in some given way it is invariably because those who act as its government decide, rightly or wrongly, to use its sovereign power in that given way. The state itself, in sober realism, never acts; it is acted for by those who have become competent to determine its policies. . . . For every critical challenge to law involves a threat to order; and every government, where order is threatened, will necessarily use the armed forces of the state to preserve it. . . . From this angle the state may legitimately be regarded as a method of organising the public power of coercion so that, in all normal circumstances, the will of the government may prevail. It is a power outside and above that of the people as a whole. It is in suspense so long as the will of government is unchallenged; it becomes operative immediately the effectiveness of that will is in danger. And it is the possession of this legal right to resort to coercion which distinguishes the government of the state from the government of all other associations. The authority of a trade union or a church over its members is never a coercive authority in the first instance; it can only become such when the state decides to support the trade union or the church. The sanction of that support is always, in final analysis, the same: it is the knowledge that behind the decision of the state is the coercive power of those armed forces upon whose services its rulers are legally entitled to rely" (pp. 25-28). To this definition he adds: "For it can never be said too often, especially of that material basis which is decisive in determining social relations, that men think differently who live differently, and that the unity which gives endurance and stability to a society is therefore unattainable where they live so differently that they cannot hope to see life in the same terms. It is the poison of inequality which has wrought the ruin of all great empires in the past. For what it does is to break the loyalty of the masses to the common life, and, thereby, to persuade them, not seldom rightly, that its destruction alone can build the path to more just conceptions of statehood. In the long run, the exercise of power for ends unequally shared always breeds envy and hate and faction in a society; and no fabric can survive the circulation of these evils in its tissues. . . . Until Marx, it is true to say that most political speculation was inadequate because it failed to understand the dominating influence of the property-relation in determining the purposes of the state. It is in the proper grasp of that influence only that an adequate theory of political obligation can be found" (pp. 102-103).

times termed the "police state" (*Verwaltung*), in contrast with the subsequently developed "housekeeping state" constituted by the citizens, either as electors or representatives on public bodies, or as individual members of voluntary associations, for the administration (*Wirtschaft* or *gestion*) of their common affairs.¹

This Hegelian conception of the state is not that which lies at the base of the practice of the USSR, which indeed avoids the use of the term "state" for the Soviet Union, just as it discards the word "Russia" in the designation of the government of the community. In the minds of the administrators of the Soviet Union, and those of the philosophers who explain its policy, what is being built up in the USSR is not a government apart from the mass of the people, exercising authority over them. What they believe themselves to be constructing is a new type of social organisation in which the people themselves, in their threefold capacity of citizens, producers and consumers, unite to realise the good life. This is in fact not a state in the old sense of the word, but an organised plan of living which the people as a whole adopt, comprising (a) defence against assailants; (b) procuring the means of the fullest life; (c) sharing these means among themselves without class or other privileges. What they visualise is a new form of society, unlike any other; made up of a highly elaborate and extremely varied texture of many kinds of collective organisation, by the universal membership of which the *interests and desires of all the different sections of the population will be fulfilled in a manner and to a degree never yet attained in any other community*. Hence the development, as we have described, of the multiform democracy of man as citizen, man as producer and man as consumer. With them, as every populous community needs leadership, there stands the new and unique professional association, which we have termed the Vocation of Leadership. This vocation, following the pattern of various professions in other societies, is recruited by cooption according to prescribed standards of knowledge and character. With them, too, it enjoys corporate autonomy and self-determination in its professional policy. It is without statutory powers, but it is, in effect, continuously seeking ratification of its corporate decisions, not only through the acquiescence of public opinion, but also in the active cooperation in the administration of a majority of the citizens themselves.

But this new type of social organisation, less than twenty years old, is not yet free from entanglement with the remnants of the old society out of which it sprung. In its pursuit of the good life, it is still assailed

¹ In England, the "housekeeping state" first appeared in the form of voluntary associations for such purposes as paving, cleansing and lighting the thoroughfares of the growing cities. These associations presently obtained from Parliament statutory powers (in what were called "Local Acts") to make all the householders compulsorily into members, so far as concerned the payment of contributions, and to warrant the execution of other improvements, including the manufacture of gas. It was out of these associations, called Commissioners, that English municipal enterprise was derived (*Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes*, by S. and B. Webb, 1922, especially the last chapter, on "The Old Principles and the New").

by enemies from within as well as from without. It therefore deems necessary for defence the maintenance of an extensive and elaborately equipped military force, able to repel a hostile world in arms. Equally necessary is the maintenance of courts of law and drastic penal sanctions, in order to deal effectively with enemies within the Union who still refuse to accept loyally an established order with which they some of them honestly disagree. In short, there is declared to be still a state of war, whether marked by individual sabotage or by wilful default in the fulfilment of social obligations, or by sporadic outrages and persistent threats of foreign invasion.

The present condition is accordingly regarded as a transition stage in which the new social order is not yet completely established. When this stage has been passed, it is believed that it will be possible gradually to dispense with the instruments of coercion in internal relations, even before the state of the world enables all armies to be abolished. It is assumed that the new type of community, with its elaborate and varied social texture—whether the pyramid of soviets from village to All-Union Congress, with their innumerable executive organs; or the nation-wide federations of trade unions and artels of industrial owner-producers, and presently also of collective farms; or the still vaster network of consumers' cooperative societies; or the penumbra of voluntary associations for innumerable purposes by which all the public bodies are surrounded and interpenetrated—will be able to obtain a sufficient degree of general loyalty and of assent to the good life that these "collectives" both make possible and embody, without any other coercion than that of education and public opinion. This, we gather, is the "withering of the state"—to use the Marxian phrase—that is to-day foreseen and prepared for in the USSR.

Even this seems too utopian for the Briton or the American, who finds it hard to believe that there will not always exist individuals who, from whatever motive, will, at one time or other, refuse or neglect to cooperate with their neighbours, to such an extent as actually to thwart what is devised to promote the common good; and who will therefore need to be suppressed by a police force.

But let us consider why the foreigner finds it difficult to share the optimism of the soviet philosophers in this respect. He may be prepared to believe that the active opponents of the USSR, who at present watch from Paris or Prague, Warsaw or Riga, Belgrade or Harbin, for any chance of destroying the Bolshevik Government, will presently die out, or become discouraged by cessation of the tacit connivance of foreign governments, and by the formal acquiescence of all the states of the world in the continuance of the Soviet Government. But every citizen of a capitalist country is conscious of the extensive underworld beneath its apparent order, from which there emerges a continual stream of common criminals, which he cannot believe to be lacking in the USSR. Such a citizen is, however, usually unaware of the very large percentage of all

the crimes in his own country that are committed by men and women who are desperately poor. Nearly all minor thefts and malversations are directly occasioned, if not caused, by their perpetrators being, at the time, without regular employment at wages sufficient for their maintenance, or actually without the means of subsistence. Second only to destitution as a cause of crime is the habit of acquisitiveness which has become a social disease. It is hard for the Briton or the American to realise how large a part, not only of crime, but also of the temptation to default in one's social obligations, is due to the ingrained positive passion of acquisitiveness, reinforced by the negative dread of poverty, which has been for centuries fostered by the institution of private property in the means of production, and the use of these for individual profit-making, especially in the "epoch of scarcity" out of which, as regards the mass of the population, the capitalist world has not yet emerged. We do not know what proportion of the major crimes against property—such as forgery and embezzlement, the promotion of fraudulent companies and the shady practices of the Stock Exchange—are committed by brokers or dealers in commodities or securities; or by financiers of all sorts, together with their clerks and other subordinates; or by trustees or solicitors who are false to the trusts that they have undertaken. But it seems at least likely that, in a society in which these classes have ceased to exist, the crimes specially characteristic of their occupations would eventually disappear. Probably no one born in the nineteenth century can realise adequately the extent to which crimes against property will be lessened among a generation reared, as that of the USSR will be, *without risk of destitution in any of the vicissitudes of life*, and thus without even the apprehension of it; without ever witnessing the masses of private property which at present tempt to crime so many of those who have the handling of them; and also without any more thought of the possibility of making a fortune by speculative dealings or by employing other people for profit, than the village postmaster has of owning the profitable postal service of his own or any other country—a generation which will also have grown up in full consciousness of so much of an epoch of plenty as to be at all times fully insured against actual want.

That there will always remain occasional lapses in conduct, due to temptations and emotions unconnected with wealth or the absence of wealth, would be admitted by communists themselves. Communism is not anarchism; rather it is the polar opposite of anarchism. What is expected in the fully developed communist society is, not that everybody will be at all times perfect in his behaviour, but that these occasional "lapses will be dealt with otherwise than by penal laws and cruel punishments.

The social influences and devices by which, in the USSR, the necessary acquiescence and cooperation of the whole of the population in the general plan of living may be secured without recourse to the sanctions

of imprisonment, flogging or execution, will, it is expected, be manifold. Apart from the unique elaboration of the representative system, there will, it is clear, be a great extension of what we have termed Measurement and Publicity. And the experience of the USSR has already shown how successfully, by a highly evolved series of expedients, a voluntary and essentially spontaneous public opinion may be brought to bear, almost irresistibly, upon those who, in one or other way, fail in their civic duty or take from the community more than they give to it.

Measurement and Publicity

It will be seen that we couple measurement with publicity. Soviet Communism is fully alive to the importance of publicity in public affairs; and there is, as we have shown, probably a greater volume of public discussion of them in the USSR, by a larger proportion of the population, than in any other country. The interminable discussion on all public affairs in the factories and throughout cities, is rapidly extending to the country districts, where the village meeting, and now often the village club-room, provides a perpetual forum. The Government departments constantly feed the widely read newspaper press with facts and figures on every branch of administration. The newspapers revel in the "self-criticism" involved in the exposure of every case of defect or deficiency in the administration. The soviet leaders make their frequent speeches not only longer, but also much more educational than those of the statesmen in other countries, by their constant criticism of departmental shortcomings, and even by fierce exposures of administrative failures. This publicity is already aided by extensive methods of objective measurement of the result of every branch of administration. The soviet statistical service is, in all its ramifications, probably the largest in the world. It is rightly felt that without measurement there can be no accurate knowledge. This demands a continuous extension, not only of detailed statistics of what can be precisely measured, such as tons of grain, or square yards of textiles, but, even more urgently, of qualitative standardisation, so that the statistics can convey definite information as to the kinds and qualities, the excellences and the defects, of the output or other results.

In our Chapter IX. entitled "In Place of Profit" we have described many of the expedients already adopted by the Communist Party and Soviet Government to ensure an exact reckoning-up of every man's work, and of the results of the activities of each factory or plant, whether with regard to the productivity of labour, the use of raw material, the care of machinery, and the full utilisation of all the instruments of production. This formed part of the duty of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, when separate bodies of workers and peasants accompanied by specialists, roamed about the country investigating this plant or that factory, and reporting the results to the factory management, to the

Trade Union and to Gosplan. This certainly secured publicity but not always accuracy of measurement. Although the informal juries of inspection may be continued by the trade unions, this important institution was virtually superseded in 1934 by the two Control Commissions of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party respectively, made up of full-time investigators who were deputed to discover every failure to carry out successfully the decisions or commands that had been issued.¹

Even more important, from the standpoint of discovering hidden waste, was the tentative adoption, during the past few years, of a primitive system of cost-accounting. The so-called Cost-Accounting Brigades, formed under the supervision of the trade-union and factory committees, have sought to discover, by analysis of the total cost of production of each product, the points at which time was lost or waste of material occurred. To this was added the influence of socialist competition between brigades, factories, plants, ships, collective farms, municipalities and even republics; the results being widely published, the winners rewarded, and the losers helped by the winners to bring up their productivity. This has meant an immense amount of measurement and publicity, largely of a kind elsewhere unknown.

But all this inspection and analysis has left unascertained and unrecorded most of the cases in which the quality of the product varied from the standard, and was often sadly defective. Soviet statisticians are accordingly studying how they can bring to bear an exact measurement of quality, in supplement of the simple measurement of tons of grain or square metres of cloth.

Now the only universal measure of quality applicable to all commodities and services is their common value in money. It is with this valuation in money that the statisticians of other countries usually content themselves in their measurement of aggregate production and consumption. It has, however, two fundamental faults as a yardstick of quality. Money, whether coin or paper, gold or silver, the rouble or the dollar, is itself of perpetually shifting value in exchange, and is consequently not to be relied on for comparisons between different years or different places. Some measure of quality can be gained, in dealing with certain commodities, by adding statistics of weight to those of superficial area. Thus it is proposed that in all forms of textile cloth, whether of cotton, wool, hair, silk, rayon or mixed substances, each package or unit for transportation should be measured simultaneously in square metres and in pounds weight. It is said that such a double measurement would be of great value in revealing certain qualitative differences. Under consideration in the USSR are also the various systems of grading according to quality, by independent public officials, which have been adopted by some countries concerned to maintain the reputation of their exports of butter, etc. The success of the voluntary British Standards Association in securing a large amount of standardisation, especially in

¹ See Appendix VI. to Part I. p. 365.

engineering components and construction materials, is also being studied as possibly proving useful as suggesting measurements of quality.

A Universal Audit

To obtain the fullest utility from any collection of statistics, whether quantitative or qualitative, demands the adoption of another social instrument. It involves the development of a systematic audit of every branch of administration, not only as regards its transactions in money, or its use of stamps, or its system of bookkeeping, but extending to all its achievements in commodities and services, and to all the results intended or unintended, of its operations on the workers concerned, or on the consumers whom it serves, or upon other branches of the administration, or upon the locality in which it operates. Cost-accounting, in the sense of determining precisely the cost, not only of every commodity but *also of each component in every commodity*, in comparison with that of each of them in other establishments, or other countries, or by other processes, would form an important part of such an audit. But the general economic and social results of the enterprise as a whole would be of no less interest. Such a universal audit—not yet existing in any country¹—will, we predict, become an invaluable instrument in the Measurement and Publicity that will play perhaps the largest part of the “endless adventure” of the art of government during the remainder of the twentieth century.

The psychological conditions of such an audit are seldom adequately appreciated. It should be conducted by highly trained experts—trained in the special art of auditing—entirely unconnected, not only with the management of the enterprise under examination, but also with the management of any enterprise whatsoever; and confined to the one profession of auditing, in which they would pass their whole time in examining successively all the enterprises of the community, and eventually, in a new “international”, those also of other communities. They would have no responsibility for any of them, and likewise no authority. They could dismiss nobody. They could not even reprimand anybody. They would only make their reports on what they had seen, adding any comments and suggestions that they thought helpful. The manage-

¹ The nearest approach to such a system of universal audit is seen, perhaps, though only in germ, in (a) the organised expert profession of public accountants in the United Kingdom, the United States and the British Dominions; (b) the official auditors of the Ministry of Health in England and Wales, whose work is confined to the operations of the Local Government authorities; and (c) the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of the United Kingdom, whose jurisdiction extends only to the expenditure of moneys voted by Parliament. All these have the qualities of highly trained *expertise*; independence of those whose work they audit; irresponsibility for the success of the enterprise; and powerlessness to reprimand or dismiss. But their audit is confined practically to cash, stamps and stores, and to calculations of profit and loss; it never enquires into social results, and seldom includes even comparative cost-accounting of components or processes; whilst it is far from being universal.

ments and the staffs concerned would have an opportunity of considering the reports; and, if desired, of replying to them. But the reports (together with the replies, if any), would be influential with the supreme authorities in the community; and eventually, when published with public opinion, both inside the enterprises and outside them.¹

Let us consider how this continuous bringing to bear, at every stage, of organised knowledge and the acid test of accurate statistics, may be expected to solve the perennial social problem of how to combine the authority of the manager or foreman in the factory with the workman's sense of personal freedom, and his impulsive resentment of "government from above". Reported discussions among the Comsomols show that, even in the USSR, there is still some anxiety as to the extent of the authority given to a director to decide what shall, and what shall not be done in the course of the day. Some think that the workers should control their own work, or at any rate should be continuously consulted about it. Indeed the vital question, who should give orders and who should obey them; whether the government of industry shall be "from above" or "from below"; agitates the Labour Movement throughout the world. But with the adoption of the principle of Measurement and Publicity this controversy will become largely meaningless. Paradoxical as this may seem to-day, we venture on the prediction that, from the standpoint of personal authority, it will matter far less than at present exactly how the executive command is apportioned. In industry, no less than in political administration, the combination of Measurement with Publicity is to-day already undermining personal autocracy. The

¹ In connection with the necessity of publication of the auditor's reports, we add another suggestion. Amid all the whirlwind of publicity that prevails in the USSR, in the newspapers, at public meetings and by the informative and critical speeches of the statesmen, the student of administration notices one omission. There is a marked absence of the detailed annual report of its proceedings which, in Great Britain and the United States, is habitually published by every joint-stock company or corporation for the information of its shareholders; and likewise, for the information of the public, by nearly every department or executive organ, whether central or local. The practical substitute in the USSR for these detailed statistical reports appears to be the newspaper paragraph or article, in which all the facts likely to be interesting to the casual reader are given in attractive journalistic form. But this is not enough. Neither the casual newspaper reader, nor even the busy journalist, is likely to detect what is socially and economically most important among the selected facts and figures that are alone placed before him. Moreover, dealing with only one enterprise at a time, he is unable to take a comparative view, either of past years or of other enterprises of the same sort, either at home or abroad, or of all the different enterprises of the same locality. The careful study and comparative analysis of the detailed reports themselves—and especially when illuminated by reports of such a comprehensive audit as will gradually become universal—is the work for the trained scientist in economics and other branches of sociology. Only from such a professionally expert analysis—preferably as the work of a scientific research institute—can the necessary education of public opinion be effectively stimulated and wisely directed, through the newspaper press and at public meetings. The requirement from the management of every enterprise or institution in the USSR, central or local, industrial or cultural, of a comprehensive, detailed, statistical annual report of all the proceedings of the concern during the previous year, to be printed and published, and systematically collected and made the subject of critical analysis by specialist scientific institutes, would be a valuable addition to the publicity already provided for.

deliberate intensification of this searchlight of published knowledge we regard as the corner-stone of successful democracy. The need for final decision will remain, not merely in emergencies but also as to policy; but the decisions which are deducible from ascertained and registered facts rouse none of the resentment provoked by assertions of personal will. Sailors may mutiny against an arbitrary captain, but never against the compass. A great deal of the old autocracy, once deemed to be indispensable in Government departments and capitalist industry alike, is ceasing to be necessary to efficiency, and will, accordingly as democracy becomes more genuinely accepted, gradually be dispensed with. The practice of the USSR during the past decade has shown that much can be done in this way. It is plain that a steadily increasing sphere will, except in matters of emergency, be found for consultation among all grades and sections concerned, out of which will emerge judgments and decisions arrived at, very largely, by common consent, which will really be a common submission to accurately ascertained and authoritatively reported facts, driven home by the silent persuasiveness of the public opinion of those concerned. The factory committees, the Party groups, the directors of factories and plants, the All-Union Council of Trade Unions and Gosplan, will have before them not merely the spontaneous promptings of their members' minds, and not even only the information provided by their own officials, but much more. To such committees and councils there will come, as a matter of course, a stream of reports from independent and disinterested experts, retained expressly for this professional service, which will carry with them no coercive authority, but which will graphically reveal the results, material and moral, of each establishment or of each industry, in comparison alike with its own past, with the corresponding results of analogous cases elsewhere, and with the possibilities opened out by new discoveries great or small. "Tovarisheli," the chairman will say, in opening a joint meeting of the factory committee and the management, "you will have read the report of the health expert showing that our staff has a markedly lower standard of health than it had during the preceding decade, and lower also than the average of the district. Scarcely less disquieting is the education expert's report, which has also been circulated to you, reporting that our young men and women come too tired to the technical institute to be able to get adequate advantage from the costly instruction provided for them. On the other hand, we have the best output return in the whole industry; and, owing to your decision to put at once into practice the new method of operating, that was laid before us in the memorandum from the Soviet Control Commission, we have actually the lowest accident rate ever recorded. But it is plain that we cannot stand being gazetted to the public as being the most backward in health among all the establishments in the industry, and as depriving our young people of their educational chances. The question that we have to consider is which of the suggestions put before us, or what modification

of them, we can adopt for improvement in these respects, consistently with maintaining our good position in other respects." Or we may imagine the director of the trust controlling a great industry faced with reports giving, with graphic statistics, the results of investigation of the complaints of particular consumers' organisations, that supplies had been irregular or insufficient, owing to some arrangement of holidays, or of shifts, or the hours of beginning and quitting work, that proved to result in undue discontinuity of production. There might be no idea of lengthening the working day or of lessening the holidays; but the problem of how best to maintain continuity of supply would have to be faced, and faced in the light of the reports discussing all the various solutions that had been suggested. To the obstruction of mere disgruntled criticism there would always be the challenging reply, "What are your alternative proposals? Let us discuss them."

The Organisation of Public Opinion

We have seen, in the descriptions of the elections to the pyramid of soviets, of those in the trade union and the consumers' cooperative movement, and of the perpetual gatherings of members in the federated industrial artels and the collective farms, how large is the part played in the USSR by the discussions in public meeting. We have described in our Chapter IX, entitled "In Place of Profit", how varied and extensive are the expedients by means of which the public opinion of the workers in the factory, the mine and the collective farm is brought to bear on the member who fails to live up to the standard of duty common among his comrades and neighbours. As another sample of the originality and inventiveness sometimes displayed in creating an informed public opinion, here is a scene described at a collective farm in the village of Shemyaline in the province of Moscow. "The economic plan of the kolkhos had been considerably obstructed through inefficiency", we are told. "At a club meeting a teacher suggested organising a puppet theatre to combat poor work and misconduct on the farm. Shortly afterwards Petrushka, the puppet, made his bow.

"All the kolkhosniki, old and young, came to witness the spectacle. In the front row, with a sceptical and superior air, sat the kolkhos chairman.

"Bobbing and bowing, Petrushka, the main character of the show, appeared from behind the scenes and in clever lines scored the inefficiency of the kolkhos management.

"No kolkhosnik had ever spoken so sharply, so directly and with so much wit. The audience rocked with laughter and with assenting voices affirmed Petrushka's charges.

"'That's right!' they shouted. 'That's the boy, Petrushka!'

"But it was not merely amusing. The puppet's caustic criticism struck home. As the curtain fell the kolkhos chairman, his face livid

with rage, rushed behind the puppet-box. 'Show anything you want, a tragedy or a comedy,' he cried, 'only remove your Petrushka.'

"Petrushka, however, was not removed. He is active to this day. He continues to work for the good of the kolkhos. Through his exposures, the chairman, who wanted to remove him, was himself removed, and the new management now works hand in glove with Petrushka, criticising the shortcomings and praising the good work of the members of the collective farm."¹

There are, of course, other ways of evoking and of organising the collective judgment than that of public caricature and censure. We find in 1931 a typical example of spontaneous participation of mechanics and automobile drivers in an attempt to save the flax crop, which was threatened by a breakdown of the tractors supplied to the kolkhosi of a particular district.

"Tractors all over the province", writes Anna Louise Strong, one of those who took part, "stood in the fields not moving, for complex causes yet to be analysed. Who moves in such a case? The Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, sorting over in its offices the reports of all Moscow's daily emergencies, decides that the break in flax sowing is most serious of all. It declares a 'mobilisation' of mechanics. Not a single mechanic in all Moscow is compelled to answer; that's not what mobilisation means. Mobilisation means that shop committees in a hundred centres announce and promote the idea; that mechanics willing to give some time to the sowing are helped by their foremen and fellow-workers to arrange their jobs, and go forth on this sanctioned public task, without forfeiting wages, while others make up the gap at home. What is the motive? The fun of participating in saving the sowing, in running the country; the pleasure of living a vivid, useful varied life.

"Automobiles are also mobilised to carry the mechanics to the farms. Since I have time, I decide to respond to the call. Our autos, five in number, loaded with sixteen mechanics, draw up in the afternoon at the Volokolamsk Tractor Station, one hundred and fifty miles north of Moscow, to which we are assigned. Quickly, in conference with the chief mechanic, we learn the condition of the tractors, in general and in detail. 'That April lot from Putilov,' he swears. 'Thirty-three we got, all new ones: rotten! Eleven of them can't move on their own power from the railway station.'

"Dividing the farms among our five automobiles we scattered, each to our own job. At early twilight I drove my load of three machinists to a little farm of fifty families, working their soil in common, with three tractors. Here we learned a second cause for the break in the sowing. The tractor drivers, six on two shifts, were peasant boys and girls who had seen their first machine one month before. When they heard a queer sound from the machine they stopped, afraid of breaking it, and waited for the mechanic. Hundreds of tractors all over Moscow pro-

¹ *Moscow Daily News*, July 2, 1935.

vince waiting for mechanics! And only a few dozen mechanics. That was the reason for our mobilisation.

"All night, while I slept in the teacher's room, the mechanic volunteers repaired tractors. And all night the six local tractor drivers stood up to watch their job—such was their eagerness to learn. When at four in the morning they called me to drive to the next farm, the local boys and girls, drivers of tractors, kept right on work, driving out to the fields.

"Our second farm was a different sort, a backward lot. Neither bread nor tea they offered our weary mechanics, arriving two hours past dawn. They swore at us instead; city workers were we, those city workers who deceive the farms with tractors. Take them, look at them, we don't want them.

"Our city mechanics took them, looked at them, repaired them, and put them to work in the fields. The attitude of the peasants grudgingly changed. The younger ones came and thanked us.

"At four in the afternoon the five autos gathered again at the tractor station to write a formal statement which the Russians call an 'Act'. It gave in technical terms the exact fault in every tractor and generalised from those faults. From the hard-won fields of Volokolamsk, we put our fingers into the distant Putilov Plant in Leningrad, and pointed out which shops were guilty. Certain iron castings regularly went to powder. A certain little gadget that a clever engineer had substituted for ball bearings wasn't doing the work. It was a clear specific indictment, not of the Putilov tractor, but of certain specified parts. All the mechanics signed it. Through gathering dusk I drove my car to Moscow, five hours, with sleeping mechanics in the seats. . . . The Act they had written went next day to the *Industrial Gazette*, newspaper of heavy industry, chief monitor of Putilov. . . . It led to a summons sent to the chief of production at Putilov, and a hearing held in the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, attended by a dozen organisations interested in tractors. The affidavit made by our weary mechanics had been in truth an 'Act', with direct results in the tractor industry. And when spring passed into summer, the flax of Moscow province, which in early season had threatened to lag at 50 per cent of Plan, went over the top to 108 per cent, the best record in the Soviet Union. 'It was the work of the social organisation that saved us', said the Moscow Tractor Centre."¹

An arid-minded professor observes: "All these adventures are outside the sphere of economics". "That is so," answers the Bolshevik. "They are part and parcel of the good life—a more potent instrument in the remaking of man and the production of the necessary plenty for all than the motive of pecuniary self-interest upon which the capitalist countries rely." Who is right and who is wrong—the professor of political economy or the communist—will be proved by the event.

¹ *Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union*, by Anna Louise Strong (New York, 1935), pp. 20-22.

The Comradely Court

The unique institution of the Comradely Court, which we have elsewhere described¹ as an organ of public opinion, demands further mention as a valuable contribution to the new social order which, in the USSR is, within its own sphere, actually beginning to supersede the coercive authority of the "police state". "Russia", says a recent observer,² "is honeycombed in factory, in farm, in apartment house, with the institution known as a Comrades' Court. . . . The Comrades' Court is not a state judicial organ in the ordinary sense of the term. It is a quasi judicial body, representative of public opinion in the unit where it exercises jurisdiction. Its judges have tenure only for the actual sitting over which they preside, and they are elected *ad hoc* by the factory workers, the dwellers in the apartment house or the members of the collective farm, as the case may be. There is no official procedure at its sittings; those I attended were conducted very much like an English trade union meeting, with everyone present who felt he had anything relevant to say making his contribution. The maximum punishment the court can inflict is a fine of 10 roubles—or about 10 per cent of the monthly wages of the lowest paid Russian worker. The court can make representations to the management about the conduct of a worker in a factory which may result in his dismissal by the management; or it may initiate the expulsion of an undesirable tenant from his apartment. In the industrial field and on the farm, the tendency is for the judges of the Courts to be the best shock-workers there. This is the case in about 90 per cent of them. In other spheres, the tendency is to elect the men and women who are regarded by the relevant constituency as possessed of the best reputation for social initiative.

"The real function of the Courts is twofold. On the one hand they bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on citizens who are held by their comrades to have shown a defective sense of social responsibility in some minor matter. It may be persistent lateness in work, or uncleanness in the home, or unjustifiable absenteeism, or excessive rudeness to other tenants in the apartment house, or a slanderous tongue, or negligence in carrying out orders. Whatever the offence, the Court has the invaluable effect of making the culprit aware of public standards to which he must accommodate himself. He learns to respect the authority of the Court not from the penalties it may impose—in half the cases I saw, it imposed no penalties at all—not from the public analysis of the alleged fault and the subjection of the offender to the criticism of his fellow-workers or neighbours. The fact, of course, that tens of thousands of citizens have poured into the towns since the Revolution makes this self-imposed discipline a particularly valuable part of the process of social education.

¹ Chapter IX, in Part II, "In Place of Profit".

² *Law and Justice in Soviet Russia*, by Harold J. Laski (1925), pp. 26-28.

"It not only teaches discipline to all who are concerned in it. The Court is at every point a lesson in the art of conciliation. Quarrelsome neighbours, indifferent workmen, learn that they do not live to themselves alone. For the judges of the Court the work is of real importance partly as a lesson in government, and that art of effective self-expression which is so near to the heart of successful rule, and partly as a useful introduction to superior administrative tasks; there are many members of Comrades' Courts for whom service thereon has been the prelude to election to a local soviet. The institution, further, is a step towards the realisation of Lenin's insistent principle that as large a proportion of the population as possible should be related directly to the business of government. He saw, from the first days of the Revolution, the creative part that civic responsibility can play, however small be the authority conferred. There can be no doubt that literally scores of thousands of men and women have been educated to a sense of their social function by participation in the work of these Courts.

"What is vital in the institution is the fact that their status is not imposed from above by the law, but grows from within by the force of the approval they win from the constituency they serve. The committee character of the proceedings is the root of this approval. A corporate opinion grows before one's eyes, as one listens to the proceedings; those present are not silent spectators, but citizens whose comments, even whose attitudes, are always relevant to the decision reached. It is important, further, that the ability of the judges to retain their place is a direct function of the satisfaction aroused by their decisions. These are perpetually canvassed by their constituency. I have even heard an offender, after a decision had been given, discuss in detail with an interested audience why it was inadequate in the light of the evidence offered. I was particularly impressed by the Courts in dealing with marital relations, and with cases in which a male worker had been offensive to a woman worker in the same shop as himself. On this side, the Courts are a school of conciliation and neighbourliness. They introduce what may be termed 'justice without law' into all the relations of social life, in a way that undoubtedly adds to the quality of living. And the Courts are significant, further, because they have brought to the surface the immense reservoir of stout common sense the workers possess, and given it an institutional channel of expression significant far beyond the immediate purposes to which it is limited."

We add a further significance of this unique institution. As we have already hinted, one of the most keenly debated problems in the USSR, as among working-class reformers in other countries, is how to reconcile the necessity, in any extensive organisation, of "commands from above" with the hotly felt resentment of the "obligation to obey". This problem is not solved by any merely formal democracy. Whether authority is wielded by an individual employer or an autocratic dictator, or by a mass meeting of wage-earners, or by an ingenious social mechanism

combining different kinds of commanders, there are touchy and thoughtless workmen who are unable to avoid some resentment at having to obey what comes to them as an incomprehensible but authoritative order. The decision of the Comradely Court, after argument and oral discussion by his fellows, comes to the workman in quite another guise. The malcontent has had his say. He cannot help realising that the judgment against him is the expression of the feelings not of any authority above him, but of his own comrades. He is far more likely to be weaned from the habits to which they object than he would be if he was condemned in a court of law under a prohibitory statute. It is the gradual extension of this type of organisation of public opinion - aided as it will be, by every improvement in the formation made available by a systematic expert audit - that we expect to see increasingly supersede alike the peremptory command of the employer and the penal sentence of the magistrate.

We do not know whether to the wealthy rentier who is habitually unaware what his functionless existence involves in the subjection of the workers, or to the temperamental anarchist of western civilisation, this vision of the "withering of the state", with its law courts, its police and its prisons, and its replacement by an ubiquitous system of measurement and publicity, reinforced by an all-embracing award of public blame and public honour, strictly according to merit, will seem an attractive prospect. But we can assure him that in any community governed by communist principles he will have been so completely subject to these two powerful social influences from birth onwards, through all the vicissitudes of life, that he will feel the personal obligation imposed in the common interest on all alike, less of a nuisance than the drastic income-tax to which the Briton and the American millionaires are now subjected; and, indeed, no more burdensome than the weight of the atmosphere!

Contradictory Trends in Foreign Affairs

At long last we reach the problem which to many persons, communists and anti-communists alike, seems of greater importance than any development of the good life in any particular community: seems to some of them, indeed, likely to determine in the wide world the destiny of civilisation itself, if not of the whole human race. What is to be the relation of the Soviet Government, with its dominance over one-sixth of the earth's surface, and its population likely within the next decade to exceed 200 millions, to the other nations of Europe and Asia, and of the world? Will all the capitalist governments, as is still widely feared in the USSR, unite to a combined attack upon the only communist state, as the most practical way of resisting the insidious spread of communist ideas in their own countries? Or will the Soviet Government, once it has made itself safe from attack, find itself driven to send its powerful Red Army to succour the communist workers of Germany and Austria, Italy and Hungary, in the persecution and oppression from which they

are now suffering, and which may even be expected to be intensified if the USSR becomes obviously more prosperous than any capitalist state? If various European powers go to war with each other, can the conflagration be prevented from becoming a universal Armageddon in which western civilisation may be destroyed? If the Soviet Government should have succeeded by that time in establishing a good life for the broad masses in its own country, what would soviet ethics dictate as to its conduct as a nation towards the less fortunate nations of the world who were still in the gall of bitterness and the bond of iniquity of unregenerate capitalism?

Now, the policy towards other nations of the Soviet Government has, in the eighteen years of its existence, gone through various phases which it is necessary to examine.¹ Put briefly, the change in relations with the other governments of the world has been from war to peace.

The World Revolution

When Lenin and his companions assumed office in October 1917, and for several years afterwards, they believed that a world revolution was imminent. They were convinced that the proletariats of the principal capitalist countries, impelled by the economic sufferings ensuing on the Great War, would be able to rise in rebellion against their respective governments, and that they would, if properly led, be able to seize power. The various treaties of peace imposed by the victorious governments in 1919 found large numbers of wage-earners favourably impressed by the sweeping measures of nationalisation and of proletarian control of industry that were reported from Moscow and Petrograd. It looked, indeed, as a German writer has put it, as if "in the years 1919-1920, the majority of socialist workmen in France and Italy, Germany and the former Austro-Hungarian countries, favoured an alliance with Bolshevism. Strong Bolshevik sympathies also existed in the Balkan States, Scandinavia, Poland and the Baltic States."²

¹ We are naturally unable, in this work of expositions and analysis of the present constitution and contemporary working of the USSR, to recount the whole history of its foreign policy, which would demand a separate treatise. The student may be referred to the successive reports of the proceedings of the All-Union Conferences of the Communist Party of the USSR, usually obtainable both in English and in French; the detailed work of Louis Fischer, entitled *The Soviets in World Affairs* (2 vols., 1930); *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1933, 264 pp.), the same author's *The End of the Russian Empire* (New York, 1931), and his article in *The Political Science Quarterly* (New York, June 1932); the books by Leon Trotsky, entitled respectively *The Bolsheviks and World Peace* (New York, 1918, 238 pp.) and *The Permanent Revolution* (New York, 1931); and *L'Internationale Communiste après Lénine*, together with the appendices to vol. iii. of his *History of the Russian Revolution*; and his pamphlet *La Troisième Période d'erreurs de l'Internationale communiste* (Paris, 1930). See also *A History of Bolshevism from Marx to the First Five-Year Plan*, by Arthur Rosenberg (1934, 250 pp.); *L'Histoire du parti communiste de l'URSS*, par E. Yaroslavsky (Paris, 1931); *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. Popov (translated from the 16th Russian edition, 1935, 2 vols.); and the *Annual Survey of International Affairs* for 1934, by Arnold Toynbee (1935).

² *A History of Bolshevism from Marx to the First Five-Year Plan*, by Arthur Rosenberg (1934), p. 130.

The Third International

The Bolsheviks at Moscow could not understand why the German Government of 1918, dominated by the Social Democratic Party and presided over by a social democratic president (Ebert), did not at once transform the new Reich into a socialist state ; still less why the tumultuous uprising of the Spartacists in 1919 was sternly suppressed by a professedly socialist government. In these very months what were called soviet republics were actually established at Munich and at Budapest ; and if they failed to maintain themselves the failure could be plausibly ascribed to lack of sufficient preparatory organisation. The hostility of the foreign governments did not cease with the withdrawal in 1920 from soviet territory of the armies that they assisted and subsidised. In all but military measures these governments continued their war against the communist power. Lenin and his colleagues, in their own way, equally remained at war with the capitalist powers. So long as they were struggling desperately with the successive waves of armed intervention by foreign governments, the Soviet Government looked for help to the sympathetic proletariat of western Europe. It was with this view that, in March 1919, the Third, or Communist, International was formally established at a congress summoned to Moscow by wireless broadcast. Passport and other difficulties prevented the attendance of more than a handful of foreign delegates, often with unconvincing credentials. The Second World Congress at Moscow in July and August 1920 was, however, numerously attended by duly accredited delegates from nearly every European country, and also from Asia and North and South America. At this Congress Lenin got adopted a detailed scheme of organisation for all the nascent communist parties of every country, including their obligatory federation in the Communist International (Comintern), to be governed by a periodically meeting world congress of delegates, with a standing executive committee in Moscow itself.¹ The "Twenty-one Conditions" for the acceptance by the

¹ The "Twenty-one Conditions" will be found in full in *Soviet Rule in Russia*, by W. R. Batsell (1926), pp. 762-767. We reprint some of the most striking :

"Every organisation that wishes to affiliate with the Communist International must regularly and systematically remove the reformist and contrist elements from all the more or less important posts in the labor movement (in party organisations, editorial offices, trade unions, parliamentary groups, cooperatives, and municipal administrations) and replace them with well-tried communists, without taking offence at the fact that, especially in the beginning, the places of 'experienced' opportunists will be filled by plain workers from the masses."

"Every party belonging to the Communist International is obliged to carry on a stubborn struggle against the Amsterdam 'international' of the yellow trade unions. It must carry on a most emphatic propaganda among the workers organised in trade unions for a break with the yellow Amsterdam International. With all its means it must support the rising international association of the red trade unions which affiliate with the Communist International."

"It is their duty to create everywhere a parallel illegal machine for organisation which at the decisive moment will be helpful to the party in fulfilling its duty to the revolution."

"As a rule the programme of every part belonging to the Communist International

Comintern of the affiliation of any Communist Party, drafted by Lenin himself, demanded a complete and publicly avowed breach with every organisation or group affected with "reformism", or sympathy with parliamentary democracy, together with the unflinching exclusion of any individuals who hesitated or doubted, or who shrank from the decision to organise "illegal activities", or who had spoken or voted against a proposal to adopt the programme or to seek affiliation. What Lenin sought to create, suddenly and without preliminary propaganda, in each of the countries of the world, was something closely resembling the strictly disciplined Bolshevik Party of professional revolutionaries, which he had patiently and laboriously constructed out of the "underground" and exiled Russians whom he could influence in the twelve years 1903-1914. The Communist Parties thus formed, in all the countries of the world, were, under the direction of the Comintern at Moscow, to bring about the expected quick succession of revolutions in one country after another.

"Lenin's attempt in 1919-1920 to organise a revolution in Europe", it has been said,¹ "was a magnificent experiment. There were, however, gigantic difficulties to be overcome before it could succeed. The tradition of the working class in [western] Europe, was, without exception, democratic in the sense that labour policy could only be decided upon in accordance with the free exercise of the right of self-determination on the part of the masses. The conversion of the proletariat from a policy of reform to one of revolution seemed only possible if the masses altered their opinions first, and subsequently discovered a suitable means of giving expression to them. Now the exactly contrary process was to be embarked upon with all possible rapidity. A revolutionary party committee was to be set up in every country and endowed with dictatorial powers over the members of the party, and with an unquestioned authority over the masses; and this party committee was to carry out a revolution."

Initial Success of the Comintern

Notwithstanding all difficulties, the Comintern had a certain measure of initial success. At the German Social Democratic Congress at Halle, must be sanctioned by the regular congress of the Communist International, or by its executive committee."

"The duty of spreading communist ideas includes the special obligation to carry on a vigorous and systematic propaganda in the army. Where this agitation is forbidden by special laws it is to be carried on illegally. Renunciation of such activities would be the same as treason to revolutionary duty and would be incompatible with membership in the Third International."

"The parties wishing to belong to the Communist International are obligated to proclaim a clean break with the reformism and with the policy of the 'centre' and to propagate this break throughout the ranks of the entire party membership. Without this a logical communist policy is impossible."

"All decisions of the congresses of the Communist International as well as the decisions of its executive committee, are binding upon all the parties belonging to the Communist International."

¹ *History of Bolshevism*, by A. Rosenberg (1934), p. 143.

in October 1920, Zinoviev, who had been elected president of the Comintern, attended to make a brilliantly ingenious speech lasting four hours, which swept into assent a majority of the delegates, who thereupon formed a "great, new, united" Communist Party. In France also a majority of the delegates to the Socialist Party Congress accepted the Twenty-one Conditions, and formed the French Communist Party. In Italy, on the contrary, both sections of the Italian Socialist Party, under Turati and Serrati respectively, rejected the conditions; and the Italian Communist Party was founded only by minority groups. In England only tiny bodies of sympathisers with what they had heard of the proceedings of the Second World Congress of the Communist International came together to establish the British Communist Party.¹

None of these communist parties has ever come anywhere near securing the adhesion of the bulk of the wage-earners in its own country; or even the friendly cooperation of the various existing popular organisations, whether trade unions, cooperative societies, or socialist groups. Naturally, therefore, none of them has managed even to attempt a revolution. But Lenin's effort to obtain international support in his desperate fight to maintain the Bolshevik revolution in Russia was not altogether without fruit. Though the Moscow Comintern in 1920, and the communist parties that it called into existence, did not bring about the world revolution, they made the workmen and their leaders more vividly aware of the hope and promise of the revolution in Russia itself; and of the scandal of the lawless military intervention in Russia by the governments of half a dozen capitalist countries seeking to crush the Bolsheviks. In England, in 1920, a further attempt by the government to send war stores and munitions to the forces attacking the Bolshevik Government was definitely stopped by public demonstrations and threats of strikes. In France, as well as in England, public feeling fortified the Government's growing weariness of supporting the "White" Armies which never achieved any lasting success.

Right down to the year of famine (1921) the Bolshevik leaders looked hopefully to the western countries for aid by popular uprising against the governments that continued to be unfriendly towards the communist state. Even at the end of 1920, when the wanton invasion by the Government of Poland had been repelled by the Red Army and the Polish troops had been driven back to the outskirts of Warsaw, the soviet authorities hoped to be aided by proletarian uprisings, not only in the Polish cities but also in the German industrial centres. The most that the soviet leaders gained was that the British Government felt able to give the Poles only diplomatic support; and the French Government ventured on nothing more than the loan of a competent general in an advisory capacity. When it appeared that there would be no popular uprising by either Germans or Poles, Lenin insisted, in 1921, on concluding peace,

¹ In China also a Communist Party was established in May 1920, to which we shall presently recur.

even at the cost of surrendering to Poland a strip of soviet soil.

By 1921, indeed, Lenin had realised that the imminent world revolution could not be counted upon, and would probably be indefinitely delayed. He explained that "the law of uneven development" of capitalist countries almost necessarily involved that the expected proletarian revolution could not occur simultaneously in all the countries of advanced industrialism; and that the most that could be hoped for was a succession of national revolutions over a series of years. The communist "world state" which some enthusiasts had expected, but to which no content was ever given, simply faded out of the vision.

Soviet China

Rather more success seemed to be achieved in China. We take the following account from the impartial report of 1932 to the League of Nations by the Lytton Commission on the Manchurian problem. "The manifesto of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, declaring its willingness to renounce all privileges extorted from China by the former tsarist Government, created a favourable impression throughout China, especially among the intelligentsia. In May 1920 the Chinese Communist Party was formally constituted. Propaganda was especially conducted in labour circles at Shanghai, where 'red syndicates' were organised. In June 1922, at its second congress, the [Chinese] Communist Party, which did not then number more than 300 members, decided to ally itself with the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, although opposed to communist doctrine, was prepared to admit individual Chinese communists into the Party. In the autumn of 1922 the Soviet Government sent a mission to China headed by Dr. Joffe. Important interviews which took place between him and Dr. Sen resulted in the joint declaration of January 26, 1923, by which assurance was given of soviet sympathy and support to the cause of the national unification and independence of China. It was explicitly stated, on the other hand, that the communist organisation and the soviet system of government could not be introduced at that time under the conditions prevailing in China. Following this agreement a number of military and civil advisers were sent from Moscow by the end of 1923, and undertook, under the control of Dr. Sen, the modification of the internal organisation of the Kuomintang and of the Cantonese army. At the first national congress of the Kuomintang, convened in March 1924, the admission of Chinese communists into the Party was formally agreed to, on condition that such members should not take any further part in the preparation of the proletarian revolution. The period of toleration with regard to communism thus began.

"This period lasted from 1924 to 1927. Early in 1924 the communists counted about 2000 adherents, and red syndicates approximately 60,000 members. But the communists soon acquired sufficient influence inside the Kuomintang to raise anxiety among the orthodox members

of the party. They presented to the Central Committee at the end of 1926 a proposal going so far as to include the nationalisation of all landed properties except those belonging to workers, peasants or soldiers; the reorganisation of the Kuomintang; the elimination of all military leaders hostile to communism; and the arming of 20,000 communists and 50,000 workmen and peasants. This proposal, however, was defeated; and the communists ceased to support the intended campaign of the Kuomintang against the northern militarists, although they had previously been most active in the organisation of the nationalist forces. Nevertheless, at a later stage, they joined in it; and when the northern expedition reached Central China, and established a Nationalist Government at Wu-Han in 1927, the communists succeeded in obtaining a controlling position in it, as the nationalist leaders were not prepared to join issue with them until their own forces had occupied Nanking and Shanghai. The Wu-Han government put into operation in the provinces of Hunan and Hupch a series of purely communist measures. The nationalist revolution was almost at the point of being transformed into a communist revolution.

"The nationalist leaders at last decided that communism had become too serious a menace to be tolerated any longer. As soon as they were firmly established at Nanking, where another National Government was constituted on April 10, 1927, a proclamation was issued in which the Nanking Government ordered the immediate purification of the army and the civil service from communism. On July 5 the majority of the Central Executive of the Kuomintang at Wu-Han, who had so far refused to join the nationalist leaders at Nanking, adopted a resolution excluding communists from the Kuomintang, and ordering the soviet advisers to leave China. As a result of this decision, the Kuomintang regained its unity and the Government at Nanking became generally recognised by the party.¹

"During the period of tolerance several military units had been gained to the communist cause. These had been left in the rear, mostly in Kiangsi Province, when the nationalist army was marching to the North. Communist agents were sent to coordinate these units, and to persuade them to take action against the National Government. On July 30, 1927, the garrison at Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi Province, together with some other military units, revolted and subjected the population to numerous excesses. However, on August 5, they were defeated by the Government forces and withdrew to the South. On December 11 a communist rising at Canton delivered control of the city for two days into their hands. The Nanking Government considered that official soviet agents had actively participated in these uprisings. An order of December 14, 1927, withdrew the exequatur of all the consuls of the

¹ What this decorous official report does not mention is the frightful character of this repression of communism by the Kuomintang. There seems no doubt, from other reports, that thousands of communists were summarily executed without trial, often with revolting tortures and mutilations.

USSR residing in China.”¹ It was not until 1932 that diplomatic relations between the two governments were resumed. But it must be noted

¹ What has remained of communism in China is, not accurately known. For the past five years there has been almost continuous fighting between the forces of the Nanking Government and the “Red” armies. The former are always claiming victories, and the area in which “Soviet China” prevails is always shifting. But at all times tens of millions of population seem to be under its sway. We take the following account from the book *One’s Company*, by Peter Fleming (1934), whom *The Times* had sent to find out about it:

“By 1931 Communism had assumed the status of a national problem in China; attempts by the Nanking Government to solve it were becoming annually more serious, though not more successful. A Chinese Soviet Republic had proclaimed itself, and controlled—as it controls to-day—an area of which central and southern Kiangsi and western Fukien are the permanent nucleus, but which has at one time or another been extended to include parts of Hunan, Kwantung and Hupeh. . . . The curse of China is ineffectiveness; the Chinese communists are not ineffective. The Red areas are controlled, and rigidly controlled, by a central government with headquarters at the ‘capital’ Shui-kin. . . . The form of government is modelled on the Russian; the ‘Party’, guided by a small Central Executive Committee, is paramount. The territory under its control is subdivided into areas, each of which is ruled by a local soviet with a ‘Party’ man at its head. All land is common. When they came into the villages the first thing the communists did was to tear up all the landmarks. . . . The land (even including temple lands and burial-grounds) was then redistributed. All marketing of produce is done through a central government agency; and to-day the peasant inside the Red Areas is buying his rice and pork cheaper than the peasant outside them. One central and at least two local banks have been established, and notes and silver coins have been issued, the former bearing the head of Lenin and the latter the hammer and sickle. A ‘progressive’ tax is levied in proportion to income. . . . The Red Armies are commanded by Chu Teh, a general of experience and resource, said to have had some German training. His political adviser is Mao Dsu Tung, a gifted and fanatical young man of thirty-five suffering from an incurable disease. This pair have made themselves into something of a legend, and the Communist High Command is invariably referred to as Chumao. In addition to the Red Armies in Kiangsi, there is a communist force of some 5000 rifles in southern Hupeh, and a large roving army which has found its way up to the borders of Szechwan after being dislodged from Hupeh in the autumn of 1932. . . . All the Red Armies are equipped with wireless. The novelty of the Chinese communist movement lies in the fact that—in a country where the man with the big stick has always hitherto had the last word—the army does not, and cannot, rule the roost, as it would if the movement represented no more than that chance agglomeration of malcontents and freebooters which optimists see in it. The control of the Central Government (in other words, of the Party) is absolute, because the Party percolates, in the Russian manner, into every branch of military and civil life. There is, as it were, a Party man at the hub of every wheel. The mutiny of a division, the rebellion of a district, is impossible as long as there are officers and officials to see it coming, report it to the Party, and have it nipped in the bud.

“Moreover—again in the Russian manner—everyone belongs to curious overlapping organisations, all under Party control and supervision. As a member of (say) the League of Youth, the Farmers’ Union, the Peasants’ Revolutionary Society, and the 21st Red Army Group, you are caught in the cat’s-cradle of obligations and threatened with a cloud of penalties. Even the Party members themselves are supervised by Control Commissions, working incognito and reporting to the Central Executive Committee. . . . It will be seen that a great deal depends on the quality of the leaders. These would seem to be for the most part young Chinese students (throughout the movement there is a tremendous emphasis on youth), many of them trained in the Lenin University in Moscow or in a similar institution at Khabarovsk. . . . There can be no doubt that the standard of ability among the leaders is high, and unquestionably most of them are sincere. There is probably less corruption in the Red districts than in any other area of equal size in China.”

For a more detailed, though less trustworthy, account of these happenings see *The Chinese Soviets*, by Victor A. Yakhontoff (New York, 1934, 296 pp.). A vivid description of personal experiences in Hankow in 1927, with an appreciation of M. M. Borodin, is given in the interesting volume entitled *In Search of History*, by J. Vincent Shean (1935).

that since 1927 there has been no intervention on behalf of Soviet China by the Soviet Government, or even by the Comintern.

Rebuilding Soviet Russia

Meanwhile the practical Lenin had turned resolutely to the task of rebuilding social organisation, and particularly the manufacturing industry, at home. In order to obtain a temporary breathing space he did not shrink from the New Economic Policy that he was able to impose on the Tenth Conference of the Communist Party in 1921, although by this he ceded to the Russian capitalists some of the ground in trading, and even in manufacturing on a small scale, from which they had been drastically expelled in the period of War Communism. The Fourth World Congress of the Comintern, in November 1922, to which Lenin presented an elaborate report entitled "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Outlook for the World Revolution", largely devoted to a defence of NEP, made no protest against Lenin's new policy, nor against the steps taken towards industrial reconstruction. The rebuilding of large-scale manufacturing involved an extensive importation of machinery, and even of certain raw materials; and already in March 1921 the Soviet Government had signed a trade agreement with Great Britain, which had been followed during the same year by similar arrangements with other European countries.

International Conferences

In April and May 1922 the Soviet Government had made its first appearance at an important international congress, that at Genoa, at which Chicherin, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, dumfounded the delegates of the other powers by secretly concluding with the German Reich the far-reaching Treaty of Rapallo. Chicherin also attended the conference at Lausanne in 1923, to arrange a general settlement with Turkey; and eventually joined in the agreement by which the Dardanelles were formally demilitarised. In February 1924, immediately after the death of Lenin, the British Government accorded the Soviet Government *de jure* recognition, a concession followed during the same year by the governments of Italy and France. Meanwhile the reconstruction of soviet mining and manufacturing, with machinery bought from abroad and paid for by the export of timber and furs, was proceeding apace.

Socialism in a Single Country

The full object and justification of this policy of internal reconstruction was not popularly explained until Stalin, in the autumn of 1924, launched the slogan of "Socialism in a Single Country"; meaning that, in view of the failure of the world revolution to break out, the duty of the USSR was to make itself into a successful and prosperous socialist

state, which would serve as an example and a model for the proletariat of the world.

Upon this promulgation of a change of Bolshevik policy there ensued what must seem surprising to those who believe that the USSR lies groaning under a peremptory dictatorship, namely, three years of incessant public controversy. This took various forms. There were repeated debates in the principal legislative organs, such as the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. There were hot arguments in many of the local soviets, as well as in the local Party organs. There was a vast literature of books and pamphlets, not stopped by the censorship, and published, indeed, by the state publishing houses, extending, as is stated by one who has gone through it, to literally thousands of printed pages.¹ Amid all the disputants, who coalesced and redivided in successive combinations, the two protagonists were Stalin and Trotsky. Hence it is tempting to-day to ascribe the whole struggle to the temperamental incompatibility of these rival claimants of the succession to Lenin. But there was a substantial issue in debate, at any rate until it was finally and authoritatively decided by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in April 1925; a decision ratified, after more discussion, by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Conferences of October 1926 and December 1927.²

What the Controversy was About

The difficulty of discovering "what it was all about" is increased by the characteristic method of controversy adopted by both sides. The question was not put as "which policy would be likely to be most advantageous or most successful". It was perpetually argued as "what

¹ *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1933), p. 130. We are unable, in this exposition of the constitutional structure and trends of progress in the Soviet Union of the present day (1935), to do justice to the life-long revolutionary career, and the considerable services, of Leon Trotsky, which have been, for the past seven years, obscured by the malevolence of those by whom he was opposed and defeated. In the main controversy of 1925-1929 he may be deemed to have had the advantage over his adversaries in the citation of texts, even if, judged by subsequent experience, he was incorrect in his forecasts and unstatesmanlike in his particular recommendations.

The student who seeks to disentangle the various phases of this prolonged controversy should begin by the perusal of all the publications and the reports of speeches by Stalin and Trotsky that he can get hold of. He may then study such chronicles, unfortunately not unbiased, as *L'Histoire du parti communiste de l'URSS*, by E. Yaroslavsky (Paris, 1931); and *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. Popov (translated from the 16th Russian edition, 2 vols.).

² After these decisions, Trotsky persisted in his agitation, attempting to stir up resistance; and his conduct became plainly factious. It was this persistence in faction after the Party had definitely decided that led to his banishment to Alma Ata at the beginning of 1928, and to Constantinople at the beginning of 1929. His own version of the proceedings may be followed in his publications of 1929-1930, such as *La Défense de l'URSS et l'opposition* (Paris, 1929, 84 pp.; in Russian); *La Troisième Période de l'erreur de l'internationale communiste* (Paris, 1930, 64 pp.); *Die permanente Revolution* (Berlin, 1930, 168 pp.; also in English, New York, 1931).

was the view taken by Marx and Engels, and by Lenin himself; and what exactly did these authorities mean by this or that text discovered among their voluminous writings". It is now obvious that no one had directly and explicitly grappled with the particular problem, in the light of all the facts, economic, social and political, even as they were in 1845 or in 1905; and, of course, these great authorities were none of them conversant with the state of things in 1925, which alone was relevant to the issue. Ignoring this vain appeal to dead authors, to which all the disputants clung, let us try to examine the problem in itself.

The Four Arguments of the Trotskyists

Trotsky, and with him many of the ablest and most responsible Bolsheviks, retained the belief, which they had derived from Marx and Engels, that it was impossible for socialism to be safely and durably established in any one country by itself alone. One ground for this belief was the economic argument upon which Marx and Engels had proceeded in 1847. This was most clearly stated by Engels, in a document of 1847, which had been published in Moscow only in 1923. "Large-scale industry," said Engels, "by creating the world market, has established so close a connection among all the peoples of the globe, especially in the case of the civilised peoples, that each of them depends on what happens to others. . . . Large-scale industry has so levelled the social development in all civilised countries that everywhere the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have become the two determining social classes, and the struggle between them is the chief struggle of our time. The communist revolution, therefore, will not be merely national, but will take place simultaneously in all civilised countries; that is, at least in England, America, France and Germany. . . . It will also exercise a considerable influence upon the other countries of the world, and will completely change, and much accelerate, their former course of development. It is a world revolution, and will therefore have the whole world as its arena."¹

To this it may to-day be answered that the injurious effects of foreign capitalist competition on the nascent industries of the USSR, which might be undersold by cheap foreign products, and the possible catastrophic currency depreciation and price-changes that foreign manipulations of the exchanges might effect, were both obviated by the plan that the Bolsheviks had already adopted (but of which neither Marx nor Engels had ever dreamt) of a rigid Government monopoly of all international trade, and an absolute prohibition of any import or export of the soviet currency. This plan of foreign economic relations has continued to be completely successful as a measure of defence.

¹ From Engels' MS. *Principles of Communism*, a draft used by him and Marx in the preparation of the Communist Manifesto of 1848. It was not published until the new issue of the Russian translation of the Communist Manifesto itself in 1923.

Another ground on which it was argued that Socialism in a Single Country was impracticable was that, even if it were for a moment established, it could not be maintained against the combined attack which the capitalist countries would inevitably make for its destruction. The answer as it seems to day is obvious. The apprehension, the probability and even the certainty of such an attack on the first socialist community was, and is, irrelevant to the issue. Unless the objectors wished all attempts at industrial reconstruction of the USSR to be abandoned, and the penury and periodical famine to be continued, whilst waiting for the socialist revolution to take place in the capitalist countries, it seems plain that the USSR would become progressively more able to resist such an attack, the greater its advance in industrial reconstruction. To abandon the rebuilding of large-scale industry would be to render impossible any effective defence against a renewed intervention by the foreign armies.

There were two other objections to Stalin's policy that deserve notice. It was denied that the collective ownership of all the principal means of production, together with all the operations of banking and credit, combined with the collective administration of commodity distribution and of the rapidly expanding social services, constituted even progress towards the socialist state. All these things, it was said, amounted only to state capitalism, corresponding with reforms already partially adopted by parliamentary democracies. Here we have an echo of the old utopian conception of a socialism akin to the philosophic anarchism of Kropotkin, as the dream of a community without troublesome international complications; without deliberate organisation of education and public health; without the centralisation that is indispensable in a populous community with modern means of communication; without foreign trade; without electricity; without the elaborate mechanisation of agriculture, which alone gives economic security—in short, without the means by which any extensive community can now lead a civilised life. Those who say " It is not socialism, but only state capitalism "—and they still exist in the USSR as in other countries—can only be told that everyone is free to call anything by any name that he pleases. What the proletariat of every country means by socialism is the supersession of the landlord and the capitalist, together with the profit-making motive, by collective ownership, in a condition of social equality, with the universalisation of security by the appropriate organisation of social services.

The final objection that we can disentangle from the controversy of 1924-1927 is that the pursuit of socialism in a single country meant the betrayal of the world proletariat, to whom the hope had been held out of a world revolution. It was, so Trotsky alleged, the policy of a narrow nationalist egoism, unworthy in the successors of Lenin, Engels and Marx. Better far, it was said, devote all the energies of the USSR to the tasks of the Comintern. The proper communist policy, it was urged,

was to promote actively a proletarian insurrection in every country, by fomenting strikes, inciting colonial rebellions, subverting the troops, and eventually seizing power by a forcible revolution in one state after another. The answer was plain. Five years' experience had shown in 1924 that there was little promise, in western Europe or the United States, of any early success along such a road. After all, the revolution in each country could be made only by the people of that country. Would it not be likely to produce a greater effect on the mind of the wage-earners in every advanced industrial country, and on those of the oppressed natives of every capitalist colony, if socialism were successfully established in a single great country ; if it were made manifest that the landlord and the capitalist could be dispensed with, and if social equality and economic security were in that country seen to be enjoyed by every family without distinction of colour or race, class or position ? The building-up of socialism in a single country was, in fact, in itself the most promising method of causing proletarian revolutions elsewhere ; and of propagating communist theories in a way to which the capitalist governments would find it difficult to take exception.

From War to Peace ,

We trace to the year 1928 the effective change of the policy of the Soviet Government in its foreign relations, from measures of hostility (largely through the Comintern), to measures of peace conducted by the USSR Government itself. The soviet leaders became, from that date, ever more absorbed in their gigantic task of building up the mining and manufacturing industry of their own country, in which they went from success to success. Their task proved more difficult than had been expected. The collectivisation and mechanisation of agriculture, seriously grappled with in 1928-1929, in the hope of removing permanently the menace of famine, was found to involve a severe struggle with the recalcitrant peasants, which for several years taxed to the utmost the powers of the Government and the Party, and prevented any scattering of effort in foreign parts. At the same time it became more and more evident that it was the degree of success attained in raising the standard of life in the USSR, and not the machinations of the Comintern and the local communist parties, that was most influential in the conversion to communism of the British and French working men. Moreover, on the coming of the great slump in 1929, opinion in western Europe and the United States, notably among business men, and even among economists, showed signs of change. Many influential people began seriously to lose faith in the capitalist system, which had previously seemed so secure. The Bolsheviks came to feel, not merely that they had a strong case to put before the world, but also that their arguments were likely to prevail among the thinkers as well as among the wage-earners, and that it required only the undeniable demonstration of continued economic success

in the USSR to convert to Soviet Communism a substantial part of the population of every capitalist country.

During the past seven years (1928-1935) the Soviet Government has, through its Foreign Office (Narkomindel) and its diplomatic agents, persistently striven for the establishment of genuinely peaceful relations with all foreign countries. Towards Japan, which has been guilty of provocation after provocation, in aggressive frontier incidents, in fishery disputes, and in repeated maltreatment of the soviet officials administering the jointly owned railway through Manchuria, the Soviet Government has shown a dignified forbearance unusual among governments. It has finally sold the railway to the government which coveted it on the easiest of terms. At the same time, as the best means of averting attack, it has allowed to be known the extent of its preparations for defence, by concentration of a large fleet of bombing aeroplanes, and the accumulation of troops and all necessary stores along the Siberian railway—above all, by making the Far Eastern province as a whole, with all its garrison, self-supporting in munitions as well as in all other requisites, even if cut off from the rest of the USSR for a whole year. These measures of defence appear to have achieved their object. The Japanese General Staff seems to have recognised that they deprived the intended invasion of any prospect of success. Towards all other countries the Soviet Government has pursued a policy of appeasement. Litvinov, since 1930 in sole charge, as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, has repeatedly informed the diplomatic world that the Soviet Government entirely accepted the view that the internal organisation of a country was a matter for its own people to decide, and that there was no reason why nations adopting different economic and political systems should not live in amity together. The Soviet Government has, with quiet persistence, concluded pacts of non-aggression with all its neighbours who were willing to join, and all but Japan and Germany have done so. It has joined the League of Nations and taken a leading part in its work. It has thrown all its weight into the attempts to secure an all-round limitation of armaments. It has even secured recognition from the United States. On the accession of Hitler to power in Germany, with his never-disavowed project of territorial expansion eastward, the Soviet Government has welcomed the conclusion of a virtual alliance for mutual defence, first with France and then also with Czechoslovakia, with the concurrence of the other members of the Little Entente. Litvinov's lengthy speech to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) on December 20, 1933,¹ was a masterly exposition of the position of international relations among all the countries of the world, in which the necessity of maintaining the utmost friendliness one with another was emphasised. "Peace is indivisible", which is Litvinov's slogan, has travelled all over the globe. Stalin himself has come forward to receive with honour and

¹ English translation printed in full in the pamphlet *Our Foreign Policy* (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1934).

cordiality the successive ministers of foreign powers who travelled to Moscow during 1935 to cement friendly relations with a country whose martial strength and economic prosperity had demonstrably made it one of the world's Great Powers. There can be no doubt in the mind of any candid student that the policy in international relations of the Soviet Government, with the complete assent of its people, has to-day become one of non-interference and peace.¹ So far as the Soviet Government can lay down the conditions of the good life in international relations, it has done so by recognising the importance of making itself a model civilisation, which all the world will be attracted to follow; and of relying exclusively on the force of example as the most promising way of spreading soviet ideas.

This new outlook of the Soviet Government upon foreign affairs is well summarised in Litvinov's statement to the French press in July 1935. He described the three basic principles on which soviet policy was based. "First, the Soviet Government does not need land or property belonging to other countries and it therefore has no intention of making war upon anyone. Secondly, under the conditions of modern imperialism, *any war must be converted into a universal bloody clash and slaughter*; for under present-day conditions no war can be localised and no country is able to maintain neutrality, no matter how hard it may try. Thirdly, any war causes privations and sufferings primarily to the great masses, and the Government of the Soviet Union, which is a government of the toilers, is opposed to and hates war."²

¹ It has been remarked by a hostile critic (H. Rollin, in his *Histoire de la révolution russe*, pp. 153-279) that Lenin was much influenced by what he learnt from the writings of Clausewitz that war is only a continuation by other means of the policy pursued in peace. It may not be too fanciful to see in the momentous change in international relations made by the soviet authorities that the peaceful measures which they adopted increasingly from 1929 onwards have been but a continuation, by other means, of their previous policy. It was never hostilities as such that they wanted, but the conversion of other nations to communism; and it came to be recognised that this was more likely to result from the economic success of the USSR, which any war would seriously disturb, and which would otherwise serve as an exemplar, than by any inculcation of insurrection. What has finally changed the situation for the Soviet Government is the emergence, during the last few years, of three powerful aggressors (Japan under its militarists, Hitler's German Reich, and Mussolini's Italy), all alike bent on acquiring additional territory at the expense of the "satiated powers", among which the Soviet Union finds itself in company with the western parliamentary democracies and the United States. The imminent danger of a war in which all Europe might be involved, and in which the USSR might be the first to be attacked, compels the Soviet Union to range itself on the side of those capitalist powers who are at the same time seeking to resist fascism and to maintain the peace of the world.

² It will be remembered that the Soviet Government, in response to the request of the Government of the United States, gave a very definite undertaking against militant propaganda in the treaty of 1934. "Litvinov", said Mr. Chamberlin, "gave President Roosevelt a sweeping assurance which cannot be paralleled in soviet discussions of this delicate subject with other governments. Under this assurance the Soviet Government undertakes 'not to permit the formation or residence in its territory of any organisation or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organisation or group, or of representatives or officials of any organisation or group, which has as aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of or bring about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions' " (*Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, p. 235).

The Subversive Tactics of the Comintern

What, meanwhile, has been the policy of the Comintern, and, under its influence, that of the various local communist parties in other countries? The student of their several proceedings will, we think, conclude that, down to the end of 1934 at any rate, they continued unchanged in spirit and very little modified in substance. They were even invigorated from Moscow itself. The Sixth World Congress of the Third International, which took place at Moscow in 1928—apparently the most numerous attended of any that have been held—was a lively and disputatious gathering, which busied itself, in its 46 prolonged sessions, with interminable discussions about this or that source of dissatisfaction with the shortcomings and failures of the various local organisations.¹ The discussions in the Congress were dominated by Bukharin, who was, it is clear, acting as the mouthpiece of Stalin himself, with whom he professed to be in complete accord. This Congress, it has been said,² “performed the momentous task of providing the international communist movement with a definite programme”, and also with “the general lines of the policy actually to be followed by the Comintern and the Communist parties”. The conclusions of the Congress were embodied in an unusually lengthy programme, extending to nearly 30,000 words, which re-stated, in substance, the Communist Manifesto of 1848, enlivened by personal denunciation or abuse of most of the socialist or labour leaders of the European countries who remained outside the Communist Party. The rules binding upon every communist party in the world were completely revised. They expressly maintained the continuous control of every affiliated party by the standing committee at Moscow; and the obligation of every party to obey all directives given by such committee. The “programme” adopted by the Congress formally prescribed, as the final stage of the local party agitation in every country, “the general strike, conjointly with armed insurrection against the state power of the bourgeoisie”. “An absolutely essential condition precedent”, it was laid down, was “intensified revolutionary work in the Army and Navy”. Throughout all the activities “constitutional methods must unflinching be combined with unconstitutional methods”.

So far we see no substantial change of policy from that laid down by the previous world congress. The new feature was the emphasis laid upon the importance of building up socialism in the one country in which it had been established, and of making the communist parties of all the

¹ *The Programme of the Communist International* (New York, 1929, 96 pp.) is only one of the numerous publications in several languages giving the full text of the lengthy resolution and the rules. A verbatim report of the proceedings of all the 46 sessions was printed in successive issues of *International Press Correspondence* from July to September 1928. (A complete bound set of these issues of the French edition may be obtained from the Bureau des Éditions, Paris.) The proceedings and conclusions are critically analysed, from a special point of view, in *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1934, 261 pp.).

² *World Revolution and the USSR*, by Michael T. Florinsky (1934), p. 176.

other countries sufficiently powerful to prevent any attack upon the Soviet Union by their several capitalist governments, whom in due course they would be able to overthrow by armed insurrection after the troops had been subverted. It was with this double object that the communist parties were to continue to wage war upon all the other organisations of the workers in their several countries. By their exposure and denunciation of the social democratic or labour parties, who persisted in vain parliamentary struggles ; of the trade unions, who busied themselves with merely economic issues ; and of such bourgeois intellectuals as the philosophic anarchists, the Guild Socialists and the Fabians, the communist parties were to take from all these false prophets every vestige of working-class support, in order to concentrate in the Communist International the complete adhesion of the entire proletariat. It was in this way that the workers of the world were to unite for the destruction of all the governments other than that of the USSR, and, by means of this destruction, for the universal establishment of communism throughout the world.

Between 1928 and 1934 the communist parties in the different countries had each its own chequered history of spasmodic agitations and incessant defeats. For seven years no world congress was held, the assembly being often announced for the ensuing year, but always being postponed. Meanwhile the presidium and secretariat of the Comintern continued in active correspondence with each affiliated party, reprimanding them all in succession for their failure to gather strength, and frequently issuing "directives" on both policy and tactics. The full executive committee met regularly twice a year, when the attendance of a few of the members representing other countries was obtained. It must suffice to say that a study of these proceedings indicates that Moscow continued to prescribe not merely lawful but also definitely illegal agitational activities, which, it was publicly boasted, were carried on in defiance of the law in many countries with which the government of the USSR stood in friendly relations, no less than in others with which there was still no diplomatic intercourse. Continual efforts were made to subvert the soldiers and sailors ; political strikes were fomented ; mass demonstrations were held ; a "united front" with every working-class organisation was persistently demanded ("from below"), whilst the trade union and socialist leaders were nevertheless vilified and denounced as "social fascists" ; and no opportunity was neglected of trying to pull down the governments of the countries with which the Narkomindel (the Soviet Foreign Office) was simultaneously seeking to promote reciprocal intercourse and a mutual advantageous exchange of products. These openly avowed and persistent hostilities, conducted in almost every way short of military operations or armed insurrection, stood out increasingly in contrast with the attempts of the Soviet Foreign Office (Narkomindel) to strengthen the friendly relations of the USSR with all the capitalist powers.¹ To

¹ This is all the more remarkable because Stahn has been himself continuously a member of the presidium of the Comintern, which constitutes its standing executive, and at

put the issue squarely, was it practicable to combine the slogan of "Governments of the World, unite to preserve the peace of Europe" with the slogan of the Third International in 1928, "Workers of the world, unite to destroy all the capitalist governments"?

It may well be that some inkling of these contradictory trends in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union had a depressing effect on the constant agitation of the various communist parties in their pursuit of the world revolution. At any rate we notice, after 1930, without any avowed change of policy, or even any manifest change of heart, a gradual diminution in the volume of activities, alike in the Moscow committee and in most of the communist parties of both Europe and America, the effective membership of which seems to have fallen away in numbers. There is a general indisposition, against which Moscow makes no protest, to arrange for a further world congress; and this is year after year postponed. During the whole of the seven years 1928-1934 there is no substantial change in the tone of the pronouncements of D. Z. Manuïlsky, who, since the removal of Zinoviev, has acted as president of the Comintern, or in the publications by its other members.¹

The New Orientation of 1935

The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, which was at last held at Moscow in July and August 1935, differed in several ways from its predecessor of 1928.² The attendance appears to have been less than half in numbers, although the communist parties of over sixty countries were professedly represented. Although Stalin appeared on the platform at the opening meeting, and was in due course re-elected to the presidium of the Comintern, he did not address the Congress himself. It is significant that the report on the work of the Comintern as a whole, and on that of its Executive Committee, was made, not by

the same time a member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party, in concert with which the foreign policy of Narkomindel is necessarily determined. Moreover, D. Z. Manuïlsky, who took an active part in the 1928 Congress, and who succeeded Zinoviev in acting as president of the Comintern, has publicly declared that "not one important document of big international significance was issued by the Communist International without the most active participation of Comrade Stalin in its composition" (*Stalin, a collection of reminiscences and laudations published by Ogiz, Moscow, p. 93*; quoted in *Russia's Iron Age*, by W. H. Chamberlin, 1935, p. 178).

¹ See *Leading the World Proletariat to New Decisive Battles*, by O. Pyatnitsky and V. Khorin (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1934, 64 pp.); *World Communists in Action*, by J. Piatnitsky (London, 1931, 64 pp.); *Thèses et résolutions de la XI^{me} Assemblée Plénière* (Paris, 1931, 44 pp.); *Thèses et résolutions [of the Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International]* (Moscow, 1933, 36 pp.); *La Position de l'internationale communiste devant la crise, la guerre et le fascisme*, par O. Kuusinen (Paris, 1934, 88 pp.); *The Revolutionary Crisis is Maturing*, by D. Z. Manuïlsky [Speech at 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow, 1934, 70 pp.).

² Pending the publication of an official report, the proceedings at the Congress can be most conveniently followed in the successive issues of *International Press Correspondence* from July to December 1935, as well as in the unrevised reports in the *Moscow Daily News* for these months.

D. Z. Manuilsky, who had been acting as president, but by two of the other members (Piccoli the Italian, and Pieck the German).¹ The whole task of leading the Congress was entrusted, not to any soviet statesman, but to the Bulgarian Dimitrov, the hero of the German Reichstag fire trial, whose fervent speeches, though they lasted for many hours, were enthusiastically listened to. It was Dimitrov who moved the long resolution in which the Congress was assumed to formulate the new programme, and it was Dimitrov who was elected secretary of the Executive Committee to carry it into effect. At the same time it was announced that the resolution itself, together with the existing rules in which the Congress had made no alteration, stood referred to the new Executive Committee, for such alterations in them as might be called for.²

In the absence of a definite text of the programme and rules, the change, if any, that has been effected by the 1935 Congress cannot be determined with any precision. We infer that a definite attempt has been made by the soviet leaders to bring the whole Communist International, with its subordinate local parties, more nearly in line with the policy pursued by the Soviet Union through its Commissar of Foreign Affairs. We note that Dimitrov laid stress on the necessity for abandoning the habit of vilifying all the social democratic and trade union leaders who stood outside the local communist parties, and that he particularly blamed the confusing trick of denouncing them as "social fascists". He strongly urged that, in all countries of parliamentary democracy, the communist parties should make a sincere attempt to combine with these leaders and their organisations in a joint resistance to fascism, which was, in various forms in the different countries, the immediate enemy of all working-class movements. This "united front" was to be demanded, no longer as hitherto "from below", by incitements to the masses to revolt against their leaders, but "from above", by persuading these leaders of its urgent necessity if any working-class movement was to survive.³ At the same time, however, Dimitrov seems to have insisted, perhaps as a sop to the prejudices of his hearers, that the local communist

¹ He had made a long speech to the plenum of the Executive Committee of Comintern in December 1933, describing the accession to power of Hitler, *La Lutte pour l'Allemagne des Soviets*, par Wilhelm Pieck (Bureau des Editions, Paris, 1934, 96 pp.).

² It is an ironical comment on the ambiguities of the widely reported speeches at the World Congress of 1935, that these speeches led to a renewal of the serious diplomatic protests of the United States and some other governments against the militant propaganda of the local communist parties. What the activities of these parties during the past few years had not produced, was suddenly produced by the boastful exaggerations of their delegates to the Moscow Congress—just at the moment when the soviet statesmen were seeking to bring about the change from the tactics of war to the tactics of peace.¹ It is these public avowals of seditious activities which, by their effect on public opinion, compel foreign governments to withdraw from friendly cooperation with the Soviet Government, perhaps even to the extent of suspending diplomatic relations.

³ This new policy of a "united front from above" in resistance to fascism could point to one achievement of importance. The pro-fascist demonstration in the streets of Paris in February 1934, which led to the resignation of the Daladier Ministry and its replacement by a "National Government" under Doumergue, seriously alarmed all the working-class organisations. After prolonged consultations a "Pact of United Action" was signed on

parties, whilst joining hands with the trade unions and the labour and socialist parties in resisting fascism — perhaps also in promoting the closer alliance of their governments with the Government of the USSR—were nevertheless to continue unrestrained their own active propaganda in favour of a complete communist revolution in their several countries, almost certainly entailing armed insurrection. Whether these or any other of Dimitrov's propositions will be expressly embodied in the programme and rules as revised by the Executive Committee is, at the time of writing, unknown.

If we are correct in our inference that the soviet statesmen have attempted to bring about a radical change in the policy or tactics of the Comintern (and incidentally also in those of the Profintern), together with those of the affiliated communist parties in the parliamentary democracies, we think the decision a wise one. The events of the past decade indicate that there is no likelihood of any early communist revolution in any of these parliamentary democracies, or in any of their colonial dependencies. There is a nearer danger, in one or other country, of *drastic repression of any working-class activities, with new statutory restrictions of democratic liberties*. Even an outbreak of war among the European powers, which would endanger the progress of the Soviet Union and might even destroy the civilisation of Great Britain and France, affords, in the present state of education among the masses, no prospect of the establishment of a communist social order upon the ruins that the war would leave. If it were possible to avert these dangers by bringing about an effective unity among all the working-class organisations within each nation, if only a unity for defensive action, the gain would be great. Such a defensive unity would bring, not only the communist parties, but also the other working-class organisations of the western world, into line with the policy in international relations which Stalin and Litvinov have been pursuing during the past five years.

The United Front from Above

We cannot say that the prospect of obtaining such a unity in any country but France (and permanently not even throughout all France) is at all bright. To begin with, it remains to be seen whether the new policy of the Comintern will be promulgated by the Executive Committee in the clear and unambiguous language, without evasive reservations, that alone would be likely to ensure its genuine adoption by the communist parties in the various countries. With relatively few exceptions,

July 27, 1934, by the leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties, for a joint campaign to defend democratic liberties, to prevent preparations for a new war, to abolish the ministerial decrees (issued otherwise than by direction of the Assembly), and to combat the fascist terror in Germany and Austria. In the course of the joint campaign the two parties agree not to attack or criticise each other, but otherwise each retains freedom of recruitment and propaganda "though refraining from insulting the other" (*France in Merment*, by Alexander Werth, 1934, p. 285).

these parties are not made up of the right sort of people. For the most part they are, at any rate, the very opposite of the elaborately instructed, strictly disciplined and willingly obedient men and women whom Lenin enrolled as professional revolutionaries in the Bolshevik party of 1903-1914. Whilst many of them in various countries have displayed the utmost courage and devotion, even to the point of martyrdom for the cause, it is rebellion that is in their blood, not social reconstruction; it is combating their enemies that they are after, not converting these opponents to communism. If, whilst not actually opposing or denouncing the other working-class organisations with whom they were joined in defensive alliance, they kept up, as they have hitherto done, a constant carping criticism of the separate action of the trade unions, or of the parliamentary activities of the labour and socialist parties, the defensive alliance would have neither strength nor stability. Will the Executive Committee at Moscow have the determination and the ability to make clear to these parties, without ambiguity or reservation, the imperative need of a change in tactics?

For our own part, we doubt whether it is practicable in the western democracies for any effective defensive alliance against fascism to be established among organisations so different in character and immediate objects as the trade unions, the socialist and labour political parties, and the communist parties affiliated to the Third International. Still more do we doubt whether in the western democracies the communist parties affiliated to the Third International can obtain through such a "united front" any substantial accession of strength for their avowed object of bringing about the establishment of a communist social order. For this doubt there seem to us to be two grounds. In the first place, such a defensive alliance among disparate and mutually antagonistic organisations, appealing for the allegiance of the masses of the people, serves rather to emphasise these differences, and may even make for the continuance of their common rivalry in pursuit of their several objects. This continuance of rival organisations may well interfere with, or even prevent the emergence of, a national organisation wholly devoted to the establishment of a communist social order, of a kind congenial to the aspirations of the particular country, and therefore able to make such an appeal to the masses of the people as would cause its more impotent rivals to wither away. There is reason to think that only after a coalescence into such a single united party could any of the western democracies, by parliamentary action, be transformed into a communist social order.

"Orders from Moscow"

There is the gravest ground for doubt whether the communist parties affiliated to the Third International could ever themselves attain the position of a single united party of the masses in any of the western democracies. We see no chance of any of these communist parties

securing either the coalescence with itself of the other organisations claiming working-class support, or absorbing into its ranks the mass of the members adhering to them. The peoples of the western democracies, like those of the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, will not stand government, or even authoritative direction, from a foreign capital, even if that capital is under a government with whose policy they are generally in sympathy. Experience indicates that no popular movement will ever become powerful in any country, or at least in any in which the Protestant religion has prevailed, if it is believed to take its orders from, or to be controlled by, the governing group of any foreign country. It was not the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church against which our Plantagenet and Tudor rulers so often rebelled in England, but specifically against "government from Rome". It might even be argued that the Roman Catholic Church has become more successful in its missionary efforts in Protestant countries since it became unconnected with the Roman government. There is reason to believe that communism would, in many countries, spread faster if it were not supposed to involve government from Moscow. "We are not going to take our orders from Moscow" is the spoken or unspoken reaction of any assembly of British workmen towards any resolution proposed by a member of the British Communist Party repudiating the policy or defaming the character of the chosen leaders of the socialist or trade union or cooperative movement of Great Britain. Our conclusion is that, somehow or other, the appearance and the fact of "orders from Moscow" must be dropped out of communist propaganda.¹ Is it not chiefly a mistaken adherence to an "orthodoxy" of the past that prevents the Comintern from making it clear that it now restricts its relations with the various communist parties to offering them such "information, sympathy and material aid" as they may from time to time desire; while disclaiming all intention or desire to direct or control their local activities? It is the people of each country who will insist on themselves directing their own policy and that of their government. It is only by the conversion of each people to communism, of the brand which it may prefer, that communism of any kind will spread. Is it too paradoxical to suggest that the soviet statesmen are coming to recognise that it is the Third International itself, with its insistence upon the dictation to all peoples, or at any rate to the communist parties of all countries, of one particular social order, that excites repulsion?² There seems much to be said for the view that the con-

¹ It does not seem that Lenin insisted on "government from Moscow". We find him saying that "There is one, and only one kind of real internationalism; hard work at developing the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own land, and the support (by propaganda, sympathy and material aid) of such, and only such struggles and policies in every country without exception". Thus he did not always insist on the local activities being directed, still less governed from Moscow (*Lenin's Collected Works*, vol. xx, Book I. of 1929 American edition; see *New Minds, New Men?* by Thomas Woody, New York, 1932, p. 257).

² Was this the reason for the repeated postponement of the Seventh World Congress, which ought to have been held in 1930 but was not summoned until 1935?

version to communism of the peoples of other countries—and therefore the world revolution for which Lenin and his colleagues vainly looked in 1918—is likely to come about more quickly by the successful building up of the socialist state in the USSR, and the discovery of this success by the thinkers as well as by the working masses of the other countries, than by any dictatorial instigation of the Comintern itself. A cool observer of the world's public opinion might well conclude that, at the present time, Moscow's most effective agents for converting both Europe and America to communism are not the Communist International and its affiliated communist parties, but VOKS and Infourist; ¹ the periodical theatre and musical festivals that attract so many appreciative visitors; and especially the various international conferences which force the chemists, the physiologists, the doctors, the educationists, the engineers and other specialists in all the countries of the world to compare the relative progress in their particular technologies of the USSR with their own lands.²

A New World Order

We note that there are critics of the Soviet Government who assert that its change over in international relations from a policy of war to a policy of peace for the sake of a quick success in its own country, was a "betrayal of the world proletariat". Such critics take the change to

¹ VOKS is the Society for Promoting Cultural Relations with other countries; and Infourist is the government tourist agency.

² Another kind of international organisation might with advantage be added. Socialism and communism have passed beyond the stage of mere rebellion, easily to be confused with anarchism. The Soviet Government has come to a position of commanding influence in world affairs. Socialist administrations are actually in office in several other countries. In others there are socialist oppositions awaiting only an electoral victory to assume ministerial office. Hundreds of cities in France, Great Britain and other countries are governed by socialist municipal councils. Experience has proved that it is not practicable to combine for political purposes the representatives of governments with those of agitational groups, many of them "illegal". What seems suggested is a new body in which socialist or communist statesmen and municipal administrators (in general agreement about eliminating the landlord and the capitalist, and dispensing with the incentive of private profit) could periodically compare experiences, and discuss the relations of the trade union and cooperative movements to the political government, and the many problems of a collectivist administration, in each of the branches of social organisation, such as education, health, the conditions of labour in mining, manufacturing and agriculture respectively, taxation, credit and currency, international relations, and the prospects of a world government. Such a periodical conference, meeting successively in the different state capitals that would welcome it; holding separate sessions for the several subjects; and regarding itself exclusively as a scientific body, would constitute a worthy crown to the various institutes in the social sciences established or assisted by the several governments. If it were attended by the ministers, ex-ministers and probable future ministers of the several departments in the various countries, and if socialist or communist specialist experts in the subjects concerned were invited to contribute reports and papers, it would not be necessary to come to any agreement on any issue, and, following the practice of scientific conferences, not even to pass any resolutions. The object would not be the outvoting of minorities by majorities, but the discovery of truth. The validity of the conclusions arrived at on the several subjects could, anyhow, not be determined by the delegates' votes. The papers and discussions themselves would advance the knowledge of those on whom, in each country, the responsibility of action must fall; and thus contribute more powerfully to the building up of the various socialist states of the world, than any amount of agitation.

mean that the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have deliberately given up the aim that Lenin pursued of "world communism"

of eventually bringing about in every capitalist country a "classless society", based on social equality and universal economic security, in the midst of plenty for all men, irrespective of race or colour; thereby not merely spreading everywhere the conditions of the Good Life, but also superseding war between nations. This accusation is unfounded. Those who are leading and directing soviet policy to-day are not less fervent than Lenin in the desire for world communism, and in the belief that it will be brought about. On the contrary, their belief and their desire have alike been confirmed and strengthened. Lenin, following Marx, looked to the future solely with the eye of faith. Stalin and his colleagues feel that to them it has been given to add to this vision the solid basis of achievement—achievement in no small measure of the actual building of the socialist state over one-sixth of the world's surface, among what will shortly be 200 millions of people, of vastly differing races and of every stage of civilisation from sheer savagery to a culture inferior to none. With so much achievement in little more than a decade, Soviet Communism cannot but stride forward with ever-growing confidence in the spread of its doctrine.

What has happened to the international policy of the Soviet Union during the past seven years is not a change of aim but a change of tactics. The objective remains the same; but about the procedure by which it can be reached with the least delay there has been a change of mind, perhaps even a change of heart. Soviet statesmen have been compelled to realise that no progress was being made towards the outbreak of communist revolutions in the western democracies, still less was there any hope of such insurrections attaining any immediate success. Some at least of these statesmen recognise the futility of seeking to manoeuvre the workers of other countries, with quite other traditions, and enjoying a standard of life and a measure of freedom and economic security far greater than those of Tsarist Russia, into attempting a violent revolution in their several communities, probably entailing a disastrous civil war. On the other hand stands an alternative method of propaganda, that of erecting a shining example of socialism in a single country, which can be imitated elsewhere, and which is already extorting, even from a prejudiced and reluctant world, an ever-increasing curiosity, interest and admiration. It is, we believe, the large measure of success of this kind already obtained by the tactics of peace that has persuaded the soviet statesmen more and more steadfastly to abandon the tactics of war, in their unflinching pursuit of their original aim of a communism extending the whole world over. It is, in short, by means of their own devotion to the establishment of the Good Life, not only in their own country, but also in its relations to other countries, that they are now hoping and expecting to see it adopted elsewhere. In the following epilogue we venture to give our answer to the question whether the world is not here witnessing the emergence of a new civilisation.

EPILOGUE

A NEW CIVILISATION ?

As we have seen, the Bolsheviks consider that what they are doing among the 170 millions of people of the USSR is much more than introducing them to newspapers and books, the theatre and the opera ; or improving their health, and increasing their wealth production. What they believe themselves to be establishing in the world is nothing less than a new civilisation.

Now there is no generally accepted definition of what amount or kind of change in the manner of living among a whole people constitutes a different civilisation. Nevertheless it is commonly recognised that certain contemporary communities are, in the aggregate, sufficiently unlike to warrant us in speaking of them as distinct civilisations. Thus, there is substantial agreement that the Chinese, the Hindus, the Moslems and the Christianised white Europeans (including their descendants in other continents) belong to different civilisations. Moreover, within historic times, other civilisations have existed and passed away. We need only instance the Sumerian and the Egyptian ; to which some would add, as equally distinctive, the civilisations of Troy and of Tyre, of Etruria and of Carthage, and doubtless those of other defunct communities that further archaeological researches may uncover.

It is plain that many different factors may enter into the making of a distinctive civilisation.¹ To some the most important seems the nature

¹ The word "civilisation" is sometimes used in the singular to denote the progress of human society from primitive to civilised ; and sometimes in the plural in order to distinguish one civilisation from another. Thus Professor Arnold Toynbee, in his brilliant and erudite *Study of History*, vols. i.-iii., enumerates (after dismissing the 600-odd primitive societies) 27 distinct civilisations within historic times, of which 5 survive to-day. These are : Western Civilisation, which, as he observes, has succeeded in embracing within its system not only Europe and North America, but also all navigable seas, and all the ports of the world ; and four other extant civilisations, the Islamic, Hindu, Far Eastern and "Orthodox" Christianity. This last example of an extant civilisation is difficult to identify to-day, as the Greek Orthodox Church, as distinct from the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, which characterise what he calls Western Civilisation, barely exists now that the vast Eurasian continent has rejected its creed and code of conduct. Perhaps Professor Toynbee sees a survival of Christianity in the communist's aim of "from each according to his faculty, and to each according to his need".

On the other hand, H. T. Buckle, in his famous *History of Civilisation in England* (1857), seems to regard "civilisation" as taking different forms, largely determined in the past by different climatic environments, but distinguished in its latest and most developed form by the rise of science as a way of controlling nature.

Seignobos, the French historian, divides "civilisation" into ancient and modern. He makes the end of ancient civilisation to be the death of Charlemagne ; but he also differentiates mediaeval civilisation from contemporary civilisation. He even mentions that, in the eleventh century, the world was divided into two civilisations : the West, with its miserably small towns, cabins of peasants, rude fortresses, etc. ; and the East, with Constantinople, Cairo, Bagdad, Damascus—the Moslem and Byzantine worlds being far better built, better policed and more enlightened than the western world. "By

and character of its particular religion. Those communities in which Christianity has been dominant stand out from the rest. In other instances, as in China, racial characteristics afford the most noticeable difference. What may be called the political organisation of a community has sometimes—for instance, in feudalism—served as the mark of a distinct civilisation. Even more distinctive of different manners of life may be the economic organisation, as in the contrast between communities living mainly by hunting or fishing, or by rearing cattle, or by cultivating the soil; and those engaging extensively in commerce, or, with the constantly increasing use of power-driven machinery, in mining and manufacturing. Or we may notice whether the several families of a community habitually work for themselves; or whether, as slaves, serfs or wage-labourers, the majority serve the owners of the means of production.

For our present purpose there is no need to discuss all known or possible civilisations. It will suffice to start from the common division of the three thousand years' history of Europe since the days of Homer into the three successive civilisations that are covered respectively by the story of Greece and Rome; by the widespread adoption of Christianity and feudalism; and by the modern world from 1492 down to our own day. Everyone is familiar with the characteristics of contemporary civilisation of this specifically European kind, which has undoubtedly resulted in great progress and has been carried by white settlers, traders or travellers all over the world. It will suffice to emphasise its four main features. First in date stands the Christian religion, with the code of conduct that it inculcates. Then, increasingly after the fifteenth century, comes the so-called capitalist system of the private ownership of property, notably in the means of production, to be utilised, under the direction of the owners, upon the incentive of the making of profit either by the employment of workers at wages or by trading in goods; or latterly, by the manipulation of money and credit by the financiers. Further we

contact with the orientals the people of the west became civilised" (see his *History of Mediaeval Civilisation*, pp. 110-117; also his *History of Civilisation: Contemporary*).

In the *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, by A. Rostovtzeff, the author describes the decay of ancient civilisations, which he attributes (1) to the penetration of lower classes and lower races into the government of the Roman Empire; and (2) to the rise of the Christian religion, which distracted men's minds from perfecting human life in this world, to securing personal salvation in the next (see chapter i.). His conclusion is significant: "The evolution of the ancient world has a lesson and a warning for us. Our civilisation will not last unless it be a civilisation, not of one class but of the masses. The oriental civilisations were more stable and lasting than the Greco-Roman, because, being chiefly based on religion, they were nearer to the masses. Another lesson is that violent attempts at levelling have never helped to uplift the masses. They have destroyed the upper classes, and resulted in accelerating the process of barbarisation. But the ultimate problem remains like a ghost, ever present and unaid. Is it possible to extend a higher civilisation to the lower classes without debasing its standard and diluting its quality to the vanishing point? Is not every civilisation bound to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses?" (*ibid.* p. 486). This reminds us of one of the paradoxical dicta of Bernard Shaw that the conversion of savages to Christianity has involved the conversion of Christianity to savagery.

notice, continuously during the past two centuries, even if apparently momentarily arrested, a widespread trend towards government on the system of parliamentary democracy. Finally we have to note during the past hundred years, as peculiar to this particular civilisation, an unprecedented increase, through knowledge, of man's command over Nature, along with an increasing application of science, under the influence of humane feeling, to the amelioration of the lot of some sections of the poor. Such being the starting point, the question that is asked is whether what is developing in the USSR since 1917 is so markedly different from the manner of life in the England or the France or the United States of the past three or four centuries as to justify calling it a new civilisation. Let us try to set out the features in which Soviet Communism differs essentially from the characteristic civilisation of the western world of to-day.

The Abolition of Profit-making

We place first in far-reaching importance the complete discarding, as the incentive to production, of the very mainspring of the western social order, the motive of profit-making. Instead of admiring those who successfully purchase commodities in order to sell them again at a higher price (whether as merchant or trader, wholesale dealer or retailer), Soviet Communism punishes such persons as criminals, guilty of the crime of "speculation".¹ Instead of rewarding or honouring those (the capitalist employers or entrepreneurs) who engage others at wages in order to make a profit out of the product of their labour, Soviet Communism punishes them as criminals, guilty, irrespective of the amount of the wages that they pay, of the crime of "exploitation". It would be difficult to exaggerate the difference that this one change in ideology (in current views of morality as well as in criminal law) has made in the manner of life within the USSR. No one can adequately realise, without a wide study of the facts of soviet life, what this fundamental transformation of economic relationships has meant, alike to the vast majority of the poor and to the relatively small minority who formerly "lived by owning", or by employing others for profit.

The change has not had the particular results anticipated by our capitalist reasoning. It has not meant compulsion to take service under the government as the only employer.² It has not prevented millions of individuals from working independently, or in voluntary partnerships, for their own or their family's subsistence. It does not forbid either the independent producers or the producing partnerships to sell the product of their own labour in the public market, or by contract, for any price they can get. It has not involved the abolition of personal property, or any compulsion to have all things in common. It has not prevented

¹ Compare the mediæval crime of "regrating", and the sin of usury; as to which see *The Acquisitive Society*, by Professor R. H. Tawney (1931).

² See Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer", and Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

inequality of possessions, or of incomes, or even difference of earnings. The payment of interest on government loans, and the receipt of interest on deposits in the savings bank, have not ceased. But the habit of able-bodied persons living without work has become disgraceful, however great may be their savings or their other possessions; and the class of wealthy families, whether as owners of land, employers of labour or rentiers and financiers, has ceased to exist. More important still is that the control of the instruments of wealth production by individuals seeking to enrich themselves, and the power of the landlord and the capitalist over those whom they can employ at wages, or from whom they can exact rent, has passed away.

The Planning of Production for Community Consumption

The abolition of profit-making as the incentive to the capitalist entrepreneur, together with the transfer to collective ownership of the principal means of production thereby involved, made indispensable the deliberate planning of the production of commodities and services. Instead of the individual capitalists producing what they severally thought they could make profit out of, and incidentally vying with each other to satisfy the desires of such consumers as could, by having the means to pay the price, make their demand "effective", some national authority had to work out statistically and communicate to each factory or mine its own particular share of exactly what the whole community of consumers, irrespective of their means, needed and desired. For this purpose every factory or mine, every farm or oil-field, every institute or office, and indeed every enterprise, whether industrial or cultural, now makes a return showing what machinery and materials it is using, and what commodities and services it has been and expects to be producing, to be compared with next year's aggregate needs and desires of the whole community. This enormous calculation, which was, in every other country, thought to be beyond human capacity, is, as we have described,¹ actually performed in the USSR by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), in incessant consultation with the powerful All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, the highly organised Consumers' Cooperative Movement, and the several People's Commissars directing the tens of thousands of separately administered factories, mines, oil-fields, state farms, warehouses, ships, railways and what not. We cannot discuss again whether or to what extent this gigantic planning is successful in ensuring that every person in the USSR gets the commodities and services that he needs or desires.² But if we notice that the work of Gosplan does, in fact, relieve the USSR from the alternation of booms and slumps that characterise the capitalist world—still more if we realise that this deliberate planning of all production for community consump-

¹ Chapter VIII. in Part II., "Planned Production for Community Consumption".

² *Ibid.*

tion ensures the complete abolition of involuntary mass unemployment, whether "technological" or "cyclical"—we can hardly deny that the new system effects a startling transformation in the economic relationships of the whole community, which has changed the very mentality of the producers, whether administrators, technicians or manual workers. The highly organised trade unions of the USSR, containing over 18 million members, are not only whole-heartedly in favour of increasing the productivity of labour by such devices as piece-work rates, cost-accounting, and competing among themselves as to who can make the greatest output at the lowest labour cost, but are also constantly pressing for the adoption of more and more labour-saving inventions, in order that the machine may increasingly become the slave of mankind. This is because there is no longer any conflict of interests in production. Whether between enterprises or between grades or kinds of workers or producers, there is, as is commonly said in the USSR, no enemy party; no person's gain is rooted in another person's loss. Every individual engaged in production, whether of commodities or of services, benefits materially by increased or improved production, and by the zealous and efficient service of every other producer. When it is realised that everybody's share of the aggregate net product is made actually greater by any increase or improvement of that product, it is actually and visibly to everybody's pecuniary interest that no one should be inefficient, no one idle, no one negligent, no one sick. There is a universal and continuous incentive to every producer, whether manual worker or technician, to improve his qualifications, and to render the utmost service, in order to increase the common wage fund, which is wholly divided without any tribute to landlord or capitalist, among the whole body of producers, according to the sharing arrangements that the whole body of producers themselves make. Hence the eager zeal and devotion of the "shock brigades" (*udarniki*) to do more work than is customary, and the public honours that are accorded to them. Hence the unpaid service of the "Saturday-ers" (*subbotniki*), who give up their free time to clearing off arrears in any enterprise that lags behind its programme. Hence the "socialist competitions" in which shifts or brigades, factories or oil-fields, ships or state farms, and even municipalities and republics, enter into formal agreements to vie with one another as to which can achieve the greatest output or create the least "scrap", or build the greatest number of new schools, or establish the most technical classes, or erect the most new dwellings over a given period. And most remarkable of all, from the angle of western competitive sportsmanship, it is from the same unity of interest that springs the custom of the winning team in these competitions making it a matter of honour immediately to proceed to the assistance of the losing team, in order to teach those who have failed in the competition how they can improve their production so as not again to fall behind that of the winners. The unity of pecuniary interest extends, in fact, to all the various enterprises in the USSR. Each becomes

eager to help every other enterprise, whether of the same or of any different kind, to attain the greatest possible product, because it is the aggregate net product of all the enterprises in the USSR that provides not only all the social services (the socialised wage) but also the wage-fund to be shared among the producers (their personal wage); so that not only the divisible income of each enterprise, but also that of the other enterprises, and thus the share of all the producers of all kinds and grades in all the enterprises, ultimately depends upon the total net output of the whole of them.

Social Equality and Universalism

It is claimed that the whole social organisation of Soviet Communism is based upon a social equality that is more genuine and more universal than has existed in any other community. To engage in socially useful work, according to capacity, is a universal duty. It is a distinct novelty in social life that there should be no exemption from this duty in favour of the possessors of wealth or the owners of land, the holders of high offices, or those having exceptional intellectual or artistic gifts or attainments, the geniuses or the popular favourites. Work, like leisure, has to be shared by all able to join in social service. There is only a single social grade in the USSR, that of a producer by hand or by brain; including, however, those so young that they can only prepare themselves for becoming producers, and those so aged or so infirm as only to be able to look back on the work they did in their strength. This is what is meant by the "classless society", in which each serves in accordance with his ability, and is provided for appropriately to his needs.

The depth of the difference between this manner of living and that of capitalist states is scarcely to be fathomed. But it involves the very opposite of uniformity or identity among all men. It not only allows, but even actively encourages and promotes, the utmost development of individuality in social service. Nor does it produce an exact equality of earnings or other income; although the prohibition of profit-making by "speculation", or "exploitation", and the collective ownership of all the principal means of production, coupled with drastically progressive income taxes and death duties on exceptional individual fortunes, effectively prevent the gross inequalities which threaten the stability of states in which millionairism is not only tolerated but allowed to become a plutocracy.

But the principle of social equality goes much further than community in work and leisure, common schooling and games, with a constant approximation to substantial equality of standards of income and expenditure. It extends, in a manner and to a degree unknown elsewhere, to the relations between the sexes, and within the family group. Husbands and wives, parents and children, teachers and scholars, like friends of different sexes, or of not too unequal incomes, like managers and factory

operatives, administrators and typists, and even army officers and the rank and file, live in an atmosphere of social equality and of freedom from servility or "inferiority complex" that is unknown elsewhere. What is still more unique is the absence of prejudice as to colour or race. The hundred or more different races and language groups of the USSR of nearly all shades of colour, including the wildest nomads and the most rooted townsmen, the most urbane diplomatists and the most primitive barbarians, enjoy not only complete identity of legal and political rights, but also the fullest equality of freedom in economic and social relations. Wherever schools exist at all, those living within reach are educated in common; they work together at wage-rates differentiated only by differences in the tasks; they use the same public conveyances, the same hotels and holiday homes, the same public utilities; they join the same trade unions and other voluntary associations; they sit side by side in the lecture-rooms, libraries, theatres and cinemas. They form mutual friendships irrespective of race or colour, and intermarry freely. Again, there is no imposition of a central pattern. On the contrary, the cardinal bond of the Soviet Union is the guarantee to each "national minority" of its own "cultural autonomy". Each maintains its own vernacular, its own schools, its own newspapers, its own publishing houses, its own theatres; and they are all specially assisted to do so out of federal funds. What is more, each of the dozens of constituent or autonomous republics making up the USSR freely elects or appoints, if it chooses, its own people to the local representative bodies and to the local offices, and is vigorously incited and encouraged to do so by the Government at Moscow. It would be hard to over-estimate the sense of freedom and equality—far exceeding that of the corresponding arrangements as to "natives" in analogous dependencies of other states—produced by this effective cultural autonomy and local government by officials of one's own race.

There is yet another feature in the social equality of the civilisation of the Soviet Union which we term "universalism". Other communities have willingly acquiesced in the fact that the advantages and amenities which their civilisation provides, including most of the luxuries of life, do not reach the poorest or weakest, or least developed, or least thrifty or least well-conducted members of the community. The current economic and social arrangements do not enable these unfortunates to reach the same standard of health and education, or to attain the same longevity or intellectual development, or even to procure the amount of food, clothing and shelter that is deemed necessary and normal among the more favoured classes. A few such communities are, in the twentieth century, just beginning to realise these features of the inequality in which their social life is rooted. It is a distinctive feature of the social arrangements of the Soviet Union¹ that, to a degree unparalleled elsewhere, they provide for every person, irrespective of wealth or position, sex or

¹ See Chapter X. in Part II., "The Remaking of Man".

race, the poorest and weakest as well as those who are "better off", in all cases equality of opportunity for the children and adolescents, and, increasingly, also a common and ever-rising standard of living for the whole population. This is well seen in the sphere of education. Other communities, especially during the past century or two, have striven to create educated, and even cultivated classes within the nation. The Soviet Union is the first to strive, without discrimination of sex or race, affluence or position, to produce not merely an intelligentsia but a cultivated nation.

A Novel Representative System

In every community of any magnitude, social organisation has to include a system by means of which the desires and the common will of the population can be expressed. In contrast with every other community, the USSR has evolved a complex and multiform representative system of complete originality, based upon the principle of universal participation in public affairs, under the guidance of a highly organised leadership of a unique kind. As we have described,¹ man is represented in three separate capacities, as a citizen, as a producer and as a consumer. In each case the franchise is the widest in the world, though with peculiar and steadily dwindling disqualifications, whilst the extent to which the entire population actually participates in elections is without parallel. The representative system has hitherto been, above the 70,000 village or city soviets, one of indirect election; but it was in 1935 decided to replace this by direct election upon a franchise uniform among both sexes, all races, and every kind of occupation, throughout the USSR.

It is impossible to enumerate all the channels, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the extent, of the participation in the public affairs of the Soviet electorate of over 90 millions of men and women. The characteristic multiformity of every kind of soviet organisation, economic or political, together with its threefold system of representation, and the omniscience, as regards powers and functions, of each tier of councils in its ubiquitous local government, are in vivid contrast with the dominance of the parliamentary systems of the western world. To begin with, the universal electorate in the USSR does a great deal more than elect. At its incessant meetings it debates and passes resolutions by the hundred thousand, in which it expresses its desires on great matters and on small; by way of instructions or suggestions to the "deputies" whom it chooses and can at any time withdraw by a vote of "recall", and who habitually take notice of these popular requirements, even when it is not found immediately practicable to carry them into effect. Nor does the participation in public affairs end with the perpetual discussions in which the Russian delights. In every village, as in every city, a large part of the

¹ See Chapter II., "Man as a Citizen"; Chapter III., "Man as a Producer"; Chapter IV., "Man as a Consumer", all in Part I.; also Chapter IX. in Part II., "In Place of Profit".

detailed work of public administration is actually performed, not as in France or Great Britain or the United States, by paid officials, and not even, as in small or primitive communities, by the elected deputies or councillors, but by a far larger number of the adult inhabitants themselves, as part of the universally expected voluntary social service.

The same characteristic multiformity and popular participation prevails also in the extensive and highly organised trade unionism, in which are voluntarily included five-sixths of all the persons employed at wages or salaries, whatever their occupations or grade or remuneration. The trade unions by no means confine themselves to their extensive collective bargaining over wages and hours, and other conditions of employment, which far exceeds that of the trade unions elsewhere, together with their active share in the administration of the factory or the mine.¹ For instance, it is to the trade union organisation that is now committed not only the control but also the actual administration of the colossal services of social insurance, which are more extensive and costly than those in any other country, and to which the workers make no individual contribution. This huge administration is carried on, not wholly or even mainly by the paid officials whom the trade unions appoint, or by the committees which they elect, but personally, without remuneration, by something like 100,000 "activists" among the trade unionists themselves as part of their social service.

The Consumers' Cooperative Movement, which numbers over 70 million members, displays a like multiformity of organisation, and a similar personal participation by its vast membership, in the complicated business of distributing over the huge area of the USSR the greater part of its food and other commodities.

Yet another variety is exhibited by the immense and highly differentiated voluntary associations, sometimes numbering even millions of members apiece. These multifarious self-governing associations, which often enjoy financial subventions, undertake public service of one or other kind; partly educational, partly propagandist, including also sports and games of every description, along with music, painting, dancing and acting, as well as active cooperation with various branches of government service, from the promotion of science and art up to the assistance of the defence forces.

The Vocation of Leadership

All the diversity of participation in the universal multiformity of organisation which distinguishes the USSR from every other country makes more than usually indispensable that leadership without which democracy, in any of its forms, is but a mob. It is on this point that the actual constitution of the Soviet Union, which is not completely written in any statute, differs most substantially from every other known to

¹ See Chapter III. in Part I., "Man as a Producer".

political science. In the USSR the function of affording to the population the necessary guidance of public affairs is assumed by a voluntary but highly organised and strictly disciplined Vocation of Leadership, which calls itself the Communist Party. It is, as we have explained,¹ unlike anything that the western world understands by the term "party" in the political sense. Far from seeking to enrol everyone professing agreement with its policy or "voting its ticket" or subscribing to its funds, the Communist Party of the USSR has a strictly limited membership, amounting to less than 3 per cent of the electorate, or less than 2 per cent of the census population, recruited exclusively by cooption, after prolonged probation, on qualifications of character, ability and zeal coupled with ungrudging acceptance of the existing régime. We need not repeat our description of the way in which this peculiar companionship is organised on the common pattern of indirect election; nor yet that of the higher standard of personal conduct than is expected from the ordinary citizen to which its members are held. Perhaps its most significant difference from the political parties of western politics may be found in the manner in which it maintains this standard by incessant corporate supervision, supplemented every few years by a systematic public examination of the entire vocation, and the drastic "purging" out of all backsliders and offenders, even to the extent of a fifth of the membership at a time. With its voluntarily assumed special obligations of "poverty" (limitation of salary by a common maximum) and "obedience" (willingness to undertake any service imposed by its own corporate authority), as well as in its enforcement of discipline only by the penalties of reprimand and expulsion, the Communist Party of the USSR may be thought to resemble in structure the typical religious order of the Roman Catholic or the Greek Orthodox Church. But unlike the monastic orders, the Communist Party employs its members exclusively in the secular occupations of citizenship; more than half of them continuing their work at the bench or in the mine, and some 40 per cent filling the administrative or other offices to which they get elected or appointed. There is, however, a spiritual difference. It is an absolute condition of membership that the candidates must be free from any vestige of belief in supernaturalism, and that they must continue to adhere to "Marxism", as from time to time authoritatively determined.² Since the offering of guidance in public affairs by political leaders is an inevitable feature of civilised society, we may classify the Communist Party of the USSR as a professional association voluntarily qualifying itself specially for

¹ Chapter VI. in Part I., "The Vocation of Leadership".

² Moreover, the Communist Party in the USSR is unlike the religious order in not being subject to any chief imposed upon it from without, and being democratically governed by its own membership, dispersed in some 130,000 Primary Party organs, which elect a pyramid of tiers of committees, rising up to an All-Union Conference, with its central committee and sub-committees; Stalin, whom foreigners are apt to think of as a dictator, being merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee.

the exercise of this function, analogous to any other organised scientific profession.¹ For in the Soviet Union it is claimed that political science takes the place of the electioneering ballyhoo called politics in our western states.

Such an assumption of leadership and guidance in public affairs by a carefully selected, deliberately organised and strictly disciplined vocation plainly constitutes a fundamental difference between the USSR and every other community. Elsewhere this function of leadership and guidance is assumed, often without avowal, by monarchs, aristocracies, churches, military castes or, more recently, by the shifting juntas or groups, termed cabinets or parliaments, composed mostly of landowners, capitalist employers, financiers, merchants, bureaucrats, lawyers or mere accumulators of wealth, with more or less pretence of ascertaining and understanding the desires of the people at large, but to the habitual exclusion of more than a handful of the small peasants and manual working wage earners who make up two-thirds of the population.

We need not here attempt to measure the success or to estimate the value of this exceptional Vocation of Leadership, which may well be deemed the dominant political feature of Soviet Communism. The student of the past couple of decades of the USSR will not go far wrong if he ascribes to the outstanding members of the Communist Party the initiative and the decision issuing in nearly all the achievements, as well as some of the shortcomings, of the administration since the Revolution of 1917. Nor do we undervalue the passionate zeal and devotion of the far-flung membership when we suggest that it is the peculiar form of organisation of this Vocation of Leadership, which seems to have been devised and principally worked out by Lenin and Stalin themselves, that is responsible for much of the amazing degree of success against immense difficulties which our preceding chapters have had to recount. Nevertheless, as we have described in the preceding chapter, this concentration of authority in a highly disciplined Vocation has had its drawbacks; there has been an atmosphere of fear among the intelligentsia, a succession, within the Party, of accusations and counter-accusations, a denial to dissentient leaders of freedom of combination for the promotion of their views, and among the less intelligent of the rank and file, no small amount of the chronic disease of orthodoxy.

The Cult of Science

One of the differences between the soviet civilisation and that of other countries is the way in which science is regarded. Unlike the groups of landed proprietors, lawyers, merchants, bureaucrats, soldiers and journalists in command of most other states, the administrators in the Moscow Kremlin genuinely believe in their professed faith. And

¹ It is interesting to recall that essentially such a Vocation of Leadership, termed the Order of the Samurai, was suggested by Mr. H. G. Wells in 1905 in his book entitled *A Modern Utopia*.

their professed faith is in science. No vested interests hinder them from basing their decisions and their policy upon the best science they can obtain. Moreover, under the guidance of the Communist Party, public opinion in the Soviet Union has come, to an extent unparalleled elsewhere, to be overwhelmingly in favour of making the utmost use of science as manifested in labour-saving and wealth-producing machines and invention. The whole community is eager for new knowledge. There is no country, we imagine, in which so large and so varied an amount of scientific research is being carried on at the public expense, alike in the realm of abstract theory and in that of technology. There is certainly none in which there is so little chance of that frustration of science by the profit-making instinct of which the British and American scientists are now complaining.¹

This intense preoccupation, and even obsession, with science in the USSR has steadily increased during the past six years of the successive Five-Year Plans significantly enough, just at the time when even the United States has shut down much of its scientific activity. Nor is this contrast surprising. In the USSR the dominant purpose of everyone who takes part in public affairs is concentrated on increasing the aggregate wealth production, as the first condition of raising the cultural level of all the 170 millions of people. The instrument by which this universal levelling-up can be effected is, as is widely believed, science itself. As we have described in a previous chapter,² science is more and more dominating the schooling and the college training, and more and more enrolling in its service the most energetic and capable of the young. The continuous application of science to agriculture as well as to manufacture; to the discovery and utilisation of new substances, plants or animals, as well as to the improvement of those already known; to the development without limit of electric power and its use, not only in the various forms of communication and transport, but also in altogether novel transformations of the processes of mining and metallurgy, opens up a bright vista of what may amount to a new "Industrial Revolution" in which, if only a parallel development in sociology and ethics enables it to avoid the mistakes of the previous centuries, the population of the USSR may give a practical example of what was meant by the old stipulation "unless you be born again".

"Anti-Godism"

The feature in Soviet Communism that has most scandalised the western world is undoubtedly the widespread "anti-godism" which is common to the Soviet Government and a large, and apparently a steadily increasing, proportion of the whole population. An aggressively dogmatic atheism denies the existence, and the possibility of the existence,

¹ See, for instance, *The Frustration of Science*, by Sir A. Daniel Hall and others, edited by Professor F. Soddy (1933).

² Chapter XI. in Part II., "Science the Salvation of Mankind".

of anything supernatural behind or beyond what science can apprehend or demonstrate. This sweeping denial has, it is claimed, the merit of a public and persistent repudiation of the equivocal hypocrisy in which the governments and churches of other countries, together with hosts of merely conventional Christians, are to-day implicated. That is, for the remaking of man, no small matter. It is not with impunity that nations or individuals, outgrowing any genuine faith in a personal deity who hears their prayers and governs alike the ocean and the earthquake, the harvest and the hearts of men, can continue to practise rites and accept religious institutions as if they were still believers. No code of conduct professedly based on the supposed commands of an all-powerful ruler will outlast the discovery that it has, in fact, no such foundation. One result of this widely spread equivocation is seen in the practical abandonment at the present time by millions of young persons in Europe and America, not only of Christianity, but also, along with it, of nearly all the commandments by which their parents were guided, without acquiring any substitute. Another result is the actual retrogression, in principles and in acts, of this or that nominally Christian country, if not of many of them, to the characteristics not of civilisation but of barbarism -- the blood-lust and sadism accompanying the worship of a tribal god -- out of which they seemed to have emerged centuries ago. All this is noticeably increasing the number of those who think that there is something to be said for the paradoxical claim of Soviet Communism that it is, in morals as well as in economics and political science, actually leading the world.

The spokesmen of Soviet Communism defend their attitude towards religion also on other grounds. They are engaged in the colossal task of raising to a higher level of civilisation, not only the workers in the cities, but also the huge mass of barbarian and even savage peoples of the backward regions of the USSR -- the entirely unlettered races of the Arctic Circle or the Central Asian mountains, the nomadic tribes, the scattered hunters and fishers of northern and eastern Siberia, and with all these, the slow-moving and stubborn peasantry of the remote "deaf villages" of the great plain. So strongly does primitive man cling to the superstition and magic derived from his barbarous ancestry that there is still a great deal to be done in the USSR to eradicate from the minds of these backward peoples such of their traditional and proverbial beliefs and practices as obstruct the adoption of scientific methods of production, and hinder the extension of hygienic measures for the prevention and cure of disease. The Vocation of Leadership in the USSR feels therefore justified in advising, and the People's Commissars in commanding, the exclusion from the schools and the newspapers of any approval of supernaturalism, and in substituting for it the complete inculcation of science in all the relations of life, together with the encouragement of and assistance to the research from which advances in science are to be expected. And all this applies, as we have elsewhere suggested, not only to the

study of physical and biological facts, but also to the scientific study of social institutions and to that of the important part of the universe which we term human behaviour.

Emergence of a Communist Conscience

But science, whether in the discovery of truth about the universe or in the dismissal of untruth, is not, by itself, enough for the salvation of mankind. If scientific knowledge is to be brought to the service of humanity, there must be added a purpose in man's effort involving a conception of right and wrong to be embodied in the Good Life. We need not repeat our description of the purpose, or our analysis of the code of conduct, emerging, as a new conscience,¹ from the actual experience of life under Soviet Communism. The feature in this new morality which stands out in sharpest contrast with the morality of capitalist societies is the recognition of a universal individual indebtedness. No human being reaches manhood without having incurred a considerable personal debt to the community in which he has been born and bred for the expense of his nurture and training. That debt he is held bound to repay by actual personal service by hand or by brain. Moreover, he is required throughout his able-bodied life to employ in the service of the community the faculties which he has derived from it. Any person who neglects or refuses to pay this debt by contributing, according to his ability, to satisfying the needs of the present or future generations is held to be a thief, and will be dealt with as such. He will, to begin with, be faced everywhere and at all times with the manifest disapproval of his mates. If his idleness or slackness continues, or if his example proves contagious, or if it is accompanied by negligence causing breakage of machinery or wastage of material, he may have to be isolated for appropriate remedial treatment. But in mental no less than in physical diseases prevention is better than cure. The encouragement of good habits is deemed even more effective in producing virtuous conduct than the discouragement of bad ones. Hence what the governing classes of the West consider an almost recklessly extravagant development of educational work in the Soviet Union from the crèche to the scientific research institute. Hence the adoption of schemes of remuneration according to social value, and constant promotion from grade to grade. Hence, too, the incitement to extra effort in the shock brigades, constantly intensified by socialist competition, and the manifestations of public honour, public ridicule and public disgrace; along with the helpful

¹ There is no warrant for the modern assumption that the word conscience refers to some supernatural revelation, or to assume that it implies a command of the Deity. The *New English Dictionary*, in nearly four columns of quotations and derivations, finds no such usage. The word replaced "inwit" (see *The Aynbytte of Inwytt*, 1300). Dean Swift preached that "the word conscience properly signifies *that knowledge which a man has within himself of his own thoughts and wishes*" (*Works*, 1745, vol. viii. p. 233). For the conditions and manner of its emergence in man see *The Dawn of Conscience*, by J. H. Breasted, New York, 1932.

patronage of the weak or untrained by the strong and skillful. All this deliberate creation of virtuous behaviour is combined with a continuous application of the principles of measurement and publicity which are thus used to foster the habits of the Good Life.

The insistence on the liquidation of individual indebtedness, as the basis of virtue, is balanced by an equal insistence on the fulfilment of its corporate obligation as a social institution by every group or organisation. Whether a village soviet or the All-Union Congress, whether a factory committee or an industrial trust, whether a village cooperative society or the great Centrosoyus, whether the smallest collective farm or the office directing the entire foreign trade of the USSR, the group of individuals concerned is always made conscious of the necessity of fulfilling the obligations to the community for which, rather than for the purpose of enforcing its own rights, the corporate entity has been called into existence. It is interesting to find, among these corporate obligations of every social institution in the USSR, not only the fulfilment to the utmost of its particular technical purpose but also the adoption and maintenance of universal principles of Soviet Communism. We need only name the widest practicable participation of all the citizens in every service, and in all corporate functions; the development of multiformity of structure according to circumstances instead of clinging to a rigidly prescribed uniformity; and the whole-hearted acceptance of the rule of universalism, irrespective of sex or race, affluence or official position.

It is these outstanding features of the emergent morality of Soviet Communism that seem to us to mark it off from that of all other civilisations. In particular, it is just these features that enable communist morality to embrace more than the exaction of the performance of duty. Within its sphere is also the positive provision not only of universal opportunity for the enjoyment of life but also of equal provision of leisure for individual disposal. It is an essential part of the Good Life in the USSR that every person should actually have the opportunity of working at the job that he finds within his capacity and chooses as that which he likes best. Labour, the Bolsheviki declare, is to cease to be merely continuous drudgery of an inferior class or race, and is to be made a matter of honour and a joy for every member of the community. It was for this even more than for exacting the performance of duty that Lenin based the Good Life on social equality in the midst of plenty. If this idea seems fantastically utopian, that little fact itself marks the gap between the two civilisations.

A Synthetic Unity

The foregoing summaries of the principal features of Soviet Communism demonstrate at least its contrast with western civilisation. But do these separate characteristics constitute a synthesis which can properly be considered a new way of living, distinct from that pursued by other

civilised societies ? We suggest that they do.

The characteristics of Soviet Communism, which we have summarised one by one, exhibit, when we take them together, a distinct unity, itself in striking contrast with the disunity of western civilisation. The code of conduct based on service to the community in social equality, and on the maximum development of health and capacity in every individual, is in harmony with the exclusion of exploitation and the profit-making motive, and with the deliberate planning of production for community consumption ; whilst both are in full accord with that universal participation in a multiform administration which characterises the soviet system. The economic and the political organisations, and with them the ethical code, are alike staked on a whole-hearted reliance on the beneficial effect of making known to every citizen all that is known of the facts of the universe, including human nature itself ; that is to say, on science as interpreted dialectically, to the exclusion of any miraculous supernaturalism or mystical faith in the persistence of personal life after death. The Worship of God is replaced by the Service of Man.

We may note in passing that the synthetic unity of the new civilisation of the USSR, whether or not it can be said to be in any degree due to geographical or racial factors, is at least in harmony with them. The vast monotonous and apparently boundless steppe, sparsely peopled and only patchily brought under cultivation, with its prolonged winter cold and darkness, certainly influences its various inhabitants towards a common unity ; to this or that form of collectivism ; to mutual help in voluntary cooperation ; to incessant discussion in village meetings and to the acceptance of centralised guidance from a Vocation of Leadership.

Disintegrating Capitalism

This synthetic unity of the various features of Soviet Communism is clearly very different from the warring "contradictions" that continually disillusion contemporary western civilisation. Why the striking increase in the productivity of labour arising from the application of modern science in industry and agriculture should have led, in all capitalist countries, to the paradoxical result of destitution continuing in the midst of plenty ; why inventions should be simultaneously encouraged and not applied ; why science should be at one and the same time promoted and frustrated ; why the capitalist-producing organisation should close factories, shut down mines, stop building operations and habitually destroy the undue abundance of its harvests, whilst millions of people go underfed, under-clothed and under-housed, and are yet refused employment at wages, and so cannot make their demand for commodities "effective" ; all these contradictions immanent in the latter developments of capitalism insult reason and yet seem to defy reform. These contradictions are perceived by those who are unaffected by communist propaganda. It is no less a person than the Chief Medical Officer of the

British Government who has just told the nation that "*Unemployment, under-nourishment and preventable malady and accident seem to be the unavoidable concomitants of current civilisation in Western Europe of the present day*".¹ It is an American technologist who declares that "A new machine which can lighten the human burden is not a thing of evil, but a blessing to mankind. An idea which increases efficiency in an office or factory-- enables one person to do the work of two without greater effort-- is not in itself harmful to society. *It is the utilisation of these machines without regard to human needs that has led us into our present ghastly predicament.*"²

Nor is this the only form taken by the contradictions. The capitalist employer or trader or financier usually supports the church and even attends its services; but his common sense and business experience forbid any attempt on his part to square his profit-making, which competition makes ruthless and even nationally destructive, with the denunciations of the prophets and the exhortations to mercy and compassion, and brotherly love toward all men, to which he piously listens on Sundays, and to which the statesmen whom he supports continue to pay what is, necessarily, in many, perhaps even a majority of them, an insincere homage. "Compromise is as impossible", to quote the words of Professor Tawney, "between the Church of Christ and the idolatry of wealth, which is the practical religion of capitalist societies, as it was between the Church and the state idolatry of the Roman Empire. . . . It is that whole system of appetites and values, with its deification of the life of snatching to hoard, and hoarding to snatch, which now, in the hour of its triumph, while the plaudits of the crowd still ring in the ears of the gladiators, and the laurels are still unfaded on their brows, seems sometimes to leave a taste as of ashes on the lips of a civilisation which has brought to the conquest of its material environment resources unknown to earlier ages, but which has not yet learned to master itself."³ Moreover, the autocratic position attained by the owners of the means of production, whether employers or landlords or financiers, with the growing inequalities of wealth and enjoyment, becomes daily less compatible with the exigencies of parliamentary democracy, just as both parliamentary democracy and Christianity are severely discovered to be incompatible with the imperialism manifesting itself in the exploitation of subject races to which capitalism is increasingly driven; whilst statesmen, capitalists and clergy are alike becoming aware that their countries are drifting, as it seems owing to the very disunity characterising their common civilisation, helplessly towards another world war. "The growth of civilisation hitherto known to history", it has been

¹ Annual Report for 1933 of the Chief Medical Officer, Ministry of Health and Board of Education, entitled *On the State of the Public Health*, by Sir George Newman, K.C.B. (Stationery Office, 1934), p. 254. See also *Public Ill-Health*, by C. E. McNally (1935).

² "The Problem of Technological Unemployment in the United States", by Irving H. Flamm, in *International Labour Review* (March 1935), p. 347.

³ *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, by R. H. Tawney (1926), pp. 286-287.

said by an acute student of both the past and the present,¹ "has . . . always followed a curve. The vigour and constructiveness cause what seems to us an upward movement in human society until a point is reached at which no further movement in that direction is possible unless the small civilised minority are prepared to share both the material products and the psychology of civilisation with the mass below them. No civilised minority has yet been found willing to make the necessary sacrifices, and the result has always been a struggle in the heart of civilisation and society; the upward movement immediately stops; the gates are once more opened to the barbarians; the curve descends and civilisation fades and dies. . . . *We are living through one of these periods of struggle and decivilisation.*"

Let us end this rapid summary of the contradictions inherent in the civilisation of western Europe by the less pessimistic prediction of an American thinker regarding the coming revolution in his own country.² "It would be pleasant to be able to predict that those who accede to power will be at once wise, efficient and resolute, that the old ruling classes will gracefully bow to the inevitable, that neither violence nor civil war will follow, that a system of socialised planning will smoothly come into being, which almost at once will realise all the beneficent possibilities of a technical civilisation. If all this does occur so painlessly, it will be the first time in history that a social revolution has been completed with neatness and dispatch. What is much more likely is that there will be a prolonged period of turmoil and uncertainty, the moderates will ingloriously fail, and there will be fighting, swings to the left and reaction. It will be a period of terrible discomfort, of mingled heroism and meanness, of the clumsy effort of human beings slowly to adjust themselves to the new conditions of life. Eventually the outcome will be the final disappearance of government by private profit-makers over the means of production, a chance for social management to learn its task by experience. This will not be Utopia. The perfect society has never yet resulted from a revolution. The process will simply be the adjustment of mankind to a new phase, made necessary by its own evolution. The new society will consist of men and women in a new bond of comradeship setting forth on still another voyage to the unknown."

Will Soviet Communism Endure ?

For the first four or five years of the soviet revolution, during the period of civil war and famine, all the governments of the world assumed that the Bolshevik rule would pass away, and be superseded either by the return of tsardom or by one or more parliamentary republics. Even seven years ago, after the formal recognition of the Soviet Union by many of the governments of the world, the predominant opinion of those

¹ *Quack Quack I*, by Leonard Woolf (1935), pp. 165-166.

² *The Coming American Revolution*, by George Soule (1934), p. 303.

who thought they knew about Russia was that Soviet Communism would presently be liquidated. It was held that the Five-Year Plan would be a hideous failure, that the great dams and power stations, like the gigantic new factories, were destined to stand as silent and motionless on the steppe as the pyramids of the Egyptian deserts ; that the debts contracted abroad for production goods would never be paid ; and that the foreign specialists would troop away as their salaries ceased. To-day not even the most embittered enemy denies that Soviet industry is a going and even a steadily increasing concern ; or that more and more factories and power stations, schools and technical institutes, new cities and cultivated areas, are being opened up on both sides of the Urals, all the way from the Baltic to the Pacific. It is admitted that roads and canals and new lines of railway are extending in all directions from the Arctic Circle to the Central Asian mountains and the Black Sea, whilst civil aviation is already as prominent in Siberia as in western Europe. About the complete success of collectivised and mechanised agriculture there may be, in certain quarters, still some doubt. But the experience of the last three harvests seems to justify the claim of the Soviet Government that the initial difficulties of this gigantic transformation have been overcome. There is, indeed, little reason to doubt that the aggregate output of foodstuffs, and of such specialised crops as cotton, tea, flax and sugar-beet, is being increased at a great rate. Already every soviet citizen may have as much food as he can pay for—for the Russian a great thing—and that he can also pay for much else than food is demonstrated both by the total absence of involuntary unemployment and by the rapidly increasing sales of popular luxuries. Even the bankers of London and New York are impressed by soviet debts being for the first time paid in native gold, whilst purchases are increasingly made for cash on delivery rather than on onerous credit terms. Besides these pacific activities, the very enemies of Soviet Communism warn us that, notwithstanding its supposed inefficiency, it has somehow built up a well-armed, highly disciplined and extensively mechanised Red Army a million strong ; and, above all, the largest bombing air force in the world. The change in governmental opinion about the USSR is shown by the successive arrivals in Moscow of the foreign minister of state after state, bent on concluding pacts of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union ; and by its admission, on a practically unanimous invitation, into the League of Nations. What would happen to any government in Europe or Asia in the event of a great war no one can foresee. The Bolshevik Government evinces an insistent eagerness to ensure world peace ; and this might rashly be taken as a sign of weakness. On the other hand, it is becoming evident that the rulers of huge territories, possessed of great air fleets, such as the USSR and the U.S.A., stand at an advantage in conflict with smaller and more densely populated countries such as Japan and Great Britain, Germany and Poland, and other European states. In short, the survival-value of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whether in peace or in

war, is to-day estimated at least as highly as that of any other of the Great Powers.

At this point we hear an interested reader asking " Will it spread ? " Will this new civilisation, with its abandonment of the incentive of profit-making, its extinction of unemployment, its planned production for community consumption, and the consequent liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, spread to other countries ? Our own reply is : " Yes, it will ". But how, when, where, with what modifications, and whether through violent revolution or by peaceful penetration, or even by conscious imitation, are questions we cannot answer.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE SECOND EDITION

To the readers as well as to the authors of *Soviet Communism* it seems a tiresome business to add to its 1193 pages four-score more by way of Postscript to this second edition. Our excuse is that during the past two years changes have been made and events have occurred that have been widely advertised and eagerly discussed, both by friends and by opponents of the Soviet Union. We do not like to let the book continue to be sold without mention of these happenings.

Foremost among these new-comers into the field of controversy is the new constitution of the USSR, already announced in the first edition (see pp. 84-87), but to-day the law of the land, in course of being implemented from end to end of the vast territory from the Baltic to the Pacific. As a set-off against this novel and surprising "Declaration of the Rights of Man", there is the dark shadow of the Moscow Trials, with its sequel of "conspiracy-hunting", a tragic hangover from the violence of the revolution and civil war. But this is not all. Alike in the organisation of Man as a Producer and Man as a Consumer, notable developments have taken place since 1934; such, for instance, as the Stakhanov Movement, started by members and officials of the trade unions, which, in their growth, have themselves been thoroughly reorganised. When we visited the USSR in 1932, and again in 1934, the success of the collective farms (associations of owner-producers) was still in doubt. Eye-witnesses during 1936 and 1937 testify to the marked change in the life and mentality of the peasants in these collective farms, whose greatly increased purchases of formerly unknown luxuries demonstrate their growing prosperity.

Passing from Man as a Producer to Man as a Consumer, there needs to be recorded, along with the vast increase in production, a new and extensive reorganisation of the whole system of retailing commodities to cope with a great increase in popular demand, and a consequent shift of the sphere of the ever-growing consumers' cooperative movement. As some of our critics not unjustly complained, we omitted altogether, in the first edition, to describe the working of the system of currency and the place of money in the Soviet Union. Since we wrote in 1934 the whole of rationing has disappeared, and with it all the separate kinds of "exclusive" retail shops at which particular sets of citizens enjoyed specially privileged supplies and prices. Now everyone buys where he will, at prices substantially uniform. This enables us to expound very simply the paradox of currency in the USSR, where neither surplus nor scarcity of notes has any effect on prices, production or foreign trade; and money serves only to give the citizen unfettered freedom to spend his income where and when and how he chooses.

More exciting is the "stop in the mind" of our Bohemian admirers

of revolutionary communism at what seems to them the terrifying resurrection of what they call "puitan ethics", manifested by the public insistence on cleanliness and decency of personal conduct; the prohibition of abortion and homosexuality; the objection within the Communist Party to sexual promiscuity among its members: and, most reactionary of all, the outspoken approval of lifelong attachment of husband and wife as the most appropriate setting under Communism for family life! Considering all these changes in the form, if not also in the substance of Soviet Communism, have the developments since 1935 warranted the provocative words in the title of our book, "A New Civilisation!" If so, can we, by omitting the mark of interrogation, answer the question in the affirmative? In the concluding paragraph of this Postscript, we give some reasons for such a decision.

The New Constitution

We chronicled, in our first edition, the decision of the Congress in January 1935 to formulate a new constitution in which would be substituted "equal franchise for not entirely equal, direct election for indirect, and secret for open voting" for all representative organs, from the city and village soviets to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The proposal, made by Molotov, the President of the Council of People's Commissars, was immediately referred to the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) with instructions to prepare a complete draft for submission to a specially summoned All-Union Congress. The very next day the Central Executive Committee, on the suggestion of Stalin, who was elected to preside, appointed a committee of 31 leading statesmen and constitutional authorities to carry out the task. This committee called to its aid no fewer than twelve subcommittees, to eleven of which specific chapters were entrusted, whilst the twelfth, of which Stalin himself was chairman, served as an editorial body, coordinating the work as a whole. Within five months this committee had reported to the Central Executive Committee, by which its draft was approved. On June 12, 1936, this draft was published to the world with an invitation to all the citizens of the USSR to criticise freely, and to suggest without any limitations, whatever alterations they desired. There followed a nation-wide discussion, extending over the whole 13 chapters and 146 clauses of the draft, a public discussion unparalleled in scope and range. The document was published in full, not only in thousands of newspapers but also in cheap pamphlet form, eventually to the number of sixty millions of copies in a dozen different languages. It was broadcast, chapter by chapter, from scores of radio stations to the listening crowds at thousands of public loud-speakers, and over two million domestic wireless sets. Innumerable public meetings were held—the number reported was 527,000—for exposition and free discussion in factories and on farms, in village streets and city halls, from the Polish border

to the Pacific coast. The aggregate attendance was estimated at thirty-six and a half millions. As a result, more than a hundred and fifty thousand suggestions and criticisms were received by the twelve sub-committees at Moscow, by whom they were boiled down to a hundred or so of useful criticisms, most of them supplying accidental omissions from the draft, or making verbal improvements. Along with these minor changes half a dozen amendments of substance were recommended to the Congress for acceptance. In November 1936 the specially elected All-Union Congress (the eighth and last) assembled in the Great Hall of the Kremlin to the number of 2016 delegates, representing 63 nationalities or races from all parts of the USSR. After ten days of eager discussion during which all delegates claiming to speak were heard, the recommended amendments were all carried, either by acclamation or by substantial majorities, and the draft as amended was, on December 5, 1936, finally adopted without a dissentient voice.¹

The Significance of the New Constitution

What is the dominant feature of the New Constitution? To the British or American publicist it may seem to be the broadening and strengthening of the political structure of the community. But we suggest that the importance of these purely electoral changes has been exaggerated. Thus, the method of direct election of representatives, by the largest electorate ever known, is no innovation in the Soviet Union. It has for years prevailed in both city and village, no fewer than seventy-seven million votes having been directly cast for the soviets at the last general election prior to that of 1936, out of a total electorate of over ninety-one millions. In fact, direct election by adult suffrage was actually included in the published programme of the Bolshevik Party as long ago as 1903. It is true that, amid the revolutionary turmoil of 1917-1918, the civil war of 1918-1920 and the incessant labours at reconstruction during the past dozen years, it was almost necessarily arranged that, whilst the elections to the seventy thousand city and village soviets continued to be direct, the members of the four or five thousand district and provincial councils, like those of the supreme assembly, the All-Union Congress of Soviets, should be indirectly elected, as members of the Senate of the United States were until 1913. It is not clear to the outsider how much difference has been made in the character and composition of the U.S. Senate by the substitution of direct for indirect

¹ The best description of all these proceedings is *The New Soviet Constitution*, by Anna Louise Strong (New York, 1937, 169 pp.). We have added to the Appendices of Part I. (pp. 528¹-528³⁹) a translation of the whole text of this New Constitution, together with our own summary of its clauses, rearranged in a way to emphasise its importance as a new Declaration of the Rights of Man. It remains to be said that all the constitutions of the previous constituent republics of the Union, together with those of the new promotions to that status, have been superseded in the course of 1937 by new enactments of the several legislatures, incorporating all the features of the revised federal constitution, in some cases with minor additions on local topics.

election. No one can predict with any confidence that any greater difference will be made by the analogous change in the USSR. Even the adoption of secret voting everywhere and its substitution, throughout the rural districts, of some 600 substantially equal constituencies of considerable magnitude, for the show of hands in hundreds of thousands of relatively small village meetings, may be found, in the circumstances of the USSR, where the personal tyranny of landlord and capitalist is unknown, to make little change.¹

Similarly, with regard to the enlargement of the electorate and the equalisation of representation of citizen and villager. Certainly, the gesture is impressive of the abandonment of all exclusions² and inequalities from the electoral franchise, which becomes unquestionably by far the widest in the world. Neither ill-gotten wealth nor former anti-social occupation, not even family relationship to the late Tsar, nor membership of a religious order, will henceforth deprive a soviet citizen of his vote. It has scarcely been noticed that, with one conspicuous exception, these exclusions had already mostly lapsed in practice. The principal innovation in 1936 is that, without any change of official policy towards theology, nearly fifty thousand practising priests of the Greek Orthodox Church, together with some hundreds of Roman Catholic, Evangelical, Mohammedan and Buddhist officiants, now for the first time receive votes. (This reveals, by the way, how untrue is the common statement that religious worship had been suppressed in the USSR.) But what are fifty thousand in an electorate that has already reached a total not far short of one hundred millions? Possibly more significant is the enactment that the vote of each of the sixty-odd millions of rural electors will henceforth count as much as that of each of the thirty-odd millions of urban electors, instead of only about half (usually mis-stated as one-fifth) as much. This is Stalin's effective answer to the constantly repeated slanders as to the oppression of the peasants, and their supposed disaffection. They are now confidently expected to vote in much the same way as their sons and daughters and brothers and sisters who have migrated to the cities.

To the student of political science the most important innovation is, not any reshaping of the electoral machinery, but the enshrinement in the constitution of a new set of the "rights of man". The Declaration

¹ It should be noted that, during 1937, the system of voting by secret ballot instead of in open meeting has been adopted also in the elections within the Communist Party and the trade union movement. Why? Because it is felt that open voting "in meeting assembled" leads in some cases to cooption of new members by the committee, owing to neglect of the officials to call meetings and indifference of the members to attend them. From a historical standpoint it is interesting to note that there was a similar objection, in England, to the Open Vestry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and that Select Vestries, coopting new members, were established in many districts. The method of indirect election to superior authorities has also been tried and found wanting in Great Britain. The indirectly elected body ceases to be subject to popular approval or control, and tends also, in practice, to choose its new members by what is virtually cooption. (See, for the English experience, *The Parish and the County*, by S. and B. Webb.)

² Other than for certified mental deficiency, or judicial sentence expressly including a temporary deprivation of electoral rights.

of Independence of the American rebels of 1776 and the United States Constitution of 1787 were both founded on an almost unfettered individual ownership of private property for the making of profit. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 (and as re-written in 1793) had a similar basis. These were alike sanctifications of the motive of individual profit-making, then believed to be the necessary foundation of economic progress. Even in the *Principles of a Civil Code* Bentham allowed only one encroachment upon private property—that of taxation—and recognised only four “ends” of civil government, without specifying how they could be attained, namely, subsistence, security, equality and abundance. In 1848 Louis Blanc asked in vain for the addition of the “right to work”, meaning the right to be found paid employment by the state. In 1936 the Soviet Constitution ensures to every citizen, not only protection against aggression and arbitrary arrest, but also the right to have remunerative work; for the women the right to a specially elaborate provision for motherhood; for both sexes the right to specified hours of rest and paid weeks of holiday; the right of education of every kind and grade and at any age, open to all, free of charge; and, most far-reaching of all, the right to full economic provision, according to need, in all the vicissitudes of life. And this formal enactment of such enormously extended “rights of man” is but the explicit consecration in the constitution of what is, throughout the USSR, already very largely in operation.

A few words may be added with regard to the amendments recommended by the government and adopted by the congress out of the hundred and fifty thousand separate criticisms or suggestions yielded by the nation-wide discussion. A few of these were merely verbal, including some further additional explicit recitals of existing law, such as the safeguarding of property in such collective ownership as trade unions and cooperative organisations, sports clubs, etc., and the reaffirmation of the right of inheritance. Another emphasised that the permanent occupation of land in usufruct secured to collective farm associations was to be for ever free of rent (though not of taxation!). A numerously supported proposal to continue indefinitely the deprivation of the right to vote heretofore suffered by priests, monks and other ministers of religion was emphatically negatived as contrary to fundamental Bolshevik policy. Universalism in electoral matters was carried to a further point, by amendments extending direct election even to the Soviet of Nationalities (the chamber of the bicameral Supreme Council giving equal representation to large and small national constituents of the USSR—see pp. 88-91); and making its total membership equal in number to that of the other chamber (Soviet of the Union). Otherwise it is remarkable how much of the constitutional structure of the USSR, as settled in 1924, was retained in the draft formulated by Stalin’s committees, and how completely their proposals were approved in popular discussion, and finally enacted by the congress.

Considered as a political gesture, alike to the millions at home and

to other nations, the sternest critics allow the new constitution to be a political masterpiece. For the first time since the revolution of 1917 Moscow was able to sound the note of achievement. Those in authority at the Kremlin were able to announce, in effect, that the immense difficulties of so gigantic a social and economic reconstruction are overcome. Not stability only, but also success, had been substantially secured. A second impression is that of maturity. The child born in 1917 has come of age and is now taking an adult place in the world. Development, far from having stopped, is plainly proceeding at a greater rate than before ; but it is seen now to be the development of a new type of democracy broadening into ever wider circles and still rising towards its prime. It must, however, be remembered that constitutions are judged, in the long run, not by what they say, but according to how they work—or are worked ! The “ Twelve Tables of the Law ” (see pp. 528³¹-528³³) enshrined in the new constitution of the Soviet Union, as it was enacted in December 1936, will be judged by the world according to the way in which these provisions are found to be actually working, say, in December 1942, after five years’ experience without war ! To-day they at least mark a distinct stage in political progress ; and they point in what seems to most Britons and Americans, Frenchmen and Scandinavians, the right direction.

The Treason Trials

From the high lights of the New Constitution we descend to the dark depths of the Moscow Trials. To many people in Great Britain and the United States the outstanding feature of the record since 1934 is the series of trials of highly placed soviet citizens for high treason, conspiracy to assassinate, criminal intercourse with the spies and other agents of foreign powers, and even the wilful wrecking of railways and industrial plants. That so many men in high official positions, mostly active participants in the Revolution of 1917, and some of them companions of Lenin, should have committed such crimes, sometimes over a number of years, has seemed to western observers almost incredible. That in the course of the customary private investigations, prior to the judicial trials, the defendants should, one and all, have made full and detailed confessions, unreservedly repeated in open court, of the guilt not only of themselves but also of their fellow criminals, seemed to raise the tragic story to the fantastic madness of a nightmare ; it seemed that the confessions must have been forced on the prisoners by torture or the threat of torture.

A distinguished Irishman long resident in London, hints that what needs explanation is rather the British procedure in criminal prosecutions, which differs so remarkably from that of all the other nations of Europe. In his view, the conduct of the prisoners in these Russian trials is in full accord with the Russian character.¹ In England, our friend remarks, a

¹ “ What did Radek mean ”, asks Sir John Maynard, “ when he said that ‘ there are in this country semi-Trotskyists, quarter-Trotskyists, one-eighth-Trotskyists . . . to these

prisoner indicted for treason is practically forced to go through a legal routine of defence. He pleads Not Guilty; and his counsel assumes for him an attitude of injured innocence, refusing to admit any evidence that is not within certain rules, demanding legitimate proof of every statement and setting up a hypothesis as to what actually happened which is consistent with the prisoner's innocence. He cross-examines the Crown witnesses mercilessly. He puts the prisoner into the witness-box and asks him questions so framed that by simply affirmative answers or indignant denials or at worst by flat perjury (which is considered allowable on such occasions) he may seem to support the hypothesis. The judge compliments the counsel on the brilliant ability with which he has conducted his case. He points out to the jury that the hypothesis is manifestly fictitious and the prisoner obviously guilty. The jury finds the necessary verdict. The judge then, congratulating the prisoner on having been so ably defended and fairly tried, sentences him to death and commends him to the mercy of his God.

May not this procedure, which seems so natural and inevitable to us, very intelligibly strike a Russian as a farce tolerated because our rules of evidence and forms of trial have never been systematically revised on rational lines. Why should a conspirator who is caught out by the Government, and who knows that he is caught out and that no denials or hypothetical fairy tales will help him to escape—why should he degrade himself uselessly by a mock defence instead of at once facing the facts and discussing his part in them quite candidly with his captors? There is a possibility of moving them by such a friendly course: in a mock defence there is none. Our candid friend submits that the Russian prisoners simply behave naturally and sensibly, as Englishmen would were they not virtually compelled by their highly artificial legal system to go through a routine which is useful to the accused only when there is some doubt as to the facts or as to the guilt or innocence of the conduct in question. What possible good could it do them to behave otherwise? Why should they waste the time of the court and disgrace themselves by prevaricating like pickpockets merely to employ the barristers? Our friend suggests that some of us are so obsessed with our national routine that the candour of the Russian conspirators seems grotesque and insane. Which of the two courses, viewed by an impartial visitor from Mars, would appear the saner?

Nevertheless the staging of the successive trials, and the summary executions in which they ended, appeared strangely inconsistent with people we say . . . whoever has the slightest rift with the Party, let him realise that to-morrow he may be a diversionist, to-morrow he may be a traitor, if he does not thoroughly heal the rift by complete and utter frankness to the Party'. We think that he unconsciously furnished a clue to the riddle of the confessions. Not only in these Trotskyist cases, but in many others, we have seen accused persons apparently eager to confess, and to insist on the completeness of their guilt. And the confessions have not been of the defiant kind. Rather have they been of the penitent kind, of a sinner making a clean breast of his sins, and extenuating nothing." ("Light on the Trotskyist Trials", by Sir John Maynard, in *The Political Quarterly*, July 1937, pp. 403-416.)

the other actions of the Soviet Government. For the past seven years its policy had seemed to be directed towards exciting admiration for its achievements, and even towards winning the respect of the western world, and especially of Britain and the United States. It must have been foreseen that this whole series of trials, the numerous shootings to which they led, and the ugly publicity and popular abuse of the defendants which the Soviet Government apparently organised and encouraged, and especially the malignity with which Leon Trotsky, safe in far-off Mexico, was assailed, would produce a setback in the international appreciation which the Soviet Union was increasingly receiving. The Soviet Government must have had strong grounds for the action which has involved such unwelcome consequences.¹

Let us first set out the facts before attempting any interpretation of them. We described in our first edition (pp. 533-534) the principal public trials of this kind during the past decade, from the so-called Shakhty prosecution in 1927-1928, of Russian technicians in the Donets Coal-mines, together with some German engineers; the monster trial at Kharkov of the Ukrainian Nationalists in 1929-1930, and that of the so-called Industrial Party at Moscow in 1930-1931; down to the prosecution of the Menshevik professors and officials in 1931. It may well be a matter for doubt and enquiry how far the breakdowns or betrayals of soviet organisation revealed in these trials were attributable to deliberate treason on the part of the perpetrators, in conspiracy with the ever-active *émigrés* in Paris or at Prague, and how far to the constant suspicions of associating with disloyalty under which the intelligentsia of the period had to work. It is only fair to describe (see pp. 555-556) how Stalin, in his widely reported speech of June 23, 1931, made an attempt to get the Soviet Government out of this vicious circle by insisting on new relations with the professional experts, and generally with the intelligentsia, who were henceforth to be treated with respect and trust.

¹ The principal source of information must always be *The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre: A Verbatim Report published by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR* (586 pp.), published in 1937 within a few weeks after the trial, at the price of half a crown or one dollar in London and New York respectively. An abbreviated version, with preface, is given in *The Moscow Trials* (January 1937), edited by R. T. Miller (London, 1937). See also *Soviet Justice and the trial of Radek and others*, by Dudley Collard, Barrister-at-Law, with an introduction by D. N. Pritt, K.C., M.P. (London, 1937); and the very informative article, "Light on the Trotskyist Trials", by Sir John Maynard, in *The Political Quarterly* for July 1937. The best press comment known to us is Malcolm Cowley's lengthy review of the proceedings in *The Nation* (New York) for April 7, 1937 (pp. 267-270). Radek's statement is published in *The Slavonic Review* for April 1937. *Moscow, 1937*, by Lion Feuchtwanger (London, 1937, 134 pp.), gives two valuable chapters of an eye-witness's impressions.

Trotsky's own case for his policy (written before the trial) may be studied in his book *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York and London: 1936-1937; also in French, *La Révolution trahie*); also *The Third International After Lenin* (New York, 1936, 356 pp.); together with his book entitled *The Stalin School of Falsification* (New York). See also *The End of Socialism in Russia*, by Max Eastman (New York and London, 1937, 46 pp.), and *World Revolution, 1917-1936*, by C. L. R. James (London, 1937).

Unfortunately this generous spirit did not long prevail. The trial of the Metro-Vickers engineers and their Russian colleagues in January 1933 (see pp. 557-558) revealed (though only in some of the defendants) not only cases of mild bribery and the systematic collection of information coming within the legal definition of espionage, but also a negligence that was hardly to be distinguished from sabotage, which was visited by the court with sentences of discriminating moderation. There promptly followed a renewed campaign of incitement by the *émigrés* of Prague and Paris, with which was apparently connected the illegal and secret entry into the USSR, across its western land frontier during 1934, of more than a hundred emissaries, bearing arms (and some of them bombs), nearly all of whom were, without publicity, promptly arrested, and held for interrogation. It will be recalled that it was during this period that Hitler was proclaiming his intention of annexing the Ukraine, and of securing forced concessions of much-needed minerals from the Urals—a threat which, it might be argued, implied that he was aware of there being allies within the USSR who would help him to overcome Stalin's government, just as he later became aware of confederates in Spain among the army officers bent on overthrowing the Republic government, and installing a Fascist régime in alliance with the Fascist Powers.

In December 1934 the head Bolshevik official in Leningrad (Kirov) was assassinated by a dismissed employee, who may have acted independently out of personal revenge, but who was discovered to have secret connections with conspiratorial circles of ever-widening range (see pp. 558-561). The Government reaction to this murder was to hurry on the trial, condemnation and summary execution of the hundred or more persons above referred to, who were undoubtedly guilty of illegal entry and inexcusably bearing arms and bombs, although it was apparently not proved that they had any connection with Kirov's assassination or the conspiracies associated therewith. These conspiracies were gradually unravelled in several successive trials during 1936, which involved the condemnation and summary execution of Kamenev, Zinoviev and others of lesser notoriety.

A climax which seemed final was reached by the criminal proceedings in January 1937 against such leading Bolsheviks as Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Radek and Sokolnikov, with others less well known abroad, upon charges of conspiracy to overthrow the Government by force, treasonable associations with German and Japanese government agents to this end, attempts at assassination of Molotov and other leaders, and criminal sabotage of mine and railway working resulting in loss of life. Yet only a few months later came a new sensation, when eight generals of the Red Army were tried and condemned to death for treasonable association with the emissaries and spies of foreign governments preparing for invasion of the USSR. The unpleasant impression of these proceedings on the western world was deepened by the bias persistently shown against the exiled Leon Trotsky, constantly alleged to have been the chief insti-

gator and director of the whole series of crimes. The confessions of the defendants; the manner in which their several stories corroborated one another; their frank explanations of the way they had yielded to the temptation of giving their general adhesion to a treasonable conspiracy of which they did not at first understand the scope; and how they had then found themselves unable to escape from the toils in which they had become entangled;—be it added, a certain amount of further corroboration deduced from incautiously published utterances both by German and by Japanese statesmen, convinced the British and American journalists present at the trial in January 1937 that the defendants were really guilty of the treasonable conspiracies with which they were charged. Careful perusal of the full reports of the proceedings and speeches at the public trial leaves upon us the same impression, so far as concerns the actual defendants, though without necessarily endorsing the judgment on Trotsky himself, who was not before the Court, and of whose personal participation there was little testimony that would have been accepted as evidence in a British court. It must, however, be admitted that the impression made upon public opinion in the United States and western Europe has been unfavourable to the Soviet Government, even to the extent of creating a certain sympathy with Leon Trotsky; this sympathy causing to be forgotten, not only his repeated published demands and incitements that the government of Stalin must be overthrown, but also that it is Trotsky and the Trotskyists in America and western Europe who are avowedly seeking to create forcible revolutions everywhere, in opposition to Stalin's administration, which, as we have described (pp. 1110-1118), has for the past ten years abandoned that policy for one of "building socialism" in the USSR, in the hope that it will be able to influence the world towards Communism, not by any revolutionary incursions into other countries, but by the peaceful example of its own economic and social achievements in the Soviet Union.

If we may attempt a detached and philosophical interpretation of these proceedings, alike of the various defendants and of the Government which brought them to trial and sentence—a hypothetical explanation which is not offered as a justification of either party—we suggest that they are the inevitable aftermath of any long-drawn-out revolutionary struggle that ends in a successful seizure of power. The successive generations of Russian revolutionaries, continuing for a whole century, during which they were hunted by the Tsar's police, in constant peril of exile and imprisonment, flogging and death, were moulded to a particular "pattern of behaviour" which became a fixed character. Lies and aliases, deceit and trickery, theft and assassination, filled their whole lives. These revolutionary conspirators, successive generations of whom we have known personally in exile, were not criminals in the ordinary sense. Even if it came to them in their warfare to commit theft, forgery or murder, they cannot accurately be classed as thieves, forgers and murderers. The best of them were heroic, even if we think them mistaken; though some

among them succumbed to the temptation of betraying their comrades and even becoming tsarist spies and *agents provocateurs*.

An analogous manifestation of the same pattern of behaviour may be traced in the action of those who have come to the top, and who are now concerned to "maintain the revolution". They are incurably distrustful of the loyalty of their colleagues. Opposition, however reasonably expressed, looks like defeatism and incipient rebellion. Every passing grumbling among the intelligentsia starts a jealous watchfulness which goes far to make life intolerable. A whole crop of suspicions, jealousies, delations, accusations and counter-accusations is as unmistakable an aftermath of a long-drawn-out revolutionary struggle ending in a constitutional upheaval as the subsequent conspiracies and attempts at counter-revolution themselves.

The pattern of behaviour produced in these underground revolutionary conspirators may be traced in like struggles in other countries. Even England and Scotland, in the small population of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a much less fundamental revolution, produced generation after generation of conspirators, to whom treason and killing, with lies and deceit, were only part of what they felt to be a righteous effort. The Scottish noblemen seem to have conspired and killed, one side against the other, protestant and catholic, whig and covenanter, Hanoverian and Stuart, for almost a couple of centuries. In England, Cromwell and King Charles; General Monk (the hero or the traitor?), Mounmouth and his army; Judge Jeffreys' atrocious Western Assizes, hanging or flogging every prisoner whom he disliked; the whig nobles who put their hands to a flagrantly treasonable invitation to William of Orange; Churchill and others who betrayed their king on the battlefield; the perpetrators of the Glencoe massacre; the secret correspondence with the Stuart pretenders of Bolingbroke and even Marlborough; the century of repression of the Jesuits, with the persecution of the English catholics—not to mention the long-drawn-out time of trouble in Ireland—all these exhibit just such a "pattern of behaviour" among those concerned, many of whom we now think of as ordinary and even devoted citizens, whose efforts and sacrifices secured for Great Britain its present political democracy and freedom in matters of opinion, which most of us have come to deem superior to absolute kingship by divine right, with an orthodoxy enforced by law.

The French Revolution of 1789-1795 ushered in a similar period of conspiracy and struggle, leading to a whole succession of counter-revolutions, not reaching the stability of a democratic republic, with its large measure of personal security and social equality, for nearly a century. Much the same pattern of behaviour can be traced in Barras, Sieyès, Babeuf, Buonaparte, Talleyrand with the Legitimists and Orleanists, and the early life of Napoleon the Third.

In Russia (which was in 1900 in the matter of morals and civilisation very much where Britain and France stood in 1700) the pattern of be-

haviour of the revolutionary conspirators culminated in a bitterness and mutual antagonism more acute and all-pervading than in any other example. It was only by a hard struggle and after prolonged suffering that the revolution of 1917 was successful; when the little group of leading Bolsheviks under Lenin found themselves the Government. It took nearly three more years for them to beat off the White armies unlawfully supported by half a dozen foreign governments, in a civil war which ended in a devastated country and a terrible famine. The psychological effect on all the combatants and sufferers was profound. This extreme embitterment and lasting suspicion characterises any prolonged civil war, as distinguished from a war between separate states. A civil war hardly ever ends by a peace treaty. The soldiers of the armies of warring states eventually retire behind their respective frontiers, and need not retain any evil feelings against their former opponents. The partisans in a civil war have to continue to live among their neighbours, even with those lately in arms against them. The revolutionary pattern of behaviour among the Russian revolutionaries was intensified and embittered by the continued clash of loyalties and ambitions among the half a dozen different sections of revolutionary opinion, not to mention also the various nationalities, religions and races making up the 170 millions scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface.

Now to get back to the Russian conspirators who have, during the decade 1927-1937, been convicted on their own confessions of attempts to create a counter-revolution. Are not such attempts at a counter-revolution exactly what was to be expected? Has there ever been a great and successful revolution without attempts at a counter-revolution? The Stalin group, who now constitute the government, have had immense difficulties to face in their fight against famine, and in their effort to raise to a higher level of efficiency and civilisation what is reputed to have been the worst peasantry in the world.

In establishing the new social order it was inevitable that there should arise, throughout the whole decade, honest and legitimate differences of opinion as to policy. What were those differences? We need not recite here (see pp. 168, 243, 1101-1104) the earlier issues on which, between 1921 and 1927, Trotsky and his shifting groups of friends took one view, whilst Stalin and his following took another. Outstanding was the supreme issue as to whether the revolution in Russia was to be supported by ceaselessly fomenting other revolutions in other countries, which Trotsky demanded as the only way in which the Bolshevik régime could be maintained in Russia (this Trotsky called the "permanence of the revolution"). Or, on the other hand, as Stalin insisted from 1926 onwards, when the revolutions in other countries had failed to occur, should not the Soviet Government postpone—some said abandon—the project of seeking to foment revolutions in western Europe and the United States, and rather apply all its energies to building up the industries and revolutionising the agriculture of the USSR itself, in the hope that this exemplar

of a successful socialist state on an immense scale might arouse the proletariats of the rest of the world themselves to transform, one after another, the capitalist governments of Europe and America? It is not without significance that it was in the dark days of 1931-1933, when the fate of the collective farms seemed to many to be trembling in the balance (see pp. 245-272), that the conspiracies unveiled in the trials of 1937 are stated, by Radek and others, to have taken shape. It was only to be expected that those who thought the government policy wrong and disastrous to the country should take to underground conspiracy to resist it and to upset the government which had adopted it. If some of these conspirators took in their stride both wrecking and assassination, this was exactly what Stalin and others of them had been doing, with a good conscience, most of their lives prior to 1917. If it is true that they called in aid of their conspiracy hostile governments, this is just what the patriotic and high-minded English and Scottish nobility, statesmen and ministers of religion did three centuries ago in calling in alternately the Dutch and the French.

How long is this apparently continuous series of conspiracies and attempts at counter-revolutions likely to last? The only probable answer is that sporadic attempts of this kind—arising as they do fundamentally from the pattern of behaviour by which the lives of the conspirators have been moulded—may well continue as long as the pattern of behaviour itself. This, as experience indicates, is a lifelong matter. Not until the present generation of those whose early lives were spent in underground conspiracies against the Tsar has passed away will the USSR be as free from attempts at counter-revolution as Great Britain became after 1760, generations after the century of rebellions of 1641-1745. With the ever-increasing success of Soviet Communism in solving the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, which capitalism seems to find insoluble, these spasmodic attempts will become more feeble, and will be presently confined to incipient conspiracies which are strangled at birth by the public opinion of the rising generation. But the pattern of behaviour fades slowly in those whom it has moulded, and only with the death of the last of those who conspired against Nicholas and Stolypin will it have entirely disappeared. "For a long time to come", wrote Lenin to one of his followers in November 1922,¹ "there will be doubts, uncertainty, suspicion and treachery", a forecast which is borne out by the evidence in the Moscow trials of 1937.

To complete the story down to the autumn of 1937, it must be said that not only the trials and the executions but also the successive demotions and dismissals of such highly placed Party members as Bukharin, Rykov, Rakovsky and Yagoda, together with a whole series of unexplained removals from office and transfers from post to post, maintained the popular excitement and the general suspicion which spared no one.²

¹ *The Letters of Lenin*, translated and edited by Elizabeth Hill and Doris Mudie, 1937, p. 475.

² Almost wholly confined to the officials and the intelligentsia.

Possibly quite unconnected with such treasonable conspiracies as were widely suspected, was another series of trials in many of the constituent republics in the course of 1937 in which highly placed officials, mostly, but not exclusively, Party members, were found guilty of various forms of malversation, including embezzlement and diversion of public property to private uses, shameless extravagance and riotous living at the taxpayers' expense, coupled with forgery and fraudulent accountancy in some cases, and of culpable negligence, amounting to bribery and connivance, and positive wrecking, in others. That many cases of this kind should occur in a population now risen to 180 millions must be regarded as inevitable. After such a régime as the Tsar's government, which was notorious for widespread bribery, graft and malversations far beyond that of western Europe or the United States, no student of social institutions could believe that none of the corruption had survived. What surprises the Englishman and the American is the Russian practice of smearing over all such offenders with the epithets of Trotskyist, diversionist, menshevist, deviationist, and even bourgeois, when they seem to be only common thieves. We imagine that many of these criminal trials during the spring and summer of 1937 may have been the direct outcome of the systematic inspection and checking of the whole industrial and agricultural organisation which has been for some time in progress as part of the improved administration of Gosplan and Gosbank, which in Britain would have been termed an audit. It may well have been deemed advisable, for the sake of deterrence, to depart exceptionally from the practice (for which there is much to be said) of not publishing broadcast the proceedings in such criminal trials, so as not to put it in the mind of the casual reader to imitate the offences. The occurrence within a year of a few hundred cases of administrative corruption, whether in the federal republic or municipal enterprises, or in the cooperative or trade union movements, in a community having four times the population of Britain or France and one-third more than that of the United States, would not in these countries seem in any way remarkable.

The Stakhanov Movement

Let us now return to the internal development of the new social order. One of the most important, and to the western economists one of the least expected features of Soviet economy—one which during the past three years has grown impressively in vividness—has been the revolution in the wage-earners' mentality towards measures and devices for increasing the productivity of labour. The divorce of the manual-working wage-earners from the ownership and direction of the capital upon which they work, and therefore from the product of their labour—specially characteristic of the capitalist system since the Industrial Revolution—has produced in the western world, so employers have long complained, an intuitive hostility to any new methods of working or any

technical improvement of processes, and, most of all, to the introduction of any labour-saving machinery permitting the employment of new kinds of workers. This persistent obstruction to any increase in labour productivity that might enable some of the present workers to be dispensed with, amounts in capitalist countries, so the economists declare, to a continual drag on economic progress. In the Soviet Union, as we described in some detail in our first edition (pp. 697-804), any such obstruction to industrial improvement, and any such drag on economic progress, has been, for the past decade, increasingly absent. We have described the feeling or conviction of the Soviet trade unionist—incredible as this seems both to many a western trade union official and to most western employers of labour—that, in soviet industry, there is no “enemy party”. The manual workers in the factory equally with the office workers, the agricultural workers like those in the mine or the oil-field, realise that the whole of the aggregate net product, after the necessary allocations for taxation and common services have been made, but without deduction of tribute to landlord or capitalist, is genuinely at the disposal of the aggregate of workers, from the director and technicians to the mechanics and labourers, for distribution among themselves, either in social services or in personal wages or salaries, in such ways and at such rates as they, by their own trade union organisation, choose to determine.¹ It follows

¹ The trade unions of the USSR have had their own part in the universal “cleaning up” and improvement of organisation of the past two years. Their total membership has increased from eighteen to twenty-two millions. The number of separate unions has grown from 154 to 163. The central councils of many of the unions “lost contact”, according to the deliberations of the plenum, “with the rank and file members”; and they must, therefore, keep closely in touch with all the factory committees by their own staffs of officials. The steady increase in the aggregate funds administered by each union for insurance and other social purposes has greatly enlarged the financial work which, it was complained, was not carried out properly: “It was managed bureaucratically, without the participation and control of the rank and file members. . . . Roubles were wasted if not also embezzled by the leading organs; by the Bureau of Social Insurance at the AUCCTU, by the Ukrainian, Leningrad and White Russian Trades Councils” (from the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the AUCCTU). This financial work has now been lightened by charging the whole cost of the medical services direct to the People’s Commissariats of Health of the several constituent and autonomous republics. During 1937 the cases of slackness among officials and members have received repeated consideration. Here and there the local committees and officers had dispensed with the members’ meetings, even for the re-election of officers and committee members, preferring the easier method of cooption. The All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, which ought to have been elected at least biennially, had not been convened since 1932, although the number of unions had been enlarged from 154 to 163, and All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) contenting itself with filling vacancies by cooption. Moreover its plenum had not been convened since 1934. All this slackness, which the rank and file had failed to correct, was made the subject of prolonged discussion when the Sixth Plenum of the AUCCTU was at last held (from April 27 to May 15, 1937), at which 106 members and candidates of the AUCCTU, 122 chairmen of the executive committees of the unions, 46 instructors and 104 chairmen of the factory workers’ committees were present. The whole membership and all the officers were very seriously scolded, and the procedure for the future, especially as regards the election of committees and officers, was elaborately reformed with the object of ensuring, from one end of the USSR to the other, a more vigorous trade union democracy. A lengthy resolution was passed by this plenum, in which it was agreed to abolish the practice of cooption and to re-elect individually all officers and members of the committee meetings by a secret ballot; to publish the financial

that it is to each man's pecuniary interest that not only his own productivity but also that of every one of his colleagues (of whatever grade, in the particular enterprise, and even that of everyone in the whole aggregate of enterprises of every kind throughout the USSR, should be as great and as continuous as possible. The wage of each worker in the USSR, whether by hand or by brain, depends, in a very real sense, on the maintenance and the progressive increase of the productivity of all of them. This conviction has produced, as we have described (see pp. 747-767), among the wage-earners of the USSR, and especially among the five-sixths of them who are trade unionists (now increased in number to over twenty-two millions), a veritable passion for productivity.¹

Out of this multitudinous striving after greater productivity, and especially out of the experiments in cost-accounting, there emerged in 1935 what has been called the Stakhanov Movement; which has, without increase of capital outlay or working cost, and without throwing any wage-earners out of work, doubled and trebled the product of many manufacturing processes, and even many processes of mining and agriculture, with the result, it is computed, of increasing the total output of the USSR by as much as 10 or even 20 per cent within a single year.

"The Stakhanov Movement", said Stalin in 1935, "as an expression of socialist competition, contrasts favourably with the old stage. In the past, about three years ago, in the period of the first stage . . . socialist competition was not necessarily connected with new technique. At that time, in fact, we had hardly any new technique. . . . The Stakhanov Movement, on the other hand, is necessarily connected with new technique. We have before us . . . new people, working men and women, who have completely mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed it and driven it forward."

reports of all central committees of the unions; to re-elect all the executives before July 15, to hold the oblast conferences and the union's congresses before October 1, and to convene the All-Union Congress of the Trade Unions on October 20; to dissolve the regional councils as cumbersome; to elect in all enterprises and institutions councils of social insurance, to improve the work of inspectors and to introduce examinations for them—all inspectors in future must be elected from skilled workmen and Stakhanovite employees; to re-establish the practice of concluding *kol-dogovors* (see the specimen pp. 505-528); to convene regular industrial conferences; to urge all trade union organisations to take more active part in solving the housing problem; to widen the cultural work and to repair the slackness of the club administration; to introduce a vigorous control of funds and to open educational courses for trade union officials. The plenum finally elected a commission for drafting new model rules to be submitted to the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions in October 1937 (*Trud*, May 16, 1937, No. 110 (4982); see also *International Press Correspondence* for June 12, 1937). It is hard to imagine a British, French or American trades union congress so drastically overhauling the whole trade union organisation!

¹ The Russian newspapers of 1935-1936 were full of reports and comments on Stakhanov experiments. The British or American readers should consult a remarkable book entitled *Labour in the Land of Socialism: Stakhanovites in Conference* (Moscow, 1936, 240 pp.; Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR), being a report of 35 speeches at the "First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites"; also the report by V. J. Mezhlauk in *The Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR, 1931-1937* (Moscow, 1937, 671 pp.), pp. xix-xxii; and the (Russian) *Organisation of Work in the Stakhanov Movement* (Moscow, 1936, 208 pp.).

What exactly is this Stakhanov Movement, and how did it originate? The Soviet leaders regard it as a "response" to "the historic speech on cadres made by Comrade Stalin on May 4, 1935, when he told the younger workers in the USSR that they must 'master technique'", particularly the technique of each worker's own particular job. The response was not long delayed. In August 1935 a miner, Alexei Stakhanov, aged twenty-nine, in the Donets coalfield, pondering over his highly skilled task of operating a pneumatic drill or coal cutting machine, had the idea that he could cut out more coal during his six-hour day, if he could concentrate all his effort and attention continuously on cutting, whilst arranging for the various subsidiary operations of getting the place ready and removing the coal that was cut to be performed by the other members of the team with whom he worked, enabling them to concentrate similarly on their own particular processes. When he explained his idea to his fellow-workmen and to his immediate superior, the assistant manager, he was met with the natural indisposition to any change of habits. But Stakhanov persisted, and called in aid his fellow-members in the local organ of the Communist Party. This body, being on principle favourable to increased production, brought the necessary pressure to bear on the mine management; and Stakhanov proceeded to days of continuous coal cutting, in cooperation with assistants giving equally continuous days of subsidiary attendance. The result was immediately amazing. Instead of the six or seven tons per shift usual in the Donets mines, or the ten tons of the specially highly organised German mines in the Ruhr, Stakhanov began at once to cut 102 tons in one shift, an amount which was later increased. "If, after this, we calculate the productivity of labour for the whole of a brigade which has adopted the Stakhanov method, we find . . . for each member of the brigade . . . 35 tons or more per shift . . . an average productivity three, four and five times greater than the same pneumatic drill gave formerly."¹

The idea promptly spread to other industries. We give a second example from a cotton-weaving shed. A woman cotton weaver, Evdokia Vinogradova, aged twenty-one, herself described how she discovered that it cost her less time and labour to mend the broken thread and restart the machine when she walked continuously along each row of Northrup automatics, instead of rushing hither and thither in all directions across the vast floor, to attend particularly to each loom that was interrupted, now here and then there. She found that by traversing successively the long rows of looms (each worked without belting by its own electric dynamo) and dealing in its turn with each break as it was reached, she could keep going, with less aggregate interruption, as many as 96, 144 and eventually no fewer than 220 looms (the whole floorful); whilst nine unskilled assistants concentrating on feeding spools of thread and shifting the weft, by escaping the incessant distraction of change of process, enjoyed a like economy of physical effort and lessening of mental

¹ *Labour in the Land of Socialism; Stakhanovites in Conference*, pp. 37-38.

strain. Thus the team composed of one highly skilled weaver, Evdokia Vinogradova, and nine assistants, may be said to be managing 22 looms per head; an output which is stated to surpass the highest Lancashire or New England output per head on the same Northrup looms by more than 50 per cent.

The new movement received, from Stakhanov's very first experiment in continuous coal cutting, the eager support of the quickwitted People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, G. Ordjonikidze,¹ who repeatedly warned the managerial departments against any obstruction of the workers' projects for the rearrangement of their tasks. With the unrivalled Soviet apparatus for giving publicity to any new invention or discovery in social organisation, the Stakhanov Movement quickly spread to nearly every manufacturing industry from the Polish frontier to the Pacific Coast, as well as to some of the processes of agriculture and mining. Even the salesmen and cashiers in the crowded retail stores of the cities discovered means of quickening their service in the hours of greatest pressure by having ready packed the quantities usually demanded of the commodities in greatest request; and by preparing beforehand the piles of small change required for each denomination among the rouble notes that would be presented during the day. Already before the end of the year 1935 the Soviet Government was able to hold the "First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites" at Moscow, attended by many hundreds of outstanding workers in all sorts of enterprises.² At this conference not only Alexei Stakhanov and Evdokia Vinogradova, but also three other coal-miners and four other women weavers, two forge-hammer men in automobile works, three locomotive engine drivers on the railways, a woman filling tins of vegetables in a cannery, a woman machine-knitter, two women boring-machine operators in an armament

¹ This was emphasised in the obituary notices of this able organiser, who died suddenly of angina pectoris on February 18, 1937.

² The table below purports to give the percentage of Stakhanovites amongst industrial workmen on August 1, 1936:

Branches of Industry	Men and Women	Women	Young People
Electricity	42.0	32.1	55.1
Petroleum: (a) oilfields	36.4	14.7	33.5
(b) oil-refining plants	57.7	38.5	57.5
Iron mines	21.6	5.3	19.4
Cast-iron	26.2	14.1	25.1
Metal industry	27.7	19.4	26.2
Chemistry	26.7	16.5	34.6
Textiles	19.7	21.3	16.1
Leather	39.8	40.4	36.9
Boots	41.4
Meat	38.8	32.0	37.6
Confectionery	35.5	39.0	29.5
Timber industry	30.5	26.0	32.5
Paper industry	23.8	19.2	25.5

(*The USSR—The Country of Socialism*, Moscow, Gosplan, 1936, p. 106.)

factory, a turner in a carburettor works, and various others, severally described in fascinating detail, how they, merely by rearranging the processes of their jobs, so as to cut out waste of time and effort, had substantially increased productivity, and at the same time lessened spoilage. One after another, the directors and foremen confirmed the accounts of these "Stakhanovites", whose numbers were growing to hundreds in each large enterprise; and emphasised not merely the increase in productivity but also in the gain involved in the shortening of factory time required to turn out big and complicated machines, or execute large orders; as well as the lessening of the waste in faulty product. Nor was the advance always a case of improvement on the exceptionally low mechanical capacity of the Russian ex-peasant. One director after another felt able confidently to assert that various Stakhanovites had attained results actually superior to the best that was done in the same processes in Germany or Belgium, Britain or the United States.

The Stakhanov Movement, it will be seen, is the obverse of the American system of "scientific management" as devised by Taylor. He went on the plan of emptying out of the workman's job every factor of initiative, thought or mental effort, so as to get from the labourer almost exclusively physical effort, and so to arrange that physical effort, by motion-study and prescribed rest pauses, in such a way as to increase its productivity to the utmost. All the mental effort that maximum productivity required was assigned to a group of "functional foremen" directing the factory as a whole. In the Soviet Union the Stakhanov Movement, devised and introduced by the workmen themselves, consists essentially in such a rearrangement of each job as to give to each workman the opportunity of concentrating his mind, throughout his short working day of six or seven hours, upon the particular process entrusted to him, so that he can exercise his own initiative and devote his own mental as well as physical energy to his special work, without any loss of speed by passing from one task to another. Worker after worker testified that he or she did not thereby suffer either increased physical exertion or mental strain. On the contrary, continuance at the same task led to a particular rhythm which was less fatiguing, because less "worrying" than distracted and irregular operations. It was also not a case of the workers' actions being driven ever faster by having to keep up with machinery that was always being speeded up. The pace for each member of the team was set, not by any wheel that the management turned, but by the workers' team itself, which determined its own rate of working, and set its own rest-pauses. Nor was it a case of the leading operator forcing greater speed on subordinate attendants. Not the leader alone, but all the members of the team shared alike in the decision of how the work should be done, and in the advantage of unbroken concentration on a precisely defined task, by which both time and "worry" were saved. Moreover, all alike were always on piecework rates, and all secured a substantial increase of earnings—sometimes doubling or trebling their

previous takings for the month—as a result of the increase in output which they had jointly produced. It need hardly be said that, in the Soviet Union, no attempt was made to cut the piece-work rates. The increase in earnings, far from increasing the cost of production of the commodity or service, actually involved a decrease, owing to the lessening, per unit of output, of overhead expenses.

We do not overlook the fact that workers of all kinds and grades differ in temperament, and that some prefer to lounge and loiter through a longer working day, even if they dispense with holidays. Others willingly exert themselves more rapidly as well as more continuously during more limited hours, which they think recompensed by longer intervals for rest and recreation, and more frequent holidays. Such differences of tempo and of continuity also characterise different occupations and different jobs within each occupation, among which workers may choose according to their idiosyncrasies. It would be as tyrannous to coerce the quick man into an essentially leisurely job as the slow man into the job admitting of greater speed and concentration of effort. But besides the remedy of this initial freedom of choice, there is much to be done by training and habit to fit the man to the job. It is a characteristic fallacy of the amateur onlooker to think amazing and almost incredible the high speed and large output which the trained and practised craftsman accomplishes without turning a hair. It was recognised by the manual workers, equally with the factory managers, that the improved methods of working, like the introduction of new labour-saving machines, would involve in due time a readjustment of “norms”, or standards upon which the piece-work rates were calculated, so as to secure, in agreement between the trade unions and the management, a new approach to equality of remuneration for the same effort as between job and job. The permanent advantage to all the workers, by hand or by brain, was seen to reside in the greater amount of commodities which the community as a whole is able to share among its working members, together with their youthful and aged dependants. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that there are some tasks for which piece-work speed is dangerous, and also some kinds of machines and plant which can easily be unduly depreciated by too swift or too continual working.

“Wherein”, asked Stalin at the “First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites”, in 1935, “lies the significance of the Stakhanov movement?” In words which demand attention from the economists of the western world, he asked: “Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of productivity of labour; it enabled society to produce an incomparably greater quantity of products than was the case under the feudal system. Because it made society richer. Why is it that socialism can and should and certainly will defeat the capitalist system? Because it can furnish higher models of labour, a higher productivity of labour than the capitalist system of economy. Because it can give society more products and can

make society richer than the capitalist system of economy can.”¹

To appreciate fully the economic significance of the Stakhanov Movement of 1935-1937, it must be seen, as Stalin saw it, as the culmination of the successive manifestations of the revolution in the wage-earners’ mentality, described in our chapter entitled “In Place of Profit” (see pp. 697-804), towards increasing productivity, on which, as Stalin suggested, the success of socialism ultimately depends.

The Success of Collective Agriculture

According to all the information that we have been able to obtain from those who have visited the rural districts of the USSR during the past few years—some of them staying for months in collective farms—and from such published reports and statistics as exist, the condition of the 22 millions of families grouped in nearly a quarter of a million kolkhosi, taken as a whole, has considerably improved since 1932-1933.²

“The change in four years”, states one eye witness,³ “is almost unbelievable. . . . Again and again the machine has come to the rescue of the Russian Revolution, and has quickly healed up wounds that an unexpected catastrophe had inflicted on the country. Certainly, the village of Reshitlorka [Ukraine] this summer (1936) was a living example of such a recuperation. Hardly a peasant family but had a cow and some boasted more than one cow and one pig. The three collective farms into which the village was divided had imported beehives in the spring, some of which they had distributed among the members for their individual use. In 1932 people wandered about the market-place sadly and sullenly in quest of eggs and butter. The sale of meat was completely forbidden. Now the tables groaned under the weight of cheese, butter, eggs, meat and other foodstuffs. On the fringe of the bazaar peasants were selling for meat live cows, sheep, calves, pigs and fowls. The shops which four years ago boasted mainly cosmetics and cobwebs, which had not an ounce of sugar or cereals or herring, were now crammed with sugar, cigarettes, and tinned fish and meat. The number of shops had

¹ *Labour in the Land of Socialism*, pp. 15-16.

² Among recent books by eye-witnesses may be cited: *Vom aussserordentlichem Dorf zu sozialistischen Kollektivwirtschaft* (Monographie Zweier Sowjetdörfer), von Schawajow, Moscow, 1935; *In a Collective Farm*, by Vern Smith (New York and London, 1936, 239 pp.). Tho (Russian) *Agricultural Economy in the USSR* (1465 pp. Moscow, 1936) contains over 1000 detailed tables of statistics relating to the development of the different branches of agriculture, and of its organisation in the Soviet Union for the years 1928 to 1935. This immense mass of statistical information as to area, crops and yield is copiously reviewed and dissected in *Soviet Agricultural Reorganisation and the Bread Grain Situation*, by V. P. Timoshenko (Stanford University, California, April 1937), in which every possible adverse criticism is adduced, nevertheless leading up to the conclusion that there has certainly been a great improvement during the last few years.

³ See the article entitled “Russian Defensive Strength” in *The Round Table*, No. 106, March 1937; and, in corroboration, some incidental references in “The Anti-Bolshevist Front”, by Wickham Steed, in the *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, March 1937. See also the article by Maurice Hindus, at p. 14 of *Soviet Russia To-day* (New York) for May 1937.

multiplied at least three times. Everywhere in the Ukraine this summer (1936) it was the same story of abundant crops, fewer and fewer families without their own cow, pig, chickens. Everywhere collective farms were setting out huge orchards, developing large apiaries, digging ponds in which to catch the spring waters, and use them for pleasure, for the cultivation of fish and for irrigation.

"The Kuban, the land of the doughty Kuban cossacks, was even more of a revelation. There, four years ago, people were in open rebellion. Women and children, and sometimes men disguised as women so as to avoid physical retaliation, marched up and down the streets heaping oaths and curses on Soviet officials. . . . Mayevskaya, rechristened Krasny Tamenetz, is one of the most prosperous collective farms in the Kuban. Its people received in 1936 for each labour-day $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilos of grain and 6 roubles in cash, in addition to other forms of produce. The collective farm has its own electric plant, which furnishes light for every home and every barn; and 70 new houses were being built for members."

The published statistics show that the total area sown and cultivated in the USSR, and the total yield in harvest, have as a whole risen, and were, in the aggregate in 1936-1937, considerably in excess of the figure, not only for 1924, when things were at their lowest, but also for 1913.¹ The increase has not been so much in wheat and rye, for which sufficient has now been provided for home consumption, whilst some other commodities serve better for international exchange. The greatest increase during recent years has accordingly been in the so-called technical crops, such as flax, hemp, cotton, sugar beet and sunflower, as well as in potatoes, tea, tobacco, various kinds of fruit, flowers for the city markets, and even (to the extent of some 30,000 acres) the approved substitute for the india-rubber plant (*kok-sazn*). The colossal destruction of livestock by the recalcitrant peasants during 1929-1933 (see p. 236) began in 1934-1935 to be made good, notably in pigs and large-horned cattle.² This has been achieved partly by improved administration in the special stock-breeding state farms (*sovkhosi*), and, with increased knowledge and care, by the growth of the dairy and piggery herds of many of the *kolkhosi*; and partly by the device of enabling the families in *kolkhos* membership, to a number that had in 1935 already reached some six millions, and by 1938 is expected to approach twenty millions,³ to obtain a calf for favourably deferred payments, to be reared on the peasant's

¹ The official statistics state that the total area sown in 1935 was 132.8 million hectares, as against 105 in 1913. Of this area 103.4 million hectares were in grain in 1935 as against 94.4 in 1913 (translated from *Socialist Construction*, published by Gosplan, Moscow, 1936, p. 278).

² The figures for 1935 may be compared with those for 1929-1933 on p. 246. On June 1, 1935, there were still only 15.9 million horses as compared with 34 millions in 1929; and 49.5 million sheep, etc., as compared with 147.2 millions in 1929; and 49.3 million large-horned cattle as against 68.1 millions in 1929. But the pigs had increased to 22.6 millions as against 20.9 millions in 1929 (*The Second Five-Year Plan*, by V. I. Mezhlauk, p. xxxvi, Moscow, 1937).

³ *Ibid.* p. xliii.

individual holding. The individual family enterprise which this small-holding represents (which is no innovation, as it was expressly provided for in 1928) has been formally generalised in the model kolkhos constitution, now universally adopted with minor variations by the members' meetings.¹

Much collateral evidence of the great advance in prosperity during the past few years is available. The doctors attribute the steadily improving health of the peasantry during recent years largely to their being better nourished. They are plainly eating more wheaten bread than ever before, and more butter and meat. There are considerable balances at any date due to the collective farms from the diverse institutions to which they send regular supplies, week by week, of vegetables and other farm produce or fresh fish, under the network of voluntary contracts of purchase and sale at wholesale market prices, by which the USSR is now covered (see pp. 333, 693-694). These have been steadily increasing in amount. The kolkhosi have nearly all got current accounts in the State Savings Bank in which they deposit temporarily their undistributed balances. The aggregate amount of these kolkhos balances in July 1936 was three times that in July 1934. In addition, many of the kolkhosi have lately been making investments in the government's internal loans, which yield premiums as well as interest. Throughout all the rural districts the sales of the Consumers' Cooperative Societies, membership of which is practically universal among the adult peasants, have during the past two years increased in amount by leaps and bounds, and greatly widened in range. The villagers are everywhere buying not only boots and clothes and unaccustomed household furniture (for instance, iron bedsteads) but also sports goods, fancy soap and cosmetics, books and stationery, photographic cameras, musical instruments, wireless sets and expensive delicacies.

This is not to say that every kolkhos has attained prosperity. The government still has periodically to remit arrears to particular collective farms unable to pay their dues. At the end of 1936 the government cancelled all outstanding arrears, so as to allow them all without exception to start free of debt. How many of the quarter of a million are still struggling against poverty we are unable to say. What is now remarked is the emergence of what are popularly called "millionaire" kolkhosi, being collective farms in which the aggregate divisible income

¹ Adopted by the Second All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers, and approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU, February 17, 1935.

This elaborate and detailed constitution and code of administration, which in the English translation exceeds 6000 words, affords the best vision of the kolkhos organisation. It will be found as an appendix to the volume *In a Collective Farm*, by Vorn Smith, pp. 214-229.

The area of the individual holding of each member's family, which can be altered by the general meeting of members, varies from half an acre to as much as three acres according to the district, and also proportionate to the number of workers in the family and the amount of their live-stock.

of the membership (which varies from a few dozen families to a thousand or so) during 1936-1937, in cash and in kind, has exceeded a million roubles. Of these there are reported to be several thousands in the USSR, the collective income, in a few cases of the larger farms, running up to five million roubles. Family incomes for the year, in particular kolkhosi, of thirty, forty and even sixty thousand roubles are occasionally to be found.¹ It is this widespread prosperity that explains the considerable aggregate investment of the collective farms during the year in additional farm buildings and sawmills, schools, clubhouses, bathhouses, motor lorries and bicycles, and occasionally even aeroplanes. By the end of 1936, no fewer than 7600 collective farms had installed electric light and power in their dwellings and farm buildings, which is more than are to be seen in Britain. The grain crop from 1,877,500 acres was threshed in about 4000 electrically driven threshing machines. In the southern farms half a million sheep were sheared electrically. In Central and Northern Russia many kolkhosi now use electricity for heating the glass-houses in which large crops of vegetables are raised. It is interesting to come across instances in which the collective enterprise of the kolkhos has enabled emergencies to be met, and difficulties to be overcome, that would have transcended the powers of an independent peasant family. In this way kolkhosi have defeated local droughts by constructing ponds as local flood or snow reservoirs; in the summer stocking them with fish and using them as swimming baths. Or by digging primitive irrigation channels to be filled by pumps from these ponds, sometimes electrically driven. Or even, in one case that we know, by carrying water from the river by a human chain of buckets.² Efforts such as these are believed to have saved the situation in 1936, when unusual cold in April and local drought conditions prevailed in many parts, which might otherwise have caused a serious shortage. Or the kolkhos has erected,

¹ Here, the British economist may say, we see emerging the phenomenon of economic rent. It must, however, be remembered that the principal examples of economic rent, namely, those arising from building-site-values and from the working of minerals, are definitely excluded from kolkhos enjoyment or ownership. Accessibility to the bazaar or other free market remains, but may be deemed of small importance, as a considerable proportion of the produce is disposed of to the Government. By far the largest part of the difference per head in net divisible income between the various kolkhosi plainly results from their inequalities in competence of management, in skill and assiduity of labour and in the extent to which improvements in method have been adopted. Their members are not exempt from the progressive income tax and death duties.

² "Two years ago in the republic of Kabarda in the North Caucasus, after the crops had been put, in, there was no rain. Day after day the sun rose hot and dry and the soil began to parch and bake. Thereupon Metal Kalmykov, the political leader of Kabarda, one of the most amazing personages in the revolution, and incidentally the most brilliant and most humane collectiviser in the country, issued a call to the whole population to go out with picks, shovels, spades and bring the mountain streams to the land and save themselves from disaster. Schools closed, offices closed, factories wherever possible closed, and the whole population, including Kalmykov and all his secretaries and assistants, went into the fields and shovelled dirt. About half of the land of the country was irrigated when the rains splashed down. Meanwhile the ditches are there, and whenever drought threatens crops the mountain streams can be turned on almost like faucets" ("Russia's Greatest Victory", by Maurice Hindus, *The New Republic*, April 14, 1937, p. 286).

by joint effort of its members, additional storing-places for the crop, or new shelters for live-stock and machinery, by which the members' collective property is better preserved.

We infer accordingly with some confidence, if without complete statistical proof, that, taken as a whole, the system of kolkhosi, as it has now been got to work, has during the past three or four years become substantially successful. Alike with respect to the individual shares divided among the families in membership, and to the amount received by the government, the condition in 1934 and 1935, and, under less favourable climatic conditions, even that of 1936 taken as a whole, together with the prospects for 1937, indicate positive prosperity. There is a fair promise not only of this success increasing and becoming more nearly universal, but also of its proving equal to deal successfully with the periodical adverse climatic conditions that would have meant, to an individual peasantry, a serious famine. It is significant that the Soviet Government has lately become convinced that, in the present state of development of the rural population, the kolkhosi are proving more successful than the sovkhosi. These nine or ten thousand relatively gigantic state farms, worked by wage labour, from which so much was expected a decade ago, have been in many cases reduced in size by subdivision; in other instances changed from such specialised enterprises as "grain factories" into mixed farming; and, most significant of all, in various localities, transformed into kolkhosi, either by the division of their land among neighbouring collective farms, or by the establishment, instead of the sovkhos, of a group of newly arrived or transferred peasant families as one or more new collective farms. It is reported that during 1935-1936 some 55,000 acres were added to the aggregate under collective farms, much of this by transfer from sovkhosi. There are now fewer sovkhosi, and they were sowing in the spring of 1937 only one-tenth of the area of grain sown by the kolkhosi.¹ We can discover no case of reversion to individual peasant holdings.

The eye-witness on whom we rely, in agreement with those foreign agricultural experts whose testimony we have been able to obtain, agrees in attributing the success of the collective farms to three main factors, about which there is disagreement only as to their relative efficacy. The first of these is the extensive mechanisation of agricultural processes rendered possible by the enlargement of scale of the farm.

"Collectivisation of the land", says the eye-witness already quoted, "is the only apparent reason for the amazing change in the condition

¹ These state farms are now (1937) under three separate administrations. The People's Commissar of Sovkhosi had within his jurisdiction 13 million acres sown by sovkhosi; the People's Commissar of Food Industry and the People's Commissar of Agriculture had each about 2 million acres. At the same time the area sown by collective farms reached 189 million acres, whilst that sown by individual peasants was less than 2 million acres.

It has been stated that "the Government has recently turned over about a fourth of all land in state farms to collectives" (*Soviet Agricultural Reorganisation and the Bread Grain Situation*, by V. P. Timoshenko, 1937, p. 365).

of the countryside and in the attitude of the people. Cossacks and peasants. Dire as has been its cost in human life and in sorrow, few peasants, even among those who loathe the new discipline, still doubt its superiority over the old way of farming. . . . In the country at large, collectivisation has become firmly entrenched: the [hundreds of thousands of] tractors, combines and other modern implements have wrought a great change in the minds and lives of the Russian peasantry."¹

The effect of this mechanisation upon the yield is often misunderstood. It is said for instance, that the tractor, not being manure, though it lessens labour, does nothing to increase fertility. But, at any rate, the tractor-plough and the combine-harvester alike increase the actual yield of produce per hectare. The accomplished agricultural expert whom the German Government has, for years, maintained as part of its embassy in Moscow to be perpetually reporting on Soviet agriculture, has lately become emphatic in his testimony as to this cause of such success as he admits the kolkhosi to have latterly attained. In the old days, he pointed out in 1936, when the work was done by horses, or by the peasant himself with his wife, there was often an insufficient interval between the end of the summer and the beginning of winter snows to get completed the autumn ploughing of every tiny strip of the peasant holding. Much of the soil was often hardly scratched, and part was sometimes not ploughed at all. But now, under the complete tractorisation of the collectivised arable areas of the USSR, the whole cultivable surface can be ploughed 18 inches deep in ten days. In one Ukrainian kolkhos a visitor was informed in 1936 that the ploughing had taken only five days.

Sowing has been everywhere expedited. In 1937 a majority of the kolkhosi in a particular district were reported to have completed their spring sowing within three days. After the autumnal sowing, when winter comes, the snow fills the deep furrows now customary, and remains undisturbed until it melts in the spring, when the water does not flow off, but, in each furrow, sinks gradually into the soil. This, in the semi-arid area, causes a marked increase in fertility.² Moreover, much more time has become available for weeding and repeated harrowing, resulting in increased yield. Similarly the use of the combine-harvester effects both a more complete and a more speedy harvesting of the grain, with a shortened period of risk from bad weather, and actually less loss in

¹ *The Round Table*, No. 106, March 1937.

² "Thus the peasant lands are plowed to a depth of twenty and twenty-five centimetres. They are well cultivated. One does not have to be an agricultural expert or a dirt farmer to appreciate the vastness of this one change in peasant farming with all that it implies in conservation of moisture and in destruction of weeds. In the Ukraine and the Kuban, Russia's chief grain-growing regions in Europe, there were no rains last summer. Yet wherever I travelled in these sections crops on the average were as good as and often better than the year before. Again and again older peasants told me that never in all their experience as farmers did they remember a time when crops resisted so successfully the onslaught of the drought. Even in the Volga regions, where the drought was most severe, the collective farms, because of superior tillage, managed to save about a third of the crop" ("Russia's Greatest Victory", by Maurice Hindus, in *The New Republic*, April 14, 1937, p. 286).

warehousing. In one kolkhos in the southern Ukraine the whole harvest of grain was reported in 1936 to have been reaped, threshed and stored in 18 days—processes formerly extending over several months. Experiments have been made, now thought to have been not altogether successful, in the use of the aeroplane for spring sowing, so that this can be begun earlier in the year. This enables the seed to be scattered actually upon the snow, when it sinks down gradually, through the melting mass, into the moistened earth. Such broadcast sowing upon the snow may have to be resorted to, even with all its drawbacks, in backward seasons in which the snow lies very late. But now that the use of the tractor enables each of the successive operations to be completed within a few days, the kolkhosi are warned not to sow too early; the sowing by aeroplane will be done only in exceptional cases in a backward spring. Fertilisers and germicides can be spread, and effective campaigns against locusts and mosquitoes can be carried out quickly and cheaply, and even a little irrigation effected by water sprinkling from the air. It is therefore strictly accurate to say that mechanisation may be used so as positively to increase the quantity of the product in some cases even more advantageously than additional fertilisers.

The second factor in the economic success of the collective farms within the last decade, especially during recent years, and one which many critics ignore, has been the very general increase in knowledge of their members. To bring these lately quite illiterate peasants into the educational atmosphere of the settlement of the farm affairs, by frank discussion, in frequent members' meetings; to have these meetings addressed by more competent instructors, whether the elected chairman, the representative of the machine and tractor station, or a visiting official from the Commissariat of Agriculture; to send away groups of members as delegates to Moscow, or to hear some leader at a district conference; and to have the reports of these delegates discussed at the members' meeting—all this, together with the circulation in the villages of literally millions of copies of books of every kind, not to mention the newspapers, and the habitual listening-in to the Moscow and other radio talks, has produced an outburst of learning among this backward population of a hundred and twenty millions of persons from the Baltic to the Pacific, which may not unfairly be compared in magnitude with the more advanced but far less widespread Renaissance of the fifteenth century, which can have touched only a few thousands of people in each of half a dozen nations. To predict, as one enthusiast did in 1930, that the kolkhos would become the peasant's university, was perhaps going too far. Yet within less than a decade something comparable with this has actually happened in thousands of collective farms that were formerly stigmatised as the "deaf villages" of the remote steppe.¹

¹ As to the advance in schooling in the collectivised villages, a British visitor, inspecting a village school in 1934, found the elder boys and girls being taught to read and speak, not only their own vernacular and Russian, but also German: and then discovered that

The third factor in this success has been the ingenious use that has been made of the peasant's inherited passion of acquisitiveness. Membership of the kolkhos does not involve and (contrary to careless mis-statement) has never involved the abandonment of the peasant's own dwelling, his own garden, or even the paddock for his own poultry-run, piggery and cow. All this he keeps, as has always been his habit, for the profit of himself and his family. Even the scattered strips which the peasant used to plough and reap, and which are now thrown together in one great open field, to be cultivated collectively, are dealt with on an individual piece-work basis. The net yield is annually distributed, not equally among the members as such, but unequally, strictly in proportion to the number of work-days (an arbitrary measure of the amount of labour, fixed by the members' meeting) registered as performed by each worker. The government now takes from the kolkhos, and that in kind, only the proportion of the produce which had been settled before the beginning of the agricultural year, leaving to the workers the whole advantage of any increased area sown, or of more intensive cultivation in the course of the year. In the cases that have been investigated, the total share taken by the government for agricultural tax and payment for the use and repair of the tractors and other machinery supplied, amounted to less than one-third of the yield, leaving to the members much more than, under equivalent weather conditions, they had ever enjoyed before; not only more than the Tsar, the landlord and the usurer had left them, but more than the great mass of them (as distinguished from the minority of kulaks) had ever enjoyed as individual peasants since the Revolution.¹

in all seven-year schools (8-15) a foreign language was a compulsory subject, in practice either German or English. The seven-year school was already universal in nearly a thousand cities in the USSR (unless it had become the more advanced ten-year school (8-18); it was already existing in all the villages of the Ukraine and in about half of those of the RSFSR and by 1938 it would be universal from the Baltic to the Pacific. The Englishman thought with shame that in no single village school in all England and Wales was any foreign language being taught. The Russian villages have now gone further. In 1937, as eye-witnesses have told us, some of the larger villages in the Ukraine have already converted their schools into ten-year schools, retaining their own pupils until 18, whilst attracting others from the neighbourhood; and sending quite a good proportion on to institutions of university grade, with maintenance grants from the kolkhosi to which their parents belong.

¹ After payment of the Government dues, what is left is disposed of as the members' meeting decides. After covering all the advances to members, the farm expenses and the planned reserves for seed, etc., the net balance may be either allocated by vote to new buildings or other collective improvement, or divided among the members in proportion to their work-days. The members may either sell their shares in the free market or to other consumers jointly, and divide the proceeds; or (as some obstinate individuals prefer) take their shares themselves to the nearest free market and retail them for their individual advantage.

Much misunderstanding has arisen from the practice of the Government of inducing (and doubtless practically requiring) the kolkhos to enter into a contract to supply the Government with a specified amount or proportion of the yield at a price arrived at by agreement. This has been assumed by critics to be always a "nominal", some say a "confiscatory", price, far below the price of bread in the cities, amounting in fact to an almost unbearable burden. We are unable to make a satisfactory estimate. As described to us by members of the kolkhosi that we visited, the Government price was, in effect, a wholesale price, certainly substantially below what the peasants could obtain by retail

The working members are, by decision of the members' meeting, organised in brigades, and each brigade is now usually made responsible for the continuous performance of a particular section of farm-work—it may be a particular area of the arable, or a particular herd of cows, or the management of the piggery, or the driving of the tractors—for at least a whole year. In these various ways the common human desire for increased spending-money is so harnessed and adjusted as to stimulate all the men- and not less the wives and the adolescents—always in the direction of increased quantity, efficiency and regularity of labour. This ingenious adaptation of the ingrained propensities of an age-long peasantry, which is especially characteristic of the agricultural kolkhos, is not, as is often ignorantly asserted, a departure from the original plan of 1928, when the form of the *artel* was expressly adopted for the collective farm in preference to that of the commune; still less is it a “reversion to capitalism”. It is, on the contrary, merely a continuation, with some minor improvements, and over a limited part of his field of activity, of the private enterprise which once filled the peasant's whole life. The peasant, who could not have been suddenly swept into complete communism, has been, largely though not wholly, collectivised. Nor can the collective farm accurately be called a return to capitalism, seeing that the kolkhos members are, like everyone else, whether individually or collectively, definitely prohibited, under severe penalty, from resorting to either of the two characteristics of capitalist enterprise, namely, taking for themselves the product of labourers whom they hire at wages, or buying commodities in order to sell these at a higher price.

No candid observer in 1937 can doubt that the collective farm system has proved not only its economic superiority over the starveling peasant holding, however skilfully developed; but also its cultural advantages in enlightening what Marx and Lenin called the “idiotcy” of rural life: this is why it has now, after little more than a decade of trial, generally speaking, won its way to reluctant approval by the members. This came about by degrees, as the workers' dividends steadily increased, though not by any means entirely because of their increase. First to be converted by experience were the women and the adolescents (two-thirds of the whole), who found themselves suddenly emancipated from their thralldom to the male head of the household; becoming free members of the governing assembly; and for the first time drawing their own individual incomes from the common estate. The elderly men long remained sullen, bewailing their lost autocracy, but were frequently molli-

sales if they took the trouble and incurred the expense of transporting the crop to the nearest beazaar, and selling it, bit by bit, to individual consumers. That was, however, as the peasants declared, an unprofitable alternative. The Government gave them the privilege of obtaining, also at a wholesale price, all the articles of equipment, together with seed and fertilisers, required by the farm. We are not convinced that the transaction is more onerous than is the sale to the travelling grain dealer as was usual before the Revolution, and as is still common in other peasant communities. For similar wholesale purchases by the Government, at a collectively agreed price, in the fishing industry, see pp. 291-292; and for furs and skins, see pp. 295-296.

fied by being appointed inspectors of quality, charged to walk about to see that loss was prevented and waste eliminated! Willing acceptance of the new organisation was greatly promoted by the official declaration in 1935, which was in 1936 enshrined in the New Constitution of the USSR, that each kolkhos was secured, in perpetuity, the occupation of the land allotted to it, undiminished in area, and free of rent (except in the form of taxation of the annual product). This sense of permanence of occupation in usufruct—scarcely distinguishable from the Russian peasant's idea of complete ownership—has been brought home to the 22 million families by the issue, in the course of 1936-1937, to each of them, of a well-got-up, attractively bound "book", containing a map of the kolkhos land. This shows the boundaries separating the land of each kolkhos from that of its neighbours, and also contains a copy of the rules for the administration of its affairs that its members' meeting had adopted. Visitors to the homes during the past year have been impressed with the naïve joy and pride with which this "title deed" is treasured. A small part of its result is the zeal with which, in one kolkhos after another, the boundaries have been marked on the ground by stones or fencing, the land being then cultivated right up to the edge, instead of broad strips being left waste to avoid disputes. Another is the constant effort to drain the swampy patches, stub up the bushes and level the little irregularities by reason of which parts of nearly every kolkhos area have previously defied effective cultivation. The transformation of feeling is marked by the fact that there is manifested (1937), in various parts of the USSR, a movement to the kolkhosi, in place of the former movement away from them. Some kolkhosi, indeed—perhaps because so many of their young people are now in the cities studying to be doctors or engineering technicians, or agronomists (see pp. 1179-1180); or because they need a book-keeper or a particular craftsman; or because they have been allotted additional land from a disrupted sovkhos—were found in 1936 to be actively seeking additional members from the neighbouring small towns. Several at least of the persons extruded from Moscow because of failure to find rooms there, or situations which they were willing to accept, have been admitted to kolkhosi wanting additional members. We happen to have heard on good authority that the government of a neighbouring state was, in 1936-1937, warned by its agents in the USSR that the feeling in the country districts had completely changed from that prevailing four or five years ago, and that no assistance from mass discontent was now to be counted on, whether in the Ukraine or the Kuban or anywhere else, among the peasantry.¹

¹ We append the testimony of an eye-witness whose personal acquaintance with the Russian peasantry makes him an unrivalled authority. Mr. Maurice Hindus described in April 1937 what he calls "Russia's Greatest Victory".

"Some years ago while on a visit to a village in the province of Ryazan I attended a meeting at which a teacher of agriculture delivered a lecture on gardening. At great length he explained to his audience that the way to grow large firm heads of cabbage was to set the plants in squares and far enough apart that the cultivator could through the

The Retailing of Commodities

The reader will not need to be told of the continuous progress made, year after year, in the USSR, in practically every branch of wealth production. Nor need we give any account of the colossal new enter-rows both ways. The peasants listened and seemed impressed, and then went home and planted cabbage the way they had always done—close together, the theory being that the more plants there were in a row the more cabbage they would have. Last summer, while visiting villages all the way from the black-earth region to the Turkish border in Armenia, I made a particular effort to look into gardens, and wherever I saw cabbage it was planted precisely as the above-mentioned teacher of agriculture had urged his hearers to do.

"The Crimea and the Southern Ukraine had to import seed potatoes. In recent years Professor Lysonko, by his method of vernalisation, that is, starting growth in the cellar, has made it possible for these territories to raise their own. In the past year 10,000 collective farms in the Ukraine no longer had to import seed potatoes. Meanwhile White Russia, though especially suited to potatoes, is cutting down on its potato acreage and planting more and more flax. The peasants there had long ago been told that flax was more profitable than potatoes, but habit, inertia, dread of innovation—ancient foes of progress in the Russian village—kept them from making the shift. Now under collectivisation the shift is being readily achieved.

"More perhaps than any other farmer in Europe the *muzhik* was wary of new ways of farming, chiefly because his own experience and the experience of his ancestors had taught him that the old ways, however crude and ineffectual to the man of the laboratory, were sure to yield results, even if poor ones, but that the new method, because it was new, might prove a failure, and then what would he do in winter with no cabbage, no onions, no pork, no potatoes? . . . There is not a collective farm but boasts its quota of members who at first scoffed and swore at new methods of tillage, but who subsequently recognised their error and have since been ready to follow the proposals of the agronomist.

"In 1927 one-third of the peasantry had no draught animals. One-fifth had no cows. Of those who had horses, one-half had only one horse per family. With the best intentions these peasants could not use heavy ploughs—a horse could not pull them—or any other modern machine. The size of the average individual farm was a little over eleven acres, and few owners of such small holdings could hope to attain a degree of prosperity that would enable them to buy modern agricultural implements. That was why about three-fourths of the Russian peasantry sowed their grain by hand, a process as slow as it was wasteful. Nearly half of them did their harvesting by hand. Peasants with no horse, or with only one horse—and they were in the vast majority—could use a light plough or a *soha*, a wood-framed plough, neither of which could turn up a furrow of more than ten or thirteen centimetres. In the absence of heavy disk harrows they could not prepare proper seed beds, and a marked feature of their fields was their lumpy condition. In time of drought the sun quickly baked up their land and when fall or winter came they faced starvation. . . .

"Russia paid an appalling price for collectivisation; more than for any other enterprise of the revolution, save for the conquest of power. The blunders that the soviets and the Communist Party committed in the first three years of the movement have turned many a friendly foreign journalist into an implacable and lasting foe of the revolution. . . . Yet now as one travels about the country and sees the superbly tilled fields and the increasing herds of live-stock, especially sheep and swine, it seems unbelievable that only four years ago the Ukraine and the Kuban and other districts were smitten with hunger and devastation. . . .

"Because they are so new and are such a stupendous departure from former methods of work, the collectives have many difficulties to overcome. There are not enough good managers. There are not enough good foremen. There are entirely too many office workers and executives. On some farms about one-fourth of the workers hold non-productive jobs. The division of labour is still clumsy and wasteful. . . . Certain branches of farming, especially horticulture, have been grossly neglected. This is why fruit is so scanty in Russia. Bureaucracy, the chief curse of the revolution, though not so viciously rooted as in the city, is yet in evidence on some of the best collectives. But these are faults of organisation which time and experience should overcome. . . ." (Article in *The New Republic*, April 14, 1937, pp. 284-287.)

prises that are going on in every part of the USSR. Everyone will have heard of the Moscow Underground Railway, of which the second section will soon be opened for traffic, nor is it necessary to do more than mention the White Sea Canal, connecting Leningrad with the Arctic Ocean. We can hardly omit the vast series of ship canals, hydro-electric stations and irrigation works which are rapidly making Moscow a port from which ships sail into five separate seas. Meanwhile the production of coal and mineral oil, iron and steel, manganese and aluminium, and finally gold, has during the past two years exceeded all records. The distinctive feature of these years has been a spectacular increase in the production of all sorts of household commodities. The Soviet Government has found itself up against another problem, namely, that of getting the goods to the customers.

We described in the first edition (pp. 304-310) how much more difficult it had proved to be, in so vast a territory, to construct efficient social machinery for the retail distribution of commodities in satisfaction of the consumers' desires, than to organise, with a growing measure of success, the production of these commodities, and even their actual transport by rail and road. In the course of the year 1917, Lenin (and, we think, among the Bolshevik leaders he only) discerned that the function of retailing must be undertaken, at any rate in the earlier stages of socialism and communism, by the then inchoate consumers' cooperative movement. It was, however, not until 1929-1931 that the elimination of the profit-making private retailer, who had been re-established under the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921, was substantially completed. Meanwhile the consumers' cooperative movement had been growing by leaps and bounds from one end of the USSR to the other, coming, in 1935, to have about 73 millions of members, organised in some 45,000 societies, strongly federated in *Centrosoyus*. It had covered the greater part of the USSR with its retail distributing points. It had constructed, with government assistance, magnificent mechanised bakeries equal if not superior to the best in the United States or Great Britain. Its central stores in Moscow and Leningrad could claim in 1935 to be unsurpassed by any retailing establishment in the cooperative world. Nor could it be forgotten that in the earlier years, at a time when all other credits were refused to the Soviet Union, *Centrosoyus* had obtained, largely with the willing aid of the English and Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Societies, the necessary imports, especially of tea, textiles and hardware, which would otherwise have been lacking. But we had also to describe (see pp. 323-327) how persistent was popular dissatisfaction with the inability of *Centrosoyus* to cover successfully the whole field of distribution, and how its sphere of operations had been successively encroached upon. Already in 1934 we recounted at some length (see pp. 327-335) how various important parts of the function of retailing household commodities were being undertaken by other authorities.

During the past three years not only have these encroachments

increased, but also the whole ground has been surveyed and the functions of the several authorities have been systematically reallocated.¹ In 1935, with the advent of plenty, the whole working of retailing was fundamentally changed by the successive abolition, for bread, for meat, and presently for all commodities whatsoever, of rationing and ration cards. The retailing system is, in 1937, one of substantial identity of prices, with steadily diminishing variations from district to district, to all purchasers in all shops, by whatever authority conducted, with freedom to all customers to buy where they like, and as much as they can pay for. In 1937 we find the whole business of retailing commodities (including public catering) growing to the colossal figure, as planned, of 131 thousand million roubles (say £5,000,000,000) for the year, shared among three sets of institutions, which we may designate respectively governmental, cooperative and the bazaar.

Government retailing has, during the past three years, been increasing at a great rate. It is conducted by many different public authorities, federal, republic and municipal, including the USSR People's Commissariats of Food Industry and Light Industry, as well as, for particular kinds of commodities, those for Heavy Industries and Timber Industries; in the constituent and autonomous republics, the People's Commissariats of Local Trade; and, in the principal cities, the municipal soviets. This systematisation of governmental retailing is not yet complete and further rearrangements may be expected. At present the distribution of the work of retailing among these various governmental organs cannot accurately be stated as being according to the kinds of commodities dealt with, or according to the magnitude of each enterprise, or according to the section of consumers to be served, or even according to locality.²

Cooperative retailing, which had been, for years, most seriously encroached upon in the cities, was entirely excluded from the 654 chief towns by decree of September 29, 1935. This drastic transfer, from the voluntary consumers' cooperative societies to various governmental organs, of the magnificent central stores and mechanised bakeries in all but the smallest cities of the USSR, was misunderstood by cooperators in the capitalist countries, among whom it provoked some animadversions.³ It was made without compensation to the individual members,

¹ The student will find a critical survey of some of the changes described in this section in *The Review of International Cooperation* for December 1935, pp. 441-442, 444-450. Those in Moscow are described in *Moscow in the Making*, 1937, by Sir Ernest Simon and others, pp. 20-21, 32-33. Statistics will be found in the publications of Gosplan and Centrosoyuz relating to each successive year.

² See, for instance, the complication between the functions in retailing of the various kinds of governmental organisations in Moscow, described in *Moscow in the Making*, by Sir Ernest Simon and others, 1937.

³ The position of consumers' cooperation in the USSR was discussed with some acerbity at the meetings of the executive of the International Cooperative Alliance in February and April 1937. It is not always remembered that, in marked difference from the arrangements of the consumers' cooperative movement of Great Britain, that of the USSR makes no use of the device of dividend on purchase, nor does it pay any interest to its shareholders, who (again differing from British practice) hardly ever hold more than

but it was accompanied by a very extensive increase in the capital which the Soviet Government placed without charge at the disposal of the consumers' cooperative movement as a whole; and the government action, far from lessening the business of *Centrosoyus* and the thousands of rural societies that were left to it, promptly resulted in a considerable aggregate increase. An extensive reorganisation of the administration was immediately undertaken. The whole attention of *Centrosoyus* was directed to satisfying the rapidly growing demands of the 130 millions of villagers to whom the *kolkhosi* were bringing prosperity (see pp. 1171-1180). Many of the tiny societies in the smaller villages, often working year after year at a loss, were amalgamated by decision of their members' meetings into larger units permitting of the engagement of competent managers and trained salesmen at more liberal salaries. To enable the expansion of the peasants' demands to be still better met, *Centrosoyus* has established during 1936-1937 in the chief village centres more than 5500 relatively large department stores, usually under the management of the committees of the district unions into which the village cooperative societies with the consent of their meetings of members had been grouped, which offer for sale a range and variety of goods altogether beyond the previous experience of the countryside. With the aid of extensive credits from federal funds, and of this drastic reorganisation of the village societies, their sales during 1936-1937 have gone up by leaps and bounds. *Centrosoyus* can accordingly expect (although the number of separate societies has been reduced to 22,500, and the membership to 38,500,000, that it will, before the end of the year 1937, record total retail sales, for the villages alone, of more than 30,000 million roubles, being three times as great as in 1934; and actually far in excess of the entire cooperative turnover in 1934 for city and village together.¹

a single share. The taking up of this share, and the completion of payment of its price, amounts to little more than an entrance fee, giving the right to purchase at the store. This right was not taken away when the stores in the cities became governmental, although it ceased to be exclusive. The compensation to the cooperative movement as a whole took the form partly of a complete remission of taxation on all cooperative trading during the year 1937 and partly of a nominal loan of 350 million roubles, not repayable, as additional capital to enable it to undertake the vast extension of its aggregate business that is rapidly taking place.

¹ At the same time various other kinds of retail organs were shifted from one administration to another. The "Departments of Workers' Supply" (ORS) administered in connection with the mines and factories of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and (so far as they served the railway workers) of the People's Commissariat of Transport, into which, as we described (pp. 333-335) most of the "closed cooperative societies" had been converted, were "liquidated", and replaced by open retail shops and productive departments governed by the People's Commissariats of Local Trade of the several republics. Those serving the workers in the peat industry, and in the industries connected with the non-ferrous and other metals, and with non-metallic minerals, have not yet been transferred. The special army (including navy and air force) cooperatives have been converted into open retail shops under the People's Commissariats for Local Trade of the several republics. Those connected with the state farms (*sovkhosi*), 340 in number, with 360 million roubles turnover, have been converted into consumers' cooperative societies, and transferred to *Centrosoyus*.

The bakeries outside the 654 chief towns remain under *Centrosoyus*. On October 1, 1936, there were as many as 17,568 of them, with an output of 4304 thousand tons of bread

Meanwhile the innemorial bazaar, which existed at the Revolution in every urban centre, and had been for the past twenty years alternately suppressed and restarted under more or less regulation, has been again taken into favour, and given a recognised place in the retailing system. Every kind of working producer (as distinguished from the profit-making "speculator" or "exploiter"), such as the members of a collective farm or fishery (*kolkhos*) and the surviving remnants of the independent peasantry; the still numerous handicraftsmen working independently on their own account, and the members of a cooperative productive society (*kustar artel* or *incop*); the miners or factory operatives cultivating allotments in their spare time; the professional hunter, trapper or angler, and the worker who uses his leisure to combine sport with catching for sale; and, finally, any person who wishes to dispose of any article for which he has no further use—all are now allowed, and are actually encouraged jointly or individually to bring their wares for sale direct to consumers in the free market or bazaar, for which the municipalities to-day provide more or less comfortable accommodation, properly cleansed and lighted, often with rows of stalls protected from the weather and kept in order by the local militiamen (*police*). With the bazaar must be grouped—for, in so vast an area and for so diverse a population, no part of the old social structure disappears completely and ubiquitously—the periodical fairs still held in such centres as Baku and Tashkent, Arkhangelsk and Simferopol, which are now attended only by working producers and consumers to the exclusion of profit-making dealers or merchants or employers of hired labour. Such fairs, restricted to their new kinds of sellers and buyers, have been increased in number and frequency, being held periodically at short intervals, in or adjoining many smaller towns and even large villages, mainly for the convenience, as retail sellers, jointly or individually, of the members of the collective farms and fisheries, and the allotment-holders among the workers in the government mines, oil-fields and factories; and for affording additional facilities, as retail buyers, to all the dwellers in the countryside.¹

and confectionery in the year, and an aggregate selling price of about 4000 million roubles. The catering business has been shared on similar lines. In all the larger cities and towns in the various republics it is now undertaken by the People's Commissariat of Local Trade, whilst everywhere else it is left to the Consumers' Cooperative Movement, which is rapidly extending restaurants, buffets, tea-rooms and common kitchens throughout the villages. On October 1, 1936, these cooperative enterprises already numbered 5158 with an annual turnover of 630 million roubles.

The peculiar "Integral Cooperatives" (see pp. 293-296) have had a special development. All the enterprises situated to the north of the 62nd degree of latitude have been placed under the newly formed Main North Sea Way Commission (described in *40,000 against the Arctic*, by H. P. Smolka, 1937), in which many of the separate enterprises have been absorbed. Those lying to the south of the 62nd degree have been assigned to *Centrosyus*, and have been converted into consumers' cooperative societies, confined to trading (134 societies, with 820 shops serving 102,000 members). Meanwhile the productive activities have been taken over by "*incops*" (associations of producers of the *artel* type (see pp. 220-233)).

¹ These modern fairs—really only enlarged periodical consumers' markets—are to be distinguished from their better-known predecessors, such as that of Nizhni-Novgorod,

It remains to be said that nearly all these retailing agencies, whether governmental, cooperative or bazaar-like, make use simultaneously of all the usual apparatus of retailing, from gigantic central stores in the great cities, either for particular classes of commodities or having a variety of departments for many kinds of wares; with similar department stores in over 5000 rural centres; through a whole series of smaller stores, themselves of various kinds, serving particular localities; in Moscow and Leningrad fleets of motor delivery lorries taking goods to the customer's home, down to an interminable range of fixed or peripatetic stalls, stands, pedlars' packs and delivery vans, temporarily serving all sorts of crowds in market and fair, in busy thoroughfares or in the harvest fields.

There is also the extensive and growing form of retailing that we may designate public catering, in connection not only with all sorts of residential institutions such as orphanages and students' hostels, but also the provision of meals for payment either in dining-rooms open to all comers, or in schools and colleges, factories and offices; together with the supply of refreshments at the parks and railway stations. The form of retailing, like all the rest, is shared in at different places by the various forms of governmental organisation and by the consumers' cooperative movement.

Along with this extensive reorganisation of retailing agencies there has gone a steady increase in magnitude and variety in the systematic provision, under free and voluntary contracting, of regular supplies of foodstuffs (including vegetables, fruit and fish) to institutions having to provide meals, whether hotels and residential hostels, public restaurants and dining-places, factories and offices of all kinds, as well as to *Centrosoyus* and separate cooperative societies, and to various governmental organs. The sellers thus undertaking regular supplies may be either collective farms or fisheries, or workers holding allotments, or independent producers, whether peasants, hunters or anglers. This network of free and voluntary contracting (from which all merchants, dealers and employers of hired labour are excluded) now extends from end to end of the Soviet Union to an extent shown at present, so far as we are aware, by no aggregate statistics.¹

It is, we think, not always realised that this multifarious development

which were largely attended by merchants and dealers for wholesale transactions. The modern analogue to these older fairs may be seen in the Soviet Government's periodical auction sale of furs, when Leningrad is visited by hundreds of foreign buyers, largely American and British.

¹ At the same time the consumers' cooperative societies in the villages have been encouraged increasingly to meet their members' demands for particular foodstuffs (especially meat and fish, potatoes and other vegetables, and various fruits) by an organised system of "self-supply". This has greatly increased during the past three years, in such forms as the society's own fishpond, vegetable garden, orchard, pigery or dairy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the society's purchases from collective farms or individual peasants, anglers or allotment-holders, to an amount during 1937 expected to exceed 6000 million roubles.

of the organisation by means of which commodities and services are increasingly brought to the very doors of the consumers' households throughout so much of the USSR has meant a great increase in personal freedom, especially to the woman housekeeper, not only by the removal of restraint (such as rationing) but even more by the widening of opportunity. Such an increase of individual freedom within the social organisation is outside the economist's consideration and is, indeed, not to be measured quantitatively at all, but only evaluated qualitatively by unstatistical comparisons. Viewed in this way, the manifest improvement in the distribution of commodities and services in the USSR during the past quinquennium, which has, in actual practice, enabled any person to spend his wages in any one of a dozen different kinds of retail shops, and to purchase, up to the total of his income, as much as he chooses of any of the greatly increased variety of things now placed within his reach—must count for as genuine an enlargement of his opportunity to satisfy his desire to consume or use as the doubling or trebling of production under the First and Second Five-Year Plans, or as the quickening of transport by the substitution of the train and the motor car for the horse and cart. The ever-increasing freedom thus secured to the consumer in the Soviet Union has not been achieved by any reversion to profit-making, in either of its characteristic forms of the trader buying in order to sell again at a higher price or the disposal by the employer of the product of his hirelings. Nor has it been achieved by leaving prices to be freely settled by the haggling of the market. It has been attained by adjusting supply to the expected demand under a comprehensive plan for production, transport and distribution alike, at retail prices fixed for all the several commodities; fixed, as we fear the economist would say, arbitrarily by the various authorities concerned. More intelligently, the distribution as well as prices of commodities and services may be said to be fixed deliberately, with a constant tendency towards equality as between district and district, with the object of enabling all the inhabitants of each place to find at their disposal as much of the various commodities as they, in the aggregate, are expected to desire to purchase; and at the same time so as to yield to the public authorities as much as is required to provide for public needs outside the economic calculus, such as defence, public health, education, provision for those incapable of work, scientific research, all the forms of art and beauty, and the distant future of the race. It is interesting to note that the result is arrived at by deliberate and steadily increasing application of competition or emulation among retailing organs of diverse kinds, but competition or emulation stopped off any action upon prices, and directed exclusively towards satisfying those customers' desires which it is in the public interest to encourage, namely, for quality, purity, durability, beauty, style, good taste and what not—never the yearning of the unregenerate man or woman for a "cut price"!

Soviet Currency

It has been made a matter of reproach that in our first edition there was no description of the working of the system of currency in the USSR. If we had been writing a history of the Soviet Union there would have been numerous experiments to describe,¹ from the attempt to dispense altogether with any form of money under "war communism" to the measureless printing of notes during the Civil War, and (as in the German Republic) the unexpectedly successful supersession in 1924 of a ruined currency by the device of an ostensibly new rouble; from the frequently attempted legal regulation of prices in the bazaar to the local suppression of that social institution, to be followed by its rehabilitation and even encouragement with enlarged scope; from the various systems of specially favoured retailing of goods to customers employed in particular industries or offices, or to purchasers bringing with them particular media of exchange, and then the sweeping away of all such contrivances in favour of an extraordinary simplicity of treatment of what has usually been something between magic and a mystery. When we wrote in 1935 there was already so little complication about Soviet currency that it simply did not occur to us to give its working any place in our description of the contemporary social organisation of the Soviet Union. During the past three years the matter has been made even more commonplace by the successive discontinuance in 1935-1936 of the rationing by card of foodstuffs and textiles, and eventually of all household commodities, to which in the Great War all nations had to resort, and by the abolition of such specially privileged retailing as the remainder of the closed cooperative societies, open only to persons engaged in particular factories or occupations, and the discontinuance, on February 1, 1936, of the Torgsin shops selling only for payment in gold, platinum or *valuta* (p. 329). The retailing system throughout the USSR is now substantially one of uniform fixed prices for each city or geographical province, tending steadily to a general uniformity. There are many varieties of retail shops, but the very smallest difference between them in respect of prices or use of currency. The one exception, and that more apparent than real, namely, the bazaar or free market, will be considered later.

Let us see plainly how currency now works in the USSR. It is, of course, strictly a federal monopoly. The USSR People's Commissar of Finance, with the concurrence of the Sovnarkom (Council of Ministers), provides from time to time whatever currency, in the form of inconvertible rouble notes and subsidiary coins, he thinks desirable for the convenience

¹ For studies of currency changes in the USSR the student should see *Soviet Policy in Public Finance, 1917-1928*, by G. Y. Sokolnikov, and associates (Stanford University, California, 1931, 470 pp.); *Currency Problems and Policy of the Soviet Union*, by L. N. Yurovsky, 1925; *The Russian Finance System*, by W. B. Reddaway, 1935, x and 106 pp.; *Soviet Money and Finance*, by L. R. Hubbard (1936, 339 pp.); *Banks, Credit and Money in Soviet Russia*, by Arthur Z. Arnold (New York, 1937, 559 pp.).

of the government and the public. The USSR enjoys, in fact, like all other great nations to-day, what is literally a managed currency, though this is "managed" on a system quite different from that in operation in any other country, that is to say, without reference to the foreign exchanges or the international valuations of national currencies. For, incredible as it may seem to the bankers and economists of the western world, the fluctuations in the aggregate amount of Soviet currency, or in its velocity, have no discoverable effect upon the price level of commodities and services, either within the USSR or elsewhere, or upon the relation between the volume of currency and that of transactions in goods.

The explanation of this paradox is to be found, not in the nature of the currency itself, but in the peculiarity of the economic structure of the USSR. The common idea that the volume of money combined with what is called its velocity must inevitably affect the volume of transactions in goods, and the general price level, depends on the assumption that all business is inspired and guided by the motive of profit-making, and that the market for commodities, or for the use of capital or credit, is everywhere as free as it is in Threadneedle Street. But instead of Threadneedle Street being typical of the universe, over a large part of the earth's surface production is wholly or mainly carried on from other motives than profit-making, and the market is not by any means free. We need here say nothing of the power of custom which governs prices in the common transactions throughout most of Asia and Africa—that is, among nearly half the human race; or the large area of the world in which agriculture, fishing and hunting are carried on practically for self-subsistence. In the USSR profit-making has become a criminal offence, and has passed out of the economic picture as completely as pocket-picking. Accordingly, in the USSR the prices of commodities are fixed, much as those of urban water, electricity and gas are elsewhere fixed, neither by custom nor by the chaffering of buyers and sellers, but by a superior authority, the government decisions in the USSR being arrived at (see pp. 625-647) on a whole range of considerations unconnected with currency. The possible influence of other currencies upon prices in the USSR is definitely and permanently excluded by the legal prohibition of both import and export of Soviet currency, and by a rigid government monopoly of all foreign trade and of international banking transactions. Equally, the amount of the Soviet issues of currency has no effect whatever upon either the aggregate amount of capital investment in new undertakings or the choice of industries or of localities in which such investments shall be made, because (as explained at pp. 633-644) these decisions are made after elaborate investigation entirely irrespective of currency considerations. It seems, therefore, that the Soviet authorities are justified in their constantly repeated claim that their currency, though varying from time to time in aggregate amount and presumably also in velocity, does not produce either inflation or deflation, in so far as these terms denote either rises or falls of the general price level, or alterations

in the aggregate volume of employment or of capital investment, or changes in the direction either of the one or the other. It may be said, indeed, that the Soviet rouble notes operate over the whole range of buyers' transactions in the USSR almost precisely as postage stamps everywhere operate in the single commodity of postal service. An unnecessarily large supply of postage stamps in the pockets of the people does not raise the postage rates, nor cause any greater number of letters to be written, nor letters to be sent to certain places rather than others. A scarcity of postage stamps has equally no effect in lowering postage rates and none whatever on our choice of persons to whom we choose to write.

This is not to say that there are never any changes in prices in the Soviet Union, just as there are from time to time changes in the rates of postage. In the case of commodities as in that of postal services, in rates of wages as in the price of vodka, the changes occur because the government has definite reasons for making the change. But the reasons are independent of currency considerations. There may be social advantages in increasing or decreasing particular rates of wages or the sales of particular commodities. There may be a shortage of supply of certain commodities, and a glut of others, which makes it socially convenient to contract one demand and to widen another. What happens, it may be asked, to the roubles that the peasant or workman does not spend because there is a shortage in the supply of what he yearns to purchase? Very often he buys something else; it may be beer or books, or he temporarily hoards these unwanted roubles—there was a time when the peasants stuffed their pillows with them—or more intelligently he puts them in the government savings bank. What seems not to happen is a rise in the government shops of the retail prices, or in the postage rates that the government fixes, in the one case as in the other.

Can we not say the same about bank credit? The various branches of the State Bank (Gosbank)¹ grant credits to the various enterprises, whether industrial or cultural, strictly for such purposes only as have been specifically approved in advance by the State Planning Department (Gosplan) as the outcome of a whole range of considerations into which the aggregate volume of currency and credit, or the velocity of either of them, enters not at all. The dates and conditions on which these advances are to be made, and how they shall be repaid, are in every case precisely determined without regard to the volume or velocity of the currency in circulation. The usual case is that of a government factory requiring credit for the amount of wages and cost of material and components

¹ The State Bank (Gosbank) had, in 1935, 2313 and it has now (1937) over 2600 local branches. The subsidiary banking establishments, which act largely under its direction, and with its aid, now comprise (a) the Prombank (for capital construction in industry and electrification); (b) the Torgbank (for capital construction and cooperative trading); (c) the Selkhosbank (for agricultural enterprise); (d) the Tsëkombank (for municipal and housing enterprises); (e) forty-four municipal banks (for local service); and, most important of all, (f) the Vneshstorgbank (for foreign trade and international remittances).

(the rates of all these being fixed) in order to enable it to produce the commodities commanded by the legislature at the instance of the State Planning Commission. Such an advance involves, in practice, the issue by the bank of rouble notes and subsidiary coins for the payment of wages; and the advance will be repaid to the bank when the finished commodities are delivered at prices so fixed as normally to cover all the direct and indirect costs, including taxes. It is accordingly not the aggregate volume or amount of bank credit and currency that determines the decision of the factory director—who gets his orders from Gosplan, irrespective of any currency considerations—as to the amount or kind of commodities to be produced, or the prices that will be charged for the finished product, or the surplus (which the western world would call profit) that will normally be made by the enterprise. There will, indeed, sometimes be a loss, due to breakdowns of machinery or failures of the human factor, in workman or director. Gosplan knows well that nothing can be done without the three D's—Deficiency, Damage and Delay. In due course those who caused the failures will be carpeted, and perhaps removed, demoted or punished. The loss will be made good from public funds, but will have nothing to do with credit or currency. In either case the incomparable superiority of the system of planned production for community consumption (see pp. 662-670) which the centralised direction by Gosplan alone makes possible, is manifested in the absence of booms and slumps, and in that of involuntary mass unemployment, whatever may be the variations in the volume of currency or bank credit.

That is, as any economist who has given attention to the facts of the USSR will probably agree, the general picture. But some additional explanations are required. What about the ubiquitous bazaar, the free market, in which all sorts of commodities (though a tiny fraction of the aggregate turnover) are sold direct to consumers in free competition, bazaar fashion, at whatever price the sellers can get from those customers who choose to buy in the bazaar rather than in the retail shops? The Soviet Government soon discovered, like other governments, that it is futile to impose a legal maximum price for anything of which it does not control the supply. But this does not mean that the price level of the free market now escapes government control. During the past few years, whenever the People's Commissar of Internal Trade has heard that the price level in any particular free market was substantially above that fixed by the government for other retailing, he has opened a government shop in or next to the bazaar, and offered for sale, under specially attractive conditions of quality and cleanliness, and at an attractively low price, quite irrespective of the cost of this tiny fraction of his huge turnover, the commodities in which profiteering was prevailing. In this way the peasants have been compelled in innumerable instances, without any imposition of a maximum price, to reduce their demands by as much as 20 or 30 per cent at a blow, indeed, down to the level of the prices in the other forms of retailing.

Analogous to the bazaar, and equally exempt from price regulation, but steadily influenced towards assimilation to the government's price level, is the free market enjoyed by the self-supply of the consumers' cooperative movement (p. 356), and the system of contracts for periodical deliveries entered into by communal feeding organisations in school or factory, and by consumers' cooperative societies, with individual producers, industrial artels and agricultural or fishery kolkhosi (pp. 731-733). The range and volume of this free marketing, in a wide range of forms, is steadily increasing (pp. 1171, 1188). But it is apparently not allowed, any more than is that of the bazaar, to pass into higher price levels (otherwise than merely transiently) than those dictated by the government.

What about the influence upon the internal price level of the rates of exchange in other countries? By the government monopoly of both importing and exporting, and of all international banking transactions, no one even knows what the exchange value of the rouble in this or that *valuta* might be if it was left to be freely settled in the respective money markets of the world. In fact, there are and can be no such rates. Hence the supposititious rates of exchange for the rouble do not affect even the decisions of the Soviet Government as to what it will import and export. It is the aggregate cost of all its imports that controls the aggregate of all its exports, and not conversely. The government finds that its various departments consider desirable the purchase abroad of certain commodities which it is inconvenient or impracticable to produce at home. These have to be paid for at the world price, not in roubles but in sterling, dollars or francs. To obtain this *valuta*, in the absence of foreign loans, the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade is driven to export timber or furs, wheat or flax, manganese or gold, or anything else that can be sold abroad at world prices, up to an aggregate that will equal the cost of the imports. The choice among things to be exported is made, principally, according to the relation between the expense of production of an additional output of the various commodities obtainable in the USSR, on the one hand, and, on the other, upon the world price in *valuta* of each of these commodities that can be spared for export. It is for instance always possible to increase the production of timber or manganese, if these are fetching good prices abroad. But it may seem preferable to export native gold, even if it costs more to produce than additional timber or manganese, if the gesture of "payment in gold" is calculated to impress the London money market, and thus raise the credit and the political influence of the Soviet Government! It will be seen that only a *differential* change in world price level (such as a greater rise in manufactured articles than in primary products) affects the choice of commodities to be exported. A universal rise in the level of world prices affecting equally all the articles of import and export leaves the Soviet Government unconcerned.

How then, asks the pertinacious enquirer, did it come about that there

was always in Moscow and Leningrad, Kharkov and Kiev, the so-called "Black Exchange", where native speculators illegally offered to the tourist, for American dollars or British pound notes, five, ten or even twenty times as many roubles as the State Bank would give? This means that there were always Russians desirous of obtaining *valuta* (foreign currencies), in order to remit by post to relations or friends living abroad, perhaps to pay their passage money to Russia; or to subscribe for books or newspapers published abroad; or (and this was until 1936 perhaps the most important demand) in order to make special purchases at "Torgsin", the government shops offering a large range of commodities at tempting "New York prices", but payable exclusively in *valuta*, or in gold or platinum, which the government wished to collect in order—strange though such a proceeding sounds to capitalist ears—to diminish the country's export of such other commodities as timber or grain. It is plainly always convenient for the Soviet Government to lessen the amount of bulky commodities that it needs to export in order to pay the bill for the imports required. It may be added that, with the closing in 1936 of the Torgsin shops, on the one hand, and on the other the recent substantial reduction in the arbitrarily fixed retail prices in the USSR, and the new government valuation there of the dollar, the franc and the pound sterling, the Black Exchange is reported during the present year to have nearly ceased to exist.

But, it will be asked, how does the Soviet Government, with its universal fixing of prices, and its deliberate management of the currency irrespective of the volume of sales and purchases, contrive to bring about the "equalising of supply and demand"? When there is a falling off in the harvest, or a breakdown in industrial production, or any of the innumerable cases of short supply, so that much less is produced than suffices to satisfy the would-be consumers, what happens? There can be, for the moment, no genuine equalising of demand and supply. In the western world we are accustomed, in such a case, to let the problem be solved by a rise in the price of the scarce commodity. The effective demand, we say, shrinks with every rise, by the falling away of applicants unable to pay a higher price, until a point is reached at which every would-be purchaser can be supplied. This means, not that the supply of the commodity becomes equal to the desire to possess it or to the previous demand, but only that the richer persons get the whole supply, whilst the poorer persons get none at all, even if they are dying for lack of it. In the Soviet Union rich and poor are on an equality in the matter. The practice may be "first come, first served"; involving the temporary phenomenon of queues. Or a preferential supply may be afforded at a low price to particular sets of workers. Thus we saw, for a time, the phenomenon of "closed cooperative societies", confined to the workers (of all grades from the director to the gate-keeper) in favoured key-industries. Or whatever is available (as with milk in short supply) may be wholly reserved for the young children. We in England dislike

such preferences, and prefer "selection by ability to pay the economic price". It is true that in the Great War we resorted to the rationing of sugar, meat, etc., in order that the very poorest might not be deprived. This was resented by the wealthier housekeepers. The present writer vividly remembers the disgust with which a millionaire shipowner (and his wife) received the first proposals of rationing, first of freight space so as to ensure transport for the indispensable imports, even at the cost of excluding those on which a higher rate would gladly have been paid for carriage; and then of sugar and meat. Why not, they exclaimed, leave the equalising of supply and demand, as the economists advise, to be effected by a change in the price level? The Soviet Union has, it thinks, a better plan for dealing with the condition of commodity scarcity, in which it had to spend the whole of its first decade. Now, when there is plenty of all the principal kinds of commodities (although there may not yet be quite all the grades of quality, or even quite all the varieties of colour or shape that the caprices of such a host of buyers might dictate), the Soviet Government, like the manufacturers elsewhere who fix the retail prices of their own branded goods, applies itself rather to organising the selling of its abundant stocks, even by various forms of advertisement.

An interesting explanation may be given of the way in which, when there seems to be an inconveniently large amount of currency in the pockets of the people, the Soviet Government relieves this inconvenience. There is, at all times, a perpetual flow of rouble notes to the State Savings Bank, by way of excess of deposits over withdrawals, as well as to the Government Treasury in the steadily rising receipts from railway, river and air passenger traffic, and from the ever-growing sales of books and newspapers. In addition, the government raises from time to time an Internal Loan by asking the people to subscribe, in roubles, for bonds of conveniently small amounts, repayable at fixed dates, either with interest or with lottery prizes. These loans—virtually short-term deferments of the people's spending on consumption goods—help the People's Commissar of Finance to provide, without additional issues, the notes required to pay the wage-bills of new enterprises of capital construction. Meanwhile the loans, like the constant increase of Savings Bank deposits and other government receipts, withdraw great blocks of paper roubles temporarily from circulation.

There is one other feature of the Soviet currency system as it now exists which seems worth notice. It calls for no store of gold or other metallic currency for the purpose of maintaining public confidence in the notes and in the stability of their exchange value. This advantage, indeed, is now common to the currency system of practically all the nations of advanced capitalism, which have ceased, either by law or by administrative practice, to pledge themselves to give coin in return for their own government notes. It has been found by experience in most countries that, at the present level of popular education, whenever there is a condition of plenty in the commodity market government notes

(and, usually, even the notes of joint-stock banks) continue to pass freely from hand to hand as a medium of exchange within each country, even when these notes are inconvertible into metallic coin.

This newly discovered truth, which the economists and the financial wisacres of "the City" do not seem eager to explain to the public, is not yet adequately recognised by the journalists and the plain man, who still talk of "fiduciary issues" as if they were exceptional and even a little dangerous, so that any increase is apologised for. Most governments retain metallic reserves, and make widely known their amount (which hardly ever suffices to redeem their whole issue) professedly in order to "maintain confidence" in their paper money. In fact, however, these metallic reserves are nowadays maintained on other grounds. This is why they are sometimes kept secret, a secrecy which the Briton thinks rather shocking or at least suspicious. The gold reserve in the USSR, as in Britain or France, is no longer required in order to induce agriculturists or shopkeepers to part with commodities for notes. Government gold reserves are now maintained for quite other reasons, in order to provide for the sudden increase in expenditure involved in mobilisation and war, or for the emergency of earthquake or famine; or, generally, for shipment from time to time to other countries to enable unusually large quantities of imports to be obtained in any urgent need. In the USSR, where the community itself, by one or other of its organs, is practically the universal retailer, there can be no fear that its own inconvertible notes will not be accepted in payment for purchases within its boundaries, and it is therefore plain that no metallic reserve is required to maintain confidence in the rouble. The Soviet Government has accordingly ceased to tell the world how great is its gold reserve, any more than how powerful are its bombing aeroplanes, although it can be deduced that it includes a substantial proportion of an annual gold production which has already become the second in the world.

The Control of Abortion

A remarkable instance of the realism with which the Soviet authorities watch the operation of the particular measures to which they have been driven by circumstances; and of the courage and decision with which, when necessary, they reverse their action, is afforded by the new law of June 24, 1936, relating to abortion. In our first edition we described (pp. 826-833) how a widespread popular demand from the women had led, in 1920, to a limited legalisation of abortion. It was a time of extreme economic hardship. There was as yet no adequate provision of medical aid or maternity hospitals, and but few crèches or kindergartens. There was then in the USSR next to no popular knowledge of birth control. The housing conditions were still indescribably bad. One result was the secret practice (as in western Europe and America) of illegal abortion, with its inevitable consequence, not only of high mortality rates but also

of severe injury to health of many of the women resorting to it. After serious consideration and prolonged discussion in the medical profession as well as among the statesmen and the public, it was reluctantly decided, largely as the only practical expedient for stopping the practice of illegal abortion at the hands of unqualified persons, to provide for the performance of abortion in maternity hospitals, with strict limitations and under the most hygienic conditions. This law, which was stated to be a temporary expedient for so long as "the moral traditions of the past, and the difficult contemporary conditions of the present, force a certain proportion of women to decide on the operation", remained in operation for sixteen years. It was generally considered to have achieved the immediate objects at which it aimed. The resort to secret operations by unqualified persons, with the consequent evil results, was believed to have fallen away (at any rate in the cities) to next to nothing. It could even be claimed that the USSR, where abortion was in certain cases legalised, had, during the past decade, a smaller percentage of abortions to population than either France or Germany, where the operation was a criminal offence.¹

In 1936 the law was repealed. By the decree of the Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom) of June 27, 1936, the performance of abortion anywhere and by any person was again made a serious criminal offence, except only in cases in which the continuation of pregnancy threatens the life or may seriously undermine the health of the pregnant woman, or in which there is a danger of serious diseases of parents being passed on to children, when the operation might be performed only by qualified practitioners in hospitals and maternity homes.²

It is not clear what were the facts or the arguments on which this important change of policy was based. In the preamble of the decree of 1936 it was claimed that the material security of the women, the vastly increased provision of maternity homes, crèches and kindergartens,

¹ We abstain from citing figures as to the number of abortions, whether in Moscow or in the USSR, or in other countries; such estimates in different places varying from one abortion per seven or ten births, up to nearly twice as many abortions as births. The fact is that in no country do the statistics about abortions, and their effects either on maternal mortality or on the birth-rate, escape serious criticism, owing to the vague and conflicting definitions in use, and the lack of any registration of pregnancies. There are certainly some indications, in such statistics as exist, which support the common opinion that in practically all countries the practice of secret abortion, attempted or completed, is prevalent in all social classes; and that, in the present century, in most places, it appears to be increasing. What may be the relation between the practice of abortion and that of contraception is obscure. The student may be referred to a recent medical treatise entitled *Abortion Spontaneous and Induced*, by F. J. Taussig, M.D. (London, 1936); to Vol. VII. of the *Proceedings of the International Congress for Studies of Population*, Rome, 1931; and to the *Epidemiological Report* by the secretariat of the Health Section of the League of Nations, July 15, 1933; together with the British Ministry of Health Report of an investigation into maternal mortality (in England, Cmd. 5422, 1937; and in Wales, Cmd. 5423) and other enquiries therein cited.

² Decree of June 27, 1936, published in *Izvestia*, June 28, 1936. A summarised translation will be found in *The Slavonic Review* for January 1937, pp. 458-461.

and the very considerable financial assistance given from public funds for childbirth and towards the maintenance of children, had rendered abortion no longer necessary on economic grounds. The decree very confidently recited that, even under the best conditions "abortions are harmful to health". It seems clear that the total number of cases dealt with in the hospitals of the large cities had steadily increased, so that there were, in some places, more abortions than births. It was not denied that the hospital authorities had been able to show that the operation was in only an infinitesimal proportion of cases fatal, or accompanied by septic infection or perforation, and that the patients in hardly any case manifested any immediate deterioration in physical health. On the other hand, the practitioners of the health authorities had been becoming progressively more uncomfortable at the increase of various pelvic disorders, leading to "decreased fertility, ectopic pregnancy, the tendency to miscarriage, prolonged labour, endocrine disturbances and the delay in normal sexual response".¹ Whatever may have been the effect on the general birth-rate of the limited legal practice of abortion, it must be recognised that a steady growth of the population of the USSR, even at an increasing rate, is, to say the least, not unwelcome either to the governing authorities or to public opinion. There is felt to be room for at least twice or thrice the present population, great as it is, and sheer economic gain to the community in developing the immense open spaces, besides additional security against foreign aggression either from the West or from the East. We do not know whether there is any evidence for the suggestion that some of the women who insisted on abortion felt in their hearts that it was a sin, and suffered accordingly not only agonies of remorse, but also a subtle deterioration in character. We must assume that the Soviet Government became convinced, that, whatever might be the preponderance of opinion among the women, the permanent interests of the community as a whole made a change of policy imperative.

It can hardly be said that the action of the government was dictatorial in form or method. Draft proposals for the prohibition of abortion were published for public discussion during 1935, accompanied by others for making divorce less easy, stiffening the father's responsibility for the cost of maintenance of children born from mating unregistered as marriage, and promising substantial additions to the money payments made to all mothers. The subject was agitated for some months. Articles and letters appeared in the thousands of newspapers; numerous discussion meetings

¹ As to the after-effects the student should note such testimony as "The Sequelae of Induced Abortion as a Factor in Depopulation, with special reference to Tubal Sterility", by I. C. Rubin (also the bibliography for 1910-1931, and other papers in Vol. VII. of *Proceedings of International Congress for Studies of Population*, pp. 127-145). Evidence as to the Russian experience will be found in such medical reports as "Erkrankungs- und Sterblichkeitsfrequenz vor und nach der Freigabe des Aborts in der SSR Union" (*Die Medicinische Welt*, No. 52, December 1929, pp. 1857-1859); and "L'Avortement artificiel", par Serdukov, in *Le Journal de Gynécologie*, March 1928, pp. 196-288.

were held in clubs and factories; criticisms and suggestions were publicly called for. The newspapers reported that more than 12,000 suggestions and criticisms, protests and demands, were sent to the government within a few weeks; many of them from groups of women indignantly objecting to the proposed change. So far as it could be estimated, the opinion of the women (though not that of the men) seemed to be preponderatingly in favour of free abortion whenever desired. Nevertheless, so convinced was the government of the need for a reversal of the policy of 1920, that the Sovnarkom (cabinet of ministers) and the Central Executive Committee (TSIK), which may not unfairly be regarded as corresponding to the House of Commons, passed the new law, it is understood, by overwhelming majorities. At the same time the public provision for maternity and child maintenance—already far more munificent than in any other country—was extended and improved in all directions. The decree itself provided for an immediate increase in the allowance for the baby's *layette* from 32 to 45 roubles, and that towards its food for the first year from 5 to 10 roubles per month. This alone would involve, for six million births, an increased charge on public funds of more than four hundred million roubles (16 million pounds sterling) per annum. In addition, a special bonus is made payable to every mother who has now or may subsequently have as many as six children, of 2000 roubles a year for five years from the birth of each subsequent child; whilst to those who have now or may subsequently have ten children, the bonus for each additional birth will be 5000 roubles for the first year and 3000 roubles for each of the next four years. Even more important in the long run may be the enormous addition that is being rapidly made to the number and capacity of maternity homes, crèches and kindergartens. Considerable progress has already been made in these new constructions, whilst already (1937) some hundreds of thousands of claims to the bonus payable on additions to families of six or ten, have been made and passed for payment. It is doubtful whether the feminine objections against the new law have been removed; for, whilst the birth-rate in the cities in 1937 seems to have bounded upward, it is impossible yet to form any useful estimates of the effect on the health or fertility of the women throughout the USSR, or on the growth of population.¹

Some Criticisms

We pass now to certain weighty criticisms or accusations made both by friends and by enemies of the Soviet Union, particularly in view of

¹ The fullest account (accessible to British or American students) known to us of these proceedings is in the article "Woman and the Family", by Alice Withrow Field, in *Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, November 1936, issued by the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, 56 West 45th Street, New York City. See also articles by Louis Fischer in *The Nation* (August 21, 1935; July 18 and 26, 1936) (New York); and by Jessica Smith in *Soviet Russia To-day* (New York), July and August 1936, together with notice in *The Eugenics Review* for January 1937.

the developments of the past few years. These fall under three main heads : the continued inequality of incomes, the growth of bureaucracy, and the repression of individual freedom of thought.

Inequality of Incomes

Admittedly there is, in the USSR of to-day, no sign of the coming of identical, or even of substantially equal incomes for all workers by hand or by brain. On the contrary, the utmost use continues to be made of such forms of remuneration as piece-work rates and payment according to social value (*i.e.* scarcity) or technical skill, not to mention also such devices for intensification of effort as socialist competition and Stakhanovite rationalisation of industrial technique - all candidly justified by their demonstrated results in increasing production. The same argument is held to warrant the payment of higher salaries to officers chosen for superior capacity to discharge managerial or administrative duties of social importance ; as well as a system of promotion from grade to grade. In every branch of art and literature, whilst the average performers may be continuously employed and paid modest salaries, the outstanding men and women are usually remunerated by the job, often on some sort of royalty basis, which, in a few cases (notably in music and the drama, and for the most popular authors) mounts up to immense sums in particular years. The effect of all these devices is to make the maximum divergence of individual incomes in the USSR, taking the extreme instances, probably as great as the corresponding divergence, in incomes paid for actual participation in work, in Great Britain if not in the United States. It is not clear whether the divergence between the extreme instances in the Soviet Union is actually widening. It is, however, plain that, with the huge increase during the past few years in the number of great enterprises and in the magnitude of their transactions, the number of persons receiving incomes many times as great as those of the mass of the less skilled manual workers, typists and elementary school teachers now runs up to tens of thousands.

This inequality in incomes is regarded by many friends of the Soviet Union as a serious departure from socialist principle in the social pattern that it is working out. Trotsky makes the existence of such financial inequality in the USSR of to-day the main point in his indictment, *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936). They have evidently not considered that a government aiming at equality of income must ascertain, however roughly, the figure at which it is possible or desirable to equalise. Under the Tsardom the Russian masses worked for twelve roubles a month and slept ten in a room, paying the housewife whose room it was two or three out of the roubles for the accommodation. In the first terrible years of War Communism an equal division of income, had such an operation been possible, could hardly have improved on the standard of life they represent. But skilled labour, much less professional work

and competent management, cannot be obtained so cheaply; and it was just these grades that were most desperately needed to increase production or even to maintain it. Foreign workers had to be imported from America, England, Belgium and Germany. Now, an English workman could not have lived on twelve roubles a month. Twelve roubles a week would not have tempted him. Professional men could not do their home-work in kitchens shared by ten tramps. It was clear that the ideal income level must be that of highly cultivated workers, and the condition of the rest brought up to it instead of levelling everybody down to the standard of the tramp in the kitchen.

For the moment, therefore, the ideal of equal incomes for everybody had to be not only dropped but vigorously disparaged by the Soviet rulers. Its realisation must await the time when production will have reached a point yielding enough to give the uncultivated, unskilled person as much as the educated expert, by which time it may be assumed that there will be no uncultivated persons in Russia, and that any scarcity of labour will be in the ruder rather than in the more refined types of labour. In the meantime excessive inequalities of income can be dealt with, as they are at present, not by direct reduction of payments for work, but by a graduated income-tax.

We need not emphasise the impracticability of transforming, within less than twenty years, a population of many millions, spread over one sixth of the earth's surface, with every diversity of race, language, occupation and habit, from a traditional self-regarding instinct rooted in the primitive struggle for existence to a like intuitive acceptance of the principle of an equal sharing of desirable things among all the citizens. Whatever may have been fondly imagined by enthusiasts, a new civilisation does not arrive with any such suddenness, simultaneity or completeness. It is part of the very nature of things that no great community can pass from inequality to equality in a jump, or even within a generation. Stalin himself made this quite clear in January 1934. In his report to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party he distinguished between the two stages of the Bolshevik programme. First, that of creating a socialist society, in which there would be an equal right of all those who worked to receive according to the amount of work they had severally performed. Secondly, the transition to a communist society, in which there would be an equal right of all who worked to receive according to their requirements. In his view the Soviet Union is still in the first stage.¹

It is perhaps more important to consider in what sense either socialism or communism is, or should be, rooted in equality. Plainly, no real equality is secured by identity either of money wages or of the allotted shares of commodities; if only because the number and kinds of dependants on incomes vary, and the needs of the individuals differ. To pay workers all alike would clearly be to make very unequal provision

¹ See the full quotation at p. 702.

for needs. Nor would equality be attained by letting each person help himself from a common store. Even in a family it is soon found that individuals differ as widely in their knowledge, energy and capacity to help themselves to what their needs really require, as in the character and urgency of these needs. Not unless and until the individuals in a great nation become all alike in energy, capacity and knowledge can we assume, even under the most unfettered helping themselves from a common store, that the result would be anything like equality of provision for all human needs.

What Soviet Communism is aiming at, and, as it seems to us, by its Planned Production for Community Consumption and its principles of multiformity in social structure and universalism in consumption and use, what it is increasingly securing, amounts to what is better termed social equality. Instead of an identical wage or share, there has to be a whole series of collective arrangements. To secure for all the 180 millions between the Baltic and the Pacific identity of legal, political and social status. To give to all the infants and children, and to all the adolescents and adults, irrespective of race, language, age or sex, unlimited opportunities of education and training without fee and according to individual desire and capacity. To ensure to every person able to work effective access to continuous employment at tasks within his or her capacity, at a wage-rate settled by the trade union, and at least adequate for subsistence, secure against interruption either through the foreman's caprice or the employer's bankruptcy, or because of a capitalist crisis. To organise the best possible provision for the entire population, without any other differentiation than that of each individual's particular need, in every vicissitude of life, from birth to burial, including the prevention of disease and accident, the utmost medical and surgical aid in childbirth and all kinds of ill-health ; immediate succour of the widows and orphans, the incapacitated and the aged, as well as of any who are temporarily and involuntarily unemployed. Finally, to make all that collective provision for music and the drama, amusement and recreation, sports and pastimes, excursions and travel, without which leisure and holidays cannot be effectively enjoyed by the multitude. This, and nothing less than this, is the task with which the Soviet Union is struggling ; and towards the achievement of which it has certainly, in the past twenty years, made very much greater progress than any other government within the same period. In fact, no other government in the world is even attempting such a task.

With this continuous progress towards an ever more complete social equality, people in the USSR make very little complaint of the variety in personal incomes. If piece-work rates or socialist competition, high salaries to specialists and administrators or great bonuses to inventors do, in fact, cause increases in the aggregate production of commodities and services, they are usually felt to be devices fully justified by results.

So long as there is no reversion to private profit-making (in the

sense of either mere trading in commodities or making gain out of hired labour), the theoretic objection to the existence of a variety of grades of wages or salaries, and of large but transient incomes earned by popular authors and artists, is negligible. What would be seriously objected to would be the establishment of any large amount of inherited wealth and of a class of vocationless rich. This is often recklessly predicted by outside critics. We see no sign of the emergence of any idle class of vocationless rich, or of the inherited ownership of tributes from productive industry in the form of rent or interest, which makes so objectionable the far greater social inequality of Great Britain and the United States. With progressive income and inheritance taxes there would be no difficulty in counteracting any unforeseen developments in this direction in the USSR. Even the swollen royalties of popular novelists and dramatic authors could (in the absence of capitalists competing for their services) easily be curtailed.¹ So long as a vocation for every man is insisted on by public opinion, and so long as all children and even all backward races enjoy genuine equality of opportunity, there is (where no class of functionless rich exists) little social harm in transient inequalities of personal earnings or possessions which involve no differences of education or manners, and therefore create no distinctions of social class.

In one direction, indeed, we deservy a danger, which has already led to counteracting efforts. What is likely to happen to the wives of the men earning the exceptional incomes? The men themselves are kept too continuously at work, and have to cope with too perpetual a stream of difficulties, for them to succumb to the insidious temptations which everywhere beset the idle rich. But the wives of the commissars, of the directors, of the superior technicians, and of the popular authors, what (beyond care for their children) are they to find to do, if, as is often the case, they abandon their own vocations soon after marriage? It is interesting to watch, in the Soviet Union of the past few years, the frequent holding of conferences for wives of Red Army commanders or of factory directors, or of scientific technicians, for the purpose of getting them to assume social duties, either by pursuing a vocation of their own in art or literature, or by some means in which they can indirectly promote the success of their husbands' work. There is no "welfare work" for them: the government does not leave room for amateur charity, nor is there any social wreckage on which to practise philanthropy. They must either discover new social activities for themselves, or else learn to understand their husbands' vocations and thereby become real helpmates in their difficulties.²

¹ It was simply never foreseen that the books of a popular author would (as did those of Gorky) sell to the extent of a million copies a year for twenty years.

² A similar danger has been noted in the absence of any recognised sphere of duty among the wives of the British members of the Civil Service of India. But we do not learn that any conferences of wives have been held to discuss what should be done! The world-wide organisation of the Salvation Army has long had a rule requiring the fiancée of any officer of the Army to undergo six months' training in the duties of an officer's wife.

Bureaucracy

In the Soviet Union itself, there is incessant popular criticism of the great, and, as it is often suggested, the growing evil of bureaucracy. By this is meant (apart from the increasing number of those paid at a rate considerably above the incomes of the mass of the people) the habit in officials of ignoring or being irritated by the desires or feelings of the public, and even of those of the members of the official's own organisation ; together with the multiplication of forms to be filled up, and regulations to be observed, which surround everything with a maze of complications against which the citizen feels helpless. In part, we think, this criticism comes to no more than the average sensual man's impatience of the unavoidable apparatus of any highly developed industrial community—an impatience, due to ignorance or misunderstanding of what is necessary for the efficient working of any social organisation which we recognise as essentially anarchist in derivation. But collectivists themselves do well to overhaul, from time to time, the social apparatus they are driven to construct. The leaders of the Soviet Union have repeatedly insisted on such an overhaul. During the present year (1937) strenuous efforts have been made, both in the trade union organisation and in the Communist Party, to cut out the dead wood. The officials of every grade are told to remember that their first duty is to serve the public. The rank and file of their membership, in these organisations, and also those in the consumers' cooperative movement and the collective farms, are scolded for not insisting on more frequent meetings, and for failing at such meetings to complain of every shortcoming. To the student familiar with the bureaucracy of American joint-stock monopolies, French government offices, or Italian identity papers, what is remarkable in the Soviet Union is, not the amount of its bureaucracy in this sense, but the sustained effort that is made to suppress it, and to lessen its inconveniences to the public.

Repression of Independent Thinking

Far more serious, in its possible danger to future progress in social evolution, is the continuance in the USSR of the deliberate discouragement and even repression, not of criticism of the administration, which is, we think, more persistent and more actively encouraged than in any other country, but of independent thinking on fundamental social issues, about possible new ways of organising men in society, new forms of social activity, and new developments of the socially established code of conduct. It is upon the power to think new thoughts, and to formulate even the most unexpected fresh ideas, that the future progress of mankind depends. We discussed this danger at some length in our first edition (see pp. 996-1004), making some suggestions for its mitigation. The fatal feature of this disease of orthodoxy is that it is highly infectious. It spreads rapidly to men and women of all occupations, to teachers and

students of all types of culture, injuring their intellectual integrity and cramping their creative powers, not only in the social sciences, but also in music and drama, in literature and architecture.¹

In 1931 Stalin himself called for a new and more rational treatment of the intelligentsia. Unfortunately the question of freedom of independent thinking for the intellectuals has become, in the past few years, entangled in the need for continued vigilance in defence of the existing régime, both against conspiracies from within and aggressions from without. We have already discussed (see pp. 1037-1042) the dangers to which the Soviet Government feels that it is exposed, and the atmosphere of suspicion and repression to which such a feeling of imminent peril inevitably leads. The British if not also the American student will know, from the past history of his own government, how little intellectual freedom on fiercely controversial subjects is apt to be allowed, either by government or by public opinion, during the first generation or two after a violent social revolution.² The recent admission to the franchise, and to full and equal membership of the trade unions and the cooperative societies, of all the deprived classes, including even the former "Whites", the former members of the hated tsarist police, and the existing priests and other ministers of religion, entirely irrespective of their present opinions, in less than twenty years after the Bolshevik Revolution, affords some ground for hoping that, as the imminent danger of counter-revolution and foreign aggression fades away, the repression and discouragement of independent thinking, even on the most fundamental issues, will be silently discontinued.

A New Civilisation

In 1933, when settling the title of the book-to-be, we chose "Soviet Communism" to express our purpose of describing the actual organisation of the USSR. Before publication, in 1935, we added the query, "A New Civilisation?". What we have learnt of the developments during 1936-1937 has persuaded us to withdraw the interrogation mark. We see no sign in the USSR of any weakening on the stern prohibition of private profit-making; meaning by this either the buying of commodities with the object of selling them at a higher price (termed speculation), or the hiring of workers for the purpose of making pecuniary gain out of their product (termed exploitation). Moreover, fifteen years' experience of three successive Five-Year Plans has demonstrated the practicability of what the western world declared to be beyond human capacity, namely, the advance planning of the wealth-production and the cultural activities of an immense population; together with the

¹ See *The Seven Soviet Arts*, by Kurt London (London, 1937, 381 pp.).

² In Great Britain the Roman Catholics remained disqualified for the franchise, as well as for membership of the House of Commons and the municipal councils, and even for admission to the Universities and public schools, for more than a century and a quarter after the British Revolution of 1689.

deliberate organisation of the whole for the supply and service of the community without the guidance of "price in the market" arrived at by the chaffering of buyers and sellers.

This twofold change of fundamental base effected by Soviet Communism—the abolition of the profit-maker's trading and hiring of wage-labour guided by the competitive price system, and the substitution of deliberately planned production for community consumption at authoritatively fixed retail prices, according to the utilitarian instead of the economic calculus¹—seems to us to be so vitally different from the essential base of the capitalist organisation which has during the past four centuries spread over the western world, as definitely to amount to a new civilisation. This is not to say that, in twenty years, the Soviet Union has achieved a condition of plenty as statistically opulent as the richest capitalist nations have reached in the course of several centuries. In spite of a material progress during these twenty years which has probably never been equalled in any other country at any period of its history, the 180 millions of Soviet citizens have still an insufficient supply of what seem to be necessities of civilisation—to name only two, of bedrooms and of boots! What is really significant in this connection is the economic discovery that the substitution, for profit-making manufacturing, of planned production for community consumption frees the nation not only from the alternation of booms and slumps, but also, by ensuring an ubiquitous effective demand in the growing population, from the hitherto incessant social malady of involuntary mass unemployment. As to increasing plenty, Soviet Communism has the guarantee, not only of a continuous advance of technical science, but also of the psychological discovery by the workers that the planning system eliminates the enemy party from distribution. The entire net product of the community is in fact shared among those who cooperate in its production, in whatever way they themselves decide, without tribute to a hereditary parasitic class. This produces an emotional passion for production among the industrial millions such as heretofore has only been manifested in other countries by the individual peasant proprietor or the profit-making entrepreneur. In the USSR it is the trade unions that most strongly insist on the utmost use of labour-saving machinery and piece-work rates, socialist competition and Stakhanovism.

But there is another and a non-materialist factor in Soviet Communism, setting it in contrast with the civilisation of the western world. It is based on an intellectual unity throughout all its activities. It definitely rejects every remnant of the superstition and magic which the most matter-of-fact twentieth-century man in the capitalist societies

¹ Economists owe to the late Professor F. Y. Edgeworth (in his *Mathematical Psychics*, 1881) a distinction, which some of them forget, between the economic calculus, dependent on price in a competitive market, the necessary basis of a capitalist system; and the utilitarian calculus, based on greatest happiness, the greatest possible aggregate of pleasure, "summed through all time and over all sentence" (p. vii), which is what the sociologist or the statesman has to estimate.

retains in his conception of the universe and of man's place in it. That is to say, Soviet Communism has a new ideology as well as a new economics. Soviet Communism puts no limit to the growth of man's knowledge. It counts, in fact, on a vast and unfathomable advance of science in every field. But (as is specially characteristic of a new civilisation) it refuses to accept as knowledge or as the basis of its code of conduct any of the merely traditional beliefs and postulates about man and universe for which no rational foundation can be found, or any of the purely subjective imaginings of the metaphysician or the theologian. It is working out the ethics of a new civilisation upon its own experience of social life. And in that pragmatic evolution of a code of conduct based essentially upon the hygiene of the individual and of the social organism of which he forms part, Soviet Communism is assisted by the essential unity in principle of its economics and its ethics. Under Soviet Communism, with its planned production for community consumption, the pecuniary gain to the profit-making entrepreneur, nicknamed the economic calculus, the free working of which is the be-all and end-all of capitalist civilisation, is deemed an undesirable guide to action, whether public or private. The dominant motive in everyone's life must be not pecuniary gain to anyone but the welfare of the human race, now and for all time. For it is clear that everyone starting adult life is in debt to the community in which he has been born and bred, cared for, fed and clothed, educated and entertained. Anyone who, to the extent of his ability, does less than his share of work, and takes a full share of the wealth produced in the community, is a thief, and should be dealt with as such. That is to say, he should be compulsorily reformed in body and mind so that he may become a useful and happy citizen. On the other hand, those who do more than their share of the work that is useful to the community, who invent or explore, who excel in the arts or crafts, who are able and devoted leaders in production or administration, are not only provided with every pecuniary or other facility for pursuing their chosen careers, but are also honoured as heroes and publicly proclaimed as patterns and benefactors. The ancient axiom of "Love your neighbour as yourself" is embodied, not in the economic but in the utilitarian calculus, namely, the valuation of what conduces to the permanent well-being of the human race. Thus in the USSR there is no distinction between the code professed on Sundays and that practised on week-days. The citizen acts in his factory or farm according to the same scale of values as he does in his family, in his sports, or in his voting at elections. The secular and the religious are one. The only good life at which he aims is a life that is good for all his fellow-men, irrespective of age or sex, religion or race.

INDEX OF PERSONS

- Abolin, A., 125, 127-8
 Adonatsky, V., 761
 Agabekov, Gregor A., 471
 Akulov, Ivan Alexandrovich (b. 1888), joined the Party, 1907; chairman of Ukrainian trade unions, 1927; vice-president GPU and USSR procurator, 1931; secretary of TSIK, 1935-489
 Alexandrov, 774
 Alexejew, N., 102
 Almin, J., 471
 Aluf, A., 569
 Amfiteatrov, G., 503
 Anderson, Benjamin N., Jr., 519
 Anderson, Paul B., 809
 Anstey, T. C., 191
 Antonov, W. W., 171
 Antsiferov, Alexis N., formerly professor of University of Kharkov and lecturer in École de Droit, at Paris—170-71, 220
 Arkupov, K., 47
 Arnold, Arthur Z., 955
 Arnold, Matthew, 716
 Ashleigh, Charles, 212
 Ataturk, Kemal, xxiii-xxiv
 Auhagen, Otto, 180, 189, 196
 Avdeyenko, A., 839
 Badnev, Alexey Ergorovich (b. 1883), was a Bolshevik deputy in the Fourth Duma; member of TSIK; Order of Lenin for construction of mechanised bakeries; leading member of Moscow Party Committee—235, 246
 Bagotsky, S., 692
 Baikolov, Anatol, Russian cooperator, formerly representative of Zakupshyt, in London; later left Bolshevik Party, and became author and journalist—630
 Bakunin, Michael Alexandrovich (1814-1876), leading anarchist opponent of Marx in First International; left Russia, 1840; took part in 1848 risings; arrested and surrendered by Austrian Government to Russia, where he was imprisoned for years; exiled to Siberia, whence he escaped in 1861; aided Polish insurgents, 1863; joined the International, 1864, whence he was excluded in 1872; continued anarchist propaganda until he died—46
 Baldwin, Roger N., 809, 824
 Ballod, Karl, 505
 Bannerman, Sir Henry Campbell-, 564
 Barker, L. F., 675
 Baron, N., Ukrainian, long manager of Moscow Narodny Bank in London until 1933; author of many works on cooperative banking—220, 235
 Batsell, W. R., 5, 10, 12, 27, 29, 46, 49, 56, 62, 67, 71, 74-5, 78, 80, 108, 110, 112, 114, 262, 285, 316-18, 319, 355, 876
 Bauermeister, Mary, 495
 Baum, A., 703
 Beer, Max, 340
 Bekhterev, 791
 Belloc, Hilaire, 586
 Bentham, Jeremy, 90, 922
 Berdyaev, Nicholas, 809, 843
 Berkman, Alexander, Russian emigrant to United States, where he became a leading anarchist and was imprisoned; returned to Moscow 1919, and was employed to collect archives, travelling throughout European Russia; left in disgust at centralised authority and published books against Bolshevism—145-6
 Bernal, J. D., 761, 763
 Bey, Essad, 474, 482
 Bickerman, Joseph, 720
 Birmingham, Bishop of, xxvii
 Bishop, R., 180
 Blanc, Elsie Terry, 219, 235
 Blonsky, P. (b. 1884), Russian educationist; published *Die Arbeitsschule* in Berlin, 1921—728
 Bogdanoff, P. A., 506
 Booth, Rt. Hon. Charles, 561
 Borders, Karl, 18, 235, 675, 678, 682, 685, 689
 Borisov, A., 839-40, 857
 Borodin, Michael. Of Czechoslovakian origin, educated Valparaiso University. Long communist propagandist in Spain, Mexico and United States. Imprisoned in London and deported. Went to China as agent of Party, and became communist adviser to Sun Yat Sen, 1924-7; escaped through Mongolia to Moscow. Then became editor of *Moscow Daily News*—881
 Boross, L. P., Russian journalist in Moscow; author of *Reise durch hundert Kollektivwirtschaften*, 1932—180, 190, 218
 Boverat, Fernand, 670
 Brailsford, H. N., 7, 38, 472, 690, 739, 746-747, 751
 Breasted, James H., 818, 840, 911
 Brogan, D. W., xxix
 Brunovsky, Vladimir, 474
 Brutzkus, Boris, 181, 190, 196, 526, 533-4, 539, 553, 649
 Buhnov, A. S. (b. 1883), joined the Party, 1903; member of Central Committee, 1917-1918; long director of educational work in Red Army; People's Commissar of Education in RSFSR, 1930—725
 Buhnov, D. M., 115
 Buhnov, J. V., 219, 235
 Buchez, Dr., 586
 Buchwald, N., 180
 Buckle, H. T., 807, 898
 Bugacheva, Natalia, 295-7
 Bukhurov, 843

- Bukharin, Nicolai I. (b. 1888), joined the Party, 1904; published with Lenin *Pravda* in America; member Central Committee, 1917; editor of *Pravda*, 1918-1928, frequently sided with Trotsky; removed from office, 1928-1929; readmitted, 1929; member of presidium of Commissariat of Heavy Industries, also member of Academy of Sciences; author (with E. Preobrajensky) of *The ABC of Communism*, 1923; arrested, 1937-46, 187, 284, 761, 773, 840, 857, 889
- Bulak-Nalajovich, formerly officer in tsarist army; took command of White Army in White Russia; joined Yudenich, and then Petlura; retreated with Polish troops, 1920-449
- Bunyan, James, 444
- Burns, Emile, 761
- Butler, Samuel, 726
- Cachin, Marcel, 457
- Calcott, M. S., 484
- Campbell, Thomas D., 180, 209
- Carrit, E. P., 761, 763
- Castagne, 108
- Cederholm, B., 474
- Chadwick, Edward, 675
- Chamberlain, Neville, xx
- Chamberlin, W. H., 10, 80, 82, 125, 165, 181, 202-3, 217, 218, 366, 444, 457, 474-5, 489, 525, 630, 804, 809, 812, 888, 891
- Charques, R. D., 718, 719
- Chase, Stuart, 180, 262, 283, 698, 710
- Cher, 458
- Chernavin, Vladimir (Tchernavin), professor of ichthyology in Agronomic Institute of Leningrad, 1921-1923; 1926-1930, in charge of biological laboratories of Northern Fisheries Trust at Murmansk; arrested in 1930 and sent to Solovetsk, whence he escaped in 1932, in company with wife and child, to Finland and London-474, 482
- Chernishev, I. P., 170, 180
- Chernov, V. M., 474
- Chervakov, A. G. (b. 1892), was long a teacher; joined Party, 1917; since 1923 one of the presidents of TSFK; president of White Russian Republic-357
- Chesterton, G. K., 586
- Chicherin, Georg V. (Ornatsky) (b. 1872), mainly Menshevik until 1917; member of Central Committee of Party, 1927-1930; People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930-60-61, 98, 882
- Childs, S. Lawford, 125
- Chu Teh, 887
- Churchill, Winston, xix-xx, li
- Citrine, Sir Walter, xlix
- Coit, Stanton, 818
- Cole, G. D. H., xlvii, 520, 944
- Cole, Margaret L., 101-2, 104, 106-7, 180, 496, 529, 666, 670, 736, 753
- Collard, Dudley, 925
- Conite, Auguste, 745
- Conus, Esther, 658, 660, 666
- Counts, G. S., 718
- Cowley, Malcolm, 925
- Cripps, Sir Stafford, li
- Croft, A. A., 125
- Crowther, J. C., 726, 772
- Cuenot, 674
- Cummings, A. J., 461
- Dalton, Hugh, 496, 529
- Danishevski, 793
- Darwin, Charles, 766, 803-4, 816
- Davies, Joseph E., xliii, 431
- Davis, Jerome, 262, 283
- Davydov, L., 723
- Demin, 611
- Denikin, General, 238, 265, 444-6
- Deploige, Simon, xxvi
- Despreaux, E., 115
- Devaud, Eugene, 718
- Dewey, John, 718
- D'Herbigny, M., 809
- Diakonov, V. A., 635
- Dillon, Emile Joseph (E. B. Lanin), 121, 466, 637, 655, 657, 810
- Dimitrov, xlvii, 892
- Disraeli, Benjamin, 112, 822
- Dixon, W. Hepworth, 482
- Dobb, Maurice, 87, 761
- Dobbert, Gerhard, 80, 82, 180, 189, 196
- Dobrynin, I., 246
- Dominique, Pierre, 693, 696
- Dostoevsky, 813
- Douglas, Paul H., xxix, 235, 698
- Douglas, William F., 221
- Douillet, J., 474
- Dranitsyn, S., 316
- Dubois, Joseph, 524
- Dubrovsky, S., 441
- Duchaux, E., 798
- Dufour, Raoul, 102
- Dunn, Robert W., 125-6, 130-31, 134, 148-9, 151, 158-9, 162-3, 165, 180, 698, 710, 713
- Dutt, R. Palme, 316, 319
- Dvoretzky, A., 666, 675
- Dyerjinsky, Felix (died 1926), Polish nobleman, for many years member of Central Committee of Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania; delegate to Fourth and subsequent congresses of Bolshevik Party; in penal servitude, 1912-1917; from April 1917 member of Bolshevik Central Committee; from 1918 president of Tcheka and OGPU; also at times People's Commissar of Home Affairs, and of Transport, also Chairman of Supreme Economic Council; his great fondness for children led to his being made chairman of commission for liquidating the "homeless waifs"; and to his successful work on this problem-473, 475-6, 483, 485
- Eastman, Max, 925
- Eddy, Sherwood, 199, 649, 809
- Edgeworth, F. Y., 972
- Efremov, 457

- Einstein, 766, 804
 Eismont, 282
 Engels, Friedrich, xxvii, xlvii, 306, 492, 728, 761-2, 797-8, 802-6, 809, 858, 881
 Enslin, 295
 Enukidze, A. S. (*b.* 1877), was the secretary of TSK of USSR from 1920 to 1935; removed and expelled from Party in 1935 for gross negligence and personal disoluteness, but appointed president of Transcaucasian Federation; subsequently, on evidence of further guilt, removed from this office, and made assistant director of Kislovodsk, 1935-357, 373, 379, 857
 Epstein, M., Assistant People's Commissar of Education of RSFSR -720, 740, 748
 Ercoli, 892
 Falkowski, Ed., 223
 Faraday, 766, 785
 Farbmán, Michael, 125, 128, 209, 291, 449-451, 453, 495, 498, 505
 Feiling, Arthur, 204, 446, 449, 635-6
 Feodorov, Lev Nicolaevich, 697, 843
 Fethi Bey, xxiii-xxiv
 Feuchtwanger, Lion, 925
 Field, Alice Withrow, 560, 658, 663, 666, 670, 671, 965
 Finer, Herman, 11
 Firin, C. G., 618
 Fischer, Louis, 157, 212, 218, 334, 456-8, 460, 462, 489, 759, 850, 875, 965
 Fisher, the Rt. Hon. H. H., 444
 Flamm, Irving H., 914
 Fleming, Peter, 881
 Flexnor, Abraham, 798
 Florinsky, Michael T., 461, 875, 883, 889
 Fox, Ralph, 761, 763
 Frouval, L. A., 495
 Freeman, Joseph, 125, 157, 170, 277, 569, 601, 839
 Freund, Heinrich, 102
 Friedlander, L., 115
 Friedman, Elisha M., 85, 279
 Frumkin, 786
 Frunze, Michael Vassilevich (1885-1925), born in Turkestan, of Roumanian origin; arrested, 1904; took part in Moscow rising, 1905; sentenced in 1907 to five years' imprisonment; escaped to China in 1915; in 1918 was head of Minsk civil militia, but commanded armies in civil war against Wrangel, Petlura and Makhno. In 1925 appointed Narkomvoemor, but died same year-91, 447
 Gaissinovich, S., 725, 727-8
 Gantt, Horschley W., 675
 Gaystor, Azon Israelovich, member of presidium of Gosplan, and president of Academy of Agricultural Science, 495
 Genkin, D. M., professor of law, Moscow; specialist on Uncomps-170, 172, 703
 Gens, A., 670, 673-4
 George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd, 698
 Gerbacy, Richard, 213
 Ginsburg, L., 503, 698
 Gladkov, Feodor, 839
 Gnessov, V., 170, 180
 Godwin, William, 837
 Gollancz, Victor, xlvii
 Goode, N. T., 718
 Gorachev, 297-9
 Gorm, P., 8
 Gorky, Maxim (1868-1937), born Nizhni-Novgorod, now Gorki; arrested and exiled, and, 1905, imprisoned; published Socialist daily newspaper; from 1906 spent winters in Capri; returned to Moscow 1928, and became greatest proletarian writer 247, 457, 486, 759, 969
 Grabe, J., 152, 480
 Graftio, 774
 Greenwood, Rt. Hon. Arthur, xxi
 Gregory, T. E., 496, 526, 531, 539, 546, 566
 Grenard, Fernand, 10, 173, 503
 Grigoriev, 446
 Grinko, Grigory Federovich (*b.* 1890), has been successively People's Commissar of Education, Ukraine; president Ukraine Gosplan; vice-president central committee Ukraine Party; vice-president Gosplan USSR; vice-commissar of Agriculture USSR, and People's Commissar of Finance USSR 87
 Groman, 158, 520
 Gruzdev, B., 728
 Gubkin, L., 795
 Guest, L. Haden, 675
 Guiboud-Ribaud, P., 483
 Gurbiz, S. L., 804-5
 Gurvich, G. C., 10
 Haensel, Paul, 87, 418, 473
 Haines, Anna J., 140, 161, 666, 670, 675, 677, 679-80, 682, 688, 691-4
 Haldane, J. B. S., xlviii
 Hall, Sir A. Daniel, 789, 909
 Halle, Fannina W., 346, 451, 658-61, 666, 668, 670, 674, 839-40, 847
 Hamant, 674
 Hambro, Carl J., xxxi
 Hans, N., 718, 722-4, 730
 Harper, S. N., 96, 98, 125, 127-8, 262, 276, 286, 292, 303, 311, 319, 328, 601, 603-4, 718
 Harris, Henry, 670
 Harrison, C. A., 718, 727-8
 Hartmann, Nicholas, 818
 Hartshorne, Charles, 767
 Hastings, Somerville, 670, 675, 685, 693
 Hayek, F. A., 496, 539, 552
 Hecker, Julius F., x, 329, 761, 808-9, 811, 813
 Hegel, 761, 801
 Heffetz, E., 115
 Heiftz, L., 703
 Herriot, Edmond, 96, 98, 764
 Hessen, S., 718, 722-4
 Hewes, Amy, 125
 Ehill, Elizabeth, 930
 Hindus, Maurice, 96, 180, 184, 214, 219, 509, 535-6, 538, 839, 938, 941, 943, 947

Hitler, Adolf, xix, xlviii-xlix, li, 67, 157, 333, 437, 892, 926
 Hobbes, Thomas, 262
 Hoetzsch, Otto, 99
 Hogben, Lancelot, 761, 765
 Hook, Sidney, 340, 343, 761
 Hoover, Calvin B., 125, 278, 366
 Horabin, J. F., vii
 Hubbard, L. R., 955
 Hurst, F. E., 199, 217
 Hutchins, T., 734
 Hutchinson, L., 87
 Huxley, Julian, 773

Ignatiev, V. I., 47
 Ikov, 458
 Ilf, Ilya, 854
 Injevatkine, Gregor, 197
 Isbach, A., 198, 203
 Istrati, Panait, 630
 Ivan the Terrible, 472
 Ivanovsky, L., 221

Jagow, A., 495
 Jakobson, Michael, 125, 132, 134, 147-8, 159
 James, C. L. R., 925
 Joffe, 786, 879
 Jones, B. Mount, 773
 Judenich. See *Yudenich*
 Judine, Serge, 695
 Just, 736

Kaganovich, Lazar Meissoevich (*b.* 1893), by origin Ukrainian leather worker; joined Party, 1911, active worker; member of TSIK since 1924; secretary to Central Committee of Party and member of Politbureau, 1928; secretary of Moscow Party and leading member of Moscow City Soviet; has successively reorganised the trade union movement, Moscow municipal administration, MTS and collective farms, and central Party organisation, and is now People's Commissar of Means of Communication (railways)—27, 32, 39, 42, 44, 66, 131-2, 164, 193-4, 196-7, 199, 203, 207-9, 214, 247, 276, 282, 288, 292, 300, 337, 340, 367, 462, 478, 613, 628, 698, 704, 756, 758

Kai-shuk, Chiang, li
 Kaiser, Georg, 496
 Kalinin, Michael Ivanovich (*b.* 1875), originally metal worker in Putilov Works, but also active as underground worker in Rostov, Tiflis and Moscow, 1898-1917; in 1919 succeeded Sverdlov as president of TSIK of Republic, and since 1924 president of TSIK of USSR; member of Central Party Committee since 1919, and now also member of Politbureau—25, 77-78, 157, 192, 214, 285, 327, 332-3, 357, 373, 379, 487, 625
 Kalmykov, Metal, 841
 Kamonev, Lev Borisovich (Rosenfeld) (*b.* 1883), arrested and emigrated, 1902; attended Third (1905) and Fourth (1907) Party Congresses; was on editorial

board of *Punda*; returning to Russia was arrested 1908 and again emigrated, but returned 1911 to be again arrested and exiled to Siberia in 1914, between 1917 and 1935 successively held various offices (delegate to Brest-Litovsk Peace, ambassador to Italy, president of Council of Labour and Defence, etc.); but almost invariably developed factional intrigues (often with Zinoviev, sometimes with Trotsky) against the Party policy; repeatedly removed from office or relieved of assigned task; three times (1927, 1932 and 1935) formally expelled from Party, but twice readmitted on abject recantation and promise of loyalty; in 1935 arrested with Zinoviev on suspicion of connection with assassination of Kirov, and eventually found guilty by Supreme Court of conspiracy, and sentenced to long term of imprisonment; again tried, and shot, 1937—357, 462, 506, 728, 857

Karavai, M., 198
 Karpinsky, A. P., 162, 772, 774
 Karpov, Lev Yakovlevich (died 1921), eminent scientist in industrial chemistry; member of Central Committee of Party, 1900-1904; held important industrial positions from 1918 until his death—502

Kats, R., 703
 Katzenellenbaum, Zakhary F. Solomonovich, 87
 Kaufmann, L., 137, 145-6, 569, 575, 577-8, 580, 582
 Kautsky, Karl (*b.* 1854), a very leading German Social Democrat, author of many polemical volumes on Socialism, and against Soviet Communism; worked successively in Zurich, Stuttgart, London, Berlin; editor of *Die Neue Zeit* in Vienna from 1883 to 1917—505
 Kayden, E. M., 170-71, 220, 235
 Kazakov, 409
 Keeton, G. W., 461
 Kennan, George, 474
 Kerensky, Alexander Federovich (*b.* 1881), leading lawyer and Social Revolutionary; member of Fourth Duma; in February 1917 became Minister of Justice in Provisional Government, and in July 1917 premier; in October 1917 escaped abroad—238, 341, 440, 443, 472
 Kerzhentsev, Platon Michaelovich (Lebedev), joined Party, 1904; emigrated, 1912; Soviet minister to Sweden, 1921; ambassador to Italy, 1924; director of administrative affairs of TSIK—276, 317, 605, 815-16
 Khaltourine, Stevan V. (1856-1882), prominent revolutionist worker; principal founder of North Russian Workers' Union, 1878-1879; member of Narodnaya Volya; in 1880 caused explosion in Winter Palace intended to kill Tsar; assassinated in 1882 Strehnikov, prosecutor in Odessa; hanged, 1882—126
 Khibir-Aliev, 357

- Khomikov, 843
 Khoysky, R. I., 703
 Kindermann, Karl, 474
 King, Beatrice L., 718, 728
 Kingsbury, John A., 184, 537, 665-6, 670, 674-5, 682, 683, 690, 691, 716
 Kirov, S. N. (1881-1934), member of Party from 1904; worked illegally at Tomsk, Irkutsk and Vladivostok; a commander in Civil War; from 1922 member of Central Committee of Party; in 1923 secretary of Party Committee of Azerbaijan; from 1926 secretary of Leningrad Party Committee; from 1928 member of Politbureau; assassinated, December 1934—461-3
 Kisselev, Alexey Semonovich (b. 1879), metal worker; joined the Party, 1898; chairman of St. Petersburg Metal Workers' Trade Union, 1912-1913; member and secretary of USSR TSIK; author of *Tasks of the City Soviets in the Light of the New Decree*, 1933-27
 Kleist, Peter, 99
 Knickerbocker, H. R., 405
 Kuorin, V., 295, 891
 Koerber, Lenka von, 480, 484
 Kogan, L. I., 618
 Kohn, Hans, 111-13, 119, 811
 Kosisky, I. R., 170
 Kokovtzeff, V. N., Count (1853-1928), finance minister in Stolypin's Cabinet; after Stolypin's assassination became premier—532
 Kolchak, Alexander Vassilievich (1873-1921), admiral in Tsar's navy; became dictator of Siberia during Civil War; after defeat of his army he was arrested by Czechoslovak troops and handed over to Soviet army, when he was shot by order of the Irkutsk revolutionary committee in January 1921—265, 441
 Kolesnichenko, S., 303, 309
 Kollontai, A. M. (b. 1872), mainly educated at German universities; from 1904 to 1916 was a Menshevik, working in the women's movement, for which she propagated in United States; returned to Russia in 1917 and was arrested by Kerensky's Government; became member of Bolshevik Party Central Committee, taking part in October rising; in 1918 People's Commissar of Social Welfare; from 1920 to 1922 she was associated with opposition factions, and was reprimanded by Comintern; she then became loyal Party member; appointed USSR minister, Mexico; then to Norway; and then to Sweden; is author of various novels, dealing with sex relations and communist ethics—658, 663, 839
 Komarov, N. P., 757-8
 Kon, Felix Yakovlevich (b. 1864), long member of Polish Proletarian Party; sentenced to many years of hard labour in Siberia; returned to Poland in 1904 and continued revolutionary work; in 1922-1923 became one of the secretaries of Comintern—357
 Konchalovsky, Maxim Petrovich, 792-3
 Korber, Lili, 569, 621
 Korel, L., 771
 Korolenko, Vladimir, 170
 Korostovetz, Vladimir, leading landowner in White Russia, and official in Tsar's Foreign Office; escaped to Poland, 1918; author of *Seed and Harvest*, describing his life and adventures—441, 808
 Korovin, E. A., 99
 Kosarev, A. V., 305
 Kolyzarevsky, Sergey F. Alexandrovich, 47
 Kotov, Vassili Annasevich (b. 1885), locksmith; joined the Party prior to war and was arrested in 1916; took part in fight against Yudenich, 1919; member of Party central committee and of TSIK of USSR; head of Social Insurance Bureau of RSFSR to 1934; then head of Insurance Department of AUCCTU—698, 701, 707-9, 712, 716
 Kovalevsky, E., 720
 Kovalevsky, M. W. de (1851-1916), professor of political science at St. Petersburg University; deprived of his post in 1887 and emigrated; founder of Higher Russian School in Paris, 1905; returned to Russia and became member of First Duma—170, 186
 Kovalyov, K. N., 658
 Krasnoff, 502
 Krasin, L. B. (otherwise Nikitich, Zinin, Winter, etc.) (died 1926); a leading revolutionary from 1902; attended Third and subsequent Party congresses; exceptionally active in organisation work; in 1909, at the split, he joined the Vperyod group, and presently withdrew from politics, achieving a high technical position in chemical and electrical industry. He returned to active Party work in 1918, from which time he occupied a succession of important administrative and diplomatic posts, including mission to London in 1920. At the Thirteenth Party Congress he was elected member of the Party central committee. Later he became successively USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Trade and soviet ambassador at London, until his death—485, 502, 506-8
 Krishanovski, M., 495
 Krizhanovsky, Gleb V. (b. 1872), a distinguished scientist in electricity and chemistry; in 1920 elected member of Academy of Sciences, and its vice-president. Took leading part in social democratic activities in St. Petersburg towards end of nineteenth century, becoming a member of RSDLP Party in 1903. Withdrawing from active politics after 1905, to devote himself to science, he joined the soviet administration in 1918, and took leading part in industrial reorganisation,

- At Eighth Congress of Soviets in 1920 he reported on electrification for the Goelro, and later became chairman of Gosplan and a member of the Party central committee, actively engaged in administration—158, 305, 773
- Kropotkin, Peter (prince) (1842-1921), founder of Anarcho-Communism; distinguished scientist in geography, and secretary of Imperial Geographic Society; active in propagandist revolutionary work in St. Petersburg until his arrest in 1874, when he escaped from prison to Scotland; was deported from Switzerland to France in 1881, and in 1883 sentenced by French court to five years' imprisonment for membership of International Workers' Association, but was released in 1886; then settled in London, until return to Russia in 1917. Disappointed with the centralised collectivism of the Soviet Government, he lived in retirement until death—46, 474, 885
- Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinova (b. 1869), became the wife of Lenin in 1898; worked in St. Petersburg as member of League of Struggle for Emancipation of Working Class in 1895-1896, and was exiled to Siberia, where she joined Lenin. After expiration of sentence she emigrated with him, actively helping in the most secret work at London, Paris, Geneva, Zurich, Vienna and Cracow, returning with him to Petrograd in 1917. She was long secretary of editorial board of *Iskra*, and attended all Party congresses. Since 1918 she has held important positions in educational work—311, 313, 842
- Krylenko, Nicolai Vassilievich (b. 1885), prominent leader in 1905-1908 of revolutionary movement among the students; served as ensign in the Great War, and in November 1917 was appointed by Lenin to be Commander-in-Chief of the rapidly dissolving army; subsequently held various offices, latterly as assistant to People's Commissar of Justice, and Procurator of RSFSR—457-9, 850
- Kulbishev, Valerian Vladimirovich (1888-1935), joined Party, 1904, and active in 1905 revolution; engaged in Party work in Siberia (born at Omsk); frequently arrested, and sentenced in 1908 to five years' exile, in 1915 to three years' exile, whence he escaped, but was again arrested and exiled; fought throughout Civil War; in 1917 president of Supreme Economic Council; some time secretary of Party central committee; president of Gosplan; deputy chairman of Sovnarkom and Council of Labour and Defence; member of Politbureau until death—52, 387
- Kurella, Alfred, 728
- Kuropatkin, Alexey Nicolavich (1848-1926), general in tsarist army and Minister for War, 1898-1904; conducted war with Japan, 1904-1905; in 1916 governor of Turkestan, dismissed in 1918—438
- Kursky, Dmitry Ivanovich (b. 1874), leading advocate and law professor; joined Party, 1904; 1918-1928, in Ministry of Justice of RSFSR; in 1928 soviet ambassador to Italy—357
- Kuusinen, O., 891
- Labry, Raoul, 5
- Ladejinsky, W., 181, 202, 204-5, 214
- Lapandin, 589
- Larin, Y. (Lurie, M. S.) (1883-1932), political economist of advanced but erratic opinions. In 1906 advocated a Labour Congress and a broad Labour Party; then Menshevik-Internationalist. Joined Bolshevik Party, 1917; and held various economic posts (delegate to Berlin about Brest-Litovsk Treaty and member of Supreme Economic Council); attended Seventh and later soviet congresses; and became member of RSFSR central executive committee and USSR TSIK; withdrew from Party and emigrated, becoming hostile critic abroad, until his death—502-3
- Larsons, M. I., 474
- Laski, Harold J., xlvii, 102, 484, 860, 872
- Lassalle, Ferdinand, 2
- Lawrence, Martin, 268
- Leary, D. B., 718
- Lebedeva, V. P., 658, 666, 670, 709
- Lee, F. E., 235
- Leibovici, Raymond, 670-71, 696
- Lenin, N. (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) (1870-1924). Born at Simbirsk, son of Ilya Ulyanov and Maria Alexandrovna Blank; younger brother of Alexander Ilyich Ulyanov, who was hanged in 1887 as being concerned in an attempted assassination of the Tsar Alexander III. by the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) party. He entered Kazan University, August 1887, but in the following December was expelled and exiled to his mother's small farm at Kokushino, where he read the works of Marx. He was allowed to reside at Kazan in October 1888, and at Samara in May 1889. In November 1891 he was permitted to sit for examination for law degree, St. Petersburg University, and for several years had small practice in local courts as defending counsel. In 1893 settled at St. Petersburg, and instructed workmen groups. His first publication was *What are the Friends of the People?* 1894. In 1895 he was deputed to proceed abroad (on excuse of ill-health) to arrange for establishment of revolutionary journal, visiting Austria, Switzerland, Berlin and Paris. Returning to St. Petersburg, 1895, he was arrested, kept in prison until 1897, and then exiled to Siberia for three years. Krupskaya was shortly after also exiled, and joined Lenin in 1898 upon

marriage. He returned alone to St. Petersburg, 1900, leaving Krupskaya to complete her own sentence, and went to Switzerland and Munich, where Krupskaya joined him, 1902. Together they visited London, 1902, France, 1902-1903, London again, 1903, for Social Democratic Congress, always engaged in propaganda and study, and the publication of *Iskra*, from which he was driven to resign in 1905, when he started *Forward* (*Vperyod*). The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) led to Gapon's appeal to Tsar, December 1905, and "Bloody Sunday". Lenin attended congress at Stockholm, 1906, and London, 1907. In 1908 published *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*; attended Copenhagen Congress of Second International, 1910. During these years of reaction resided mostly in Switzerland and France, and in 1913 moved to Cracow for sake of easier communication with revolutionists in Russia. On outbreak of Great War (1914) he was arrested by Austrian Government, but released after ten days, moving to Vienna and Switzerland. After February revolution (1917) contrived to leave, with other Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, etc., in "sealed carriage" through Germany for Sweden, Finland and Petrograd, where he took command of small Bolshevik Party and prepared for seizure of power. To escape arrest by Kerensky's police he went into hiding outside Leningrad, keeping in constant communication with Party. In October he reappeared and deposed Provisional Government, becoming president of Sovnarkom of People's Commissars. He insisted on concluding peace with Germany (Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918). In the same year Volodarsky and Uritsky were assassinated, and Lenin was wounded by revolver shot by Dora Kaplan, a Social Revolutionary. Half a dozen foreign governments supported, by invasion, the White Armies. Then followed three years' desperate fighting to maintain the revolution and avert famine. In 1921 Lenin was victorious, but had to adopt New Economic Policy (NEP) as temporary expedient. In May 1922 he had a paralytic stroke, but struggled desperately for health. A second stroke in December 1922 compelled him to go into the country for prolonged rest. He had a third stroke in May 1923, and lingered until January 1924, when a fourth stroke produced death—xxv, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxix-xl, xliii-xlix, 4, 5, 8-11, 36-7, 45, 60, 74, 86, 107-8, 124, 127-31, 158, 169, 171, 183, 213, 235, 238, 263-6, 269, 304, 306, 310, 311-318, 330, 333, 335, 338-44, 365, 438-43, 447, 449, 451-3, 462, 473, 489, 496-8, 500, 503-5, 508, 519, 529, 561-2, 570, 572-3, 598, 607, 612, 616, 628, 648, 653, 655,

657-8, 660-61, 663, 667, 677-9, 698, 717-720, 728, 740, 718, 761-3, 769, 778, 797-8, 802, 801-6, 809, 818-19, 823, 833, 846-9, 854, 859, 873, 875-9, 882-4, 888, 891-7, 908

Leontiev, A., 195

Le Play, Pierre G. F., 586

Levine, Isaac Don, 334, 504-5

Levit, Boris, 251

Levitsky, Nicholas Vassilevich (b. 1859), humane Russian landowner and co-operator; member of Narodniki; organised first agricultural ardel in Kherson gubernia in last decade of nineteenth century. After the 1917 revolution devoted himself to cooperative movement in the Ukraine—186

Levy, H., 761, 763

Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich (Vallakh, Maximovich) (b. 1876), in revolutionary work, 1898; arrested and imprisoned, 1901; escaped to Switzerland and worked there and in London until 1917; joined Party, 1902; agent for *Iskra*; member of Bolshevik central committee; and attended Third Congress and International at Stuttgart in 1907. In 1917 sent as diplomatic agent to London, and was there arrested and held as hostage; exchanged for Bruce Lockhart. From 1918 in Commissariat Foreign Affairs, head of numerous diplomatic and trade missions and international conferences; vice-commissar, 1929; People's Commissar since 1930; member of League of Nations Council since 1934; elected member of central committee of Party in 1934; member of USSR TSIC—66, 99, 461, 837-8, 893

London, Kurt, 971

Lozovsky, Solomon Abramovich (A. S. Dridso) (b. 1878), was a blacksmith; joined Party, 1901; arrested but escaped to France, 1909; secretary of trade unions and cooperative societies in France; returned to Russia, June 1917; expelled from Party for heterodoxy, 1918; became an Internationalist, and secretary of various trade unions; readmitted to Party, 1919; one of the founders, and since 1921 the secretary of Profintern; member of USSR TSIC; candidate for central committee of Party—126, 165

Lubimov, Isidor Evstigneievich (b. 1882), joined the Party, 1902, filling various Party and governmental posts; in 1924 became president of Centrosoyuz; in 1934 People's Commissar of Forestry and Timber Industries—219

Ludwig, Emil, 334

Lannacharsky, A. V. (Voynov) (1876-1933). From 1906 engaged in editing legal Bolshevik paper, the *Noruga Zhizn*; attended Third and Fourth Congresses and International Congress at Stuttgart, 1907; during the war belonged to the

- Internationalists and collaborated in Trotsky's paper *Nash Slovo*. After 1917 revolution joined Bolshevik Party and became People's Commissar of Education for RSFSR until 1929; then member of presidium of USSR TSNTK and chairman of its scientific commission. In 1930 elected to Academy of Sciences, and in 1933 appointed first soviet ambassador to Spain, but died before taking up this post—717-19, 725, 728, 739, 712, 810, 842
- Lurie, M. S. See *Lavin*
- Luzhin, A., 21
- Lyadov, M. N., 262
- Lyubchenko, P. P., 662
- Macartney, W. C., 57, 62, 118
- Mackenzie, F. A., 809
- Macmillan, Prof., xxiv
- MacMurray, John, 761, 763, 808
- Madjar, L., 457
- Maitsky, Ivan Mikhailovich (Lyakhovetsky) (b. 1884). He was born at Omsk, educated St. Petersburg and Munich universities; joined revolutionary movement, 1899, being many times arrested. Emigrated to Germany and England and came in association with Mensheviks. Returned to Russia in 1918 and joined Bolshevik Party. Director of expedition for exploring Mongolia, 1919-1920; president Gosplan (Siberia), 1921; director Press Department of Narkomindel, 1922-1925; counsellor of embassy to London, 1925-1927; to Tokio, 1927-1929; soviet minister to Finland, 1929-1932; ambassador to London, 1933—463
- Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich (b. 1889), was a peasant; in 1905 joined the anarchists. In 1918 formed a band of peasants which fought indiscriminately the landlords, the German armies and the Ukrainian Government forces, opposing Petlura, who was driving the German army out of Ukraine. Later Makhno's band opposed the soviet army, but soon joined it in opposition to Denikin's forces. Makhno again opposed soviet army whilst Wrangel was advancing, and after an unsatisfactory armistice, was completely defeated and escaped in 1921 to Roumania—446, 449
- Malevsky-Malevich, P., 235
- Manuilsky, Dmitry Zukharovich (b. 1883), joined the Party, 1904; arrested, 1906, but escaped abroad; was in Vperyod group, 1909; participated in October revolution in Petrograd, 1917; member of Party committee in Ukraine, 1920-1925; later member of Comintern, and its Executive Committee; and of Central Committee of the Party—318, 357, 891-892
- Mao Dsu Tung, 881
- Maquet, Gustave, 495
- Margolis, A. D., 115
- Margolis, M. L., 115
- Markov, P. A., 742
- Marley, Lord, 115-16
- Marsakov, 246
- Martov, L., 262
- Martusya, 146
- Marx, A., 115
- Marx, Karl, xxxii, xxxiii-xxxiv, xlv-xlvii, 9, 264, 266, 269, 306, 315, 339, 339-43, 438, 442, 572, 659, 663, 728, 759, 761-2, 766, 769, 797-8, 802-7, 809, 816-17, 821-2, 846, 854, 858-9, 884
- Maslov, S. S., 450
- Mavor, James, 502
- Maxwell, B. W., 10, 12, 14, 20-21, 29, 29, 49, 72, 99, 119, 262
- Maynard, Sir John, 923-5
- Mazepa, Isaac, 100, 191, 201, 457
- McCullagh, Francis, 809
- McCulloch, J. R., 522
- McNally, C. E., 911
- Mechnikov, Ilya Ilyich (1845-1915), eminent chemist and biologist; member of Academy of Sciences—483
- Medvedev, 787
- Mehner, Klaus, 303, 328, 718, 839
- Melgounov, Sergey Petrovich, 474
- Mendeleev, 766
- Menzhinsky, Vyacheslav Rukolovich (1874-1934), Polish nobleman; joined revolutionary movement, 1895; emigrated until 1917, when appointed to Narbonne; later soviet consul-general at Berlin, and subsequently president of USSR Intelligence Department in United States; member of presidium of Telchka; in 1926 president of OGPU until death—100, 476
- Mezhlauk, V., has filled many posts; was vice-president of Supreme Economic Council; successively member and president of Gosplan and Commissar of Heavy Industry—511, 933, 939
- Miasnikam, A. F., 357
- Mikoyan, 596-7
- Mikulina, E., 600
- Mill, John Stuart, 586, 598
- Miller, Margaret S., 87, 495
- Miller, R. T., 925
- Milyukov, Paul Nikolaevich (b. 1859), was professor of history, Moscow, 1895, and Sofia, 1897-1898; leading member of "Cadets" in Duma, 1907-1913; Minister for Foreign Affairs, February-May 1917; emigrated to London, 1917, and Paris, 1921, where he edited *Les Dernières Nouvelles*—655
- Minervin, 400
- Mirski, Dmitry S., prince; was in tsarist army but resigned; rejoined for the war, and afterwards fought in Denikin's army, from which he escaped to Greece and London. Appointed lecturer at King's College, London University; became leading promoter of Eurasian Movement in Paris. Afterwards wrote biography of Lenin and rallied to support of Bolshevik Party, returning to Moscow in 1933—7
- Mises, Ludwig, 531, 540, 552

- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhonovich (Skryabin) (b. 1889). Born at Kazan, where he began revolutionary work, 1906; was arrested and exiled, 1909; in 1911 secretary of Bolshevik journals, and 1912-1914 on staff of *Pravda*; took a leading part in October revolution, 1917; closely associated with Lenin. In 1920-1921 secretary of Central Committee of Party in the Ukraine; and since Tenth Party Congress secretary of TSIR. Since 1930 has been chairman of USSR Sovnarkom. Is member of Politbureau—xix, 5, 15, 65-6, 76-7, 157, 214, 285, 327, 332-3, 340, 373, 379, 628, 634
- Monkhouse, Allan, 61, 80, 273, 461, 468, 475, 479, 481, 538, 557
- Morgan, John, 180
- Morozov, 208
- Moulton, H. G., 87
- Mudie, Doris, 930
- Muller, Herman J., 787
- Muller, Prof., 792
- Munblitt, E. G., 692
- Munro, Ion S., 338
- Mussolini, Benito, xix, xlix, 67, 157, 333, 338
- Nadeau, L., 474
- Narimanov, N. N., 357
- Nearing, Scott, 718
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, xxii
- Nekrasov, A. I., 794
- Nekrasov, N., 235
- Nesline, 692, 694
- Neugebauer, 765
- Newman, Sir George, 914
- Newsholme, Sir Arthur, 484, 536, 665-6, 670, 674-5, 682-4, 690, 691, 716
- Nicholas the First, 472
- Nikolayev, A., 160, 461
- Nodel, W., 217, 235, 239, 246, 248-9, 254, 258-9, 527
- Noulens, J., 473
- Nov, D. V., 805
- Noyes, J. H., 633
- Nyurina, F., 656, 660
- Obolensky-Ossinsky, Valerian Valerianovich (Obolensky) (b. 1887). He joined Party, 1907; exiled, 1910; edited legal Bolshevik journal; again arrested and exiled to Kharkov, where he became member of military revolutionary committee; active in October revolution, and became president of Supreme Economic Council, 1918; later director of Gosbank and then People's Commissar of Education, 1920. Associated with group of "Left Communists", 1918, and "Democratic Centralists", 1920-1921. He was appointed Soviet Minister to Sweden, 1923 to 1927; and member of presidium of Gosplan, 1929-1933; then head of Department of National Economic Accounting of USSR. Is candidate of Party central committee—495
- Ognyov, N., 725
- Olenhoff, Nils, 195
- Olkhovsky, 784
- Oppokov, G. I., 502
- Ordjonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (b. 1886), joined the Party, 1903, in Georgia; repeatedly arrested; emigrated to Persia and Paris; returned to Russia, 1917; fought in Civil War, and member of military soviet of Caucasian Front; since 1926 member of presidium of Party central committee, and of USSR TSIR; People's Commissar of Heavy Industries; died 1937—805
- Ostrovityanov, V., 778, 780
- Owen, Lancelot A., 141
- Owen, Robert, 213, 586, 617-18
- Page-Arnot, R., 761, 763
- Paley, A., 784
- Papovian, 804
- Parker, John, xxiv
- Pashukanis, E., 355
- Pasvolsky, Leo, 87
- Paton, G., 85
- Pataudillet, J., 402
- Paul, Leslie A., 220, 235, 244, 247
- Pavlenka, Stepan B., 792
- Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich (b. 1849), the eminent physiologist; Nobel prizeman; member of Academy of Sciences; died 1936—683, 697, 791
- Pazhitnov, K., 170
- Pazukhina, Eudoxia, 180, 206, 466
- Perehilt, L., 112, 119
- Perrot, M. D., 613
- Peter the Great, 472
- Petlov, Eugene, 854
- Pethura, Simon Vassilevich (1877-1926), Right Wing Social Democrat and Leader of Ukrainian People's Republic, 1919; sided with Polish troops in fighting against soviet army; escaped to Poland and Paris, where he was assassinated in 1926 by Shwartzberd, Jewish Ukrainian nationalist—238, 445-6, 449
- Petrov, A., 221
- Petrovsky, Georgey Ivanovich (b. 1877), was a metal worker, born in Khurkov; social democrat from manhood; arrested many times; took part in 1905 revolution, and escaped to Germany. In 1912 elected to Fourth Duma, and chairman of Bolshevik Fraction; exiled to Siberia, 1915; in 1917 became People's Commissar of Home Affairs. Since 1919 has been chairman of Ukrainian Central Executive Committee; and since 1922 also chairman of TSIR of USSR. Is candidate of Politbureau of Party—357
- Platnitsky, Josef Aronovich (b. 1882), joined the Party, 1898, and specialised in transport of illegal literature from abroad; later member of central committee of Party and of that of Comintern—165, 295, 891
- Pieck, Wilhelm, 892

- Pierce, Charles Saunders, 767
 Pierre, André, 12
 Pierremont, R., 474
 Pinkevich, A., 718, 727, 773
 Pistrak, 718, 728
 Pitirim, 808
 Pitt, William, 837
 Plehn, Carl G., 87
 Plehve, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich (von), leading tsarist official; 1881-1884, director of department of police; 1889, State Secretary for Finland; in 1902, Minister of Interior; assassinated, 1904, by E. Sazonov (Social Revolutionary)—438
 Plekhanov, xxxix
 Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1868-1932), principal Marxian historian; began work, 1892; became Marxian before 1900; joined Party, 1905; member of Moscow committee, 1906-1907; delegate to Fifth (London) Congress, 1907, where elected to Party central committee. Joined Vperyod group in Paris, 1909-1911, writing his five volumes of *History of Russia*. Returned to Russia, 1917, and elected chairman of Moscow soviet; from 1918 to 1932 was Assistant People's Commissar of Education RSFSR—7, 778
 Poletika, W. von, 181
 Pollock, Friedrich, 495, 502
 Popoff, G., 474
 Popoff, P., 219
 Popov, N., xlviii, 235, 262, 282, 504, 875, 883
 Poppelmann, Heinrich, 82
 Postgate, R. W., 316, 736
 Postov, 788-9
 Postyshev, Paul (b. 1888), joined the Party, 1904; arrested and exiled to Siberia for four years, 1908. In revolution of 1917 was head of army of Far Eastern Republic. From 1926 member of Party Politbureau and secretary of Ukraine Party and Kharkov Party Committee. At 16th Party Congress appointed secretary of Party central committee—201
 Premysler, R., 778, 780
 Price, George M., 698, 703, 705, 709-10, 712-713
 Price, M. Phillips, 502
 Pritt, D. N., 101-4, 106-7, 484, 925
 Prokofiev, G. E., 488
 Prokopovich, Sergius (b. 1871), a professor: was a "Legal Marxist", then collaborated with Mensheviks; and later joined the Cadets. In 1917 Minister of Food Supplies in Kerensky's Government. Now lives in Prague and edits hostile *Bulletin on Russian Economic Conditions of Today*—279, 534
 Purves-Stewart, Sir James, 875
 Pushkin, 119, 743
 Quisling, xliii
 Radak, Karl, imprisoned 1937—66, 925, 930
 Rainov, T., 770, 772
 Rakovsky, K. G. (b. 1873), was a physician, Bulgarian Social Democrat: emigrated from Roumania to Geneva, 1891; attended International at London in 1896 as Bulgarian delegate; married a Russian; visited Russia in 1897 and in 1900, when he was instantly expelled. Later he was imprisoned at Jassy, and released by soviet troops, 1917, when he joined the Party; becoming in 1919 president of Ukrainian Sovnarkom, which agreed to join Soviet Union, 1922; later soviet ambassador to London, 1925-1926. Became involved in Trotskyist faction, and was expelled from Party, being appointed president of a provincial university. Recanted his opposition in a dignified letter, 1933, was appointed in Commissariat of Health; removed from office, 1937—60, 357, 857
 Ramzin, 457, 480-81, 485
 Rapoport, Vera, 666
 Rasputin, 439, 808
 Ratner, G., 220
 Ratzenburg, Manfred Langham, 113
 Reddaway, W. B., 955
 Rein, Prof., 687
 Reussner, M. A., 778
 Revzina, 780
 Reynolds, R. A., 675
 Rezunov, M., 24
 Ricardo, David, xlvii, 522
 Riddell, W. R., 461
 Ridley, Geoffrey, 753
 Robbins, Lionel, 496, 518, 559
 Robinson, C. G., 180
 Robinson, G. T., 438, 440-41
 Rollin, Henri, 96, 262, 327, 503, 888
 Romanov, Panteleimon, 839
 Ronin, Solomon Lazarevich (b. 1894), able economist; member of presidium of Communist Academy and of the board of Prombank; author of *Foreign Capital and Banks*—500
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, xx
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 333, 888
 Rosenberg, A., 9, 262, 875, 877
 Rosenberg, James N., 115
 Rosenfeldt, 458
 Rosenhaupt, H., 675
 Rosenholz, A. P., 85
 Rostortzeff, A., 899
 Roubakine, Alexandre, 673, 682
 Rubin, I. C., 964
 Rubinov, I. M., 115
 Rudzutak, Y. I., 300, 357
 Rukeyser, W. A., 475-6, 480, 483, 525, 751
 Rutherford, Lord, 766
 Ryazanov, 849, 857
 Rykov, Alexey Ivanovich (b. 1881), first joined Party, 1902; several times arrested; member of Party Central Committee, 1905, but became a conciliator and opposed October rising, 1917. After the revolution was engaged in economic administration. Member of Politbureau

- from 1919 to 1929. Becoming involved in the "Right Opposition" he was expelled from Party in 1929; but on recantation was readmitted promptly. In 1930 he was transferred from chairmanship of USSR Sovnarkom to be People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs—36, 187, 327, 340, 357, 502, 619
- Rysakoff, A. 63
- Sabunin, A., 99
- Sakhat-Muratov, 298
- Salutski, 462
- Samolovich, 295
- Sapir, S., 235
- Sapronov, T. V., 357
- Savacov, joined the Party, 1908; became a leader of "New Opposition" in 1925; expelled from Party at Fifteenth Congress for Trotskyist participation; but in 1928 he recanted and was readmitted. Then worked in Comintern—462
- Sawadsky, A., 102
- Scheffer, Paul, 456-7
- Schierband, Wolf von, 466
- Schiller, Otto, 180, 190
- Schlichter, 457
- Schmidt, Otto, J., 605
- Schulze-Molkan, Rudolf, 113
- Schuwanjow, 938
- Schweitzer, Robert, 532
- Segal, Louis, 495, 505
- Seibert, Theodor, 290
- Selitzky, L. A., 170, 703
- Semashko, Nikolai Alexandrovich (*b.* 1874), able medical scientist; studied Moscow University, 1893; arrested, 1895 and 1905; passed examinations at Kazan University; emigrated, 1901, and joined Party. A nephew of Plekhanov, owing to divergence of views he hardly ever saw his uncle, but formed friendship with Lenin, with whom he associated in Paris, Geneva, etc. Served as doctor in Balkan war. Returning to Russia in 1917, he began acting as Medical Officer for Petrograd, but was appointed in 1918 Minister of Health for RSFSR, a post that he retained until 1930. Now editing *Soviet Great Medical Encyclopedia*—675-9, 682, 689, 692
- Semonov, 786
- Serafino, 749
- Seraphim, H. J., 87
- Sordukov, 964
- Serrati, 878
- Sevridov, 409
- Shaginyan, M., 641
- Sharonov, 620
- Shaw, Alan, xlv
- Shaw, G. Bernard, 844, 899
- Shchushev, 749
- Shean, J. Vincent, 881
- Shoftel, S., 262
- Sholokhov, M., 470, 839
- Shulgin, Alexander, 202
- Shvernink, Nikolai Michailovich (*b.* 1888), was a metal worker; joined Party, 1902; in 1918 became chairman of Samara city soviet; in 1922-1925 he was head of the RSFSR Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; late member of Central Committee of Party; and from 1930 secretary of All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions—5, 132, 135-7, 146-7, 157, 162-3, 286, 581, 599, 602, 609, 611, 614, 618, 628-9, 698-9, 702, 704, 712-13, 749
- Simon, Sir John, 161
- Simon, Sir Ernest, 950
- Skilasovsky, Dr., 695
- Skomorovsky, D., 728
- Skoropadsky, Pavel Petrovich (*b.* 1873), was formerly officer of Imperial Guard; became Hetman of the Ukraine from April to December 1918, in subjection to German dictation—445-6
- Smidovich, P. G., 295, 357
- Smirnov, 282
- Smith, Charles, xxiv
- Smith, Sir Hubert Llewellyn, 564
- Smith, Jessica, 658, 839, 965
- Smith, Vern, 938, 940
- Smolka, H. P., 952
- Soddy, F., 790, 909
- Sokolnikov, Grigory Yakovlevich (*b.* 1888), was born in Poltavskaya *gubernia*, but received secondary schooling in Moscow; joined Party, 1905; arrested and exiled to Siberia, 1907; escaped to Paris; belonged, 1910-1911, to group of conciliators, and later worked on Trotsky's newspaper, but then joined Lenin's group, and returned with him to Russia in 1917. In 1918 chairman of delegation to sign Brest-Litovsk Peace; and was prominent military worker during Civil War. At Sixth Party Congress in 1917 he had been elected to Central Committee. From 1922 to 1925 he was People's Commissar of Finance, when he rehabilitated the currency. From 1925 to 1927 he was associated with opposition groups, with which he definitely broke in the latter year. At Sixteenth Party Congress was elected candidate to Central Committee; then university professor of finance; and, 1929-1933, was soviet ambassador to London; tried and imprisoned, 1937—87-9, 91, 955
- Solovyov, 843
- Soltz, Arnold Aaron (*b.* 1872), was born in Vilna; joined Party, 1898, after Second Congress was Bolshevik. Many times arrested. After February revolution 1917 edited *Pravda*. In 1920 member of TSIK, and from 1921 continuously member of presidium of Central Control Commission till 1934; is a president of Supreme Court, and in 1934 assistant to procurator of USSR—459-60, 819, 850, 852
- Soukhanov, 458
- Soule, George, 915
- Speransky, Count Michael Michailovich (1772-1839), tsarist statesman; best

- known as chairman of commission for codification of law—793
- Stalin, Josef, Vissarionovich (Djugushvili, Ivanovich, David, Nijeradse, Chizkov) (b. 1879), was educated at priests' seminary, Tiflis, which he left for revolutionary work; leader of Marxian group in Tiflis, 1897, and member of Georgian Party committee, 1900; repeatedly arrested and exiled, but escaped and resumed underground activity; attended Bolshevik congresses in Finland, Stockholm and London, 1907; again arrested, exiled and escaped; member of Party central committee, 1912; worked on *Pravda* and *Zvezda*; deported and again escaped; leader of Bolshevik group in Duma and director of *Pravda*. Again arrested and exiled to Turukhan. After February revolution returned to Petrograd as active member of Party central committee; was member successively of "The Five" and "The Seven"; People's Commissar of Nationalities, 1917-1923; also of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Since 1922 general secretary of Party central committee, and member of Politbureau; since 1930 also member of Council of Labour and Defence (STO); since 1934 also member of presidium of executive committee (TSIK) of USSR congress of soviets; also member of presidium of Comintern—xix-xx, xxv, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxix, xli, xliii, xlv-xlvi, xlviii-xlix, 47, 61, 69, 77-8, 85, 108-11, 121-5, 180, 187-90, 196, 206, 214, 266, 268, 285-286, 300, 306, 318, 327, 332, 343, 346, 357, 365, 447, 456, 458-9, 462-3, 465, 467, 478, 508, 519, 571-3, 581, 593-4, 599-7, 599, 606, 628, 639, 648, 650, 652, 718, 720-21, 735, 758, 762, 769, 779, 802, 807, 818, 882-3, 887, 889-91, 893, 907-8, 971
- Stanley, Arthur Pourhyn, 802
- Starobinsky, A., 692
- Stasova, 295
- Stechoua, 446
- Steed, Wickham, 938
- Steinberg, J., 444, 473, 474, 503
- Steinman, M., 809
- Stekloff, G. M., 315
- Stepniak, Sergey Michailovich (Kravchinsky) (1852-1895), artillery officer and revolutionary of the 'seventies. Joined Tchaikovsky group in 1872; in 1878 collaborated with Bakunin. In 1878 he killed with a dagger Mezentsev, head of tsarist gendarmerie, and escaped to London, where he lived as an author until run over by a train in 1895—180, 465-6
- Stetsky, A. L., 804-6
- Stolypin, Peter Arkadievich (1862-1911), tsarist statesman; a sternly repressive Minister of Interior and chairman of council of ministers, 1906-1911. Carried through important agrarian reform establishing peasant proprietorship. Assassinated in the Tsar's presence by revengeful police official in Kharkov opera-house, 1911—185, 187
- Strong, Anna Louise, journalist; born and educated in United States, taking Ph.D. degree at age of 23. Humanitarian sympathies led her to join in Quaker relief organisation for famine of 1921; from that year she made the soviet cause her own; engaged in journalism, she has visited many countries, mostly in the service of *Moscow Daily News*, to the staff of which she belongs; has published various books, including autobiography entitled *I Chungu Worlds* (1935)—xi, xxv, 206, 337, 345, 410, 788, 839, 870-871, 920
- Strumilin, Stanislav Oustavovich (b. 1877), able economist and statistician; joined Party, 1899; long attached to Gosplan, of which he was sometime vice-chairman; author of various works on economic problems and on planning—596
- Sturmer, 808
- Sun Yat Sen, 879
- Sverdlov, I. M. (Andrey) (1885-1919), born at Nizhni-Novgorod (now Gorki), and joined Party under influence of his brother Zinovy, who was adopted son of the author Maxim Gorky. Several times arrested and exiled, the last time (1913) to a remote village where he met Stalin. He was one of the leaders of the October revolution; a brilliant organiser as a member of the Party central committee, and from 1917 to 1919 a member of TSIK, until his premature death in 1919—11, 333
- Swift, 759
- Swift, Dean, 911
- Taracougio, T. A., 99
- Tarankov, 409
- Tataev, N., 180, 211
- Taussig, F. J., 963
- Tawney, R. IL, 831, 900
- Tchernavina, Tatiana, 474
- Teper, Lazare, 14
- Thadens, P. J., 213
- Thompson, Dorothy, 658
- Tikhomirov, W., 170-71, 220
- Timaschew, N., 102
- Timoshenko, Vladimir P., 20, 180, 938, 942
- Tobashev, 208-9
- Tolmachov, 282
- Tolstoy, Leo, 660, 743, 839
- Tom, Lillian, xxvi
- Tomsky, Michail Pavlovich (Efremov) (b. 1880), at first compositor and engraver; joined Party, 1904. In 1905 in revolution, was elected Starosta of Revel soviet; was arrested and exiled, but escaped to St. Petersburg, 1906; attended Party congresses in London, 1907, and was sent by Party to Paris, 1909. On his return was arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment, 1909-1914,

- and to exile to Siberia until 1917. In 1917 became president of Moscow Trade Union Council and member of Ispolkom of Petrograd branch of Party; and at Eighth Party Congress in 1919 was elected to central committee. From 1917 to 1929 was president of All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. In 1921 he was sent to London as member of TSIK of USSR. In 1928-1929 was one of leaders of Right Opposition to the Party policy; expelled from office, 1928, but recanted and readmitted in 1929; member soviet of People's Economy, 1929-1932; appointed head of RSFSR state publishing house (Giz) in 1932; in 1937 prosecuted, when he committed suicide 125, 129-31, 168, 327, 357, 857
- Toynbee, Arnold J., 798, 876, 898
- Trovelyan, C. P., xvi
- Trillat, Jean V., 718, 728
- Trotsky, Leon (Bronstein, Pero) (b. 1879), son of peasant in Kherson gubernia, educated at Nicolaev and Odessa, where he was active in the South Russian Labour Union. Arrested 1898, he was in prison for two years, and then exiled to Irkutsk for four years. In 1902 he escaped to Vienna and London, where he joined Lenin in writing *Iskra*. In 1903 temporarily joined the Mensheviks, but left them in 1904 to advocate theory of "permanent revolution" with Parvus. Attended Second Party Congress as delegate from Siberian Union; in 1905 returned to Russia and was elected chairman of St. Petersburg soviet; arrested in 1907, he was exiled for life to penal colony at Obdorsk (Siberia), but escaped before reaching it, to Petrograd and Vienna, publishing *Pravda* for circulation in Russia. Broke with Mensheviks and went to Paris; attended Zimmerwald Conference, 1915, and was then expelled from France to Spain, and from Spain to New York. Returning to Russia in 1917, he was arrested by British Government at Halifax, but released on request of Provisional Government, which then arrested him in Petrograd; joined Bolshevik Party in 1917, and became People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and negotiated at Brest-Litovsk, but refused to sign treaty. Appointed People's Commissar for War, he organised Red Army, and was largely responsible for its successes, 1918-1920. After Lenin's illness, he became persistently in opposition to the Party policy, and was transferred from Commissariat of War to that of Transport; expelled from Party, 1927, and exiled to Alma-Ata; deported to Turkey, 1929; lived in France until 1934; in Norway until 1936; since then in Mexico—10, 74, 94, 98, 126, 129, 157, 187, 238, 268, 330-40, 438-9, 447, 508, 657, 806-7, 857, 876, 883, 885, 926, 927, 929
- Tsikhon, Anton Michailovich (b. 1887), a metal worker; joined the Party, 1906; from 1918 to 1930 filled various important posts in Moscow; 1930-1931, People's Commissar of Labour for USSR; member of TSIK—711
- Tskhakaya, M. (Barsov) (b. 1865), commenced Marxian propaganda in Georgia, 1883, working underground in Tiflis, Batumi, Kutais; in 1897 and 1900 arrested and exiled. Then emigrated, returning to Russia with Lenin. Attended Third, Fifth and subsequent Party Congresses. After Georgia joined the Union, he became president of Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee, and member of TSIK of USSR—357
- Tugwell, R. G., 180, 516, 698, 710
- Turati, 878
- Turgenev, 839
- Turin, S. P., x, 8, 126
- Ugrimoff, A. von, 285
- Ussachev, T., 303, 309
- Vaillant-Couturier, P., 96
- Valershtein, L., 195
- Valois, Georges, 157
- Vandervelde, Émile, 158
- Vardin, 462
- Vassilyev, M. I. (Yuzkin) (b. 1878), a Bolshevik lawyer; many times arrested and exiled; after 1917 held various legal offices; now president of Supreme Court of USSR—474, 480
- Vavilov, N. I., 777, 787-9
- Veblen, Thorstein, 855
- Vernadsky, G., 473, 499
- Vincent, J. M., xxvi
- Voinova, A. L., 646, 664
- Volgin, V. P., 775, 777
- Volokitin, 611
- Voroshilov, Klement Efremovich (b. 1881), son of railway watchman, he worked successively as miner, shepherd, farm labourer and factory worker; first arrested for organising a strike, 1899; frequently imprisoned for revolutionary activities; joined Party, 1903. During Civil War commanded various divisions, and helped to organise Red Cavalry; member of Central Committee of Party since 1921; member of Politbureau since 1926; commander of Moscow military district, 1924; People's Commissar for War (now Defence) since 1925—94, 214, 337, 340
- Vorosin, 605
- Vyshinsky, 463
- Wallis, J. E. P., 491
- Ward, Harry F., 303, 315, 480, 529-30, 544, 569, 575, 577, 603-4, 607-9, 612-13, 617, 619
- Washburn, G., 718
- Weiss, Paul, 767
- Wells, H. G., 265, 443, 444, 497-8, 834, 908

Werth, Alexander, 893
 Williams, A. R., 180, 441
 Williams, Frankwood E., 686
 Williams-Jones, Clough, 753-4
 Wilson, Lucy L. W., 718
 Winter, 273, 774
 Winter, Ella, 460, 480, 658, 666, 839, 842, 849, 852-3
 Winterton, Paul, 213, 496
 Wise, E. F., 235
 Witte, Count, 138-9
 Wood, Robert, xlv
 Woody, Thomas, 303, 328, 718, 734, 800, 816, 839, 851, 895
 Woolf, Leonard, 809, 915
 Wootton, Barbara, 367, 496, 539, 546, 556, 560, 568, 761, 767
 Wrangel, Baron Peter Nikolayevich (1878-1928), began military career in Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, and held important commands in Great War, 1914-1917. In 1918 he joined Helman Skoropadsky in the Ukraine, then Korndlov in South Russia; commander Caucasian Army, 1919; and successor to Denikin, 1920. Defeated at Perekop, November 1920, he embarked his whole army and many civilians, and brought them to Constantinople. Died at Brussels, 1928 - 265, 444, 449
 Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich (b. 1891), joined the Party, 1907; arrested and exiled, 1911; worked as cashier in Putilov factory, 1913; took active part in Civil War; vice-chairman of Intelligence Department of USSR in U.S.A.; vice-president of OGPU, 1924; appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of USSR, 1934; member of TSIK; in 1937 removed from office - 476, 490, 618
 Yakhontov, Victor A., 881
 Yakovlev, Yakov Arkadievich (b. 1896), joined the Party, 1913, whilst studying at Polytechnical Institute, St. Petersburg; in 1917 was secretary of Dniepropetrovsk committee of Red Army; in 1923 in charge of Press Department of Party; in 1926 Assistant People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and editor of *Peasants' Gazette*; since 1929, People's Commissar of Agriculture of USSR; member of Central Committee of Party—180, 214
 Yakovleva, Varvara Nikolaievna (b. 1884), joined the Party as student of first Moscow women's college. Arrested in 1910 and exiled, but escaped abroad; returning illegally, was again arrested and exiled to Astrakhan. Active in October rising, 1917. Worked in Narkompress. Since 1930 People's Commissar of Finance of RSFSR—21, 662
 Yanoff, Stefan, 355
 Yanovsky, 618
 Yarmolinsky, Avrahm, 109, 115, 117
 Yaroslavsky, Emelyn (b. 1878), was born

at Chita, of Siberian exiles; had very adventurous life, often arrested, and in 1908 sentenced to five years' hard labour. In 1917 was elected as member of Party to the Constituent Assembly; in 1921 a member of Central Committee of Party; and later a member of TSIK of USSR. Leading member and sometime president of the Anti-God Union. Member of presidium and secretary of Central Control Commission—126, 262, 281-2, 292, 839-840, 855, 857, 875, 883
 Yevdokimov, 462
 Yorke, Onslow (W. H. Dixon), 316
 Yudenich, Nicholas Nicholasovich, (b. 1862), was general in tsarist army; in 1917 emigrated to Finland, but later took command of White Army, 1919, which was defeated near Leningrad; escaped to Estonia and London—444
 Yugov, A., 449, 500, 504, 510, 535, 540
 Yurovich, A., 502
 Yurovsky, L. N., 87, 955
 Zagorsky, S., 125
 Zaitsev, Vladimir, 718, 735
 Zant, John van, 545
 Zaslavsky, D., 34, 162, 759, 777
 Zaslavsky, Eugen Ossipovich (1840-1878), son of a tsarist general; organised South Russian Labour Union, arrested 1875 and imprisoned until his death—126
 Zatonsky, Vladimir Petrovich (b. 1888), began his revolutionary activities whilst at secondary school, 1905; graduated at Kiev University, and became lecturer in science. Joined the Party in 1917, and became in 1918 president of TSIK of Ukraine; in 1919 Narkompress of Ukraine; later chairman of central control commission and People's Commissar of Workers and Peasants' Inspection of Ukraine; and later People's Commissar of Education of the Ukraine—457
 Zelenski, 286
 Zelitch, Judah, 102, 104-6, 475
 Zetkin, Clara (1857-1933), claimed to be the oldest revolutionary woman, with lifelong activities among Polish and German workers; intimate friend of Lenin and Krupskaya; an extremist in the Second International; member of Communist Party of Germany from its formation in 1920; communist member of Reichstag; member of executive committee of Comintern—661, 740, 847
 Zinoviev, Grigori Evseyevich (Radomysky) (b. 1883), joined the Russian Social Democratic Party, 1901, working as student at Berne; and Bolsheviks in 1905 on returning to Russia; elected member of Central Committee, 1907; arrested and emigrated, 1908; returned, 1917, and pursued with Kamenev a doubtful policy. In 1918 president Petrograd soviet; president of Comintern, 1919-

1926, member of Central Committee, 1907-1927, twice expelled for factional opposition, in 1927 and 1942, but re-admitted on re-entrance, 1928 and 1933, president of Centrosoyuz, 1928-1930. In 1934 was implicated in conspiracy out of

which came assassination of Kirov, and was for the third time expelled from Party and sentenced first to exile and then in 1937, to death. 318, 462, 857, 878, 894
Zorner, H., 481

INDEX OF PLACES

- Abakan, 351
 Abkhaz, 351
 Adygensk, 351
 Adzhar, 351
 Aktubinsk, 352
 Alexandrovsk, 352
 Alma-Ata, 351, 352, 758
 Amur, 352
 Anadyr, 352
 Archangel, 352, 149
 Argayash, 352
 Armenia SSR, 59, 351, 112, 415, 918
 Asbest, 939
 Ashkhabat, 351
 Asovo-Chernomorsky Krai, 352
 Azerbaijan SSR, 59, 351, 112, 414
 Azov-Black-Sea Krai, 370, 371, 376
 Azov, Sea of, 223, 370, 371
- Baku, 351, 444, 445, 756
 Baltia (Tiraspol), 351
 Bashkir, 53, 109, 351, 370, 371, 376
 Batumpashinsk (now Sulimov), 351
 Batumi, 351
 Bessaratba, 656
 Biro-Bidjan, 112, 116, 351
 Blagoveshchensk, 352
 Bolshevo, 484
 Buda-Pest, 876
 Buryat-Mongolian, 53, 351
- Caucasian Krai, North, 223, 352
 Caucasus, 1, 713, 715
 Caucasus, North, 84, 309, 371, 376, 471, 592, 941
 Central Black Earth, 53
 Cheboksary, 351
 Chechen-Ingush, 351-2
 Chelyabinsk, 352, 371, 376, 468, 753, 757-8
 Chelyabinsk Oblast, 352
 Cherkess, 351
 Chervogov, 54, 352
 Chirchik, 352
 Chita, 352
 Chita Oblast, 352
 Chukotsk, 352
 Chuvash, 53, 109, 351
 Crimea, 53, 109, 351, 370, 376, 948
 Cronstadt, 451
- Dagestan, 53, 351
 Dnepropetrovsk, 54, 352
 Dnieprostroi, 28, 58, 248, 752, 754, 756
 Dombas, 589
 Donetsk, 54, 352, 456
 Donetsk Basin, 468, 567, 628
 Dudinka, 352
 Dzerzhinsk, 756, 758
- Eleninsk, 352
 Elista, 351
 Erivan, 351
- Frunze, 351, 758
- Genoa, 61, 882
 Georgia, 59, 351, 444, 478, 724
 Gorki (Nizhni-Novgorod), 12, 70, 116, 352, 638-9, 754-8, 952
 Gorki Krai, 352, 376
 Gorno-Badakhshansk, 351
 Grosny, 351, 756
- Halle, 877
- Ioshkar-Ola, 351
 Irkutsk, 352
 Ivanovo, 53, 757
 Ivanovo-Industrial Oblast, 352
 Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 7, 352
 Ivanovskaya Oblast, 376
 Izhevsk, 351
- Jama'ik, 352
- Kabardino-Balkarsk, 351-2
 Kalakan, 352
 Kalinin, 352, 756
 Kalinin Oblast, 352
 Kalmyk, 351-2
 Kamchatka, 352
 Karachaevisk, 351
 Karagandinsk, 352
 Karakalpak, 53, 351
 Karakstan, 757
 Karelia, 53, 109, 300, 351, 488
 Karkaralinsk, 352
 Kazak, 53, 351-2, 376
 Kazakhstan, 173, 371
 Kazan, 351, 612, 665
 Kem, 481
 Khabarovsk, 352
 Khakass, 351
 Kharkov, 54, 58, 162, 351-2, 440, 457, 589, 612, 639, 752, 754
 Khibinsk, 787
 Khorog, 351
 Kiev, 54, 58, 162, 351-2
 Kineshma, 758
 Kirghiz, 53, 351-2, 412
 Kirghizia, 371
 Kirov, 352
 Kislovodsk, 741
 Kolpashev, 352
 Komi-Permyak, 352
 Komi (Zyryan), 351
 Koryansk, 352
 Kostroma, 7
 Krasnaya Presnya, 693
 Krasnodar, 351
 Kuban, 202, 943, 948
 Kudymkar, 352
 Kuibyshev, 352
 Kursk, 352
 Kuznetsk, 533, 756
 Kuznetskstro, 248

- Leningrad, electoral statistics for, 29-30 ;
 organisation of work in city soviet of, 40-
 44 ; rayons (districts) of, 42-4
 Livadia, 713
 Lubertsy, 631
 Lysva, 758

 Magnitogorsk, 468, 639, 753-4, 756
 Magnitostroi, 468
 Makbach-Kala, 351
 Mariinsk, 351
 Maslov Kut, 18
 Mikoyan-Shakhar, 351
 Minsk, xxxix, 351
 Moldavian Republic, 54, 351
 Mongolia, 99, 561, 583
 Mordovsk, 351
 Moscow, municipal election in, 33-8 ; or-
 ganisation of work in city soviet of, 39 ;
 rayons (districts) of, 42-4 ; suggestions
 by electors at, 607
 Moskovsky, 30, 43
 Munich, 876
 Murmansk, 449, 557

 Nagorno-Karabakh, 351
 Nakhichevan, 351
 Nalchik, 351
 Nar'yan-Mar, 352
 Narym, 352
 Nenetsk, 352
 Nevsky, 30, 43
 Nicholsk-Ussuriisk, 352
 Nikolaevsk on Amur, 352
 Nizhni Amur, 352
 Novosibirsk, 352, 756, 758

 Ob-Irtysh, 376
 Obsko-Irtysh Oblast, 352
 Odessa, 54, 58, 300, 352, 793
 Oirat, 351
 Oktyabr'sky, 30, 43
 Orenburg, 352
 Ossotinsk, North, 351-2
 Ossotinsk, South, 351
 Ostyanko-Vogul'sk, 352

 Palekh, 230
 Pensensky, 13
 Penzhinsk Kultbase, 352
 Perm, 758
 Peterhof, 713
 Petersburg, St., 7-8, 750
 Petrogradsky, 8-9, 30, 43
 Petropavlovsk, 352
 Petrovsk, 351
 Petrozavodsk, 351
 Poltava, 440
 Primorsk, 352
 Pyatigorsk, 352

 Rostov-Don, 352
 RSFSR, 48-9, 55-7, 63, 103-5, 109-13, 175-6,
 255-6, 361-2, 412, 414, 431-3, 458, 505,
 668, 679-81, 770, 945
 Rukhlovo, 352


 Sakhalin, 352
 Salegard, 352
 Samara, 352, 758
 Samarkand, 351
 Samurovo, 352
 Saransk, 351
 Saratov, 352, 371, 376, 410
 Seupalatinsk, 352
 Shakhty, 758
 Shenyaling, 869
 Siberia, xxxviii, 16, 20, 53, 226-7, 248, 300,
 419, 472-3, 561, 582, 593, 715
 Siberian Krai, East, 352
 Siberian Krai, West, 352
 Simferopol, 351
 Smolensk, 352
 Smol'ninsky, 30, 43
 Solovetsk, 481
 Stalinabad, 351
 Stalingrad, 27, 352, 371, 376, 639, 688-9,
 754, 758
 Stalingrad Krai, 352
 Stalino, 352
 Stepanakert, 351
 Sukhum, 351
 Sverdlovsk, 352, 757 8
 Sverdlovsk Oblast, 352
 Sverdlovskaya, 371, 376
 Syktyvkar, 351

 Tadzhik, 351
 Tadzhikistan, 55, 770, 787
 Tambov, 451
 Tarn, 352
 Tarsky, 352
 Tartar, 53, 109, 114-15, 351, 371, 376,
 722-3
 Tashkent, 330, 351
 Tiumysk, 352
 Tiflis, 351
 Transcaucasia, 55, 59-60, 112, 248, 351-2,
 770, 787
 'Tumen', 352
 Turinsk Kultbase, 352
 Turkhestan, 414
 Turkmenistan, 55, 770
 Turkoman SSR, 53, 351, 412, 415
 'Turkuk, 351

 Udmurtsk, 351
 Ufa, 351
 Ukraine, xix, xlviii, li, 20, 52-5, 57-9,
 84, 112, 190, 201-2, 238, 256, 280, 309,
 351-2, 376, 412, 414, 444-6, 457, 471,
 478, 592, 662, 723-4, 770, 938-9, 943-5,
 947-8
 Ulala (now Oirat-Tura), 351
 Urals, 53, 173, 625
 Uralsk, 352
 Ussuriisk, 352
 Uzbek, 351-2, 787
 Uzbekistan, 55, 770

 Vassileostrovsky, 30, 43
 Velikie Luki, 352
 Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Uda), 351

- | | |
|---|---|
| Vimlza, 54, 352 | White Russia, 55, 59, 112, 351, 376, 656, |
| Vitimo-Olekmino, 352 | 770, 948 |
| Vladikavkaz (now Ordzhonikidze), 351 | Yakut, 53, 351 |
| Vladivostok, 352, 419, 557 | Yakutsk, 351 |
| Volga, 53, 109, 309, 351, 376, 451, 943 | Yaroslavl, 352, 757 |
| Vologdsky, 30, 43 | |
| Volokolamsk, 870 | Zeyisk, 352 |
| Voronezh, 757 | Zkhinvali (now Stalinu), 351 |
| Vyborgsky, 30, 43 | |



INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Abortion, proposed penalisation of practice of, xxvii; provisions as to, 670-71; universal prevalence in every country and at all times, 670; demanded by women in USSR, 670-71; widespread discussion of, 671-2; adoption of, as social service, 672; operation of the service of, 672-3; statistical results of, 673-4, 965; re-enactment of prohibition of, 962-5; reasons for, 963-4; after-effects of, 961; leading to increased provision for children, 964-5
- Absolute morals non-existent, 810-12
- Academy, the Communist. See *Communist Academy*
- of History of Material Culture, 163
- of Planning, 512
- of Sciences, *ib.*, 163, 730, 772, 773-8, 795-6
- Accidents from road traffic, 691-6
- Accounting, steady improvement of, 634-6. See also *Cost Accounting*
- Achievements of Bolshevism, *the*, 657-8
- Acquisitive society, *the*, 900
- Acquisitiveness, 853-6
- Administrative structure of USSR, diagram of, 353; table of areas, 351-2; table of organisations, 354
- Adulation of the leader, xlv-xlv, 328-9; effects of, 800-801
- Advertising, waste of, 559
- Advisory centres for mothers and infants, 666-7
- Advocates. See *College of Advocates*
- Aero-Dynamics, Central Institute of, 794
- Aeroplane, use of, in agriculture, 944
- Age qualification, 11
- Aggregate of individual freedoms, 832-4
- Agnosticism instead of dogmatic atheism, 815-16
- Agrarian Institute (All-Union Academy of Agriculture), 780-81
- revolution, *the* second, 464-7
- Agricultural cooperative societies, forms of, 185; success of, 938-48. See also *Collective Farms*
- Agriculture, books on, 180-81; new commissariat of, 75, 192-3; organisation of, 374-9; success of collective, 938-48; statistics of, 938-41; factors of improvement of, 942-7
- Agronomists largely women, 662
- Air Force. See *Aero-Dynamics, Aviation and Defence*
- transport, Commission for, 76
- Alcoholism, 852
- Aliens not disqualified, 11, 18
- Alimony, 849-50
- Allotments, 566-7, 588-90
- "All Power to the Soviets", 55
- All-Russian Conference of Proletarian and Peasant Women, 659
- All-Russian Congress of Soviets. See *Soviets*
- All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), *the*, 130-32, 150-58, 368, 521, 563, 577, 580-81, 599, 609, 614, 617-18, 621-5, 629, 701-2, 701-5, 819, 901
- commissariats (formerly "united"), 421
- Conference on Planning Scientific Research Work, 771
- Congress of Business Accounting, 610-611
- Congress of Collective Farmers, 214-215, 592; of Soviets, *see Soviets*
- Congress and Conference of Communist Party, xxxiv, xl, 281, 631
- Congress of Consumers' Cooperative Societies, 212-3
- Congress of Fishing Kolkhozi, 222-5
- Congress of Shock Brigades, 608
- Congress of Soviets, became in 1936 Supreme Soviet, xxv, xl, xlv, 415-19. See *Soviets*
- Congress of Supreme Economic Council, *the* first, 501-2, 501-5
- Congress of Trade Unions, 151-2
- Institute of Experimental Medicine, 697
- Inventors Society, 621-5
- Ambulatoria (medical consultation points), 667, 669, 672-3, 683, 688
- American Declaration of Independence, echo of, 6
- Auto Auto Works, 605, 619
- Annual reports, need for, 866-7
- Anti-Comintern Axis, xxi
- Anti-Jodism, 807-17, 909-11
- Anti-religious propaganda a constitutional right, 427
- Anti-semitism not allowed, 826
- Appeals, 103
- Appendices to Part I (I to XII), 349-437
- Arbitration, machinery of, 583-4. See also *Triangle*
- Archaeologists, Association of, 163
- Architects, Association of, 163; best buildings by, 719
- Area of USSR, 6
- Armenian SSR, 59, 351, 412, 415, 918
- Army as a school, 95-8; cooperatives transferred to Commissariat of Local Trade, 951
- Artel (association of owner-producers), 124, 180, 230-31, 590; of disabled men, 228-30
- Artistic culture, 730-41
- Artists' cooperative societies, 230
- Asceticism not desired or promoted, 846-7
- Assassination, attempts *at*, of soviet leaders, 458, 461, 926
- of the 26 commissars at Baku, 444-5
- of Kirov, 461-3
- Association of Integral Cooperatives, 228
- Athanasius, abuse of opponents by, 802

- Atheism, 808-9
 Attorney-General or State Attorney. See *Prosecutor*
 AUCCTU. See *All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions*
 Audit, difficulties of, in distribution of commodities, 236; provisions for, 636-7; advantages of, 866-9; need for universal, 866-7
 Autarky, policy of, 522-3
 Authority, personal, everywhere resented, 636; substitute for, 636-7
 Authors, Association of, 163, 230; incomes of, 966; publications of, 742-4
 Autocracy? is the Soviet Union an, 344-7
 Autonomous oblasts, 351-2
 — — Republics, xxi, 53-5, 71, 89, 107-15; area and nature of, 113; represented at Moscow, 74; list of, 351-2
 Autonomy, cultural, 108-11
 Aviation. See *OSOAVIAKHIM*
 Azerbaijan SSR, 59, 351, 442, 414; list of territories within, 414
 AZRG. See *Railway Workers' Trade Union*
 Backwardness of agriculture in Russia, 519
 Bakeries, mechanisation of, 246-7; changes in administration of, 951-2
 Baku, the 26 commissars of, 444-5
 Balance, the, indispensable in planning, 515-517
 Ballot, secret, 920-21; second, 436
 Ballie Works, the, 630
 Banking, 91-2, 957-8. See also *State Bank*
 "Barbering the grain", 202
 Bargaining, collective, 141-6. See also *Collective Agreement*
 Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, education in, 723
 Basic duties of man, 436-7
 Baznar, the, 257-8, 395-7, 952-3; how prices are controlled in, 958-9
 Beauty, lack of, 748-9
 Bedniaki (poor peasant), 464, 535
 Bee-keeping, 591
 Behaviour, human, need for a science of, 798-801
 Betrayal of the world proletariat, alleged against Stalin, 885-6, 896-7; not a change of aim but a change of tactics, 897
 Bezbozhnik (the Godless; an anti-religious journal), 810. See *Anti-Godism*
 Biro-Bidjan, Jewish settlement at, 112, 116. See also *Jews*
 Birth control, 669-70. See also *Abortion*
 Black Exchange, 960
 — — pay window, 619
 Blind spot, the, in the study of constitutions, 4
 Boarding out, 667
 Bolshevo. See *Reformatories*
 Books and shoes, continued scarcity of, 537-538, 972
 Border states, independence of, 60
 Bourgeois Revolution, the, 439-40
 Brain, Leningrad Institute of the, 791
 Brest-Litovsk Peace, 464
 Brigade (in trade unionism), 136; (in collective farms), 210-12. See also *Udarniki and Shock Brigade*
 British Empire, comparison of, with USSR in policy, 493, 928; cases of treason in, 927-9
 — — Communist Party, 895
 — — officials in India, occupation for wives of, 969
 — — Standards Association, 865
 BRIZ. See also *Bureau of Inventions*
 Broadcasting, radio, x, 828-9
 Buddhist priests enfranchised, xxi, 921-2
 Budget, magnitude and range of, 87-90
 Bundists, the (Jewish Social Democratic Association), 127
 Bureau of Administration, 75
 — — of Inventions, 82, 626, 781-2
 Bureaucracy, 648, 948, 970
 Business accounting. See *Cost Accounting*
 Ca' canny, trade-unionist objection to, 585
 Cadets (Constitutional Democrats), 473, 478
 Cadres (technicians of different grades), 639-640
 Candidates (alternates or substitutes in elected bodies), 14-15, 23-4, 64
 — — (aspirants to membership of the Communist Party), 266-7
 Capitalism, contradictions in, and disintegration of, 913-15
 Capitalist powers, intervention of, 443
 Captains of industry, 642-3, 646-7
 Cassation, 103
 Casualties, descriptions of, not allowed, 826
 Categories of wages, 578-84
 Catering, changes in administration of, 952
 Cattle, increase of, 939
 Cell (primary Party organ). See *Communist Party and Primary Party Organ*
 Censorship of printed matter, 825-7, 836-7
 CC of CP (Central Committee of Communist Party), ix, 282-8, 333-6, 368, 518, 529, 628, 728, 771, 779-81, 795, 883
 Central Executive Committee (TSIK), 67, 919; bicameral form of, 67-70; powers of, 67-70; presidium of, 70; administrative commissions of, 70; interpenetration of other bodies by, 70-74; activities of, 369, 467, 488, 511, 529, 563, 582-3, 608, 625, 725, 755, 771-3, 778, 852, 837, 883, 885-6, 919, 963, 965
 Centrosoyuz (All-Union Council of Co-operative Societies), 242-5, 563, 796, 750-52; Central Board of, xlix. See also *Co-operation*
 Chairman of village soviets, duties of, 25-6; educational classes for, 25
 Change of constitution, procedure for, 430-431, 434
 Changes of fashion, how produced, 542
 Chelyushkin expedition, 905
 Chemical warfare. See *OSOAVIAKHIM*
 Chemistry, Karpov Institute of Physical, 786
 Child inventors, encouragement of, 782-4

- Children's homes for orphan, deserted and neglected children, 667
 — technical stations, 782-4
 — theatres, 741-2
 China, Soviet action in, 879-82
 Chinese Communist Party, 879-82; organization of, 880-81
Chistka (cleansing or purging the Communist Party), 282, 289-300, 632-3, 738; of the whole staff of any establishment, 365-7
 Christian Socialists, xxxv
 Christianity, extensive abandonment of, in the Western world, 909-10
 Chuvash Republic, 109
 Cinemas, 825
 Citizen, Man as a, 7-123
 Citizens, basic rights and duties of, 426-9
 Citizens' control in certain cases, 562-3; for public services, 562; for future generations, 563
 City of the Science and Art of Health, 697
 — soviet, election of, 26-31; formulation of instructions to the, 31-2; election campaign for, at Moscow, 33-8; organization of, 38-44; at Moscow, 39-40; at Leningrad, 40-44; sections and commissions of, 363-4
 Civilisation, a new, 898-917, 971-3
 Civilisations, the different, 898-900; ancient, 898-9; mediaeval, 898-9; European, 899; how new, arose, 654-5; Soviet Communism, a new, 971-3; apparent permanence of new basis of society in USSR, 972-3
 Civil War, horrors of the, 414-6; end of the, 449
 Classless society, the, 821-3
 Clausewitz, dictum of, influential in USSR, 888
 Cleanliness of the white blouses, 538
 Closed cooperatives, liquidation of, 951, 960
 Coal-mines run by Incops, 173
 Coeducation universal, 719
 Coefficient of increase, 620
 Coercion by planning, alleged, 563-7
 Collective agreement, campaign for, 137; extent of collective bargaining for, 141-9; procedure as to, 142-3; text of specimen of, 391-409
 — bargaining, 137, 141-9, 391-409, 521; no enemy party in, 142
 — farms, xx, 179-219, 465, 478, 504; management of, 210-11; model constitution of, 212; sharing of income of, 215-219; inspectors of quality in, 218; decisions to be taken by members' meetings, 592; self-employment in, 590-93; ups and downs in membership of, 606; workdays on, 591-2; members of, free to sell on bazaar, or to contract to deliver, 567; growing prosperity of the mass of, 938-48; causes of ill-success of some of, 948
 — fisheries. See *Fishermen*
 College of Advocates, 106-7
 Collegiate decision, the universal form, 331
 Collegium, 78-9; supersession of, 679-80
 Colonies, difficulty of representing, in Parliament, 122; deputies from, at Paris, 122
 Colour prejudice, absence of, in USSR, 118-120; none against negroes, 119, 901
Comintern (Third International), 315-21; origin of, 316-17; object of, 315-16; congresses of, 316-18, 876-8, 889-91; conditions of membership of, 317-18; supreme over all Communist Parties, 327, 895-6; foreign policy of, 876-97; finances of, 319
 Commission of Party Control, 76, 284, 367-8
 — of Soviet Control, 76, 368
 — shops, 94, 256
 Committee control, the stigmata of, 336
 Communal feeding, 219, 594-5
 Commune, agricultural, 185-6, 213-14; of Seattle, 213
 — fishery, 222-3
 Communist Academy, the, 745, 778-81; absorption of, by Academy of Sciences, 781
 — Manifesto, the, 728, 884, 889
 — medicine, perspective of, 677; achievements of, 677-97
 — Party, ix, xxv, xxvii-xxviii, xxxviii-xli, xlv-xlix, 3-4, 99-100, 262-323, 560, 648, 684, 738, 842, 849, 870, 907-11, 948; what it is, 262-3; how it arose, 263-6; membership of, 266-8; rules, 268-71; sympathisers with, 268; dues payable to, 268; obligations of members of, 268-272; caucus of, 273-4; cell or nucleus or primary organ of, 274-80; possible future of, 327; reorganisation of, in 1934, 299-303; resemblance to Comte's Spiritual Power, 303; and to H. G. Wells's Order of the Samurai, 908; essential nature and functions of, 319-21; difference of, from a religious order, 320-21; resemblance to other professional organisations, 321; assets of, 562-3; starts patronage agreements, 603-4; self-criticism in, 632-3; supplies captains of industry, 642-3; view of ethics of, 838-9; membership, duties of, 856-7; provision for expelled members of, 856-7; limitation of incomes of members of, 854; mentioned in Constitution of 1936, 436. See also *Vocation of Leadership, Comsomols, Pioneers, Octobrists*
 — Party Congresses: the Fourth, 8; the Twelfth, 53; the Fifteenth, 538, 628; the Sixteenth, 132, 509, 607; the Seventeenth, 266, 573, 584, 757
 — Vanguard Works, 614
 Competition of managements for operatives, 627
 — in distributive system, 593-7
 Competitive marketing, great and varied increase of, 953-4
 Comradely Courts (or Factory Workers' Courts), 385-96, 621-3, 838, 852, 872-4
Comsomols (League of Youth), xl, 303-10, 560, 614-15, 648, 734, 736, 849, 852, 855, 859; origin and history of, 303-7; pat-

- tern of organisation of, 304-5; admission to, 305-6; duties of, 305-8; educational functions of, 307-8; congresses and conferences of, 308-9; in cooperative management, 251-2
- Concentration camps, 481-3
- Concurrence* (capitalist competition), 598
- Conduct, code of, 817
- Congresses of collective farmers, 214-15, 608-9
- - of health and medical services, 679-80
- - of soviets. See *Soviets*
- Conscience, origin and sphere of, 816-17; emergence of a Communist, 911-12
- Conspicuous waste is contemptible in USSR, 855
- Conspiracy trials in 1937, 926-7
- Constituent Republics, xxi, 55-9; list of, 351; additions to, 352; new list of, 412; list of members of executive (Supreme Council) of, 422-3
- Constitution, definition of, 1; contents of, 1-6; mobile, not rigid, 324-6; diverse rates of growth of its parts, 324-6; change of, in 1936, xiv-xv, xliii, xxv, xxvii, xxxvi-xxxviii, 110-37; summary of new, 435-6; proposal of, 912-13; text of new, 410-34; electoral regulations made under, 434-5
- Consular service of USSR, 99
- Consumer, assumed coercion of, by planning, 563-8; for a wealthy minority, 564; not for the proletarian majority, 564-5
- , Man as a, 235-61
- Consumers' control essential, 499-500. See also *Cooperation*
- Control and supervision, excess of, 649
- Commissions, 73, 650-51. See also *Commission*
- figures, 506, 540
- Convalescent home, 712-13
- Cooperation, integral, 225-8; for a new world order, 1-11
- Cooperative Employees' Trade Unions, 382
- Movement (consumers'), ix, 235-61, 952; organisation of, 239-45; closed societies in, 385-6; educational work of, 247; achievements of, 238-9, 246-53; encroachments on sphere of, 263-60, 949-961; future sphere of, 444-5, 901, 950-51; self-supply in, 953; excluded from cities, 950; bound upwards of, in villages, 951
- publishing societies, 230-31
- societies among agriculturists, 219-21
- Wholesale Society, 230
- Coppersmiths, shortage of, 561, 581
- Corporate obligation to fulfil function, 912
- Correspondence, inviolability of, 427-8
- Corruption; prevalence of, 931
- Cost accounting, 159-61, 610-12, 634-6
- of production lessened by high piece-wage earnings, 578-7
- Cotton Workers' Trade Unions, 381
- Council of Fulfilment (of STO), 75-6
- of Labour and Defence (STO), activities of, 75-6, 78-82, 174, 176, 246, 333, 562, 626, 682, 782
- Council (Soviet) of Nationalities, 67-9, 416-416, 418, 922
- of Peoples' Commissars, xliii; as Executive, 418-21; new list of members of, 420
- Counter-planning, 528, 602
- Counter-revolutionary publications not allowed, 825
- Cows supplied to collective farmers, 592
- Creating Health, 675-97
- Crèches, ubiquitous provision of, 667-9, 689
- Credit, supply of, not affecting price-level, 957-8
- societies, agricultural, 220-21; for personal loans, 713-15
- Crime, causes of, 862-3
- Criminean Republic, the, 109, 351
- Crises, commercial or financial, unknown in the Soviet Union, 541-3, 902
- Cultural autonomy, 107-15, 120-21, 721-4, 903-4
- Culture, diverse meanings of the term, 744-7
- Currency, 91, 918, 955-7; working of system of, 955-62; recent history of, 955; a "managed" system, 955-6; no inflation created by, 957; analogous to postage stamps, 957
- Darwinism in biology, 803-4
- Days lost by sickness, 716-17
- "Deaf villages", 330, 910
- Death benefit, 706-7
- rates, 536-7
- Debt, payment of, to society, 843-5; a universal obligation even of the wealthy, 911-12, 973
- Decentralisation of administration in social insurance, 701-3
- Declaration of Rights, 5-6; new declaration in Constitution of 1936, 435-6, 922
- of Union, 6, 355-7
- Decline in mortality, 530-7
- Defeatism, 834-6
- Defects of money prices as measurement, 865
- Defence, 75, 94-5, 522-3; People's Commissar of, 95
- "Deficiency, damage and delay", as inevitable incidents of action, 958
- Degradation, extreme, of Tsarist Russia, 685-7
- Delivery of commodities to the homes, 248-9
- Demand illimitable, 539
- Demarcation disputes, absence of, 578-9
- Democratic centralism, 274, 326
- Democracy without leadership a mob, 906. See also *Dictatorship, Vocation of Leadership and Soviets*
- Depersonalisation, 571-2
- Deprived, categories of the, 12-16, 731; removal of disqualification of the, 921; in individual production, 588; in incops, 179-80, 590; occupations always open to the, 179-80, 566, 588, 590; long excluded

- from consumer ' cooperative societies, 238-40; children of the, 729
- Diagrams of structure and functions of USSR, 350-51
- Dialectical materialism, 761-3, 767; nature of changes described as, 767
- Dictatorship, 321-18, 763, 807, meaning of the word, 330-32; exercised by the Communist Party, 332-3; not by Stalin, 333-340; what Marx meant by, 340-41; what Lenin meant by, 341-44; characteristics of Soviet Government not those of, 336-7; contrast with Hitler and Mussolini in respect of, 333; immovability of leader similar to, 338-40; of the Dictatorial, 340-44; does it amount to autocracy, 347-8; is it a new social form, 348
- of the Dictatorial, 340, 822. See also *Dictatorship*
- or Democracy, which is the Soviet Union? 324-48
- Dining Room Spoon Band, the, 619
- Diplomatic agents in other cities of USSR, 72; in other countries, 99, 886-97
- Direct election substituted for indirect, 65-67, 920-21
- Disabled men, provision for, 228-30
- Discipline, labour, 500
- Discussion, great amount of, xxvii, 345-7; about the agricultural problem, 461; about marriage law, 345-6; about abortion, 671, 963-5
- Disease of Orthodoxy, the, 801-7, 836, 970-71
- Dismissals and demotions in 1937, 930-31
- Dissoluteness, general, a mark of social decadence, 848-9
- Dissolution of Supreme Soviet provided for, 417
- District Attorney. See *Prosecution*
- Divorce, original laxity of, 817; growing stringency with regard to, 817-51; new regulations as to, 964; English law of, 824
- "Dizzy with Success", Stalin's proclamation, xx, 189, 335
- Dniepropetrovsk Steel Works, 137
- Dnieprostroi, gigantic hydro-electric works, 28, 58, 248, 752
- Doctors, multiplication of, 682; two-thirds now women, 682; how admitted and trained, 682-3; quality of, 683; organisation of whole health service by, 662-97; reason why few, are Party members, 684
- Don Cossacks, 190, 202
- Donets coal basin, sabotage trial, 926
- Doubt as the originator of all intellectual progress, 807
- Drainage of land, gigantic schemes of, 750
- Droshky drivers, 232, 588
- Drug addiction, 852
- stores, 257
- Duma, the tsarist, 439
- Dzerzhinsky Metallurgical Works, 610
- Eastern Institute, 775-6
- Economic calculus to be distinguished from utilitarian calculus, 972-3
- Economic security, organisation of, 698-717
- Economist's (abstract) relation of planning, 648-51
- Education and enlightenment, 717-49; in training for life, 717-19; continuous increase of, 719-20; one main object of planning, 531-2; work of cooperators in, 217; universalism in, 719-21; great growth of, in villages, 944
- Effective demand, alone considered by western economists, 552; only in USSR is it universal, 540-7; under capitalism exercised only by a minority, 552
- Election regulations, 131-5
- Electoral system in New Constitution, 429-430, 131-5
- Electorate, magnitude of, 11; exceptional inclusiveness of, 11-12; activity of, 905-906; now greatly increased, 921; new regulations as to polling of the, 131-5
- Electors' instructions to deputies, 905
- Electrical Machine Factory at Kharkov, 773
- Electrification, 453, 505, 532, 750, 758
- Electro-chemical, 116
- Electrosila Works, 5, 485
- Emancipation of women, 658-62
- Empire*, the, 59, 111, 478, 925
- Endocrinology, Institute of, 791-2
- Endurance of Soviet Communism, 915-17
- Enemy party, absence of, 575-6, 902
- Engineers, All-Union Sectional Bureau of (YMBIT), 162-3
- vast increase in number of, 730; scarcely ever executed even if condemned to death, 479-80; guilty of sabotage, 457; of Metro-Vickers, trial of, 460-61, 926
- English law, cruelties of, 490-91; in the colonial empire, 493; certain prohibitions of, unknown in USSR, 824-5
- Environment, changing the, 749-60; inevitable compulsion by the, 824-30
- Equating of supply and demand, how effected when prices are fixed, 960-61
- Equilibrium, nowhere existent, 766; an economic myth, 548
- Esperanto, wireless broadcasting in, x
- Ethics, communist, evolution of, 614-15, 825-6, 838-61; to be discovered, not invented, 840-42; need for science of, 798-801, 910-12
- Eurasian plan, the great, viii, 913
- Evangelical clergy entertained, xvi, 921-2
- Examinations, at first dispensed with, 719; later introduced, 725; competitive, for entrance to some institutions, 730
- Exchange, foreign effect of, 952; the Black, 960
- Excess is always misconduct, 846
- Executive of Constituent Republics. See *Constituent Republics*
- of USSR. See *Council of Peoples' Commissars*
- Experimental Medicine, Institute of, 791
- Exploitation, abstention from, the most frequent moral lesson, 844

Exploring expedition, 791-5
 Exports determined by the aggregate amount of imports, 516-17
Fabkom or *FZK*. See *Factory Committee*
 Faction, fear of, 837
 Factory Committee (*FZK* or *Fabkom*), 128, 135-14, 147-8, 235, 381-90, 393-6, 702, 704, 710; powers and functions of, 384-390
 --- school (*FZU*), 395-7, 403, 406
 Failure of other governments to raise their populations to a higher level, 654, 968
 Fairs, transformation of, 952-3; survival of some of the ancient, 952
 Family, effect of Civil War on, 450-51
 Famine in Russia, heretofore frequent, 182, 519; of 1891, 200, 450; of 1906, 450; of 1911, 450; of 1921, 200, 450; alleged, in 1931-3, 199-210, 217-18
 Federal Union, establishment of, 60-63; principles of constitution of, 60-62; varieties of races in, 62; new list of powers of, 412-13
 Feldsher, the, 678
 Fiduciary issue needs no reserve, 962
 Finance. See *People's Commissar of Finance*
 --- of health and medical services, 681
 Fire insurance compulsory, 92-4
 First Factory Building Trust, scathing report on, 631-2
 --- Five-Year Plan, formulation of, 507-510, 536. See also *Gosplan* and *Planned Production for Community Consumption*
 --- International. See *International*
 --- State Factory of Spare Parts, 146
 Fishermen, organisation of, 221-5, 381
 Fishing, deep sea, 221-3; shore and river, 222-5; by kolkhozi, 222-5; trade unionism in, 222, 381; by Integral Cooperatives, 226-7
Fizculturniki (members of physical culture clubs). See *Physical Culture*
 Flying squads of doctors and nurses, 667, 681, 691
 Food. See *People's Commissar of Food Industry*
 Forced labour, 559-60
 Foreign Affairs. See *People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs*
 --- competition no menace to Soviet Union, 584-5
 --- correspondents, books by, ix; censorship of telegrams of, 825-6
 --- intervention, 443-6
 --- languages to be taught in all schools to all children over twelve, 727-8, 944-5
 --- Trade. See *People's Commissar of Foreign Trade*
 Foremen earn less than skilled workers, 582
 Forestry. See *People's Commissar of Forestry*
 Fraction. See *Party Group*
 Fraising-lathe, 391; works, *Koldogovor* of, 146, 391-409
 --- discussion prior to legislative enactment, xxvi-xxviii

Free competitive contracting for supplies, increasing prevalence of, 953-4; how prices are controlled in, 958-9
 Freedom, restrictions on, in Great Britain, 827-9; of the capitalist purveyor of amusement, 828-9; of the tentier, 830; in USSR, 824-33
 --- of competitive trading contracts, 593-597; of dealing in the bazaar; extent and variety of this free trade, 593-7
 --- of the press, 428; meaning of this as a constitutional right, 436
 Free-thought on fundamental issues, repression of, 970-71
 French precedents for counter-revolutionary attempts, 928
 Fundamental law, 12, 55-6; revised at New Constitution in 1936, 410-35
 Funerals, gratuitous, 706; religious service allowed at, 813
 Fur auctions at the modern wholesale fairs, 953
 Future, governments have to plan for the, 563
FZK. See *Factory Committee*
FZU. See *Factory School*
 Games, 731-6
 Gauchos of Paraguay the cultural analogues of the Russians, 657
 Gay Pay Oo. See *People's Commissar of Internal Affairs*
 General Line, the, 277
 --- Plan, how it might be upset, 551-8; effect of war on, 556; effect of superabundance on, 558
 Generals, trial of the eight, 926-7
 Genetics, 787-90
 Geographical factors in Soviet Communism, 913
 Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, 59, 351, 412, 414, 441, 478, 724
 German-Soviet Pact of 1939, xlviii
 Glass of Water Theory, 817
Glavlit. See *Censorship*
 Godless, League of the, 328-9, 815-17
 GOELRO. See *Electrification*
 Good Life, the, as object of government, 654, 818-97; based on social equality in the midst of plenty, 912, 973
 Gosbank, 91-2, 957
Gosizdat. See *State Publishing Department*
Gosplan, xxxvi, 81, 901, 950. See also *State Planning Commission*
Gosstrakh. See *Insurance*
Gostorgovlya (trading depots of RSFSR Commissariat of Local Trade), 228
 Government contracts with collective farms, nature of, 945
 GPU. See *People's Commissar of Internal Affairs*
 Gramophones, 742
 Greek, teaching of, 745
 --- Orthodox Church, xxi, 808, 810, 839, 843, 847, 898, 907, 921; character of, 807-8; popular excesses against, 810
Gubernia (province), 47, 110, 440

Guild Socialists, xxxv

Gupfergrad (town-planning institute), 752

Gypsies, 113

Hail, insurance against, 90, 92-3

Hammer and Sickle Works, 146

Health, Commissariat of, 672-97; organisation of, 672-88; enormous improvement in, 694; policy of creating positive, 675-679; for all as the goal, 678; statistics as to, 682, 685, 690; centres in factories, 688-9. See also *People's Commissar of Health, Doctors and Hospitals*

Heating, centralised, in some cities, 758

Heavy Industries. See *People's Commissar of Heavy Industries*

Heirs of all knowledge, the Bolsheviks claim to be, 768-9

Hero-worship, exploitation of the emotion of, 338, 801

Hierarchy, meaning of, 2-3

Historico-Archaeographical Institute, 775, 781

History reinstated as subject, 730-31, 745

Holidays and amusements, at Kislovodsk, 741; in parks of culture and rest, 744; in rest-houses, 714

Holliness, personal, 839

Home-workers. See *Owner-producers*

Homeless waifs, 484-5

Homosexuality, 852

Hospitals, 684-5. See also *Night Sanatorium and Health*

"Housekeeping state", the, 861

House organs, not directed by the management, 619-21

Housing, factory committee's duties as to, 386-7; former low level of, 535; service of, 749-57; frightful condition of, in 1913, 750-51; as factory enterprise, 754; by cooperation of tenants, 755; in communal dwellings, 755; total extent of, 756-7

Human nature, the task of changing, 653-760

Hunters, cooperation among, 226-7

Idleness not criminally punished, 545; heavily discouraged by public opinion, 844, 874

Illegitimacy abolished, 671

Immortality, loss of faith in, 809

Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 528

Improving one's qualifications, 581

In Place of Profit, 569-652

Incentives to utmost productivity, 569-652

Incest, 851-2

Income Tax, rates of, 90

Incops (industrial cooperative societies). See *Owner-producers*

Increase, coefficient of, 520

Indirect election, prevalence and nature of, 44-7; supersession of, in 1936, 65

Individual producers, multitude of, 232-4, 587-8, 590-93; on holdings in collective farms, 939-40, 945-6

Industrial Party (*Promparti*), prosecution of, 457, 925

— Revolution in Britain, evils of, 491-2

Industrialism, need for, 820

Inefficiency of industry, causes of, 637-40; increased by overlapping of controls, 640-642

Inheritance, legal right of, confirmed by Constitution of, 1936, 112

Initiative, amount of, in Soviet Union, 644-645, 760

Insecurity, economic, a fatal blemish of capitalism, 698

Inspection, workers' and peasants' (RKI).

See *Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*

"Inspectors of quality", 218, 917

Insurance, compulsory, 92-4; voluntary, 91; fire, 92-5; hail, 92-3; goods in transit, 94; life, 91

Integral cooperation, origin of, 225-6; activities of, 225-8; reorganisation of, 226-7; statistics of, 227; sharing of product in, 593; changes in, 951-2

Intellectual workers' cooperative societies, 230

Intelligentsia, participation of, in the Revolution, 138; persecution of, 455-60; Stalin's pronouncement as to, 458-60; successive State trials of, 157-61; change of policy as to, 650, 970-71

Interest, reason for debiting, to each enterprise, 634-5; in many cases impossible, 634-5

Internal Affairs. See *People's Commissar of Internal Affairs*

International Association of Proletarian Free-thinkers, 812

— Association of Trade Unions, the Amsterdam, 165, 167

— Cooperative Alliance, 950

— Federation of Trade Unions, xlix

— Working Men's Association, the First (1864-76), 315; the Second (from 1889), xlix, 165, 315; the Third (from 1919), see *Comintern*; the Fourth, Trotsky's attempts to form, 884-6, 927, 929

Interpenetration, 70-74, 79, 372-3

Intervention, the foreign, 444-50

Intourist, 613, 896

Invalidity, provision for, 708-9

Inventions, encouragement of, 623-6

Inventors, Central Council of, 782; Congress of, 624; Society of, 626

Inviolability of homes and of correspondence, 428, 434

Irrigation, gigantic schemes of, 750; of collective farms, 939, 941, 943

ITR (technical personnel). See *Collective Agreement*

Izhorsky Works, 480

Jacquarie, the Russian, 440-41

Jewish Colonisation Society (OZJET), 116

— Distribution Committee (New York), 116

Jews, history of, 115-18; poverty of, 116; land settlement of, 116-18; in Ukraine

and Crimea, 116-17; in Biro-Bidjan, 116-17; some soviets exclusively Jewish, 116-17; autonomous areas of, 112, 439
Journalists, free-lance, 586
Judges, appointment of, 103; election of, 425-6. See also *Supreme Court*
Justice. See *People's Commissar of Justice*

Kadets. See *Cadets*

Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast, 109, 351
Karelian Autonomous Republic, 109, 351
Kazak SSR, 351, 112: list of territories within the, 414-15

Kerensky Government, the, 341, 410, 443
Kharkov Electro-Mechanical Factory, 621
--- Tractor Works, 589, 612, 759

Khudozhnik (association of cooperative artists), 230

Kindergarten, 427, 732

Kirghiz SSR, 351, 412

Kirov murder trial, 461-2, 926

Kislovodsk, amusements and habits at, 841
Kol-dogovor, text of specimen, 391-409. See also *Collective Agreement*

Kolkhosi (collective farms). See *Collective Farms*

Komi Autonomous Oblast, 109, 351

KOTIB (Commission for the Betterment of Labour and the Standard of Living), 667

KOV (Peasant Society for Mutual Assistance), 329

Krai, 52-5; its difference from Oblast, 47; still existing, 413

Krasny Perokop Works, 614-15

--- Proletari Works, 614

Kulaki (petty capitalist peasants), xxxiv, 182-3, 185, 187-8, 463-71, 478, 560

Kuomintang, the, 879-82

Kustari. See *Owner-producers*

Labour, scarcity as result of planning, 543-548; on roads compulsory on peasants, 560. See also *People's Commissar of Labour*

--- school, the, 728

Land and capital, democratic control of, xxxii-xxxv; committees and departments for, 193-4; nationalisation of, 441-442; perpetual tenure in usufruct of, by collective farms, 947

Lapti (primitive footwear), 538

Latin, teaching of, 745

Law of diminishing returns, repudiation of, 536, 558

Leadership, need for, 321-3; the vocation of, 262-323. See also *Communist Party*

Lead mines run by incops, 173

League of Nations, xlviii; joined by USSR, 887

"Leftist blockheads", 573

Legal system of the USSR, 101-7

Legislation and administration undistinguished in USSR, 2

LEGPROM. See *People's Commissar of Light Industries*

Leisure, organisation of, 733-4

--- class, no provision of education for a, 729

Leningrad, Institute of Electro-Physics at, 773; Academy of Agricultural Sciences at, 777, 788; Institute of Chemical Physics at, 786; Polytechnical Institute at, 730

Lenin's mausoleum as a work of beauty, 749
Lepros, 681

Liberalism condemned as failing to transform society, 654

"Liberty of prophesying", 834

Liberty so precious that it must be rationed, 833

Libraries, 743

Light Industries. See *People's Commissar of Light Industries*

Liquidation, of the Landlord and the Capitalist, 438-94; of the Tsarist Government, 439; of the agrarian landlords, 440-42; of the capitalist employers, 442-4; of the Nepman, 454-6; of the disaffected intelligentsia, 455-6; of the conspirators and wreckers, 457-61; of the kulaks, 182-9, 204-6, 463-71

Listvensky Works, 608

Literature, promotion of, 742-4

Livestock, extensive slaughter of, 189-90, 218

Lunacy, 841

Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS), organisation of, 193-6, 378-9

Main North Sea Way Commission, account of, by Smolka, 952; transfer of Integral Cooperation to, 952

Maintaining the revolution, the need for, 341-4

Malingering, infrequency of, 653-4

Man as a Consumer, 235-61, 918. See also *Cooperation*

--- as a Producer, 124-234, 918; in trade unionism, 124-69; in industrial cooperatives, 170-79; in collective farms, 179-219; in fishing copartnerships, 221-5; in integral cooperatives, 225-8; war invalids and other disabled persons, 228-30

Manchurian railway, sale of, 887

Manor-houses destroyed, 440-41

Markets, open, 257. See also *Bazaar*

Marriage, growing strictness with regard to, 349-51

Marxism, 821-2, 907; peculiar phraseology of, 761-3; essence of, 763-9

Marx-Lenin-Engels Institute, , 745

Materialism, the term not used as in common British parlance, 763-5; equally inclusive of mind as of matter, 764-5

Materialist conception of history, 761-3

Matter, invariable conjunction of, with motion, 766

Measurement, universal need for, 633-7;

and publicity, 633-6, 864-9, 874

Mechanisation and Electrification of Farming, Institute of, 787

--- effects of, on productivity, 942-4

Medical research, 696-7

--- schools, 730-31

--- service, organisation of, in the cities,

- 685-90; in the country, 689-90; in factories, 688-9. See also *Doctors and Hospitals*
- Medical Workers' Trade Union, 110, 161, 382
- Mensheviks, 127-8, 311, 158, 178, 187, 198; trial of, 158, 926
- Mestkon*. See *Factory Committee*
- Metalpromsoyuz* (union of metal-working arteks), 171
- Meteorology, economic, continuously studied by Gosplan, 528
- Metrostoi* (Moscow Underground Railway Works), 613-14
- Metro-Vickers engineers, trial of, 160-61, 926
- Migration directed by economic favours, 582-3
- Militia (police force), 100, 176, 188-9; territorial, 96
- Milk, kitchens for infants, 667; when supply is short, reserved entirely for children, 960
- "Millionaire kolkhosi", 910
- Mineworkers' Trade Unions, 380
- Minorities. See *National Minorities*
- Min, 16, 124, 110
- Mobilisation of mechanics by public opinion, 870
- Mobility of constitution of the Soviet Union, 321-6
- Mohammedan mosques functioning at Kazan, 114
- religion not interfered with, 811-13; multibahs enfranchised, xxi, 921-2
- Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, 59, 351
- Molotov Auto Works, 757
- MOPR (International Association for Assistance to Revolutionaries in Other Countries), 329, 796
- Morals in USSR, 897, 909-12; morality has to be, not invented but discovered, 813; ethics emerging from life, 840-42, 972-3
- Moscow Electric Works, 607
- Institute of Experimental Electro-Technics, 773
- Sports Club, 653
- Underground Railway, 613-14
- Moselprom* (Moscow Trading Trust), 256
- Mosstorg* (Moscow Trading Company), 256, 597
- Mother and Child, Institute of, 850
- Motherhood, cost of, as a functional expense, 662-3; universality of, provision for, 662-663; extent and nature of provision for, 663-6; provision for, in collective farms, 664; further provision for, 664-5
- Motives other than profit-making, 571, 972-3
- MPS. See *Machine and Tractor Stations*
- Mujik (Russian peasant), very unproductive, 181-2; *jacqueries* of, 182; new rebelliousness of the, 184-5; transformation of, by education in collective farms, 212-13, 944-5
- Multiformity of structure, viii, 4-5, 169, 177, 221, 227, 231-4, 323, 329, 566, 593, 626-8, 685, 755, 822-3, 861, 906, 912, 968
- Municipal services, 757-60; scanty in 1913, 757; great development of, 757-8; in housing for public officials, 764-5; banks for local enterprises, 957-8
- Murder of Kirov, 461 2, 926
- Museums, 740
- Music, 712
- Mutual Aid Societies, among the industrial wage-earners, 713-15; among the peasantry, 329
- Narkomat* (Ministry). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomfin* (NKFIN: ministry of Finance). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomindel* (NKID: Foreign Office). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomlegprom* (NKLEGUPROM: ministry of Light Industries). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomles* (NKLES: ministry of Forestry and Wood Industries). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomoborony* (NKOBORONY: ministry of Defence). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkompishch* (NKPISSHCH: ministry of Food Industry). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomps* (NKPS: minister of Means of Communication, including railways). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomsyaz* (NKSYYAZ: ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Radio). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomtorgprom* (NKTYAZHUPROM: minister of Heavy Industries). See *People's Commissar* and *Heavy Industries*
- Narkomvneshtorg* (NKVNESHTORG: ministry of Foreign Trade). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomvnutel* (Ministry of Internal Affairs). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomvnutorg* (NKVNUTORG: ministry of Internal Trade). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkomvet* (NKWT: ministry of River Transport). See *People's Commissar*
- Narkozem* (NKZEM: ministry of Agriculture). See *People's Commissar*
- National minorities, problem of, 107-22; education of, 721-5; cultural autonomy for, 122; great progress of, 122; administration of, 99-122
- Nationalisation, 503; of all but the smallest industries, 450; of all medical services, 201; of the land, 441-2
- Navy cooperatives transferred to Commissariat of Local Trade, 951. See *Defence, Red Army and People's Commissar*
- Needlework instruction for both sexes, 732
- Negroes in USSR, origins of, 118-19; complete equality of, 118-20; elected to Moscow soviet, 11; a whole village has negro soviet, 119; no prejudice against, 119, 904
- NEP (New Economic Policy), 129, 183, 451-5, 507-8, 799, 806, 882; reversal of, 453-5

- Network of contracting for supplies, 591-5
 --- of free contracts, 325
 Newspapers, character of, 737-8, 825-6
 Night sanatorium, 693-4
 NIS (Scientific Research Sector of People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry), 773, 775, 778, 786. See also *People's Commissariat of Heavy Industries*
 "No enemy party", 132, 142-3, 146
 Nomadic tribes, 513, 626, 628
 Non-unified departments, 72-4; now
 "Union-republic" Commissariats, 433
 North Sea Route, 76
 "Not done", what is, 852-3
 Nudity not shameful, 841
 Nurses, 681
 Oblast, the, 62-5; magnitude of, 53-4; administration of, 53-4; difference of, from Krai, 17; list of, 351-2, 411
 Obshchiny (council of cooperative societies of the oblast or province), 242
 Occupations, followed by women, 661-2; choice of, for all, 937
 Octoberists, the Little, 310-13
 OIU (Friends of Children Society), 329
 Odessa sanatorium as a work of beauty, 749
 Office and workshop, temporary changes of occupation between, 606
 Officials, subordinate, 617-8, 651-2
 OGIZ. See *State Publishing Department*
 OGPU (Gay Pay Oo), origin of, 100-101, 461-2, 472-4; books about the, 474-5; organisation of, 475-9. See *People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs*
 Okhrana. See *OGPU and People's Commissariat of Justice*
 Okrugs, abolition of, 47-9, 194; list of existing, 352
 Old-age pensions, 707-9
 Omnibus services, 758
 Oneida Community (New York State), 633
 One-party system of government, xxiii; past and present alternatives to, xxv-xxvi, xxviii-xxxii
 One-price stores, 255
 Opportunities, widest possible choice of, 832
 Opportunity, presence of, as freedom, 831-3
 Optical Institute of Leningrad, 786
 Order of Lenin, 617-18
 --- of the Red Banner of Toil, 617
 --- of the Red Star, 618
 Orders of Merit, 617-18
 "Orders from Moscow", objection to receiving, 894-6
 Original sin, no sense of, 839
 ORS (factory retailing of commodities), 259, 587; transfer of, to Commissariat of Local Trade, 951
 Orthodoxy, disease of, xlv-xlvii, 801-7
 OSOAVIAKHIM (voluntary association for defence by aviation and chemical warfare), 328, 796, 906
 Overlapping of controlling authorities, 640-642
 Over-representation of the cities, 343-4; abolition of, in New Constitution of 1936, 921-2
 Owner-producers, associations of (cooperative production), 169-234; transfer of Integral cooperatives, 952
 OZET (Jewish Colonisation Society), 115-116, 329
 Palace of Industry at Kharkov as a work of beauty, 749
 Pan-Russian chauvinism, 112, 807
 Paris Commune, the, 9; income limitation under, 854
 Participation, threefold nature of, 1-2; great use of, 168, 326, 521, 601, 651, 729, 760, 905-6, 912
 Party, the. See *Communist Party*
 --- Control Committee, 865
 Passports (*pasais de séjour*), 100
 Patronage, system of, 602-8. See also *Shefstvo*
 Pattern of behaviour, influence of, 927-30
 Pawnbroking, 94
 Payment according to social value, 581-3, 966
 Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 464; of Riga, 56, 60
 --- policy of Soviet Union, 880-8; "peace is indivisible", 887
 Peasants, agriculture of, 181-2; uprisings of, 439-42
 Peat industry, cooperatives in, 951
 Pensioners encouraged to earn, 229-30
 People's co-sitters equivalent to jury, 117, 426
 --- Commissar (minister of state), origin of term, 74; laborious duties of, 82; list of offices of, 75; title used also in autonomous republics, 110
 --- Commissar of Agriculture, 75, 192-3, 781; organisation of, 374-9
 --- Commissar of Education, 718, 725, 728, 730, 739-40, 771
 --- Commissar of Finance, 75, 87-94, 704
 --- Commissar of Food Industry, 75
 --- Commissar of Foreign Affairs. See *People's Commissar for International Relations*
 --- Commissioner of Foreign Trade, 75, 516
 --- Commissar of Forestry and Wood Industries, 75
 --- Commissar of Health, 677-81; wide scope of, 880-81; does not now cover the work in Red Army, nor that on the railways, 681; work of, in rural districts, 689-91; other activities of, 695, 701-2, 704, 710, 716, 850
 --- Commissar of Heavy Industries, 75, 771, 773, 785-6, 796, 871
 --- Commissar of Internal Affairs, 75-6, 80, 100-101, 472-89, 855
 --- Commissar of International Relations, 74-5, 98-9, 887, 890-97
 --- Commissar of Justice, 101-5, 483, 850
 --- Commissar of Labour, 577, 583, 701, 704
 --- Commissar of Light Industries, 75

- People's Commissar of Means of Communication (railways, etc.), 75
 --- Commissar of Nationalities, 108-11
 --- Commissar of Posts, Telegraphs and Radio, 75
 --- Commissar of River Transport, 75
 --- Commissar of State Farms, 75, 192, 369-73, 781
 --- Commissar of Supplies, 75, 253-4, 594, 596-7
 Persecution of the intelligentsia, 455-9, 463
 --- of the religious-minded, nature and extent of, 810-14; all clergy enfranchised by Constitution of 1936, xxi, 921-2
 Personal credit, 713-15
 --- freedom. See *Freedom*
 --- health a social obligation, 845-7
 Pervaya Pyatiletknaya kolkhoz, 604
 Peter Alexeyev Textile Factory, 621
 Petrovsk and Lenin Metal Works, 145
 Petrushka, puppet show as public opinion, 869-70
 Pew-rent principle, the, 859
 Pharmacy, the district, 256-7
 Philosophy, *teaching of*, 745
 Phrasology, Marxist insistence on a peculiar, 802
 Physical culture, 734-6; Supreme Council for, 329-30
 Physico-Technical Institute of Kharkov, 773, 786
 Pianos, demand for, 742
 Picture galleries, 740
 Piecework, 144-5; British trade union views on, 573-4; the "basic system" in the USSR, 574; explanation of, 574-6; progressive, never degressive, 576-7; foreseen by Krassin, 507; sometimes inappropriate, 578
 Pigs, increase of, 939
 Pioneers, origin and history of, 310-15; pattern of organisation of, 311-13; laws and customs of, 311-12; results of, on character, 312-15; activities of, 855
 Plan, the General, its objects and purpose different from those of capitalists, 553-4; how it might be upset, 554-8; steps taken to meet unforeseen contingencies, 555-6; how to plan for war or famine, 556; can it be wrecked by success, 553-5; human desires insatiable under, 558-9; advantages of, 540-41; emergence of, 504-5; results of, 531-9; must be under consumers' control, not producers', 561-3; provision for exceptional personal requirements, 565-8; does planning mean slavery? 558-61; no legal compulsion to work, 559-60
 Planned Production for Community Consumption, xxxvii-xxxviii, xlii, xlix, 495-508; fundamental importance of, 501-3; books as to, 495-6; how it arose, 496-504. See also *Gosplan*, *First Five-Year Plan*, *Second Five-Year Plan* and *Plan, the General*
 Plant Culture, Institute of, 777
 Plenty, pursuit of, 818-19; necessary to maximum freedom, 833
 Ploughing, importance of deep, 943
 Poland, war with, 878-9
 Police, lack of, in Tsarist Russia, 475; the word never used in USSR, 475. See also *Militia*
 Policy Sections (politotdeli), 196-9
 Politbureau, xx, 462-3, 511, 518, 529, 632
 Political culture, 736-9
 "Political Grammar", 736
 Politotdeli (Policy Sections), for collective farms, 196; railway centres, 287-8, 301
 Polytechnical, meaning of, 725
 --- Institute at Leningrad, 730
 --- school, 719, 725-33
 Polytechnicalisation versus British dichotomy, 769
 Pornography, 826
 Postage stamps, roubles like, in effect upon price, 957
 Posts, Telegraphs and Radio. See *People's Commissar*
 Powers and functions of village soviet, 358-362
Pravlenie (committee of management), 210
 Pre-parliament (Kerensky's Democratic Conference), 237-8
 Pre-schooling, 721
 President of the USSR, 78, 333
 President of Central Executive Committee, 70
 --- of Comintern, 889-91
 --- of Profintern, 166
 --- of Supreme Soviet, xix-xxi, xxvii, xlviii, 416-17, 425
 Price mechanism, 549-51; not wholly dispensed with, 567-8; fixing of prices causes competition to operate on quality, 954; why price changes occur, 956-7; prices in the bazaar, 958-9
 --- regulation, ineffective, 596; superseded by government competition, 596-7
 Priests and monks, among the "Deprived", 15; now admitted to all privileges of citizenship, 921; no prospect of extinction, 15
 Primary Party organ (cell). See *Communist Party*
Principles of a Civil Code, by J. Bentham, 922
 Prisons, 483-4; regularly inspected by Procurator's staff, 104; report of department of, 483; general character of, 483-4
 Proclamation of Union, 5-6
 Procurator, 104-6; has to visit prisons, 104; procedure of investigation, 104-6; action of, 489-90; in new constitution, 425-6. See also *Attorney-General*
 Producer, Man as a, 124-234
 Producers, three layers of, 645-52; control by, objections to, 498-500, 561-2
 Production, passion for, 972
 --- conferences, 385, 600-64
 Productivity, Socialism can triumph only by a higher, 616
 Professional Associations, 161-4

- Profintern* (International Council of Red Trade Unions), 161-7, 893; presidium of, 166
- Profit, in Place of, 569-652
- Profit-making, abolition of, xlix, 900-901; substitute for, 644
- Progressive piecework rates, 575-7
- Prombank* (bank for industrial construction and electrification), 957
- Promparti* (Industrial Party), trial of, 457, 485
- Propaganda, whether more in USSR than elsewhere, 829; protests against, 888, 892
- Property, collective, 411; socialist, 411; state, 411
- Prophylactorium, 686
- Proportional representation suggested, 9; not adopted, 17
- Prosecution, of Ukrainian intellectuals, 456-457; of Social Revolutionaries, 458-9; of Mensheviks, 458; of Promparti, 457, 485; of Metro-Vickers engineers, 460-61; of treasonable conspiracy, 923-32
- Prosperity in the village, 938-40
- Prostitution, 851-2
- Prosveshchenie* (enlightenment). See *Education*
- Public dining-rooms, 594-5
- dishonour, 618-23; for drunkards, absentees and lazy fellows, 618
- honour and shame as incentives, 617-623
- opinion, organisation of, 869-71
- Punishment as means of enforcing faithfulness and zeal, 649-50
- Purchasing power, the magic of, universalised, 546-7
- Puritanism, growth of, based on hygiene, 848-51, 859
- Purpose, 818-19
- Putilov Works, 621, 777, 871
- Pyutilotka, 690, 779-80. See *First Five-Year Plan*
- Pyramidal structure, 2-3
- Pyramids of Egypt, prophecy that the Soviet factories would resemble the, 532, 916
- Queues, nature of, 251, 535, 960
- Rabkrin* or RKL. See *Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*
- Race prejudice, absence of, 118-20, 903-4
- Railway Workers' Trade Union (AZRG), 131, 382; directing traffic, 128; originators of all-grade national organisation by whole industries, 134
- Railways, Ministry of. See *People's Commissar*
- Raisnyos* (council of cooperative societies of the rayon or district), 241-2
- Rapallo, Treaty of, 61, 882
- Rate-fixers and rate-fixing bureaux, 385, 574, 577-8
- Rationing, is it any lessening of freedom? 833; complete abolition of, 955; objections to, 961
- Rayon, the, as rural district, 47-52; soviet of the, 68-9; organisation of the, 51-2; rearrangement of, 48-9; land department of, 378; as city district (municipal ward), 42-4; as Party district, 280
- Recall, 905
- Recognition of Soviet Union, 882
- Red Air Force, 1
- Army, 1, 91-8; an efficient technical school, 96; how recruited, 96-7; character and manners of, 97-8; Party infiltration of, 98; influence of, on international relations, 916. See also *People's Commissar, Aviation and Defence*
- Banner of Toil, the, 617-18
- October Works, 146
- Plough Works, 146
- Professors, Institute of, 780
- Profintern Works, 611
- Terror, the, 474
- Reduction in hours of labour, 688
- Reformatories, 484-5
- "Regrating", 900
- Religious orders, 907; now enfranchised, xxi, 921
- worship, carried on unmolested, 812; by the Orthodox Church and its sectaries, the Jews, the Roman Catholics, the Evangelicals, the Buddhists and the Moslems, 812; baptismal, marriage and funeral rites allowed, 813; confirmed by New Constitution, 427, 921; teaching in school or outside family group forbidden, 810. See also *Persecution*
- Remaking of Man, the, 653-760
- Remission of taxes in particular localities, 561
- Representative system, novel form of, 7-12, 905-6
- Repression of free-thinking, 970-71
- Republic Conference (of Communist Party), 280
- Republics, Union or constituent, 55-60; list of, 351-2; autonomous, 67-9; list of, 351-2
- Research, organisation of, 769-81; plan for, 771-6; popular participation in, 776-777, 781-4; detailed programmes of, 784-785
- Reserves provided by the Plan, 524-5
- Responsibility of every kind of collective, enforcement of, 844-5
- Rest-houses (holiday homes), 232, 712-13, 736, 741
- Restraint, absence of, as freedom, 830-34
- Retailing, recent history of, 949-50; abolition of rationing in, 950; reorganisation of, 948-54; shift of sphere of co-operation in, 950-51
- Revolution, the, religious, 490-91; the industrial, 490-91; the political, 490-91; British compared with Russian, 490-94; of 1905, 438-9; of 1917, 439-40
- Revolutionaries, professional, 264; social, prosecution of, 458
- Rheumatism, campaign against, 792-3
- Riga, Treaty of, 56, 60

- Right Opportunists, the, 509
 Rights of Man, 918; new list of, in 1936
 Constitution, 126-9; summary table of,
 135-6
 Risk taking, immense amount of, in Soviet
 Union, 611-5
 River transport, administration of, 75;
 Socialist competition in, 599-600; trade
 union of workers in, 382 See also
People's Commission
 RKI or *Rabkrai* (Workers' and Peasants'
 Inspection). See *Workers and Peasants*
 RKK See *Commission of Soviet Control*
 Road Transport Board, 76
 Roman Catholics, long repression of, in
 England, 971. See also *Religious Persecution*
 Rontgenology, Central Institute of, 790
 Rostselmash Machine Works, 136, 139
 RSFSR. See *Russian Soviet Socialist Republic*
 Russia, low state of, in 1917-22, 569-70
 Russian Social Democratic Party, 659
 — Socialist Federal Soviet Republic
 (RSFSR), 48-9, 55-7; constitution of,
 56; other references to, 63, 103-5, 109-
 113, 176-6, 256-6, 351-2, 112, 111, 131-3,
 458, 605, 668, 679-81, 770, 915
 Russification, 107, 111, 139
Rybkolkhoznopros (All Union Congress of
 Fishing Kolkhozes), 222-3
 Rykov mine, 571-5
 Salvation Army practice as to officers'
 wives, 969
 Samurati, Order of the, 908
 Saporozhe Prison Colony, 180
 Saturday eve. See *Subbotnik*
 Saving and investment, how the total
 amount is determined, 620-22, 698, 855-6.
 See also *State Savings Bank*
 Scarcity really a triumph for planned eco-
 nomy, 538
 Schools, built under patronage agreements,
 605, 916; in villages, great improvement
 in, 911-5
 Science, the Salvation of Mankind, 761
 817; cult of, 908-9; lull in, 761-70;
 successive developments of, 761-6. See
 also *Research*
 Scientific humanism, xli-xlii, 1
 Scissors, the (divergence in prices of agri-
 cultural products and manufactured
 commodities), 183, 203
 Seafarers' Trade Union, 110, 382
 Second Five-Year Plan, 510, 529, 532, 757,
 822. See also *State Planning Department*
 (*Gosplan*) and *Plan*
 ———— ballot, not adopted, 17; adopted in
 1937 electoral rules, 435
 Secrecy of judicial proceedings, 477
 Secretaries, number of, 646
 Security, economic, establishment of, 698-
 702
 Self-criticism, 628-33, 825-6, 864
 Self-determination, 108
 Self-employment, as alternative to wage
 system, 581-93; numerous cases of, 232-
 234, 587-8, 590-93
 Self governing workshop (*ucop*), 169-79,
 586-7; education for members of, 177;
 health insurance for, 177
 Self supply, principle of, 260, 386, 566-7,
 627, 953
Selkhozbank (bank for agricultural enter-
 prise), 957
SELKHOSSNABJENIE (department sup-
 plying machines, etc., to State farms),
 376
 Selmashtroi Works, 595, 618
 Selosoviet. See *Village Soviet*
Serednyaki (middle peasants), 161
 Service to the community a universal obli-
 gation, 561, 842-5, 973
 Sewage systems, 758
 Sex appeal, censorship of, 826
 Sexual morality, 817-52, 919
 Shakhly trial, 156, 925
 Share piece-work, 571-5
Shel'sto (patronage), 602-8; the winners
 helping the loser-, 602-3; of one occupa-
 tion or enterprise by another, 602-4; by
 the factories over the state organs, 607
 Shock brigades (*Udarniki*), 132, 159-61, 205,
 599-602, 608-12
 Shooting game for sport, 821
 Shopkeeping, aversion to, 594
 Sickness benefit, 707-8
 Skhlassevsky Institute, 695-6
 Smoking, 852
 Soap, continued scarcity of, 538
Sobornost (collective salvation), 813
 Social Democratic Party of Russia. See
Communist Party
 — equality, meaning of, 572-3, 903-5,
 967-8
 — heritage, 653
 — institutions, effect of transformation
 of, 653; lack of scientific study of, 790-8
 — insurance, complete system of, 698-
 717; without individual contribution,
 699; under trade union control, 702
 — Revolutionaries, 341, 478, 187; prose-
 cution of, 158
 — service as fragments of Communism,
 858-9
 — value, payment according to, 581-3
 Socialism, success of, dependent on superior-
 ity in production, 937
 "Socialism in One Country", controversy
 as to, 882-6; view of Engels, 884
 Socialist competition (or emulation), 132,
 598-602; in agriculture, 600; on White
 Sea Canal, 486-7; reasons for popularity
 of, 586
 — property, definition of, 411
 Societies. See *Voluntary Associations*
 Society for Proletarian Tours and Excurs-
 ions, 735
 — of Inventors (VOIZ), 625
 Sociological discoveries of Communism, 796-
 797
Soc-sorevnikovie (socialist emulation). See
Socialist Competition

- Soviet China, 879-82
 — Construction and Law, Institute of, 779-80
 — Control Commission, 865
 — of Nationalities, xxi, 67-70, 111-12, 415-16
 — of the Union, xxi, 415-16
 — Reform Bill, 65-7. See also *Constitution*
 Soviets, All-Russian Congress of: the Second, 10; the Fifth, 11; the Eighth, 450; the Tenth, 61
 —, RSFSR Congress of: the Sixteenth, 756-8
 —, All-Union Congress of: the Fifth, 65, 510; the Sixth, 65; the Seventh, 15, 662; the Eighth, 919-20; becomes Supreme Soviet, 415-19
 — of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, origin of, 7-8; at first organs of revolt, 9, 127; later recognised as organs of government, 8-10; of villages, 15-26; of cities, 26-44; Commissions and Sections of, 363-4; of rayons, 48-52; of oblasts, 52-5; one entirely of negroes, 119; others of Jews, 112, 117, 439; and indirect election upwards, 344
Sovkhoz (state farms). See *State Farms* and *People's Commissar*
Sovkhosnab (supplies for state farms), 371
Sovnarkom (cabinet of ministers), xix-xx, xlviii, 75-9; has it minutes? 75. See also *People's Commissar*
 Spooning in public, 841, 852
 Sports, 731-5; associations for, 329-30
 Spread of Soviet Communism, 917
 Stakhanov Movement, xxxviii, 931-8; how it differs from Taylorism, 936-7
 Stakhanovites, First All-Union Conference of, 935-6
 Stalin Metallurgical Works, 611
 Stalingrad Tractor Works, 146, 610
 State, definitions of the, 859-64; new basis of the, 121
 State Attorney. See *Prosecutor*
 — Bank (*Gosbank*), 91-2; languages used by, 112; activities, 595, 855-6
 — Farms (*Sovkhoz*), organisation of, 372-373; administration of, 73, 75, 84, 951. See also *People's Commissar*
 — fisheries, 221-3
 — loan, 856
 — Planning Commission (*Gosplan*), 75, 84, 86, 563, 771-2, 901
 — Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy, 658, 666
 — Savings Bank, 90, 92, 855
 — Socialism, objection that it is not even an approach to Communism, 885; this an anarchist view, 885
 — sovereignty, 70-71; includes right of secession, 70; affected by interpenetration, 71-2; and by unifying influence of industry and the Communist Party, 120
 Statistics, official, of the Soviet Union, alleged unreliability of, 533; as to production, 532-3; apparatus of, continued increase and improvement of, 631-7
 STO. See *Council of Labour and Defence*
 Stope, stoper, 375
 Street casualties, provision for, 694-6
 Strikes, 521-5, 583, 585; of the peasantry, 204-5, 470-71; former frequency of, 7, 126, 129-30; how obviated, 146-7. See also *Arbitration and Triangles*
 Struggle with Nature, the, 763-6
 Study leave, 684
Subbotniki (Saturday-ers, or voluntary labourers), 44, 150, 612-14; a universal social obligation, 614-15, 902
 Suicide, 853
 Supercitizens. See *Communist Party*
 Supernaturalism. See *Anti-Godism*
 Supreme Court, 101-3, 425-6
 — Economic Council (or Council of National Economy), 80-81, 500-503, 562, 580
 — Medical Council of RSFSR, 680
 — Soviet, xix, xxi, xxxiv, xlv, 415; provision for dissolution of, 416-17; of constituent republic, 418-19
 Sympathisers, 292, 738
 Syndicates (combainats), 85
 Tables of the Law, the Twelve, 435-6
 Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic, 63, 351, 412, 414
 Talented children selected for specialist training, 739
 Tartar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, education in, 722-3; other activities of, 53, 109, 114-15, 351, 371, 376
 TASS (Soviet telegraph agency), 737
 Taxation, general plan of, 86-7, 90
Tcheka. See *OGPU*
 Teachers, restriction on personal freedom of, 827-8; trade unions of, 383
 Technical education provided for all youthful unemployed, 544; normalisation bureau, 577
Technicums (technical institutes of secondary grade), 177
 Technology, bias of all schooling towards, 726; why science always takes the form of, 768
Tekstorg (retailing department of the Textile Combine), 254
 Theatres, 740-42, 825
 Third International, the, xvi, xlvii-xlix, 875-97; acceptance of, by Communists of Germany, France and Italy, 877-8; by those of China, 879; demand that it should be energetically supported, 885-6; Sixth World Congress of, in 1928, 880-91; Seventh World Congress of, in 1935; 891-4. See also *Comintern*
 — Section of the tsarist Chancery, 472
 Timber industry, 75, 173, 380
 Time-tables, school, 733
 TNB (technical normalisation bureau or rate-fixing bureau), 577-8

- Torgbank* (bank for capital construction for trade and cooperatives), 957
- Torgsin* (retail shops selling only for gold or valuta), 255; abolition of, 960
- Tormazovny Zavod Works, 621
- Torture, physical, not used, 179
- Town planning, excellence of, 751-3
- Trade Unionism, 124-69. See also *Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining and Collective Agreements*
- Unions, suppressed in 1907-8, 439; extent of control by, in 1937, 233-4; of fishermen, 222; functions of, 906; list of the, 380-83; officials of, 154-5, 157-8; progress and reform of, 932-3; adoption of secret ballot by, 932
- Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Federation, 55, 59-60, 112, 248, 351-2, 770, 787
- Treason trials, xliii, 923-31; English procedure in, 924
- Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 461
- of Rapallo, 61, 882
- of Riga, 56, 60
- Trekhgornaya Works, 783
- Trekhgorka Works, 604
- Trespass law in Great Britain, 824
- Triangle, the, 146, 212, 524, 583-4
- Trotskyism, xliv, xlviii, 129, 509, 882-6
- Trotskyists, the, in opposition to policy as to trade unionism, 129; to the First Five-Year Plan, 509; to the agricultural policy, 187; and to attempts to build Socialism in a single country, 882-6, 923-32
- Trud* (weekly trade union journal), xxviii, 171, 610, 849-50
- Trusts, 84-6
- TSIK. See *Central Executive Committee*
- Tsekumbank* (bank for municipal enterprises), 957
- Tuberculosis, campaign against, 691-4; use of night sanatorium for, 693
- Turkoman Soviet Socialist Republic, 63, 351, 412, 415
- Two Nations, the, 822
- UDARNICHESTVO. See *Shock Brigade*
- Udarniki* (shock brigades), 601, 608-10. See also *Shock Brigade*
- “Udarniki of the Sea”, 223
- Uezd* (former district), 13, 47, 110, 440
- Ukraine, Soviet Socialist Republic, xix, xlviii, li, 20, 52-5, 57-9, 84, 112, 190, 201-202, 238, 256, 280, 309, 351-2, 376, 412, 414, 444-6, 457, 471, 478, 592, 662, 723-4, 770, 938-9, 943-5, 947-8
- Ukrainian intellectuals' trial, 456-7, 925
- Unemployment, technological, incurable under capitalism, 548, 551
- abolished by planning, 543-8, 901-2
- benefit, 710-12
- Unequal incomes under capitalism often inversely proportionate to needs, 552
- Unification of all the services for women and infants, 665
- Unified departments, 72-3, 110; now termed All-Union Commissariats, 421
- Union of the Godless, 811
- of Soviets as one chamber of TSIK, 67-70
- of constituent republics, 71; federation of, 111-13; descriptions of, 113; list of, 351-2
- Union-Republic Commissariats. See *Non-Unified Departments*
- United front, policy of the, 892-6
- Unity, in action with adventure in thought, 833-8; Soviet Communism a synthetic, 912-13; being a unity of economics and ethics, 972-3
- Universalism, viii, 719-24, 746-7, 819, 832, 838, 903-5, 912, 968
- Unlimited freedom of intellectual discussion, 833-4, 970-71
- Unnational State, the, 61-2
- Ural Machine Works, 576
- Usury, the sin of, 900
- Utilitarian calculus to be distinguished from economic calculus, 972
- Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 63, 351, 412, 414
- Verbalisation, effect of, on collective farms, 948
- Village cooperative societies demanding gramophones and pianos, 742
- correspondents, 629
- meeting, 15-20
- shopkeeping, changes in, 950-51
- soviet, election of, 15-20; administration by, 20-26; executive of, 23-6; one entirely of negroes, 119; others of Jews, 112, 116-17, 439; powers and duties of, 358-62
- Vneshnortorgbank* (bank for foreign trade), 957
- Vocation of Leadership, 262-323, 861, 906-8. See also *Communist Party*
- Vodka, 16, 18, 811, 852-3
- VOIZ (commission for inventions), 782
- VOKS (society for cultural relations), 784, 896
- Volga Germans, 113
- Volist* (former district), 110
- (old district), 47
- Voluntary associations, extent and variety of, 328-30, 906
- work, 684
- Votynk Autonomous Oblast, 109, 351
- Vsekopromessoyuz* (union of timber articles), 173
- Vsekopromsoviet* (council of incops), 174, 176
- Vsekorybaksyuz* (federation of fishermen), 226
- Wage-fund, how determined, 521-2, 540-47, 902
- Wage-levelling objected to, 581-2
- Wage-rates, grades of, 578-81; progress from grade to grade, 579-81; encouragement of technical classes by, 580-81; inequality of, not objected to, 966-7; identity of, why undesirable, 967-9
- Wall newspaper, 77, 618-20, 825-6
- War Communism, 447-50, 806, 810, 882

- War invalids, organisation of, 228-30 ;
varieties of work done by, 229
- Wars undertaken in order to avert revolution, 438-9
- Waste, prevention of, 623-6
- Waterways, network of, 750, 949
- Wealth, personal, what can be got by it, 854-5
- White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, 55, 59, 112, 351, 376, 412, 656, 770, 932
— Sea Canal, works done by convict labour under socialist competition, 485-7, 600
— — Terror, the, 474
- Whites, the (White Guards), 445-6, 448-9, 463, 474, 612
- Widow, instant provision for, 706
- Wireless broadcasting in foreign languages, x
- Withering of the State, the, 859-64
- Woman, the remaking of, 658-62 ; a large proportion veiled, sold as property and kept as slaves, 659 ; upward bound in development of, 661-2 ; peasants, change of mentality of, 946
- Woodworkers' Trade Unions, 380-81
- Workdays on collective farms, 591-2, 915
- Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, 73-6, 365-8, 385, 648, 650-51, 864-5 ; history of, 365-8 ; decay of, 384 ; supersession of, 367
- Workers' Control, episode of, 128-30, 232-4, 496-9, 571-2
— in industry, energy and assiduity of, 647 ; keen on labour-saving invention, 623-6
- World Economy, Institute of, 779-80
— revolution, aiming at a, 875-97 ; change of policy as to, 886-8. See *Trotskyism*
- Yaro-lav Brake Works, 146
- Yarzevsky Works, 615
- YCL (All-Union Communist League of Youth). See *Comsomols*
- Yiddish language in use, 116-18
- YMBIT. See *Engineers*
- Young Communist League. See *Comsomols*
- Youth, League of. See *Comsomols*
- ZAGI, the Works of (journal of aero-dynamical institute), 794
- ZAVKOM. See *Factory Committee*
- Zemstvo, voluntary work in the, 615 ; activities of, 47, 237, 439, 684
- Zionists, opposition of, 117-18. See also *Jews*
- ZRK (closed cooperative societies), 258-9, 386, 394, 402 ; superseded, 258-9, 951
- ZU (factory management), 400

